sex among allies

Military Prostitution in U.S. –Korea Relations

Katharine H.S. Moon

During the Korean War, American servicemen stationed in Korea enjoyed easy access to Korean prostitutes. After the war, military prostitution continued to flourish in South Korea as the sex industry had become an important feature of the U.S. military bases. By the late 1960s the seedy camptowns around the bases had become a source of friction between the United States and the Republic of Korea because of venereal disease, crime, and local antipathy. In 1971, tensions between the Korean and U.S. governments came to a head after sharp reductions in U.S. troops throughout Asia. In a campaign to persuade the United States to maintain its military presence, the Korean government initiated a "Clean-Up Campaign" to stamp out venereal disease and extend control over prostitution; prostitutes were to become, in effect, unofficial ambassadors between the two nations. Katharine Moon examines the role prostitutes played in preserving the strategic relationship between Korea and the United States, focusing on policy and power conflicts, rather than culture, as the cause of institutionalized military prostitution.

Drawing on a vast array of data—archival materials, interviews with officials, social workers, and the candid revelations of sex industry workers—Moon explores the way in which the bodies of Korean prostitutes—where, when, and how they worked and lived—were used by the United States and the Korean governments in their security agreements. Weaving together issues of gender, race, sex, the relationship between individuals and the state, and foreign policy, she shows how women such as the Korean prostitutes are marginalized and made invisible in militarily dependent societies both because of the degradation of their work and because of their importance for national security.

"Katharine Moon has lifted the veil that has long shrouded the U.S. military's sex industry in Korea. **Sex Among Allies** is the first book to treat the systematic nature of sexual exploitation in the camptowns of Korea. It is well researched, thoughtful, and a major contribution to our understanding of Korean-American relations." —Bruce Cumings, author of *Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History*

"In a carefully researched study of U.S. military prostitution in Korea, Katharine Moon validates Cynthia Enloe's claim that the personal is international. These moving stories tell how the lives of Korean prostitutes in the 1970s served as nearly invisible instruments of U.S.-Korean policies at the highest level. Moon's innovative case study demonstrates how a Cold War alliance was maintained at the price of these women's personal insecurity and challenges us to reconsider the human costs of international security policies." —J. Ann Tickner, author of *Gender in International Relations*

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Printed in U.S.A.
Cover photo: © Rene Burri / Magnum Photos
Cover design: Maria T. Giuliani

ISBN 0-231-10643-2

9 780231 106436

columbia university press new york

Sex Among Allies:
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New York

Columbia University Press

1997

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Preface

To my Teachers at Smith College,
1982Ð1986,
with gratitude and love

This case study is based on interviews conducted and documents collected in the United States (mostly Washington, D.C.), the Republic of Korea, and Geneva, Switzerland, from 1989 through 1992. In addition, a few interviews were conducted in 1993. Written information is identified in the Notes on Sources. The main sources of written information on the Clean-Up Campaign include the following: 1) minutes of the SOFA Joint Committee, 1971Ð76; 2) minutes of the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Civil-Military Relations of the SOFA Joint Committee, 1971Ð76; 3) reports, letters, memoranda, and other records found in files of various USFK/Eighth Army offices in Korea, and various ROK government documents regarding kijichÕon venereal disease control; 4) cables, policy statements, and memoranda regarding the control of venereal disease and crimes committed against kijichÕon prostitutes allegedly by U.S. servicemen, obtained from the Pentagon through Freedom of Information Act requests. Interviews include the following individuals:

U.S. Military. 1) in Washington, D.C.: Active military chaplains, officers in charge of Morale, Welfare, and Recreation policies, officers in charge of health policy; other relevant U.S. military personnel; 2) in the United States: retired military personnel who once were members of the Subcom- mittee on Civil-Military Relations or the Joint Committee during the 1971Ð76 period; 3) in Korea: current U.S. military personnel involved in or familiar with the 1971Ð76 Clean-Up Campaign (most in community relations offices), and current U.S. military personnel familiar with the effect of the Nixon Doctrine on U.S.-ROK and USFK-ROK relations.

Republic of Korea: 1) retired and active officials involved in the Clean-Up Campaign of the 1970s (primarily from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs, Health and Social Affairs, and the Blue House Secretariat); 2) Korean women who had worked as camptown prostitutes during some part of 1971Ð76 (some of these women were interviewed in the United States by telephone). Conversations throughout 1991Ð92 with current camptown prostitutes and other camptown residents, as well as Korean activists staffing churches and counseling centers for camptown women, also informed this study. A list of the primary interviewees is included in the appendix. (Interviews conducted by telephone are indicated as such.)

Most of the retired USFK officers who had served on the Subcom- mittee were contacted through the various locator services of the U.S. military (their names are listed in the Joint Committee Minutes). Most of the ROK government officials interviewed were contacted through their respective government ministries or agencies. I am especially indebted to two ROK foreign service officers for helping me contact many of the interviewees.

All other interviewees were contacted through the "snowball" method, i.e., referred by other interviewees and individuals familiar with kijichÕ on life. Here, it must be noted that four of the former prostitutesÕ interviews were conducted through an intermediary. Given that most camptown prostitutes, especially of the early generations, refuse to discuss their past, owing to a sense of shame, pain, fear, and mistrust of people, especially strangers, the only way to get their response to my research questions was to have someone the women know and trust to ask the questions. Two such intermediaries, Mr. An and Mrs. Smith (pseudonyms) posed my questions to the women and afterwards conveyed the responses to me by telephone. Both individuals have known the women on a personal level and are very familiar with Korean camptown life, given that they themselves lived in them in the 1960s and 1970s. I informed them both in detail about the Clean-Up activities and my research agenda by telephone and letters so that they would have a clear framework from which to ask the research questions and elicit responses.

The transliteration of Korean terms and personal or place names (except Seoul) follows the McCune-Reischauer convention except in the case of quoted material or references in written documents. Names of Korean authors who have published their works in English are listed following each authorÕs preferred transliteration.

Index of Abbreviations

bccuc -- BaseÐCommunity Clean-Up Campaign

cg -- Commanding General

cinc -- Commander in Chief

dprk -- Democratic PeopleÕs Republic of Korea

eusa -- Eighth U.S. Army of the USFK

id -- Infantry Division

jc -- Joint Committee of the US-ROK Status of Forces Agreement

kafc -- Korean-American Friendship Council

ksta -- Korean Special Tourist Association

korscom -- Korea Support Command

knp -- Korea National Police

mofa -- Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ROK)

moha -- Ministry of Home Affairs (ROK)

mohsa -- Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (ROK)

moj -- Ministry of Justice (ROK)

mot -- Ministry of Transportation (ROK)

psyop -- Psychological Operations Detachment of EUSA

r&r -- rest and relaxation

rok -- Republic of Korea

rokg -- Republic of Korea Government

2d id -- Second Infantry Division

sofa -- Status of Forces Agreement

usagy -- U.S. Army Garrison, Yongsan

usea -- U.S. Eighth Army of the USFK

usfk -- United States Forces, Korea

Acknowledgments

Finally, I can breathe a sigh of great relief after many years of sleepless nights, fear at not finding enough information, and anxiety that this project would never have an end. I have many people to thank, who I hope will share in this sigh of relief--and celebration of women's voices in international relations.

Michael Doyle and Atul Kohli of Princeton University offered their thoughtful guidance as intellectual advisers, moral supporters, and provocative devil's advocates on my dissertation committee. I also would like to thank Lynn T. White III and Mrs. Mildred Kalmus of Princeton University and Samuel Kim of Columbia University for their constant encouragement of my studies.

I am also indebted to the Ann Plato Fellowship of Trinity College (Hartford), the Center for International Studies of Princeton University, and the United Methodist Church for their generous financial support while I was researching and writing as a dissertation student.

To the many friends who have helped me articulate my thoughts and maintain my sanity through the most stressful moments, I offer you unending thanks, especially Yumiko Mikanagi, Patricia Schechter, Thomas and Sandy Nolden, Jane Dawson, Taeku Lee, and Elizabeth Crowell. I owe special thanks to André Schmid, who combed through the dissertation version with more care than I, and also to Victor Cha. Both offered thoughtful, critical comments through the revision process, even when I requested their help at very short notice.

Diana Lee and Grace Lee, who became my friends during my research stay in Korea, have become my new sisters. Together, we took many trips to the different camptown areas, listened to and ate meals with many camptown women who sell sex to U.S. soldiers, watched them comb their children's hair, carried one another's heavy equipment and the heavy hearts that grew from what we saw, heard, and felt. Their documentary on U.S.-Korea camptown prostitution, Camp Arirang, debuted in 1995. I owe them my friendship and love.

This book could not have been written without Ms. Kim Yonja's energetic willingness to teach me all about camptown prostitution and the lives of the women bar workers. She opened her mind, heart, and home to me and shared her personal past as a camptown prostitute; she has been a generous teacher. I am also grateful to the staff and members of My Sister's Place (Turebang) in Tongduch'on and Songsan, especially Ms. Yu Pongnim, Mrs. Faye Moon, and Ms. Kim Hyonson, for sharing their perspectives on camptowns and U.S. bases and showing me the power of commitment and dedication to improving women's lives. There are numerous officials of the ROK government and the U.S. military that I need to thank, but in order to protect their identities, I shall not name them. Many shared their personal files and memories and offered invaluable accounts of camptown politics and U.S.-Korea relations.

Kate Wittenberg, editor-in-chief of Columbia University Press, has been a patient, considerate leader through the publication process. I owe her and her staff a great deal. I would also like to thank the reviewers, who offered insightful comments on revising the manuscript. Jennifer Wallner, a student at Wellesley College, has been my "savior" through the revision; she contributed her computer skills, library research time, and cheerful "can-do" spirit. A hearty thanks also to John Frankl, Ph.D. candidate in modern Korean literature at Harvard University, for his assistance with the transliteration of Korean names and words.

To Cynthia Enloe--thanks! How fortunate many of us younger scholars are to have a mentor, visionary, and generous moral supporter like you! I owe much to my family. My mother, Ai Ra Kim, has endured my bad temper and regular "venting" and offered in return her prayers and herself as my emotional anchor. She also helped me with research and translation. My father, Kwang Hwan Moon, has been a formidable supporter, actively helping me dig out materials in the libraries of Seoul, offering me complicated history lessons on U.S.-Korea relations while we rode in taxis or drank coffee during cold winter days in Korea. Even when he disagreed with my interpretations, he never stopped believing that I was doing what I believed I had to do. To Caroline, my sister, housemate, and best friend, thanks for injecting humor and freshly baked cookies into my life. And to Abby, my cat, thanks for putting up with the tap-tap of the keyboard that kept interrupting naps.

Photographs



Rooftop view of houses and shacks, village adjacent to Camp Stanley, Uijôngbu.

Photo: grace yoon-kyung lee; developed by deborah hardy.



Storefronts, Uijôngbu, Camp Stanley.

Photo: grace yoon-kyung lee; developed by deborah hardy.



Daytime view of Alley, with nightclubs and bars, Tongduch'on.

Photo: hye kyung park; developed by deborah hardy.



Each bar/club in the camptowns bears this warning at the front door: "Korean Nationals Prohibited This club is registered according to the Tourism Business Law Article 21. Only UN forces and other foreigners are permitted patronage. The establishment offers tax-free liquor; Korean nationals are therefore denied entry."

& nbsp; --Chairman, Korea Special Tourist Association.

Photo: grace yoon-kyung lee; developed by deborah hardy.


의정부시고산성병진료소

Korean VD clinic, Uijôngbu.

Photo: grace yoon-kyung lee; developed by deborah hardy.



VD Examination room, Uijôngbu.

Photo: grace yoon-kyung lee; developed by deborah hardy.

[redacted]

My Sister's Place, Uijôngbu.

Photo: grace yoon-kyung lee; developed by deborah hardy.

Public cemetery, Tongduch'ôn. Locals state that Kijich'on women who have died in the camptowns or have been (allegedly) murdered by U.S. soldiers are buried here. Most of the graves are unmarked.

Photo: grace yoon-kyung lee; developed by deborah hardy.

Prologue

As a child growing up in South Korea, I was taught at an early age that there were good Korean women and bad Korean women. Perhaps I was four or five. I learned that there were women to be admired, praised, emulated--like my grandmother, a sacrificial mother and trustworthy wife--and women to be noticed only from the corner of an eye, never to be spoken about. I was never to copy their heavy eyeliner-look, never to imitate their close walk side by side a foreigner in uniform. The foreigner was the U.S. GI stationed in Korea, and the woman, a *kijich'on* (military camptown) prostitute.

The selling and buying of sex by Koreans and Americans have been a staple of U.S.-Korean relations since the Korean War (1950-53) and the permanent stationing of U.S. troops in Korea since 1955. It would not be far-fetched to say that more American men have become familiar with camptown prostitution in Korea since the 1950s than with military strategy and Korea's GNP figures. Since the war, over one million Korean women have served as sex providers for the U.S. military. [1] And millions of Koreans and Americans have shared a sense of special bonding, for they have together shed blood in battle and mixed blood through sex and Amerasian offspring.

U.S. military-oriented prostitution in Korea is not simply a matter of women walking the streets and picking up U.S. soldiers for a few bucks. It is a system that is sponsored and regulated by two governments, Korean and American (through the U.S. military). The U.S. military and the Korean government have referred to such women as "bar girls," "hostesses," "special entertainers," "businesswomen," and "comfort women." Koreans have also called these women the highly derogatory names, *yanggalbo* (Western whore) and *yanggongju* (Western princess). As this study reveals, both governments have viewed such prostitution as a means to advance the "friendly relations" of both countries and to keep U.S. soldiers, "who fight so hard for the freedom of the South Korean people," happy. [2] The lives of Korean women working as prostitutes in military camptowns have been inseparably tied to the activities and welfare of the U.S. military installations since the early 1950s. To varying degrees, USFK (U.S. Forces, Korea) and ROK authorities have controlled where, when, and how these "special entertainers" work and live. The first half of the 1970s witnessed the consolidation of such joint U.S.-ROK control.

This book attempts to bring two strands of U.S.-Korea relations together, the first being a story about people-to-people relations in the camptowns and the second about state-to-state relations between Seoul and Washington. We have a tendency to understand foreign relations as sets of policies that are formulated and executed by an elite group of men in dark suits, as abstracted from individual lives, especially in the lowest reaches of society.

Kijich'on women, who occupy those reaches, would then be destined to invisibility and silence, though in fact, evidence shows that they were very much an integral part of the tensions and negotiations between U.S. and ROK officials in the 1970s. By following both strands and knitting them together, the hope is to reveal how private relations among people and foreign relations between governments inform and are informed by each other. Specifically, we shall explore how and why these women became a symbol of the Korean government's desire for and the USFK's assurance and commitment to a continued, large U.S. military presence in Korea in the context of the Nixon Doctrine; this change in foreign policy mandated a 20,000 reduction of U.S. troops from Korea (chapter 3). In short, the focus is on the role of the women as instruments in the promotion of two governments' bilateral security interests.

There is another hope contained in the writing of this book: to help lift the curtains of invisibility that have shrouded the kijich'on women's existence and to offer these pages as passageway for their own voices. Many of the women I met and learned about while conducting field research in Korea (1991-92) were far from silent when engaged. They often offered biting criticisms of the Korean government, the U.S. military, of American life, and of one another's child-rearing habits, relationships with GI customers, and make-up style. They ranged widely in personality, age, reasons for selling sex, adaptation to kijich'on life, and future aspirations. But they also shared some commonalities: The vast majority of the prostitutes in the 1950s to the 1970s had barely completed elementary school; junior high graduates were considered highly educated among such women. [3] Most, especially among the earlier generations of prostitutes (1950s-70s), came from poor families in Korea's countryside, with one parent or both parents missing or unable to provide for numerous family members. The earliest prostitutes were camp followers of troops during the Korean War; they did laundry, cooked, and tended to the soldiers' sexual demands. Some had been widowed by the war, others orphaned or lost during a family's flight from bombs and grenades. Many of the kijich'on prostitutes considered themselves "fallen women" even before entering prostitution because they had lost social status and self-respect from divorce, rape, sex, and/or pregnancy out of wedlock. For these women, camptowns served as a place of self-exile as well as a last resort for earning a livelihood.

The vast majority of these women have experienced in common the pain of contempt and stigma from the mainstream Korean society. These women have been and are treated as trash, "the lowest of the low," in a Korean society characterized by classist (family/educational status-oriented) distinctions and discrimination. The fact that they have mingled flesh and blood with foreigners (*yangnom*) [4] in a society that has been racially and culturally homogeneous for thousands of years makes them pariahs, a disgrace to themselves and their people, Korean by birth but no longer Korean in body and spirit. Neo-Confucian moralism regarding women's chastity and strong racialist conscience among Koreans have branded these women as doubly "impure." The women themselves bear the stigma of their marginalization both physically and psychologically. They tend not to venture out of camptowns and into the larger society and view themselves as "abnormal," while repeatedly referring to the non-camptown world as "normal." Once they experience kijich'on life, they are irreversibly tainted: it is nearly impossible for them to reintegrate themselves into "normal" Korean society. Kim Yang Hyang, in the documentary *The Women Outside,* recalls how her family members rejected her when she returned to her village after working for a time in the kijich'on. One of her cousins told her, "Don't come around our place." [5]

As a result of the rejection by their own countryfolks, the women (except the very old) keep their eye on the prize: marriage to a U.S. serviceman. As the legal wife of a U.S. soldier, her hope is to leave behind the poverty, shame, and alienation experienced in Korea and begin life anew in the United States. As a wife and mother, she hopes to fulfill all the obligations and dreams that her country expected of her as a Korean woman but denied to her as a kijich'on prostitute.

During my preliminary research trip to Korea in the winter of 1990, I met "Johnston's Mom" in Songsan, Uijongbu, north of Seoul. I was introduced to her by staff workers at My Sister's Place (Turebang), a social service and counseling center run by the Women's Division of the Korean Presbyterian Church and staffed mostly by hard-working college students and young activists. I entered a run-down cement building-front off an alley in Songsan and into a small dark room with gray cement walls and a few pots and pans--the kitchen. In an adjoining room was Johnston's Mom, in her late twenties, sitting on her bedding on the floor, busily packing large cardboard boxes with what looked to me like thousands of white toothbrushes. She greeted me without looking at me and never interrupted her packing pace.

Johnston's Mom had been living in this unheated, cement-cold hut of a home for several months with her two sons, "Johnston" and "Joey." Both boys were Amerasian and had different fathers. Johnston was about six years old and Joey two. Until very recently, there had been a fourth resident, a U.S. soldier who had been feeding the boys and their mom in return for the sex she provided him. The two adults had what is common in camptowns, a "contract cohabitation" (*kyeyak tonggo*) relationship, whereby a serviceman and a prostitute have an agreement that they will shack up together for a given period of time. A woman in this live-in arrangement is considered to be at the higher end of the kijich'on prostitute hierarchy because her situation closely resembles a marriage situation and because she does not have to walk the streets or hostess at a club, where most women pick up GIs. My Sister's Place staff members later informed me that Johnston's Mom and the U.S. GI had regular sex in the same room with the boys--there was nowhere else to go. Johnston at the time had problems at school--other Korean children made fun of him because he looked different and because some found out that his mother was a GI prostitute. Both boys ran around without adequate clothing in the cold Korean winter and giggled and tumbled in front of me while I silently endured the cold.

Johnston's Mom, because her "contract lover" had abandoned her before their term was over, had to stuff the boxes with toothbrushes to earn about 150,000 won ($197) a month to keep her boys alive. As I watched her, I saw a rather gaunt, haggard, and aged woman before me, not a mythical sex-pot looking for fleshly pleasure or a Suzy Wong versed in the powers of seduction. She spoke bluntly and had a short temper. There was no pretense in her voice or words, no formality, while her sense of humor was robust. She said good-bye to me, again not batting an eye, while she mechanically stuffed the box with toothbrushes.

"Bakery Auntie," unlike Johnston's Mom, had no children and no family. She lived alone in a rented room in Songsan, near My Sister's Place. She had been working for about a year in the small bakery set up at the center when I met her at the end of 1991. The bakery, consisting of an oven, baking tins, and a few mixing bowls, had been set up in 1990 as alternative employment for women who wanted to get out of the sex trade or were too old to earn money off their bodies. When I first met Bakery Auntie, I was struck by how young and well-kept she looked for an elderly woman. She had coal black hair, lightly powdered skin, and extremely long eyelashes that were obviously fake. Yet, she seemed to be well past her sixties. I was soon after advised by the My Sister's Place staff never to address her as *halmoni* (grandmother) and never to ask her if her eyelashes are fake. Otherwise, I would have to endure her unleashed wrath and be considered her enemy forever. I later learned that for Bakery Auntie, who had worked and lived as a military prostitute for nearly all of her 67 years, youth and feminine beauty were her most highly regarded possessions. Without them, she believed she would starve. She had been walking the kijich'on streets even until she was 65, offering GIs nearly a third her age tricks for cheap. My Sister's Place staff people had felt great sympathy for her and persuaded her to visit the center and get off the streets.

Although Bakery Auntie received the attention and friendship of the staff and other kijich'on women at My Sister's Place, she remained continuously distrustful and nervous. She had had a history of severe physical and psychological abuse by her pimps. She had a constant fear of losing people who became close to her and had difficulty relating to people as an equal. It had taken her six months at My Sister's Place to eat her meals with the other women because she had been accustomed to eating alone, hiding from pimps who had yelled at her for wasting work time by eating. Even when she was able to join the other women at the common table, owing to much encouragement and prodding by the folks at My Sister's Place, she usually inhaled her bowl of rice in vacuum cleaner-like speed and left the table abruptly to head for the kitchen and solitude. One of her greatest fears was that she would have no one to care for her in her old age and that she might die alone.

This woman, who had been born in the early 1920s, had received very little formal education but had plenty of knowledge and wisdom to impart. During one of my visits to My Sister's Place, she once mentioned that Japan got rich off the Korean War and that South Korea did the same off the Vietnam War. She also once asked me if I knew why the United States had fought Iraq in the Gulf War. When I asked her to tell me, she stated that it was the U.S. military-industrial complex that wanted the war; the United States had amassed too many fancy weapons, she said, that had to be used. Immediately following such words, she would say under her breath, "But what do I know? I have no brain. I am uneducated."

"Sonha's Mom," when I met her in the spring of 1992 in Anjongni, near Camp Humphreys, was one of three women in the same family who had worked and lived as kijich'on prostitutes. She and her younger sister had two different African-American fathers. Their elderly mother, ill and weak, upon my visit to their home, had been a GI prostitute catering to black Americans during the 1950s and 1960s. Sonha's Mom, then 35, and her younger sister, then 30, had both worked in camptown bars. Sonha's Mom had four children of her own, all of Korean-African-American descent, by different men. Sonha's Mom and sister were fully Korean in their speech, mannerisms, and customs. But they were fully aware that there was no Korea for them outside the small camptown. Because of their black skin and racial features, their marginalization from Korean society was most severe. Their obvious physical connection with kijich'on prostitution and camptown life was a matter never discussed or revealed even to their relatives. One of their cousins, who was racially all Korean, had come for a visit to introduce his new wife to the Anjongni family. In the midst of these visitors, I upset the feeble grandmother by asking Sonha's Mom and her sister questions about kijich'on life. Sonha's Mom took me aside and informed me that her mother feared that such talk would reveal the family's shameful history to the visiting relatives.

For many kijich'on women, their pariah status is due to the unique demographic and cultural constitution of the camptowns in which they live and the particular prejudices of Korean people regarding race, class, and Western influence. Camptowns adjoining or near U.S. military installations in Korea, especially the large army camptowns, are mostly located near the demilitarized zone (DMZ) between North and South Korea, where the bulk of both the North's and the U.S./South's troops and armaments are placed. Kyonggi Province has housed the bulk of both U.S. troops and Korean sex workers from the 1950s to the 1970s; in 1977, 18,551 of the estimated 36,924 prostitutes worked in this province. [6] Kijich'on towns are also hybrid towns, possessing elements of America and Korea in the bodies of their residents, English and Korean language store signs, U.S. military slogans and logos juxtaposed with dolls garbed in traditional Korean dress. But camptowns are also places that are "neither America nor Korea," where "Konglish" (a fusion of broken English and broken Korean) is often heard on the streets and in the bars and nightclubs and where Amerasian children themselves serve as living testimony to the mix between different races. They are stage sets, in a sense, for the U.S. military presence in Korea, characterized by dimly lit alleys blinking with neon-lit bars boasting names like Lucky Club, Top Gun, or King Club. The alleys rock with loud country-western or disco music, drunken brawls, and American soldiers in fatigues and heavily made-up Korean women walking closely together with hands on each other's buttocks.

Along with the seediness of these areas arose social disorder, violence, and crime. With the establishment of these shantytowns in the 1950s and Ô60s came an influx of not only poor women and war orphans but entrepreneurs and criminals seeking fortune off the U.S. dollar and anonymity from the law. For the majority of Koreans, names of cities such as Tongduch'ôn, Osan, and Kunsan have become synonymous with prostitution, drunken U.S. soldiers, social deviance, and immorality. One physician working in the local venereal disease (VD) [7] clinic in Tongduch'ôn reminded me during an interview in the spring of 1992 that these areas are so tainted by the history of criminality and deviance that even nonprostitute girls or young women who reside in these areas have difficulty finding decent Korean men who will marry them. By frequenting these camptowns during my research stay in Korea, I also became suspect: some of my Korean relatives in Seoul urged me not to visit the camptowns so often and definitely not to share meals with the prostitutes, lest I catch a terrible disease. Others insisted that I be silent about my research to nonfamily persons, lest they question my moral character and family background.

The bulk of the kijich'on prostitutes' pariah status and social marginalization is due to Korean society's contempt for what I call the women's "cusp" status. The prostitutes' imitations of Western dress, hair, and make-up style, especially in the earlier days of kijich'on prostitution, their loud utterances of Konglish, their heavy drinking and cigarette-smoking, and fraternization and sexual relations with "*yangnom*" marked a Korean society caught between tradition and Westernized modernity. The character of Yonghi, a "U.N. Lady," in the popularly acclaimed Korean novel and film, *Silver Stallion,* [8] aptly embodies this kind of cusp status that makes the residents of "Kumsan Village" shocked and contemptuous of her look and behavior as a *yanggalbo.* Mansik, one of the main characters, describes the strangeness of these women's attire:

> short blue-black skirts that exposed not only the bare skin of their calves but the whole round shape of their hips, and brightly colored blouses without any sleeves at all that revealed the ugly marks of cowpox shots on their shoulders for everybody to see. Their peculiar hair, in permanent waves, resembled upside-down bells, and both of them wore pointed, glossy leather shoes with high heels as sharp as hoe blades unlike the beautiful and elegant white or turquoise rubber shoes with exquisite flower patterns he was accustomed to seeing. [9]

The arrival of Yonghi marks the beginning of the demise of Kumsan Village, the disintegration of families, and the scattering of the villagers as homeless refugees of war. Old Hwang, the village head, viewed these women as "immoral, sinful creatures who were determined to corrupt and destroy the community." [10] In a sense, kijich'on prostitutes have represented a limbo-status that South Korea has witnessed since the Korean War and during its rush-attempts at economic development--a simultaneous uprooting from the past with uncertainty about its long-term viability and identity.

I think there is yet another, unspoken, reason why these women have been forced out of Korean consciousness for nearly half a decade: Koreans have not wanted reminders of the war lurking around them and the insecurity that their newfound wealth and international power have been built on. That is, kijich'on women are living symbols of the destruction, poverty, bloodshed, and separation from family of Korea's civil war. They are living testaments of Korea's geographical and political division into North and South and of the South's military insecurity and consequent dependence on the United States. The sexual domination of tens of thousands of Korean women by "Yangk'i foreigners" is a social disgrace and a "necessary evil" that South Koreans believe they have had to endure to keep U.S. soldiers on Korean soil, a compromise in national pride, all for the goal of national security. Such humiliation is a price paid by the "little brother" in the alliance for protection by the "big brother."

It is not a coincidence that a newfound public interest in the plight of kijich'on prostitutes in the mid-late 1980s and early 1990s occurred at a time of increased and sometimes intense anti-Americanism among Koreans. Social activists and antigovernment protesters have pointed to kijich'on prostitution as representative of U.S. domination over Korean politics and the continued presence of U.S. military bases as perpetuation of South Korea's neocolonial status vis-ˆ-vis the United States. [11] For anti-U.S. base activists, Korean independence from U.S. domination means the withdrawal of U.S. bases from Korea and the liberation of the kijich'on woman from the sexual domination of the GI.

The disregarding of kijich'on prostitutes as invisible and/or marginal has been apparent in academia and activism as well. Until very recently, social science scholarship on Korean women and society since the 1950s has focused mainly on women as low-paid, underskilled labor in Korea's rush to export-led economic growth. [12] But only since the early 1990s has there been any significant academic scrutiny of kijich'on prostitution, which has been around longer than the bulk of women's modern factory work.

A part of the reason for the dearth of academic interest in this subject is due to Korean social activists' own neglect of this issue. During my research stay in Korea from 1991 to 1992, I experienced many difficulties finding academics and activists who might be well-informed on camptown prostitution issues of the 1960s and Ô70s (the latter being the focal time of my research). One woman whom others had referred to as my "one sure bet" even admitted honestly that she and other long-time social activists had neglected the issue of camptown prostitution. She stated that she and others had focused their organizing attention and energy on organizing factory workers and protesting Japanese sex tourism in the 1970s (chapter 1), but that tackling the problem of camptown prostitution had never entered their minds. She confessed that she and her coworkers had never placed the kijich'on prostitutes in any framework of exploitation or oppression, that even most activists considered these women "too different" from themselves.

"Too different" was a polite way of saying what many Korean activists and academics today, even those who advocate on behalf of the former Korean "comfort women" to the Japanese military in World War II, still believe--kijich'on prostitutes work in the bars and clubs because they voluntarily want to lead a life of prostitution, because they are lacking in moral character. This kind of academic and activist negligence of kijich'on prostitutes is a function of the Korean society's bias against these women--that they are an "untouchable" class, that they have already departed so far from the norms and values of mainstream society to deserve consideration of the political, economic, and cultural sources of their unenviable existence. Faye Moon, a cofounder of My Sister's Place, noted, "Students often become anti-American and shout Ô Yankee go Home' when they demonstrate. However, most Korean students have never visited an ÔAmerican' military town in Korea. They are unaware of the oppression which takes place in these villages." [13] Students began visiting and extending their solidarity to kijich'on prostitutes only as recently as 1990. [14]

But there is a deeper underlying reason for these women's invisiblity even among progressive Korean activists and academics. For most of the post-civil war period, South Koreans have lived with military threat from the North and the presence of U.S. troops as givens that were not questioned, and the administrations of former generals-turned-presidentsPak Chonghui (1961-1979), Chon Tuhwan (1980-87), and Ro T'aeu (1987-1992) kept popular criticism of both domestic and foreign governmental policy at bay with authoritarian measures. Anticommunist and national security rhetoric was regularly employed to muster society's support for the government's economic and foreign policies as well as to stifle political dissent, protest, and inquiries into alternative interpretations of political issues such as the need for the U.S. troop presence and the terms of the U.S.-Korea alliance. Under the national security blanket, the work and lives of kijich'on prostitutes became integrally embedded in the work and lives of the U.S. soldiers, who provided protection deemed vital to the South Korean people's viability and prosperity. In a sense, to inquire into the plight of kijich'on prostitutes and to question their role in U.S. camptown life would have been to raise questions about the need for and the role of U.S. troops and bases in the two countries' bilateral relations.

Beginning in the early-to-mid 1980s, the writings of Cynthia Enloe and other feminist scholars focused for the first time on military prostitution as a subject of study in political science, especially as a critique of military ideology and lifestyle. They have asserted that the very maintenance of the military establishment depends on promoting gendered notions of femininity and masculinity, weakness and strength, conquered and conqueror. Such feminist critiques point to the linkage between military prowess and male (hetero)sexual prowess as the basis of discrimination against, subordination of, and violence toward women. Women as war booty and slaves are examples of past relationships between women and war; [15] women as victims of wartime rape in Bosnia and forced prostitution as Japanese "comfort women" are the most recent examples of sexual abuse wreaked on women by men in war.

Enloe in particular has been a pioneer in defining the nature of military prostitution as not simply a women's issue, sociological problem, or target of disease control, but as a matter of international politics and national security. In all three of her recent books on gender and international relations, she points out that seemingly private conduct, such as sexual relations between men and women, are intimately related to international politics through their organization and institutionalization by public authorities and help to inform and maintain the masculinist military ideology on which the regular operations of international political institutions depend:

> *None of these institutions--multilateral alliances, bilateral alliances, foreign military assistance programmes--can achieve their militarizing objectives without controlling women for the sake of militarizing men.* (Enloe's italics) [16]
>
> A military base isn't simply an institution for servicing bombers, fighters, aircraft carriers, or a launch-pad for aggressive forays into surrounding territories. A military base is also a package of presumptions about the male soldier's sexual needs, the local society's sexual needs, and about the local society's resources for satisfying those needs. Massage parlors are as integral to Subic Bay, the mammoth U.S. naval base in the Philippines, as its dry docks. [17]

Given, then, that women are already involved in international political processes through gendered norms and institutions, foreign policy changes, far from affecting solely the relations among governments, directly produce changes in women's lives.

> *Insofar as the expansion or retraction of any foreign power's overseas bases increases or decreases the demand for women's sexual availability to male soldiers or sailors, the Pentagon's changing Asian strategy is a "women's issue."* (Enloe's italics) [18]

Although it is helpful to understand military prostitution as a function of masculinist norms and practices in militaries, the "gender lens" alone fails to address the political context in which international institutions--alliances, military assistance programs, and overseas military bases--seek to control women and gender constructs for the sake of pursuing their "militarizing objectives." Since the institutionalizing of military prostitution involves a social, economic, and political process, overseas military prostitution must be examined in the context of interaction between foreign governments and among governments and local groups. The challenge in this book is to analyze the interstate context(s) that determine what Enloe herself admits feminists know little about: "how bargains are struck between influential civilians in a garrison town and the local military commanders." [19] .

The specific intergovernmental context in focus here is the disparities in power (unequal military, economic, and diplomatic capabilities) between the Republic of Korea and the United States during the first half of the 1970s, which marked the beginning of U.S. distance from Asian military conflict, with the application of the Nixon Doctrine. This study of U.S.-Korea kijich'on prostitution seeks to strengthen and refine feminist analysis of foreign policy by asking when, how, and why governments use women, not just gendered ideology, as instruments of foreign policy, how specific uses affect women's lives, and if participation in the process politicizes the women's self-identities. In the process, we may find that women are more directly involved in international politics than through their part in gendered schemes of power, that their relationship with foreign soldiers *personify and define,* not only underlie, relations between governments.

Although we rarely, if ever, think of women and prostitution as actors and issues in foreign policy, the following pages show that the sexual health and work conduct of Korean kijich'on prostitutes became an urgent and regular focus of joint U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) actions in the first half of the 1970s through the "Camptown Clean-Up Campaign" (also called "Purification Movement"). The 1971-76 Minutes of the U.S.-ROK Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) [20] Joint Committee and its Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Civil-Military Relations, which provide much of the historical documentation for this study, offer detailed descriptions of such actions. The five-year Clean-Up effort coincided with the Seoul government's desperate attempts to prevent further withdrawal of U.S. troops, begun under the Nixon Doctrine, and to gain the reaffirmation, through U.S. policy statements and increased military assistance, of Washington's commitment to South Korean security. Korean kijich'on prostitutes, through the Clean-Up Campaign, became integral to the efforts of the U.S. Forces in Korea and the Seoul government to secure firm U.S. military commitment to the Republic.

In chapter 1, I begin this exploration of the connections between the personal and the international with an overview of the development of U.S.-Korea kijich'on prostitution and its significance from the viewpoint of the U.S. military, the Korean government and public, and the prostitute women themselves. Here, I consider different approaches to analyzing overseas military prostitution, paying particular attention to the following questions: What kinds of factors help create and maintain it and for what ends? Do the ends coincide or conflict for the different actors involved? How fixed are the boundaries of private sexual relations and politics among nations? How is prostitution political?

Chapter 2 offers a brief discussion of relevant scholarly perspectives in international relations to help frame the following discussion of interstate relations and women. I argue that although power disparities do shape the larger framework of relations between governments and their relationship to women, the dynamic of organizational interests and coalition-building among different political actors, including prostitutes, determine the daily effects on women's lives.

Chapter 3 describes the policies and politics surrounding the Camptown Clean-Up Campaign (or Purification Movement) as a result of the Nixon Doctrine and the reduction of U.S. troops. The chapter particularly addresses the significance of the Campaign in organizing and facilitating US-Korea relations at the local level.

Chapter 4 focuses on the kijich'on prostitutes as the central objects of joint U.S.-Korea governmental control. This section illustrates how and why these women became "personal ambassadors" who were responsible for improving U.S.-Korea civil-military relations through their sexual relations with GIs and why the women became the main indicator of Seoul's willingness to accommodate the U.S. military's interests.

Specifically, the Korean government intended to transform these women from "bad ambassadors" to "good ambassadors" by forcing them to accommodate the USFK's attempts at promoting nondiscriminatory behavior toward black GIs and strict VD control.

Chapter 5 places the Camptown Clean-Up Campaign in the larger context of the U.S.-ROK security relationship and examines the motivations of both the USFK and the Seoul government in conducting the Campaign. It argues that the application of the Nixon Doctrine to Korea drove the USFK leadership and the ROK government into each other's arms, thereby tightening their joint commitment to the preservation of a large U.S. troop presence in Korea and emphasizing the control of prostitutes as proof of such commitment. The chapter also highlights the disparity in political, military, and diplomatic power between Seoul and Washington as the reason why the USFK was able to coerce the Korean government to participate actively in the Campaign and extend its regulatory control over the kijich'on prostitutes.

Chapter 6 addresses some effects of the Purification Movement on two aspects of kijich'on women's lives--their work environment (bar/club life) and their bodies, and relatedly, their physical mobility and autonomy over their sexual labor. The chapter shows that the USFK, the Korean government, and local camptown power-holders promoted their respective interests, usually at the expense of the prostitutes,' and that for the USFK, the Clean-Up particularly functioned to silence the hitherto loud and unruly presence of kijich'on women in camptown politics. Moreover, the Clean-Up Campaign was a direct response to the noisy and disruptive protests that prostitutes staged to challenge U.S. domination in camptowns.

Finding and getting former prostitutes to talk with me was one of the most difficult aspects of the research because many had died and others had been forgotten by family members and camptown residents who had once known them. Many who are still living in camptowns experience ill health and loss of memory as a result of years of physical abuse, drug and alcohol intake, and psychological stress. Moreover, the women often lie about their camptown experiences because they are ashamed of revealing the past and because they have grown accustomed to lying as a means to survive in the camptowns. Several of the women I was introduced to did not cooperate, saying they had nothing to say or that they do not remember anything. I also gave up chances to interview several former prostitutes I befriended while traveling to various camptowns in Korea (It'aewon, Tongduch'ôn, Uijongbu, Osan, Kunsan) because to interview them as subjects of a study would have been to betray a trust and friendship they had sincerely offered to me. Many of the thoughts and experiences they shared in regular conversation, however, have informed my thinking and writing.

Kim Yonja, a former kijich'on prostitute of twenty-five years and now a missionary-activist who speaks out about kijich'on life and the plight of Amerasian children in the towns, served as a major source of information and inspiration. She is public about her experiences as a prostitute and believes that it is her Christian calling to expose the injustices inflicted on kijich'on women and their Amerasian children. I refer to her real name, not a pseudonym.

Lastly, many of the interviews took place over a series of meetings, over tea and meals, and in the company of other camptown prostitutes and staff members at various counseling centers. I also offered English lessons at My Sister's Place and got to know different women. Like many Koreans, most camptown women of the older generations do not have a concept of a research interview, where two strangers talk simply to ask and answer questions about a particular topic. Moreover, the women did not believe they had opinions worth sharing with "educated people." Even while they spoke of their experiences, they often would interrupt themselves, saying apologetically, "I know nothing; I am ignorant." To motivate them to speak, I assured them that their life stories were very important for a young Korean-American woman to hear and learn from and avoided settings and mannerisms that would seem formal, academic, and alien to them. The interviews with the former prostitutes are not intended to offer statistical evidence of any point I make in the study but rather to provide credence to the fact that these women's lives were heavily involved in U.S.-ROK relations at the camptown level and to give voice to people who most Koreans and Americans have never considered as having anything important to say or worth listening to.

U.S.-Korea kijich'on prostitution is part of the U.S. military's chain of overseas camptowns which have thrived on prostitution in Asia (Vietnam, Thailand, Okinawa, and the Philippines, in addition to South Korea).

What sets kijich'on prostitution apart is the high level of military dependence--in terms of troops, weapons, treaty commitments, and the amount of U.S. military assistance--that South Korea has exhibited toward the United States since the Korean War. The immediate cause of such dependence is the Communist regime in North Korea, which is still technically at war with the South. The U.S.-Korea alliance is an oft-cited example of patron-client relationships in international politics [21] and as such may help us frame the context in which to pose questions about power disparities between states and their relationship to military prostitution. South Korea is also an example of a nation whose security interests have determined nearly all aspects of its political, economic, and social life from the 1950s to the late 1970s and begs the question of to what extent and at what human and social cost a state's pursuit of its military security objectives can be justified.

The Korean case of foreign-oriented military prostitution is particularly important also because of its historical precedent: the approximately 200,000 Korean women who worked as sex slaves, or "comfort women," to the Japanese military about fifty years ago. The recognition of these parallel cases forces us to track the responsibility of the authorities and powers involved--in this study, the legally sovereign South Korean government and its main military ally and former "savior" from Communist takeover, the United States--while women's bodies and dignities are actively being sacrificed, rather than wait another fifty years to "discover" the abuses of power in the name of military interests.

Most of the comfort women to the Japanese military never lived to shape and hear their own utterances regarding their personal histories and their part in the history of World War II. It is my hope that the voices of living Korean comfort women of the many U.S. camptowns in Korea, who have sexually serviced and presently serve American soldiers, will be heard and their personal histories and integral part in the history of U.S.-Korea relations unveiled before another fifty years bury them more deeply in silence.

Note 1: *The Women Outside*, directed by J. T. Takagi and Hye Jung Park, 1996 (aired on PBS, July 16, 1996).

Note 2: See chapter 1 on statements made by ROK National Assemblymen regarding U.S.-oriented camptown prostitution.

Note 3: Interview with Mrs. K., Women's Welfare Bureau, Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, Uijô,ngbu City, June 12, 1992.

Note 4: This can be translated as "Western guy" but is a pejorative term akin to calling a person of African descent "nigger" or Asian descent "chink."

Note 5: *The Women Outside*.

Note 6: ROK Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, *Yullak yôsông silt'ae chosa kyôlgwa pogosô*, (Report on the State of Prostitutes), 1977, p. 9.

Note 7: The term "sexually transmitted diseases" (STDs) was not in use in the early 1970s. Reference to VD in this book includes gonnorhea and syphilis.

Note 8: Junghyo Ahn, *Silver Stallion: A Novel of Korea*.

Note 9: Ibid., pp. 88Ð89.

Note 10: Ibid., p. 107.

Note 11: Migun kiji pandae chon'guk kongdong taech'aek (National Association Against U.S. Bases), *Yangk'i ko hom*, (Yankee Go Home) (Seoul: Migun kiji pandae chon'guk kongdong taech'aek, 1990); Pusan minjok minju undong yonhap (Federation of Pusan People's Democracy Movement), *Nôhûi ga mullônaya uri ga sanda*, (You must withdraw so that we can live) (Seoul: Toso, 1991), part 2, ch. 2; *Malchi*, (Mal Magazine).

Note 12: Wha Soon Cho, *Let the Weak Be Strong: A Woman's Struggle for Justice*; Kyung Ae Park, "Women and Development: The Case of South Korea"; Ralph Pettman, "Labor, Gender, and the Balance of Productivity: South Korea and Singapore"; George L. Ogle, *South Korea: Dissent Within the Economic Miracle*; Seung-Kyung Kim, *Class Struggle or Family Struggle: Lives of Women Factory Workers in South Korea.*,

Note 13: My Sister's Place, *Newsletter*, July 1991.

Note 14: Ibid.

Note 15: For example, the *Iliad*, of Homer.

Note 16: Cynthia Enloe, "Beyond 'Rambo': Women and the Varieties of Militarized Masculinity," p. 85.

Note 17: Enloe, "Bananas, Bases, and Patriarchy," p. 200.

Note 18: Enloe, *Does Khaki Become You?*, p. 38.

Note 19: Ibid., p. 25.

Note 20: The SOFA lays out the terms and conditions of the stationing and operation of the U.S. forces in the ROK.

Note 21: For a characterization of the patron-client relationship, see Michael Handel, *Weak States in the International System*, pp. 132-33.

1. Partners in Prostitution

In the middle of rice paddies, a conspicuous road sign announces in English,"American Town." American Town is in Korea, in the city of Kunsan, in the province of North Cholla. My first view of it in the spring of 1992 was from the rice fields. I had to look up to catch a limited view of the"town" upon a hill; with store signs written in English along the perimeter of the walled compound, it looked more like a commercial fortress than a village in the countryside. It is an enclave that people can enter by invitation only. A U.S. soldier's uniform serves as his invitation, and a Korean prostitute's registration card serves as hers. Together, the soldier and prostitute drink, dance, have sex. For the soldier, this is rest and relaxation (R&R). It is a place of work for the woman.

American Town is like many of the other numerous camptowns near or adjoined to major U.S. military camps in South Korea. Like no other places in Korea, Americans and Koreans together make up the residents of the kijich'on. All the businesses in these areas cater to the lifestyle and consumer needs of the U.S. GI and the women who sexually service them. The bars, or clubs, where the soldiers go off duty to drink beer, relax and pick up women, are the centers of kijich'on life. The club owners"gain financially from the sale of liquor and food and, of course, from the women's sexual labor. The grocery, liquor, and Mom-and-Pop stores in the area are also dependent on the bar traffic" as are the hairdressers, cosmetics shops, and clothing stores"that cater to the women, who must dress up for work to attract the guys." [1] Photo shops, souvenir stalls, and so-called marriage counseling centers [2] also abound. Before the early 1970s, private VD clinics were also a mainstay business. Neon lights, booming American music, cigarette smoke, heavy drinking, darkly lit bars, and interracial couples speaking Konglish--these are the daily staples of all kijich'on.

What distinguishes American Town from the other camptowns is its physical isolation--it is completely walled off, with a guard posted at the gate--and its"incorporated" status. American Town is not simply a place; it is a corporation, with a president and board of directors who manage all the businesses and people living and working in it. The corporation headquarters occupies a small building within the walled compound. Originally, the Town was constructed in the early-to-mid 1970s through funds from both the local government and Seoul. [3] The corporation not only oversees business practices, but also owns and manages the numerous apartment buildings and boarding rooms that cover the Town. Prostitutes who work in the bars must live there and pay rent to the corporation. These rooms serve as both residence and brothel. American Town illustrates in high relief the raison d'être of the kijich'on: a town built on and for prostitution. [4]

Prostitutes and Their Lifestyles

There are two types of kijich'on prostitutes, the registered and the unregistered, or so-called streetwalkers. This book is about the first group of women, who are the governmentally recognized"special entertainers." Registered women sell drinks, dance with GIs, and pick up their customers in the kijich'on clubs. These women have more job security than streetwalkers because they have official sanction to sell their flesh. Moreover, they have a regular establishment from which they can attract customers, and they will not be hauled off to jail for prostitution, unlike streetwalkers, unless their official identification cards are invalid.

In order to work in the clubs, a woman must go to the local police station to register her name and address and the name of the club where she will be working. She must also go to the local VD clinic, undergo gynecological and blood examinations and receive a VD card. To maintain her status as a"healthy" hostess, she must go once a week for VD examination and get her card stamped"healthy" by the clinic;"healthy" means she is free of VD infection. She pays for each clinic visit, and if she fails the exam, she cannot work in the club-- she must also pay for medical treatment--until the clinic certifies that she is"healthy." The club woman must carry the registration and VD cards with her at all times. The Korean Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (MoHSA, formerly called the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare) has been supervising the formulation and enforcement of these regulations since the early-mid 1960s, but until the early 1970s, enforcement was highly inconsistent throughout the numerous camptowns. Prior to the 1960s, U.S. medics conducted VD examinations of the women; even in the 1970s, U.S. camps in areas where the Korean authorities were lax about such regulations continued to check the prostitutes.

Once in the club, the woman's life revolves around the schedule of the local GIs and the business demands of the club owner or manager, who serves as her pimp. On a typical weekday, she dresses and puts on her make-up in mid-afternoon in preparation for the GIs who"pour out of the [camp] gates at the end of the [work]day." [5] From around 4 or 5 p.m. until midnight to 2 a.m., she sells drinks, flirts and dances with men, and solicits customers for the night. On the weekends, her workday begins earlier and ends later. The club owner/manager requires the woman to sell as many drinks to GIs as possible--alcohol for the men and"ladies' drinks" (usually soft drinks) for herself. Ladies' drinks are particularly high-priced, now about $5 a small glass; the goal is to get the GI to buy many drinks in order to increase the club's revenues. Historically, women have received 10 to 20% of the income from the drinks they sell. [6] Many clubs have drink quotas for the women: if they do not sell at least 150 drinks per month, they do not receive their share of the revenues. In some clubs, if a woman sells more than 600 drinks in a month, she gets a gold ring; if she sells more than 1,000 drinks in a month, she receives a"special bonus." [7] Pushing drinks on the soldiers means the woman also has to keep drinking; on the average, a club woman drinks 20 glasses of soft drinks and/or a mixture of whiskey per night. [8]

Moreover, to sell drinks, she must mingle with various GIs in one night, fondling them and being fondled by them in return. On the average, in the mid-1990s, clubs were paying a hostess $250 a month. [9] Selling drinks, however, has never been the mainstay of the women's earnings: Women are expected to sleep with GIs for the bulk of their income because their cut from selling drinks cannot support them, and"[m]any places don't pay any salary." [10] In Uijongbu in the mid-1980s,"long-time" (overnight) was $20, while"short-time" (hourly rate) was $10. [11] Owners and pimps generally take 80% and give the prostitute 20% of her earnings per trick.

Most women do not come into the clubs equipped with"hostessing skills" and the willingness to share flesh with GIs. For women who are new to the club scene, an initiation process often takes place. Some women attest to having been raped by their pimp/manager; others have been ordered by the club owner to sleep with a particular soldier; yet others stumble into bed with GIs on their own; some receive advice on the type of man to avoid (e.g., violent types) from more experienced prostitutes. In *Let the Good Times Roll,* " Ms. Pak" expresses her confusion, curiosity, and fear at beginning work at a GI club in Osan. Although she had sold her body to Korean men before entering the kijich'on, she had a difficult time adjusting to her new situation--she had never seen an American before and worried how she could handle their large bodies. [12] Black men were even more strange to her. At the prospect of her first black patron, she wondered to herself how dark his penis would be and"If I do it with him, will my skin turn black?" [13] Her first sexual encounter with an American took place at the order of her club owner, who"warned that I had to do it." [14] Most of the women have taken to alcohol or drugs to help them get through their sex work. [15]

Sometimes women pick up customers; at other times, the GIs express their interest in a particular woman to the club owner/manager, who then tells the woman to sleep with the soldier. The GI and club woman go to her room, which is usually attached to or located near the club. Her room is part of a complex of rooms lined up in a row and separated by very thin walls; other prostitutes live in those rooms. The complex usually belongs to the club owner, who places a watchman or -woman by the entrance to monitor who goes in and out, to receive payments for the sex, and to insure that no woman runs away. In some of the older complexes,"pimp holes" were made in the rooms so that the pimp or monitor could watch over the woman while she sold sex and make sure that she was not scheming with the GI to run away. Moreover, such peeping Tom activities were intended to prevent GIs from avoiding payment--many GIs would claim that the the prostitute never"put out," even if the woman had provided the agreed-upon sexual service.

Both the prostitutes and U.S. military officials have observed that club women aggressively seek out customers. In *Camp Arirang,* Kim Yonja recalls how she and other women grabbed onto men in order to make money. One U.S. Army chaplain commented that"in Korea, the guy is inundated with prostitutes." [16] And an Army captain who had served in Korea during the early 1980s noted that young, inexperienced enlistees were most susceptible to getting duped into serious relationships with prostitutes who sought to"exploit the boys for money." [17]

How prostitutes fare physically, financially, and emotionally in the kijich'on environment depends to a great extent on the particular club owner/manager and GI customers she encounters. As"Nanhee" says, some GIs are mean and nasty, especially when they are drunk; others are nice and gentle. [18] At worst, a woman encounters a GI who beats her and murders her, as Yun Kumi did in October 1992. Private Kenneth Markle was convicted of killing her; her landlord found her body--"naked, bloody, and covered with bruises and contusions--with laundry detergent sprinkled over the crime site. In addition, a coke bottle was embedded in Yun's uterus and the trunk of an umbrella driven 27 cm into her rectum." [19] At best, a GI provides money and other necessities, is faithful and caring and ultimately marries her."Oon Kyung," who had married"Jack," was one of the lucky ones. He had"scrape[d] and save[d] to pay to get Oon Kyung out of a club." [20] Afterward,"he work[ed] alongside guys who had slept with her when she was working as a prostitute before they were married." [21]

No club woman I spoke with ever referred to club owners and managers as nice, kind, and gentle. Some are not as abusive as those who beat and rape the barwomen, but it is apparent that the owner/manager is responsible for the bulk of the everyday exploitation of the women. Ms. Pak states that"owners usually take advantage of [the women]" by not paying them their share of revenues from drinks and sex. [22] Women who move up in the hierarchy of sex work can become club managers, and they do not necessarily treat the prostitutes with compassion. Kim Yonja, who had worked as a madam in Kunsan, recalled how tough she had been on her hostesses; she had scolded them and pushed them to bring in income for the bar. [23] Thomas Kelly, a former GI and VD officer (he had to help the military track down prostitutes who were alleged to have transmitted the infection), noted how the madams would send out"slicky boys" to"rough up the girls who [didn't] pay [their club debts]." [24]

The"debt bondage system" is the most prominent manifestation of exploitation. A woman's debt increases each time she borrows money from the owner--to get medical treatment, to send money to her family, to cover an emergency, to bribe police officers and VD clinic workers. Most women also begin their work at a new club with large amounts of debt, which usually results from the"agency fee" and advance pay. Typically, (illegal) job placement agencies which specialize in bar and brothel prostitution place women in a club and charge the club owner a fee. The owner transfers the fee onto the new employee's"account" at usurious rates; Ms. Pak mentions one club owner charging 10%. [25] Often, women ask the owner for an advance in order to pay off her existing debts to another club, and the cycle of debt continues. Owners also set up a new employee with furniture, stereo equipment, clothing, and cosmetics--items deemed necessary for attracting GI customers. These costs get added to the woman's account with interest. In 1988, the left-leaning *Mal* Magazine (*Malchi*), reported that on the average, prostitutes' club debts range between one and four million won [26] ($1,462 and $5,847 respectively in 1988 terms). For this reason, women try to pick up as many GIs as possible night after night, and for this reason, women cannot leave prostitution at will. Nanhee sums up the debt-ridden plight:

> In some American [camptown] clubs, if you have no debt, they see to it that you incur some. If you had no debt, you would have the choice of going to another club, a better club. But if the woman has debts, she can't leave before she pays up. Escaping from a club isn't easy to do. The women with a conscience stay and work [to pay off the debt]. [27]

The great majority of women who enter kijich'on prostitution have already experienced severe deprivation and abuse--poverty, rape, repeated beatings by lovers or husbands. The camp followers of the war era lived off their bodies and fed their family members with their earnings. Korean camptown officials who had lived through the war expressed sympathy for the early generations of prostitutes when I interviewed them in 1992. Their sentiment was such:"All of us Koreans back then--educated or uneducated--were dirt poor; we were all in the same boat and were forced to do things beneath our dignity to survive."

Poverty, together with low class status, has remained the primary reason for women's entry into camptown prostitution from the 1950s to the mid-1980s. Stories of growing up with no plot of land or high debts from farming attempts, going hungry amidst eight or nine siblings, barely finishing a few years of schooling, and tending to ill parents resound among kijich'on women. Many of these women were part of the migration flow from the countryside to the cities in the 1960s. [28] They left their villages in search of work, believing that they had a 50/50 chance of"making it" in urban areas. [29] But finding employment, especially one that paid enough to support a woman and her family in the countryside, was difficult. A report by the Eighth U.S. Army, which discusses some causes of women's entry into camptown prostitution, states that among women aged 18 to 40 who were living in Seoul in 1965, 60% were unemployed. [30] Although women have served as the backbone of South Korea's economic miracle, through their work in light-manufacturing industries, not all women have had luck finding and keeping viable work."Hyun Ja," a middle-aged divorcée with children, who had no more than a grade-school education, became a GI prostitute as a last resort--factory jobs catered mostly to young women and were therefore difficult to obtain. [31]

Still others were physically forced into prostitution by flesh-traffickers or pimps who waited at train and bus stations, greeted young girls arriving from the countryside with promises of employment or room and board, then"initiated" them--through rape--into sex work or sold them to brothels. Women also fell into prostitution by responding to fraudulent advertisements which offered appealing calls for employment as waitresses, storekeepers, singers, and entertainers. Some ads even promised"education" (*kyoyuk*) without specifying what the women would be expected to learn. [32]

For example, one woman who had answered an advertisement for a job in a restaurant found that she was taken to a GI bar. There"[s]he was made to die [sic] her hair blond and wear braless T-shirts and hot pants" and was"beaten into submission" and"forced to provide sexual services" to GIs. This came at the heels of a history of deprivation and abuse; she had been orphaned as a child,"adopted" by a Korean family who used her as a"slave" to take care of the family's four boys, raped by the father, and kicked out by the sons. Then she went to work at a factory and married the owner's son, who physically abused her and abandoned her and their newborn son. [33]

The overwhelming majority of the prostitutes have experienced a combination of poverty, low class status, physical, sexual, and emotional abuse even before entering the kijich'on world. Their identities had already become one of"fallen woman." Having lost their virginity and not having much family connections or education to fall back on, these women often expressed that there was not much else they could do; they were already"meat to be slaughtered on the butcher's block" (*toma wi e innun kogi).* Kim Yonja, who is unusual for having completed high school in the late 1950s, often speaks about being raped at 11 years of age by her cousin as one reason why she entered the kijich'on world. She believes this rape would not have occurred and that her life would have turned out better if her mother had been at home to protect her; but her mother had to work as a traveling peddler because her father had abandoned them.

The youth and lack of formal education among the women who fell into kijich'on life made them vulnerable to the abuse and exploitation of owners and pimps. As mentioned in the Prologue, the vast majority of prostitutes from the 1950s to the 1970s had barely completed elementary school. During the spring of 1992, I met several old women, who had either worked as prostitutes or were then working as madams, who were illiterate. New initiates have also tended to be very young in age, from the late teens to the early twenties. The ROK Ministry of Health and Social Welfare reported that among 36,924 prostitutes documented in 1977, 21,305 were between 20 and 24 years old and 7,669 were between 15 and 19. [34] Nanhee reveals that she was too old, at 29, to"get to know this kind of world." [35] Many girls and young women have literally grown up in the camptowns, with the pimp or owner functioning at times as a parent/authority figure, disciplining women and bailing them out of financial straits (at high interests). Older, experienced prostitutes have also served as maternal figures and big sisters, teaching the women how to avoid pregnancy and trouble with the police and manage abusive owners.

The women's unfamiliarity with English compounds their sense of abuse and humiliation. They feel that they cannot hold their own--in negotiating a price or terms of sexual service--in relation to GIs because they cannot understand the men or express themselves clearly and fully to them. Nanhee states that she"didn't know a word of English" when she began work in a kijich'on club:"If they [Americans] asked my name, I just said 'yes.' They would laugh and make fun of me. I was so embarrassed." [36] Similarly, Jin Soo, in the film *Camp Arirang,* expresses her frustration and resentment at the GIs who treat her as if she is"stupid" because she cannot understand them. If a woman begins work with a knowledge of"ABCs," she is ahead of others. One of the missions of My Sister's Place is to offer elementary English lessons to club women who want to improve their English so that they can better communicate--and assert their interests--with their American clients.

Since the early 1960s, most camptowns have had a"Women's Autonomous Association" (*chach'ihoe*) which, in the best of circumstances, functions as a support group for club prostitutes in their interactions with owners, GIs, and local authorities. It'aewon's was (is) called the Rose Society, Songt'an's the Honey Bee Association, and Tongduch'on's the Dandelion Society. Some camptowns have required *chach'ihoe* member ship, as well as official registration, in order to work as a club hostess. Each member pays monthly dues to the *chach'ihoe* (1,000 won/mo. in Kunsan in 1992), which serve as a collective pool of funds for emergencies such as funeral expenses of a deceased member and expensive medical treatment of ill members. The power of the *chach'ihoe* to act as a positive, supportive force for its members depends to a great extent on the association's leadership. The association head, or *haejang,* who uses her position to advocate for her members, can have significant effect on reducing some of the exploitive and oppressive treatment of the women. Camptown residents I spoke with in 1992, both prostitutes and Korean authorities alike, have noted the strong leadership of such *haejang* as Kim Yonja of Kunsan and Songt'an and Yi Chongja of Anjongni in the 1970s. Both women led protests on behalf of prostitutes' interests and mobilized women to protect themselves against the exploitation of private VD clinics (chapter 6).

But in reality, these associations have never been autonomous. The local police and governmental authorities select the leaders of the associations and keep watch over the women's activities; each police station details an officer to serve as liaison with the women's association. Prostitutes who have better command of English, compared to others, and appear to have some influence or leadership among the women are usually selected as *haejang.* From the perspective of the police and local government, the purpose of the *chach'ihoe* is to make the women monitor one another in matters pertaining to VD regulations and"business conduct," such as ensuring proper VD validation of its members and disciplining those who do not comply with regulations. They have also been expected, since the early 1970s, to ferret out streetwalkers (unregistered women). Leaders who do not take activist roles on behalf of the members serve as dupes for the police and other authorities. A 1963 EUSA document regarding the women's associations states that *haejang* have served as informants for the Korean government and the U.S. military:

> It is known that the 108th ROKA [ROK Army] CIC [Central Intelligence Command?] as well as the KNP [Korean National Police] Intelligence Section maintains an information net among the Haejongs [sic] supposedly for counterespionage purposes. This Detachment [that of the EUSA author] maintains a parallel net to prevent or at least to keep informed on information gathering activities by anyone. [37]

Kijich'on prostitutes have a complex system of social stratification among themselves. As mentioned earlier, a registered woman has official sanction and the backing of her *chach'ihoe,* in contrast to streetwalkers. Young, attractive women can fetch a higher price and work in the best clubs, compared to older and unattractive women. The elderly, the"veterans" of camptowns, fare the worst; they have neither the youth necessary to work in the clubs, nor financial security or family who can provide for their old age. Bakery Auntie in Uijongbu was streetwalking at the age of 65 for a few dollars a trick. At the other end, women who are married to servicemen occupy the top of the kijich'on social ladder. Most women aspire to this position because GI wives most resemble a"normal" woman's role as wife/mother and no longer have to work in the clubs. U.S. soldiers usually pay the club debt of their girlfriends/fiancées as the first step in the marriage process. A GI wife also has access to the military compound's commissary and PX and will most likely go to the United States, privileges that kijich'on prostitutes work for. The next best thing to marriage is the"contract cohabitation" (*kyeyak tonggo*), which means that a prostitute and a GI decide to set up house together for an agreed-upon period of time (depending on the soldier's tour of duty and training schedule). She plays"wife" while he pays her club debt and provides financially for her.

All the women I met in the camptowns either actively dreamed or had dreamed of leaving prostitution and leading so-called normal lives, marrying a GI, having a family and a home. Some had tried to leave kijich'on prostitution and learn vocational skills and work in normal jobs, e.g., factories. But I heard many stories of women returning to kijich'on work because they could not adapt psychologically to the"normal" world or could not live on the low wages. In some cases, that of Nanhee, for example, employers never paid the women their earnings. [38]

Most women support family members with their incomes; earning money to pay for a parent's medical treatment or a brother's school fees is a common motivation in their sex work. A 1965 study conducted by the Eighth Army found that of 105 prostitutes surveyed in the Yongsan area, all"were supporting from one to eight members of their family." [39] Stories about young females working in camptown prostitution to pay for their brothers' high school and university education or their parents' medical expenses still abound in Korea. [40] Ms. Pak, who had sold sex to Koreans before entering a kijich'on club, chose to sell sex to Americans because it would be better for her brothers' futures:

> If I do this with Korean men, someday it might get in the way of my brothers' advancement. What if my brothers get married and somehow a member of the bride's family, an uncle or cousin, recognizes me from this kind of work? It's a small world. I don't want to mess up my brothers' lives that way. If I'm going to earn money by having sex with men, I might as well do it with Americans. [41]

Even when the prostitute marries an American soldier, [42] she does not forget her natal family. In 1988, *Malchi* reported, based on U.S. Embassy (Seoul) records, that statistically 15 relatives follow one former prostitute to the United States. [43] Elaine Kim calls this"piggy back immigration." [44] Many of those who are unable to invite their families to the United States often send money back to Korea to support them.

The Political Economy of Camptowns

The evolution of camptowns and camptown prostitution as permanent fixtures in American-Korean relations began with the Korean War and the arrival of U.S. troops. They are no less a part of the history of U.S. involvement in the Korean War than General Douglas MacArthur's successful push of North Korean troops back beyond the 38th parallel. But kijich'on prostitution surely is not a matter of heroism in war, and perhaps that is why the numerous thick volumes of history written on the Korean War neglect it. For both the U.S. military and the Korean government and people, it is not a practice or story to be proud of. But to leave out the sex, prostitution, Amerasian offspring, physical beating of women, the VD policies, the dating, the interracial marriages, and the immigration of GI wives and their families to the United States is to construct what Enloe would call an unrealistic"war museum," [45] or history of war and the people and societies whose lives were irrevocably affected by it."A museum curator--or journalist, novelist, or political commentator--who edits out sexuality, who leaves it 'on the cutting-room floor,' gives the audience a skewed and ultimately unhelpful account of just what kinds of myths, anxieties, and inequalities are involved fighting a war or sustaining a militarized form of peace." [46]

Prior to the Korean War, the sex work of camp followers was informally organized and unregulated. The women who sold sex to U.S. occupation forces from 1945 to 1949, who like other camp followers in other lands at other times, followed or greeted troops with willingness to wash laundry, run errands, and provide sex for some form of remuneration--money, food, cigarettes. Prostitution took place in U.S. military barracks in the early years of U.S. military occupation (1945-46) and in shabby makeshift dwellings called *panjatjip* (literally, houses made of boards). By the late occupation period (1947-49), simple inns or motels (*kani hot'el*) also became the loci of sexual exchange. [47] Then, prostitution was not officially organized into an R&R system that now caters to a myriad of sexual fantasies and forms of entertainment--peep shows, strip tease,"vaginal coin-suck," [48] short time/long time" and so on. Neither was it an entrenched economic interest that brought in coveted foreign exchange, as it began to be in the 1960s. Nor was it a part of the"Americanization" that contemporary kijich'on areas experience--Wendy's, Dunkin' Donuts, Kentucky Fried Chicken, Rap music, and mirrored disco balls.

The Korean War and the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty (effective November 1954) provided the raw materials for the kijich'on R&R system. The war, with its accompanying poverty, social and political chaos, separation of families, and millions of young orphans and widows,"mass-produced" prostitutes, creating a large supply of girls and women without homes and livelihoods. [49] Fleeing bombs and gunfire and seeking food, shelter, and work, camp followers flocked to areas where the UN/U.S. forces were bivouacked. The majority of the strategic areas (close to the border with North Korea) developed into R&R boomtowns beginning in the mid-1950s. Most of these areas had been sparsely populated agricultural villages. For example, Tongduch'on sprouted from agricultural fields into one of the most notorious camptowns, having housed four different U.S. infantry divisions since the end of the Korean War (3d, 1st, 7th, 2d). During its"golden age" in the mid-1960s, Tongduch'on boasted approximately 7,000 prostitutes. [50] Similarly, Songt'an, which had been a small unknown farming village until the Korean War, grew to be the"darling" of U.S. Air Force (USAF) camptowns since the early 1950s. On July 9, 1951, the 417th Squadron came to Songt'an with bulldozers to construct an airfield, causing 1,000 families, or 5,000 people, to lose their homes and land. [51] The faces and economy of Uijongbu also became radically transformed by war and U.S. troops. The *Tonga Ilbo,* a leading national daily, reported on July 22, 1962, that prior to the war, Uijongbu was a small town of 10,000 with only one silk mill representing all of the industry in the area, but that with the war, hundreds of unemployed people, including"gun men" (gangsters), and the UN forces swarmed in and created a netherworld.

The Mutual Defense Treaty, which commits both the United States and the Republic of Korea as alliance partners in the case of a commonly perceived threat (military action would be taken in accordance with each side's constitutional processes), formally granted the stationing of U.S. troops in the ROK. Since the completion of the withdrawal of wartime forces in early 1955, two infantry divisions, the 7th and the 2d, plus support units and several Air Force squadrons composed the backbone of U.S. defense efforts in Korea until the early 1970s. The troops that the Defense Treaty provided for have served as the demand side of the prostitution equation.

On the surface, simple market economics--"where the boys are"-- has dictated the number of prostitutes and high density areas of military prostitution. When troops are withdrawn or redeployed, as in the early 1970s, the women and other kijich'on residents pick up their wares and move to where the soldiers resettle (chapter 3). Since 1990, Songt'an's R&R business life has been growing because the Eighth Army headquarters, which had been in Seoul since the permanent stationing of U.S. troops in Korea, was scheduled to move in. I felt the heartbeat of this kijich'on throbbing with vigor when I visited Songt'an several times throughout the spring of 1992. It is the only kijich'on that is booming with loud music and thriving with business transactions even in the daytime. Its nightclub alleys, marketplace, and souvenir shops are filled with the hustle and bustle of Koreans and Americans, whereas most of the camptowns in the Paju area, that had housed the highest concentration of U.S. troops from 1953 to 1971--it was called the"GI's Kingdom" [52] --now resemble sleepy shantytowns in the day and come to life slowly only at night. Besides Osan and American Town in Kunsan, Tongduch'on and Uijongbu are the two major R&R areas left; the latter two cater mostly to the 2d ID, the only U.S. army division remaining in Korea since 1971. Camptown residents and former prostitutes themselves acknowledge the significance of the U.S. troop count in their lives. They noted in conversations with me that the number of kijich'on prostitutes declined substantially in the late 1970s as a reaction to the Carter administration's crusade to withdraw U.S. troops completely from South Korea. But Koreans have also noted that with the Reagan administration's increase in the number of troops, beginning in 1984, the number of prostitutes also increased. [53]

Given that the U.S. bases have served as the major source of legitimate (e.g., clerks, translators, janitors) and illegitimate employment, the majority of Koreans residing in camptowns became almost exclusively dependent on the military for their economic survival. For example, an estimated 60% of the Korean population of Uijongbu in the early 1960s were engaged in some form of business catering to the U.S. military. [54] In Songt'an, by the late 1970s, 80% of its 60,000 residents, including approximately 2,500 prostitutes, lived on income earned from U.S. military personnel. [55]

The economic power that U.S. servicemen represented and wielded in the camptowns easily translated into social and sexual clout over Korean kijich'on residents. South Korea in the 1960s became the"GI's heaven"; it was a time when an average GI could live like a king in villages"built, nurtured and perpetuated for the soldiers of the U.S. Army," [56] a time when things American, especially the dollar, were almighty. Men and women danced and drank to their hearts' content with cheap liquor and loud music; over 20,000 registered prostitutes were available to"service" approximately 62,000 U.S. soldiers by the late 1960s. For $2 or less per hour ("short time") or $5 to $10 for an"overnight," [57] a soldier could revel in sexual activities with prostitutes. Servicemen purchased not only sex mates but maids, houseboys, shoeshine boys, errand boys, and other locals with ease. Bruce Cumings characterizes the 1960s as a time when"[o]ne could be born to a down-and-out family in Norfolk . . . and twenty years later live like the country-club set" in Korea, a time when the"highest Korean ultimately meant less than the lowest American in the entourage." [58]

Cynthia Enloe notes that"[i]n the microcosm of the base, soldier-clients learn to view their masculinity--and the prowess of the nation they represent--as dependent on their sexual domination of the women who live near the base." [59] I found that in Korea, the *prostitutes'* perception of GIs' sexual power depended on their views of the political and economic prowess of the United States. Camptown prostitutes who remain in the business today speak with a confidence and arrogance that have accompanied their nation's"economic miracle." All the women I spoke with in 1991/92--young and old alike--asserted that they have no illusion about America (as their predecessors had had) as the greatest country in the world. On the contrary, they criticized the U.S. mismanagement of its economy, high unemployment rates, low educational standards in public schools, racial discrimination, and imperialistic actions toward developing nations. Ms. Pak, one of the two Korean women who speak out about their kijich'on experiences in *Let the Good Times Roll,* bluntly recounts such sentiments. She once argued with a GI,"You are in Korea to make money, not to help us." [60]

The women I spoke with noted that the average GI cannot afford to keep up with the high prices in the Korean economy and the high consumerist tendencies of average Koreans; several women ridiculed the way GIs"suck on one or two bottles of beer all day" because they can't afford hard liquor. They compared the declining economic power of GIs with the now heavy-spending tendencies of Korean men; the common remark was that"when Korean men sit at a bar, they drop hundreds of dollars." Such low esteem for U.S. economic power influenced some women's perception of the sexual desirability of American GIs. Once when I was visiting My Sister's Place in Uijongbu, one middle-aged woman, who was considered too old (by soldiers and other prostitutes) to charge going rates, scoffed at a young soldier's solicitation; she called his offer"measly" and"ridiculous."

The criticisms of the United States, particularly of the troops in Korea, that some of the kijich'on prostitutes voice echo those of the larger society. Often hailed as one of the few places where"Yangkee go home" was not heard, South Korean society has increasingly become critical of the United States, and student activists have increasingly become anti-American since 1980. [61] Ms. Pak' s complaint that the U.S. military"can use as much electricity or water as they need" while"the [Korean] government tells [Koreans] to save electricity and water" [62] is a variation on the common theme-- U.S. wastefulness and privilege at Koreans' expense. In regular conversations, even among those who support the retention of U.S. bases, Koreans often complained that the USFK headquarters in Yongsan, Seoul, had occupied one of the choicest pieces of real estate in the city. They complained that while Koreans compete for high-priced housing and feel the crunch of overcrowdedness in urban areas, Americans live and work on sprawling compounds, and at Yongsan, complete with their own 18-hole golf course. Several student activists I spoke with in 1992 charged that because of the U.S. compound and its engineering complexities, the Yongsan area has been cut off from the rest of Seoul's subway system--the web of underground pipes and other infrastructure that support the U.S. base have made subway construction impossible and hence made life inconvenient for many Koreans living in Seoul.

Koreans' increasing sensitivity and resistance to U.S. dominance in camptown life reached a critical mass with the murder of a kijich'on prostitute, Yun Kumi, in the fall of 1992. Thousands of Koreans from outside the kijich'on areas joined prostitutes and other camptown residents to protest publicly U.S. crimes against Koreans. A coalition of 46 different Korean organizations stated in a letter to the commander of the 2d division (November 7, 1992):"This [crime] has been presented as an accidental homicide, committed by one individual soldier--a 'Private crime' between the victim and the perpetrator. However, we the people believe that this is an example of how American soldiers treat Korean women." The coalition also stated,"American troops have been stationed in Korea for over forty years, and the recent reality is that crimes of rape, robbery, theft, and violence committed by American soldiers has [sic] become a daily occurrence and chronic problem." [63] Prior to this time, prostitutes held small demonstrations against GI violence against women, especially murders, that did not receive larger public attention or support. The blatant inequalities in economic and political power that kijich'on residents, especially the prostitutes, have experienced from the 1950s into the 1980s have increasingly become an emotional manifestation of the growing anti-Americanism among Koreans, especially the younger generations.

Such sentiments and protests against the dominance of the U.S. military in the camptowns echo those in the Philippines and Okinawa. For example, the most recent explosion of"pent-up fury that many people in Okinawa . . . feel about the American bases" [64] occurred after three U.S. marines had kidnapped and raped a 12-year-old Japanese girl in September 1995. The men were tried and sentenced by a Japanese court in March 1996. [65] Feelings of admiration and respect for the U.S. have been replaced by [a] gradual erosion over the years of public support for the [US-Japan] alliance and a growing antipathy towards the U.S." [66] The Japanese, like the Koreans, are increasingly viewing Americans as bullies.

U. S. Military Prostitution in Asia

The U.S.-Korean history of military prostitution shares many of the characteristics and tensions present in other sites of overseas U.S. bases, especially in Asia. The economic dependence of local camptown residentson the presence of U.S. troops is not unique to South Korea. For example, Takazato Suzuyo, a political activist on Okinawa, reported that Okinawa, which served as a R&R area to U.S. troops in Vietnam, lived off U.S. dollars:

> In its heyday, there were more than 1,200"approved" bars, night clubs, and restaurants on Okinawa, and soldiers spent money freely. B-52 bombers were taking off from Kadena [US Air Force] base almost every day to bomb North Vietnam, while returning soldiers from Vietnam, with their chest pockets filled with dollar bills, sometimes spent all their money in one night. [67]

In Olongapo and Angeles in the Philippines, where the U.S. Subic Naval Base and Clark Air Force Base were respectively located (until the withdrawal of U.S. forces in 1992),"[t]here was virtually no industry except the 'entertainment' business, with approximately 55,000 registered and unregistered prostitutes and a total of registered 2,182 R&R establishments. [68] By 1985 the U.S. military had become the second largest employer in the Philippines, hiring over 40,000 Filipinos. . . . The sum of their salaries amounted to almost $83 million a year." [69]

Ideologies around race and nationality have also contributed to the social inequalities and conflicts, especially affecting prostitutes, in the U.S. camptown communities in Asia. Enloe writes that"[c]lass and race distinctions inform all social relations between the U.S. military and the host community." [70] The racism demonstrated by American soldiers toward Asians in Vietnam and Korea are well-documented. Lloyd Lewis notes that"soldiers in all branches of the armed services [in Vietnam] recount receiving the same indoctrination" that the"enemy is Oriental and inferior." [71] The racist terms for Vietnamese--"gook, slant, slope, dink . . . or a half a dozen local variations"-- [72] had all been employed previously by Americans [toward Japanese in World War II and Koreans and Chinese in the Korean War] to designate yellow-skinned peoples." [73] Max Hastings has noted in his history of the Korean War that the"Eighth Army was forced to issue a forceful order" in the summer of 1951 that soldiers cease"to take a perverse delight in frightening civilians" and attempting to"drive the Koreans off roads and into ditches." The order concluded with"We are not in this country as conquerors. We are here as friends." [74] Hastings also includes a comment by a Marine, Selwyn Handler:"Koreans were just a bunch of gooks. Who cared about the feelings of people like that? We were very smug Americans at that time." [75] Bruce Cumings recounts the racism among Americans, soldiers and diplomats alike, in the late 1960s:"Their racism led them to ask me, because I was living with Koreans and they rarely ventured out to 'the economy,' things like whether it was true that the Korean national dish, *kimch'i,* was fermented in urine." [76]

Racist stereotypes of Asians within the American society have mixed with sexist stereotypes of Asian women to foster American participation in camptown prostitution in Asia. The main military newspaper, *Stars and Stripes,* encouraged soldiers to explore Korea's"nighttime action," especially the *kisaeng* party, the"ultimate experience":

> Picture having three or four of the loveliest creatures God ever created hovering around you, singing, dancing, feeding you, washing what they feed you down with rice wine or beer, all saying at once,"You are the greatest." This is the Orient you heard about and came to find. [77]

A U.S. Army chaplain I interviewed in April 1991 noted the following:

> What the soldiers have read and heard before ever arriving in a foreign country influence prostitution a lot. For example, stories about Korean or Thai women being beautiful, subservient--they're tall tales, glamorized. . . . U.S. men would fall in lust with Korean women. They were property, things, slaves. . . . Racism, sexism--it's all there. The men don't see the women as human beings--they're disgusting, things to be thrown away. . . . They speak of the women in the diminutive. [78]

On Okinawa, U.S. servicemen from the Kadena Air Base"can be seen in town (Naha) wearing offensive T-shirts" depicting"a woman with the letters LBSM," which means"little brown sex machine." [79] The"brown" refers to the Filipino and Thai women who constitute the majority of military prostitutes on Okinawa. [80] Aida Santos reveals that Olongapo sells a variation on the theme--a popular T-shirt"bearing the message 'Little Brown Fucking Machines Powered with Rice.'" [81] She emphasizes that in the Philippines,"[r]acism and sexism are now seen as a fulcrum in the issue of national sovereignty." [82]

The presence of U.S. military servicemen in Asia generates significant social transformations that affect both the host Asian society and the American society across the Pacific. Thanh-dam Truong has asserted that the U.S. military's use of Thailand as the major R&R base for U.S. soldiers fighting in Vietnam has spawned the now booming sex tourism industry all across the country, [83] winning Thailand the ignoble title,"Asia's brothel." Filipinos have charged that U.S. servicemen have brought AIDS and HIV into their country. Prostitutes in Olongapo, along with the umbrella feminist organization, GABRIELA, and health organizations, pushed the Philippine government to"obtain a guarantee that all U.S. service personnel coming into the Philippines be tested for HIV." [84] In 1988, the Philippines Immigration Commissioner required all U.S. servicemen entering the Philippines to present certificates verifying that they are AIDS-free. [85]

In addition, sexual relations between American men and Asian prostitutes have created a living legacy of mixed-raced children who are rejected by both their mother's and father's societies. Maria Socorro"Cookie" Diokno, an active leader in the Philippines' anti-base movement, has referred to the children born of American servicemen and Asian women as"Amerasian 'souvenir' bab[ies]." [86] ABC's *Prime Time* (May 13, 1993) depicted Amerasian children in the Philippines who had been abandoned by their soldier-fathers and were living with their impoverished mothers, scavenging for food among heaps of rubble and waste. Enloe reports that"[o]f the approximately 30,000 children born each year of Filipino mothers and American fathers, some 10,000 [were] thought to become street children, many of them working as prostitutes servicing American pedophiles." [87] Enloe adds that a Filipino"insider" has noted that many others have been sold, with"Caucasian-looking children . . . allegedly sold for $50-200 (around P1,000-4,000), whereas the Negro-fathered ones fetch only $25-30 (around P500-600)." [88] Johnston's Mom in Songt'an, Korea, also tried to give up her sons to adoption, after earlier having given up a daughter. But in the end, she could not bear to do it and went back to prostitution in order to keep her boys. [89] In the film, *Camp Arirang,* one barwoman in Songt'an laments the need to give up her half African-American son one day; black Amerasian children are most shunned in Korean society, so most mothers try to send them to the United States for a chance at education and a future. She has already torn up all photographs of herself with her son because she knows she must let him go. In a voice cracking with emotion, she calmly says,"All I want him to know is that he was born in Korea, that his mother is Korean, and that she is dead. It will be easier for him that way."

The withdrawal of U.S. naval bases from the Philippines in 1992 also left behind a legacy of approximately 50,000 Amerasian children in the Philippines, with an estimated 10,000 of them living in Olongapo, which had housed the U.S. Subic Naval Base. The law firm of Cotchett, Illston, and Pitre of Burlingame, California, filed a class action suit against the U.S. government on behalf of Amerasian children left behind in the Philippines in March 1993. [90] The plaintiffs would"ask the federal court to order the Navy to provide funds for the education and medical care of these children until they reach 18 years of age." [91] The prostitute-mothers of these children and several leading Philippine civic organizations, such as GABRIELA, as well as the Council of Churches, mobilized such legal action.

Asian societies have borne the burden of the painful repercussions of militarized prostitution, but the American society has not gone untouched. Many of the prostitutes who end up divorced from their GI husbands (an estimated 80% of Korean-GI marriages end up in divorce) [92] go back into prostitution around military camp areas in the United States. [93] In the film *The Women Outside,* officials from the Mayor's Office of Midtown Enforcement in Manhattan state that some U.S. ser vicemen have been paid by flesh traffickers to marry women in Korea and bring them to the United States for work in massage parlors and brothels.

Policy Versus Practice in the U. S. Military

Individual moments of sexual contact have engendered large-scale socioeconomic transformations for Americans and Koreans, as well as personal traumas and challenges. But to root these consequences of prostitution in individuals' behavior without assessing the policies and practices of the U.S. military is like seeing the trees but not the forest. Policies on the prevention and control of sexually transmitted diseases, fraternization with locals, language and cultural awareness programs for soldiers stationed outside of the United States, and the length of the tour of duty are just some of the factors that influence the participation of soldiers in prostitution and the system of prostitution that evolves in a locality.

For example, Korea is one of the two countries, among those where the United States has bases, categorized as a"noncommand- sponsored" tour, [94] meaning that the Department of Defense will not pay for the travel and living costs of family members who accompany soldiers to Korea. In 1991, only 10% of the 40,000 troops were accompanied by their family members. Korea is also a"hardship tour," partly because of its status as a war zone and also because the living arrangements, language, and cultural differences pose difficulties for Americans. Korea is also a"short tour," usually about one and a half years long. Moreover, enlisted men who are sent to Korea tend to be very young, in their late teens and early twenties--they are without family and get hands-on experience in (technically) a combat zone. This contrasts with U.S. military policy for troops in former West Germany, which tends to send married men with their families since the 1980s. [95] One U.S. military official, who is familiar with troop life in Korea and Germany, found that prostitution rose concomitantly with a predominance of single men based around Nuremberg in the 1960s and 1970s; the swing toward the stationing of married soldiers in the 1980s coincided with a decline in prostitution. [96] Moreover, Germany in the 1970s and 1980s was considered a"plum" post, as opposed to a"hardship tour," because family members could experience European living. All Americans and Koreans who are familiar with U.S. military life have told me that the noncommand-sponsored status and the short duration of tours prevent a soldier from getting to know Korean culture and people and from putting down roots and establishing a stable life. The fact that the enlistees are unattached, lonely,"ghettoized" in Korea and distanced from America, and that they are moving on in a year's time makes them ready candidates for"GI johns."

Command policies say no to prostitution. All commands hold briefings introducing soldiers to their new posts and inform them of special health hazards and precautions. Servicemen also receive sex education on STDs and AIDs. In the Asian posts, superiors discuss the local camptown environment and prostitution. But the attitudes and the conduct of local commanders and immediate superiors, rather than official policies and briefings, determine how servicemen perceive prostitution in overseas settings. Two Army chaplains I spoke with emphasized that"[t]he command spells out what's o.k. and not o.k. in terms of interactions with the locals, including women. In Saudi Arabia [Persian Gulf War], it was definitely 'Thou shalt not.'" [97] Another Army chaplain agreed,"[In] Saudi Arabia, even before the soldier could go near a local woman and get caught by Arabs, we'd get him before the Arabs could; that's how strict we were." [98] In contrast, he pointed out that in Korea, the military says," 'Aw, it's the culture' and winks at what goes on." [99] One sailor I spoke with in the spring of 1991 stated that just before his ship docked in the Philippines or Korea, the medical officer gathered the men for a briefing about health precautions and"threw the men condoms as if they were Hallmark cards." He added that some officers would tell their men that prostitution is a way of life for Asians and that Asians like prostitution. [100] Former servicemen who had served in the Philippines stated on ABC's *Prime Time* (May 13, 1993) that military officers had"enthusiastically promoted" prostitution in the Philippines and that some had their own clubs and owned women.

Indeed, prostitution is an everyday experience, part of the routine, for the thousands of American servicemen in Korea. The authors of"Human Factors Research" (by EUSA) found that of 1% of the population surveyed in 1965,"approximately 84% of the men stated[d] that they have 'been with' or 'been out with' a prostitute at least once for one purpose or another." [101] Peer pressure was a major culprit:"[M]ost of the men state that one of the forces exerting pressure on them to 'try a prostitute' immediately after arrival is the encouragement of other Americans." [102] One U.S. Army captain who had served in Korea in the early 1980s also pointed out that there is"overwhelming cultural pressure among enlisted men" to seek out prostitutes. [103] He added that even moral crusaders who come in talking big about the sinfulness of prostitution ended up participating themselves.

The U.S. military does have a sporadic history of tackling prostitution and venereal disease as a moral crusade. Social and moral reform efforts during World War I years is the most prominent and well-documented. Controlling prostitution and venereal disease was part of a"garrison state" mentality, characterized by the"subordination of all other purposes and activities to war and the preparation for war." [104] For women, this meant"the first time a"national, concerted policy sanctioned the total abrogation of civil rights for women on the streets." [105] The"prostitute was cast as the enemy on the home front. . . . War propaganda presented the prostitute as someone predatory and diseased, who 'could do more harm than any German fleet of airplanes' to the men fighting the war." [106] The military judged the women to be responsible for generating the high rates of venereal disease among soldiers. Brandt points out that"[a]t home and abroad during the war, almost seven million days of active duty were lost to venereal disease, the most common illnesses in the service next to influenza." [107] In addition,"venereal diseases during the war cost the government almost fifty million dollars." [108] In the entire army, 76.6% of the infections involved soldiers serving in the United States. [109]

To remedy this crisis, the military enlisted the help of progressive-era social reformers and together pushed for legal and social measures to prevent prostitution and sexual freedom in general. Despite the repressive treatment of women, such as forced gynecological examinations and detention at the mere suspicion of having a VD infection, [110] a serious concern with the welfare and protection of girls and women involved in vice-related activities drove the actions of social reformers, especially the Progressive era"social feminists." [111] Moreover, reformers attempted to apply through law and education the"language of Progressivism":"*self*- discipline, *self*- denial, *self*- sacrifice, and *self*- control."((112 (emphasis in original)

Indeed,"war policy makers sought to offset prevailing negative attitudes toward male virginity through training camp discipline that presented continence as manly and Spartan." [113] When Georges Clemenceau, the French premier, expressed his doubts about the practicality of upholding the policy of (what Inspector Simonin of the French surgeon general's office called)"official continence" to General Pershing, he offered to establish"special houses" of prostitution for the American Expeditionary Forces in France. When Raymond Fosdick, then in charge of making"camps morally safe and free of venereal disease" for the War Department, informed the then Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker, the latter responded,"For God's sake, Raymond, don't show this to the President or he'll stop the war." [114] Such efforts demonstrate that the military does respond to larger social movements and dominant values regarding sexuality and that"military masculinity" as heterosexual prowess is neither fixed nor universal.

Some military officials in the 1950s and 1960s in Korea also decried their soldiers' participation in"illegal sexual activities." [115] The EUSA"Human Factors Research" (1965) noted that the U.S. command was"very concerned" about the problem of prostitution and was"interested in a full-scale morals study recently" (This never materialized.). [116] Those who held strong Christian perspectives on sexuality especially seem to have opposed the troops' participation in prostitution. One of the key U.S. initiators of the Camptown Clean-Up Campaign in the early 1970s was such a man; he had come from a missionary background and believed prostitution was immoral for both the woman and man involved. Additionally, commanders also worried that their men's participation in prostitution would hurt the image of their organization in Korea. But later in Korea, during the first campaign to "clean up" prostitutes and generally reduce camptown vices, individual morality and self-control were not official concerns. The moral character of soldiers or prostitutes never became an issue; in the 1970s, for both the U.S. military and the Korean government, the fundamental concern was the health and comfort of U.S. servicemen.

Prostitution and Korean Society

In the eyes of so-called normal Koreans, the prostitutes have served two important social functions: containing undesirable foreign influences on the greater Korean society [117] and preventing the prostitution and rape of"respectable" girls and women by U.S. soldiers. A 1965 EUSA report acknowledged that

> Excessive restrictive measures [regarding prostitution] . . . may be objected to by certain segments of the Korean population . . . since it would mean that the mobility of the Korean female national in close, continuous contact with the American would be heightened to the extent that she would infiltrate in hitherto"purely Korean" residential areas. [118]

Like their political leaders, Koreans generally have viewed camptown prostitution as a"necessary evil" but ultimately have blamed the women rather than the foreigner or the pimps and club owners for such prostitution.

Korea has a long-standing tradition of governmental utilization of women and their sexuality for political ends. Since the early part of the Koryo period (918-1392), professional female entertainers, *kisaeng,* served the royal court and the (male) members of the scholar-official class with the art of music, dance, poetry, and conversation. The government formally trained these women, who came from the lowest social class (*ch'onmin*), in institutes called *kyobang;* these women belonged to government offices. Although kisaeng received formal education (Chinese classics), which was forbidden to all other women and male members of the low-class during the Choson dynasty (1392-1910), and had access to public outings (while upper-class women were sequestered in the home), these entertainers were the most socially stigmatized and morally marginalized among all women. The Choson rulers' adoption of neo-Confucianism translated into strict social and legal emphasis on women's chastity."Chastity for a woman is more precious than life" was a common proverb. It is common knowledge that Confucian ideology extols chastity as women's greatest virtue, but Korea is the only Confucianist country that has been obsessed with this ideal. According to Jae On Kim, folk tales common to China, Japan, and Mongolia, unlike those from Choson Korea, do not contain the chastity motif. [119] In such a society, kisaeng women, who had become synonymous with courtesan and prostitute by the second half of the Choson period, represented the polar opposite of the chaste wife/moral mother paradigm that was idealized among the upper class."In general, people perceived kisaengs as 'flowers on the roadside for any man to pick.'" [120]

Not only kisaeng, but other women also have served as a collective sacrifice for governmental priorities. The Korean monarch was required to hand over thousands of women, along with artisans and eunuchs, as human tribute to the Mongols who established the Yuan dynasty in China (e.g., example 1,000 women in 1231).

> At first Koryo tried to fill the quota by selecting the widows of criminals, mistresses of Buddhist monks, and unattached women, thereby protecting upper-class women. Facing the Mongol demand for a special collection of beautiful girls, however, the government set up a special office to spot candidates. Since every family tried to hide or marry their daughters off at an early age, the government also promulgated a law forbidding the marriage of girls between the ages of twelve and fifteen without the prior registration with the government, which in turn lowered the marriage age even further. Historical records of this period are filled with cases of men, including high officials as well as commoners, who received severe punishments for not obeying the law. [121]

Furthermore, women who sacrificed their chastity and lives for the good of the country have been extolled in Korean popular memory. For example, the story of Non'gae has been taught in Korean schools and celebrated as an example of Korean women's personal contributions to Korea's historical fight against Japanese domination. According to the legend, Non'gae, the concubine of General Choe Kyonghoe, governor of Chinju in the late 1500s, seduced a Japanese commander, Rokusuke Kedanimura, during the Japanese invasion of Korea and siege of Chinju in 1592, in order to kill him. While dancing with him, she led him toward the edge of a cliff and threw herself and Kedanimura into the river beneath. It is said in Korea that every June 29 of the lunar calendar, kisaeng and others go pay respects to Nongae at the shrine established by government authorities in Chinju.

The kisaeng tradition and the role of women as entertainers/servants to men live on in South Korea today. The *yojong,* which functions as a high-class kisaeng house/restaurant, continues to cater to wealthy and powerful men, including politicians, businessmen, and scholars. The very individuals who have the power to pass laws on prostitution and women's welfare have been the users of women's sexual services. One former member of the Internal Affairs Committee of the National Assembly during the 1950s stated that"In fact, madams in high-class yojongs are doing business with the support of high executive members in the Liberal Party (the then government party), so the [Seoul] Metropolitan Police Director cannot dare peek into their front doors." [122]

Although cultural explanations can serve as a starting point, they do not constitute the crux of understanding the sophisticated structures and types of sexual services available in South Korea today. First, nearly all cultures contain some form of prostitution, but not all cultures have government-sanctioned and -sponsored sex industries. Second, a"culture of prostitution," assumes an essentialist view of a people and their sexual activities; there is no biological or psychological reason why Koreans must prostitute women. Relatedly, as Cumings points out, prostitution is not the" 'culture' of North Korea, and that makes it hard to attribute the behavior to some unchanging Korean 'way of life.' The regime outlawed prostitution and concubinage in 1946, at the same time that it established formal legal equality for women." [123]

Rather than culture, the South Korean government's priorities for state-building, national security, and economic development, over any concern for the social welfare of women and/or the moral order of society, have determined policies regarding prostitution. Upon seizing the presidency through a coup d'état, Pak Chonghui promulgated the Prostitution Prevention Law in November 1961, one of his first administrative actions in the new office. The 1961 law was originally intended to punish women *and* men (customers and pimps) engaging in prostitution. But in reality, while men were released with mild warnings, female prostitutes were penalized: They were tried at summary courts, sentenced to detention, imprisoned, and/or sent to vocational training institutes by force. [124] The law also included provisions for the institutionalization of"potential prostitutes" (or"women in need of protection"), namely, poverty-stricken women, single mothers, runaway girls, and other vagrants, in"accommodation centers" (*suyongso*) and vocational schools. [125] In essence, the law was a two-edged sword--to punish and prevent prostitution. [126] The punitive function was carried out by the police, while the protective function was the job of the Women's Bureau in the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs." [127]

It took eight years for the law to become effective (1969), and no detailed regulations to enforce the law have ever ensued. [128] The law was mainly a political act, part of a larger emphasis by the Pak regime to clean up the political corruption and social chaos inherited from Pak's predecessor, Yi Sungman. By cracking down on prostitution, Pak aimed to distinguish himself from his opponents as a law-and-order, morally upright national leader. [129] But in less than a year, the government's stance changed from prevention of prostitution to regulation. In June 1962, by joint action, the Ministries of Justice, Interior, and Social Welfare and related agencies established 104"special districts" of prostitution. By 1964, the number had increased to 145, and 60% of them (89 areas)--with approximately 13,000 prostitutes catering to U.S. troops--were located in Kyonggi Province, where American soldiers were most heavily concentrated. [130] Since 1972, approximately 70 such districts have remained in operation.

Although there was no legal basis for such special zones, the ROK government provided the following rationales: 1) to minimize prostitution's negative influence on the culture and education of general citizens; 2) to promote the spirit of collective defense of prostitutes against the exploitation of pimps; 3) to prevent the threat to public health by establishing venereal disease checks. [131] Despite the government's avowed reasons, leading Korean feminist scholars Cho Hyong and Chang P'ilhwa believe that the reality of prostitution flourishing in the U.S. kijich'on areas made the execution of the 1961 law impossible and the 1962 decision a necessary compromise. [132] Further, the fact that the Pak regime also established the Tourism Promotion Law in August 1961, three months before the promulgation of the Prostitution Prevention Law, raises the possibility that the elimination of prostitution was never a genuine concern of the government, given that the availability of women for various aspects of tourism, including sexual service, would have undermined the foreign-exchange orientation of the industry. Indeed, for the last 25 years or so, the Korean tourism industry has experienced a boom, hand in hand with the sex industry.

At an extreme, government officials have enthusiastically supported prostitution as a way to increase foreign exchange earnings for the Korean government. In 1973, Min Kwangsik, the then Minister of Education, created a stir in the press and antagonized women's groups in Korea and Japan by stating during a visit to Tokyo,"The sincerity of girls who have contributed (with their c--ts) to their fatherland's economic development is indeed praiseworthy." [133] Korean Church Women United (KCWU), a leading women's organization, has reported that the Korean government, through the Korea International Tourism Association (KITA), [134] licenses and"trains" women who will work as prostitutes for foreign men. The KITA-sponsored"orientation program" includes lectures by"renowned persons and professors" on"how valuable the foreign exchange earned by them [prostitutes] is to our economic development; how to behave with their foreign customers; how post-war Japanese girls contributed to their nation's reconstruction period by earning dollars through prostitution and about anti-communism." [135] The KITA issues the Certificate of Employment in Entertainment Service, which acts as a license for prostitution and pass into hotels. [136] Hei Soo Shin has argued that Korea's economic development and the growth of women's sexual services have symbiotically nurtured each other.

Cho and Chang's 1990 study of forty years of discussion on prostitution in the ROK National Assembly (the legislature) highlights a"pragmatic permissiveness" toward kijich'on prostitution on the part of its members. The authors state that from 1948 to the late 1980s, members of the National Assembly focused on GI prostitution among the different types of prostitution they mentioned. [137] Assemblymen made a sharp distinction between domestic and foreign-oriented prostitution, advocating strict control and/or abolition of domestic-oriented prostitution but sup porting, tongue in cheek, U.S.-oriented camptown prostitution. [138] One Assemblyman in October 1959 stated bluntly:

> It's inevitable that there are prostitutes who cater to foreign soldiers. . . . We should distinguish between those prostitutes who cater to domestic customers and those who cater to U.S. soldiers and train those catering to the foreigners on American customs, [entertainment] facilities, or language and etiquette. [139]

The Korean legislators held the view that man's nature necessitated prostitution as a"necessary evil" among troops:

> As long as the U.S. continues to stay in the ROK, we must acknowledge that the majority of the troops are single and by human nature want entertainment (sex). It's better to provide special facilities for them than discuss the problem of prostitutes alone. For example, we could provide luxurious accommodations/facilities around Seoul for these men so that they don't have to go to Japan [for R&R]. [140]

Cho and Chang conclude that the legislators viewed U.S. camptown prostitution"as rather functional for national defense and/or for GNP growth" and therefore supported"policies that promote[d] prostitution, in compensation [for the U.S. soldiers' presence in Korea]." [141]

Kijich'on prostitution has served the Korean government's economic, as well as security, goals. In 1965, the Office of the Inspector General of the Eighth Army reported,

> It cannot be expected from the Korean Government that this Government, which receives a considerable amount of its gross national product from activities associated with prostitution, etc., will be enthusiastic and sincere in enforcing measures cutting down this considerable source of income for this Government. As one Korean official of the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs put it,"You Americans are asking us to cut a source of revenue which demands no Government funds but provides livelihood for uncounted thousands." [142]

One EUSA intelligence officer estimated that the troops contributed 25% of South Korea's GNP in the 1960s. [143] In 1987, the U.S. forces contributed an estimated $1 billion to the South Korean economy, or about 1% of the total GNP. [144] The EUSA Inspector General in 1964 highlighted the importance of prostitution on the local camptown economy:"At the local community level the business of prostitution is recognized as a source of income large enough to have an impact on the economy." [145] Similarly, in the spring of 1992, a Korean Protestant minister who serves the prostitute community in Songt'an commented that prostitution and related businesses support 60% of Songt'an's economy. [146]

Although not unique in Asia, the South Korean government is responsible for abetting and sanctioning the growth of commercialized sex into a booming industry. Since the fall of 1973, the government has pursued an aggressive tourism development policy based on women's sexual service. Korean Church Women United pinpoints the diversion of Japanese male tourists from Taiwan to Korea, as a result of Japan's diplomatic normalization with the People's Republic of China (Japan cut off ties with Taiwan) in 1972 as the main cause; no longer able to go easily to Taiwan, Japanese men went to Korea for their sex-vacations. [147] The number of Japanese tourists, 85% of whom traveled without wives or girlfriends, skyrocketed from 96,531 in 1971 to 217,287 in 1972 and 436,405 in 1973. By 1979, the number was 649,707. [148] Japanese sources estimated a 700 billion won gain in revenues for the Korean economy from prostitution in 1978. [149] KCWU adds that the Korean tourist industry, led by the Ministry of Transportation,"underwent a drastic change making a quantum leap forward quantitatively as well as qualitatively, all in response to the onrush of Japanese tourists." [150] The number of foreign tourists increased from 11,108 in 1961 to more than 1 million in 1978 and 2.34 million during 1988, the year of the Seoul Olympics. [151] The number of hotels also rose from 42 in 1967 to 130 in 1978 and 276 in 1988. [152]

By 1989, the entertainment industry--the world of nightclubs, bars, and prostitution--was estimated to reach a total sales of more than 4 trillion won, or 5% of the total GNP. [153] The Seoul YMCA, which has been actively campaigning against the sex industry in particular, and the entertainment industry in general, has estimated in its 1989 study that more than 400,000 establishments offered sexual services and that between 1.2 and 1.5 million Korean women ("one-fifth of the total number of South Korean women in the 15 to 29 age cohort") were selling sexual services. [154] The diversity of sexual services is also phenomenal."Room salons," where men go to rent rooms and women in order to conduct business or relax over liquor and lewd jokes--the women are sometimes available for sex--are common currency among South Koreans today; they range from the cheap and seedy to the very posh and outrageously expensive. In addition, barber shops, massage parlors, bars, tea rooms, and hotels--from local inns to Seoul's luxury accommodations--have women available for sexual services.

With the boom in such commerce and the accompanying news stories of women being kidnapped in daylight by flesh traffickers, [155] public pressure for governmental intervention began to mount beginning in the mid-1980s. In response,

> the government came up with series [sic] of administrative measures--raids, cancellation of business permits if found"decadent," forced closure of unlicensed premises, tax investigations of suspected establishments, and in Jan. 1990, as a final blow, prohibition of business for entertainment after midnight. [156]

Shin highlights the fact that such establishments catering to foreigners or located at tourist hotels"were excluded from this measure and allowed to stay open until 4 a.m. as usual, again reflecting the government policy of treating tourists differently [for foreign exchange]." [157]

If there is a"culture of prostitution" in South Korea, it is one that has actively and rapidly been forged as a strategy for economic growth and international recognition--tourism. Selling sexual services has become so commonplace that Koreans often speak about seemingly respectable female college students earning their pocket money by turning tricks. Lucia Chong, a Catholic missionary who serves the prostitute community in Itaewon, told me in the spring of 1992 that several GI prostitutes complained that wealthy college students are frequenting It'aewon clubs to pick up GIs. Some pay the GI--with leather jackets, jewelry, and other gifts--for the sexual encounters. This angered the prostitutes because the"rich girls" were taking potential customers away; they would say,"What man wants to pay for sex when they can get gifts for it?" South Korea in the post-Olympic years appears to embody what Kathleen Barry calls the"prostitution of sexuality." It is a society that is"sexually saturated" and"equated with the female body--where it is gotten, had, taken." [158]

External intervention in Korean society has prominently helped shape the history of modern prostitution. In 1916, the Japanese colonial government legalized prostitution for the first time in Korean history by first importing Japanese prostitutes for the Japanese ruling elite in Korea. [159] Japanese prostitutes numbered 2,947 in 1906, 4,253 in 1980, and 4,417 in 1910. [160] Eventually, Korean women, particularly poor women, also participated in this legalized prostitution. Several Korean researchers have asserted that"most of the present red-light districts [in South Korea] were formed at this time." [161] Japanese organization and control of Korean women's sexuality reached their climax with the recruitment and deployment of approximately 200,000 girls and young women as members of the *chongsindae* (Women's Volunteer Corp), today known as comfort women. [162] These sex slaves of the Japanese military serve as the historical prototype of U.S.-oriented prostitution in Korea. Indeed, some of the staffworkers at My Sister's Place believe, based on their piecing together of older prostitutes' personal histories, that some former comfort women also worked as GI prostitutes among the first generation of kijich'on sex workers. [163]

The Allied defeat of Japan and the consequent liberation of Korea from Japanese rule in 1945 set the stage for governmental sanction of prostitution by later South Korean administrations. The U.S. Military (occupation) Government (1945-48) established the first official women's welfare policy in Korean history, as well as the first Women's Department in the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs in 1946. [164] Although the occupation authorities prohibited the sale of women and the contracting of women for sale in May 1946, they did not outlaw prostitution. General Archer Lerche, the Chief of Civil Administration of the U.S. Military Government, stated that the government has no intention to prohibit prostitution. [165] The United States did later prohibit licensed prostitution in November 1947 (effective 1948), imposing punishment of less than two years and/or less than 50,000 won on all persons, including the customers, involved in prostitution. [166] But the transfer of government into Korean hands, after the election of 1948, and the GI prostitution already in full swing around U.S. camps prevented the enforcement of this law.

Increasingly, Koreans view the history of prostitution and the contemporary forms of sex tourism in Korea as manifestations of foreign domination over their country. Shin effectively has argued that the use of women's sexual labor for economic growth reflects South Korea's dependent development status. More graphically, Korean women have deemed the kisaeng tourism activities of Japanese men in the early-to-mid 1970s a revival of Japanese imperialism of 1910 to 1945. Students of Ewha Womans [Women's] University, the leading institution of women's higher education in South Korea, publicized the following in their protests against kisaeng tourism:

> Our country should not become Japan's colony again. Under the title of"the promotion of tourism" as a national policy, many women are being sold as prey to economic animals to help pay off a foreign debt of $5,500,000,000. The sound of Japanese wooden sandals is now taking the place of the sound of their military boots. The Japanese are coming to this land as our bosses again. [167]

Similarly, anti-base activists and Korean feminists are increasingly casting the kijich'on prostitute as a victim of U.S. imperialism and militarism.

Note 1: Saundra Sturdevant and Brenda Stolzfus, *Let the Good Times Roll*, p. 313.

Note 2: These are private businesses that assist Korean women and GIs in preparing the paperwork for their marriage application process. Marriages must be approved by the military command and processed through the U.S. Embassy in Seoul.

Note 3: Interview with the former Blue House Political Secretary in charge of overseeing the Clean-Up Campaign, Seoul, June 11, 1992.

Note 4: In *Camp Arirang*, a documentary film on U.S. military prostitution in Korea (produced and directed by Diana S. Lee and Grace Yoonkyung Lee, 1995). Jonathan Simmons, a former GI, says of American Town: "It blew my mind; it was a town built on prostitution."

Note 5: See *Camp Arirang*.

Note 6: See *Camp Arirang*.

Note 7: *Mal*, Magazine, vol. 26 (August 1988), p. 108 (in Korean).

Note 8: Ibid., p. 108.

Note 9: *The Women Outside: Korean Women and the U.S. Military*, a documentary film, directed by J. T. Takagi and Hye Jung Park, 1996, aired on PBS, July 16, 1996.

Note 10: Sturdevant and Stolzfus, p. 212.

Note 11: Ibid., p. 192.

Note 12: Ibid., pp. 230-33.

Note 13: Ibid., p. 231.

Note 14: Ibid., p. 232.

Note 15: See *Camp Arirang*,. Korean prostitutes are not unique in this sense; sex workers catering to U.S. soldiers stationed in Hawaii during World War II used morphine and opium in order to endure their work. See Beth Bailey and David Farber, *The First Strange Place*, p. 107.

Note 16: Interview, Washington, D.C., April 24, 1991.

Note 17: Interview, Princeton, N.J., May 31, 1990.

Note 18: Sturdevant and Stolzfus, p. 206.

Note 19: Rainbow Center, "Rainbow News Letter," #3, January 1994, p. 8.

Note 20: My Sister's Place, *Newsletter*, Fall 1989, p. 2.

Note 21: Ibid.

Note 22: Sturdevant and Stolzfus, pp. 212-13.

Note 23: See *Camp Arirang*.

Note 24: Ibid.

Note 25: Sturdevant and Stolzfus, p. 230.

Note 26: *Mal*, Magazine, vol. 26 (August 1988), p. 108.

Note 27: Sturdevant and Stolzfus, p. 203.

Note 28: In 1963, 68% of women worked in agriculture and 7% in manufacturing. In 1980, the figures were 39% and 22.3% respectively. By 1990, the figures were 20.4% and 28% respectively. In 1990, 51.6% worked in the service sector. From Kyung Ae Park, "Women and Development," p. 132. These figures are from the Economic Planning Board, Republic of Korea, *Annual Report on the Economically Active Population Survey*.

Note 29: Eighth U.S. Army, "Human Factors Research, Part I," p. 9.

Note 30: Ibid.

Note 31: My Sister's Place, *Newsletter*, Summer 1988, p. 2.

Note 32: Conversations with staff, My Sister's Place, 1992.

Note 33: My Sister's Place, *Newsletter*, Spring 1989, p. 3.

Note 34: MoHSA, *Yullak yôsông silt'ae chosa kyôlgwa pogosô*, (Report on the investigation of the state of prostitutes), 1977, p. 37.

Note 35: Sturdevant and Stolzfus, p. 192.

Note 36: Ibid.

Note 37: EUSA, "Memorandum for Record, Subj: VD Control in Uijongbu Vicinity, 1963." The contents of the memo suggest that the author was stationed in Uijongbu.

Note 38: Sturdevant and Stolzfus, p. 184.

Note 39: "Human Factors Research, Part I," p. 7.

Note 40: For example, see My Sister's Place, *Newsletter*, #5 (in English), Fall 1989 and #5 (in Korean), February 1990.

Note 41: Sturdevant and Stolzfus, p. 231.

Note 42: From the early 1950s to the early 1990s, over 100,000 Korean women have immigrated to the United States as wives of servicemen. Not all of the women were prostitutes. See Daniel Booduck Lee, "Marital Adjustment Between Korean Women and American Servicemen," p. 102.

Note 43: *Mal*, Magazine, vol. 26 (August 1988), p. 109.

Note 44: See *Camp Arirang*.

Note 45: Cynthia Enloe, "It Takes Two," p. 23.

Note 46: Ibid.

Note 47: Migun kiji pandae chon'guk kongdong taech'aek, *Yangk'i ko hom*, (Yankee Go Home), p. 72.

Note 48: The contemporary sex industry in Asia offers a myriad of sexual "entertainment" possibilities. Some establishments feature stage shows where women pick up coins and smoke cigarettes with their vaginas.

Note 49: Elim Kim, "Research for the Reform of the Law on the Prevention of Prostitution," p. 89 (in Korean).

Note 50: Ibid., p. 75.

Note 51: *Yangk'i ko hom*, pp. 76-77.

Note 52: *Yangk'i ko hom*, pp. 74-75.

Note 53: Editorial Board, *Tosô, Publishers*, *Sarang ûi P'umasi*,(Love for Sale), p. 94.

Note 54: *Tonga Ilbo*, July 22, 1962 (EUSA translation).

Note 55: *Yangk'i ko hom*, pp. 76-77.

Note 56: *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, July 15, 1971.

Note 57: "Human Factors Research, Part I: Korean Sample and Implications," 1965, p. 7. This rate pertained to the Yongsan area in Seoul in the mid-1960s. Rural areas generally had lower rates for sex.

Note 58: Bruce Cumings, "Silent But Deadly," pp. 170 and 175, respectively.

Note 59: Cynthia Enloe, "A Feminist Perspective," p. 101.

Note 60: Sturdevant and Stolzfus, p. 209.

Note 61: One of the major causes of this anti-Americanism stems from the belief among many Koreans that the U.S. government supported the Korean military's crackdown on demonstrators in Kwangju, commonly known as the "Kwangju Massacre," in May 1980. Dissident groups and human rights observers have estimated the civilian death toll at approximately 2,000. Korean activists have charged that the Commander of the US forces, which has operational control over the ROK military, permitted the deployment of Korean troops for the violent crackdown. See Donald N. Clark, ed., *The Kwangju Uprising: Shadows over the Regime in South Korea*; and Tim Shorrock, "The Struggle for Democracy in South Korea in the 1980s and the Rise of Anti-Americanism."

Note 62: Sturdevant and Stolzfus, p. 209.

Note 63: *Rainbow News Letter*, #3, p. 8.

Note 64: *New York Times*, March 7, 1996.

Note 65: Ibid.

Note 66: *Far Eastern Economic Review*, November 2, 1995.

Note 67: Christine Wing, "The United States in the Pacific," p. 141.

Note 68: Aida Santos, "Gathering the Dust: The Bases Issue in the Philippines," p. 37.

Note 69: Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches, and Bases*, p. 86.

Note 70: Enloe, "A Feminist Perspective," p. 98.

Note 71: Lloyd B. Lewis, *The Tainted War: Culture and Identity in Vietnam Narratives*, p. 55.

Note 72: Ibid.

Note 73: Ibid., p. 56.

Note 74: Max Hastings, *The Korean War*, p. 241.

Note 75: Ibid. Also see Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War*, vol. 2, *The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950*, pp. 690-97.

Note 76: Cumings, "Silent But Deadly," p. 175.

Note 77: *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, July 3, 1977.

Note 78: Interview, Washington, D.C., April 19, 1991.

Note 79: Aurora Camacho de Schmidt, "Voices of Hope and Anger: Women Resisting Militarization," p. 110.

Note 80: It is interesting to note that "LBSM" is a spoof on "SLBM," submarine-launched ballistic missiles, which forms one leg of the U.S. nuclear "tripod."

Note 81: Santos, "Gathering the Dust," p. 40.

Note 82: Ibid.

Note 83: Thanh-dam Truong, *Sex, Money and Morality*, pp. 161-67.

Note 84: Sturdevant and Stolzfus, "Disparate Threads of the Whole: An Interpretive Essay," in *Let the Good Times Roll*, p. 311.

Note 85: Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches, and Bases*, p. 89. Enloe refers to the *Christian Science Monitor*, February 18, 1988.

Note 86: Camacho de Schmidt, p. 112.

Note 87: Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches, and Bases*, p. 87.

Note 88: Ibid.

Note 89: My Sister's Place, *Newsletter*, Fall 1989, p. 2.

Note 90: Christopher Acebedo, Ruby Acebedo, Tyson David, and Brenda David v. United States of America, Complaint for Damages Under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. S1491.

Note 91: Law Firm of Cotchett, Illston & Pitre, "Press Release," March 3, 1993.

Note 92: See *The Women Outside*.

Note 93: Interview, Princeton, N.J., May 31, 1990.

Note 94: Young Mi Pak, "U.S. Military Presence in Korea and Its Effect on Women," p. 23.

Note 95: Interview, Princeton, N.J., May 31, 1990.

Note 96: Ibid.

Note 97: Interviews, Washington, D.C., April 19, 1991.

Note 98: Interview, Washington, D.C., April 24, 1991.

Note 99: Ibid.

Note 100: Conversation, Washington, D.C., April 1991.

Note 101: "Human Factors Research, Part I," p. 6.

Note 102: Ibid., p. 10.

Note 103: Interview, Princeton, N.J., May 31, 1990.

Note 104: Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, p. 348.

Note 105: Barbara Meil Hobson, *Uneasy Virtue*, p. 165.

Note 106: Ibid.

Note 107: Allan M. Brandt, *No Magic Bullet*, p. 115.

Note 108: Ibid.

Note 109: Ibid.

Note 110: Hobson, p. 167.

Note 111: Ibid., p. 171.

Note 112: Brandt, p. 120.

Note 113: Hobson, p. 180.

Note 114: Brandt, pp. 105-6.

Note 115: Capt. J. B. Wayne, ACofs, J-5, "Comments on Draft Talking Paper Entitled Immorality and VD," November 19, 1964; also, Letter from Lt. Gen. T. W. Dunn, Headquarters I Corps Group, to Gen. Hamilton Howze, EUSA Commanding General, July 19, 1964.

Note 116: "Human Factors Research, Part I," p. 3.

Note 117: Felix Moos described camptowns in Korea as "buffer communit[ies] in which compromises between the two cultures are reached and in which fusion of two patterns takes place." Moos, "Some Aspects of Korean Acculturation and Value Orientation Since 1940." But Americans and Koreans familiar with camptowns whom I spoke with while in Korea (1991/92) claimed that camptowns, rather than serving as "buffers," serve as "walls," blocking Americans from entering Korean society and blocking "normal" Koreans from interacting with Americans.

Note 118: "Human Factors Research, Part I," p. 13.

Note 119: Jae On Kim, "The Idea of Chastity in Korean Folk Tales," p. 9.

Note 120: Hei Soo Shin, p. 42.

Note 121: Ibid., p. 44.

Note 122: Ibid., p. 67.

Note 123: Cumings, "Silent But Deadly," p. 174.

Note 124: Hei Soo Shin, p. 62.

Note 125: Ibid., p. 63.

Note 126: Yongsu Kang, "A Study on Prostitution in Korea," pp. 97-98 (in Korean).

Note 127: Hei Soo Shin, p. 61.

Note 128: Sonsuk Pak, "Yo,song ui song'u,l chungsim u,ro bon maemaech'un chongch'aek e kwanhan yon'gu" (Research on prostitution policy from the perspective of women's sexuality), p. 38.

Note 129: Hyoung Cho and P'ilhwa Chang, "Perspectives on Prostitution in the Korean Legislature: 1948-1989," p. 95 (in Korean).

Note 130: Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, *Punyô haengjông 40 nyôn*, (40 Years of Women's Administration), p. 111.

Note 131: Paraphrased from Elim Kim, p. 90.

Note 132: Cho and Chang, p. 95.

Note 133: Yayori Matsui, "Why I Oppose Kisaeng Tours," p. 68.

Note 134: Established in 1962, KITA changed its name to Korea National Tourism Corporation in 1984.

Note 135: Korea Church Women United, "Kisaeng Tourism," p. 26.

Note 136: Ibid.

Note 137: Paraphrased from Cho and Chang, p. 87.

Note 138: Ibid., p. 92. Cho and Chang note that legislators exempted high-class prostitution (*yojông*,) from control/abolition. *Yojông*, considered the most elite of the numerous forms of sexual entertainment/prostitution available in Korea, are usually frequented by Korean politicians and wealthy businessmen.

Note 139: Ibid., p. 92.

Note 140: Ibid., p. 92.

Note 141: Ibid., p. 94.

Note 142: "Human Factors Research: Part I," p. 13.

Note 143: Interview, Seoul, May 12, 1992.

Note 144: My Sister's Place, *Newsletter*, July 1991, p. 8.

Note 145: EUSA Office of the Inspector General, Memorandum from Col. Frederick B. Outlaw to EUSA Chief of Staff, Re: "Memorandum for Information of the Chief of Staff; Subject: Observations Regarding Prostitution," March 18, 1964.

Note 146: Conversations with Rev. Han, Songtan City, May 1992.

Note 147: Korean Church Women United, "Kisaeng Tourism," p. 11.

Note 148: Ibid., p. 10.

Note 149: Ibid., p. 52.

Note 150: Ibid., p. 11.

Note 151: Hei Soo Shin, p. 58.

Note 152: Ibid.

Note 153: Ibid. p. 5. Shin cites the research of the Seoul YMCA (1989), which produced a comprehensive study on "entertainment culture" and measures to fight it.

Note 154: Ibid.

Note 155: From the mid-1980s to the early 1990s, stories of women and girls being kidnapped, drugged, and sold into prostitution buzzed all around the major Korean cities. The media often reported on this phenomenon, and family and friends warned one another of the dangers of women walking on streets and taking taxis alone. When I was doing my research, several relatives urged me to take precautions and gave me tips on how to resist such attacks and seek help.

Note 156: Hei Soo Shin, p. 69.

Note 157: Ibid.

Note 158: Kathleen Barry, *The Prostitution of Sexuality*, p. 20.

Note 159: Pak, p. 31.

Note 160: Hei Soo Shin, p. 46, n. 8.

Note 161: Ibid., p. 45.

Note 162: See George Hicks, *The Comfort Women*.

Note 163: Conversations, Spring 1992.

Note 164: Pak, p. 36.

Note 165: Ibid., p. 34.

Note 166: Hei Soo Shin, p. 48, n. 13.

Note 167: Asian Women's Association, "Prostitution Tourism," p. 15.

2. Interstate Relations and Women

Security studies, which have focused on the "guns and bombs" issues in international relations, have had very little to say about interstate relations and women. Perhaps Thucydides, a patriarch of the Realist tradition, of which contemporary security studies is an offspring, best summed up the connection between the politics among states and women through the words of his Athenian delegates to Melos: "The strong do what they will and the weak do what they must." He was referring to Melos as the weak party that was forced to accept Athenian rule through choice or conquest. The leaders of Melos chose independence and paid dearly for it--the Athenian navy conquered the island by force; it killed all young men and took the women as slaves. [1] Women as victims of war has been the legacy.

Conventional security studies talk about alliances and focus on the relationship between the international system and the interactions among states [2] but say nothing about women and gender. [3] By addressing the relationship between the interests and actions of elites in institutions and foreign policy actions, studies on organizational behavior (bureaucratic politics) try to teach us that states are not monolithic abstract entities and that people do account for the decision making. [4] But again, such studies are silent about women and gender. For the most part, security studies do not say much about common people, with the exception of their potential as resources for and supporters of the state. [5] Schelling belies the ultimate cynicism in Realist thinking, when he highlights the central role of common people as potential or real recipients of pain and suffering; this, he says, is a form of power--the "power to hurt." [6]

Feminist scholars have been prolific in filling the void of knowledge about women and war. Elshtain offered the first panoramic view of women and war from the perspective of a political theorist, focusing on the gendered underpinnings of women's and men's relationships to war and peace. [7] Spike Peterson has provocatively critiqued the gendered nature of the modern state, the wielder of "legitimate violence," as predator, rather than genuine protector, of women. [8] Jeanne Vickers and Tsehai Berhane-Selassie alert us to the detriment to women's welfare as a consequence of large military budgets. [9] A plethora of authors have graphically illustrated the horrors of war that women as victims experience--Susan Brownmiller's accounts of rapes in war are classic examples. [10] And everyday newspaper accounts of female refugees from Rwanda and Burundi remind us of the human atrocities that are today caused by war.

We know from these and other accounts that there are explicit connections between guns and bombs (or spears and canons) and women and that to a great extent, the relationship has been sexually defined. But the numerous writings on women and war say little about how power disparities in interstate relations affect and are affected by women. Most of the writings also focus on the gendered premises and consequences of international politics, but not on the gendered processes.

Feminist scholars and activists of the Marxist tradition pick up where Thucydides left off by transferring the power disparities between nations, or governments, onto women's bodies. The argument is that the relative weakness of a small state leaves its women unprotected and vulnerable to the violence, abuse, and exploitation by the strong state and its agents. Simply, the domination of a weak country leads to the foreign domination (economically, politically, sexually) of the women of that country. For example, Mies claims that "imperialist industrial capital follows the imperialist military, [sic] both, however, strengthen the sex industry." [11] Koreans on the left argue similarly that U.S. imperialism and militarism are responsible for the sexual exploitation of and physical violence perpetrated on kijich'on women. [12] Yu Pongnim, a cofounder of My Sister's Place, also publicizes this view. One Mrs. Choe, a former kijich'on prostitute, linked together the weakness of Korea, vis-ˆ-vis the United States, and kijich'on women's own powerlessness: "Korea was a land where only idiots lived: The government could not even defend its own people's inter ests with respect to the U.S." [13] Kim Yonja, a former prostitute for twenty-five years, echoed this view:

> [B]ecause kijich'on prostitutes had no political power to effect policy changes, the interest [in security and other governmental policies] wasn't there. But this refers to Koreans in general--there really isn't much that we Koreans have been able to influence vis-ˆ-vis the U.S. Is there?,/font> [14]

There is no doubt that conquering nations and colonizing nations imposed their sexual demands on colonized women. Japan's forced prostitution of up to 200,000 Korean women during World War II is the most contemporary and egregious example. Cooper and Stoler point out that colonial "[policy makers] fantasized about what people did at night and thus alternately saw prostitution, concubinage, and 'healthy conjugal sex' as the basis on which colonial authority might be secured or irreparably undermined." [15] But an historical look at U.S.-Korean camptown prostitution raises a paradox and questions the accuracy of equating a stronger state's sexual domination and control of women with the political and economic weakness of the dominated state. In South Korea, the U.S. military was not able to control kijich'on prostitutes in the early 1960s but was able to do so in the early 1970s. In 1964, Lieutenant General T. W. Dunn, the Commander of I Corps (Group), vehemently complained about prostitution and VD in a letter to the Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) Commanding General Hamilton Howze. He stated that the U.S. forces cannot "accept the deplorable conditions as an unchangeable part of service of US personnel in Korea." Relatedly, he complained about the lack of cooperation on the part of the ROK government to control the women and VD: "I am convinced that we receive mostly words and bows and little practical help in areas vital to the fundamental problem." [16]

In the early 1960s, the USFK had been unsuccessful in persuading the ROK government to take action. An official from the Eighth Army (EUSA) IO (International Relations Office) also observed, in his memorandum to the EUSA Deputy Chief of Staff, that with respect to prostitution control, "our negotiating position appears to be weak, for we have no lever to force the ROKs to improve their efforts. Also, the VD problem to them is a minor one." [17] The Korean government considered kijich'on prostitution and venereal disease primarily a US problem and offered no or little help to US military authorities.

The immediate and favorable response of the Korean government, in 1971, to USFK complaints of unruly and unlawful conduct in camptowns was in and of itself a landmark in the history of ROK-U.S. military relations. For the first time, the Korean government went out of its way to address civil-military relations and to meet the standards of the U.S. authorities. Prior to 1971, the Korean government had not paid much attention to camptown problems. [18] For example, the only time such issues had been addressed by the Joint Committee, in 1968, U.S. complaints quickly became a non-issue. [19] Although the then U.S. Representative to the JC had painted a portrait of serious security threats, both political and economic, to the ROK, posed by lawlessness in the Osan area, the ROK Representative disagreed with his counterpart's assessment of the situation and forced his counterpart to back down and accept the ROK assessment of the situation. In 1968, what the USFK had deemed a potential Communist threat to the political and economic security of Korea, the Korean government had rejected as not a threat at all. However, three years later, the Korean government appropriated as a Korean problem what the United States depicted as primarily an in-house U.S. forces problem (black-white racism and lack of troop discipline). Without doubt, the Korean government felt more vulnerable to U.S. demands in 1971 than in 1968, and the importance of base-community relations in the greater context of the U.S.-Korea security relationship had increased significantly.

Several former prostitutes I spoke with recalled the 1960s as a time when they were "most free." They ran around wild, they said, drinking and fighting in public with GIs. They also got into violent brawls with one another; they cursed vehemently and even smashed glass bottles on top of one another's heads and ground the pieces into the scalp. They were brazen, they said, and fearless of governmental authority. Some boasted that even the police feared them and mostly left them alone. [20] The women did not have much governmental authority to fear in the early 1960s because the Korean government generally applied a laissez-faire policy to camptown affairs, including the women's activities.

Korea was weaker economically and militarily in the early 1960s, and hence more dependent on the United States, than in the 1970s. For example, per capita GNP in 1961 was $82 and in 1971 $285 (in 1990 terms), [21] and South Korea's GNP per capita had outpaced that of North Korea in the decade. The South also had a more technologically sophisticated military in the early 1970s than in the decade prior. [22] But it was in the early 1970s that the Korean government actively began to participate in the control over these women. The increased economic and military capabilities of the ROK in the 1970s, which logically should have decreased U.S. dominance in the relationship, and the retrenchment of the United States from "imperialistic interventionism" in Vietnam (and related reduction of its troops from Asia) did not translate into decreased control and abuse of the Korean kijich'on women.

The Korean case points out that foreign control and domination of women is variable and that Marxist-influenced correlations between interstate relations and women's oppression do not account for the variability. The basic problem is that such correlations assume a zero-sum relationship between a stronger state and a weaker state's interactions. But studies on organizational/institutional behavior, big power/small power relations, [23] and dependent development [24] point to the fact that actual bargaining activities of states are not fixed by discernible disparities in power. They illustrate ways in which a weaker power can gain leverage over the stronger power, given a particular context of interests and commitments. Viewing strong-weak state relations as an interactive process, then, offers us a more open-ended array of consequences and roles in interstate relations for women.

In addition, perpetuating a static dichotomy of power relations between nations, so that the women of the weaker nation are always oppressed and exploited by the men of the stronger nation (with the help of local operators, of course), does not help us "disaggregrate" the content and degree of exploitation and abuse. With respect to the U.S.-ROK power relations and military prostitution, what exactly are we trying to explain? Causes and characteristics of the sex trade? Variations in prostitution practices among the different military camps? Changes in the system over time? Or do we focus on the kind and degree of poverty, social degradation, and "choice" confronting the individual women in the prostitution systems?

What I try to do in this book is outline a framework for understanding the intersections of interstate relations and women's lives by drawing upon both established approaches in international relations and feminist studies. I particularly want to focus on specific aspects of kijich'on women's lives, rather than their general state of physical, economic, and social hardships, as manifestations of interstate relations.

First, we need to begin viewing even the most dispossessed women as "players" in world politics; without jumping back and forth from two opposite poles of self-agency and victim-hood, a middleground must be found. [25] The kijich'on prostitutes mentioned in this book were definitely not autonomous actors because they were economically and socially dispossessed. Moreover, their physical freedom was often limited. And most had psychological dependence on their pimps, club managers, or GI customers. But neither were these women simple recipients of governmental actions. The fact is that both the USFK and the ROK government acknowledged and treated these women as significant players in the Clean-Up Campaign. The women did not choose this particular camptown project, but the Campaign's success depended on these women's participation. Participation for these women was not free of co-optation, but neither were all women beaten into submission nor silent about the effects of U.S. foreign policy changes on their lives. The women themselves helped forge kijich'on residents' sentiments against U.S. military domination in their lives and used some of the Campaign's repressive policies to pursue their self-interest (chapter 6).

Keohane and Nye's early conception of transnational politics is helpful here: a "conception of world politics in which the central phenomenon is bargaining between a variety of autonomous or semiautonomous actors [i.e., not just governments]." [26] However, although transnationalism originally opened up international space to include nonstate actors, the great majority of the world's women cannot be included because they are without "significant resources" or "substantial control" over issue areas, requirements that Keohane and Nye include in their definition of transnational actor. [27] Elites and powerful transnational organizations, like multinational companies, the Red Cross, and Amnesty International, remain the source and focus of politics for many transnationalists. If we abide by such characterization of international actor, we would never be able to see how Korean kijich'on women, who lacked "significant resources" and control, had any significant role in transforming camptown relations. We need to broaden the content of significant resources to include not only money, guns, diplomatic weight, and public opinion, but also sex. As long as the prostitutes' bodies served as the daily "glue" between camptown Americans and Koreans, their role as a "player" in kijich'on politics was undeniable.

About twenty-five years later, current conceptions of nongovernmental actor have not expanded significantly upon Keohane and Nye's original formulation; the definition of "actor" as applied to the poorest and most dispossessed of women still goes wanting. In 1996, Weiss and Gordenker emphasize organization and "internationally-endorsed objectives" [28] as the defining characteristics of nonstate actors. They argue that no matter what one calls nonstate actors, "[t]here seems no quarrel, however, with the notion that these organizations consist of durable, bounded, voluntary relationships among individuals to produce a partic ular product, using specific techniques." [29] Again, these parameters leave most of the world's women outside the domain of recognized political processes and in the role of victim or bystander. Most poor women's political interests are matters of day-to-day survival, not of bounded durability, and most assert their interests through whatever apertures in the system they can take advantage of, rather than through organized techniques aimed at a "particular product." It is more useful to view disempowered women as players in world politics from the perspective of what they do *with* politics across borders--survive, adapt, facilitate, criticize, and resist--than what they do *to* it. Such women may not mitigate the sovereignty of states, as transnational organizations do, and they may not forge interests and coalitions across borders, as NGOs do, but they do share in the process of "politici[zing] the previously unpolicitized and connect[ing] the local and the global." [30]

Second, in order to examine the dynamic of interstate relationships and their linkages with women's lives, we need to keep in mind that the "strong state," "the military," even "capitalist interests," are not monoliths. The papers in the November 1989 issue of *American Ethnologist* remind scholars of imperialism and colonialism that there were competing "colonialisms" among different groups of colonizers and colonists even in one location. Similarly, the U.S. military does not maintain the same and constant strategic and organizational interests, nor do these interests always coincide with those of the White House or Congress. And the U.S. military exhibits different norms and practices regarding fraternization and sexual interaction with local women in different overseas camp areas. Organizational studies help us maintain these distinctions and urge us to look for competition and bargaining activities among different groups with vested interests as a way to understand specific policy decisions and outcomes relating to women. [31]

Like transnational studies, the bureaucratic politics model also focuses on the role of elites in policy making, including, in recent years, women. As more women have joined the ranks in these institutions and helped formulate women-oriented policies, they remind us that institutional cultures are not gender-neutral and therefore not value-free in making and implementing policies. Kardam and Whitworth offer excellent examples of ways in which even "women-friendly" offices and projects within, respectively, the World Bank and the International Labor Organization suffer from gendered biases about the meaning, context and goals of development and labor for women. [32] Kardam points out that the World Bank's bias toward the economic "efficiency" and "effectiveness" of their projects overshadows the "equity" and social welfare needs of most women in developing countries. [33] Similarly, Enloe and others have observed that military institutions are severely gendered in their organizational structure and culture. [34] For example, Enloe states: "A drill sergeant is trying to devastate a resistant young man when he contemptuously shouts into his face, 'Woman!' To be prepared for combat, to soldier, a man must be stripped of all his 'feminine' attributes." [35] This illustrates the way that the U.S. military establishes its organizational hierarchy and gendered ideology by degrading the feminine and constructing an acceptable masculinity.

But these pathbreaking studies still leave us with more questions than answers about how these organizations negotiate 1) the larger power disparities between the country or countries they are sponsored or funded by and those they are trying to aid; 2) the interests and capabilities of host nations and local people. Moreover, studies on organizations and women tell us little about the interactions of bureaucracies and the poorest and most powerless of women, and studies that focus on gendered ideologies of organizations cast women as recipients of actions based on such ideologies.

Feminist scholars of dependency and dependent development have sketched the connection from the international economic system to the limited control of developing countries' governments over the system, to the government's use of women, based on gendered ideology, for its own aims, to the work choices and living conditions of women. [36] For example, Truong has offered a compelling study of sex tourism industries in Southeast Asia as the outcome of interests and interactions between the Asian governments and international organizations and multinational corporations of wealthy countries. [37] But she does not include the residents and authorities of specific localities, who actually participate in and oversee the daily operations of the sex industry, as part of the sex tourism-building process. Nor are the women who work in the industries part of the bargaining process; they are the recipients of others' actions. In a different kind of study, Ward conducts statistical correlations of dependency (commodity concentration and foreign trade structure) and women's status and fertility, [38] but we are left with no idea of the different actors and their interests and interactions that have generated negative effects for women. What we need is to focus our inquiry on specific international actors, broadly defined, their interests and resources,their gender ideologies, and their interactive process.

Last, both dependency and dependent development approaches remind us that governmental and non-governmental elites use different classes and groups of individuals to pursue the "national interest." It goes without saying that all women of one country are not involved in or affected by the dynamic of interstate relations in the same way. Class, local culture, and race interface with a particular foreign policy issue and the interests and capabilities of governments. The key is to pinpoint which women at what time and in what gendered way are identified with the politics of a foreign policy issue. Korean kijich'on prostitutes' status as the "lowest of the low"--in terms of class, educational background, and social stigma of their work--and their key role as daily providers of a resource--sex--facilitated their "convertibility," through the Camptown Clean-Up Campaign, into joint governmental instruments of foreignpolicy.

The following chapters illustrate that power disparities do determine the general framework of interstate relations--the Nixon Doctrine framed U.S.-Korea relations in the first half of the 1970s--but that the dynamic of interests, bargaining tools, and coalitions among governmental and nongovernmental actors determine the relationship between interstate relations and women.

Note 1: 1. Thucydides, "The Melian Debate" in *Classics of International Relations*, 2d ed., ed. John A. Vasquez (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1990), pp. 16Ð20.

Note 2: For a succinct overview of the alliance literature, see Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, pp. 6Ð11.

Note 3: A few of the most recent studies, especially postmodernist scholarship on security, do mention gender as a way to critique conventional understandings of security. For example, see David Campbell, *Writing Security*,. Also Michael Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy*, ch. 3, which offers a historical examination of different ideologies that have informed U.S. foreign policy, is an excellent study of the intersections of race, gender, and international politics. For a feminist critique of conventional security studies, see Ann Tickner, *Gender in International Relations*.

Note 4: See Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision*; Morton Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*.

Note 5: E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919Ð1939*, pp. 132Ð45. Carr discusses the importance of individuals in forming public opinion, a form of power for states, which governmental elites must successfully manipulate.

Note 6: Thomas Schelling, "The Diplomacy of Violence," p. 169.

Note 7: Jean Bethke Elshtain, *Women and War*.

Note 8: V. Spike Peterson, "Security and Sovereign States: What Is at Stake in Taking Feminism Seriously?"

Note 9: Tsehai Berhane-Selassie, "The Impact of Industrial Development: Military Build-Up and Its Effect on Women"; Jeanne Vickers, *Women and War*.

Note 10: Susan Brownmiller, *Against Our Will*, ch. 3.

Note 11: Maria Mies, *Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale*, p. 139.

Note 12: Migun kiji pandae chon'guk kongdong taech'aek (National Association Against U.S. Bases), *Yangk'i ko hom*, (Yankee Go Home); Pusan minjok minju undong yonhap (Federation of Pusan People's Democracy Movement), *Nôhûi ga mullônaya uri ga sanda*, (You must withdraw so that we can live), part 2, ch. 2; *Malchi*, (*Mal*, Magazine).

Note 13: Telephone interview with Mrs. Ch'oe via Mrs. Smith, April 2, 1993.

Note 14: Interview with Kim Yonja, Songt'an, May 3, 1992.

Note 15: Frederick Cooper and Ann L. Stoler, "Tensions of Empire," p. 614.

Note 16: Letter by Lt. Gen. T. W. Dunn, Commander of I Corps (Group) to EUSA Commanding General Hamilton Howze, July 19, 1964.

Note 17: Memorandum from EUSA IO to EUSA Deputy Chief of Staff, Re: "Construction of Medical Clinics," May 3, 1963.

Note 18: Interviews with a key initiator of the Clean-Up, Coscob, Connecticut, October 24, 1991; a USFK community relations officer and former member of the Subcommittee (1970s), Seoul, April 6, 1992.

Note 19: The then U.S. representative, Lt. Gen. Robert J. Friedman, described the USFK's alarm and sense of urgency regarding camptown problems. He stated that "North Korean intelligence and subversive agencies are known to be attempting to operate among criminal elements in the Republic of Korea" and that the "presence of such large, well-organized criminal groups in the immediate vicinity of the headquarters of the [US] Air Forces, Korea, offers the North Korean communist regime a lucrative target for exploitation, against the security interests of the Governments of both the Republic of Korea and of the United States." The then ROK representative, Yun Hajong, retorted that his government's investigations found to the contrary that the incidence of crime had decreased and KNP arrests had increased in the Osan area in 1968. Yun "concluded that he could not see that there existed general lawlessness or organized criminal elements at Osan." Gen. Friedman maintained that the situation remained serious but conceded that he "hope[d] that the ROK Representative's estimate of the situation at Chicol Village [Osan] was a more accurate assessment than that presented in the US statement." JC Minutes, #26, June 5, 1968.

Note 20: Conversations with Kim Yonja, Songt'an, Spring 1992; interview with Ms. Pae, Songt'an, June 6, 1992.

Note 21: Byung-Nak Song, *The Rise of the Korean Economy*, p. 60.

Note 22: For a breakdown of troop composition and armaments in the early 1970s see Col. T. N. Dupuy and Col. Wendell Blanchard, *The Almanac of World Military Power*.

Note 23: Robert O. Keohane, "The Big Influence of Small Allies," and "Lilliputians' Dilemmas"; Astri Suhrke, "Gratuity or Tyranny"; David Vital, *The Survival of Small States*.

Note 24: Fernando Enrique Cardoso, "Associated Dependent Development"; Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, *Dependency and Development in Latin America*; Peter Evans, *Dependent Development*.

Note 25: For example, Kathryn Ward, *Women Workers and Global Restructuring*, writes that women actively do resist patriarchal control and the negative aspects of global restructuring, including "working even though it is against cultural norms; manipulating racist and sexist managers into giving women privileges; participating in engagement parties and worker weekends; and unionizing" (p. 3). She includes both overt and passive forms of resistance (p. 15).

Note 26: Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, eds., *Transnational Relations and World Politics*, p. 380.

Note 27: Ibid.

Note 28: Thomas G. Weiss and Leon Gordenker, eds., *NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance*, p. 21.

Note 29: Ibid., p. 18.

Note 30: Ibid., p. 19.

Note 31: Graham Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis"; Graham Allison and Morton Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications."

Note 32: Nuket Kardam, "The Adaptability of International Development Agencies"; Sandra Whitworth, "Gender, International Relations, and the Case of the ILO."

Note 33: Kardam states that "[e]ffectiveness refers to the degree to which a given objective is achieved. Efficiency, on the other hand, is a measure of the relationship between given outcomes and their costs" (p. 117).

Note 34: Cynthia Enloe, *Does Khaki Become You?*; and "Beyond 'Rambo': Women and the Varieties of Militarized Masculinity"; and "Bananas, Bases, and Patriarchy."

Note 35: Enloe, *Does Khaki Become You?*, pp. 13Ð14.

Note 36: See June Nash and Maria Patricia Fernandez-Kelly, eds., *Women, Men, and the International Division of Labor*.

Note 37: Than-dam Truong, *Sex, Money and Morality*.

Note 38: Kathryn B. Ward, *Women in the World-System*.

3. U.S.-ROK Security and Civil-Military Relations: The Camptown Clean-Up Campaign

> We [Koreans] have come to know kijich'on as places cluttered with store signs written in English, bars that come to life in bright lights and wild music, overly made-up faces of women being fondled by drunken GIs, a place which is neither America nor Korea, a place where the state affairs and policies of both the United States and Korea meet face to face--such places we have come to call kijich'on. [1]

The Camptown Clean-Up Campaign (or Purification Movement) of 1971-76 represents in a nutshell a convergence of high politics (U.S. security policy toward South Korea) and low politics (local civil-military relations between Korean residents and the U.S. military). It offers an in-depth look at how national governments, local people, and representatives of foreign governments create and adapt to political and economic opportunities fostered by foreign policy changes at the top. An analysis of the Campaign illustrates that Washington's revision of its Asia policy in the late 1960s directly generated social and economic dislocations in the kijich'on areas and triggered new assertions and configurations of power and interest regarding camptown life by both Koreans and Americans.

The Nixon Doctrine, which signaled U.S. disentanglement with land wars in Asia, serves as the backdrop to discussing the depth and breadth of camptown problems and the joint U.S.-Korean actions taken to address them through the Camptown Clean-Up Campaign. The Campaign was initiated by the U.S.-Korea Status of Forces (SOFA) Joint Committee (JC). [2] Apart from the organizational imperative of maintaining military discipline and morale, improving local civil-military relations became a crucial link to improving U.S.-ROK security relations (chapter 5).

From 1971 to 1976, the ROK government and the U.S. military in Korea (U.S. Forces, Korea or USFK) instituted many changes in the physical and social environments of the towns adjacent to U.S. military bases. At no time before and after these five years has there been such constant and intense effort on the part of the JC, the USFK leadership, various levels of the ROK government, and local residents to improve civil-military relations. To resolve the problems, the JC established the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Civil-Military Relations (hereafter, Subcommittee) in September 1971, which in turn established seven panels to investigate specific problem areas and recommend action. Altogether, twenty-one Subcommittee reports, based on numerous field investigations, were presented to and approved by the JC during the five-year period.

The Nixon Doctrine and Troop Reduction

We have no intention of forever having troops in South Korea.
&nb sp; --William Rogers, U.S. Secretary of State, 1970 [3]

On July 24, 1969, President Richard Nixon, en route to Guam, told reporters that the United States would seek to reduce its military involvement in Asia and encourage the "Asianization" of conflicts on that continent. Originally called the "Guam Doctrine" and better known as the "Nixon Doctrine," this change of foreign policy was a result of U.S. public pressures to get out of Vietnam, the war's drain on the U.S.

economy, the new president's intention to uphold his campaign promise to "withdraw honorably" from Southeast Asia, and the new administration's aspiration to meet the geopolitical challenges and opportunities generated by the Sino-Soviet split of the late 1960s. Throughout the early 1970s, the Nixon administration developed its strategy for a new relationship with Asian nations, based on the maintenance of U.S. security commitments to and increased burden-sharing by its Asian allies. Simply put, the Nixon Doctrine stated: "We shall be faithful to our treaty commitments, but we shall reduce our involvement and our presence in other nations' affairs." [4]

In practical terms, this meant the reduction and/or withdrawal of U.S. troops from Asian countries and future restraint in sending U.S. forces to Asia (based on "case-by-case" decision making). [5] And the United States continued its promise of including South Korea in its nuclear umbrella. By the end of 1971, U.S. forces in Korea had been cut by 20,000, second in size to the 265,000 withdrawn from Vietnam, followed by 16,000 from Thailand and 6,000 from the Philippines. [6] With respect to Korea, the 7th Infantry Division (ID), one of two divisions that had been in Korea since 1955, and three Air Force fighter squadrons were withdrawn from the full force of 64,000, leaving approximately 43,000 in the ROK. As part of its troop reduction and redeployment, the United States officially withdrew its men from the 155-mile demilitarized zone (DMZ) on March 10, 1971, which it had guarded since 1953, and transferred the responsibility (except for a small section in the Panmunjom truce area, which the United States continued to guard) to the ROK Army (ROKA).

Although the primary motivation was to disentangle the United States from Vietnam, the Nixon administration's public rationale for transferring the military burden was that many Asian nations had developed economically and politically enough to take on increased responsibilities for their security. Nixon praised South Korea's "graduated status" during his 1969 meeting with President Pak Chonghui in San Francisco, emphasizing that Koreans' economic achievements had reached "the point where they can look to the day where they will be able to stand on their own feet without outside aid." [7] During the Nixon Doctrine years, U.S. military and economic assistance, which in the 1954-1970 period had amounted to one-tenth of Korea's GNP, was cut dramatically. For example, total U.S. economic aid to Korea dropped from $928.7 million in 1961-65, to $546.7 million in 1966-1971, to $12.2 million in 1971-78. [8] Similarly, U.S. Military Assistance Program (MAP) grants to Korea declined from $291 million in 1971 to $94 million in 1974 to nothing in 1978. [9]

But despite the leaps and bounds made in economic development in Korea by the late 1960s, the United States, particularly the military, stressed the need to modernize ROK forces if the U.S. troop reduction were not to upset the military balance on the peninsula. The USFK emphasized the strength of the North Korean military, particularly its advantage over the South's in air power. [10] Accordingly, the Nixon Doctrine, as applied to Korea, included $1.5 billion in military modernization assistance for a five-year period (1971-75). [11] Although neither the ROK nor the United States officially stated that the large sum was com pensation for the troop withdrawal, the modernization aid was without a doubt a means to soften the blow to Korea.

Initially, both the South Korean government and people expressed concern but not alarm over the Nixon Doctrine because since the Korean War, they had regarded their ties with the United States as a "special relationship," particularly since they had contributed 50,000 of their best troops to the U.S. war effort in Vietnam. [12] Korean officials originally assumed that their country would be exempted from Nixon's new Asia policy. Even three months before the U.S. ambassador officially notified the ROK government of the troop reduction plan, then Foreign Minister Ch'oe Kyuha stated in his testimony before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the ROK National Assembly (December 2, 1969) that a U.S. troop withdrawal from Korea is "unthinkable" because the United States regards the Korean peninsula as a "special security area." He confidently asserted that he believed the United States would maintain its two divisions in Korea. [13] In his 1978 congressional testimony, Rinn-Sup Shinn, then a researcher at American University in Washington, D.C., also discussed the Korean government's view of the special relationship and attributed the Korean government's naivete and lack of political and diplomatic preparation for unfavorable changes in U.S. foreign policy to its "being steeped in the innocence of a dependency mentality." [14]

But when U.S. Ambassador to Seoul William Porter announced the troop reduction to Pak on March 26, 1970 (National Security Decision Memorandum 48, calling for the reduction, was issued on March 20, 1970), the Korean government hit crisis mode in its relations with the United States and its security posture vis-à-vis the North. The general reaction was shock: The *Korea Herald* reported that the "20,000-man U.S. troop withdrawal was first regarded as a bolt from the blue sky," [15] and the *Far Eastern Economic Review* characterized the Seoul government's opposition to the withdrawal as "violent." [16] Defense Minister Chong Raehyok bought an advertisement opposing the troop cut in the *Washington Post.* [17] More dramatically, Prime Minister Chong Ilkwon threatened to resign with his entire Cabinet and to leave a portion of the DMZ unguarded if the United States actually executed its decision. He also threatened Porter that "if an attempt were made to fly the 7th Infantry Division out of Korea, he personally would lie down on the runway to keep the planes from taking off." [18]

The psychological impact of the withdrawal announcement was greater than the reality of the numbers [19] because Koreans had come to view the large presence of U.S. ground forces as "more important than [the Mutual Defense] treaty language itself" [20] and feared that the withdrawal of one division was merely the beginning of the end of U.S. support for Korean security. All sectors of the Korean society--government, military, legislature, media, and the general public--opposed the U.S. cut as sudden, hasty, and provocative (of North Korean reaction). Even opposition members of the National Assembly joined the mass protest. [21] Koreans "expressed the fear that the new attitude in America really means that the United States will abandon Korea." [22]

Seoul did have substantive grounds for doubting U.S. reliability because of its history of disappointment and frustration with what it considered to be inadequate U.S. responses to North Korean provocations in the late 1960s. First, President Pak was deeply upset by Washington's unwillingness to retaliate against the North's attempt on his life on January 21, 1968, in what is commonly known as the "Blue House Raid." Thirty-three heavily armed North Korean commandos had crossed the DMZ undetected in mid-January and had come within 1,000 feet of Pak's official residence, the Blue House, to attack the building and kill Pak. (U.S. Ambassador William Porter was the North Koreans' second target.) [23] Two days later, North Koreans seized the USS *Pueblo* in international waters near Wonsan, charging that the ship had illegally entered North Korean territorial waters and was involved in hostile activities against the North. *Pueblo's* 83 crew members were taken hostage. In reaction to these scare-tactics, Pak proposed that the United States and ROK jointly take decisive action, suggesting that the United States should launch air strikes against North Korean military installations. Pak also told Ambassador Porter that ROK troops could be in Pyongyang within two days. [24] But the United States took a low-risk approach, doing nothing about the Blue House Raid and conducting direct, bilateral negotiations secretly with the North Koreans for the release of the crew. This kind of U.S. caution greatly frustrated Seoul. Then in April 1969, the United States again decided against military retaliation for the North Korean downing of a U.S. EC-121 (unarmed reconnaissance) aircraft and its 31 crew members.

Once again, the South Koreans were disturbed by the emerging pattern of U.S. self-restraint, which they felt could only encourage North Korean belligerency. Seoul began to question seriously whether the United States, bogged down in the Vietnam War and undergoing an erosion in global influence, had the resolve to protect South Korea effectively in the event of an armed attack. [25]

The Nixon Doctrine and the troop reduction occurred in the wake of such tensions in the alliance and in the midst of major geopolitical changes. First, plans to revert the control of Okinawa to Japan by 1972 were nearing completion. Although the Koreans ostensibly considered this a bilateral issue between Japan and the United States, they were nevertheless extremely nervous because they had regarded the purpose of U.S. bases in Okinawa as extended defense forces for Korean security. [26] Desperate not to lose U.S. military support in East Asia, Seoul had offered the United States its own soil, particularly Cheju Island, as a replacement base for U.S. forces in Okinawa and stated its willingness to house U.S. nuclear weapons. [27] Second, highly sensitive to U.S. policy toward South Vietnam, Seoul was severely dismayed to see U.S. military will and might dwindle in its Southeast Asian neighbor. In a congressional testimony, Ambassador Porter stated: "[Koreans] of course had noted the rising outcry in the United States about the Vietnam War. . . . They were afraid we were losing our fiber, that . . . our determination was being sapped by the media." [28]

Third, with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and President Nixon's sudden and secret undertaking of détente with the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1971 and 1972, the ROK government expressed fear of being abandoned in a game of big power politics. In the words of A. Doak Barnett, "Nixon's announcement of his planned visit took the world by complete surprise and indicated to both allies and adversaries that fundamental changes in East Asian international relations were under way." [29] Relatedly, in 1971, the United States definitively supported China's entry into the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly, in contrast to the wishes of Taiwan, who had been, like South Korea, a staunch U.S. ally against Communism. The ROK Foreign Ministry immediately called the announcement of Nixon's upcoming visit to the People's Republic of China "shocking." [30] Ambassador Porter later told Congress that the United States had given the Koreans "one hell of a jolt when we went into China without telling them." [31] The abandonment of Taiwan, by the United Nations and Japan (who normalized relations with the PRC) in 1972 reinforced the Koreans' fear of big power politics in East Asia.

Although Washington assured Seoul that the United States would not sacrifice the latter's interests in pursuit of better relations with the PRC, the Pak administration remained skeptical. The Koreans were particularly disturbed by the talk of "neutralization" (demilitarization) of the peninsula as a way to meet PRC demands for U.S. troops to leave the South. An editorial in the *Korea Herald* (August 15, 1971) voiced the Seoul government's anxieties and admonitions regarding U.S.-PRC rapprochement:

> If the United States should raise the question of Korea's neutralization in earnest, it would but be an apology for total desertion from the Korean scene. It will be the last thing we will find acceptable as a solution to the Korean problem. The only avenue to reducing tension and safeguarding the security of Korea will be to maintain a position of strength and superiority vis-à-vis the Communists. To conduct dialogue with them would be meaningless and hazardous unless we stand on such a position. . . . We are opposed to any move to utilize this country as a pawn in power politics in which our due voice and stake have little or no part.

The 1971-72 period was also filled with ill-timed U.S. decisions and diplomatic faux-pas regarding bilateral issues, which in turn led Koreans to be confused and increasingly doubtful of U.S. commitments to the ROK. About a month before the joint U.S.-ROK announcement of U.S. force reductions (July 6, 1970), the United States moved to end economic grant assistance to Korea. In 1971, about a month before the full departure of the 7th ID from Korea, the *Korea Herald* (February 24, 1971) reported talk in Washington of terminating all U.S. aid-- economic and military--to Korea by 1976. Then in late October 1971, the U.S. Senate voted against the 1972 foreign aid package to Korea, causing strong protest by the Korean government and press. [32]

Additionally, the United States sent mixed signals about its military intentions in Korea. Although the congressionally authorized U.S. troop ceiling in Korea was 43,000, U.S. military sources in Korea stated that "it [the ceiling] does not necessarily mean that the U.S. forces will maintain the full authorized manpower spaces after June 30 [1971]," the official deadline for the troop reduction. [33] More importantly, high-ranking Washington officials, on several occasions, mentioned a full withdrawal of U.S. forces by the mid-1970s, contradicting official statements that no such plans were in the works. For example, Vice President Spiro Agnew, after having talked with President Pak about U.S. commitments to the ROK in August 1970, "slipped" to reporters that all U.S. forces would be out of the country in five years. [34] Pak immediately demanded that the State Department clarify U.S. intentions. Moreover, the Koreans discovered after Agnew's visit that while the Vice President came to Korea ostensibly to coordinate, with the Koreans, plans for the troop cut and modernization aid, the United States had already begun sending its troops back home.

Less than a year later, Defense Secretary Melvin Laird stirred confusion and consternation among Koreans by stating in Congress (June 1971) his interpretation of the Nixon Doctrine as applied to Asia: "[T]o the extent possible we say military assistance, yes, but American ground forces, no." [35] He also "issued in August 1971 a Program Decision Memorandum to reduce the 2d Infantry Division [the only full division in Korea] to one brigade by the end of fiscal year 1974."((36 (Later in 1974, members of Congress recommended that the remaining 2d ID be moved south of Seoul and put in reserves in order to avoid automatic physical involvement in a possible war.) [37]

The summer of 1971 was wrought with more U.S. statements that increased Seoul's insecurity. In early July, Major General Felix Rogers, the long-time senior delegate to the UN Korean Military Armistice Commission (KMAC), suggested that a Korean should take over as the senior KMAC delegate to the talks with the North. [38] Although the UN/USFK command officially commented that Rogers' statement "does not represent or imply any current or contemplated changes in the KMAC by the U.S. government," [39] Koreans interpreted the suggestion as a reflection of the U.S. trend to disengage itself from problems on the peninsula. [40] Adding fuel to fire, the United States urged Seoul in early July to reduce its armed forces by 125,000 "within the next five years so that," according to the *Washington Post,* " Seoul can assume increasing operation[al] military costs now covered by U.S. grants." [41] This prompted an immediate objection from the ROK Defense Ministry. Because Koreans voiced strong opposition to such a reduction at the 1971 U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting (annual meeting of the U.S. and ROK heads of Defense), the United States acceded to postponing discussion of the issue until the next SCM meeting. [42]

Although foreign policy "shocks," bad timing, and conflicting words and actions emanating from U.S. officials, along with Seoul's traditional hypersensitivity to Washington's every word and deed regarding East Asian security, were greatly responsible for the above-mentioned problems, a difference in threat perception between the United States and ROK was the fundamental cause of the tensions in the early 1970s. The U.S. Ambassador to Korea from 1974 to 1978, Richard Sneider, admitted that the U.S.-ROK relationship suffered from a "lack of mutual perception" during congressional hearings on U.S.-Korea relations in the 1970s. [43] The United States underestimated Korean response to the troop cut, in particular, and the Seoul government's insecurity vis-à-vis the North, in general. For the Koreans, the news of the troop withdrawal reminded them of the U.S. pull-out in 1949, a year before the Communist invasion of the South. The *Korea Herald,* upon House Speaker Carl Albert's visit in August 1971, boldly asserted,

> W]e cannot but recall the bitter memory of the grave blunder both the United States and this republic committed shortly before the outbreak of the Korean War early in 1950. Resting assured on wishful thinking about the ever-aggressive and hostile nature of the North Korean warlords, the United States withdrew its occupation troops from Korea, leaving behind only a token force of military advisers. [44]

Others likened Laird's congressional testimony in which he stated that the United States will avoid sending ground troops into Asian conflicts to former Secretary of State Dean Acheson's 1950 speech omitting Korea from the U.S. defense perimeter in Asia. [45] Koreans feared that Laird's speech would serve as another green light for the North to invade. In the early 1970s, Korean officials and press emphatically reiterated Premier Paek Tujin's warning of March 1971 that the United States was underestimating the threat from the North. [46] President Pak himself also frequently commented that "foreign observers" who doubt that the Pyongyang regime would provoke a war in the 1970s "do not understand the fundamental nature of Kim Il-sung and his clique or what the Communists are aiming at." [47]

Although the United States never dismissed North Korean military capability and threat, many of its top-ranking officials considered Seoul's fears as "exaggerated." [48] Even the USFK Commander, General John Michaelis, testified before Congress that although the North Korean threat "is felt in a very real way in the Republic of Korea today," North Koreans lack the ability to conduct prolonged conventional warfare without the aid of the Soviet Union and the PRC and is therefore most likely to continue unconventional military operations, [49] such as psychological warfare, infiltrations, and espionage. The Korean press was quick to note such opinions and disagree: The *Taehan Ilbo* noted: "[W]e think the north Korean Communists could invade directly into this republic when all the U.S. forces withdraw, while Ambassador Porter and Gen. Michaelis doubted any possibilities of . . . [such] invasion even after the withdrawal of U.S. forces." [50]

Unable to control U.S. policy-making, the ROK government made all-out attempts at damage control and development of resources to influ ence its ally in the future. First, Seoul insisted on U.S. assurances, particularly the strengthening of the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty to allow the automatic involvement of U.S. military forces in case of armed conflict, in lieu of the stipulations requiring congressional consultation and consent. The United States never agreed to any kind of expansion of the original treaty. Second, the ROK insisted on receiving the $1.5 billion modernization aid prior to U.S. troop reductions, to which the U.S. never agreed. Reluctantly accepting the fact that the United States would pull out without fulfilling the aid promise, the ROK government persistently sought guarantees that Congress would appropriate the full amounts on time during the five-year period. No such promise was ever offered. By 1972, the United States already began to fall back on its word and by 1975 fulfilled only 69% of its military aid commitment. [51] The aid program took two years longer than the original date of 1975 to complete.

Yet, the ROK's military arsenal and preparedness improved significantly in quality and quantity through the $1.5 billion, leaving the South with better resources to match the North's. The modernization program included "F-4 Phantom aircraft, M-48 Patton tanks, armored personnel carriers, heavy artillery, and Honest John surface-to-surface missiles," [52] as well as substantial upgrading of command and communications equipment. Besides the increases in military hardware, the modernization aid served to assuage Seoul of its anxiety about U.S. commitments and insecurity toward its Northern enemy.

Third, the ROK government launched a new phase in U.S.-ROK relations by opting for a more independent security stance and aggressive diplomacy. The Nixon shocks of the early 1970s motivated the Pak administration to increase its defense budget from the postwar ceiling of 4% and to develop its own military equipment and research. By 1976, the South was producing or coproducing patrol boats, tanks, and M-16 rifles, and by 1978 successfully testing its first surface-to-surface missiles. [53] Pak made numerous speeches calling for self-reliance in defense matters throughout 1971 and 1972, and initiated unprecedented, direct talks with the North for improved North-South relations.

Fourth, the Pak regime began pursuing unconventional means of diplomacy, namely influence-peddling through private agents, "people-to-people diplomacy," to compensate for its dearth of conventional carrots and sticks in its relations with the United States. This move later snowballed into the "Koreagate" scandal (chapter 5). The ROK government's attempt to lobby the U.S. Congress and public aimed first at pre venting further U.S. troop cuts; second, ensuring continued congressional approval of the military modernization assistance promised by the Nixon administration; third, quelling U.S. criticism of Pak's increasingly repressive form of rule in the 1970s; fourth, maintaining a powerful Korean presence among Washington's elite as a way to supplement conventional forms of diplomacy. It was this context of uncertainty and tension in the U.S.-ROK relationship that highlighted the urgency of U.S.-Korea camptown relations. The following pages link together the elite world of Washington and Seoul and the netherworld of kijich'on prostitution as the loci of adaptation to the Nixon Doctrine.

Base- Community Problems in the Early 1970s

Washington's systematic calculations of troop reduction in Korea generated into social, economic, and political disarray and tensions for Koreans and Americans in the kijich'on areas. With the reduction of U.S. forces by 20,000 (7th ID), military units were disbanded and reorganized, and the remaining troops were redeployed. The 2d Infantry Division (2d ID), whose home had been in the Munsan/Yongjugol region, moved to Tongduch'on to occupy the camps left behind by the 7th Division, while camptowns in that region were virtually shut down. Together with the flux of U.S. soldiers, Koreans helped reshape kijich'on commerce and social life. Club owners, prostitutes, and others moved away from areas being deserted by the troops to those where the troops were concentrated. Officials from both the U.S. military authorities and the ROK government agreed that

> [t]he drawdown of U.S. forces introduced new elements of tension into traditionally friendly relationships. Accompanying base closures and restationing of U.S. Forces resulted in widespread dislocations among Koreans living in villages adjacent to U.S. bases . . . and resulted in increased competition among bar owners, "business girls," and merchants. [54]

(The above appears in capital letters in the original document.)
The withdrawal of U.S. troops caused economic havoc for the thousands of Korean nationals dependent on U.S. bases for jobs and income. The *Korea Herald* reported that by June 1971, 6,000 Koreans (out of a total of 32,000) employed at various U.S. installations were to be laid off. [55] Real estate prices in most camptown regions sank with the rise in the Korean residents' insecurity about the future of the U.S. military presence in their towns. [56]

The camptown businesses, in particular, were severely hit. According to one official of the Korea Special Tourist Association, [57] "[t]he withdrawal put over 100 clubs out of business. Many of these people just threw away [abandoned] their establishments and left the area because there was no one to sell them to." [58] Newspapers reported that "[b]ar owners who used to clear $200 to $300 a night now [following the withdrawal] eke out a living on $4 to $5." [59] Prostitutes also suffered economic losses and geographical dislocation. The village of Yongjugol, which in the summer of 1970 had "boasted a total of over 2,200 'entertainers' who catered to the needs and wants of about 18,000 soldiers from the 2nd Inf. Div. and other units in the area," marked a mere 200 women remaining in July 1971. [60] Hundreds moved to camptowns in Seoul (It'aewon), Osan, and Tongduch'on. "Others . . . quietly slipped back into their families and [went] to work as taxi drivers, beauty shop operators, or secretaries." [61] The Korean press reported that "[t]he business slump has hit the Korean girls catering to the GI's. They number about 5,000. Up until last September, their earnings averaged about W100,000 a month per person. In recent months, the figure dropped to W5,000 to W7,000." [62]

During my interviews, U.S. military and ROK government officials who had been familiar with the withdrawal effects on camptowns emphasized the anger, frustration, and loss of trust that Korean residents felt toward U.S. servicemen. A Korean national who had worked in Community Relations for the USFK since the 1960s noted:

> With the withdrawal, camptown residents came to question the reliability of the U.S. Camptown and national public opinion was,"It's too soon to withdraw. . . ." [People] lost their livelihood, and there was no financial compensation from the U.S. side. . . . With the withdrawal, people felt loss and despair. [63]

Local Koreans, who had long felt abused and mistreated by American economic superiority and arrogance, vented their fears and frustrations more violently than in the past. The Korean government official serving as an Assistant Secretary to the Joint Committee during this period had spoken with camptown residents to investigate racial problems. He summed up the Korean sentiment as follows:

> Simply put, the local Koreans felt like this: "Since you [U.S.] say you're leaving, we don't like you anymore." Until the late 1960s/early 1970s, the locals had trusted and depended on the U.S. So, even when the GI behaved badly and fought with Koreans, the locals put up with it because they knew they'd see the soldiers the next day [in their stores or bars]. But once the

> men who were to leave acted nasty in town, the locals became more resentful.,/font> [64]

Aware of the connection between troop reduction/redeployment and camptown problems, the same official had requested that the U.S. military provide information in advance on future troop deployments in Korea, especially in those areas that were being expanded, such as P'yongt'aek (especially Camp Humphreys and Osan Air Base areas). [65] U.S. military officials in both Washington and Korea were aware that the withdrawal of 20,000 troops might have negative effects on community relations in general and discipline and morale of U.S. troops in particular. Senior U.S. officials in Washington noted that since nearly all of the front line duties were turned over to the Korean military for the first time, the "American troops no longer feel 'an immediate exposure' to the Communist fire, less 'motivation' for being in Korea which requires a greater amount of effort to provide servicemen with constructive programs so that they would not feel they are 'wasting 13 months of their life' in Korea for no 'visible and immediate' purpose." [66] The USFK noted similarly that "[t]he withdrawal of the U.S. troops from the DMZ probably has been a contributing factor toward a lessening of morale and esprit de corps among American troops in Korea, which in turn has tended to stimulate incidents in rear areas." [67]

Base-community conflicts had long been brewing in the camptowns prior to the early 1970s. Fights among U.S. servicemen and between the soldiers and local Korean nationals were not uncommon. Camptown residents and USFK officials both had frequently complained about black-marketing and theft by both Koreans and U.S. military personnel. Koreans often accused U.S. soldiers for abusing their power with the locals, for example, for refusing to pay for taxi rides and prostitutes. Prior to 1970-71, base-community problems gained national attention when a Korean national was alleged to have been killed by a U.S. serviceman. The murder victims were more often than not young Korean prostitutes. Such problems were publicized by Korean newspapers, often as a reflection of the ROK government's dissatisfaction with U.S. actions/inactions [68] and as a reflection of local protest. [69] The U.S. military regularly scrutinized community relations issues and particularly their "play" in Korean papers and noted: "It is easily conceivable that the large number of assaults by U.S. personnel against Korean national females, no matter what provocation might have been given for these assaults, could be made into a major article condemning American brutality." [70]

But for the most part, the Korean government and Koreans remained loyally pro-United States throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and most of the 1970s, and base-community problems, despite their constant presence and nuisance, were seen by both sides as a part of the U.S.-Korea relationship.

In the summer of 1971, base-community problems took a turn for the worse. Fights between black U.S. servicemen and white servicemen were frequent in 1971, as were fights between blacks and local Korean residents. Increasingly, the United States portrayed local Korean residents as instigators and culprits, rather than as victims of U.S. military abuses (which both U.S. and Korean reports had done prior to this summer). Investigations by the JC yielded the following explanations for the disturbances:

> Most such incidents take place in places of entertainment such as Korean night clubs in the near vicinity or entry/exit gates of the U.S. compounds, or in the alleys and pathways offering ingress and egress to and from the clubs. A careful review of such incidents reveals that a large number, if not a majority, of such clashes arise [sic] from feelings by black servicemen that they are being discriminated against in some respect by either white servicemen or by Korean service personnel working in the various Korean clubs. . . . More specifically, investigations reflect that black charges of discriminatory practices in Korean clubs relate to the performance of three functions by club proprietors and their managers and personnel. These are: 1)

> alleged or real discrimination against black servicemen in the service of food or beverages on club premises; 2) alleged or real discrimination by bona fide hostesses working in the clubs against black servicemen in their entertainment or dancing functions on club premises; and 3) alleged or real discrimination against black servicemen by club management in the selection of types of music played within the clubs. [71]

The Psychological Operations unit of the Eighth Army (EUSA) made the following assessment of Korean culpability in the racial incidents:

> This [increased Korean] involvement [in racial confrontations] normally assumes three forms of progression. First, the Koreans aggravate racial problems [existing on post] by discriminatory practices. Second, they are often the injured party during black/white confrontations, suffering physical and/or property damage. Third, they demonstrate, often violently, against U.S. troops in general and against blacks in particular. . . . Discriminatory practices by the Koreans are usually of a passive nature rather than one of violence. In the clubs, such practices include poor service, unfriendliness, and sometimes refusal to even serve black soldiers. Among business girls, such practices take on two forms. Some of the business girls refuse to associate with blacks. Some also discriminate against Koreans who do associate with blacks and consider those Koreans to be of lower status than those who go only with white soldier[s]. Polarization has developed to the point that some girls are called 'black' because of their frequent association with blacks." [72]

From the perspective of the black soldier, discrimination by local Koreans, in addition to the discrimination within his military unit, was like adding salt to an open wound. [73] Instead of serving as a source of rest, relaxation, and pleasure, bars and clubs offered the black soldier more tension and alienation. Black Americans complained that Korean clubs play rock and country music instead of soul music (preferred by blacks) to attract white patrons and that the few bars that were all-black bars were usually dirtier, smaller, and less pleasant than the white establishments. They also protested that the Korean owners of bars and clubs discriminated against their credit, that "white credit," but not "black credit," was accepted as payment for drinks and food. [74] Moreover, their money and, therefore, they themselves were sometimes rejected by Koreans. One black soldier stated aggrievedly: "I lost a brother and a cousin over here during the [Korean] war. . . . But the Koreans tell us they don't want us because we're black. I ask a girl to go to bed and she says no. My money is as green as anybody's." [75]

Black soldiers' protest against discrimination was part of the Black Power movement taking place in the United States. As one soldier put it, "We're tired of discrimination. We're tired of it in the vil [camptown] and we're tired of it in the Army. We're not gonna take it anymore. We're gonna get what belongs to us. We're gonna get what the white dudes have taken away from us for years." [76] Such soldiers staged sit-ins and protests to celebrate the lives of Martin Luther King and Malcom X [77] and wore special black arm bands as a gesture of protest and solidarity with other blacks. Some of the most militant were also followers of Eldredge Cleaver. [78]

From the perspective of the local Koreans, much of their discrimination against blacks was defensive, necessitated by the black-white polarization that existed among the ranks of U.S. military personnel. The Korean owner of a bar or club feared that welcoming black patrons would alienate the white patrons, who outnumbered and allegedly out-paid blacks. [79] Similarly, Korean prostitutes were also highly alert to racial divisions among U.S. soldiers. Prostitutes who associated with whites were considered "higher class" than those who slept with blacks, and it was common for the women to be socially and geographically segregated (in terms of bars and residence) according to the race of men they slept with. A woman who worked in white bars catered to white men and risked beatings by white soldiers and/or loss of business if she "entertained" or slept with a black man, just as a woman who slept with black men also risked retaliation from her black clients if she crossed the racial line.

U.S.-ROK documents, newspaper reports, and interviews with Americans and Koreans who lived or worked in the camptowns in the 1960s and 1970s indeed verify that many camptown Koreans, including the prostitutes, discriminated against black soldiers. There is no reliable scholarship that explains the sources and dynamics of Korean racism toward blacks, but it is commonly known among Koreans that they prefer lighter skin to darker skin even among fellow Koreans and other Asians. Abelmann and Lie do point out that "American racial ideology" is the primary source of Koreans' racism toward African- Americans, both in Korea and in the United States. [80] One Korean American immigrant they had interviewed offered, "I had the idea that blacks were dirty and aggressive from American films and from our experience with black soldiers. My very first day in America I was afraid to go outside because of the dangerous blacks." [81]

Both Koreans and Americans familiar with kijich'on life also noted that Koreans had learned and imitated racist language and behavior toward blacks from the white soldiers in Korea since the mid-1940s. Indeed, some camptown Koreans protesting against racial violence in Anjongni in 1971 carried placards that echoed racial slurs and insults often used by racist Americans in the United States: "We Don't Need Any Niggers" and "Go Back to Cotton Field." White soldiers stationed in Korea during the early 1970s admitted that "Korean locals have been subjected to the attitudes of the white majority for so long that they practice discrimination without even being aware of what they're doing." [82] U.S. military personnel familiar with community relations issues admitted that racial problems in the camptowns were primarily a U.S. responsibility:

> [It is] undoubtedly true in many instances [that] club owners and the hostesses are discriminatory towards one group or the other. . . . However, it must be recognized that *we* have created this condition through patronage habits and individual or group behavior. . . . In many instances, vociferous groups have forced Korean clubs to cater to only a certain group and exclude all others. . . . Korean business establishments willingly try to correct those undesirable practices over which they have control but are in a dilemma when they try to correct a situation which is created and controlled by the patrons. Korean businessmen, hostesses, and residents have been drawn into the midst of the current turmoil. [83]

The U.S. military was aware that Koreans, both the local camptown residents and government officials, could become resentful of black-white problems being unleashed on Korean soil. [84] Indeed, up to the early 1970s, Koreans saw the racial tensions in the camptowns as primarily, if not solely, an American problem. [85] For local camptown Koreans, racial problems among the U.S. troops simply translated into bad business.

Korea was not the only spot during this time period where racial tensions among U.S. soldiers flared. A report published in the U.S. *Congressional Record* " showed that provost marshals in Germany, Korea, Vietnam and other major military areas reported 'sharp' to 'alarming' increase in incidents of racial unrest." [86] A study on racial tensions among troops stationed in the Far East (conducted by the Pentagon's civil rights chief) noted extreme frustration felt by black servicemen. [87] The U.S. Air Force itself publicly endorsed a "sharply worded internal report alleging racial discrimination and slack leadership in its Air Training Command." [88] What makes Korea stand out is the severity of the spillover of such tensions from within U.S. camp gates to the larger kijich'on areas, the Koreans' persistent staging of violent protests, especially by prostitutes, against the spillover, the exacerbation of racial tensions by the troop reductions and redeployments of the 1970-71 period, and the USFK's concern that North Korea would take advantage of the tensions to decry the U.S. troop presence in the South.

Throughout 1971, racial tensions between black and white servicemen increased, spread through various camp areas in Korea, and exploded on the weekend of July 9, 1971, in the village of Anjongni in P'yongt'aek County, the site of Camp Humphreys. [89] The demographics of Anjongni at the time of the July racial riots was as follows: 4,759 Korean villagers, including an estimated 970 prostitutes; 1,700 U.S. military personnel at Camp Humphreys, including approximately 500 black servicemen. There were 12 local clubs that catered to U.S. military personnel.

According to newspaper accounts, Serious Incident Reports (SIRs) of the EUSA, and official U.S.-ROK joint investigations, [90] the violence began with 50 black soldiers who simultaneously entered five local camptown clubs (bars/nightclubs), ordered people to leave, and proceeded to demolish the establishments. The violence was purportedly an act of protest against those Korean clubs that discriminated against blacks. As the blacks went on their rampage, a mob of over 1,000 Korean nationals chased them, wielding sickles and throwing rocks in retaliation. Koreans sought out and beat up the alleged black perpetrators. Fights ensued between the blacks and the Koreans, calling forth 170 U.S. military police (MPs) and 80 Korean police personnel to control the violence with tear gas and gunshots into the air. The commander of the Camp, Colonel John C. McWhorter, placed the town indefinitely off limits to U.S. personnel at approximately 1 a.m., July 10. Throughout the weekend, thousands of Korean nationals gathered near the gates of Camp Humphreys to protest against black violence and the off-limits decree. Approximately 10 U.S. soldiers and more than 20 Koreans were reported to have been injured, and the Korean side reported property damage of 20 million won ($54,000 at 1971 rates).

The Camptown Clean- Up Campaign

Top levels of the ROK government and the USFK leadership learned of the severity of kijich'on problems through numerous channels. During the early 1970s, individual U.S. command officials, who regularly reported local community problems to their superiors, urgently requested the intervention of the high command and the Joint Committee to persuade the Korean side to cooperate on improving camptown life. The then U.S. Secretary of the Joint Committee, Robert Kinney, was instrumental in pressing both the then USFK Commander in Chief (CINC), John Michaelis, and the then U.S. Ambassador Philip Habib (1971-74) to exert pressure on the top levels of the ROK government to clean up camptowns. [91] He also urged Korean members of the Joint Committee to cooperate. All ranks of the U.S. military that were concerned with community relations agreed that camptown improvements were impossible without the cooperation and assistance of the ROK government in Seoul.

In addition, Washington put pressure on the Korean government. A Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) report stated that on August 31, 1971, Ambassador Habib submitted to the ROK Foreign Minister President Nixon's letter addressed to the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense, as well as the consequent orders of the two Secretaries to overseas commands to eliminate racial problems. "U.S. Embassy personnel discussed these problems with the ROK Foreign Minister," [92] who responded that the ROK government would organize a new special joint committee to solve racial problems. [93]

President Pak Chonghui and his Blue House staff [94] also learned of the USFK's urgency regarding the July camptown problems and its general dissatisfaction with community relations through the MoFA, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA), [95] including the Korean National Police (KNP), top ROK Army brass, and the Korean press. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, through the office of the ROK representative to the Joint Committee (who was usually the Director of American Affairs in the MoFA and the official liaison between the U.S. military and the Korean government), reported the concerns and complaints of the U.S. military to the Blue House and the ministries and agencies concerned.

Interviews with ROK government officials who had been involved in the Clean-Up emphasized that more than the MOFA, it was Home Affairs [96] and a certain General Yi Chaejon who impressed upon President Pak the need to take action. According to the then Blue House official placed in charge of the kijich'on Clean-Up, General Yi, the then head of the Korean component of the ROK/U.S. I Corps Group in Uijongbu, directly addressed Pak about the severity of camptown problems and requested that Pak do something. [97] The U.S. military recorded that Pak, immediately following a visit to the I Corps Group headquarters in December 1971, "issued a call for establishment of a ROK 'Base Community Clean-Up Committee' (BCCUC) to develop a program of action to deal vigorously with the most urgent problems relating to the base communities." [98] In addition to these direct official channels to President Pak, Korean newspapers increasingly focused on the severity and intensity of base-community problems and the alleged abuse or mistreatment of Koreans by U.S. soldiers. [99] Unlike former times, camptown problems became too widely publicized within the Korean government and society and too polarized between Koreans and Americans to be ignored.

According to the former Blue House Secretary in charge of the Clean-Up, Pak was annoyed that these camptown problems had been left to fester and called the Minister of Home Affairs and other officials and "scolded them" for their negligence. He decided that leaving these mat ters to the relevant lower-level authorities was insufficient to solve the problems and that direct Blue House control was necessary. [100]

On December 22, 1971, Pak first ordered the establishment of the BCCUC ("Purification Movement" in Korean) and the formulation of "purification policies" for U.S. military camp areas. Thus a high-grounded group of Korean officials--the Principal Political Secretary (ministerial level) to the President, a vice minister from each of the following ministries: Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs, Justice (MoJ), National Defense (MND), Health and Social Affairs (MoHSA), Transportation (MoT), Communication and Information (MoCI); the director of Customs Administration, the Political Secretary to the Prime Minister, the Deputy Vice Minister of the Economic Planning Board (EPB), the Governor of Kyonggi Province, and the President's Secretary for Home and Social Affairs--assembled for the first Purification meeting on December 27, 1971, which lasted four hours at the Blue House. [101] With the official establishment of the BCCUC on December 31, 1971, the Blue House Committee on that same day ordered each government ministry, province, county, and city/village to formulate its own "purification policy." In the following six months, the BCCUC conducted fact-finding investigations and pressured and coordinated each ministry, agency, province and city involved to act on the President's orders. In July 1972, President Pak approved the comprehensive BCCUC program, which required 1.15 billion won ($2.88 million in 1972 terms) in expenditure, [102] and directed the Committee to "expedite planning for a comprehensive ongoing program for the years 1973-1975 to complete the work started in the camp communities during 1972." [103]

The U.S. side took its own initiative through its ongoing participation in the Joint Committee. "[W]ith the approval of the ROK Cabinet," [104] the JC established the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Civil-Military Relations on September 2, 1971, and delegated to it the

> responsibility to investigate and analyze the problems involving United States military personnel in Korea and Koreans living in the vicinity of or working in the United States military installations, and to make recommendations for necessary actions, both preventive and corrective, designed to eliminate conditions which will adversely affect Korean-American relations, and to promote mutual understanding and harmonious community relations between American servicemen and the Korean people. [105]

Through the establishment of numerous panels to investigate and recommend action in specific areas of community life, both the U.S. and Korean components of the JC pushed forth an ambitious agenda to improve base-community relations. [106] Between September 1971 and August 1976, the Subcommittee conducted at least 35 fact-finding tours, covering at least 15 different base areas in Korea, and made at least 43 formal recommendations to the JC, all of which were immediately approved by the committee. The bulk of these activities took place during 1971 and 1972.

The work of the Subcommittee on Civil-Military Relations and of the BCCUC were formally separate. However, by the nature of the problems and solutions involved, the work of the two was complementary. The U.S. military, through the auspices of the SOFA Subcommittee, mapped out the problem areas and specified desired ends (e.g., prevention of racial discrimination and reduction of VD rates among U.S. soldiers), and the Korean government put money and manpower to work through the BCCUC. The U.S. military aimed to improve the quality of life in camptowns for its personnel and thereby restore troop discipline and morale. The Korean government also had this concern, but as a means to improve the image of Korea in the eyes of the U.S. soldiers (chapter 5).

The SOFA Subcommittee's initial task was to reduce, if not eliminate, racial discrimination against black servicemen and racial violence in camptowns. Both U.S. and Korean members of the Subcommittee, through the recommendations of the Panel on Race Relations and Equality of Treatment, pressed local (Korean) government authorities, "in cooperation with the military representatives of . . . installation commanding officers, [to] encourage the proprietors and managers of Korean clubs . . . to train and direct service personnel . . . to perform duties in serving U.S. servicemen personnel food and beverages without discrimination as to the race of such patrons." [107]

The Panel also recommended that local Korean authorities encourage owners and managers to "train and instruct bona fide hostesses working in such establishments to refrain from engaging in discriminatory practices directed against customers of any particular race in the performance on club premises of entertainment functions such as dancing or conversing with patrons." [108] Bars and clubs were also urged to play a "balanced selection of various types of music" and thereby not cater to the musical preferences of white servicemen while ignoring those of blacks. [109] These and other forms of discrimination, such as the display of club signs that were racially offensive or exclusionary, [110] were to be prohibited.

The Subcommittee found that general environmental clean-up and improvements were needed to improve human interactions in the camptowns. To this effect, it called for the widening of narrow roads and the installation of more streetlights, the removal of bars and clubs from hidden alleys to areas of greater access, [111] and the renovation of establishments frequented by U.S. personnel to be more accommodating and inviting. The Subcommittee's Panel on Health and Sanitation also called for attention to improved sanitation and hygiene in the clubs and among club personnel. [112] The Subcommittee also recommended measures to reduce black-marketing, theft, and other vices in the kijich'on areas.

The USFK dissatisfaction with the state of civil-military relations stimulated many joint USFK-ROK efforts at reducing venereal disease rates among U.S. troops and enforcing stringent VD checks on the camptown prostitutes. Venereal disease was one of the most frequently recurring issues in the work of the Joint Committee during the first half of the 1970s and the most difficult problem to control to U.S. liking. For the U.S. miltary, VD was a serious and urgent problem; it posed difficulties in military discipline, preparedness, finances, [113] and morale. The VD problem in Korea was considered so serious that the Pentagon sent a special investigator/consultant, Colonel Robert W. Sherwood, Chief of the Preventive Medicine Division from the Office of the Surgeon General of the Army, to the U.S. Forces in Korea. Colonel Sherwood concluded that "[t]here is an uncontrolled major epidemic of venereal disease in U.S. Army personnel in Korea and an even greater uncontrolled epidemic of venereal disease in the Korean prostitutes. [114]

He called for increased VD education among servicemen and "mass treatment and chemoprophylaxis for all registered prostitutes" [115] and emphasized that VD control "*must be a coordinated effort with the other U.S. Military Forces and with the Republic of Korea*" <> [116] (italics in the original). The Surgeon of the EUSA, Colonel Henry A. Essex, agreed with Sherwood's assessment<> [117] and pinpointed the reduction of U.S. troops in Korea (in accordance with the Nixon Doctrine) as a main cause of the increase in VD rates:

> [T]he drawdown of troop strength in 1971 resulted in movement of prostitutes to other areas of troop concentration. Many of these prostitutes did not re-register, as required by the ROK government, in the new area. This substantially higher number of virtually uncontrolled prostitutes is considered a basic cause of the increased VD rate. [118]

These and other reports by the U.S. military reiterated the shortcomings of existing Korean measures to regulate VD among Korean prostitutes. The then Acting Surgeon General of the Department of Army, Major General Spurgeon Neel, recommended that in addition to traditional means of control, i.e., "extensive command health education," the U.S. military and Korean government "make an extensive effort to reduce the large number of unregistered prostitutes or to register and place them under control," to cooperate on laboratory research on VD, and (for the U.S. military) to push for adequate funding for such programs from the Korean government. [119] The U.S. component of the Subcommittee on Civil-Military Relations articulated these concerns to the Korean members. The emphasis was on registering women, enforcing regular VD checks, and quarantining women infected with VD. [120] Prior to 1971, the Korean government had usually been embarrassed and uncomfortable about such issues; the U.S. military was aware that prostitution and venereal disease were touchy topics for the Korean government. [121] Sherwood observed in his report that

> [P]rostitution is against the law [in Korea] and it is difficult for the Ministry of Health to justify a request for funds to control venereal disease in prostitutes. . . . Prostitution and the resulting high venereal disease rates in U.S. military personnel (and probably other foreigners) is a source of embarrassment to the ROK, its Tourist Service and its Ministry of Health. [122]

But with the Clean-Up efforts initiated by the Subcommittee on Civil-Military Relations, Sherwood found Korean government officials not only accessible but willing to address openly issues of prostitution and VD:

> The Koreans did not attempt to minimize the problem. They provided statistics that indicated a very high prevalence of venereal disease in prostitutes. Their statistics reveal a probable venereal disease prevalence of about 50% in prostitutes. . . . Also they indicated their concern about the inadequacy of their diagnostic facilities, laboratory procedures and training of laboratory personnel. They acknowledged that the clinics which collected cervical specimens, stained and examined them for gonorrhea were inadequately paid. . . . Finally they acknowledged that they had little control over the quality of services provided, especially in the private clinics. Most venereal disease clinics are privately operated. (It was reported from other sources that often in private clinics for a small payment by the prostitute an examination will not be done and the health card stamped free of disease.) The unfavorable situation has been described by the Ministry of Health in a com prehensive study sent to the "Blue House." (It was not possible to get a copy of the report. It was said to be "classified.") [123]

Rather than shy away from addressing these unpleasant issues, the Korean government expended considerable amounts of energy and funds into "cleaning up" its women and reducing VD transmission to U.S. soldiers. The BCCUC's first item on its comprehensive Clean-Up agenda, as with MoFA and MoHSA, targeted the control of prostitution and venereal disease by enforcing regular medical examinations of prostitutes, improving VD clinic facilities, and detaining infected women at special centers. [124]

The Ministry of Home Affairs put direct pressure on local-level officials to enforce health and sanitation standards in camptown bars and clubs. Officials of the ROK government reported to the Subcommittee that "the physical check of bar employees, most of whom are the [sic] registered business girls, are being conducted on a twice-a-week basis" and that education programs for club employees (on venereal disease and service conduct in clubs) are being conducted twice a year or more by provincial governments. [125] The ROK government allocated a total of 380 million won in 1971-72 (approximately $1 million in 1971 terms) to improve health and sanitation in camptowns, with 224 million won (approximately $600,000) earmarked for the prevention and treatment of VD. [126]

In order to improve the quality of camptown facilities and social life, both the Korean and U.S. military authorities agreed on the necessity to improve channels of communication between each base command and local Korean officials and residents. The U.S. military had long complained of inadequate and ineffective local administration and law enforcement in camptowns and periodically had urged Seoul to take action against social disorder and administrative unaccountability. [127] After conducting joint field investigations, the Subcommittee found that the lack of coordination and dialogue between local Korean governmental officials and U.S. military authorities had been "exacerbated where there were no effective community relations [advisory] councils [CRACs] through which Korean and American authorities can consult and achieve agreement on necessary actions." [128] The Joint Committee then agreed to rename these councils as "Korean-American Friendship Councils" (KAFCs) and recommended that the ROK government and the USFK require both U.S. and Korean local authorities to establish such councils. [129] The ROK government promulgated regulations concerning the establishment and functions of KAFCs in June 1973, and by September of that year, 68 councils had been formed. [130] Usually, the Korean component of the councils was composed of representatives of local shops and clubs/bars, local government officials (e.g., the mayor, county chief, health clinic director, information officer), the local police, the Korea Special Tourist Association, "respected village elders," and (sometimes) "Business Girls' Associations." The U.S. component was usually represented by the base commander (or deputy), provost marshal, medical officer, community relations officer, public affairs officer, and other relevant offices. Meetings were usually held once a month, and efforts were made to resolve "problems of mutual interest and concern" and promote "good-will between U.S. Armed Forces and the Korean civilian population." [131] Improvement in club service and facilities and "[g]uidance for VD carriers and entertainment girls" were prioritized as "matters of common interest." [132] In addition, the Korean National Police augmented its forces in numerous kijich'on areas and coordinated patrols with U.S. Military Police (MPs). The KAFCs and joint U.S.-ROK patrols were to apply and enforce Clean-Up policies formulated by the Joint Committee and the BCCUC.

The U.S. military and the ROK government each used a combination of carrots and sticks to induce the cooperation of local camptown inhabitants. The U.S. authorities employed economic gain as the carrot and the off-limits decree as the stick. They repeatedly emphasized to local authorities, bar/club owners, and prostitutes that cooperation in the form of decreased racial discrimination against U.S. servicemen, compliance with sanitation standards, and stringent observance of VD examinations and "contact identification systems" [133] would ensure continued U.S. patronage. On the other hand, failure to cooperate meant placing individual camptown establishments and/or entire areas off limits to U.S. military personnel. [134] According to the U.S. military, "[t]hey [the Korean population] realize that the Garrison Commander carries a 'big stick,' i.e., he can place the club off limits, which would deprive them of revenue which they need to stay operational." [135]

For Korean villagers dependent on U.S. patronage for income, the off-limits threat was credible. During the 48-day ban on Anjongni (July 10, 1971 to August 26, 1971), one businessman alone reported a loss of about 5 million won ($13,157), [136] and a candy-shop owner stated, "Every villager is now almost out of his mind. We are much worried about our living. Most of us depend on our daily earnings on GIs." [137] Several heated discussions between the Korean and American members of the Subcommittee took place on the issue of off-limits actions. The Subcommittee's "Seventh Report" mentions that the Subcommittee intensely argued about lifting the ban on four back-alley clubs in Anjongni, with the Korean side pushing for such action and the U.S. side holding back. [138] In November 1972, the Acting ROK chairperson of the Subcommittee threatened to suspend Korean participation in Clean-Up activities if the U.S. side could not control the abuse of the off-limits power exercised by military commanders. [139] Despite local protests against off-limits actions<> [140] and the intervention of the Korean government on behalf of camptown authorities and residents, Korean shop owners and prostitutes generally had little choice but to comply with U.S. demands. [141]

While trying to protect the interests of local businesses, the Korean government simultaneously used political patronage and authoritarian control to pressure local governments, police, and KSTAs to meet the interests of local U.S. commands. Because the Clean-Up order had been issued by President Pak and actively carried out by the upper ranks of the Home Affairs Ministry, low-level officials had little choice but to comply. As political appointees, each provincial governor, county (*kun*) chief and ward (*ku*) head were beholden to their superiors. [142] Moreover, the then JC Assistant Secretary for the Korean side noted that as the Subcommittee's Clean-Up efforts began producing positive results, "the local officials wanted to get in on the action for their own political usage. They began to run around getting involved in this work." [143] The local officials would in turn put pressure on local establishments and residents to cooperate with U.S. military authorities. [144] Regarding VD control, U.S. military and ROK government officials (former and current) commented that women were often forced to comply with regular check-ups and quarantines. [145] Although bar-owners and prostitutes generally resented the increased police and governmental control over their business activities, many camptown residents did welcome the central government's attention to "environmental beautification" because funds and other resources were made available for long-needed infrastructural improvements.

From the perspective of U.S. and Korean officials responsible for overseeing camptown improvements, the Clean-Up Campaign yielded positive results. First, racial discrimination on the part of Korean camptown workers toward black U.S. servicemen significantly decreased together with racial violence. [146] Second, sanitation conditions, roads, and lighting in camptowns greatly improved. With consistent prodding from the U.S. military, the Korean government tightened its venereal disease control of women (chapters 4 and 6), while the U.S. military restructured its VD contact identification systems and assisted the ROK government with medical supplies and expertise.

Despite the initial resentment of some camptown residents toward the increased surveillance and control of their villages by two governmental authorities, many camptown Koreans, in the long run, benefited economically and politically from the Clean-Up. The Purification Movement provided developmental attention and assistance to these long-neglected shantytowns. [147] Some residents caught on quickly that the Clean-Up would help improve business by facilitating U.S. patronage and attracting "more legitimate businesses." [148]

Politically, the Campaign's reinforcement (in some cases, creation) of Korean administrative accountability and suppression of lawlessness in camptowns served to de-emphasize the pariah image. Moreover, the establishment of Korean-American Friendship Councils helped empower villagers who had had little recourse for addressing grievances regarding U.S. military actions and GI behavior. One official of the Korea Special Tourist Association commented that U.S. Military Police (in Tongduch'on/Camp Casey), who had acted arrogantly in policing bars/clubs before 1971-72, [149] ceased to throw their weight around after the establishment and fortification of KAFCs in 1972: "Sometimes they [MPs] accompanied U.S. and Korean health officials [into the clubs] but weren't as abusive as before. I wonder if we had had the friendship associations functioning before 1972 whether such abuses on the part of the U.S. military could have happened." [150]

The KAFCs and the imposition of Korean governmental authority in camptowns also helped prevent the rampant use of the off-limits decree by U.S. commanders. [151] By the middle of 1972, Subcommittee efforts at improving community relations generated changes in the USFK off-limits policy. The new directive emphasized consultation and cooperation with Korean owners of establishments, and when necessary, the use of the USFK chain of command as mediator with the appropriate offices of the Korean government. [152]

Despite the gains, the social cost of these camptown improvements was increased authoritarian control and militarization of people's lives. The number of police personnel, [153] checkpoints, vehicles, and raids<> [154] increased in most camptowns, [155] and U.S. military patrol teams increased in number and kind to monitor the behavior of both U.S. personnel and Korean residents. Although increased policing was needed to control the excesses of camptown life, the Purification Movement reduced the amount of village space, especially that of camptown women, not subject to the surveillance of governmental and military authorities.

Note 1: Migun kiji pandae chon'guk kongdong taech'aek (National Association Against U.S. Bases), *Yangk'i ko hom* (Yankee Go Home), p. 72.

Note 2: The Joint Committee, composed of a delegation from the U.S. military and U.S. Embassy in Korea and the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), was established in 1967 as the central and primary body responsible for managing USFK-ROK relations on a regular basis. The JC met monthly until 1980 and three or four times a year from 1980 on. The Minutes of the Joint Committee meetings state that they "are considered as official documents pertaining to both Govern ments." The complete volumes of the Minutes can be found in the U.S. Library of Congress.

Note 3: *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, vol. 62, February 9, 1970, p. 1598 (Interview on "Issues and Answers," ABC network, January 18, 1970).

Note 4: *Public Papers of the President of the United States*, Richard Nixon, 1970 (hereafter, *Public Papers*, of Nixon), p. 9.

Note 5: *Public Papers*, of Nixon, 1969, p. 552.

Note 6: *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, vol. 63, December 21, 1970, p. 1643, "Statement by Marshall Green, Asst. Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs," on U.S. National Security and Assistance to East Asia, before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, November 30, 1970.

Note 7: *Public Papers*, of Nixon, 1969, p. 678 and p. 676 respectively.

Note 8: Un-chan Chung, "The Development of the South Korean Economy and the Role of the United States," p. 181.

Note 9: Joo-Hong Nam, *America's Commitment to South Korea: The First Decade of the Nixon Doctrine*, pp. 107 and 156.

Note 10: U.S. Senate, *U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad*, p. 1560.

Note 11: Originally, both U.S. and ROK sides drew up lists of modernization needs. Korea's amounted to approximately $4 billion while that of the United States was between $1 to $1.5 billion. The final bill amounted to $1.5 billion. U.S. Senate, *Korea and the Philippines: November 1972*, p. 24.

Note 12: Victor D. Cha, "Alignment Despite Antagonism: Japan and Korea as Quasi-Allies," p. 104. Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1994.

Note 13: *Korea Herald*, December 3, 1969.

Note 14: U.S. House, *Investigation of Korean-American Relations*, Part V, pp. 3Ð4.

Note 15: *Korea Herald*, July 1, 1971.

Note 16: *Far Eastern Economic Review*, August 6, 1970, p. 18.

Note 17: Chae-Jin Lee and Hideo Sato, *U.S. Policy Toward Japan and Korea: A Changing Influence Relationship*, p. 102; Il-Baek Kwang, *Korea and the United States*, p. 123.

Note 18: Robert Boettcher, *Gifts of Deceit: Sun Myung Moon, Tongsun Park, and the Korean Scandal*, p. 91.

Note 19: *Korea Herald*, January 1, 1971.

Note 20: U.S. Senate, *Report to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations*, p. 21.

Note 21: Commemoration Society for President Pak Chonghu,i and First Lady Yuk Yongsu, *Kyôre ui chidoja* ,(The Leader of a People), p. 281; Ralph N. Clough, *Deterrence and Defense in Korea*, p. 25.

Note 22: *Korea Herald*, January 31, 1971.

Note 23: Kwang, p. 102.

Note 24: U.S. House, *Investigation of Korean-American Relations*, Part IV, 1978, p. 37.

Note 25: Lee and Sato, p. 45.

Note 26: Interview with the former Assistant Secretary of SOFA Joint Committee (June 1970 to March 1973) and member of the Subcommittee, Seoul, May 25, 1992. He was a member of the following "panels" that had been established by the Subcommittee on Civil-Military Relations: Local Community and Govern mental Relations; Korean National Police-U.S. Military Police Cooperation and Coordination; Race Relations and Equality of Treatment; People-to-People Projects. Having conducted numerous field investigations and worked with U.S. counterparts on civil-military relations, this official is considered by his colleagues in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to be an expert on community relations problems during the early 1970s. Also see "Public Comment" of President Pak printed in U.S. Senate, *U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad*, p. 1663. U.S. bases on Okinawa were (and are) "the source for immediate support in case of difficulty" on the Korean peninsula. Statement of Gen. J. H. Michaelis, USFK Commander, in U.S. House, *American-Korean Relations*, p. 59.

Note 27: At the end of 1969, President Park had stated in a "Public Comment": "Our position is clear on [this] point. Regardless of what happens to Okinawa, we are willing to offer Cheju Island as a site for new U.S. bases. . . . [W]e value the power of deterrence, and would tolerate the introduction of nuclear weapons into our territory." U.S. Senate, *U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad*, pp. 1662Ð1663.

Note 28: U.S. House, *Investigation of Korean-American Relations*, Part IV, p. 42.

Note 29: A. Doak Barnett, *China and the Major Powers in East Asia*, p. 196.

Note 30: *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, July 18, 1971.

Note 31: U.S. House, *Investigation of Korean-American Affairs*, Part IV, p. 66.

Note 32: *Korea Herald*, November 4, 1971 and November 7, 1971.

Note 33: *Korea Herald*, June 20, 1971.

Note 34: U.S. House, *Investigation of Korean-American Relations*, Part IV, p. 77.

Note 35: *Korea Herald*, October 6, 1971 and June 25, 1971.

Note 36: Lee and Sato, p. 103.

Note 37: *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, September 7, 1974.

Note 38: *Korea Herald*, July 6, 1971.

Note 39: *Korea Herald*, July 7, 1971.

Note 40: Ibid. (editorial by the Korean daily *Chosôn Ilbo*, reprinted in the *Korea Herald*,).

Note 41: *Korea Herald*, July 6, 1971. (a *Washington Post*, dispatch)

Note 42: *Korea Herald*, July 14, 1971.

Note 43: U.S. House, *Investigation of Korean-American Relations*, Part V, p. 36.

Note 44: *Korea Herald*, August 11, 1971.

Note 45: *Korea Herald*, June 25, 1971.

Note 46: *Korea Herald*, March 9, 1971.

Note 47: *Korea Herald*, January 22, 1971 and July 13, 1971.

Note 48: U.S. Department of State cable, dated July 28, 1970, reprinted in U.S. House, *Investigation of Korean-American Relations*, Part IV, p. 75.

Note 49: U.S. House, *American-Korean Relations*, p. 41.

Note 50: Reprinted in *Korea Herald*, June 12, 1971.

Note 51: Norman Levin and Richard Sneider, "Korea in Postwar U.S. Security Policy," p. 49.

Note 52: Ibid., p. 48.

Note 53: Ibid., p. 48.

Note 54: Minutes of the SOFA Joint Committee Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Civil-Military Relations, Meeting #11, June 30, 1972. From here on, these minutes will be referred to as Subcommittee Minutes, followed by the meeting number and date.

Note 55: *Korea Herald*, March 19, 1971.

Note 56: For example, "Kun [county] officials [of P'yôngt'aek County] said . . . that the price of land at P'aengsong-myon and Songt'aen-myon [Songt'an], which soared up to W27,000 per p'yong [Korean measurement of land space] has recently dropped by 10 to 50 per cent. . . . Some 200-odd realtors said that as many as 1,000 persons want to sell their houses, but that only about 5 per cent of them have been able to sell their property. About twenty-two entertainment joints in P'yongt'aek and Osan are about to close up due to the acute slump." From CA News Service, entitled "Feature: Slump Hits 'GI Town' Throughout Nation Amid Rumors of U.S. Troop Cut," July 10, 1970. From files on community relations in the Office of International Relations, EUSA, Seoul.

Note 57: The Korea Special Tourist Association (KSTA) is an arm of the Korean Ministry of Transportation (which also handles matters of tourism) which represents and oversees camptown businesses. Each camptown area generally has its own KSTA office. The bars and clubs catering to U.S. military personnel are specially licensed to serve tax-free alcohol. By regulation, no male Korean nationals are permitted to enter these establishments, and female Korean nationals, except those working in the clubs, are to be accompanied by a U.S. citizen, i.e., a GI. In practice, Korean-looking men are stopped from entering while Korean-looking women are allowed in even without U.S. male escorts. Some clubs in Seoul (It'aewon) permit male Korean nationals to enter the clubs with a U.S. citizen, but the club management generally resents the presence of Korean males in the establishment.

Note 58: Interview with an official of the KSTA, Seoul, May 26, 1992. He informed me that the KSTA Club Records of 1971 and 1972 reveal that 39 clubs in Pochon, 62 in Paju, and 27 in Pup'yong disappeared with the withdrawal of the 7th Division and the relocation of the 2d. The KSTA stated that all the decreases in the number of camptown clubs took place between 1970Ð71.

Note 59: *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, July 15, 1971.

Note 60: Ibid.

Note 61: Ibid.

Note 62: Feature: "Slump Hits 'GI Town' Throughout Nation Amid Rumors of U.S. Troop Cut."

Note 63: Interview, Seoul, May 19, 1992.

Note 64: Interview with the former Assistant Secretary of the JC (1970Ð73), Seoul, May 25, 1992; see note 26.

Note 65: Subcommittee Minutes, #8, March 20, 1972.

Note 66: *Korea Herald*, April 14, 1971. The article was copied from the A-K News Service, Washington, D.C.

Note 67: "Disposition Form: Changing U.S. Forces Personnel-ROK Civilian Relations (U)."

Note 68: Publications in Korea were heavily censored at the time. Given the ROK government's general reticence to publicize officially tensions in the U.S.-Korea relationship during the 1960s and early '70s, often the newspapers would voice complaint or protest against U.S. policies or actions in lieu of the Korean government. A 1971 USFK memorandum regarding community relations states: "Current attitudes of the ROK Government toward the U.S. Government in general, and the U.S. position vis-à-vis Korea specifically, are usually reflected in the Korean press handling of Korean-American relationships." "Disposition Form" sent by Capt. Frank Romanick, ACoffs, J-5, addressed to "Chief of Staff" regarding "Changing U.S. Forces Personnel-ROK Civilian Relations (U)," June 4, 1971. Frank Romanick later became the first U.S. chairperson of the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Civil-Military Relations.

Note 69: For example, on August 7, 1968, *Tonga Ilbo*, "charged U.S. MP's [military police] at Bupyong with 'unlawfully confining people, searching houses and assaulting local residents' and cited various incidents of violence or mistreatment toward Koreans." Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) translation.

Note 70: Memorandum by John A. McReynolds, USFK, "Community Relations Advisory Council (CRAC), Bupyong (ASCOM)," November 1, 1968.

Note 71: U.S.-ROK SOFA (Status of Forces) Joint Committee Minutes, #69, Enclosure 2 of Enclosure 11 (December 16, 1971). From here on the Minutes will be referred to as JC Minutes, followed by the number, and date.

Note 72: Office of International Relations (IO), EUSA, Seoul, Korea, "Psychological Operations Campaign Control Sheet," pp. 1Ð2.

Note 73: One black serviceman said in a newspaper interview: "It all starts back in the unit. . . . There is discrimination there. Then we come to the ville and the Koreans discriminate against us. I've been told by bar owners that they don't want blacks to patronize their places." *Oversees Weekly*, April 1971.

Note 74: One of the discriminatory practices often mentioned by black servicemen was the "chit and credit system," which Korean owners/managers of clubs allegedly offered to whites but not blacks. Some commands made the abolishment of the system a condition for lifting the off-limits ban imposed on uncooperative Korean establishments. *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, August 27, 1971.

Note 75: *Overseas Weekly*, April 1971.

Note 76: *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, October 24, 1971.

Note 77: *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, May 21, 1971.

Note 78: Interview with a USFK community relations officer, Seoul, April 6, 1992.

Note 79: An investigation by the EUSA Psychological Operations unit found that "Most bar owners are hostile to blacks because: a. Their talk, dress, and general behavior frightens [sic] them and sometimes their guests. b. They allegedly don't buy as many drinks as whites but sit at tables for long periods of time. c. Their loud talk and wild gestures may cause white customers to leave the bars. d. By now racial problems involving violence are well known by the club owners. e. The owners believe that whites who spend more money in their bars, [sic] don't favor blacks." From "Psychological Operations Campaign Control Sheet," p. 3.

Note 80: Nancy Abelmann and John Lie, *Blue Dreams: Korean Americans and the Los Angeles Riots*.

Note 81: Ibid., p. 150.

Note 82: *Oversees Weekly*, August 14, 1971.

Note 83: From the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Headquarters, EUSA, "Civil-Military Affairs Newsletter 7Ð71" (July 1971), p. 1.

Note 84: Ibid. U.S. military officials monitoring civil-military relations noted the following: "The Racial Problem in Korea is undoubtedly drawing serious attention from Korean officials because of the social disruptions, property damage and injury to Korean citizens stemming from black-white confrontations in Korean communities. A natural reaction from Koreans is likely to be consternation that Americans (blacks and whites) are using Korean soil to vent their hostility toward each other."

Note 85: "Psychological Operations Campaign Control Sheet," p. 2.

Note 86: Quoted from *Korea Herald*, July 7, 1971.

Note 87: *Korea Herald*, August 14, 1971.

Note 88: The report criticized the following: "Unequal treatment is manifested in unequal punishment, offensive and inflammatory language, prejudice in the assignment of details, harassment by security policemen under order to break up five or more Blacks in a group (and) double standards in enforcement of regulations." From *Korea Herald*, September 29, 1971.

Note 89: From *Korea Times*, July 14, 1971. Camp Humphreys was (is) the home of the 23d Support Group of the Korea Support Command (KORSCOM).

Note 90: *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, July 11, 1971, July 14, 1971, July 16, 1971, August 18, 1971; *Korea Herald*, July 11, 1971; *Korea Times*, July 14, 1971; *Overseas Weekly*, August 14, 1971; Serious Incident Reports of the EUSA, Provost Marshal's Office (PMO) #7Ð51 (July 10, 1971); Letter by Col. Best (February 1972) addressed to Commanding General, EUSA.

Note 91: Interview with a USFK community relations officer, Seoul, April 18, 1992; interview with the ROK Assistant Secretary of the JC (1970Ð73), Seoul, May 25, 1992; see note 26.

Note 92: Office of the Chief of Staff, Headquarters, USFK, "Problems in CivilÐMilitary Relations in the ROK and the First Year of the Operation of the U.S.-ROK Joint Committee's Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Civil-Military Rela tions," 1972, p. 1. This report was attached to a letter written by Lt. Gen. Robert N. Smith, Chief of Staff, USFK and U.S. Representative to the Joint Committee, and sent to Philip C. Habib, U.S. Ambassador to the ROK (1971Ð74).

Note 93: ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), "Civil-Military Relations Provisional Subcommittee Activities Report and Policies," January 7, 1972.

Note 94: The Blue House is the residence of the ROK president. In Korean, it is called *ch'ôngwadae*.

Note 95: The Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) oversees the civil service bureaucracy, the national police, and local governmental affairs.

Note 96: The ROK Assistant Secretary of the JC (1970Ð73) noted that news about camptown problems and the Clean-Up climbed up the hierarchy of the MoHA, from the village and county levels to the office of the provincial governors, to the highest ranks of the MoHA and finally to the Blue House. Interview, Seoul, May 25, 1992.

Note 97: Interview with the former Blue House Political Secretary in charge of overseeing the Purification Movement, Seoul, June 11, 1992.

Note 98: "Problems in CivilÐMilitary Relations in the ROK," p. 4 (see note 92). Although the Blue House Secretary did not state when Gen. Yi spoke about camptown matters to President Pak, it is most likely, given the actions Pak took immediately after the December 1971 visit, that the problems were mentioned then.

Note 99: The U.S. military observed that "Korean newspapers are carrying increasing numbers of reports of alleged G.I. misdemeanors and acts against the Korean people, in what are obviously pro-Korean and sometimes provocative accounts of the incidents." From "Disposition Form: Changing U.S. Forces Personnel-ROK Civilian Relations (U)." For a sampling of such Korean press reports, see "GI Violences [sic] Increase in Base Areas," TA News Service, June 2, 1971 (EUSA translation); "MPs Pistol-Whip Woman," *Taehan Ilbo*, June 21, 1971 (EUSA translation); "Dirty Cups, Racial Turmoil Lead to Leave Ban," *Chosôn Ilbo*, July 7, 1971 (EUSA translation). The racial violence in Anjongni in July 1971 was also covered widely by newspapers throughout Korea.

Note 100: Interview, Seoul, June 11, 1992.

Note 101: Subcommittee Minutes, #6, January 24, 1972.

Note 102: Subcommittee Minutes, #8, March 20, 1972.

Note 103: "Problems in Civil-Military Relations," p. 4 (see note 92). This document also notes that the 1972 expenditure included approximately 395 million won ($990,223) to be provided from the national budget and 675 million won ($1,692,153) from provincial and local budgets (p. 4).

Note 104: Ibid, p.1.

Note 105: SOFA JC Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Civil-Military Relations, "Memo randum Subject: Establishment of Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Civil-Military Rela tions," signed September 2, 1971; "Problems in Civil-Military Relations," p. 1.

Note 106: There was a separate panel for each of the following areas: Local Com munity and Governmental Relations; Korean National Police-U.S. Military Police Cooperation and Coordination; Health and Sanitation; Narcotics and Drug Control; Larceny and Black Marketing; Race Relations and Equality of Treatment; People-to-People Projects. From JC Minutes, #67, Enclosure 1 to Enclosure 18, October 21, 1971.

Note 107: JC Minutes, #69, Enclosure 2 to Enclosure 11, December 16, 1971.

Note 108: Ibid.

Note 109: Ibid.

Note 110: JC Minutes, #70, January 28, 1972, Enclosure 3 to Enclosure 15. The USFK also recommended that bars post "sanitary inspection certificates" in prominent places and that they be kept current by frequent health inspectors' visits. EUSA, J-5 Fact Sheet on numbers of licensed entertainers and VD clinics, based on May 11, 1972, briefing by ROK MoHSA officials to J-5 representatives at MoHSA, entitled "Health and Sanitation," in International Relations Office Files, EUSA Headquarters.

Note 111: JC Minutes, #72, March 28, 1972, Enclosure 20.

Note 112: JC Minutes, #68, November 24, 1971, Enclosure 4 to Enclosure 15; JC Minutes, #70, January 28, 1972, Enclosure 1 to Enclosure 15.

Note 113: The U.S. Air Force in Korea reported that with regard to venereal disease, the most direct problem besides personal health is the "manhours lost away from the job required in the treatment and follow-up work of these diseases." U.S. Air Force, Korea, "Venereal Disease Control: USAF Bases, Korea," May/June 1972.

Note 114: Col. Robert W. Sherwood, "Deposition Form-Trip Report to Eighth U.S. Army, Korea," July 7, 1972, p. 7.

Note 115: Ibid., p. 7.

Note 116: Ibid., p. 4.

Note 117: Col. Henry A. Essex, Surgeon, EUSA, Memorandum addressed to Chief of Staff (EUSA), "Report of Col. R. W. Sherwood on Venereal Disease in EUSA," July 20, 1972, p. 1.

Note 118: Surgeon, EUSA, cable to Surgeon General, Dept. of the Army, "VD Rate," June 15, 1972. A memorandum by John A. McReynolds, Civil Govern ment Officer, EUSA, to Capt. Frank Romanick, U.S. chairperson of the Subcommittee on Civil-Military Relations (June 19, 1972), also underscores the troop reduction and consequent dispersion of U.S. forces and prostitutes as a major cause of the VD rate rise. He noted that "[p]rior to U.S. Forces drawdown last year, the reported number of VD cases per thousand per year was 350Ð400 (mostly gonorrhea)" and that "Following the drawdown and, as reported through 31 October 1971, the figure rose to 680-750."

Note 119: Maj. Gen. Spurgeon Neel, Acting Surgeon General, Dept. of the Army, DASG-HEP, "VD in Korea," memorandum to Army Chief of Staff, Secretary of the Army, re: Col. Sherwood's report, July 11, 1972.

Note 120: The Panel on Health and Sanitation urged vigilance on the part of bar owners/managers to assure that "Korean females permitted to roam or otherwise frequent the bars have legitimate connection with the bar and, as appropriate, possess required and current health certification." JC Minutes, #70, January 28, 1972, Enclosure 1 to Enclosure 15. It also recommended that Korean and U.S. Forces authorities charged with prevention and control of venereal disease intensify efforts to require VD carriers to undergo necessary treatment and to remove them from public circulation until such time as they are pronounced free from disease. JC Minutes, #68, November 24, 1971, Enclosure 3 to Enclosure 15.

Note 121: The EUSA J-5 "Fact Sheet" on numbers of licensed entertainers and VD clinics states that "[t]empers on both sides are easily roused on this subject, with many compound commanders tending to hold the Korean community responsible and community officials blaming U.S. personnel for promiscuity and failure to take basic sanitary precautions."

Note 122: Sherwood, "Deposition Form-Trip Report to Eighth U.S. Army, Korea," p. 4.

Note 123: Ibid., pp. 4Ð5.

Note 124: Base-Community Clean-Up Committee, "Woegukkun kiji chonghwa chonghap taech'aek" (Comprehensive Policy for the Purification of Foreign Troop Bases), July 1972, enclosed in Subcommittee Minutes, #12, July 31, 1972. Specifically, the ROK chair of the Subcommittee reported to the Subcommittee that "the ROK Government plans to open sixteen additional medical facilities to control VD at a cost of 82 million won ($205,565) during the rest of this year. In addition, VD checks will be intensified and a total of about 60 million won has been allocated for various medical control measures and treatment of VD in affected persons. In addition, the Government would augment the number of Korean doctors and nurses working on these problems by 100 and has budgeted 38 million won for this purpose." Subcommittee Minutes, #8, March 20, 1972; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Kijich'on chonghwa ru,l wihan woemubu sihaeng kyehoek" #1 (MoFA Plans for the Purification of Camptowns), enclosed in Subcommittee Minutes, #6, January 24, 1972; Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, VD Control Programs, enclosed in Subcommittee Minutes, #10 (submitted to MoFA upon MoFA's solicitation of information from relevant ministries to be reported to the 70th meeting of the SOFA Joint Committee).

Note 125: Subcommittee Minutes, #24, December 7, 1973. The report specified that 195 employees were trained in North Kyongsang Province, 805 in Kyonggi Province, and 463 in Seoul. These figures were offered to the Subcommittee as evidence of the progress the Korean government was making on camptown improvements.

Note 126: Office of the Chief of Staff, Headquarters, USFK, "Problems in Civil-Military Relations in the ROK," p. 4.

Note 127: For example, see the statements of Lt. Gen. Robert J. Friedman (U.S. representative to the Joint Committee, 1968) in JC Minutes, #26, June 5, 1968, Enclosure 1.

Note 128: JC Minutes, #68, November 24, 1971, Enclosure 15.

Note 129: Ibid.

Note 130: Subcommittee Minutes, #22, September 25, 1973.

Note 131: USFK, Headquarters, Policy Directive 5-3, "Civil Relations, Government Affairs: Korean-American Friendship Councils," September 7, 1973.

Note 132: ROK MoHA, "Working Rules for Regulations Concerning the Establish ment of Provincial ROK-U.S. Friendship Councils," 1973. Subcommittee Minutes, #33, April 9, 1976, Enclosure.

Note 133: See chapters 4 and 6.

Note 134: A good example of the use of the off-limits decree to coerce desired ends is that of the 2d Infantry Division (Tongduch'ôn) in November 1971. The commanding general of 2d ID indefinitely placed off limits the areas connecting Yongjugol, P'aju-ri, and Sonyu-ri beginning November 17, 1971, with the following justification: "The failure of Korean authorities and businessmen to control illegal, unsavory, or unhealthy activities in these areas requires such action. . . . The VD rate among prostitutes indicates a complete failure of police and health agencies to coordinate their efforts to effectively solve the problem." The commander demanded action on such problems plus the installation of street lights, the transfer of businesses catering to U.S. soldiers to main streets, and the cessation of drug sales to U.S. personnel as conditions for the lifting of the off-limits ban. Sub committee Minutes, #4, November 19, 1971, Enclosure.

Note 135: Col. Jack F. Belford, letter to Chief of Staff, EUSA, on camptown problems in It'aewon (Seoul), July 29, 1971.

Note 136: *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, August 28, 1971.

Note 137: *Korea Times*, July 14, 1971.

Note 138: "Seventh Report of the Subcommittee on Civil-Military Affairs," Subcommittee Minutes, #8, March 20, 1972. The Report states that an agreement was reached "after extensive negotiations."

Note 139: The ROK acting chairperson expressed "deep concern and regret over the unilateral actions taken by the 2d Division in placing off limits and in issuing press release on civil-military relations." He continued, "The spokesman allegedly insinuated the non-existence of the Government and administration in the territory of the Republic of Korea and the non-existence of ROK-US cooperation." He requested that off-limits in three towns in P'aju-kun be immediately lifted and that off-limits actions on Korean communities be suspended "while Ad Hoc Subcommittee is in activities." He then stated, "If these requests would not be met, the ROK component would consider suspending its activities because it defies raison d'etre of the Ad Hoc Subcommittee and usefulness of its role." At the same meeting, the U.S. chair of the Subcommittee expressed regret over this matter, apologized for the 2d ID's actions, and urged for continued joint cooperation. Subcommittee Minutes, #4, November 19, 1971.

Note 140: For example, Anjongni prostitutes and villagers (totaling approximately 3,600 people) protested at the gates of Camp Humphreys throughout July and early August against the command's refusal to lift the off-limits ban. *Chungang Ilbo*, July 29, 1971 (EUSA translation); *Taehan Ilbo*, August 10, 1971 (EUSA translation).

Note 141: For example, the commander of Camp Humphreys lifted the ban on Anjongni only after the villagers agreed to accept his five-point demand. *Chungang Ilbo*, July 26, 1971; *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, August 28, 1971. A Korean national who has served as a USFK community relations officer for about thirty years stated, "Off-limits was the ultimate leverage because it created critical injury to the owner. So, owners had to follow all the demands of the U.S. base command." Interview, Seoul, May 19, 1992.

Note 142: "As of 1967, local administration was under the direct control and supervision of the central government. The mayors of the Special City of Seoul and the Special City of Pusan, nine provincial governors, and heads of other local administration bodies [were] appointed by the central government. . . . County (*gun*,) chiefs [were] appointed by the President at the recommendation of the provincial governors. . . . Ward (*ku*,) chiefs [were] appointed by the President at the recommendation of the mayor of their respective cities." Department of Army, 8th Army Headquarters, *Civil Affairs Handbook*, #530Ð4, January 11, 1968, pp. 28Ð29.

Note 143: Interview with the ROK Assistant Secretary of the JC (1970Ð73), Seoul, May 25, 1992.

Note 144: Interview with a key initiator of the Clean-Up, Coscob, Conn., October 24, 1991.

Note 145: Interview with a USFK community relations officer, April 6, 1992. He stated, "There's no doubt that local community health officials and police were forcing girls to comply with VD checks. The women needed to be pushed." Also, interview with an official of the Korea Special Tourist Association, Seoul, May 26, 1992.

Note 146: For example, Col. G. D. Tate, Jr., Commander of the 4th Missile Command at Camp Page, reported at the March 15, 1972, Civil Affairs Confer ence: "Every club owner signed a pledge of 'equal treatment for all.' . . . Racial discrimination of any sort is minimal." "Report of Korean-American Civil Affairs Conference, Yongsan," March 15, 1972. Two years later, such progress continued in most base areas. For example, the Asst. Information Officer of the 314th Air Division at Osan Air Force Base (Songt'an) reported: "As regards discriminatory practices off-base, it appears that we have entered a more mature and encouraging phase. . . . During 1974 there has been no overt discrimination in the off-base clubs." "Eighth United States Forces Korea Civil Affairs Conference, December 6, 1974."

Note 147: One of the key initiators of the Clean-Up described the gains for local Koreans as follows: "Most of the camp areas were small villages before the Clean-Up and have since developed into thriving towns. The clean-up wasn't the only reason for their development-it was bigger than that-but the clean-up was the first time that the two governments got together and decided to do something about the areas." Interview, Coscob, Conn. October 24, 1991.

Note 148: Ibid. The interviewee commented that improved business conditions, along with improved base-community relations, attracted more non-American-oriented businesses to the camptowns, i.e., Korean dependency on U.S. military dollars gradually decreased.

Note 149: Specifically, he referred to MP harassment of club hostesses under the pretext of checking VD cards. MPs did not have the authority to conduct such searches. Interview, Seoul, May 26, 1992.

Note 150: Ibid.

Note 151: Interview with the ROK Assistant Secretary of the JC (1970Ð73), Seoul, May 25, 1992; interview with a KSTA official, Seoul, May 26, 1992. Interviews with Korean officials revealed that in the eyes of Koreans, the U.S. military, prior to the Ad Hoc Subcommittee's Clean-Up efforts, used the off-limits power as an instrument of community relations instead of as a last resort for containing serious danger or threat to the well-being of its personnel. One official recounted that "the U.S. military roped off areas with MPs guarding them when they put places off limits." Similarly, a KSTA official stated, "In the 1960s and early '70s, the U.S. side would put up signs on clubs saying 'off-limits.' They would nail them on without our [Korean owners/managers] permission or input. And they would post a sign up at their gate indicating that such and such club was off-limits. They stopped doing that from the mid-70s on. They don't directly put the signs up themselves. Consultations take place." Frequent use of the off-limits decree amounted to a U.S. challenge and insult to Korean sovereignty.

Note 152: The Subcommittee Minutes (#10) of May 18, 1972, state the following: "USFK, in supporting the work of the Ad Hoc Subcommittee, revised its policy in the area of civilÐmilitary relations. . . . [The new policy directive on off-limits] requires local commanders to formally notify and to seek assistance from establishment owners and local government officials in correcting unsatisfactory conditions." It continues that when the problem cannot be resolved at the local level, the USFK Headquarters will go to the ROK national government for assistance: "In effect, each U.S. commander now has a channel to the central ROKG [government] when required."

Note 153: For example, from September 1, 1971 to mid-December 1971, the number of Korean National Police members in Tongduch'on, outside Camp Casey (Headquarters, 2d Division), increased by approximately 150%. Subcommittee Minutes, #5, December 14, 1971.

Note 154: Police raids of clubs and camptown women's homes, as well as spot searches of Korean women accompanying U.S. GIs, increased with the VD control efforts of the Korean government and the U.S. military. Subcommittee Minutes, #11, June 30, 1972; *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, September 4, 1971; USFK, J-5, *Fifth United States Forces, Korea Civil Affairs Conference*, March 2, 1973, Report of Col. D. W. Blanton, U.S. Air Force, Commander, 3d Combat Support Group, Kunsan.

Note 155: In addition to increased Military Police and Security Police patrols, various U.S. commands formed "Salt and Pepper Teams" and "Courtesy Patrols" to help monitor camptown interactions and activities. These teams were separate from the military police. *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, August 20, 1971 and July 28, 1972.

4. The Role of Women in the Clean-Up Campaign: "Personal Ambassadors"

What began as a joint USFK-ROK venture to improve the discipline, welfare, and morale among U.S. troops in Korea turned Korean camptown prostitutes into instruments of foreign policy. Through the pursuit of the ROK government's "people-to-people diplomacy" toward the United States, the women became "personal ambassadors" who would be responsible for improving U.S.-ROK civil-military relations. During the Clean-Up Campaign, the prostitutes bore the burden of reconciling the differences between two races (blacks and whites) and two governments. Joint U.S.-ROK control over their bodies and behavior, through VD examinations and supervision of their interactions with GI customers, became an indicator of the status of base-community relations and the willingness of the ROKG to accommodate U.S. interests. Although they did not dictate policy, the women became transnational actors through their indispensable, though mostly involuntary, participation in the Clean-Up process.

The women's key role in the Clean-Up was based on their function as the glue of USFK-ROK community relations. The prostitutes were the primary and often sole contact with Korean society that GIs had on a daily basis. A "Human Factors Research Report" on troop-community relations stated unequivocally, "Fraternization [in the form of prostitution] is near the core of troop-community relations here." [1] The same study found that "there is a significant number of men in most units who believe that more male-female fraternization here endears the American to Korea--makes him more willing to fight for Korea" and that "[m]ost officers believe that fraternization is generally a constructive force." [2] According to a key U.S. initiator of the Clean-Up, the Korean government also believed that prostitution facilitated security relations between the United States and Korea:

> As a general rule, I know that the [ROK] government was benevolent about prostitution because it was a real source of U.S.-Korean friendship and friendliness. If a fellow is that far away [from home], his sexual appetites are met, he's feeling pretty good, and he'll serve better. I think both sides didn't try to stamp out prostitution but rather to keep it within bounds. [3]

The above supports Enloe's observation that women, whether wives of diplomats or military nurses, have been used to facilitate relations among men and "soften" the harsh and impersonal political environment in which men perform their public duties. [4] Korean women and their sexuality (within the boundaries set by the military and local authorities) were considered necessary to the smooth operation of the U.S. military organization in Korea.

Antidiscrimination Efforts in Camptowns

The U.S. military and the local Korean authorities pinpointed *kijich'on* prostitutes as the source of social problems and unrest, especially with respect to racial violence. [5] Most of the retired and current USFK community relations officials and former Subcommittee members whom I interviewed acknowledged that the "business girls" were the source of off-post black-white conflict in the early 1970s primarily because they were labeled as "black" or "white." Black prostitutes were looked down upon by Korean camptown residents, white servicemen, and "white" prostitutes alike. Throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s, most camptown R&R (Rest and Relaxation) establishments were segregated, not by policy but by choice and habit of the GI patrons. Accordingly, women generally worked in either "all-white" or "all-black" bars/clubs and tended not to mix their customers. But with the rise of black militancy in the U.S. military in the late 1960s and the social confusion wrought by the movement of troops and prostitutes during the early years of the Nixon

Doctrine, prostitutes and GIs would sometimes cross the racial lines, both deliberately and inadvertently. Such mixing of racial partners sparked often violent reactions among the GIs. Fights between black and white soldiers were, in a sense, over territory, that is, who possesses which women and who is trespassing on whose women.

Many Korean prostitutes did discriminate against black servicemen because of their own racial prejudices and ignorance. But they also kept their distance from the black soldier out of economic necessity, which was informed by the racial hierarchy imposed on them by white soldiers, club owners, and other prostitutes. First, there were more white bars/clubs than black ones, meaning more white customers to sell drinks and sex to. Second, many, if not most, of the white clubs prohibited blacks from entering the establishments, which meant that most prostitutes did not have to make the choice of accepting or rejecting black offers for drinks or sex. Even if the women did interact with blacks, the club owner could fire them because the owner himself often feared offending and losing white patrons who opposed mixed-race patronage. Third, and most serious, the women feared that fraternizing with black servicemen would mean physical abuse and/or loss of income from white servicemen.[6] Regardless of the women's motivations, their display of "white favoritism" provoked the anger and frustration of black servicemen.

Correspondence from installation commanders to the Commanding General of the EUSA and the Joint Committee, as well as reports from the USFK Civil Affairs Conference,[7] pinpointed the bars/clubs as the loci of camptown racial unrest and emphasized the need to make club owners control their employees' (particularly the prostitutes') discriminatory conduct. The head of the U.S. Army Garrison in Yongsan (USAGY), near It'aewon in Seoul,[8] stated the seriousness of discriminatory practices and the consequent imposition of off-limits decrees:

> An extensive study of the clubs of the Itaewon area by members of this headquarters has revealed that intolerable discriminatory practices are being allowed, or at least passively condoned, by club managers. . . . USAGY and members of the Equal Opportunity Council met with the seven Itaewon club owners and pointed out to them that they were showing discrimination toward the black soldier versus the white soldier in the areas of overall attitude, greeting, seating, and the actions of the ir entertainment girls. . . . [Soon after,] [a]ll but the King Club had made tremendous improvements. . . . The King Club of the Itaewon area will be Off Limits effective 2 June 71, in accordance with EA Reg. [Eighth Army Regulation] 192-96.[9]

The Subcommittee's Panel on Race Relations and Equality of Treatment was particularly assertive in recommending behavioral changes among club/bar employees.[10] On the Korean side, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) and the Base-Community Clean-Up Campaign also pressed for behavioral changes, particularly of the "hostesses," through camptown residents' cooperation with U.S. military personnel.[11] MoFA's "Civil-Military Relations Policy on Racial Discrimination" stated the following:

> Relevant Korean organizations should coordinate with U.S. military representatives to eliminate racial discrimination on the part of club hostesses. Relevant U.S. military authorities should educate white soldiers with all possible effort not to discriminate against women who associate with black soldiers.[12] The U.S. military mentioned on paper the need to educate its own men about fair treatment toward Korean prostitutes, but there is no evidence that such education ever took place. However, the military developed and conducted extensive programs to teach

> cooperation and respect among its own men. [13]

Education" was the key word for reducing and eliminating racial discrimination in clubs. Representatives of various USFK commands, as well as local Korean officials, regularly discussed the need to educate club owners, employees, soldiers, and other camptown residents on matters of racial discrimination. For example, the commander of the Yongsan Garrison enlisted the help of the 24th Psychological Operations Detachment (PSYOP) of the EUSA to educate club owners/managers and employees. The PSYOP team focused their efforts on the creation and distribution of posters, flyers, coasters (for glasses), [14] tape-recorded English lessons, and magazine articles designed to inform Koreans and Americans about race issues. [15] The "Psychological Operations Campaign Control Sheet" (p. 6) offers the following advice: "Distribute tape-recorded English lessons to each club. Teach carefully selected words like tolerance and equality to the waitresses." The team also prepared "a course of instruction . . . for club employees to teach them [employees] the Black soldier's culture and U.S. policy on equal treatment." [16] The team also prepared posters, bearing the words, "(We) serve all customers equally" and "Don't Discriminate--Participate," to be hung in the It'aewon clubs.

Both U.S. and Korean officials at the local levels also tried to enlist the cooperation and leadership of the local prostitutes' "autonomous organizations" to teach their members not to discriminate against servicemen. In addition, local Korean authorities, e.g., the mayor's office, the police, and health clinics, also held regular Etiquette and Good Conduct Meetings to educate the prostitutes about respecting the human rights of black soldiers and creating an harmonious camptown environment. Uijongbu, for example, held "four meetings and five meetings respectively for regular club employees and 'business girls' " in 1972. [17]

The Eighth Army Garrison in Seoul, which monitored It'aewon clubs and bars, was particulary active. In 1971, the command officials formed PEACE (Promote Equality Action Committee) with the owners of It'aewon clubs and the president of the prostitutes' organization, the Rose Society, to formulate and monitor antidiscrimination policies. The members of PEACE signed pledges to do their "utmost to insure equal treatment for all people" [18] and conducted poster campaigns (in English and Korean) to promote antidiscriminatory behavior in the clubs. [19] Camp Page in Ch'unch'on also initiated such pacts. [20]

For the U.S. military, the racial problems in camptowns posed more than a threat to discipline, morale, and defense preparedness. They also raised political problems in its propaganda war with the North, as well as potential anti-Americanism among South Koreans. The PSYOP material stressed that "[t]he ROK's enemies take advantage of racial incidents and may attempt to agitate such incidents in order to create dissension between blacks and whites and eventually between the ROK and the U.S." [21] The USFK was intent on preventing North Koreans from exploiting racial tensions in American society as a way to embarrass the United States. In the October issue of *Jayu* (*Friends of Freedom*) magazine, PSYOP linked camptown racial problems to the integrity of the U.S. military and to the defense of South Korea: "For some time, the North Korean Communists have been directing some of their propaganda attacks toward the American Negro soldier, in an effort to encourage him to rebel against his military leaders, desert the Army, abandon the defense of the ROK." [22]

The U.S. military in Korea was wary of the possibility that Korean camptown protests against the violent behavior of black soldiers (particularly in July 1971) would be misunderstood by South and North Koreans as anti-American uprisings. The *Jayu* article ended with the reminder that Korean "protests against racial disturbance ought to be distinguished from Anti-Americanism." [23] The PSYOP planners were also careful not to appear as if the USFK were dictating policies to private Korean club owners and residents, although in reality, the U.S. side developed the majority of the antidiscrimination programs, and the Korean residents (faced with the USFK's off-limits power) had little choice but to comply. Under "Programming advice," the PSYOPS "Campaign Control Sheet" emphasized that:

> It is imperative for the success of operations that all PSYOP materials be reviewed by club owners for acceptance and that distribution be made by ROK law enforcement agencies. It is

> equally important that U.S. military installations not be readily identifiable with these materials. PSYOP materials should imply *Korean* concern to improve the racial situation in their respective areas and *Korean* awareness that they contribute to racial problems and it is their problem also. [24] (italics in original)

In their efforts to educate prostitutes, the USFK planners reiterated that the women's discriminatory actions help fuel North Korean propaganda against the South and the U.S. military presence. [25] In July 1971, PSYOP officials gave 500 flyers (in Korean language) to the Yongsan police to distribute to It'aewon club owners, which in turn were distributed to "women patrons" (prostitutes). [26] In urging the women to treat all U.S. customers equally, the flyers stated:

> It should be noted that the North Koreans seek to exploit and exacerbate racial tensions among U.S. servicemen and conduct anti-U.S. propaganda in order to distance the United States and the ROK from each other. This, in effect, weakens the security of our country. [27]

Another version of the flyer directed to club women, which was written in English and distributed to It'aewon club owners and stores, was more direct and accusatory in tone:

> [Y]ou should also realize that you are unconsciously helping your enemy, while weakening the internal security of your nation. Remember U.S. personnel are here to help you to defend the Republic of Korea from North Korean invasion and subversion.
>
> In order to keep your business and help the security of your country, you are asked to join with us and help us to solve the problem. . . . You are urged to treat all U.S. customers equally. All must be seated and served with equal courtesy and speed, for example. Do not side with any particular group of customers who come to your club, bar or store. [28]

The above concerns underscore the importance of the role of camptown residents in general, and the prostitutes in particular, from the perspective of the USFK and Korean authorities, in maintaining a "united front" against the Northern enemy and in keeping the peace between the South Korean and American sides. Both authorities considered these women not as passive spectators in the joint U.S.-ROK defense efforts but as necessary team-players. Their role in reducing or eliminating racial conflict was to determine both the image of the U.S.-ROK military relationship in the eyes of Americans, both South and North Koreans, and the ability of Communists to wage their propaganda campaign against the United States and ROK. Moreover, the women's participation was needed to help check potential anti-U.S. sentiments that could disrupt the U.S.-ROK alliance.

Despite these educational attempts by the U.S. military, the real onus of off-post racial cooperation and harmony rested on the club owners and managers' ability to control of club employees. [29] Although publicity around antidiscrimination programs highlighted their cooperative and mutually beneficial aspects, the programs did in fact involve coercion and co-optation of local Koreans by the U.S. installation authorities. The commander of USAGY made this point explicit in his memorandum to the EUSA Chief of Staff:

> They [camptown Koreans] realize that the Garrison Commander carries a "big stick," i.e., he can place the club off limits, which

> would deprive them of revenue which they need to stay operational. Continually at the [PEACE] committee meetings it is brought to the committee's attention that this is a voluntary organization and certainly is not mandatory, but noncompliance to extending equality to all will lead to being placed off limits. 30

Pressured by U.S. commanders, the club owners/managers pressured their hostesses to treat customers equally. Kim Yonja, who was working in Songt'an as a prostitute in 1971, recalled the following:

> From the base side, the order that came down to us was to be nice to blacks if they come into the hall, to have the women sit with the blacks and dance with them if they wanted to dance. . . . [B]ut it was the owners who "educated" us. . . . [They] told the women, "Even if you don't bring them (black soldiers) home, at least drink and dance with them." All this refers to the Songtan area. 31

To expect club owners and managers, who served as collective pimps for the hostesses working in their establishments, to educate these women was a naive assumption on the part of the U.S. military authorities. It was common knowledge among camptown residents, both American and Korean, that club owners' only concern for the women was their ability to increase club revenues. The U.S. side was fully aware that many club owners/managers mistreated the women by physically beating them, psychologically harassing them, and keeping them in debt bondage. Demanding that these owners/managers increase control over these women's conduct was tantamount to increasing and legitimating the former's exploitation and abuse of the latter. The former U.S. chair of the Subcommittee from December 1971 to October 1972 responded frankly to my question, "What kind of carrots and sticks were used to enforce nondiscrimination by club women?" Answer: "Generally, a visit to the bar owner would either get her fired or get her head screwed on straight. Give pressure to the bar owner and they usually carried through." 32

Besides the power of hiring and firing, the club owner had other means of cutting off a prostitute's livelihood, e.g., confiscating her VD/registration card so that she would not be able to work. Kim Yonja stated that because most club women avoided the monthly "Etiquette and Good Conduct" lecture, some club owners/managers helped out the local Korean authorities who sponsored the meeting by confiscating the club women's VD cards as a way to force the women to attend: "If there were going to be a meeting tomorrow, then the owner would take away the VD card the night before, at closing time, and prohibit the women who don't go to the meeting from coming to work at the club for several days. Without the VD card, women could not work." 33

Another woman emphasized that there was virtually no legal or political recourse that women could take against the abuses: "If a woman is abused by the owner, unless the woman gets bruises that take months to heal, then, things just get covered up." 34 The women's limited power over their own lives was sharply reduced because of the political power the owners held over camptown life. According to Kim Yonja, who was active in the camptown politics of Kunsan and Songt'an in the 1970s and 1980s,

> Most club owners in camptowns are village leaders. They hold power. It's not that the original residents become the owners, but owners have arrived from other areas. By establishing their business and earning money, they become owners, Special Tourist Association leaders, etc. So, if a woman is physically abused by the owner, or if a woman is murdered by a GI, she had nowhere to turn to: She would be told (by the Korean authorities), "Look, the American soldier is here to help Korea--

> they put their lives on the line for Korea." [35]

In the end, the prostitutes bore much of the burden of allaying racial tensions and creating a sense of cooperation and harmony in base-community relations. Their role in reducing racial conflict also offered the USFK and the ROK government a sense of improved relations and friendship. Throughout the first two years of the Clean-Up Campaign, both U.S. and ROK officials increasingly commended each other for the significant declines in camptown racial problems.

Venereal Disease Control

In 1971, for the first time in history, the USFK succeeded in pressuring the Korean government to regulate systematically and strictly the bodies/health of camptown prostitutes through regular and effective VD examinations and treatment. Although the USFK implemented various measures within its commands to reduce the high VD rates among its troops, the target of the U.S.-ROK anti-VD efforts was the camptown women. Joint U.S.-ROK coordination and cooperation on this issue came to represent not only improved relations between the United States and Korea but also dual state control over the bodies and sexual labor of the women. Moreover, the Korean government interpreted the sexual labor of camptown prostitutes as a "labor of love" for their nation: With cleaner, healthier bodies and cooperative attitudes in selling sex to GIs, the women would contribute to the defense and development of the ROK.

The magnitude of VD as a social vice and medical problem became apparent to the USFK with the troop reduction of 1970-71 and the consequent redeployment of troops and migration of camptown Koreans throughout South Korea. For the USFK, prostitution and venereal disease composed the singlemost difficult and persistent camptown vice to control in the Clean-Up Campaign.

Table 4.1

Veneral Disease Rates, Army Worldwide and Specified Areas

Month & Year	Korea	Worldwide	CONUS	Thailan	Vietnam	USA-REUR Strength Korea	Mean
Jul' 70	371.69	113.15	39.43	608.19	283.27	17.06	49,258
Aug	359.99	99.28	36.52	239.09	239.09	17.26	47,685
Sep	398.33	111.82	39.16	275.90	275.90	17.43	46,856
Oct	422.38	108.86	34.10	268.73	268.73	17.02	46,217
Nov	440.62	103.15	33.33	257.27	257.27	15.32	44,954
Dec	407.38	92.94	29.67	223.26	223.26	14.97	45,318
Jan '71	464.54	103.83	103.83	382.89	264.18	7.59	44,938
Feb	513.03	96.51	96.51	495.20	230.39	9.42	45,813
Mar	547.54	99.35	99.35	529.69	263.31	8.57	42,470
Apr	518.22	99.66	99.66	489.40	298.14	6.64	40,336
May	468.04	99.48	99.48	506.98	329.42	10.83	36,350
Jun	568.86	111.40	111.40	719.85	351.05	12.36	33,537
Jul	551.55	100.04	100.04	489.97	316.86	15.12	33,665
Aug	537.49	106.27	106.27	604.69	334.13	16.59	31,851
Sep	503.58	102.01	102.01	531.25	345.62	16.33	30,564
Oct	651.24	108.21	108.21	376.60	373.49	9.02	34,170

Nov	740.39	120.52	120.52	332.41	485.59	13.43	38,470
Dec	601.81	119.95	119.95	456.95	549.93	10.10	37,935
Jan '72	611.25	125.81	125.81	708.95	614.51	12.70	36,079
Feb	747.02	115.47	115.47	708.52	508.48	15.22	35,716
Mar	750..83	136.78	136.78	631.32	813.99	24.30	35,552
Apr	732.36	115.73	115.73	677.61	854.97	21.46	35,999

Source: Morbidity Reports, RCS MED-78. From the Files of the office of International Relations, EUSA.
Note: Annual rates per 1000 mean strength includes cases treated on duty status.

The Chief of Preventive Medicine of the EUSA reported sharp increases in annual VD rates for U.S. troops in Korea from 389 cases/1000 men/year in 1970 to 553/1000/yr. in 1971 and 692/1000/yr. in 1972. Monthly VD rates in 1972 remained between 600-700, with the peak of 787/1000/yr. in May. Altogether, 24,457 cases of venereal disease [36] (among a mean troop presence of about 35,000) were reported for U.S. Army personnel in 1972. [37] Osan Air Base recorded a total of 2,261 VD cases in 1970 and 2,529 in 1971. [38] A comparison of U.S. Army VD rates worldwide (table 4.1) highlights Korea as a consistent trouble spot.

The U.S. commanders and medical officers in Korea determined that immediate and drastic measures were needed, so much so that in the summer and fall of 1972, "[t]he Surgeon General [of the Department of the Army] came under great pressure to return to punishment as a means of VD control in Korea although punitive action against VD patients in the military had been prohibited by U.S. Public Law 439 since September, 1944. Military officials also considered other urgent measures, such as allowing names of VD patients to be released to commanders on a routine basis." [39] Cables exchanged between the Commanding General of the USFK, John Michaelis, and the DoA Surgeon General's Office reveal a push by field officers in Korea to take stricter VD control measures among troops than permitted by Washington. For example, General Michaelis complained in a cablegram:

> A dichotomy exists between this headquarters and the Surg Gen [surgeon general] in such matters as releasing statistics on VD and names of infected personnel to unit commanders in order that we can as one example, deny pass privileges until the patient is certified as cured by the local surgeon. We also need this information so that we can take appropriate administrative action against those soldiers who contract VD several times. . . . DA [Dept. of Army] policy prohibits such information from being provided, therefore, request this policy be changed. It is frustrating to commanders to respond to the high priority effort [on VD] which has been directed by the Secretary of the Army without resolving this major difference and does produce an adverse morale factor among our company and battalion level commanders. . . . It must be realized that drastic action is demanded if success is to be achieved. [40] (The original, of course, is in solid capitals.)

Despite such persistence, the Surgeon General's Office remained adamant that no punitive actions, including denial of pass privileges, and other actions deleterious to "sound medical practice," such as circulating names of patients, comparing VD figures of different commands, and using VD as a basis for reenlistment decisions, would be permitted. [41] What the Surgeon General did emphasize was the "control of infection in prostitute reservoir [as] of primary importance" and recommended that the USFK "encourage growth of ROK diagnostic ability." [42] The 1972 Sherwood Report on the status of the VD epidemic among U.S. troops also emphasized that "traditional control measures," such as education and immediate reporting and treatment of the soldiers, would not significantly reduce VD rates "as long as there is such a high prevalence of venereal disease in girls that are so easily accessible." Without doubt, the number of VD-infected camptown prostitutes was high: of the approxi mately 13,000 registered camptown prostitutes recorded by the EUSA Preventive Medicine Division in the end of 1972, the Korean National Institute of Health recorded 6,700 cases of infection in October and November. [43]

Unable to reconcile the differences between the Washington office of the Surgeon General and the field officers in Korea, the USFK authorities waged an aggressive campaign to educate servicemen about VD and preventive measures, through briefings and pamphlets, [44] as well as institute various "contact identification systems" to trace the human source of each man's illness, namely, the prostitute. For the U.S. military authorities in Korea and Washington, the control of prostitutes' physical mobility, the examination of her body, and treatment of her VD infection were the key components of lowering VD rates among U.S. soldiers.

The USFK used the Clean-Up Campaign of the SOFA Joint Committee and the Korean Base Community Clean-Up Committee to press for rapid action on the VD problem. Several USFK and Korean officials I interviewed noted that although the initial target of the Campaign was camptown race relations, control of prostitutes and reduction of VD rates for U.S. troops consistently remained the major point of grievance for the USFK and the primary focus of work for the Korean government. One USFK community relations officer commented that racial unrest was merely the "spark" that ignited the Clean-Up activity and that control of prostitution/VD constituted the crux. He also mentioned that in his opinion, given the emphasis placed on VD control, the ROKG should have called the Clean-Up Campaign "Kukka Songbyong Chonghwa Undong" (National VD Purification Movement), instead of the generic "Camptown Purification Movement." [45]

Joint Committee Minutes, Ad Hoc Subcommittee Minutes, the Civil Affairs Conference reports, and official correspondences of U.S. commanders in Korea leave no doubt that prostitution/VD was the Achilles heel of improved camptown life and improved Korean-American relations. A "Fact Sheet" of the EUSA J-5 office, which handled civil-military relations, emphasized the prostitution/VD issue as a U.S.-ROK priority: "The responsibility of Korean and U.S. military officials in working closely together in lessening unfavorable camp-community relations is nowhere more pronounced than in the problem of venereal diseases." [46] As with the antidiscrimination efforts, the Subcommittee on Civil-Military Relations, particularly its Panel on Health and Sanitation, acted as the initiator, mediator, and evaluator of U.S.-ROK anti-VD efforts. By bringing the complaints of individual base commanders and the Surgeon General's Office of the Department of Army to the attention of their ROK counterparts on the Joint Committee, [47] the U.S. members succeeded in getting the following point across to the highest levels of the ROK government: "The ROK government has not applied adequate control measures to keep the prevalence of venereal disease in prostitutes at a low level." [48] The U.S. military specifically criticized the inadequacy of examination and treatment facilities, both in quantity and quality, the availability of antibiotics readily available at Korean pharmacies (at which prostitutes and soldiers regularly purchased for self-treatment purposes), medically unsound treatment regimens for infected women, and local health officials demanding and/or accepting bribes from camptown prostitutes in return for exemptions from mandatory examinations or "passing" women who failed the VD tests. [49] Simultaneously, the U.S. side insisted on active cooperation of the ROK government at all levels, and by personally visiting various camptowns, Subcommittee members, both Korean and American, were able to encourage and demand local coordination and cooperation. After such visits, local command-community cooperation on VD control was reported to have improved, with local health officials, in particular, improving their testing and treatment programs. [50]

The Korean government took the task of controlling prostitution and VD seriously. Although records show the U.S. side to have emphasized the resolution of racial problems in the early part of the Clean-Up, Korean documents available as enclosures in the Subcommittee Minutes focused on the prostitution/VD problem from the very beginning of the Clean-Up Campaign. For example, MoFA's first Clean-Up proposal to the BCCUC, entitled "Kijich'on Chonghwa rul wihan Woemubu Sihaeng Kyehoek #1" (Camptown Clean-Up Enforcement Plans of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), listed VD control (including elimination of the causes of VD, effective treatment of infected women, and cooperation with U.S. military authorities on VD education) first among numerous Clean-Up items and pressed for the ROK's "utmost cooperation" with and the strengthening of joint government action through the SOFA mechanism (the Joint Committee). [51] Another report, "Woegukkun Kijichubyon Chonghwa Chonghap Taech'aek" (Comprehensive Plans for the Purification of Foreign Military Base Areas) of the BCCUC also listed VD as the first item on its "problem list." [52]

a name="97"> Although no documents I examined offer explanations for the ROK government's emphasis on prostitution/VD control as the primary objective of its Purification Movement, those familiar with Korean views of U.S. camptowns can make the following observations. First, to the average Korean, U.S. camptowns have been synonymous with prostitution and problems associated with prostitution. Second, as mentioned earlier, prostitutes have often been considered the source of camptown problems, whether they be racial tensions, venereal disease, or black-marketing. Third, from the ROK government's perspective, Korean female prostitutes constituted the major and constant point of contact, through sexual liaisons, for the average U.S. soldier; therefore, "cleaning up" the women themselves would be the first and major step in cleaning up camptown life. Fourth, controlling prostitution and VD had always been a main source of tension and lack of cooperation between the U.S. military and the ROK goverment at all levels. [53] Therefore, it would have made sense to the ROK government to act vigorously on this long-standing U.S. complaint.

The Korean government did exert genuine effort and substantial funds to tackle the prostitution/VD problem. In its original Clean-Up plans, the BCCUC allocated 225 million won to projects aimed at the prevention and treatment of venereal disease. [54] Environmental Purification," including paving of roads and sidewalks in camp villages and improving sanitary facilities, street lighting, and housing, was the only clean-up project with an allocation figure (480 million won) [55] higher than that for VD control. The BCCUC's VD prevention program consisted of increasing the registration of women (to reduce the number of streetwalkers avoiding VD checks), enforcement of regular VD examinations for the women, improved examination and treatment techniques, construction and renovation of VD clinics and detention centers (for infected women), efforts to reduce the numbers of streetwalkers, and cooperation with U.S. military authorities on "contact identification."

According to the Korean government, mandating and enforcing regular VD exams and tightening control over both private and public VD/health clinics were intended to "liberate foreign soldiers and prostitutes from venereal disease." [56] In reality, the health of the women was intended to protect the health of the GI and please his superiors, who were intent on lowering VD rates. The BCCUC directed local Korean government officials, including the mayor, county chief, police, public health workers, Women's Welfare workers (of MoHSA), and other authorities to ensure that prostitutes register with the local police and health clinic and do not evade VD examinations and necessary treatment. Some local officials in turn worked with and through local Korean American Friendship Councils (KAFCs) to enforce VD regulation. Some of these KAFCs formed VD subcommittees, with the responsibility to formulate VD control policies, inspect club women's VD cards, oversee contact identification measures, and mediate communication and complaints between camptown residents, particularly the club/bar owners, and local U.S. military officials. [57]

In general, registered prostitutes were required to undergo twice-weekly examinations for gonorrhea [58] and syphilis tests once every three months. But because club women avoided these examinations as much as possible (chapter 6), coercive measures were often used. For example, the ROK MoHSA instituted "mass round-up" and "mass treatment" measures in all base communities "for the purpose to find out the epidemic sources of V.D." during the last two months of 1972. [59] The "control teams," consisting of personnel from local health clinics and Women's Welfare Bureaus, as well as local police, literally rounded up camptown women, be they club prostitutes, waitresses, streetwalkers, live-ins, or other "suspects of VD reservoirs," and performed gynecological examinations on them and injected them with penicillin for inoculation purposes. The MoHSA report of 1972 projects in operation stated: "The unregistered persons checked during the above period [Oct. 29 to Dec. 31, 1972] and unexaminees [registered women who avoided or failed regular exams] *are examined in force and confirmed cases will be treated in the clinics, admitted or not*"(italics added). [60]

Such mass treatments had been attempted in 1969 and 1971 without much success. [61] For example, the Commanding General of the 2d Division had complained to the Commissioner of Yangju County of Uijongbu that despite the mass round-ups and inoculation of business girls in Kyonggi Province on November 23 and 24, 1971, VD rates in the camptown villages remained "extremely high." [62] These mass round-ups and treatment routines, performed throughout the early 1970s reveal the trial-and-error measures of the Korean authorities as they groped for effective means both to control VD and "showcase" their VD control endeavors to the USFK audience. Prior to the mass treatments, ROK authorities, including the Ministry of National Defense, publicized the upcoming VD control measures to the relevant U.S. military authorities and asked the latter for their cooperation and support. [63] Despite the uncertainty of their medical value, round-ups and mass inoculations served as visible evidence of the ROK government's serious intent to meet health standards acceptable to the USFK.

In addition to registering and examining camptown women, the ROK government expended considerable funds to construct and renovate VD clinic facilities and detention centers, purchase modern clinical and laboratory equipment, and increase the number of camptown health personnel. In the second half of 1972 alone, the BCCUC appropriated 140 million won for the construction and renovation of 11 VD clinics in major camp areas as well as 93.1 million won for their 1973 operations. [64] Such projects were a priority in the Korean government's camptown VD plans, as evidenced by the speed and attention paid to completing these construction projects. According to the Thirteenth Report of the Subcommittee,

> The ROK Government had given the highest priority to the completion of five large new or renovated VD clinics in Kyonggi Province in the northern part of the ROK, and all of these facilities with a patient capacity of 550 are completed and in operation. Six facilities having a capacity of 590 patients are now completed and in operation, while the remaining five smaller facilities with a patient capacity of 170 are scheduled to open in April 1973. [65]

To staff these facilities, the ROK government decided that "67 new goverment doctors, nurses, and technicians will be hired while 25 private doctors, nurses, and technicians will be given subsidies for work for the Government on VD." [66] Originally, the ROK government had planned to hire 101 new medical personnel for VD control, but budgetary constraints decreased the number. [67] Additionally, the BCCUC's "Comprehensive Purification Policies" (July 1972) planned to spend about 11 million won on new equipment.

Given Korea's still fledgling state of economic development, the Korean government had difficulty finding funds to actualize these camptown programs. [68] Despite the ROK government's original outlays, the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs fell short of the required sums within a year of the BCCUC's purification movement. Korean officials noted that 18 million won ($45,124, 1972 rates) was the "normal" MoHSA budget for VD control "and not the extraordinary budget covered by the 'Base Community Clean-Up Committee's' program." [69] The U.S. military and the Korean government were aware that money for VD regulation and prevention had been siphoned from existing central and local government budgets intended for other projects. [70] The MoHSA prepared a comprehensive study on camptown health and sanitation issues for President Pak's review, which Robert Sherwood tried to obtain but was refused by MoHSA officials because the study was "classified." Sherwood did learn from the Korean officials that "[t]he study recommended that $250,000 be diverted from other ministry of health funds (there is no new money available) to construct additional *clinics and to put all clinics under governmental control*" (italics in original). Still, by the end of 1972, MoHSA had received only 18 million of the 72 million won ($180,496) needed to proceed with the BCCUC's 1973 VD Clean-Up. Strapped for funds and equipment and pressed by U.S. authorities to make progress on VD control, Korean officials unequivocally expressed their government's need for U.S. assistance. For example, the MoHSA representative on the Subcommittee stated that "due to budgetary limitations and the limitations on culture medium [bacterial cultures], without U.S. assistance the culture testing program could not be expanded." [71]

Although the U.S. military's constant emphasis in the Clean-Up Campaign was to make the ROK government take full responsibility for VD control, U.S. assistance in the form of diagnostic materials, medical expertise, and medication became an indispensable part of the BCCUC's effort. The U.S. military assisted the ROK government with laboratory research and analysis of diagnostic and treatment methods [72] and, in some camp areas, provided transportation (to Korean detention centers) to those prostitutes who had failed their examinations. From mid-1973 to the end of the Campaign, U.S. help increasingly focused on providing Thayer-Martin diagnostic culture materials and on training Korean doctors and laboratory technicians to use these and other medical technology properly. [73] Both USFK and ROK health officials, especially the former, regularly surveyed different camp areas to ascertain the proper diagnosis and treatment of women. Those Korean clinic employees not complying with the USFK-MoHSA recommended procedures were reprimanded and urged to correct negligent or abusive practices.

In addition to examination procedures, the USFK emphasized that ROK health authorities administer adequate treatment, in terms of medication and duration of detention, to infected women. The USFK sought to end the long-established pattern of infected women being treated with the wrong kind of medication or with dosages it considered too low for too short a time. The military, through its medical channels to MoHSA and local VD clinics and the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Civil-Military Relations, urged for a medication regimen of at least 4.8 million units of procaine penicillin preceded by 1.0 gram of oral probenecid daily until the infection cleared. [74] As with diagnostic materials, many USFK units provided medication to local VD clinics and treatment centers. For example, the Waegwan Health Center and VD Clinic received penicillin and probenecid from the 543d General Dispensary, and the VD clinic in Camps Henry and Walker area (Taegu) from the corresponding U.S. dispensaries; K2 U.S. Air Base at Taegu provided the Tonggu Health Center and VD clinic with procaine penicillin, probenecid, and spectinomycin; Kunsan Air Base, as well as Camp El Paso in North Ch'ungchong Province, usually supplied its local VD clinics with medication. [75]

Historically, the need to control prostitution and VD placed the U.S. military in a double bind: The USFK had always sought to reduce VD rates among its troops and simultaneously maintain that the U.S. military does not participate in or condone prostitution. However, VD reduction in a country like Korea, with meager resources and awareness of the problem, required that the USFK dirty its hands in the local management of prostitution. Although USFK officials in the early 1960s and those in the early 1970s both faced these tensions and formulated similar proposals, their respective attitude toward and actual involvement in prostitution control differed significantly. Whereas the officials in the 1970s aggressively dictated to the Koreans health and sanitary standards acceptable to the USFK, their counterparts in the 1960s had cautioned against such active involvement in local affairs, stating, "The United Nations Command has followed a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of the host nation." [76] Whereas the officials in the 1970s actively supplied Korean health clinics and the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs with medical supplies and training, those of the 1960s were reluctant to assist the Health Ministry's beginning efforts to open a few VD clinics and treat infected women, stating, "[T]here is, at present, no authorization for the expenditure of U.S. Army medical supplies in such a program." [77]

In the early 1960s, a Surgeon General of one of the main U.S. commands in Korea had proposed a comprehensive joint USFK-ROK VD control program similar to the one adopted in the 1970s, including the development and implementation of required training programs for employees of the MoHSW, U.S. participation in increasing personnel and equipment to support a comprehensive plan, and the U.S. purchase of necessary drugs for such a program. [78] But at all levels of the USFK, support for such interventionist programs was lacking. These officials cautioned that the implications of such a joint USFK-ROK VD program were "profound," i.e., requiring a "mass program of examination, presumably of Korean males and females, with subsequent treatment of infected individuals," and that such a program "cannot be justified solely in terms of reducing the likelihood of venereal infection among U.S. personnel. If publicized this tact [sic] could prove politically embarrassing both in Korea and in CONUS. This program can be explained only in terms of producing a positive improvement in the general health status of the local inhabitants." [79]

The Inspector General of the EUSA in 1964 also cautioned against USFK involvement in the regulation of local prostitution, stating, "Such dealings or recognition of community health inspections and [medical] treatment tend to indicate official [USFK] approval [of prostitution]." [80]

USFK officials involved in the Clean-Up Campaign of the 1970s were not oblivious to the fact that direct U.S. involvement in prostitution control could implicate the military in illegal activities, but such concerns were not primary. [81] Moreover, the "positive improvement in the general health status of the local inhabitants" through prostitution and VD control was not an issue in the 1970s. The only "benefit" to local Koreans ever mentioned (as rationale for the Clean-Up) by the U.S. authorities was economic: safer, more healthful club/bar environments, including healthier prostitutes, meant better business for the clubs. The above differences between the attitudes and actions (or inactions) of USFK officials during the two time periods indicate that prostitution had become more entrenched as a way of life for both the U.S. military and camptown Koreans by the 1970s, necessitating U.S. participation in the VD control of women, and that local Korean economic interests also became entrenched to the point that political implications of U.S. control over local life could be overlooked by both the U.S. and Korean sides.

But more significantly, the active involvement of U.S. military personnel in prostitution control points to a larger disparity in power between the U.S. and Korean governments in the early 1970s that helped effect a major shift in the ROK government's attitude toward prostitution and VD control. With this change, the USFK could politically afford to "interfere" in the "internal affairs of the host nation" without seriously risking Korean resistance and criticism. It was the Korean government, not the U.S. military, that was placed in the position of defending its actions and inactions regarding camptown prostitution and other problems plaguing the GI's life. U.S. assistance to ROK health authorities served as practical means of getting the Koreans to do what they were willing in spirit, though sometimes lacking in know-how and funds, to do. The Nixon Doctrine and the reduction of U.S. troops in Korea allowed the USFK to place the burden of official responsibility and accountability for camptown prostitution fully on the Korean government.

Although the reduction of VD rates among U.S. servicemen was the primary goal of prostitution/VD control for the USFK, the improvement of U.S.-ROK relations through local-level cooperation and the enhancement of Korea's image was the driving force behind the ROK government's control effort. Without doubt, the Korean people regarded camptown VD as such'i byong, or "disease of shame," [82] which generated a negative image of Korea. [83] The MoHSA official who oversaw the various prostitution/VD control programs in 1971-72 stated clearly that the purpose of the control effort was "to give a cleaner impression of camptowns and of Korea" and emphasized that the BCCUC's purification movement was not intended for the entire nation but solely for U.S. camp areas, especially those with large concentration of troops. [84] Only camptown prostitutes, not Korean prostitutes in general, were examined for VD (in the beginning of the Campaign). [85]

The Korean government intended to mobilize camptown prostitutes to serve as "personal ambassadors" to the numerous GIs she sexually contacted, and the task of the Purification Movement was to transform her from being a bad ambassador to a good one. The Blue House Political Secretary who oversaw the BCCUC programs stressed that camptown prostitutes needed to be taught how to work correctly. He recounted his visits to camptown areas, where he asked the women, Why did Japan develop from nothing to greatness? He answered for them by emphasizing that they should imitate the spirit of Japanese prostitutes who sold their bodies to the post-1945 U.S. occupation forces:

> The Japanese prostitute, when she finished with the GI, did not get up to go get the next GI (for more money) but knelt before him and pleaded with him to help rebuild Japan. The spirit of the Japanese prostitute was concerned with the survival of her fatherland. The patriotism of the Japanese prostitute spread to the rest of the society to develop Japan. [86]

Such a view clearly established camptown prostitutes' sex work as a vital form of patriotism, and lower-level Korean officials echoed such words in their regular educational lectures to the women. For example, women were urged during such classes in the Uijongbu area to "take charge of national prestige" (*Kugwi rul tamdang hara*). [87] One former camptown prostitute who worked in Tongduchon and Songt'an in the first half of the 1970s recalled:

> During every Etiquette and Good Conduct Lecture [sponsored monthly by local camptown officials], the local mayor or local public information officer or public peace officer would . . . give

> the introductory remarks. They would say, "All of you, who cater to the U.S. soldiers, are patriots. All of you are nationalists working to increase the foreign exchange earnings of our country." They said that we are servants of the nation and that we should live and work with pride. And then they told us not to show humiliating things [behavior] to the U.S. soldiers, to maintain our dignity as Korean women. [88]

The control of camptown women's bodies and sexual health was integral to improving deteriorated USFK-ROK relations in the early years of the Nixon Doctrine. Just as the Clean-Up Campaign in general helped mitigate tensions between the ROK government and the USFK, the Subcommittee found that those camptowns which addressed the VD problem to the satisfaction of the local U.S. command leaders possessed a "spirit of mutual cooperation . . . between the Base Command and local Korean officials" and to have "excellent" civil-military relations. [89]

Note 1: EUSA (Eighth U.S. Army), IO (Office of International Relations), "Human Factors Research: Part II. Troop-Community Relations," 1965, p. 3.

Note 2: Ibid., pp. 9-10.

Note 3: Interview with a key initiator of the Clean-Up, Coscob, Conn., October 24, 1991.

Note 4: Cynthia Enloe, *Does Khaki Become You?*, ch. 4; and *Bananas, Beaches, and Bases*, ch. 5.

Note 5: For example, one USFK community-relations officer since the 1960s stated that camptown prostitutes are the cause of all problems-social, legal, political-in the camptowns. He and other community-relations officers pointed out that the bars/clubs in which the women work and the conditions in which they work (drunkenness of soldiers, criminal activities by camptown residents, etc.) breed community problems. Interview, Uijongbu, June 12, 1992.

Note 6: EUSA, "Psychological Operations Campaign Control Sheet," p. 3; interview, Coscob, Conn., October 24, 1991 (see note 3); interview with two USFK community relations officers, Seoul, April 6, 1992; interview with the former ROK representative to the JC (April-December 1971), Seoul, December 12, 1991.

Note 7: Sponsored by EUSA, ACofs, J-5, usually twice a year, beginning in 1971. The conference, also called "Korean-American Civil Affairs Conference," convened representatives from the various U.S. installations to present and discuss both problems and progress in base-community relations. ROK participants were generally limited to the members of the Subcommittee.

Note 8: Itaewon was and still is the entertainment district closest to the Yongsan compound. It is no longer a red-light district, although it still houses many nightclubs and sex entertainment joints. It has become a shopping strip for tourists, not only GIs.

Note 9: Letter from Col. Jack F. Belford, Commander of USAGY, to EUSA Com manding General, June 1, 1971. A memorandum attached to this letter states that Belford had met with the It'aewon club managers on April 26, 1971, and requested that the latter "instruct bartenders, waitresses, employees and entertainers to provide equal and courteous service to all UNC/USFK military personnel. These services should include, but are not limited to: a. Entry into club. b. Seating arrangements in the club. c. Service by waitresses, bartenders, entertainers, and employees. d. Dancing with military personnel. . . . The managers were advised that if discrimination continued to exist at any club, it would be placed 'Off-Limits' and be enforced." Memorandum by Maj. William R. Creech, EAGY (Eighth Army Garrison, Yongsan), April 26, 1971.

Note 10: See chapter 3.

Note 11: When reporting the work of the BCCUC to the Subcommittee, the ROK chairperson of the Subcommittee stated that, with regard to the problems of racial discrimination in camptowns, "increased educational efforts will be made [by the Korean side] to inform special entertainers and club owners on various aspects of these problems." Subcommittee Minutes, #6, January 24, 1972.

Note 12: Subcommittee Minutes, #6, January 24, 1972.

Note 13: Many USFK commands created or reinforced the work of the Equal Opportunity Officer, whose office was responsible for handling problems regarding racial discrimination and developing educational measures to eliminate racial tensions among U.S. troops. Some particularly conscientious heads of commands took initiatives to invite both black and white soldiers to speak their minds regarding race and offered direct mediation. At all ranks, there was substantial effort to train personnel to respect and cooperate with one another and to observe the provisions of the SOFA. To monitor the off-post behavior of soldiers, many installations created and/or reinforced "courtesy patrols" or "salt and pepper" teams (composed of one black and one white soldier per team). Separate from the military police, these patrol teams routinely frequented the clubs and bars in their particular camptown to check any potential problems or violence owing to racial discrimination (by Koreans or U.S. personnel).

Note 14: One community relations officer who was familiar with the "coaster plan" told me that the original samples of the coasters (which bore pictures of women in nude or near-nude seductive poses like those of calendar pin-up models, with a few lines about equal service and antidiscrimination written on them) were eventually scrapped "because we [USFK officials] started noticing that the pictures were of Caucasian girls, not Asian." He implied that it would be inappropriate to use Caucasian models to represent Korean women but took no notice of the sexist portrayal of women, i.e., women looking like "sex kittens." Seoul, March 1992.

Note 15: Dept. of the Army, Headquarters, 24th Psychological Operations Detachment (A&S), Memorandum from Cpt. Stephen Sasfy to Col. Jack F. Belford (Commander, USAGY), Re: "24th PSYOP Itaewon Materials," July 28, 1971.

Note 16: Dept. of the Army, Headquarters, USAGY (PROV), Memorandum from Col. Jack Belford to EUSA Chief of Staff, Re: "Itaewon," July 29, 1971.

Note 17: Uijongbu, "Camp Village Purification Campaign," Report of 1973, January 30, 1973, pp. 3-4.

Note 18: *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, August 11, 1971.

Note 19: *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, November 25, 1971.

Note 20: *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, January 7, 1972.

Note 21: "PSYOP Campaign Control Sheet," p. 4. EUSA officials monitoring base-community relations also noted, "J5 believes the foregoing developing trends [camptown problems], if left unchecked, could develop into an explosive situation over a period of time, and could threaten the traditionally friendly relationships between Koreans and Americans unless appropriate countermeasures are taken in a timely fashion." "Disposition Form" from Cpt. Frank Romanick to EUSA Chief of Staff, Re: "Changing U.S. Forces Personnel-ROK Civilian Relations (U)," June 4, 1971. Individual heads of commands, here, Col. Best of Camp Humphreys, also articulated their belief that camptown problems, specifically racial unrest, are not isolated from the political and security interests of the ROK and the United States and that such problems "could result in adverse publicity on an international scale for both the Republic of Korea and the United States." Best expressed great frustration with camptown Korean's lack of understanding of the potentially geostrategic ramifications of their actions: "[Negative publicity] could provide significant propaganda material for the North Korean Communist Regime in particular, and the Communist conspiracy world-wide in general, while the officials in Pyong-Tae [sic] appear to take a shortsighted view of the immediate economic implications of local policies on their constituencies." Letter from Col. Best to Commanding General of KORSCOM (Korea Support Command), February 4, 1972.

Note 22: Enclosure "d" of the PSYOP memorandum by Sasfy, entitled "Racial Problems in the ROK," October 1971. English version of the *Jayu*, article.

Note 23: Ibid.

Note 24: "PSYOPS Campaign Control Sheet," p. 6.

Note 25: Psychological operations, or propaganda, was a consistent weapon in the military standoff between the DPRK and the U.S./ROK. A USFK PSYOP summary (dated Feb, 24, no year) of the North's propaganda activities between 1953-1972 states the following: "Besides the constant blare of loudspeakers and 'enlightened literature' extolling the virtues of Kim Il-sung directed at the nK [sic] people, the Korean Workers' Party (KWP) carried on an active program against the ROK. To do so, it employed clandestine radio broadcasts, balloon-delivered leaflets . . . , infiltrations into ROK rear areas, and 'gray and black propaganda' (use of fictitious front organizations and false or misattributions). Additionally, both sides used signboards in the DMZ to encourage defection, and DMZ police engaged in face-to-face contacts, in which printed materials were sometimes exchanged." I obtained this document from the Psychological Operations Office of the EUSA at Yongsan in spring 1992.

Note 26: PSYOP Memorandum by Sasfy.

Note 27: Enclosure "B" of the PSYOP memorandum by Sasfy, addressed to "Female patrons [of clubs]," July 1971 (my translation from Korean).

Note 28: Enclosure "A" of the PSYOP memorandum by Sasfy, July 1971.

Note 29: The panel on Local Community and Governmental Relations recommended that "Owners or managers will . . . [b]e in complete control of their employees and any hostesses, or others who are frequenting the establishment for the purpose of deriving revenue from the patrons." "Seventh Report of the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Civil-Military Relations," March 23, 1972, JC Minutes, #72, March 28, 1972, Enclosure 1 to Enclosure 20.

Note 30: Memorandum from Col. Jack Belford, Commander of USAGY, to EUSA Chief of Staff, July 28, 1971.

Note 31: Interview with Kim Yonja, Songt'an, May 3, 1992.

Note 32: Interview, San Diego, Calif., October 28, 1991.

Note 33: Interview with Kim Yonja, Songt'an, May 3, 1992.

Note 34: Ibid.

Note 35: Ibid.

Note 36: Included gonorrhea, syphilis, chancroid, lymphogranuloma venereum. The Acting Surgeon General of the Dept. of the Army, Maj. Gen. Spurgeon Neel, noted even higher rates for the 2d Division in the first half of 1972: 1100 cases/1000 men/year.

Note 37: Memorandum by Maj. James Hathaway, Chief, Preventive Medicine Division of Eighth Army Medical Corps, Re: "VD in Korea," March 22, 1973.

Note 38: U.S. Department of the Air Force, U.S. Air Force Hospital, Osan, Memo randum by Cpt. Rimas Liauba, Chief, Military Public Health, Re: "Venereal Disease Statistics," June 6, 1972.

Note 39: U.S. Department of the Army, "Information Paper" by Col. R. T. Cutting, Re: "Evolution of DOD VD Policy," September 10, 1973. The Army practice of routinely listing names of VD patients to commanders ceased in 1954. Cable from Maj. Gen. Seitz to Lt. Gen. Larson, Re: "VD Control," September 27, 1972.

Note 40: Cable from Gen. Michaelis to Gen. Palmer, (Assistant?) Chief of Staff of the Army, Re: "VD Control Activities," August 23, 1972.

Note 41: Dept. of the Army, Office of the Adjutant General, Memorandum by Maj. Gen. Verne Bowers, Re: "Venereal Disease Control Policy," January 19, 1973; DoA, Surgeon General, Cable to Commanding General, EUSA, Re: "VD Control Policy," August 11, 1972; DoA, "Fact Sheet" from Lt. Gen. Hal Jennings, Jr., M.D., Surgeon General, to Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Re: "The Surgeon General's VD Policy," August 1973.

Note 42: Dept. of the Army, Surgeon General, Cable to Commanding General, EUSA, Re: "VD Control Policy," August 11, 1972. Also, the Surgeon General in 1973 reiterated that "the large prostitute population frequently surrounding military bases constitutes the primary reservoir of disease, and a most important factor in the continued high VD rates among U.S. servicemen. Identi fication of infected prostitutes is dependent upon a credible case contact program based on medical confidentiality [for the U.S. servicemen]." Surgeon Gen., H. Jennings, "Fact Sheet," Re: "The Surgeon General's VD Policy," August 1973.

Note 43: Memorandum by Hathaway, Re: "VD in Korea," March 22, 1973.

Note 44: The EUSA VD education measures in the summer of 1972 included "General Orientation Lectures on VD for Incoming EM [enlisted men], monthly refresher lectures in each unit. . . . [I]n addition, the 2D division program include[d] A. Orientation talks to all EM, pay grade E-6 and below, by . . . ass't comdrs [commanders] addressing dangers of VD in Korea. B. VD briefing at division reception center. C. Periodic briefing in unit training. D. Special briefings for officers and NCOS [noncommissioned officers]. E. Div PAO [Division Public Affairs Office] publishes articles on VD in div newspapers and VD bulletins for use down to company level." Cable from Gen. Michaelis to Gen. Westmoreland, Chief of Staff of the Army, Re: "Venereal Disease Rates-EUSA Korea," June 20, 1972; original, of course, in solid capitals.

Note 45: Interview, Uijongbu, June 4, 1992. Interviewee noted that for reasons of national dignity, a name like "National VD Purification Movement" would have been inappropriate.

Note 46: EUSA, J-5, "Health and Sanitation," 1972.

Note 47: To demonstrate the urgency and serious intent of the U.S. military with regard to controlling VD, the U.S. component of the Subcommittee invited Col. Robert Sherwood from the Office of the DoA Surgeon General, Col. W. R. Warren, Chief Assistant to the EUSA Surgeon for Professional Services, and Maj. James Hathaway, Chief of Preventive Medicine Division of the EUSA Office of the Surgeon to the eleventh Subcommittee meeting. Subcommittee Minutes, #11, June 30, 1972. These individuals impressed upon the Korean component the need for Korean cooperation.

Note 48: Sherwood Report, July 7, 1972, p. 6. *example see note 3.6*,

Korea," March 22, 1

Note 49: Letter from Col. Best to Perditz, February 4, 1972; cable from Gen. Michaelis to Gen. Westmoreland, June 20, 1972; Sherwood Report, July 7, 1972; memorandum from Henry Essex, EUSA Medical Director, to EUSA Commanding General, October 10, 1972; letter from Chief of Staff of 2d Division to Commanding General of I Corps (ROK/U.S.) Group, June 26, 1972.

Note 50: For example, report of the U.S. chairperson of the Subcommittee, Subcommittee Minutes, #32, May 20, 1975.

Note 51: Subcommittee Minutes, #6, January 24, 1972.

Note 52: Subcommittee Minutes, #12, July 31, 1972.

Note 53: The EUSA "Civil Affairs Handbook" of 1968 states that with regard to CRAC (Community Relations Advisory Council) meetings held jointly by local military officials and Korean camptown leaders, "there was a natural impatience . . . [on the American side] with a strong Korean reluctance to do anything constructive about the *problems of most concern to the Americans, prostitution and venereal disease*," (italics added). EUSA, Civil Affairs Handbook, #530-4, January 11, 1968, p. 68; also p. 64.

Note 54: USFK Headquarters, "Problems in Civil-Military Relations in the ROK and the First Year of the Operation of the U.S.-ROK Joint Committee's Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Civil-Military Relations," report attached to the letter of August 19, 1972 sent by Lt. Gen. Robert Smith, Chief of Staff of the USFK, to Ambassador Philip Habib, p. 4.

Note 55: Ibid.

Note 56: BCCUC, "Woegukkun kiji chubyon chônghwa chonghap taech'aek," Comprehensive Purification Policies for the Purification of Foreign Base Areas, July 1972.

Note 57: For example, the VD Control Subcommittee of the KAFC of Uijongbu was very active in formulating and enforcing control policies.

Note 58: The 1976 "Venereal Disease Control Directives" of the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs states that the following persons were required to undergo examinations the following number of times: Prostitutes and "secret prostitutes": twice weekly; "[h]ostesses (dancers): once weekly; "[c]ateresses": once bi-weekly (p. 3). The 1977 "Directives for Venereal Disease Control" of the MoHSA required once weekly genital exams for "Business Girls"; every second week for "Dancers" and "Entertainers"; "[a]nytime necessary" for "Suspects of VD Reservoirs" (p. 7).

Note 59: MoHSA, "Report of Ministry of Health and Social Affairs," Enclosure to Subcommittee Minutes, #14, September 29, 1972.

Note 60: Ibid.

Note 61: USFK, J-5 VD Files, "Epidemiological Control Measures (as recommended by the American Public Health Association)," undated but most likely 1972 or 1973. This document offered the following reasons for the failure of the 1969, 1971, and 1972 mass treatment programs: "limited coverage of programs did not preclude reeinfection [sic] of U.S. servicemen or Korean entertainers from areas not covered by program"; none of the programs included all prostitutes within the local area covered; U.S. servicemen were restricted to post only 2-3 days, shorter than the usual incubation period of 4-7 days.

Note 62: Letter from Maj. Gen. Jeffrey Smith, Commander, 2d ID, to Commissioner Min Chong Kun of Yangju County, Uijongbu, January 7, 1971.

Note 63: For example, prior to the November 1971 round-up and mass treatment, the mayor of Uijongbu notified the Commanding General of the U.S. I Corps (Group) of the control measure and requested that U.S. troops be confined to their installation compounds for the two days while "Korean prostitutes will be required to submit to the administration of doses of penicillin for VD control." "WHB," Chief of Staff Memo, "Subject: 'Ven Disease Prophylaxis,' " to Chief of Staff, UNC/USFK, November 19, 1971. A memorandum by Brig. Gen. N. J. Salisbury, Chief of Staff, EUSACI, to EUSA Chief of Staff ("ROK Program to Counter Venereal Disease," November 19, 1971) contained similar information and added, "It is expected that CG [Commanding General], Eighth U.S. Army will formally be requested by the ROK Minister of Defense to support this program on an Army-wide basis."

Note 64: "Thirteenth Report of the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Civil-Military Relations (March 16, 1973), JC Minutes, #82, March 22, 1973, Enclosure 36.

Note 65: Ibid.

Note 66: USFK, "Disposition Form" from Cpt. Wallace Sharpe, ACofs, J-5, to Chief of Staff, UNC/USFK, Re: "ROK Government VD Program Under the 'Base Community Clean-Up Committee'," November 3, 1972.

Note 67: Ibid.

Note 68: Sherwood Report, July 7, 1972, pp. 4 and 7; Memorandum from Maj. Gen. Spurgeon Neel, M.D., Acting Surgeon General of the DoA, to Army Chief of Staff, Secretary of the Army, Re: "VD in Korea," July 11, 1972, p. 2.

Note 69: A memorandum from the office of Cpt. Wallace Sharpe (J-5) addressed to the Chief of Staff, UN Command/USFK (Re: "ROK Government VD Program under the 'Base Community Clean-Up Committee,'" November 3, 1972, based on EUSA J-5's discussions with the MoHSA official in charge of the camptown VD programs, Blue House officials, and MOFA sources. Although Sharpe's memo urged the U.S. components of the Ad Hoc Subcommittee to "utilize every opportunity to encourage further appropriations for continuation of the program started by the ROKG during the latter half of 1972," it also acknowledged that the Korean government was demonstrating genuine effort and that delays in construction of planned facilities thus far was not necessarily slow.

Note 70: Sherwood Report, July 7, 1972.

Note 71: Subcommittee Minutes, #18, March 16, 1973. Earlier in 1972, the MoHSA representative to the Subcommittee, when asked by the EUSA Medical Director "what help can be offered," stated "that there is one immediate need for transportation of patients [prostitutes] to treatment facilities" as well as the "development of their [ROK's] bacterial culture capabilities for gonorrhea." Memorandum from Henry Essex, EUSA Medical Director, to EUSA Commanding General, Re: "Visit to Ministry of Health and Social Affairs in Regard to VD Program-4 October 1972," October 10, 1972.

Note 72: Interview with the former Director of Chronic Diseases, MoHSA (1972), Seoul, May 14, 1992. He was also a member of the Subcommittee and supervised the VD control programs. Also, Subcommittee Minutes, #14, September 29, 1972.

Note 73: The Thayer-Martin culture was the method of VD diagnosis preferred by the U.S. military for Korean prostitutes. The USFK pushed Korean health authorities at all levels of government to institute the T-M method; the first use of these culture plates in the examination of prostitutes began in June 1973. Report of Maj. James Hathaway, EUSA Chief of Preventive Medicine Division, Seventh Civil Affairs Conference, April 19, 1974. The EUSA Surgeon's Office supplied the T-M culture ingredients to MoHSA "to be made up in

Korean laboratories and used in VD clinics." The USFK's 43d Surgical Hospital supplied T-M culture plates to local VD clinics in the summer of 1973. (Subcommittee Minutes, #27, May 3, 1974); Kwangju Air Base and the 4th Missile Command at Ch'unchon began supplying local VD clinics with similar plates in the winter of 1973; VD clinics near Camps Henry and Walker were given T-M cultures by the 543d General Dispensary. (The above, unless otherwise noted, are from Subcommittee Minutes, #25, February 22, 1974.)

Note 74: In some cases, women were treated with 6.0 million units of procaine penicillin, but in general, 4.8 was the recommended dosage. Subcommittee Minutes, #25, February 22, 1974.

Note 75: Subcommittee Minutes, #25, February 22, 1974.

Note 76: Memorandum by Maj. Saalberg, EUSA G-1 Action Officer, Re: "Report on Venereal Disease," January 14, 1963.

Note 77: Ibid.

Note 78: Ibid.

Note 79: Ibid.

Note 80: Memorandum from Col. Frederick Outlaw, Inspector General, EUSA, to EUSA Chief of Staff, Re: "Observations Regarding Prostitution," March 18, 1964.

Note 81: EUSA, J-5, VD Files, "VD Treatment of Korean Entertainers at U.S. Facilities," in "Epidemiological Control Measures (as Recommended by the American Public Health Association), 1972/73." This document states, "[US military] [t]reatment of Korean prostitutes could be misinterpreted as an indication of condoning or encouraging illicit sexual promiscuity."

Note 82: Interview with a USFK community relations officer, Uijongbu, June 4, 1992.

Note 83: *Korea Herald*, June 10, 1971.

Note 84: Interview with the former Director of Chronic Diseases, MoHSA (1972), Seoul, May 14, 1992.

Note 85: Telephone interview with the first ROK chair of the Subcommittee Panel on Health and Sanitation, Seoul, June 15, 1992. He was a physician from the MoHSA.

Note 86: Interview with the former Blue House Political Secretary in charge of the "Purification Movement," Seoul, June 11, 1992.

Note 87: Interview with a USFK community relations officer, Uijongbu, June 12, 1992.

Note 88: Interview with Kim Yonja, Songt'an City, May 3, 1992.

Note 89: For example, the "excellent" relations between and the "successful" coordination and cooperation of Kunsan City officials and U.S. Kunsan Air Base officials is a case in point. The "Nineteenth Report" states: "There are 550 registered business girls and waitresses in Kunsan City and Silvertown, not including an unknown number of nonregistered business girls in the area. Registered business girls required two VD checks per week. Girls registered as waitresses in bars and in tea houses were also checked once each two weeks although Base officials were urging the City to conduct checks on waitresses, especially those in the tea houses, once a week. Cooperation between City and Base officials in obtaining detailed information about possible contacts, including photographs of the girls, was excellent with an average of some 80 percent positive contacts positively identified and treated during the past six months. Most problems

resulted from incidents of VD contracted in contacts with nonregistered business girls on the streets. A 'Hot Sheet' on infected girls was maintained and data exchanged between Base and City authorities."
"Nineteenth Report of the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Civil-Military Relations," January 23, 1975, JC Minutes, #101, January 30, 1975, Enclosure 19.

5. The Clean-Up Campaign as Public Relations and "Private Diplomacy"

> All this emphasis to clean up the towns and get the President [Pak] involved was not in order to stir up withdrawal but to prevent it from gaining course because the situation was not very good for the American military there or for the Korean people. In other words, I think that the timing was influenced on both sides by the fact that the Americans didn't want to leave Korea and the Koreans didn't want the Americans to leave Korea. [1]

To understand the motivations of both the USFK and the ROK government in conducting the Clean-Up Campaign, we need to examine the role of base-community relations in the larger context of U.S.-ROK security relations. The application of the Nixon Doctrine to Korea drove the USFK leadership and the ROK government into each other's arms, thereby tightening their joint commitment to the preservation of a large U.S. troop presence in Korea. For the USFK, the Clean-Up efforts were a means to defend its organizational interests, vis-á-vis the decision makers in Washington, and a symbol of its commitment to remain in Korea, regardless of Washington's policy statements. For the Korean government, the Clean-Up was an integral part of "private diplomacy," a desperate resort to the use of local people and resources, in the absence of conventional diplomatic carrots and sticks, to secure U.S. commitments to Korea. The ROK government's lack of leverage toward U.S. government policies in the early 1970s was transposed onto its relationship with the USFK. The Nixon Doctrine and the reduction of U.S. troops provided the opportune moment for the USFK to demand camptown improvements and for the ROK government to oblige.

USFK'S Public Relations Campaign: Camptown Clean- Up

The reduction of 20,000 U.S. troops from its forces highlighted the uncertain future of the U.S. military presence in Korea. In the words of one U.S. official working for the USFK in the early 1970s, "The Nixon Doctrine took the [U.S.] residual concern about Korea and the Korean War away from the U.S. politicians and the U.S. people. They began asking, 'Did we ever need forces here?' " [2] Because the decision had been made in the highest offices of Washington and because the USFK leadership believed that the loss of the 7th Division was not serious enough to jeopardize its deterrence posture, the initial 20,000 cut took place without substantial opposition from the U.S. military. However, many in the USFK leadership "thought it was a step in the wrong direction" [3] and did not wish to see any further reductions.

The USFK leadership differed with Washington on the assessment of the security threat to South Korea. [4] In the view of these officials in Korea, the White House, the State Department, and particularly the Congress did not have an accurate understanding of North Korean military capabilities and intentions. Prior to the troop reduction, General Michaelis, then Chief of the UN/USFK forces, emphasized numerous times, during Senate subcommittee hearings on U.S. security commitments to Korea, the formidable military threat that the DPRK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) posed to the ROK's security. [5] When asked several times by congressmen, during another round of hearings on U.S.-ROK relations, if such a large U.S. troop presence (at the time, around 43,000) was necessary in Korea, he stated without hesitation that such a large force is "essential" to the security of Korea. [6] Interviews with USFK officials familiar with the Nixon Doctrine and the troop reduction reiterated the seriousness of the North Korean threat in the eyes of the USFK leadership. [7] According to one former USFK intelligence officer,

> There was very much a fear on the part of the U.S. military in Korea that Kim Ilsong would open up the second front in Korea. We took the threats as very serious. The North Koreans killed U.S. GIs in cold- blooded fashion. It was a very frightening period, a very serious time [late 1960s/early 1970s]. North Koreans were ambushing our supply trucks through P'anmunjom all the time. I remember a meeting after the *Pueblo* incident when generals here wanted to put nuclear weapons in Wonsan. [8]

Scholars of organizational studies emphasize that where one sits determines what one sees. [9] Members of military organizations are usually viewed as conservative in their political beliefs and professional conduct and prone to high perceptions of risk and danger. [10] For the U.S. military leaders in Korea, the fact that they were near, if not in, the demilitarized zone (DMZ), facing a hostile North Korean military machine, informed their threat perception of the North and their interpretation of actions in Washington. Many in the upper ranks had fought in the Korean War and were staunchly anti-Communist; their memory of the war colored their view of the North and their sense of commitment to the South. [11] A key USFK initiator of the Clean-Up commented that most of the upper-level officials in the USFK "became very pro-Korean in terms of [their] world view" and that "most commanders in Korea, including those in the 1970s, had very personal feelings--because of the war and all--of not wanting Korea to fall under the Communists." [12] USFK officials seem to have adopted what Richard Sklar describes as expatriates' loyalty to and identification with their host society: "The sense of identification with local attitudes and values on the part of such expatriates is likely to increase as a result of their participation in a heroic effort by a beleaguered and under-privileged nation." [13]

The USFK leadership and the U.S. Embassy staff in Korea also tended to view U.S.-ROK relations in the broader context of the Korean government's and society's needs, aspirations, and fears, whereas policy makers in Washington, especially Congress, tended to regard Korean matters more exclusively in terms of U.S. interests and capabilities. For example, at a House subcommittee hearing, General Michaelis spoke of the possibility that troop cuts will "endanger the present, outwardly healthy climate for foreign investment [in ROK], a prerequisite of the survival of the Republic as a free nation." [14] Ambassador William Porter also emphasized the importance of a large U.S. troop presence, not only for security reasons, but also psychological ones. He insisted that the troops were important "in maintaining the sense of confidence which is responsible for so much of Korea's development." [15] Most of the American officials I interviewed noted how much the U.S. military leadership in Korea liked and respected the Koreans for being hard-working, hard-fighting people and wished Koreans well in their quest for economic and political development.

A version of Sklar's "doctrine of domicile" characterizes the USFK's perception of its role in Korea: despite Washington's reassessment of its responsibilities to Korea, the USFK was as committed as the ROK government to the defense and promotion of South Korea's security and economic prosperity as a nonnegotiable priority. Sklar states that the doctrine of domicile is a way for transnational corporations to reconcile their conflicting global and local interests. Unlike businesses, militaries do not root themselves in countries with opposing or conflicting political and economic ideologies from those of the home country. Military alliances draw the lines of allegiance and responsibility. Yet, the interests of overseas military establishments can and do conflict with the global political and military interests of the home government. In such instances, the military merges its organizational interests with the interests of the home government in the name of national security.

Halperin notes that "[o]fficials in the field are persuaded that improving relations with their host country is vital to the security of the United States." [16] For the USFK, preventing further reduction/withdrawal was essential to its viability in Korea and to improved relations with the Korean government and people, and hence, U.S. security interests in the Far East. The 69th Joint Committee Minutes urge the Subcommittee on Civil-Military Relations to "press forward in its important work" on Clean-Up, "with the objective of improving relations between the American military personnel and the Korean people and thereby promoting our mutual defense interests and security." [17]

Halperin has underscored the protective and possessive tendency of militaries over their missions and installations: "Each military service supports foreign policies which will justify the forces it believes are necessary for the essence of the service. . . . Each service favors the retention of the bases which it uses and which suit a military strategy that accords with its force structure. Senior officers are particularly sensitive to possible actions which might jeopardize their bases. [18]

During the early 1970s, the USFK leadership had good reason to be protective of its mission and installations in Korea. Members of the U.S. Congress were quite vocal in expressing their skepticism of the need for continued U.S. military presence in Korea. Faced with public pressures to distance the United States from Asian conflicts and stop their drain on the U.S. economy, many U.S. legislators criticized the administration's military commitments abroad. Senator J. W. Fulbright exemplified the congressional discontent toward Korea: "South Korea, it seems to me, ought to be able to take care of itself. If they are not able after all this time, when they have twice as many people [as the North], and all we have given them--if you [State Dept.] want to give them a few planes [to shore up their air capability], I would not object to that--*we ought to get out*" (italics added). [19]

Throughout the 1970 Senate subcommittee hearings on U.S. security commitments to Korea, Senators Fulbright and Stuart Symington repeatedly questioned the need to station U.S. forces in Korea and emphasized that the military presence in Korea put a strain on U.S. economic resources. [20] Symington went so far as to question the validity of Korea as a U.S. security interest: "I fully supported our defending Korea, but do you think, in all sincerity, that it would have been disastrous to the security of the United States if we had lost Korea?" [21]

To make matters worse, racial clashes in the Anjongni/Camp Humphreys area and the Yongsan (Seoul) compound in the spring and summer of 1971 aroused the attention and ire of Congressman Ronald Dellums. Dellums, an African-American, was vocal in his criticism of the Korean government and people's treatment of black servicemen in Korea and questioned the need to aid militarily countries where Americans, i.e., black soldiers, were not welcome. A few days after the weekend of the Anjongni riots, Dellums said in a press release that Korea had a long history of abusing minority U.S. soldiers and pointed out that the Anjongni incident was not an isolated event. [22] For the U.S. military in Korea, resolving the racial problems and presenting an image of cooperative and harmonious relations with Korean residents and the Korean government became urgent, not only for the maintenance of troop discipline and morale, but also for congressional support of its presence in Korea.

Janowitz has noted that as a response to the "pattern of congressional-military establishment relations [which] produces mutually re-enforcing tensions and compounds the task of political control," militaries recognize the need to conduct public relations with the legislative branch. [23] Viewed in this light, the Clean-Up Campaign was an intense and comprehensive public relations effort. In the words of a key U.S. initiator of the Clean-Up,

> [It] was an opportunity for the U.S. military in Korea to put a good face on their presence in Korea . . . so that [Congress] would not have a sore spot to pick up and use against the [USFK]. . . . For the USFK, the stake in this was that it wanted to show people in Washington that we have good relations, that nothing is wrong in Korea. . . . The military in Korea did not want to leave Korea; we thought it would not be good for the world context. [24]

The USFK's attempts to avoid congressional criticism, its unwillingness to leave Korea, and its perception of its role in promoting global U.S. security interests converged in its promotion of the Clean-Up Campaign.

Additionally, the Clean-Up Campaign was not only a means for the USFK to assuage critics in the United States but also skeptics in the Korean government, who were doubtful of the sincerity of the U.S.

commitment to Korean security. This public relations effort was extended to the Korean government as a way to demonstrate the USFK's commitment to remaining in Korea, regardless of what was publicized in Washington. In the words of a key U.S. initiator of the Clean-Up,

> The Koreans were feeling at the time [of the troop reductions] that it's all over for them if the United States leaves. So, the Clean-Up Campaign helped cool down the feelings of tensions on both sides. So, we made it clear to the Koreans through the Clean-Up activities that we wanted to stay. [25]

Halperin has written about ways field officers evade implementation of foreign policy decisions made at the home office and express intentions and commitments not held or articulated by that office. The USFK did just that through its efforts to improve civil-military relations with Koreans. In the absence of strong, unequivocal statements from President Nixon or the State Department to defend Korea's security (e.g., statements promising no further troop cuts or complete withdrawal in the near future; inclusion of an "automatic response" promise in the mutual defense treaty), the USFK leadership attempted to fill the vacuum with people-to-people commitments. According to the U.S. Subcommittee chairperson of 1974-75,

> We [the USFK leadership] couldn't see that there could be any more reductions below where we were--42 or 43 thousand. During the time of the Nixon Doctrine, the U.S. military in Korea set up teams to go around to Korean areas--these were people-to-people programs--and we'd go visit little villages with the aim to improve Korean- American relations; the purpose of these visits partly was mainly to assure [Koreans] that regardless of what the reporters wrote and what U.S. congressmen said, that the USFK had no intentions of walking out of Korea.,/font> [26]

By demonstrating its desire to improve camptown life, the U.S. military aimed to prove to Koreans how much it cared about Korean- American friendship, cooperation, and cohabitation. Such efforts would show that a military bent on leaving the country would not be interested in beautifying its locale and establishing more and better official channels of USFK-Korean communication and interaction. The Clean-Up Campaign, then, was a means for the USFK to straddle U.S. critics and Korean skeptics, a public relations message to both Washington and Seoul.

Field offices sometimes do distance themselves from the actions or inactions of the home office and reveal their loyalty to the host society in order to preserve and promote their organizational interests and pursue their own version of the national interest. But this does not mean that overseas officials distance themselves completely from the policies of the home office or that they sympathize line, hook, and sinker with the host society's concerns and priorities. In the case of the USFK during the Nixon Doctrine years, its leadership was keenly attuned to the power dynamic between the U.S. and ROK governments. While attempting to relieve the Korean government of its nervous insecurity regarding the U.S. troop commitment to Korea, the USFK simultaneously emphasized the fait accompli aspect of the 20,000 cut and the threat of further withdrawal in order to pressure the ROK government into cooperating on civil-military matters. In short, the USFK took advantage of the power disparity between the United States and Korea during the early 1970s to pursue the Clean-Up.

Both USFK and Korean government officials who had been involved in the Clean-Up emphasized over and over that the timing of the Campaign greatly favored the USFK and disfavored the ROK government. They commented that the U.S. military was in the position to make demands and the Koreans without choice but to respond positively. A key U.S. initiator of the Campaign remarked that the U.S.-Korea security context of the early 1970s provided a golden opportunity to move on civil-military relations:

> It was altogether a strategic time--although the Koreans hadn't been interested before 1971, they surely responded. . . . The Koreans thought that it [the 20,000 force reduction] was the beginning of the end, so therefore that was one of the things that got them very interested into thinking and asking, "What is troubling you here? Why do you want to leave?" . . . President Pak, after all those years of neglect, suddenly realized that civil-military relations were important. . . . So, the time was right to work on them [camptown improvements], given the Korean government's willingness to work together under the possible threat of future reductions or withdrawal. [27]

Korean MoFA officials who had worked closely with this U.S. official recalled the fervor with which the American would press for Clean-Up efforts and use the troop withdrawal issue as leverage. At Subcommittee meetings, he would pound the table with his fist and emphasize, "We can go any time; You don't want us to leave, so let's cooperate!" The Korean official who worked closely with the American in the early stages of the Campaign recalled that he would then yell back, "No, you can't go!" [28] These MoFA officials noted that the USFK, in general, put pressure on the Blue House with this point, "If you don't cooperate, then it won't be fun for you: We don't know what will happen to the U.S. military presence here, and our troops are now leaving anyway." [29]

Anyone familiar with the history of post-1953 U.S.-Korea relations knows of the chronic insecurity that the Korean government, under both Yi and Pak, experienced regarding the U.S. commitment to the defense of Korea. From the 1950s to the 1970s, Korea dutifully played the role of "lesser ally" in an asymmetrical power relationship with the United States. Why then, with overwhelming power over South Korean security, did it take the USFK nearly two decades to succeed in persuading or pressuring the Koreans into cleaning up camptowns? Without doubt, the severity of the camptown problems in the early 1970s and the shock of the Nixon Doctrine on the Koreans offered immediate incentives to the USFK to push for Korean cooperation. In addition, the ROK government's decision in 1971 to withdraw its troops from Vietnam [30] increased the power of the U.S. military to exert its influence on civil-military affairs.

Keohane and Suhrke have observed that "lesser allies" have been able to exert considerable influence on the actions of the United States by demonstrating staunch anticommunism, loyalty, and reliability. [31] Regarding Korea, Suhrke states:

> President Pak cultivated an image of reliability rather than unreliability toward the United States. This was handsomely rewarded in a particular bargaining situation when South Korea had an opportunity to contribute in an area considered more important by the larger ally than by the smaller ally. . . . In return for sending troops to Vietnam, the Seoul government received financial and military assistance from the United States beyond the regular aid program. [32]

Pak had committed Korean forces to the U.S. effort in Vietnam not only as an ally and as a gesture of appreciation for American blood shed on Korea's behalf, but also as a means to "buy" U.S. commitment to remain in Korea. [33] Ambassador Porter noted in 1978, during a congressional hearing in U.S.-Korea relations, that the Korean troop contribution to Vietnam did have exchange value vis-á-vis the U.S. troop commitment to Korea. Although U.S. representatives in Korea did not publicize the possible linkage between ROK troops in Vietnam and U.S. troops in Korea, he commented: "What people [in Washington] have said occasionally [to the Koreans], it would be perhaps in the form of looser assurances: You don't have to worry, you have that big contingent in Vietnam, and you shouldn't worry while you have that." [34]

As long as the United States needed and valued the Korean contribution, the ROK government believed it held a tool of influence on U.S. policies toward Korea, [35] but with the United States itself withdrawing from Southeast Asia, the Korean contribution decreased in value.

Suhrke has noted the limitations of such small-power loyalty, that in the case of Korea, "[t]here was no apparent spillover effect in other areas of interallied bargaining, such as the reduction of U.S. forces in South Korea." [36] But a reconsideration of U.S.-Korea relations during the late 1960s-early 1970s, especially at the local level, would offer a modification. First, Korea's troop contribution to Vietnam helped forestall U.S. troop reductions in Korea; the original consideration of troop cuts dated back to the mid 1960s, not early 1970s. [37] But more important to this study, there was considerable spillover effect in in-country bargaining strengths between the ROK government and the agencies of the U.S. government. One former U.S. representative to the Joint Committee recalled that when Ambassador Habib had asked him to clean up camptown problems (in 1973), particularly black-marketing, he asked Habib why his predecessor on the Joint Committee had not already done so. The ambassador responded that because "Korea was fighting our war for us in Vietnam--with their best division," the United States could not push too hard. However, the ambassador calculated that with Korean troops home from Vietnam, the timing was better. [38] In other words, the withdrawal of Korean troops from Vietnam dispossessed the ROK government of its leverage toward the United States and transferred it to the USFK. With this new opportunity, the USFK made numerous demands on the Korean government to improve camptown conditions.

In describing the approaches available to smaller allies seeking influence on U.S. (foreign) policies, Keohane mentions the benefits of "bargaining with separable elements of the U.S. government"((39 (particularly the military stationed overseas), or in other words, taking advantage of the organizational interests [40] and politics of the overseas establishment:

> The success of this strategy is determined largely by the extent to which the American government agencies are dependent on the small ally for performance of their missions. Allied influence on the United States is therefore particularly high where the United States maintains large-scale military installations and conducts substantial aid programs, for in such situations American agencies become dependent on the small ally's consent to their continued presence within its boundaries. [41]

The Korean government indeed focused on its "common interests--in bases, military strength" [42] --with the USFK to maintain U.S. commitments to the ROK. There is no doubt that Korea provided the U.S. military with good training areas, "opportunity for exercising operational control over large ROK formations, many attractive career 'slots,' [and] a country that is unquestioned in its support of U.S. forces." [43] But Keohane's prescription for the success of this supplemental diplomatic strategy, when applied to Korea, misses the point: the severe dependence, militarily and psychologically, of the Korean government on the U.S. military for the nation's survival. No matter how much the U.S. military needed Korea for its organizational interests, the Korean government needed the U.S. military more. The larger context of power relations between Seoul and Washington informed the respective dependence level of the USFK and the ROK government on each other. Given the asymmetry of power in the U.S.-Korea alliance, the Korean government, in attempting a coalition with the USFK, was not able to exploit the USFK's dependence without the latter's intervention into local Korean political life. Once the USFK decided that the performance of its mission in Korea depended on improved civil-military relations, it was given the license to impose its vision of such relations on the Korean government and society. The application of the Nixon Doctrine to Korea and the loss of the Vietnam contribution left the ROK government grasping for straws vis-á-vis *both* Washington and the USFK headquarters in Seoul. The ROK government's dependence on both Washington and the USFK undercut the Koreans' ability to play the latter two off each other. It was the Korean government, not the USFK, that was forced to bend over backwards to keep U.S. troops on its soil.

Korea: From Insecurity to Private Diplomacy

Interviews with both U.S. and ROK officials who had been involved in the Clean-Up Campaign repeatedly point to Korea's insecurity in its security relationship with the United States during the early 1970s as the main stimulus for the ROK government's speed and alacrity in addressing camptown problems. One former ROK Subcommittee chairperson summed up the situation:

> At the time, the threat of invasion [from the North] was very serious. The need for U.S. military presence in Korea was very keen around the late 1960s and early 1970s. This threat and the reduction of U.S. troops and the US's demands for camptown improvements all came together and reached a critical mass. Until the Nixon Doctrine, we never thought the United States would go. The ROK government cooperated because the United States wanted cooperation. The Clean-Up activities weren't something the ROK government felt it needed to do anyway. But the United States put pressure on the Blue House. [44]

The Blue House, in the person of President Pak, interpreted the camptown problems as a direct reflection of the rift and conflict between it and Washington. One ROK Subcommittee member who was active in initiating the joint efforts described Pak's thought process thus: " 'Why are the U.S. troops leaving? Because they're fighting with Koreans and not getting along. Therefore, we must get along with the U.S. soldiers so that they don't leave Korea.' . . . Addressing the needs of the U.S. military through Clean-Up was one way to win points with the U.S. government." [45] Pak's Political Secretary in charge of overseeing the actual day-to-day workings of the Base-Community Clean-Up Committee emphasized that the president showed constant interest in the progress of camptown Clean-Up, sending out orders and demanding reports. [46] The speed, provision, and coordination of funds and material and human resources, as well as cooperation with U.S. military authorities at all levels of the ROK government, attested to the urgency felt by the ROK government to improve civil-military relations. The Campaign became a Blue House priority in its defense of national security.

For the ROK government, cooperation with camptown Clean-Up was intended not only to keep U.S. servicemen in Korea but also to promote U.S. military assistance to Korea's force modernization efforts. Within a year of the Purification Movement, the Korean government became less fearful of further U.S. troop cuts as imminent and found assurance in the belief that the loss of the 7th Division was not indispensable as long as modernization of its own forces took place. [47] However, Seoul's doubts increased about the U.S. government's ability to deliver on its promise of the $1.5 billion military aid package. First, congressional criticism about Korean-American race relations, which had put the USFK on the defensive, threatened to block Korea's new path to security independence. Representative Ron Dellums, who had been vocal in calling for reduced U.S. military intervention abroad, [48] took credit for the rejection of a $50 million increase in military aid for Korea for the years 1971 and 1972 (proposed by Rep. William Broomfield) and stated publicly that "the United States should not give assistance to any country in which American men stationed there are subject to harsh and vile treatment by host nationals because of the color of their skin." [49]

One ROK Subcommittee member, who had been active in initiating the Clean-Up, recalled that Dellums, during a visit to Korea in 1972 to support a black serviceman who had been charged with murdering a Korean woman, a prostitute, harshly criticized Korea through the media and called for a reduction of troops and aid. [50] According to one USFK member of the Subcommittee on Civil-Military Affairs, Dellums' threat to reduce or discontinue military aid "got the ROK government to do something about camptown problems." He continued, "After that threat, conditions greatly improved: lighting, access ways, general beautification, etc. It was evident in the work of the BCCUC that Dellums' threat stimulated the Korean government to act. There's no question in my mind." [51] If Dellums had been a congressional maverick in criticizing U.S.

military commitments to Korea, the Korean government may have been less responsive to the threats. However, as discussed above, the fact that many members of Congress had been publicly questioning U.S. military involvement in Asia, in general, and Korea, in particular, [52] helps explain the ROK government's immediate and serious attention to camptown problems, especially racial violence. One report highlighted the urgency of resolving camptown problems as a way to prevent further congressional criticism of the ROK government and threats to discontinue aid:

> The Pyongtaek riots of July 9, 1971, were reported in the foreign press as caused by Korean racial discrimination and has become a controversial issue in the U.S. Congressman Dellums and other congressmen accused Koreans of racial discrimination and strongly demanded that the United States cease its foreign aid to the ROK.
> The Ministry of Foreign Affairs ordered the Korean embassy in Washington to contact and explain to the concerned congressmen and major news organizations the details of the causes of the incident. . . . In view of the fact that the incident could cause serious repercussions in the U.S.-ROK relationship, the Foreign Ministry realized that U.S.-Korean cooperation not only at the local level but also at the national level are necessary. [53]

By 1972, it became evident to the ROK government that the U.S. administration's promise of military aid did not assure that Congress would release the funds, and this uncertainty made the Koreans more sensitive to the actions and inactions of Capitol Hill. [54] Marshall Green, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Asian and Pacific Affairs from 1969 to 1972, later told Congress that in the early 1970s, the Korean government had a difficult time accepting the offer of U.S. aid contingent upon congressional approval. He admitted that the Koreans had good reason to worry, since the United States fell short on its annual commitment "year after year." [55] The United States not only failed to deliver the promised annual sums but also stretched out the modernization program two years longer than promised, reduced the operations and maintenance part of the security assistance, and shifted from outright grants to Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credit. [56] Paul Cleveland, who served as political/military officer and political counselor in the U.S. Embassy in Seoul from 1973 to 1977, told Congress that Korean officials, especially the Korean military, worried that such changes in the aid program indicated declines in U.S. commitment to ROK security. [57]

In the summer and fall of 1970, the Korean government began to pinpoint the source of its insecurity toward the United States, as well as its hope for favorable U.S. support toward Korea: the U.S. Congress, and the American public. In the eyes of the Korean government, Congress held ultimate power over Korea's defense: Congress could extend or cut military aid, and Congress could revoke or observe the mutual defense treaty. [58] The ROK chairperson of the Civil-Military Relations Subcommittee from 1971 to 1972 spoke of his government's perceived need, in the early 1970s, to lobby the United States:

> We [the MoFA and the Blue House] watched [Congress] very keenly; we scrutinized who said what in Congress, then formulated our policies. We realized that 1) we have no lobby in Congress to speak for our interests, so shouldn't we do something about it? 2) we need to improve our public relations not only with Congress but also with the American public. These were of great concern to the MoFA and the Blue House. We wanted to "correct" American public opinion toward Korea, and to do this, we realized that we must use all means possible--public and private. [59]

It was around the same time that Ambassador Porter noted, in a cable sent to Washington, that the Korean government

> appears prepared to pull out all stops in order to impress the United States with depth of public dismay [over the U.S. troop reduction] *** Immediate aim is to impress U.S. administration and Congress but longer range objective is undoubtedly to obtain minimum U.S. withdrawal and maximum compensation. [60]

The ROK government diagnosed its problem with the United States to be bad public relations and a negative image of Korea and Koreans held by Congress and the American public. [61] To remedy this situation, the Koreans waged a campaign of "private diplomacy," or "people-to-people relations," to supplement (what they considered) their weak and inefficacious public channels of influencing U.S. policy circles. Encouraged by U.S. congressmen who were sympathetic to Korea to develop powerful lobbies in the United States, like those of Taiwan and Israel, [62] the ROK government sent out its private PR troops from various sectors of society--politics, business, media, academia, the military--to win the sympathy of their influential counterparts in the United States. [63] The Koreans wooed members of Congress, above all others, with Pak Tongson, the Korean businessman/socialite who resided in the United States, cast as the leading man in private diplomacy. Pak Tongson's overeager pursuit of congressional sympathy for Korea involved bribes, ranging from $100 to over $100,000, to at least 32 U.S. congressmen and 7 senators. His activities also included giving campaign contributions and lavish gifts, as well as throwing extravagant parties and fund-raisers. His dealings became known as "Koreagate." [64]

Image" has been an important element in the ROK's relations with the United States since the early 1970s. K. J. Holsti has highlighted the uses of propaganda as a capability in international politics. [65] What distinguishes Korea in the early- to mid-1970s from other countries is its elevation of propaganda/lobbying as the primary capability in its foreign relations with the United States. Korea's obsession with public relations filled a vacuum in conventional forms of diplomacy available to the government. Desperate to gain some influence over U.S. policies, the ROK government employed "direct" lobbying, through Pak Tongson, and "indirect" lobbying, [66] through U.S. public opinion. Congress was the target of both tactics.

It is not a coincidence that the ROK government's influence-buying policies were first initiated and implemented in 1971 [67] and that the ROK government began its Camptown Clean-Up efforts in 1971. According to former ROK members of the Subcommittee, the Clean-Up Campaign and the Pak Tongson efforts were part and parcel of Korea's attempts at private diplomacy. [68] The former was aimed at members of the U.S. community in Korea and the latter at the U.S. community in North America. The ROK government employed the camptown Clean-Up as a means to improve the image of Korea in the eyes of U.S. soldiers. It also wined and dined high-ranking USFK officials in order to gain their sympathy and commitment to the defense of Korea. In addition, as part of its new "invitation diplomacy," the Korean government invited U.S. veterans of the Korean War back to Korea to discover the "new and improved Korea," not the one described disparagingly by the U.S. press. [69] The intention was to have these pro-Korea "converts" return to the United States and act as unofficial lobbyists for Korea's interests.

These target groups fit the description of what K. J. Holsti refers to as "associational groups," individuals who are more likely to share similar attitudes, owing to similar group identification and experiences, and therefore an easier target than the general population. [70] These Americans also would have been more sympathetic to Korean interests because of their participation in Korea's defense and development. The goal was, then, to insure that these target groups gained a positive image of Korea during their stay.

All the Korean officials whom I interviewed, whether they had worked for the USFK or the ROK government, repeated that the Korean government and society were always concerned that GIs were getting a distorted and erroneous impression of Korea by their interactions with the prostitutes, pimps, drug dealers, and other social deviants populating kijich'on areas. The Blue House Secretary who oversaw the workings of the Base-Community Clean-Up Committee mentioned that the Blue House feared that because all that U.S. soldiers witnessed during their stay was *kkangt'ong munhwa,* or "culture of tin cans," [71] around their bases, these same individuals would return to the United States with an image of Korea as populated solely with poor, thieving people, groveling for U.S. dollars and lacking in national culture and pride. [72] The *Korea Herald* ran an editorial on June 10, 1971, that expressed outrage over the negative image U.S. soldiers were getting through kijich'on life. The paper urged Koreans to help clean up the towns so that the poor image would no longer negatively affect U.S. policies toward Korea:

> [Camptown vices] are bound to . . . damage the image of the Republic of Korea as a whole. . . . Highly placed military sources have been quoted by the vernacular newspaper as saying that the image of the Republic of Korea, as conveyed by nearly two million U.S. military servicemen to their relations and acquaintances at home, is extremely bad. And this is quite natural simply because the evils they personally witnessed being committed at military camp followers' towns in the Republic of Korea were, we repeat, outrageous. . . . All this, the analysis says, makes the Republic of Korea a place U.S. military servicemen are inclined to shy away from, and the poor image of the Republic of Korea, as brought back home by the servicemen, is influencing policy decisions in the U.S. Congress definitely to the disadvantage of the Republic of Korea.

A 1968 survey conducted by American researchers who were on contract with the U.S. Department of the Army found that Korean and U.S. soldiers harbored much misunderstanding about one another andabout each other's society and culture. The Koreans were resentful of American behavior that exhibited arrogance and superiority over Koreans, and the Americans were ignorant about the life and values of Korean people: 57% of the Koreans answered "no" and only 13% "yes" to the question, "Do Americans like Koreans?" although 67% of the Americans said "yes" and only 15% "no" to the same question. Moreover, the overwhelming majority of Korean soldiers said that prostitution hurts Korean-American relations, while significant numbers of American men in most units that were interviewed believed that prostitution helps Korean-American relations. [73] The point here is that Koreans felt highly sensitive about the image that American GIs were getting in camptowns.

The work of the BCCUC and the Subcommittee was intended to "correct" the image of Korea in the eyes of U.S. servicemen. One Korean national who served as a USFK community relations officer from the late 1960s to the present succinctly highlighted the crucial role of camptowns in keeping U.S. troops in Korea:

> The U.S. GIs didn't like being in Korea. If you walked into their billets [barracks], you would see posters of women's bodies marked up and divided into 365 days [indicating the days remaining in their tour of duty]. They would not have been unhappy to leave Korea. The only fun for the low-level GIs was to go into towns and drink, so, the Korean government thought it's necessary to improve camptown conditions. If community relations are bad, they can lead to withdrawal of forces. [74]

In the effort to convey a positive image, the ROK government cooperated with the Subcommittee on Civil-Military Relations to bring U.S. soldiers in touch with "true" Koreans and Korean culture. The objective of the Subcommittee's "Panel on People-to-People Activities" was to develop programs and projects

> designed to assist U.S. military personnel in obtaining a better understanding of Korea and the Korean people and their

> culture, and to assist the Korean people in gaining a better understanding of the American serviceman and his cultural heritage. This panel [was] also responsible for proposing specific measures to enlist the support and make the most effective and coordinated use of available ROK and U.S. government and private resources and institutions to promote Korean-American cooperation in civil-military relations and to enhance friendship and understanding between U.S. military personnel and the people of Korea. [75]

Through the efforts of this panel, GIs were invited to the homes of "respectable" Korean nationals (home visitations) for a traditional meal and a look at how "normal" Koreans live. The soldiers were also introduced to Korean university students at joint sporting and other recreational events, and the ROK Ministry of Culture and Information and the U.S. Eighth Army together sponsored the "Hello Korea" program, designed to introduce Korean culture to the U.S. guests. The ROK Ministry of National Defense sponsored monthly tours for U.S. officers and senior NCOs (noncommissioned officers), and the *Korea Herald* sponsored "Get to Know Korea" tours for U.S. soldiers interested in exploring the country's historical and popular sites. [76] The U.S. military, particularly the command of the 2d Infantry Division (ID), was also concerned with countering the negative image of Korea that its troops held. The command encouraged its units to take advantage of "Special Service Tours" outside the 2d ID area and also increased opportunities for social and sporting events between U.S. soldiers and Korean nationals. [77] These programs were in addition to the Clean-Up activities, which focused on reducing racial discrimination and enforcing VD regulation of prostitutes. All programs were intended to make the daily life of the U.S. soldier more pleasant and comfortable.

The Korean government also targeted its "people-to-people diplomacy" at top USFK brass. It must be noted here that, as a token of hospitality and appreciation, Koreans have generally tended to roll out the red carpet for U.S. leaders. But the treatment in the early 1970s was especially lavish. When asked about the means by which the ROK government tried to gain firm U.S. commitments to Korea's security in the early 1970s, a former USFK intelligence officer immediately spoke of "brown-nosing" by Koreans through the use of female entertainers and extravagant gifts:

> There was deliberate effort on the part of the Korean government to brown-nose the U.S. military [in Korea] so that they would speak up against troop withdrawals and speak pro-Korea in general. There was a feeling within the Korean government that "The U.S. [7th Division] left because we didn't treat them better." In all my time here, I never saw so many *kisaeng* [geisha] parties than in the early 1970s. There were *kisaeng* parties virtually every night that U.S. generals would be taken to. People in my office used to ask, Why do the Koreans want to take us to another *kisaeng* party? The Korean government did this although it did not have enough money. It was *taejop* [generous hospitality]. The American military loved it. My office called it "being in bed with the Koreans," shmoozing with the Koreans. We had so many generals in bed with the Koreans, and they didn't even know it. There was a never-ending push for the Koreans to ask to see the four-star general . . . . By the late 1970s, some U.S. generals didn't even know that Pak was a dictator. The generals received incredible gifts from the Koreans. [78]

This same official added that not only the Korean government, but also the private sector, conducted this "private diplomacy" on behalf of the government. Specifically, the heads of Samsung, Hyundai, and other *chaebol* [79] corporations wined and dined the generals regularly because the government could not afford all the expenses. This official confirmed the ROK government's fears of the negative image of Korea that U.S. soldiers held and emphasized the primacy of people-to-people diplomacy in the ROK government's effort to present a favorable image of their country. Such brown-nosing toward the USFK leadership ceased as Pak Tongson's "private diplomacy" in Washington backfired. [80]

The Korean public relations scheme extended beyond U.S. officials in office to include American veterans of the Korean War. The Seoul government invited these veterans back to Korea on all-expenses-paid trips so that they would witness the miraculous changes from the days of war-torn poverty and devastation that had served as the backdrop to the fighting. The intention was to have these veterans return to the United States with a better image of Korea and in turn pass that positive image along to their neighbors and members of Congress. Korean War veterans and other Americans who had been stationed in Korea served as a significant target group. Their numbers altogether totalled more than six million, or approximately 6% of the entire U.S. male population, from June 1950 to February 1971. [81]

It is important to note that Korea's external-oriented "private diplomacy" backfired while its internal-oriented component succeeded, particularly since in-country people-to-people interactions are usually not included in foreign policy analysis and since Korea's in-country people-to-people diplomacy has never been publicly noticed or acknowledged as an integral component of Koreagate. Korea's direct lobbying efforts through Pak Tongson represented the abrupt transition of a small ally's manipulation of its weakness [82] to pretensions of strength, as the way to influence U.S. policy. With the shock of the Nixon Doctrine and the reduction of U.S. troops, the ROK government determined that it must be a player, an active actor, in U.S.-ROK relations if it were to have any influence on U.S. decisions regarding Korea. Pak Tongson's lavish gifts and contributions to members of Congress and U.S. government officials and the Korean government's aggressive information campaign waged at the U.S. media and academia were intended to give a "new and improved" impression of Korea, one of wealth, generosity, sophistication, and pride. But these attempts came as a shock to a Congress and U.S. public that had never before witnessed an aggressive Korean presence in U.S. politics and had been only accustomed to an image of Korea as a poor, struggling, and needy nation. In a sense, such efforts represented too sharp a contrast to the already established basis of American sympathy for Korea, U.S. moral and geopolitical obligations to aid a beleaguered anti-Communist people; to succeed, propaganda-lobbying efforts should have fueled such sentiment. For the image of strength to have succeeded, Korea needed actual capabilities, economic and political, to back up its public relations claims. In the absence of such capabilities, Pak Tongson's efforts were fated to fail, at worst, and raise short-term curiosity, at best. Most important, Pak's influence-peddling schemes failed because the U.S. "dedicat[ion] to the policies of global involvement," its "crusading spirit," had weakened. [83]

On the home front, Korea's in-country "private diplomacy," including the Camptown Clean-Up Campaign, toward USFK leaders, GIs, and veterans was highly successful, compared to that of Pak in Washington. Although it is difficult to claim that the Campaign prevented further U.S. troop reductions, [84] joint USFK-ROK cooperation on civil-military matters did help ease the tensions between the USFK and the ROK government, and it helped commit the two sides more strongly to promoting the defense needs of the Republic. The target groups of in-country people-to-people diplomacy were more sympathetic to Korean interests than were the Congress and the American public. And more pertinent, the target groups had a context in which to place Korean attempts at transforming its image from poverty and weakness to improved living standards and strength; these Americans had personally witnessed the intense efforts of Koreans to build their country. [85] Moreover, the Clean-Up Campaign addressed specific needs and wishes of the U.S. military in Korea. It did not appear out of the blue, nor was it excessive, as were Pak Tongson's efforts. Most important, unlike Koreagate, which tried to force a mutuality of interests between the United States and the ROK, in the face of changing U.S. priorities, the Clean-Up Campaign addressed actual mutual needs of the USFK and the ROK government: maintaining harmonious Korean-American relations and convincing the U.S. Congress and public to keep U.S. troops in Korea and aid the latter's struggles for self-sufficiency.

Uryo Munhwa--Culture of Insecurity: Private Individualsin "Total Diplomacy"

Foreign policy decision makers who are accustomed to looking at "the big picture" deal in the currency of heads-of-state, foreign ministers, and the diplomatic establishment. They rarely focus their foreign policy "lens" on low-level bureaucracies, local politics, and private individuals' actions. This habit applies especially to well-established and experienced foreign policy institutions, procedures, and personnel, particularly in the West. Nations lacking such infrastructures and experience are less able to streamline their foreign policy conduct. With an authoritarian leader able to penetrate and politicize various layers of society, the line between foreign and domestic affairs becomes ambiguous. But even an authoritarian regime requires explanations to serve as rationales to its people for its desperate actions. *Uryo munhwa* (culture of fear and anxiety), or "siege mentality," [86] facilitated the use of people-to-people diplomacy as the ROK's U.S. strategy in the 1970s.

Since the end of the Korean War, Koreans had learned to live with daily threats from the North, under the principle of "(national) safety first." [87] They did not need to be persuaded of enemy threats, since most of them had experienced first-hand the atrocities of war. On top of their own memories of the Communist invasion and resulting chaos, newspapers constantly reminded them of the numerous infiltration attempts by the North, and public message systems regularly blasted air raid warnings and anti-Communist propaganda. With the departure of the 7th Division, such reminders of the enemy threat increased in frequency and urgency. One former USFK intelligence officer described the visible signs of insecurity all over the country: *Chaju Kukpang* (independent national defense) and *Charip* (self-determination) banners and placards; government-ordered sandbags and machine gun emplacements. [88] He summed up the *uryo munhwa* thus: "There was more money and concrete poured into national defense beginning in the 1970s than any time since the end of the Korean War. The first half of the 1970s was a time of public alarm over national security." [89]

Through speeches, decrees, and other actions, Pak Chonghui helped foster the "siege mentality," a situation akin to the state of preparation for war, where private citizens became part of the war effort and a capability in conducting foreign affairs. Personal insecurities and ambitions about his political future served as one source of his motivation for emphasizing that national security was in a state of crisis. He had won his third term by a very narrow margin in the April 1971 presidential election. His opponent, Kim Taejung (of the New Democratic Party), had repeatedly attacked him for having lost the U.S. commitment to Korean security. This was a particularly sensitive issue for Pak, since he had long held and publicized the view that only he was capable of representing his nation's interests to the U.S. government and people. In addition to the uncertainty in Korea-U.S. relations, Pak faced significant economic problems, labor unrest, and student protests that challenged his leadership. To stifle criticism and secure his power over both domestic politics and foreign relations, he instituted repressive social and political measures throughout the 1970s, beginning with the State of National Emergency Decree in December 1971 and the *Yusin* Revitalizing Constitution and martial law of October 1972. [90] He defended these measures as necessary for enhancing the Republic's security without depending on outside powers. [91]

In addition to his personal ambitions, genuine anxiety over the future of Korea's security also motivated Pak's emphatic stance on the security crisis. He publicly emphasized the changing politics of the world's great powers--détente between the United States and the Soviet Union, the rapprochement between the People's Republic of China and the United States, and U.S. waning interest and involvement in Asian conflicts--as causes for Korea's urgent need to rely on its own resources. Above all, he constantly reminded the public of the North's heightened military capabilities and intentions to invade the South and put an end to the latter's painstaking achievements in economic and national development. [92] President Pak and other leaders likened Korea's situation to the days before the Northern invasion in 1950 and called upon the people to work vigorously for the reconstruction and defense of the nation, so as not to be caught off guard. [93] Pak reminded his people that although big powers may lose interest in Korea, Korea could not afford to reduce its vigilance over its security:

> The local tension on the Korean peninsula which occupies a corner of the globe may not seem significant in the major powers' world perspectives that are mainly directed to maintain the status quo. . . . Nevertheless, . . . we must unmistakably let

> ourselves know that those very people who live in this tense corner of the world are none other than ourselves and that this tension is the very matter of our own life or death. [94]

To counter this trend toward increased danger and insecurity, Pak's Foreign Minister, Kim Yongsik, declared 1972 the "Year of National Security" (also, the "Year of Renovating Diplomacy") [95] and proposed the policy of "total diplomacy" (also called "multifaceted diplomacy"). Both Pak Tongson's lobbying efforts in Washington and "invitation diplomacy" were part of this new foreign relations campaign. Assertive overseas publicity drives also became important. The Ministry of Culture and Information distributed hundreds of thousands of copies of books, magazines, and pamphlets about South Korea, which were translated into various foreign languages. The stated aims of the public relations activities were to counter the "ever-intensifying north Korean Communist propaganda offensive" and to improve "the nation's international prestige by informing foreign countries of facts about contemporary Korea." [96] Specifically, according to the then National Assemblyman Paek Namok (also the chairperson of the ruling Democratic Republican Party), one priority of the "Year of National Security" was to keep U.S. forces in Korea. [97] The government adopted on February 18, 1972, a "seven-point guideline" for national security, which called for "mobilizing all national potential in order to meet 'all types of possibilities of aggressive schemes' of the North Korean Communists." [98] President Pak stated that in view of the "very serious situation" in domestic and international political life, "*the nation has to exploit to the fullest extent all national potential in all sectors*" [99] (italics added).

"Total diplomacy" enlisted private citizens in the crusade to enhance Korea's *chaju kukpang.* Pak urged overseas representatives of private Korean companies and Korean residents abroad to "actively contribute to the national defense" and called on "all Government officials and representatives of civil organizations assigned overseas" to work for the furtherance of national strength "with the pride and a sense of responsibility that they are representing the state." [100] As part of its propaganda campaign, the ROK government also called several Korean residents of the United States to Seoul in early December 1972 "and instructed [them] to take measures to improve the ROK Government's image in the United States." [101] Moreover, the government even recruited Korean college students to the national cause: The *Korea Herald* reported that the student body of Ewha Womans University, the largest and most prestigious women's university in Korea, held a fund-raiser and "delivered a total of 1,261,000 won [approximately $3,379 in 1971 terms] to Vice Defense Minister Yu Kunch'ang to be used for purchasing equipment for counterinfiltration operations." [102]

Korea in the early 1970s, particularly with the imposition of *Yusin* and martial law, possessed many of the attributes of Lasswell's "garrison state." [103] Huntington has written that the "subordination of all other purposes and activities to war and the preparation for war" are basic to the garrison state. [104]

But while Lasswell's criticisms emphasize the silencing and marginalization of individuals from political life, Korea's experiences reveal that such marginalization occurred side by side with a selective mobilization of people in the defense cause. In other words, the rationale for people-to-people diplomacy was the government's belief that private citizens do and can make a contribution to foreign relations, that given the country's dire situation, people could not divorce their personal lives from the political needs of the nation. Selective mobilization to meet government-established needs is not the same as voluntary political participation to determine those needs; however, it is also different from the narrowing of political space and number of actors described in Lasswell's version of the garrison-state. Moreover, Lasswell's later writings equate garrison-states with liberal Western nations, whose developed bureaucracies, technology, and sophisticated weapons systems threaten to paralyze and destroy civilian government and society. In other words, such nations are big powers who possess the political, economic, and military resources to sustain and promote the garrison-state. Korea, on the other hand, lacked such resources, and its adoption of the garrison-state represented a means to overcome such shortcomings. In the case of Korea, private individuals had more value as political assets for the government than would be the case for wealthy, big-power governments.

Note 1: Interview with a key U.S. initiator of the Clean-Up Campaign, Coscob, Conn., October 24, 1991. He served on the Joint Committee and the Subcommittee on Civil-Military Relations from 1971 to 1975.

Note 2: Interview with a former EUSA intelligence officer (late 1960s through 1970s), Seoul, May 12, 1992.

Note 3: Interview with an adviser to the Commander-in-Chief of UN Forces, Korea, Seoul, January 23, 1992.

Note 4: Interview, see note 1.

Note 5: U.S. Senate, *United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad*, pp. 1560, 1591-92.

Note 6: U.S. House, *American-Korean Relations*, p. 50. Michaelis did add that only modernization of ROK forces would eventually allow for further reductions in US troops.

Note 7: Interviews, see notes 1, 2, 3; interview, U.S. chairperson, Subcommittee on Civil-Military Relations, 1974-75, San Diego, Calif., October 28, 1991.

Note 8: Interview, see note 2.

Note 9: Graham Allison states, "[G]overnment leaders have competitive, not homogeneous interests; priorities and perceptions are shaped by positions." *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, p. 146.

Note 10: Bengt Abrahamsson, "The Ideology of an Elite: Conservatism and National Security," p. 74.

Note 11: Interview, see note 1.

Note 12: Ibid.

Note 13: Richard Sklar, *Corporate Power in an African State*, p. 147.

Note 14: U.S. House, *American-Korean Relations*, p. 43.

Note 15: U.S. Senate, *United States Security Agreements and Commitment Abroad*, p. 1579.

Note 16: Morton H. Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*, p. 263.

Note 17: JC Minutes, #69, January 16, 1971. Also Subcommittee Minutes, #2, September 22, 1971.

Note 18: Halperin, pp. 58-59.

Note 19: U.S. Senate, *United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad*, p. 1247. Fulbright was addressing U. Alexis Johnson, Undersecretary for Political Affairs, Department of State. The senator severely questioned Johnson and other representatives of the Departments of State and Defense who were called to speak before the subcommittee on U.S. policy toward East Asia and demanded that the administration reconsider the policy and seek ways to get out of Asia in the "very near future" (p. 1249).

Note 20: Ibid., pp. 1594-95.

Note 21: Ibid.

Note 22: *Korea Herald*, July 17, 1971; interviews with two former USFK community relations officers of the 1970s, Seoul, November 19, 1991 and April 6, 1992. The first of these interviewees also served as a Subcommittee member during the 1970s.

Note 23: Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, pp. 359-60.

Note 24: Interview, see note 1.

Note 25: Ibid.

Note 26: Interview with the 1974-75 U.S. chairperson, Subcommittee on Civil-Military Relations, San Diego, Calif., October 28, 1991.

Note 27: Interview, see note 1.

Note 28: Interview with a former USFK community relations officer, Seoul, April 18, 1992.

Note 29: Ibid.

Note 30: Members of the ROK Marine Brigade (Blue Dragon) and logistical unit (Southern Cross) arrived in Korea on December 9, 1971. They were the first of 10,000 ROK troops withdrawn from Vietnam by mid-1972. The last of the Korean troops from Vietnam arrived in Korea on March 14, 1973. James P. Finley, Command Historian, *The U.S. Military Experience in Korea, 1871-1982: In the Vanguard of ROK-U.S. Relations*, pp. 158 and 165. At the height of ROK military involvement in Vietnam, troop composition amounted to 50,000.

Note 31: Robert O. Keohane, "The Big Influence of Small Allies"; Astri Suhrke, "Gratuity or Tyranny: The Korean Alliances."

Note 32: Suhrke, pp. 519-20.

Note 33: To obtain ROK troop support in Vietnam, the United States promised the ROK government that no U.S. troops in Korea would be withdrawn without prior consultation with the ROK. In the words of General Dwight E. Beach, Commander-in-Chief of the UN Forces in Korea and the USFK from 1965-66, "The latter, to the Koreans, meant that no U.S. troops would be withdrawn without ROK approval." Stanley R. Larson and James L. Collins, Jr., *Allied Participation in Vietnam*, p. 125.

Note 34: U.S. House, *Investigation of Korean-American Relations*, Part IV, p. 46.

Note 35: In reaction to Washington's announcement of troop cuts in Korea, the Korean government threatened to "reappraise" its troop participation in the Vietnam War. U.S. House, *Investigation of Korean-American Relations*, Part IV, p. 45. For more in-depth discussion on the importance of the ROK troop contribution as political leverage, see Sung-joo Han, "South Korea's Participation in the Vietnam Conflict"; Sung-joo Han and Youngnok Koo, eds., *The Foreign Policy of the Republic of Korea*, pp. 149-55; Sung-joo Han and Gerald Curtis, eds., *The U.S.-South Korean Alliance*, pp. 209-12; Il-Baek Kwang, *Korea and the United States*, pp. 81-94.

Note 36: Suhrke, p. 520.

Note 37: Kwang, pp. 93-96.

Note 38: Telephone interview with the U.S. Representative to the Joint Committee, 1973-75, October 31, 1991. The quote does not represent, verbatim, the words spoken by Habib, but was paraphrased by the interviewee.

Note 39: Keohane, "The Big Influence of Small Allies," p. 166.

Note 40: Ibid., p. 165.

Note 41: Ibid.

Note 42: Ibid., p. 709.

Note 43: U.S. House, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1975*, p. 709.

Note 44: Interview, see note 28.

Note 45: Interview with the former ROK Assistant Secretary of the SOFA Joint Committee (1971-73), Seoul, May 25, 1992.

Note 46: Interview with the Blue House Political Secretary in charge of the Clean-Up Campaign, Seoul, June 11, 1992.

Note 47: Interview, see note 45.

Note 48: Dellums urged the U.S. administration to stop playing the role of world policeman abroad, insisting that domestic needs for U.S. economic resources were greater than external needs. U.S. Senate, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, p. 737.

Note 49: *Korea Herald*, July 17, 1971.

Note 50: Interview, see note 45.

Note 51: Interview with a former EUSA community relations officer and member of the Subcommittee on Civil-Military Relations (1970s), Seoul, April 6, 1992. This USFK official stated in a previous interview (November 19, 1991) that Dellums was very vocal about the race issue, telling Koreans, "If you're going to treat blacks badly, we're going to cut off U.S. assistance." According to the official, "the Korean government realized the serious nature of the threat and decided, 'We've got to do something.' The 'something' was the vice-ministerial level committee [BCCUC] to oversee base community relations." Another former EUSA community relations official, in his interview (April 6, 1992), made similar connections between Dellums' threats and the ROK government's cooperation on Clean-Up.

Note 52: Donald Ranard, Director of the Office of Korean Affairs, U.S. Department of State (1970-74), stated in Congress that President Pak was fully aware of the public pressures within the United States that led to troop cuts in Korea in 1970-71. He mentioned the mood of the Congress, starting the summer of 1970, to reduce military assistance to Indochina, Defense Secretary Laird's statements about the need to cut the military budget, and chronic congressional and media worries over balance-of-payments concerns. U.S. House, "Investigation of Korean-American Relations," Part IV, p. 77.

Note 53: ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Civil-Military Relations Subcommittee Provisional Activities Report and Policies," January 7, 1972 (my translation).

Note 54: U.S. House, *Investigation of Korean-American Relations*, Part IV, p. 43.

Note 55: Ibid., pp. 28-29.

Note 56: Ibid. p. 80.

Note 57: Ibid., pp. 91-92.

Note 58: Ibid. p. 79. Koreans were highly aware of U.S. congressional skepticism over U.S. military commitments to Korea. Senator Fulbright went so far as to raise the question of revoking the mutual defense treaty with Korea. U.S. Senate, *United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad*, pp. 1596-97.

Note 59: Interview, see note 28.

Note 60: U.S. House, *Investigation of Korean-American Relations*, Part IV, p. 44.

Note 61: Ibid., p. 33; *Investigation of Korean-American Relations*, Report, 1978, p. 41.

Note 62: Chae-Jin Lee and Hideo Sato, *U.S. Policy Toward Japan and Korea: A Changing Influence Relationship*, p. 76.

Note 63: U.S. House, *Investigation of Korean-American Relations*, Part I, 1977, p. 34. Paraphrased from the testimony of Kim Hyung Wook, former director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA); U.S. House, *Investigation of Korean-American Relations*, Part IV, p. 1.

Note 64: For detailed documentation and analysis of Koreagate, see U.S. House, *Investigation of Korean-American Relations*, Parts I-VII, the "Report," and appendixes.

Note 65: K. J. Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*, ch. 7.

Note 66: Chung-in Moon, "Influencing Washington: An Analysis of the South Korean Lobby in the United States," pp. 104-10. Moon summarizes the distinction that students of lobby behavior make: "Direct lobbying" includes the use of persons or groups in positions of power and influence over the actions of decision makers, and "indirect lobbying" attempts to mobilize public and private interests in the target country. "Grass roots mobilization," which refers to constituency influence over policy makers, is a form of indirect lobbying. The following paragraphs describe the Korean government's use of the grassroots strategy by attempting to enlist U.S. military personnel on behalf of Korea's defense cause.

Note 67: U.S. House, *Investigation of Korean-American Relations*, Part I, p. 37.

Note 68: Interview with the former ROK Secretary of the SOFA JC and the Chair of the Subcommittee on Civil-Military Relations (November 1971 to September 1972), Seoul, April 18, 1992.

Note 69: U.S. House, *Investigation of Korean-American Relations*, Part V, p. 8.

Note 70: Holsti, pp. 161-62.

Note 71: *Kkangtong*, means "tin can" in Korean. The term has been used to refer to severe poverty and accompanying shame: Korean mendicants used to carry around tin cans or pails door to door and village to village, which served as containers for the scraps of food they received from begging. Some Koreans view this practice as an outgrowth of U.S. military food handouts during the Korean War.

Note 72: Interview, Seoul, June 11, 1992.

Note 73: Robert L. Humphrey, Troy Parris, James Shepherd, et al., "Troop-Com munity Relations Research in Korea: Educational Materials," Experimental Draft, prepared for the Office of the Chief of Research and Development, Dept. of the Army, Spring 1970, p. 15; also EUSA, J-1, "Human Factors Research, Part II: Troop-Community Relations," 1965, pp. 9-10. The "Educational Materials" also raise the point that many U.S. GIs may think that Koreans are thieves (pp. 11-12) and that their poverty is due to laziness (p. 11).

Note 74: Interview, Seoul, May 19, 1992.

Note 75: JC Minutes, #67, October 21, 1971, Enclosure 1 to Enclosure 18.

Note 76: JC Minutes, #68, November 11, 1971, Enclosure 15.

Note 77: Letter of Chief of Staff, 2d Infantry Division, to USFK Commanding General, June 26, 1972. The letter expressed concern over U.S. soldiers' image of Korea and proposed measures for the "[r]emoval of misunderstood view of Korea."

Note 78: Interview with a former EUSA intelligence officer (late 1960s to early 1970s), Seoul, May 12, 1992.

Note 79: *Chaebôl*, is the Korean equivalent of the Japanese *zaibatsu*, giant business conglomerate.

Note 80: Interview, see note 78.

Note 81: Finley, *The U.S. Military Experience in Korea*, p. 152. This was part of Korea's "Invitation Diplomacy." In 1972, the ROK invited 50 "prominent" Americans from political, academic, and press circles to Korea as part of the government's public relations effort. President Pak's rationale was that if people visit Korea for themselves, they will discover a new Korea, not one described by the *New York Times*, or *Washington Post*,. (These papers had been critical of Korea in the early-mid 1970s.) U.S. House, *Investigation of Korean-American Relations*, Part V, p. 5.

Note 82: See Keohane's "The Big Influence of Small Allies" on the use of "weakness" as an instrument of small power foreign relations. Suhrke's "Gratuity or Tyranny" describes such behavior in Korea's interactions with the United States. Also see Kwang, *Korea and the United States*.

Note 83: Keohane has stated, "The small ally can take American- supported institutions and commitments for granted, however, only so long as the United States remains dedicated to policies of global involvement. It is precisely America's crusading spirit that has presented small allies with bargaining influence. " "The Big Influence of Small Allies," p. 163.

Note 84: It is a fact, though, that the U.S. troop presence remained in the low-to-mid 40,000s until recent years.

Note 85: See Chung-in Moon, "Complex Interdependence and Transnational Lobbying," for an analysis of different types of lobbying strategies employed by Korea toward the United States and their comparative successes. Moon concludes that indirect lobbying-grass-roots mobilization and coalition-building-is most promising. He points out that "the overall social, political, and cultural contexts surrounding Korea and the United States strongly influence the choice and effectiveness of lobbying strategies" (p. 82). This would support my observation that the in-country people-to-people Clean-Up Campaign was successful because of the USFK's firsthand awareness of the political, social, and cultural context of Korean-American relations.

Note 86: Rinn-Sup Shinn, a researcher of U.S.-ROK issues, described before Congress Korea's *uryô munhwa*, as "siege mentality," or "garrison state" mentality. U.S. House, *Investigation of Korean-American Relations*, Part V, pp. 12-13.

Note 87: The Commemoration Society for President Pak Chonghu,i and First Lady Yuk Yongsu, *Kyôre ûi Chidoja*, (The Leader of a People), p. 295.

Note 88: Interview, see note 2.

Note 89: Ibid.

Note 90: For detailed analysis of the *Yusin*, period and Pak's political ambitions, see U.S. House, *Investigation of Korean-American Relations*, Parts IV and V; U.S. Senate, *Korea and the Philippines: November 1972.*, Pak and his apologists have insisted that the authoritarian measures were necessary for the maintenance of ROK security, while critics have downplayed the security aspect and emphasized Pak's thirst for continued power. See chapters on *Yusin*, and *Chaju Kukbang*, by the Commemoration Society for President Pak Chonghu,i and First Lady Yuk Yongsu, *Kyôre ûi Chidoja*; Korean Research Institute on Political Issues, *Tokjaeja ûi Kal*, (The Knife of the Dictator), chs. 1, 3, 5; Kyosik Kim, *Takyumentôri Pak Chông hûi*; U.S. House, *Investigation of Korean-American Relations*, Part IV, pp. 74-75.

Note 91: *Korea Herald*, June 25, 1971, March 19, 1972, July 1, 1972; The Commemoration Society for President Pak Chonghu,i and First Lady Yuk Yôngsu, *Kyôre ûi Chidoja*, pp. 48-50; U.S. Senate, *Korea and the Philippines*, pp. 5-11; U.S. House, *Investigation of Korean-American Relations*, Part V, pp. 31-33. This last citation conveys the statements of former U.S. Ambassador Richard Sneider.

Note 92: For example, Pak stated in his 1972 New Year's Address to the country that North Korea had fortified its territory and designated the period from December 1971 to March 1972 "as a time for struggle" and that 177 armed agents had been sent by the North to the South in 1971 on 59 different occasions (39 South Koreans were killed and 70 wounded). *Korea Herald*, January 1, 1972, New Year Supplement.

Note 93: *Korea Herald*, June 25, 1971.

Note 94: *Korea Herald*, January 1, 1972 and March 19, 1972.

Note 95: *Korea Herald*, April 11, 1972 and June 28, 1972.

Note 96: *Korea Herald*, February 3, 1971.

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Note 97: *Korea Herald*, January 1, 1972.

Note 98: *Korea Herald*, February 19, 1972.

Note 99: Ibid.

Note 100: U.S. House, *Investigation of Korean-American Relations*, Part V, p. 9.

Note 101: U.S. House, *Investigation of Korean-American Relations*, p. 4.

Note 102: *Korea Herald*, June 15, 1971. Along with Seoul National University, Yonsei University, and Korea University in Seoul, Ewha has traditionally been an influential voice of and for young Koreans.

Note 103: Harold D. Lasswell, *National Security and Individual Freedom*; "The Universal Peril: Perpetual Crisis and the Garrison-Prison State"; "Does the Garrison State Threaten Civil Rights?".

Note 104: Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, p. 348.

6. The International Is Personal: Effects of the Clean-Up Campaign on Kijich'on Women

For the Korean government, kijich'on prostitutes were an indispensable asset, as "personal ambassadors," in its adaptation to the changing security policies of the United States in the early 1970s. These state-designated patriots experienced increased joint governmental surveillance and control over their lives as compensation for their participation in the Clean-Up Campaign. Yet, they learned to take advantage of some of the regulations, such as the elimination of streetwalkers. The following illustrates how the "international"--the Nixon Doctrine and troop reduction--manifested itself in the "personal"--the lives of kijich'on women--through the Clean-Up Campaign. Specifically, the focus is on the effects of the antidiscrimination and VD control policies on two aspects of these women's lives--their work environment (club life) and their bodies--and relatedly, on their physical mobility and autonomy over their sexual labor.

Although Keohane, Nye, and Huntington have mentioned that transnational processes generate "asymmetries" and changes in the "balance of power within the local society," few have paid attention to such power disparities in studies of transnationalism.[1] This chapter demonstrates that asymmetries in the balance of power within the local society did indeed result from the interactions among the ROK government, the USFK, and various camptown residents, and that the asymmetries were distinctly gendered. In general, the USFK, ROK government, and local camptown power-holders promoted their respective interests at the expense of the prostitutes. But the women were not simply passive victims of others' political and economic ambitions. Although powerless in many respects, kijich'on women did voice their own interests, when push came to shove, through private complaints and public protests. The Camptown Clean-Up Campaign, which was intended to improve channels of communication and cooperation in camptown politics, became the cork that plugged up the possibility of public protest by kijich'on prostitutes.

Effects of Antidiscrimination Policies

Racial tensions between black and white servicemen and the U.S.-ROK efforts at antidiscrimination by camptown prostitutes reduced the women's freedom to choose their customers and exacerbated the environment of fear in the clubs. Most of the women who were interviewed recalled that their club owner/manager, and sometimes, USFK officials themselves, emphatically told the women not to discriminate against black soldiers in their "entertainment" functions. The club owners stressed that if the women did not cooperate with the U.S. military's efforts to reduce racial strife, the club could be placed off limits. As mentioned in chapter 4, the USFK's pressure on the club owners to eliminate discriminatory practices in their establishments served to increase the owners' power over the women. The prostitute was faced with the choice of following the orders of the U.S. base authorities and the club owner, and thereby risk economic and physical retaliation by white soldiers, or of discriminating against blacks, and thereby risk the wrath of club owners and the off-limits decree of base officials. In either case, the choice was not much of a choice; both promised economic and physical pain.

When I asked the women if they had been forced by anyone to sleep with black soldiers for the sake of camptown racial harmony, they replied "No." In most cases, the owners did not order the women to have sexual intercourse with black soldiers. However, one woman (Mrs. Chong) stated that some club owners/managers in Uijongbu, where she had worked, did force women to sleep with black soldiers and that few women, when pressured, disobeyed, lest the owner abuse her physically or fire her from the establishment.[2] Club owners' primary interest in cooperating with U.S. authorities was to safeguard their income-earning ability. Although most camptown clubs were racially segregated, some were divided into separate sections for whites and blacks within one establishment.[3] In this case, the club owner would designate which of the hostesses were to serve the black or white section. Those designated "black hostesses" had to contend with the social stigma and potential loss of income from white soldiers. Mrs. Chong also mentioned that some club owners, to earn more dollars, lied to white soldiers, insisting that prostitutes who in fact had slept with black men were "white-only" prostitutes. This kind of behavior by the owner jeopardized the physical safety and economic future of such women; if the white soldier discovered that he had been deceived, he could beat the woman and spread the word among his white friends that the woman was a "black" prostitute.

In general, the Clean-Up Campaign's antidiscrimination policies reduced the already limited autonomy of the kijich'on prostitutes over their sexual labor. There were no special rewards for associating with blacks, but the social stigma was severe. Most camptown prostitutes considered associating with blacks to be highly embarrassing because they faced the condemnation and taunts of not only white soldiers but other Korean residents. [4] For most prostitutes, racial discrimination against black men served as a means to retain their limited freedom of choice of customers and their already compromised sense of self-dignity.

The Clean-Up efforts improved the club environment for the black soldier and thereby helped alleviate the racial problems of the U.S. forces. But for the women, the club environments became increasingly oppressive, owing to the increased surveillance over the women's conduct by the owner, U.S. military police (MP), local Korean leadership, and both black and white servicemen. To survive in the bars, the prostitutes had to "look over their shoulders" constantly (*nunch'i poda*), balancing the wishes and punitive power of each surveillance group.

Effects of VD Control Policies

More than the antidiscrimination efforts of the Clean-Up, VD control had longer-lasting and more taxing consequences, both physically and financially, for the camptown prostitutes. The genuine effort to reduce the incidence and spread of venereal disease on the part of the USFK and ROK authorities itself cannot be criticized. However, from the beginning of the Clean-Up Campaign, improving the health of the women for the women's sake was never an issue. The sole aim of the U.S. military was to prevent its men from catching VD, and the sole aim of the ROK government was to help the USFK meet that goal. The health status of these women was merely a means to an end for both the USFK and the ROK authorities. Moreover, the burden of clean health fell on the women, not the servicemen. Emphasis on stricter VD control amounted to increased harassment by U.S. military police, Korean police, both USFK and ROK health authorities, and club owners to control the bodies of these women.

VD Education

Although the USFK and Korean authorities emphasized that kijich'on prostitutes should be educated about sexually transmitted diseases (chapter 4), such training was not uniformly and consistently conducted. Rather, adequate and continued education depended on the level of conscientiousness of the USFK and ROK leaders at each camptown. For example, the Uijongbu area quite systematically held meetings during which basic lectures and slides on venereal disease were presented to prostitutes. [5] The women were also urged not to treat VD on their own by using inappropriate or inadequate medications purchased at local pharmacies, but rather to seek professional medical care as soon as they experienced signs of infection. [6] Songt'an City, though less systematically than Uijongbu, included a briefing on VD during the monthly "Etiquette and Good Conduct" lectures. But many women did not attend these education sessions either because they had never heard about them or because they had considered them yet another regulatory nuisance. According to the women interviewed, the common complaint among both those who had attended and not attended such VD talks was that the Korean government did not care much about educating women to protect their own health but rather relied on the mandatory examination system to assure U.S. authorities that the women were "clean." In short, the women believed they had nothing to gain by attending these lectures.

In addition, all of the women I interviewed blamed the government for not distributing condoms and showing women how to use them. They contrasted this with USFK practice: the USFK made condoms readily available, free of charge, at the compound gates for the soldier to take into the camptown. The women stated that gate areas were known as "condom land" and that U.S. servicemen, as soon as they landed in Korea, were given VD lectures. The women believed that the ROK government did not make proper education and the availability of condoms for women a priority because the examination and detention system served as the core of VD control.

Mandatory VD Examinations

Across the board, camptown prostitutes detested the mandatory VD examination system and its heightened enforcement because they felt they had more to lose than gain from it. First, they found the exams deeply humiliating. The women I interviewed repeatedly used the word "shame" and "dread" to describe their feelings about VD exams. A USFK community relations officer then active in VD control in Uijongbu pointed out that some of the "smarter women" told him that forced VD examinations amounted to a violation of their human rights. [7] He noted that these women especially took offense at being harassed by U.S. military police to show valid VD cards and be examined by U.S. medics. They charged that their rights as Korean citizens were being infringed: "We're Korean. Why are American doctors and police checking us?" [8]

On the other hand, one woman asserted that some prostitutes would have preferred being checked by Americans because given that Americans were foreigners and that "normal" Koreans despised these women, it was more embarrassing to expose their genitals to Korean nationals. [9] Although most prostitutes felt that they had no choice but to comply with stringent VD regulations in order to enter bars and clubs and attract GIs, they believed the system did not benefit them. Some women were known to have questioned the medical validity of a VD prevention system that focused only on women: "Why are the authorities cracking down on us? American GIs are half the problem." [10]

Second, for the women, the most burdensome aspect of stricter VD control was financial. They were obliged to pay for the VD exams and any medical treatment out of their own pockets. Given that they were forced to hand over to the club owner about 80% of the money they earned from selling sex and drinks to GIs, they often lacked enough money to pay for VD checks and adequate treatment. If detained in the *suyongso* (detention center), women were unable to work for a period of 4 to 10 days on the average, while some were required to stay for a month. [11] Until their infection cleared, they could not be released; consequently, they could not earn income but were nevertheless, in many cases, required to pay for their medical expenses. [12] Often, a woman had to borrow money from her club owner to treat medical problems, which in turn increased her club debts.

Moreover, stricter enforcement of VD control increased the likelihood of bribes imposed on camptown prostitutes by local police and private health clinics. Facing pressures from USFK and ROKG officials to tighten VD regulation, local Korean officials stood to benefit professionally [13] and financially by cracking down on the women. If caught by the local KNP for not possessing a VD card or possessing an invalid card, women were often forced to pay bribes to the police in order to be released and permitted to continue to work. But since most of the women could not afford to pay the bribes, club owners came to bail them out and in turn raised the women's club debt. Club owners often vented their anger for having to pay the bribe money by beating the women. One woman who had worked in Uijongbu clubs in the early 1970s asserted that many women she knew feared the police the most because of the bribes they imposed on the women, including extortion for non-VD-related "offenses," and the related punishments the owner would mete out. [14]

Private VD clinic operators were also notorious for bribing women, both before and after the Clean-Up Campaign. Before the USFK-ROK emphasis on VD control, private operators frequently lied to the women about their test results, claiming that those who had passed had failed and those who had failed had passed. In the first instance, women were forced to pay for treatment they did not require. In the second, women could get their VD cards stamped "pass" if they paid a fee, or bribe. One Mrs. Pak recalled that although she went for regular exams, she rarely knew if she was sick or healthy because she always felt that she was being duped by the clinic official. [15]

With the initiation of the Clean-Up Campaign and its emphasis on replacing private with government-operated clinics, corrupt private clinics which continued to operate tended to indulge in the first type of extortion. One former prostitute from Songt'an, Kim Yonja, stated that "of the four private clinics in the area, three were out to make profits."

> This created a very frightening atmosphere: even if the woman didn't have VD, she'd be told she has it and was forced to be treated. If in one day you pull that kind of stunt on only 10 people out of all the women you examine, it'd be worth having a private clinic. [16]

Ms. Kim, who had headed the "Women's Association" in Songt'an (early-to-mid 1970s), discovered numerous such abuses by clinic operators and began to compile records with which to address MoHSA authorities. In her own words,

> If the [private] clinic said that a woman tested positive for VD, then I would take her to another hospital or clinic and get her tested. If she tested negative, I would then receive the verification from that clinic. After about a year's worth of collecting various data, I reported the discrepancies (exploitation) to the Health and Social Affairs Bureau in Suwon [capital of Kyonggi Province]. In the aftermath, these private clinics were abolished, and MoHSA clinics entered the camptowns. [17]

While it is unlikely that one woman's conscientious struggle on behalf of her sister prostitutes eliminated such abuses, Ms. Kim's words attest to the exploitation that the Clean-Up's stress on VD checks and treatment inflicted on many camptown prostitutes. At the same time, her statement also reveals that women did benefit in the long run from the establishment of government-operated VD clinics and tighter government supervision of the remaining private clinics in the sense that direct monitoring of VD examinations and treatment by the MoHSA encouraged more accurate medical record-keeping on the part of medical workers and reduced the extortionary practices.

Third, by emphasizing the maintenance of valid VD cards, the Clean-Up gave license to U.S. MPs, the local Korean police and health workers to harass all camptown women, not just the prostitutes. For example, MPs would come into the clubs and demand to see the VD cards of the club's hostesses in what amounted to "surprise inspections." Such action on the part of U.S. personnel was not sanctioned by the Status of Forces Agreement and was therefore a breach of Korean sovereignty. In Tongduch'on, USFK officials who undertook daily unannounced inspections were not limited to MPs; they included representatives of camp commanders, the Equal Opportunity Treatment Office, the Public Affairs Office, the Provost Marshall, the Criminal Investigation Division, the Office of Preventive Medicine, and the Inspector General. [18] Angered by the arrogance of U.S. MPs and other USFK inspectors, club owners and Korea Special Tourist Association (KSTA) leaders protested to local ROK and USFK authorities.

> a) The [U.S.] authorities concerned frequently makes [sic] a secret inspection of our facilities and takes [sic] unilateral actions to restrict the entrance to our clubs without taking our explanation [opinion] into consideration. b) Military police or Security Police rushes to our clubs to check the passes and ID cards of the employees and also to search the counter desks and music rooms in our clubs. These are, we think, injudicious actions to violate the human right [sic]. [19]

Ms. Kim recalled that club women were also angered by the MPs' behavior and voiced their complaints to the club owners. She noted that the base authorities must have heeded these complaints because joint US-ROK medical teams gradually replaced MPs as unannounced inspectors. [20]

Outside the clubs, the Korean police were all too eager to stop Korean women in the streets. Women who wore more make-up than others, women who walked with servicemen or were near a base, unaccompanied by U.S. personnel, even though they were not prostitutes, were all subject to random checks of VD cards by Korean police and health inspectors. In 1971, the Chief of Songt'an Police stated that "[t]he problem is that KNP, Korean health agents and women inspectors have no way of determining who is an unregistered streetwalker, Korean citizen or U.S. dependent." [21] Consequently, the tendency was to treat all women as prostitutes or potential prostitutes. Such actions date back to earlier attempts in different societies to control military prostitution; the enforcement of the British Contagious Diseases Act of the 1860s and U.S. federal legislation regarding venereal disease containment during World War I translated into the assumption that any woman found near military camps is a prostitute and therefore subject to gynecological examination. [22]

The leaders of U.S. commands had to step in and negotiate with local police to refrain from stopping women for simply accompanying U.S. servicemen in town. U.S. soldiers charged that Korean police (KNP) and health inspectors were harassing them and their Korean female companions, often wives, girlfriends, or friends, without any provocation or reason. [23] Many base authorities requested that KNP and other local officials refrain from indiscriminate stopping of women accompanying GIs, claiming that such KNP actions "mean, by implication that (1) all Korean females accompanying U.S. personnel are prostitutes, or (2) that U.S. personnel go only with Korean females who are prostitutes." [24] Other commanders, however, asked their men to cooperate with the KNP, who were, after all, only doing their job to protect the health of U.S. personnel.

Whether working in the clubs, shopping on the streets, or sleeping in their rooms, kijich'on women confronted increased harassment by local U.S. and Korean VD control officials. As mentioned in chapter 4, local authorities "rounded up" women for mass VD examinations and injections of penicillin. The MoHSA official in charge of camptown VD control in 1971-72 recalled, for example, that in Tongduch'on, "[l]ocal officials would go find the woman who failed her exams and put her on the bus [for the detention center in Soyosan] by force if she resisted." [25] Ms. Kim recalled that VD control in Songt'an became increasingly severe beginning in 1972 and that "even those [Korean] housewives who happened to wear a lot of make-up [and therefore looked like prostitutes] got hauled into" the Ministry of Health vehicle stationed right at the front gates of the base. [26] It was also not uncommon for local police and VD clinic officials to enter the homes/rooms of those prostitutes who were considered to be infected and force them to go to treatment centers. [27] A Foreign Ministry document states clearly that the "health/sanitation inspection zone" was expanded to include not only clubs and restaurants but also the living quarters of club employees and adjacent residential areas that were not necessarily inhabited by people who serve U.S. military base personnel. [28] Ms. Kim and other camptown residents of the early-to-mid 1970s remarked that some U.S. base commands transported such women to treatment centers in U.S. military vehicles.

Joint USFK-ROK cooperation on VD control improved the potential for adequate treatment of infected women, but it did not fully take into account the women's sensitivities to certain medications and treatment regimens. Nor did it responsibly undertake the elimination of excessive or unnecessary treatment practices. USFK medical teams set the basic standards of diagnosis and treatment and monitored the compliance (or noncompliance) of private and public health clinics. In doing so, the USFK was instrumental in eliminating some types of inappropriate and abusive treatment practices by Koreans, especially private clinicians. For example, a (1974) joint U.S.-ROK supervision team "vigorously reprimanded" a physician in charge of examining 437 prostitutes in Chunggu, Taegu "for lack of any constructive progress since a visit last year by Dr. Kim (MHSA)." This physician was scolded for maintaining a "poorly-lighted, and quite filthy" clinic and administering inadequate doses of medication for gonorrhea. [29] More serious abuses, such as the treatment of women who tested 3+ or 4+ WBCs (white blood cells) with 1.0 gram of chloramphenicol, were considered "quite dangerous as well as probably worthless" and "recommended that it be discontinued." [30] The joint supervisory team that reported its observations to the Subcommittee in February 1974 also noted that the "haphazard treatment of cervicitis of unknown origin," administered by the Waegwan Health Center and VD

Clinic, was "unwarranted" and that some women were quarantined for a period "probably excessive for medical care." [31]

Such efforts to curb medical negligence and abuses, though genuine, were in fact selective: Some excesses were permitted to continue for the sake of inducing women's cooperation in VD control. For example, the same supervisory team that determined the Waegwan Health Center's practice of quarantining some women to be excessive did not recommend that this practice be discontinued. Rather, one of the team members, a Dr. Gallo of the 543d General Dispensary at Camp Carroll, asserted that this excessive practice had "psychological advantages." [32] In other words, the excessive quarantine period, though medically unwarranted, would serve as a lesson about the physical and financial consequences of failing VD tests to women who did not take the regulations seriously. Similarly, two other physicians on the joint team, a Dr. Antal (of the World Health Organization) and a Dr. Kim (MoHSA), "felt the period was too long when females were treated with penicillin [sic] but they did not push to reduce the period." [33]

Moreover, it appears that the U.S. military required the higher doses of penicillin, 4.8-6.0 million units, as compared to the lower doses generally administered by Korean physicians, without having adequately researched their efficacy and side effects on the Korean women. USFK and ROK medical officials did acknowledge that approximately 5% of the prostitutes were allergic to penicillin and in some base areas took precautions to substitute penicillin with other drugs. [34] But many Korean physicians, even two and three years into the Clean-Up Campaign, remained "reluctant to give such large doses . . . because such doses in subjects allergic to penicillin could result in death to the patient." [35] The Subcommittee member representing the MoHSA conveyed this observation to the Subcommittee, adding that "more study was required on this problem." [36]

According to the U.S. military, there were no reported deaths of prostitutes treated with penicillin in 1973. [37] Yet, the MoHSA chief in charge of camptown VD control in 1971-72 acknowledged that the most serious side effect from penicillin suffered by prostitutes was penicillin shock. [38] No person or document I came across offered information on the frequency and seriousness of such shock, though one joint supervision team report noted: "The doctor at the VD clinic [in the vicinity of Camps Henry and Walker in Taegu] appeared to have a paranoid fear that a girl would die of an anaphylactic reaction from injectable penicillin." [39] But instead of thoroughly investigating the situation, the team report concluded, "Most so-called reactions he was seeing were probably hysterical reactions to the injection itself and unrelated to the penicillin." [40]

This kind of casual conclusion warrants the following observations: it is unlikely that women who had grown accustomed to regular gynecological and blood examinations and attendant injections would have reacted "hysterically" at the sight of a needle. Second, it is ironic, not to mention irresponsible, that medical officials so intent on making Korean physicians observe "sound medical practices" paid scant attention to the possibility of serious side effects ensuing from the recommended high doses of medication and permitted some medically "unscientific" and "unwarranted" practices to continue at the expense of the women's health.

In the end, in the mode of business-as-usual, many clinics continued to operate as they had prior to the visits of USFK and ROK authorities, and the authorities departed, resigned to the belief that since "real change is doubtful . . . U.S. servicemen would be well advised to avoid" those areas where "most prostitutes have chronic gonorrhea." [41] In the end, restoring ailing women to health was not as important as channeling men to areas where prostitutes were healthier and therefore less dangerous as sex mates.

Contact Identification

Alongside VD registration and effective diagnosis and treatment, the Clean-Up Campaign emphasized establishing and/or reinforcing strict "contact identification" systems. The purpose was to locate the female source of VD and mandate her to obtain treatment so that she would not spread her infection. Nearly all the bases had some form of contact system and regularly briefed servicemen regarding the contact procedure(s) they should follow in case of VD contraction. The USFK also urged its men to seek medical assistance from camp physicians as soon as they had any symptoms of venereal disease. Although one USFK document recommending VD control measures states "Korean prostitutes with venereal disease are encouraged to name U.S. contacts," [42] there was no mention in any of the documents or individuals I interviewed indicating the existence of such a procedure or system. On the contrary, information about military personnel with VD was held in strict confidentiality, and a woman who was accused by a soldier as a contact was not even permitted to find out his identity to prove him right or wrong. [43]

Most of the women found the various contact identification measures humiliating, burdensome, inaccurate, and unfair. With the "tag system," women were required to wear numbered tags (VD card numbers) on their chests. The GI who contracted VD was supposed to remember the number and inform the base medical authorities of his condition. The medical office would then identify the woman by matching her number to her name and face in the "photo identification files" or copies of VD registration cards. (Medical offices and Provost Marshal Offices kept a book or file of records of each registered prostitute in the camptown, including her name, photograph, VD card registration number, local address, and the name of the club in which she worked.) The majority of the women I interviewed had worn such tags beginning in the early 1970s and remarked bitterly that they had felt humiliated in doing so. One woman asserted that many of her coworkers complained among themselves, "We're not animals--why are they tagging us and rounding us up!" [44]

Some commands encouraged the infected GI to go to the club or home of the alleged VD transmitter and point her out to the relevant military officials. Accused women found such public displays condemning and degrading and would put up loud and sometimes violent resistance. [45] Because GIs generally avoided such face-to-face confrontation, most commands eventually adopted less confrontational practices, such as encouraging the infected soldier simply to point out the room where the alleged transmitter lived. Medical officials and/or the police would then go to her room or club and force her to get treated. [46]

Club prostitutes also resented the contact systems because they tended to err at the women's expense and provided no avenue of redress for the woman who believed she was wrongly accused. The contact slip system, adopted by many commands, required that a GI who buys sex from a club prostitute write her name and VD registration number on a contact form available at the entrance of the club, retain it for two weeks after intercourse, and submit it to the medical office if he thought she was the source of his infection. The problem was that a soldier, who was often inebriated during sexual activities, did not always remember to write down the name of the woman he slept with. When pressed by medical authorities, he would offer any name he could remember. That name did not always match the identity of the real source, and consequently, a woman who had not associated with the infected GI would be accused. Women thus accused were forced to undergo gynecological and blood examinations. Kim Yonja stated that even if the test results were negative, no apology was offered by the U.S. side. She said that women, simply put, suffered unduly (*tanghaetta*) at the hands of the base authorities. [47] Indeed, a joint USFK-ROK supervisory team visiting the Tonggu Health Center and VD Clinic in Pusan found that the clinic did not treat those contacts who tested negative for VD. The team pointed out the error in such practice; the "VD Clinic was told they must use epidemiologic treatment for all contacts *regardless whether an examination is negative or not*" [48] (italics added). In other words, from the perspective of the U.S. and ROK authorities, medicating all contacts, infected or not, was preferable to letting uninfected women go free of medication.

Conflict Between Registered and Unregistered Women

Various forms of contact identification tended to fail because many GIs, disobeying command advice, continued to buy sex from unregistered women (streetwalkers or female employees of U.S. bases who sold sex on the side) and then name a registered club woman as the culprit. As the VD control programs took effect, USFK officials discovered that a significant number, if not a majority, of GI infections were derived from sexual contact with streetwalkers. For example, Lieutenant D. M. MacKinnon, representing the 4th Missile Command at Camp Page (Ch'unchon), reported at the Fifth USFK Civil Affairs Conference that over 50% of his command's VD cases were contracted from streetwalkers. [49] Again at a Civil Affairs Conference in September 1973, a Camp Page representative stated that a majority of VD cases came from "non-base-club women" living in an off-limits area 200 yards from Camp Page and emphasized that the contact slip system does not work. [50] Kim Yonja also commented that in those areas with strict VD control, "the problem was the streetwalkers. They didn't get such [VD] tests at all. So, in general, if a GI got VD, it was usually a streetwalker he caught it from, rather than a club woman, because the streetwalker was cheaper." [51]

Inaccuracies inherent in contact systems that relied on records of registered prostitutes had the effect of pitting club prostitutes and streetwalkers against each other. Club women, angered for having to face false accusations and often unwarranted medical treatment, blamed the unregistered women for their plight. They resented having to serve as scapegoats after having followed VD registration and examination procedures. Most of the women I interviewed recalled that vicious fights often broke out between registered and unregistered camptown prostitutes, owing specifically to contact errors and to a general sense of victimization and revenge on the part of registered women. One former leader of the Songt'an Women's Association recounted how she went on patrol with joint KNP-MP patrol teams to catch streetwalkers. She had often run through village alleys, together with the police, in order to "corner such women" and "turn them over to the police." [52]

From a feminist perspective, the USFK-ROK efforts to crack down on streetwalkers and enforce VD registration helped further fracture camptown prostitutes' already fragile sense of group organization and solidarity as women sharing similar plights of exploitation. First, enlisting the Women's Association to help the authorities eliminate streetwalkers amounted to a "divide and conquer" strategy on the part of the USFK and ROK Clean-Up officials. Instead of together challenging Clean-Up policies that treated both club prostitutes and streetwalkers like animals to be rounded up, inoculated, and detained, the women blamed and physically attacked one another for spreading VD. Second, the camptown Women's Associations, which were in theory to defend the needs and interests of club prostitutes, were in reality co-opted by USFK and ROK officials to compel members to observe VD regulations and antiracial discrimination policies in their sex work. Both U.S. and ROK authorities encouraged these Associations to adopt "self-policing measures" to ensure that all camptown prostitutes were registered with the Association, the police, and the VD clinic. Many of the Associations complied with U.S.-ROK requests out of self-interest: fewer streetwalkers and increased numbers of registered women observing regular examinations and treatment would prevent off-limits impositions, fewer errors in contact identification, and better control, in general, over unregistered prostitutes' activities. In helping the authorities register streetwalkers and increase compliance with VD control measures, the women themselves helped further institutionalize camptown prostitution to the USFK'sliking.

The USFK and ROK officials administering the Clean-Up did exert genuine effort to reduce the number of streetwalkers (through raids and round-ups), especially minors peddling sex for money. The Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs, Transportation (Tourism), and Health and Social Affairs all stressed the importance of eliminating streetwalkers in order to enforce VD control. This was integral to reducing the spread of VD to GIs. In particular, local Korean officials and police, under orders from their superiors, pressured pimps to release underage females and warned club managers not to hire or permit the entry of female minors into their establishments. [53]

Local camptown officials and former prostitutes I interviewed generally agreed that many club owners did cooperate with local Korean authorities to keep minors out of the clubs. Minors who were picked up by the Korean police were often turned over to the local Women's Welfare Office of the MoHSA for "guidance" education, designed to teach poor and vagrant women a skill such as barbering, hairstyling, or taxi-driving. The ROKG housed the girls in "accommodation centers" (similar to those for infected prostitutes), some of which took seriously the task of "guiding" the youths to live "normal" lives, while others served as detention centers resembling prisons. Some minors took advantage of the skills training while others returned to their hometowns. Still others went back to camptowns to earn dollars for sex.

It is impossible to know how many underage females were kept from falling deeper into the vices of camptown prostitution, but from the documents and individuals I surveyed, there appears to have been a genuine effort on the part of the ROK government to keep young girls out of camptown prostitution (and prostitution in general). One woman who has operated a small food stall in It'aewon's red-light area since the mid-1970s (to now) stated emphatically: "President Pak was a tough character: The police got rid of streetwalkers in It'aewon, especially minors, and put them in Songnam Center for 15 days or more. I heard from some women that the place was worse than a prison." [54]

VD: The Fault of the GI

Despite the aforementioned efforts to tighten VD control over women and thereby reduce VD rates among servicemen, the problem continued to plague U.S.-ROK Clean-Up officials throughout the campaign. Command officials began to accept the fact that camptown prostitutes were only half the problem and perhaps easier to control than their own men. Lieutenant D. M. MacKinnon of the 4th Missile Command (Camp Page) in Ch'unch'on reported at the September 1973 Civil Affairs Conference that the local KNP had recently begun "massive sweeps of the off-limits area to crack down on girls without VD cards." In the same breath, he admitted that such crackdowns were not the whole answer:

> We forget that it is our soldiers, as well as the prostitute, who passes the disease, and that to dwell solely on controlling the prostitute is only half the problem. We also find that dwelling too much on this Korean and American problem unfairly blinds the command to all that is good in Chunchon and Korea. [55]

There were two major obstacles to controlling the sexual activity of the GI: getting him to use condoms and getting him to stay away from unregistered women. Despite the commands' educational efforts on prophylaxis and sexual hygiene, regular reminder of the dangers of sexual intercourse with unregistered women, and placing areas frequented by streetwalkers off limits, servicemen continued to seek out streetwalkers and forgo the condom. MacKinnon stated in 1973 that although streetwalkers have been removed off the streets through KNP enforcement, "this has not deterred the price-conscious soldier, who has been going into the off-limits area to contact the street girl." [56] He added, "It is also a fact that 40% of our cases per month [at Camp Page] generally arise among soldiers who have had VD before." [57] In short, the sexual irresponsibility and promiscuity of some soldiers, not just the uncontrolled sexual activity of camptown women, became implicated in the VDproblem.

While individual soldiers ventured away from the base to find sexual pleasure, some commands sponsored prostitutes' entry into military compounds in an organized fashion. As early as December 1971, local Korean authorities in Tongduch'on complained to the Subcommittee, through ROK representatives, that a main source of VD in the Second Infantry Division (2d ID) area was the "estimated 400-500 'free lancers' " who were invited into Camp Casey "daily with no check [of valid ID and VD cards]." [58] Again in 1973, local Koreans, namely the club owners and the KSTA in Tongduch'on, aggressively raised this issue and put the 2d ID authorities on the defensive. The Ministry of Transportation conducted an investigation of a KSTA petition charging the Camp Casey authorities of transporting camptown women into the compounds and submitted the report to the Subcommittee:

> It is noted that business girls are gathered in group on the roads adjacent to the U.S. military compound, and taken into the compound by a USFK vehicle. The transportation to and from the compound is in service three times from 1700 to 1800 hours. Exact number of girls taken into compound a day cannot be verified. According to the statements made by residents in that area, the estimate of number of girls are [sic] more than 200 a day. (Photos are attached.) [59]

When a joint USFK-ROK supervisory team visited Masan in 1974, the director of the local VD clinic told the team members that no women came for examinations because "of a change in policy at the Camp which allowed females to enter without presenting VD cards. Also, when the 609th ordinance company moved from Haeundae Beach [in Pusan] they brought prostitutes with them, most of whom failed to re-register in Masan." [60]

Club owners took offense at the double standards of the U.S. military in imposing the burden of VD control on Koreans while themselves not applying strict control measures on their own personnel. "Lee Choon Sung," who sent the original petition on behalf of Tongduch'on club owners, expressed anger at the military's behavior, noting that U.S. camps, over which Korean authorities have no jurisdiction, "are the places of refuge from medical inspection, hot-beds of venereal disease." He pointed to the command's hypocrisy: "The USFK authorities . . . are ascribing the responsibilities for VD infection to us and are taking the unjustifiable measures [i.e., busing women]." [61] Although 2d ID authorities "emphasized that this [busing] program is conducted under strict supervision and that there is no prostitution involved when the girls are inside the military compounds," [62] the author of the MoT report argued otherwise:

> Inviting ladies to the compound is entirely the independent business of U.S. military authorities. However, bringing in business girls into the camps everyday in such a large scale indicates a different nature from inviting ladies for social occasions. [63]

The same MoT representative on the Subcommittee stated unequivocally that such actions on the part of U.S. officials could jeopardize joint USFK-ROK cooperation in camptown Clean-Up and urged 2d ID authorities to "refrain from daily busing a large number of business girls into the military compound." [64]

The point of contention for the Korean side was not that U.S. personnel were engaging in prostitution on base with Korean women but that busing women into the compound meant fewer men exiting the base to spend money in the local clubs. In other words, the actions of the 2d ID were hampering clubs' ability to earn U.S. dollars, particularly from the sex trade, and therefore served as a disincentive for Korean cooperation with U.S. requests for camptown "purification." The author of the MoT report summarized what was at stake for local Koreans and for the continuation of the Clean-Up:

> [S]uch actions by the U.S. base authorities might adversely affect business activities in the community in that area. Since the inception of this Subcommittee the ROK Government with U.S. cooperation made maximum efforts to improve the environmental conditions of the base areas, particularly that of sanitary and health conditions of the recreationary [sic] establishments for the U.S. personnel. In many cases such efforts paid off because local community leaders were more than willing to cooperate with the Government authorities for better facilities and services. Such being the case, if local communities are to be deprived of their business in its entirety they will have little incentive to cooperate with the authorities for better conditions. [65]

While pleading the case of local Korean club owners, this ROK member of the Subcommittee was also conveying a threat of Korean non-cooperation in continued clean-up activities.

With respect to VD control, some club owners did in fact withhold or evade cooperation with USFK demands for retaining only those women with valid VD cards. The primary reason was economic--"the more girls, the more customers." [66] But the sometimes arrogant behavior and interference of U.S. MPs in the clubs and the double standards of base authorities (e.g., busing women) were other reasons. The club owners especially resented the military's imposition of the off-limits decree for VD control violations, which they considered an insult to Korean sovereignty. Generally, clubs were put off limits (usually for 7-10 days) if three or four club prostitutes were found with invalid VD cards in one month. [67] In some camp areas, commands unilaterally placed plaques or sign plates in clubs indicating "acceptable standards" for patronage by U.S. servicemen. Korean club owners protested such actions to the USKF and ROK authorities. A representative from the MoT reported to the Subcommittee that such actions by U.S. personnel in Tongduch'on "are causing considerable ill-feelings on the part of local community," emphasizing that "the placing of plates mentioned in effect constitutes double licensing of businesses, one by Korean authority and the other by U.S. authority." [68]

Given the mutual interests of the club owners and prostitutes in blocking U.S. interference in the clubs and the off-limits decree, some club owners warned their women of upcoming "unannounced inspections" and told them to avoid being in the clubs at a certain time and/or to get their VD cards up to date. [69] The women would benefit by avoiding the potential humiliation of being charged with VD infection in public, consequent detention and costs of treatment, and income lost from prohibi tion to work in clubs. The club owners would benefit by retaining large numbers of women available for selling alcohol and sex.

Camptown Prostitutes Protest

The social unrest, economic dislocation, and sexual tensions in the summer of 1971 politicized the various groups of camptown residents, putting into sharper relief the costs and benefits of one another's actions and inciting them to defend and assert their interests both privately and publicly (chapter 3). It was the first time that kijich'on prostitutes, for a relatively prolonged period of time, led and staged public protests to voice camptown residents' grievances and demands against the USFK. Prior to this time, in most cases, the women had reacted when their bodies and pocketbooks were severely threatened by the actions of base personnel. For example, "about 200 prostitutes carrying sticks demonstrated outside [Camp Ames] demanding immediate arrest" of a GI alleged to have murdered a camptown prostitute on July 16, 1971. [70] Protests by prostitutes against alleged GI murders of Korean women and USFK's reluctance to turn the accused over to the Korean legal system were not uncommon even before the Clean-Up Campaign. [71]

What was new in the summer of 1971 was the support given by the nonprostitute residents to the prostitutes protesting what they all believed were USFK injustices toward them and the commitment of the women to challenge, sometimes violently, American power over their lives. The most ardent and prolonged of such protests (from July 13 through August 9) took place in reaction to the off-limits decree imposed by commanders in Anjongni during the racial violence of July 9-10, 1971. What began as a protest by 100-150 prostitutes on July 13 against the decision of the Camp Humphreys command to close its main gate and put Anjongni off-limits grew to a crowd of approximately 600 prostitutes and 3,000 other villagers by August 9. [72] During the series of protests, prostitutes demanded that the base authorities withdraw the "cowardly retalition [sic]" (for villagers fighting with blacks the weekend of July 10) by opening the gates, [73] blocked waitresses who work on the base from entering the compound, [74] hurled stones at military personnel, [75] overturned the Pyongtaek County Police Superintendent's car, [76] and demanded to meet the base commander. Major General Joseph Perditz, Commander of Korea Support Command (KORSCOM), stated in a letter that the crowd outside Camp Humphreys, led by prostitutes, held a total of six U.S. sol diers hostage and demanded to speak to the installation commander, who agreed to do so. [77]

The base authorities and local KNP initially responded to the protests with blockades, gas grenades, and increased police presence. The ensuing melee between the protesters and the police (both MPs and KNP) resulted in the arrest and clubbing of several prostitutes and other villagers by the Korean police. [78] But the protests also led to the official recognition of the prostitutes as a significant group to be contended with in camptown politics. Ms. Yi Chongja, "the representative of [the] village's 'girlie Club,' [79] was invited, together with National Assemblyman Choe, Yong-hee and one other village leader, to a luncheon sponsored by Col. Best to discuss the gradual lifting of the off-limits ban on Anjongni." [80] The ban on Anjongni was finally lifted on August 26, 1971 (although seven of the twelve local bars remained off-limits because of their failure to comply with standards agreed upon by local Korean and command leaders), after 48 days of social unrest and economic losses for the Korean residents. Without doubt, the prostitutes initiated and sustained this push, together with other villagers, to lift the ban on the village as promised by the Humphreys command in late July. The prostitutes not only received the support of other villagers in exerting pressure on the base leadership but also that of Koreans in the greater society. For example, on July 29, 1971, *Chungang Ilbo,* a leading national daily, accused the Humphreys command of breaking its promise to lift the ban. [81]

Besides the protests in Anjongni, camptown prostitutes also staged demonstrations on behalf of their "human rights." In May 1971, the *Han'guk Ilbo,* another major daily, reported on protests by prostitutes (in P'yongt'aek) against GIs' efforts to cut their rates for sex:

> Some 1,000 Korean prostitutes staged a demonstration in a camp town near Seoul Monday evening, denouncing American soldiers for attempting to beat down charges for their services by half.
>
> They held rallies and demonstrations in front of a U.S. Army camp in the town for three hours before breaking up voluntarily to wait for "proper measures" by U.S. Army authorities.
>
> In the demonstration, the prostitutes asked the U.S. Army to make an apology for the attempt. [82] These prostitutes were objecting to the U.S. airmen's boycott, the "Do Not Buy Korean Commodities" campaign, which had begun in mid-April 1971; 90% of the participants were black. [83] The boycott was a protest against the local Koreans' discrimination against black soldiers. It was also a protest against the rise of local prices, which resulted from the increased demand that the redeployment of servicemen to the P'yongt'aek region, as part of the troop reduction, generated. Korean camptown prostitutes were outraged at the boycott and held rallies near various U.S. camps. Songt'an prostitutes "adopted a four-point resolution, calling for the withdrawal of the Korean commodity boycott drive and reverence for the human rights of the Korean people." [84]

According to Kim Yonja, who helped lead the protest, club prostitutes were insulted by the fact that U.S. servicemen compiled a list of prices they were willing to pay for various goods and services in town, treating sex as just another object of purchase: "[T]hey fixed the local prices--for example, $5 for a pair of shoes and $5 for a 'short-time.' Therefore, we demonstrated. We charged, 'How is it possible that someone can set the same price for a pair of shoes and a woman's body, then print the prices and circulate them?' " [85]

She and other prostitutes found such actions not only economically damaging, but morally demeaning. The boycott did end a couple months after its initiation, partly because of insufficient participation by airmen, [86] and partly because of the public protests by prostitutes and other villagers. Ms. Kim recalled that someone from the command did apologize to the women, and "therefore things were appeased." [87]

The significance of the protests described above lies in the fact that many kijich'on prostitutes, though powerless in many ways, did not simply remain passive in the camptown turmoils of the early 1970s. On the contrary, they formed a local bloc with which to protest the U.S. hegemony over the economic and political life of their camptowns. Referring to the protests against the boycott, Ms. Kim stated, "[T]he shop owners and club owners joined forces with us and supported our protest because with fixed prices, the prices of their own goods fell." [88] In other words, U.S. actions, whether off-limits decrees or boycotts and prix fixe measures, had direct economic consequences on all camptown residents dependent on the bases for their survival. In this sense, although prostitutes were the most despised of the camptown residents, they represented, in stark relief, the vulnerability of local Korean residents to U.S. power and thereby succeeded to lead other villagers to challenge that power.

The political protests of prostitutes also underscore the refusal of many women, though condemned by Korean society and abused by Koreans and Americans alike, to be treated like commodities. In short, they asserted their sense of human dignity, albeit fragile, when pushed too far by others in the camptown communities. It is also significant that for these women the economic value of their labor and that of their human worth were intertwined. Moreover, they merged their sense of powerlessness, vis-á-vis the bases, to the violation of the human rights, or domination, of the Korean people in general by the United States.

It must be noted that public protest was one of the last available weapons of influence to which the women could resort and that such mass protests on the part of camptown residents were one of the reasons why the U.S. side initiated the Clean-Up Campaign. In other words, the military sought to prevent such public outcries and disturbances by instituting law and order in the camptown communities. Major General Joseph Perditz, the head of KORSCOM, complained of the unruliness of the local Korean population around several of his command areas in the spring and summer of 1971, listing the demonstrations that had broken out near Camps Howard (May 23), Humphreys (July 13, 27, August 3-5, 9), Ames (July 19), and Carroll (August 2). He and other high-ranking military officials insisted that the EUSA Commanding General raise the issue with the ROKG to ensure that such disturbances no longer occur. [89] With the initiation of the Clean-Up Campaign, such public challenges to U.S. military power in camptowns became rare throughout the 1970s. Law and order and improved communication between U.S. and ROK officials were intended to avoid violent and disorderly actions by both Koreans and Americans in the camptowns, but the effect on prostitutes was the official silencing of their voices.

Note 1: See Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, eds., *Transnational Relations and World Politics*, pp. xxv-xxvi and 388-89; Samuel Huntington, "Transnational Organizations in World Politics," p. 358. Dependency studies do focus on the "asymmetries" in terms of class but rarely in terms of gender.

Note 2: Telephone interview via Mr. An, March 10, 1993.

Note 3: Ibid.

Note 4: There were exceptions, however. For example, "Jin Soo," in the documentary film *Camp Arirang*, says that she liked black men because they were "real" and that being a "black prostitute" meant that a woman was "tough."

Note 5: USFK, "Camp-Village Purification Program" (report), January 30, 1973, and "Status of Camp Village Control" (report) of Uijongbu City, May 30, 1974; Interview with a USFK community relations officer, Uijongbu, June 12, 1992.

Note 6: Interview with a USFK community relations officer, Uijongbu, June 12, 1992.

Note 7: Interview with a USFK community relations officer, Uijongbu, June 4, 1992.

Note 8: Ibid.

Note 9: Telephone interview with Mrs. Chong via Mr. An, March 10, 1993.

Note 10: Interview with a USFK community relations officer, Uijongbu, June 4, 1992; interview with Kim Yonja, Songt'an, May 3, 1992.

Note 11: Interview with the former MoHSA physician overseeing VD control in the Clean-Up Campaign, Seoul, May 14, 1992.

Note 12: Some detention centers paid for the costs of medical treatment, and the Korean government's purification plans did allocate funds for such treatment. But according to current and former prostitutes familiar with the detention system, many women had to pay for their medical treatment themselves.

Note 13: Supervisors would commend lower-level officials for their ardor. See chapter 3 on the willingness of lower-level officials to take up the Clean-Up Campaign, once high-level interest and attention became evident.

Note 14: Interview, March 10, 1993.

Note 15: Telephone interview via Mrs. Smith, April 2, 1993.

Note 16: Interview, Songt'an, May 3, 1992.

Note 17: Ibid.

Note 18: Subcommittee Minutes, #19, May 18, 1973, Enclosure entitled " 'Report on Situation in Tongduchon' (by Ministry of Transportation)." Representatives from the Ministry of Tourism conveyed to the Subcommittee the complaints of the Korea Tourist Association (now, KSTA) regarding U.S. interference in Tongduch'on clubs. The KSTA listed the names of these USFK offices. Osan Air Base officials also instituted "[f]requent inspections of night clubs for VD control measures violations at hours of highest patronage." (U.S. Air Force, Korea, "Venereal Disease Control: USAF Bases, Korea," May/June 1972.)

Note 19: Petition sent from Lee Choon Sung, President of Korea Tourist Recreation Service Association, to EUSA Commanding General, Re: "Injudicious Actions" by the 2d Infantry Division, March 16, 1973. Korean camptown bar owners in Taegu also complained of U.S. interference in their business, stating that their bars should be inspected by the ROK authorities or by joint U.S.-ROK teams: "The owners sa[id] that inspections conducted solely by U.S. authorities, and the subsequent actions taken by the U.S. authorities based on these inspections, are unwarranted." Statement by Son Yong Sok, Civil Affairs Specialist, 19th Support Group, Taegu, USFK Civil Affairs Conference, September 28, 1973.

Note 20: Interview with Kim Yonja, Kunsan, May 14, 1992.

Note 21: *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, September 4, 1971.

Note 22: Judith Walkowitz, *Prostitution and Victorian Society*, p. 2; Barbara Meil Hobson, *Uneasy Virtue*, ch. 7.

Note 23: *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, September 4, 1971. Memorandum of Department of Army, 4th US Army Missile Command, Provost Marshall Office, Re: "Mutual Agreement," May 9, 1972, stated: "In the past, some misunderstanding and resentment has [sic] developed between American soldiers and Korean National Policemen when KN [Korean national] females in the company of American soldiers were questioned about their Venereal Disease (VD) Cards." Also, Col. D. W. Blanton, Commander, U.S. Air Force 3d Combat Support Group, Kunsan, stated at the USFK Civil Affairs Conference of March 2, 1973: "Korean police or plainclothes personnel intensified stopping girls with GI's to ask for their VD cards. (Some of those stopped were wives.)"

Note 24: Report of Col. H. E. Lovelace, Commander of 51st Air Base Wing, Osan, at USFK Civil Affairs Conference, March 15, 1972.

Note 25: Interview with the MoHSA physician overseeing VD control in the Clean-Up Campaign, Seoul, May 14, 1992.

Note 26: Interview with Kim Yonja, Songt'an, May 3, 1992.

Note 27: Interviews with Kim Yonja, Songt'an, May 14, 1992; Ms. Pae, Songt'an, June 6, 1992; a KSTA official, Seoul, May 26, 1992. Telephone interview with Mrs. Chong via Mr. An, March 10, 1993.

Note 28: "Kijich'on chonghwa ru,l wihan Woemubu Sihaeng Kyehoek #1," (Camp town Purification Enforcement Plan #1) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), in Subcommittee Minutes, #9, April 21, 1972.

Note 29: Subcommittee Minutes, #25, February 22, 1974.

Note 30: Ibid. This observation by the joint USFK-ROK team referred to the Tong Ku Health Center and VD Clinic in Pusan, which examined prostitutes working near the (US) Hialeah Compound.

Note 31: Subcommittee Minutes, #25, February 22, 1974. The Waegwan Health Center was responsible for examining and treating prostitutes who worked near Camp Carroll. The particular "haphazard treatment" consisted of 2.4 million units of probenicid penicillin "followed by erythromycin, tetracycline, or chloramphenicol in various combinations and dosages" given to women with 3+ or 4+ WBCs.

Note 32: Subcommittee Minutes, #25, February 22, 1974.

Note 33: Ibid.

Note 34: Sherwood Report, July 7, 1972.

Note 35: Subcommittee Minutes, #16, January 12, 1973.

Note 36: Ibid.

Note 37: Subcommittee Minutes, #25, February 22, 1974.

Note 38: Interview with the MoHSA physician overseeing VD control in the Clean-Up Campaign, Seoul, May 14, 1992.

Note 39: Subcommittee Minutes, #25, February 22, 1974.

Note 40: Ibid.

Note 41: Ibid.

Note 42: EUSA, International Relations Office Files, "Epidemiological Control Measure (as recommended by the American Public Health Association)," 1972 or 1973 (?). (original in capital letters)

Note 43: Interview with Ms. Pae, Songt'an, June 6, 1992.

Note 44: Interview with Kim Yonja, Kunsan, May 14, 1992.

Note 45: Interview with Kim Yonja, Songt'an, May 3, 1992.

Note 46: Regarding soldiers' reluctance to name prostitutes face-to- face, one *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, article (November 12, 1971) noted, "Some of the soldiers fear retaliation the next time they go into the village [for having accused a woman]. However, each is assured [by the medical office] that he will only have to point out the girl's residence and will not make eye-to-eye contact with her is [sic] he doesn't want to. We [U.S. medics] drop the KNP at the hooch and then take the GI back to his unit or dispensary."

Note 47: Interview with Ms. Pae, Songt'an, June 6, 1992.

Note 48: Subcommittee Minutes, #25, February 22, 1974.

Note 49: USFK Civil Affairs Conference, March 2, 1973.

Note 50: USFK Civil Affairs Conference, September 28, 1973.

Note 51: Interview with Kim Yonja, Songt'an, May 3, 1992.

Note 52: Interview with Ms. Pae, Songt'an, June 6, 1992.

Note 53: Ministry of Transportation, "SOFA *Han-Mi haptong wiwônhoe ûi habûi sahang sihaeng chisi*," (SOFA Joint Committee Joint Enforcement Instructions), March 9, 1972; Interview with a USFK community relations officer, Uijongbu, June 4, 1992.

Note 54: Conversation with "It'aewon Lady," Seoul, February 26, 1992.

Note 55: USFK Civil Affairs Conference, September 28, 1973.

Note 56: USFK Civil Affairs Conference, March 2, 1973.

Note 57: Ibid.

Note 58: Subcommittee Minutes, #5, December 14, 1971.

Note 59: Subcommittee Minutes, #19, May 18, 1973.

Note 60: Subcommittee Minutes, #25, February 22, 1974.

Note 61: Lee Choon Sung, President of the Korea Tourist Recreation Service Association, Petition to EUSA Commanding General, March 16, 1973.

Note 62: Subcommittee Minutes, #21, July 20, 1973.

Note 63: Ministry of Tourism, "Report on Situation in Tongduchon" (Re: petition signed by Lee Choon Sung), in Subcommittee Minutes, #19, May 18, 1973.

Note 64: Ibid.

Note 65: Ibid.

Note 66: USFK Civil Affairs Conference, March 2, 1973.

Note 67: Interviews with a USFK community relations officer, Uijongbu, June 4, 1992; a KSTA official, Seoul, May 26, 1992; Kim Yonja, Songt'an, May 3, 1992. Telephone interview with Mrs. Chong via Mr. An, March 10, 1993. The EUSA Civil Affairs Handbook 530-34 (January 11, 1968) states: " 'Off limits' threats are often a part of VD discussions. To produce the desired results, these measures should be considered primarily on a short-term basis whereby the Koreans are given certain conditions on which the removal of 'off limits' will be based. Placing whole villages or towns 'off limits' should be avoided, since the undesirable elements of those localities will simply filter into an adjacent 'on limits' area" (p. 67).

Note 68: MoT, "Report on Situation in Tongduchon" in Subcommittee Minutes, #19, May 18, 1973.

Note 69: Interview with Ms. Pae, Songt'an, June 6, 1992; conversations with various current and former club women in Tongduchon, 1992.

Note 70: *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, July 28, 1971.

Note 71: For example, more than 300 prostitutes "staged a protest funeral march in front of 8057 American Unit [in Pupyong], demanding a Sgt. Teni (phonetic) appear before them. They charged the American was responsible for the death of one of their friends called Miss Lee Un-ja," 23 years of age. "The hearse, carrying the girls in white mourning dress, stopped in front of the unit's front door en route to a burial site and shouted: 'Come out Teni. Let him appear before us.' They also attempted to enter the unit compound and were stopped by about 50 American military police and 30 Korean police." *Korea Times*, May 15, 1969.

Note 72: *Taehan Ilbo*, July 13, 1971 (EUSA translation); *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, August 12, 1971; *Taehan Ilbo*, August 10, 1971 (EUSA translation); *Chungang Ilbo*, July 29, 1971 (EUSA translation); letter from Col. F. Best, Commander of Camp Humphreys, to Maj. Gen. J. Perditz, February 7, 1972 (in letter from Perditz to EUSA Commanding General, Re: "Continuing Harassment by Korean Officials in Attempts to Place Back-Alley Clubs On-Limits," February 7, 1972; letter from Perditz to EUSA Commanding General, Re: "Lack of Control of Civilian Populace," August 10, 1971.

Note 73: *Taehan Ilbo*, July 13, 1971.

Note 74: Letter from Maj. Gen. Joseph Perditz, Commander of Korea Support Command (KORSCOM), to EUSA Commanding General, Re: "Lack of Control of Civilian Populace," August 10, 1971.

Note 75: *Taehan Ilbo*, August 10, 1971.

Note 76: Letter from Best to Perditz, February 7, 1972.

Note 77: Letter from Perditz to EUSA Commanding General; see note 74.

Note 78: Ibid.

Note 79: Ms. Yi Chongja was the then president of the Anjongni prostitutes' "Women's Association." According to her colleagues and friends, she had served in this capacity since the 1960s and had been an active advocate of prostitutes' interests until recent years. Ms. Kim Yonja, also a leader in the "Women's Associations" of Kunsan and Songt'an, told me that Ms. Yi would have been able to describe in detail the camptown politics of Anjongni during the 1970s, but when Ms. Kim and I tried to locate Ms. Yi in the spring of 1992, we learned that she had recently passed away.

Note 80: *Korea Herald*, July 30, 1971.

Note 81: *Chungang Ilbo*, July 29, 1971 (EUSA Translation).

Note 82: *Han'guk Ilbo*, May 4, 1971 (EUSA Translation).

Note 83: *Overseas Weekly*, August 14, 1971.

Note 84: *Chosôn Ilbo*, May 4, 1971 (EUSA Translation).

Note 85: Interview with Kim Yonja, Songt'an, May 3, 1992.

Note 86: *Overseas Weekly*, August 14, 1971.

Note 87: Interview with Kim Yonja, Songt'an, May 3, 1992.

Note 88: Ibid.

Note 89: Letter from Perditz to EUSA Commanding General; see note 74.

Epilogue: The Impact of the Nixon Doctrine on Kijich'on Women

The Nixon Doctrine and the attendant reduction of 20,000 U.S. forces from Korea were intended to lighten Washington's economic and military burden in Asia. Policy makers in Washington neither intended nor imagined any consequences for women; kijich'on prostitutes in Korea were certainly far removed from discussions about foreign policy. Yet, the Korean government's efforts to adapt itself to the changes in Washington and influence the U.S.-ROK relationship more to its liking drew these women into the process of foreign policy implementation. Consequently, the women became players, along with other camptown residents, the USFK, and the U.S. and ROK governments, in a game of competing interests and wills.

In retrospect, the Nixon Doctrine and the troop withdrawal had profound consequences for Korean camptown societies. First, many camptowns disappeared while others expanded and flourished, owing to the departure and redeployment of U.S. troops. Second, through the camptown Clean-Up/"purification movement," these long-neglected areas gained the attention and development efforts of the Korean government. Third, the establishment of Korean-American Friendship Councils and other forms of official US-ROK communication channels served as stepping stones for local Korean residents and officials to voice and pursue their interests on a more equal footing with local U.S. commands than prior to the early 1970s. In general, increased law and order and environmental improvements helped many camptowns to begin shedding their pariah status in Korean society.

The Clean-Up activities that were generated by changes in the U.S.-ROK security relationship also had the effect of firmly institutionalizing and legitimating camptown prostitution in Korean society. The regulation of women changed from a loosely organized, individual base-sponsored arrangement to a systematic operation administered by the ROK Ministry of Health and Social Affairs. [1] One MoHSA physician working in the local VD clinic for Tongduch'on prostitutes proclaimed proudly to me in the spring of 1992 that Korea has very low VD rates and that the prostitutes are "very clean" for the U.S. soldiers. Tighter regulation of the sex trade and sex workers has reinforced prostitution as an accepted, permanent, and government-sanctioned means of earning income and conducting civil-military relations between Americans and Koreans. With official government regulation of prostitution, sexual commerce in camptowns ceased being the activity of renegade individuals and became an officially supported industry.

It is also important to note that the increased governmental control over prostitution that the Campaign engendered eventually spread to the larger Korean society. As the Clean-Up progressed, USFK and ROK officials recognized the fact that U.S. soldiers engaged in sex not only with camptown prostitutes but also with women catering to Korean nationals and foreign tourists. Beginning in 1974, non-camptown prostitutes also came under increased regulatory supervision. A report by the Preventive Medicine Division of the Eighth Army Medical Corps stated that the MoHSA had begun emphasizing the registration of such women because they "represent[ed] a serious reservoir of VD" to U.S. servicemen. [2] A joint U.S.-ROK VD supervision team observed during a visit to the Chunggu Health Center and VD clinic that registration of prostitutes primarily used by foreign tourists (principally Japanese) in the central area of Pusan rose from 500 in February 1973 to 1,184 by January 1974. [3] In short, USFK-ROK Clean-Up initiatives in the early-to-mid 1970s increased police and governmental intervention--both foreign and domestic--in tens of thousands of Korean women's lives.

Unlike the attempt by the U.S. military to control venereal disease during World War I, the Clean-Up Campaign lacked any regard for the physical and social welfare of women. The Campaign in Korea was an isolated event, lacking the context of social movements, whose "coattails" prostitution reform in the United States had ridden; [4] from Seoul's perspective, it was not a women's welfare issue at all, but solely, a matter of foreign policy and military alliance.

With regard to U.S.-Korean camptown prostitution, it is evident that power disparities do establish the broad framework of interactions and bargaining capacity between a patron state and a client state. The military might of the United States and the dependency of South Korea on such muscle power, highlighted by the Nixon Doctrine, led directly to joint governmental control over prostitutes' lives. But the Campaign helped raise the status of the ROK government in the eyes of USFK officials, a significant achievement of the Campaign. Prior to and during the initial stages of the Clean-Up, local command officials commonly complained of ineffective and inadequate local (Korean) government and law enforcement in camptown areas. Some went so far as to suggest that the Korean government did not function in some of these areas. In addition, the Korean government's weakness on the international level abetted its authoritarian and sexist control at the domestic level; the Campaign helped the government to expand and solidify its bureaucratic and coercive powers at the grass-roots level.

Not discounting the joint governmental abuse of these women's bodies and labor, the Campaign had, in the long run, the positive effects of decreasing incidents of extortion by private clinic operators and increasing the chances for women to receive proper medical treatment. One could argue that while the Clean-Up increased the power of the Korean government over the lives of camptown prostitutes, it also increased the government's responsibility for the welfare of these women. Prior to the Clean-Up, the U.S. military, the Korean government, and private businesses all avoided and evaded responsibility for the problems that prostitutes confronted and caused. After 1971, it became clear that the ROK government was ultimately accountable.

National Security and Patriotism: Kijich'on Women's Perspectives

> "Our country" . . . throughout the greater part of its history has treated me as a slave; it has denied me education or any share in its possessions. "Our" country still ceases to be mine if I marry a foreigner. "Our" country denies me the means of protecting myself, forces me to pay others a very large sum annually to protect me, and is so little able, even so to protect me. . . . Therefore if you insist upon fighting to protect me, or "our" country, let it be understood, soberly and rationally between us, that you are fighting to gratify a sex instinct which I cannot share; to procure benefits which I have not shared and probably will not share; but not to gratify my instincts, or to protect myself or my country. For . . . in fact, as a woman, I have no country. As a woman I want no country. As a woman my country is the whole world.
>
> Virginia Woolf, *Three Guineas* [5]

In the late 1930s Virginia Woolf challenged the notion that states function to protect, preserve, and promote the interests of the people. Ahead of her time, she began the process of deconstructing the concepts, "national interest" and "national security." For her, "national interests" represented the interests of men, particularly the privileged, and "national security" did not eliminate the physical, economic, legal, and social insecurity of women.

More than fifty years later, women and men echo Woolf's bold assertions. Contemporary feminist academics and activists, ranging from liberal critics of Realism to postmodernists, women and development advocates, and peace activists, all challenge the role and capacity of the sovereign state to know and best fulfill the needs and interests of a nation's people. With respect to women and security, Spike Peterson and Judith Stiehm go so far as to describe the modern state as a patriarchal protection racket, [6] and many Asian feminists living with U.S. military bases and camptown prostitution in their countries consider their states collective pimps. Feminists charge that states have made women's lives insecure by fixating on military buildup, stand-offs, and adventurism. They have noted that women, if given the chance, would define security less narrowly to include "safe working conditions and freedom from the threat of war or unemployment or the economic squeeze of foreign debt." [7] Mary Burguieres advocates feminist approaches to peace which would espouse Johann Galtung's conceptualization of peace as "an absence of both personal and structural violence." [8] She adds that such approaches are important because they "loosen" governmental policies for peace from their "exclusive association with defence and foreign policy" and link peace efforts with social policy in general. [9]

My interviews with Korean former prostitutes support the basic feminist claim that states' definition of "national security" is often irrelevant to the security of women's lives, and that state pursuits on behalf of national security often exploit and oppress women. The kijich'on women ridiculed the Korean government's efforts in the Clean-Up Campaign to label them as "personal ambassadors" and their selling of sex as patriotic service. Most women admitted that they were unsure of the meaning of "national security" (*kukka anbo*) and that governmental actions generally were oblivious to their needs for physical and economic well-being. Kim Yonja, a 25-year veteran of camptown prostitution, sharply articulated that the Korean and U.S. governments' rationales for or public professions of security policies had no connection to the actual needs of camptown women for protection. All of the women I interviewed stated that their greatest need for ROK government protection (after the Korean War) was not from North Korean threats but the exploitation and abuse of club owners/pimps, local Korean police and VD clinic officials, and the power of the U.S. bases. In other words, they needed protection from a Korean law enforcement system that inadequately provided for their legal, economic, political, and human rights and a Korean government too cowardly and self-interested to protect them against violence and abuse by U.S. soldiers.

Rather than feeling protected by the Korean government and U.S. soldiers, all of the women stated they felt used and betrayed by both Korean and U.S. authorities. The first of the two most common complaints against the U.S. military was that the Americans, who were in Korea to help Koreans, considered the women mere sex toys, concerned only with the health and well-being of the GI. The second was the violence of the U.S. soldiers toward the women and the lack of legal accountability on the part of the military authorities for the soldiers' criminal behavior. Mrs. Ch'oe recalled that she had been beaten by a U.S. serviceman and had reported the incident to the Korean police and the U.S. military police but that the soldier was allowed to go free. In Mrs. Pak's case, she experienced the irresponsibility and injustice of the U.S. military authorities in the extreme. Her sister, also a camptown prostitute in Osan, was mutilated and murdered allegedly by a U.S. serviceman in the early 1970s, but U.S. authorities never turned the man over to the ROK authorities (as provisioned in the Status of Forces Agreement) to be tried in the ROK legal system. Mrs. Pak bitterly recounted that the U.S. military offered neither apology nor financial compensation to her family and that camptown residents had to collect money from one another to pay for the funeral expenses. According to Mrs. Pak: "U.S. law in the U.S. was good--but in Korea, it was never upheld. The U.S. lawyers simply protected U.S. soldiers but did not seek the truth and real justice. The U.S. government did not give any compensation to Koreans for the wrongs that U.S. soldiers committed." [10]

a name="154"> All the women emphatically repeated that the ROK government did nothing to improve their welfare. They particularly complained against the impotence and/or unwillingness of the Korean police to prevent abuses against the women and to help them leave prostitution. Mrs. Chang stated that when she had tried to run away from her club owner and had gone to the local police for help, the police kept her in the station overnight, then called her owner to come get her. The owner showed up at the station and "dragged her back to the club." [11] Mrs. Chang also recalled that local Korean officials in Tongduch'on had said that if a woman were to go to the *suyongso* (detention center for infected prostitutes), she would be taught employable skills but that in reality, that was only talk. As far as she knows, there was no such training. She also remembered that the head of a Tongduch'on organization that oversaw the prostitutes had tried in her own way to help the women by proposing that local authorities teach women who were detained in the *suyongso* how to read and write and "not let them just lie there for days while waiting for their infections to clear." [12] But the Korean government had not supported her, and the leader, lacking funds, could not establish such a program herself.

This was a common perception among prostitutes, but in fact, the Korean government did have plans and programs designed to help women leave prostitution or prevent them from entering. Since the early-to-mid

1960s, the government sent out women's welfare workers to train stations and bus depots in cities so that they could set up counseling centers for girls and young women migrating from the countryside in search of jobs. The goal was to alert these women to the activities of pimps and flesh traffickers and to dissuade them from entering jobs that were likely to lead them into prostitution. One local official of the MoHSA, who had worked in the Women's Welfare Bureau of Yangju County (which served Tongduch'on and Uijongbu) from 1964 to 1982, noted that the county increased its counseling staff by three in the early 1970s (to total four). These officials went out to the countryside to prevent women from pursuing misleading classified advertisements and job offers. They also located underage females in camptowns and sent them back home or to vocational schools. In the early 1970s, the efforts of this Women's Welfare Bureau included establishing and operating schools of instruction in taxi-driving, tailoring, and barbering/hairdressing for women who wanted to leave prostitution and minors who had not been in the prostitution business for a long time. The official stated that in 1970-71, the head of the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs notified her office of the departure of the 7th Division and requested proposals for helping camptown prostitutes find alternative means of livelihood. She recalled that the Blue House took great interest in the efforts of her office and even sent words of gratitude for the plan to teach women taxi-driving. She added, however, that the failures of government offices to help camptown prostitutes stemmed from lack of funds for women's welfare programs and the resistance of club owners and pimps to such programs. [13]

But the kijich'on women I spoke with did not interpret such welfare measures as genuine. For them, the government's only concern for the women was that they earn dollars and keep U.S. soldiers happy while in Korea. When I asked them if they felt they had contributed to the foreign-exchange earnings of the nation, most of the women replied "yes," but they immediately faulted the Korean government for failing to give them a fair share of their earnings and legal and social protection against local exploiters. For example, Mrs. Ch'oe asserted that her sexual labor helped increase the nation's coffers because, in her estimation, U.S. GIs in the 1970s spent a third or quarter of their earnings on sexual entertainment. She added that she and other women did not benefit from the government's increasing wealth: "Whatever profits were made went to private individuals with power (local businessmen and officials) and the Korean government. The government benefited at the women's expense." [14] Mrs. Chang also stated that although she helped the government get rich, she herself was charged with $1,000 in club debts by 1974-75. [15]

The women also expressed contempt at their government's designation of their camptown role as patriotic. Mrs. Pak put it simply: "It was disgraceful work: How could it be patriotic sacrifice?" [16] All of the women stated that no camptown woman they ever knew felt that their sex work was a nationalistic or patriotic act and that economic need was what drove the women to remain in prostitution. Moreover, several pursued the idea of patriotism and stated that patriotism requires education and the positive provision and reinforcement of skills to conduct "necessary and important work" for the country. [17] They did not view their sex work as necessary or important for the security of South Korea.

However, many of the women believed that their role as camptown prostitute did serve to protect "normal" Korean women in the larger society from being raped and sexually abused by U.S. soldiers. They recounted stories of how before there were large numbers of camptown prostitutes near U.S. bases, "U.S. soldiers would break into the homes of private Korean citizens and rape women--housewives and young virgin girls." [18] Ms. Pae, who has worked in camptown prostitution for over 30 years, complained bitterly, "So, why does the society call us *yanggalbo* [Western whores]? We've played our part--if it weren't for us, where would Ônormal' Koreans be?" [19]

When asked the women what they would do if they were given the power to define and advance national security and economic development to be relevant to their lives, all of them insisted that educating women would be the first and most necessary task they would undertake. Many emphasized the fact that the overwhelming majority of the camptown prostitutes of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s had very little formal education and that most had difficulty speaking, reading, and writing Korean. Many were completely illiterate. Given the Confucianist influence on Korean people, it is not surprising that these women shared with the general population the high value placed on education. One woman confessed that she married a U.S. serviceman so that she could "go to America and study." [20]

But all of the women emphasized education not merely for education's sake, but as necessary for equipping them to provide for themselves economically and socially without resorting to selling their bodies, and for the sake of making real contributions to the security and development of their nation. Mrs. Pak stated that if she had power in government, she would "take the women away from the pimps and owners and put them into vocational schools and really put the women to work for the nation's good." [21] She stressed that "education is crucial to these women because that is what they lack most and what inhibits them from controlling their own lives better." [22]

Some women also advocated governmental help in educating and empowering kijich'on prostitutes as prostitutes so that the women "could have more equal footing with the soldiers and owners they had to contend with." [23] They spoke of the need to teach English to the prostitutes so that the women could avoid exploitation and physical abuse by U.S. soldiers. More important, the women I interviewed emphasized the need for the Korean government to have provided them with legal and economic rights so that they could have had the power to fight the exploitation and abuse from pimps, club owners, corrupt police and VD clinic officials. Mrs. Choe boldly stated that if she had the authority, she would give camptown prostitutes and other poor Korean women economic, social, and legal compensation justly due to them for their work: "The government should be forthright to the women, promising them ÔIf you work this much for the government, we'll buy you a house, take care of your health, provide for your livelihood, and help you build a future.' " [24] Mrs. Chang asserted that in the worst case,

> if the Korean government wanted to continue using women's sexual labor to keep U.S. soldiers happy, then the government should take over the prostitution system (take it out of the control of pimps and club owners) to benefit the women, i.e., treat them like real employees who have rights and must be paid appropriately for their work. [25]

The point that these women tried to make was not that their government should play official pimp in camptown prostitution but that it should fairly give to the women what was their due and not solely protect the interests of local businessmen and obey the wishes of the U.S. officials. All of them decried the Korean government and people for having "thrown them away." None of the women expected or wanted the government simply to dole out economic and social benefits; they expected and were willing to work for what they considered to be their fair share.

As mentioned earlier, the women resented the weakness of the Korean government's legal system and political power to protect them and other camptown residents from the economic, legal, and political domination of the U.S. bases. Mrs. Pak, whose sister had been murdered allegedly by a U.S. soldier, stated that "the Korean government should have used such murders and other violent crimes politically to demand more fairness from the U.S. government." [26] Some of the women contrasted the "strength" of the Japanese government in postwar Japan with the "impotence" of the Korean government in postwar Korea. Mrs. Ch'oe stated that although the Japanese government sent out its women as prostitutes to U.S. soldiers after the war, [27] it also gave them their share of the earnings and taught them employable skills. [28] Mrs. Chang believed that with respect to camptown prostitution, the Japanese government was smarter than its Korean counterpart because the Japanese women were given some power to deal with GIs. For example, she claimed that some Japanese camptown prostitutes were permitted to sell only oral sex and not vaginal intercourse. She reasoned that teaching and giving Korean women the power to determine what and how much they would sell would have helped them because the women could then have avoided pregnancies, abortions, bearing interracial children, and the accompanying physical, financial, and psychological pains. [29] It is not clear whether such perceptions of Japanese camptown prostitutes were based on fact, but the comparisons are important because they reveal the Korean women's belief that their government could have done something to help them, had it been smart enough and willing.

While much of the experiences of the former Korean camptown prostitutes support the criticisms of Woolf and others that traditional notions of national security are inadequate and irrelevant to many women's lives, Woolf's claim that as women, "the whole world is our country," when applied to kijich'on women, appears irrelevant. Those who challenge the near-sanctimonious tradition of sovereignty in international relations, including established transnationalists, feminists, and World Order advocates, predominantly live in wealthy Western nations and are intellectually, economically, and socially empowered enough to call sovereignty a myth and "opt out of" the nation-state system. They can travel outside their own country, compare societies, access international law and institutions, and expand their pocketbooks from cross-border interactions. In short, they have the freedom and power to define themselves as individuals and citizens of the world.

The Korean prostitutes in this study, like most poor and socially outcast women and men, do not have such freedom and power. In the women's eyes, the fate of their lives was tied to the economic and political strength or weakness of their own nation-state. What the Korean women expressed is the need to have their country and government interact with the United States and other powers on an equal political footing, for in their eyes, Korea has never been treated as a sovereign nation by the United States or other big powers. The women saw sovereignty of their nation as a hope, rather than a myth, a means to empower their own lives. For them, the hope that Korea would some day fully exercise its sovereignty was a promise that they would be abused no longer.

The comments of all the former prostitutes I interviewed point to a deep desire and need to be embraced by their nation-state. The common grievance was that their nation-state let them down and the common hope that their nation-state would include them as part of the national family and bestow upon them rights and privileges that would help empower their lives. They could not envision severing the tie between their fate and the strength/weakness of their nation because of their psychological need to be an accepted part of the Korean society and because institutions and laws outside Korean borders seemed even more distant and difficult to reach than their own government.

Although the women expressed the need for a strong Korean government in world affairs, they by no means desired an authoritarian state. They clearly conveyed the kind of state they desired, one with fair laws and the diligent enforcement of such laws to protect and promote the women's lives.

It is important to note that these women emphasized the primacy of a (reformed) fair and strong legal system as the most urgent and reliable means of regulating their lives. Carol Gilligan [30] and other advocates of "feminist standpoint," including Keohane (when promoting transnationalism), [31] have claimed that women's views of the world are based on notions of mutuality, reciprocity, and connectedness stemming from their relational, rather than legal or rule-oriented, life contexts and interactions. In other words, the relational context has been the support system of women. The camptown prostitutes, however, do not fit this scheme: their relational contexts--family, friends, coworkers, neighbors, their own selves as mothers--rather than supporting and empowering them, failed them. Many of their families were torn apart by war, poverty, disease, and physical abuse; the prostitutes themselves never learned to trust and depend on one another because camptown life bred competition, deceit, violence, and fear. And those who bore children rarely had the opportunity and resources to play the role of nurturer. Most avoided becoming mothers, and many gave up their children to American fathers and to adoption agencies. In short, because personal relationships and contexts failed them, the rule of law became more pressing a need.

The interviews with the former prostitutes call for two observations regarding the applicability of the "gender standpoint" approach to theorizing about politics. First, although men and women have had different experiences based on their gender roles, experiences that cross the gender line--poverty, social marginalization, and lack of recognized political power--may inform individuals' worldviews more forcefully than gender. Second, whereas Western scholarship has established male and female standpoints as polar opposites (e.g., rationalism, legalism, autonomy vs. relationalism, contextualism, and mutuality), Confucianist traditions espouse elements of both gender standpoints as together constituting a whole. With regard to the women I interviewed, their recognition of the need for a strong legal system was based on their aspiration to be included as members of the greater Korean society and their belief that with laws to protect them, they can contribute to the good of the society.

If the problem in Western traditions lies in the separation of the individual and the collective and the ascendance of the individual over the collective, the problem in Confucianist traditions is the opposite: the tendency of the collective to subsume the individual. In the case of Korea, governments have used "national security" as the rallying cry for collectivism and excuse for silencing and making individuals "invisible." If values of mutuality and interdependence are needed to temper the excesses of individualism on a personal and state level in Western societies, recognition of individuals as having needs and rights separate from those that serve the collective are needed to temper the excesses of collectivism in Confucianist societies.

The expansion of the definition of political actor in international relations to include individuals without "significant resources" or "substantial control" over issue areas [32] can help "disaggregate" the collective and the hegemony of national and foreign elites and challenge governments' claims to defining alone the meaning of "national interest" and "national security." Students and practitioners of international politics have actively created the actors and rules of international politics: State sovereignty is created through the recognition or granting of such sovereignty by other states and international laws, and multinational companies and international organizations surfaced to the international arena with the recognition that private interests and operations influence and are influenced by state interests and actions. By recognizing or granting the role of international actor to women without "significant resources and influence," we can better assess the barriers that governments impose on women's ability to develop such resources and influence and help stop the vicious cycle of viewing poor, socially marginalized women as solely victims of governments or gendered schemes of power.

Note 1: In her study on the application of the British Contagious Diseases Act (1860s) to India, Philippa Levine also observed that "[i]t was only with the more organized efforts of government and the military authorities in the 1860s that the [VD regulation] system came to be established on a more secure and permanent footing." See "Venereal Disease, Prostitution, and the Politics of Empire: The Case of British India," p. 583.

Note 2: Eighth Army Medical Corps, Preventive Medicine Division, Re: "Trip Report," February 14, 1974.

Note 3: Subcommittee Minutes, #25, February 22, 1974.

Note 4: Barbara Meil Hobson, *Uneasy Virtue*, p. 209.

Note 5: Virginia Woolf, *Three Guineas*, pp. 108-9.

Note 6: V. Spike Peterson, "Security and Sovereign States: What Is at Stake in Taking Feminism Seriously?"; Judith Stiehm, "The Protected, the Protector, the Defender."

Note 7: J. Ann Tickner cites such definitions of security mentioned at the Women's International Peace Conference in Halifax, Canada, in 1985. She also states that third world women's concerns for security focused more on the "structural violence associated with imperialism, militarism, racism, and sexism" rather than Western women's concerns about nuclear war. Tickner, *Gender in International Relations*, p. 54.

Note 8: Mary K. Burguieres, "Feminist Approaches to Peace," p. 10.

Note 9: Ibid., p. 14.

Note 10: Paraphrased from telephone interview with Mrs. Pak via Mrs. Smith, April 2, 1993.

Note 11: Telephone interview with Mrs. Chang via Mrs. Smith, April 2, 1993.

Note 12: Ibid. Mrs. Chang could not recall whether the organization referred to was the local prostitutes' self-help "Women's Association" or the local MoHSA Women's Welfare Bureau.

Note 13: Interview, Uijongbu, June 12, 1992.

Note 14: Telephone interview via Mrs. Smith, April 2, 1993.

Note 15: Ibid.

Note 16: Telephone interview with Mrs. Pak via Mrs. Smith, April 2, 1993.

Note 17: Telephone interview with Mrs. Ch'oe via Mrs. Smith, April 2, 1993.

Note 18: Interview with Ms. Pae, Songt'an, June 6, 1992.

Note 19: Ibid.

Note 20: Telephone interview with Mrs. Chong via Mr. An, March 10, 1993.

Note 21: Telephone interview with Mrs. Pak via Mrs. Smith, April 2, 1993.

Note 22: Ibid.

Note 23: Telephone interview with Mrs. Chong via Mr. An, March 10, 1993.

Note 24: Telephone interview with Mrs. Ch'oe via Mrs. Smith, April 2, 1993.

Note 25: Telephone interview with Mrs. Chang via Mrs. Smith, April 2, 1993.

Note 26: Telephone interview with Mrs. Pak via Mrs. Smith, April 2, 1993.

Note 27: John Lie, "The State as Pimp: Prostitution and the Patriarchal State in 1940s Japan," pp. 11-16. The defeated Japanese government planned to "preempt American prurience by organizing prostitution for the occupying U.S. troops," p. 11. It established the Recreation Amusement Association which, at its height, employed about 70,000 women.

Note 28: Telephone interview with Mrs. Ch'oe via Mrs. Smith, April 2, 1993.

Note 29: Telephone interview with Mrs. Chong via Mr. An, March 10, 1993.

Note 30: Carol Gilligan, *In A Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development*.

Note 31: Robert Keohane, "International Relations Theory: Contributions of a Feminist Standpoint," in Grant and Newland, eds., *Gender and International Relations*.

Note 32: Keohane and Nye, eds., *Transnational Relations and World Politics*, p. 380.