War and Militarism in Modern Japan

Issues of History and Identity

Edited by Guy Podoler

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GUY PODOLER
University of Haifa

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In memory of my father Haggai

Contents

Preface and Acknowledgements

This volume is a fruit of 'The International Conference on Japan in Honour of Professor Ben-Ami Shillony', which took place at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in Israel, between 29 April and 2 May 2007. Initiated by the university's Department of East Asian Studies, the aim of the event was to pay tribute to Professor Shillony's significant contribution to the research and study of Japan, and it was held also in honour of his retirement and seventieth birthday. Bringing together scholars of Japan from all over the world to present their studies and discuss them in front of peers, interested scholars and the general public, the conference revolved around the three themes which have been at the heart of Ben-Ami Shillony's life-long research and teaching: the Japanese Emperor, the Japanese and the Jews, and War and the Military in Twentieth-century Japan. With the exception of Chapter 14, all chapters appearing in this book are revisions of some of the papers presented under the latter two themes.

As I had the honour of being in charge of the conference, my thanks first go to both the contributors who have prepared their papers for publication as well as to the participants whose presentations do not appear here, for their contribution to what turned out to be a highly successful event. Furthermore, the conference could not have materialized without the generous support of the Hebrew University's Department of East Asian Studies, the university's Louis Frieberg Center for East Asian Studies, the Japan Foundation and Mr Jim Blum. I also extend my gratitude to Ms Idit Avidan for her helpful advice during the preparatory stages of the conference, and to the students Inbal Vaknin, Yiftach Govrin and Gilad Bar-Noy for faithfully assisting me throughout the intense days of the event. Finally, I thank Ben-Ami Shillony who has initially inspired me as a teacher, later also as a scholar, and now as a colleague and friend as well.

Guy Podoler
The University of Haifa

List of Contributors

EYAL BEN-ARI is a Professor at the Department of Sociology and Anthropology in the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He has carried out research in Japan, Israel and Singapore on white-collar communities, early childhood education, business expatriates, the Israeli and Japanese militaries and peace-keeping forces. His previous publications include *Body Projects in Japanese Childcare* (RoutledgeCurzon 1997) and *Mastering Soldiers* (Berghahn Books 1998). Among recent edited books are (with Edna Lomsky-Feder) *The Military and Militarism in Israeli Society* (State University of New York Press 2000), (with Daniel Maman and Zeev Rosenhek) *Military State and Society in Israel* (Transaction Publisher 2001) and (with Timothy Tsu and Jan van Bremen) *Perspectives on Social Memory in Japan* (Global Oriental 2006).

SIGAL BEN-RAFAEL GALANTI is a Political Scientist and specializes in Japanese and Israeli politics. She is currently the Chair of the Social Sciences Department and heads the Democracy Studies Program at the Beit Berl Academic College (Israel). She also teaches at the East-Asian Department of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. She is the author of various works on Japanese and Israeli politics which were published in English and Hebrew. Among others, she published articles in *GeoJournal* and *International Journal of Sociology*. She received her B.A. from Tel-Aviv University and her Ph.D. from Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

HARUMI BEFU (Ph.D. Wisconsin 1962) holds regular appointments at the Universities of Nevada, and Missouri, Stanford University and Kyoto Bunkyo University, and visiting appointments at the University of Michigan, Kwansei Gakuin, Tsukuba, Tuebingen, Humboldt, Arhus and Oulu Universities. He is currently emeritus professor at Stanford University. His research interest is in nationalism, globalization and Japan's foreign populations, and his recent publications include *Hegemony of Homogeneity* (Trans Pacific Press 2001), *Globalization and Social Change in Contemporary Japan* (co-edited with J. S. Eades and T. Gill) (Trans Pacific Press 2000), *Globalizing Japan* (co-edited with Sylvie

Guichard-Anguis) (Routledge 2001) and *Nikkei Amerikajin no Ayumi to Genzai* (ed.) (Jinbun Shoin 2002).

DAVID G. GOODMAN is Professor of Japanese Literature at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. His books include *Jews in the Japanese Mind: The History and Uses of a Cultural Stereotype* (co-authored with Masanori Miyazawa) (Lexington Books 2000), *After Apocalypse: Four Japanese Plays of Hiroshima and Nagasaki* (East Asia Program Cornell University 1994), *The Return of the Gods: Japanese Drama and Culture in the 1960s* (East Asia Program Cornell University 2002) and *Angura: Posters of the Japanese Avant-Garde* (Princeton Architectural Press 1999). In addition to his English publications, Goodman has written four books in Japanese, including *Israel: Voices and Faces* (1979). He received his B.A. from Yale (*cum laude*), and his Ph.D. from Cornell.

IRMELA HIJIYA-KIRSCHNEREIT is Professor of Japanese Studies at Freie Universität Berlin. She held previous Professorships at Hitotsubashi and Trier University and was Director of the German Institute for Japanese Studies (DIJ) Tokyo, 1996 - 2004. Her research focuses on modern Japanese literature, cultural contacts and processes of cultural translation, and discourses of cultural self-assertion in Japan. She is editor of *Japanische Bibliothek* (34 volumes) and of *Iaponia Insula* (19 volumes) and her publications include *Selbstentblößungsrituale* (1981, 2005, trans.: *Shishōsetsu,* Tokyo 1992, *Rituals of Self-Revelation,* (Harvard University Asia Center, Cambridge, Mass. 1996), *Das Ende der Exotik* (1988), *Was heißt: Japanische Literatur verstehen?* (1990), *Kulturbeziehungen zwischen Japan und dem Westen seit 1853* (1999), *Japanische Gegenwartsliteratur* (2000) and *Aspekte des Übersetzens Japanisch-Deutsch-Japanisch* (2001).

ROTEM KOWNER is Professor of Japanese history and culture at the University of Haifa, Israel. He specializes in the behavioural aspects of Japan's modern wars and the racial facets of its encounter with the West since the Meiji era. His recent works include *The Forgotten Campaign: The Russo-Japanese War and Its Legacy* (2005), *Historical Dictionary of the Russo-Japanese War* (Scarecrow Press 2006), and the edited volumes *The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War* (Routledge 2007) and *Rethinking the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-05: Centennial Perspectives* (Global Oriental 2007).

NAOKI MARUYAMA is Professor of International Politics at Meiji Gakuin University, Tokyo, Japan. His current research focuses on Jewish refugees and American immigration policy, and on Japan and the Middle East. Among his publications: *The Pacific War and the Jewish Refugees in Shanghai* (Tokyo, 2005, 312 pp. in Japanese), 'The Shanghai Zionist Association and the International Politics of East Asia until 1936', in J. Goldstein (ed.), *The Jews of China*, vol. 1 (M.E. Sharpe, New York 1999) and 'Japan's Response to the Zionist Movement in the 1920s', *Bulletin of*

the Graduate School of International Relations, International University of Japan, 2 (1984).

MERON MEDZINI is a Visiting Senior Lecturer in Modern Japanese History in the Department of East Asian Studies of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. He received his Ph.D. from Harvard and among his books are: *French Policy in Japan During the Closing Years of the Tokugawa Regime* (Harvard University Asia Center 1971) and *From Port Arthur to Hiroshima: The Rise and Fall of Japanese Militarism* (Tel Aviv, 2006). He is also the author of a political biography of Golda Meir *The Proud Jewess- Golda Meir and the Dream of Israel* (Jerusalem, 1990).

IAN NISH is Emeritus Professor of International History at the University of London. He is an Honorary Research Associate at STICERD, London School of Economics and Political Science, and Honorary Member of the Japan Academy. His major publications include *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance* (Athlone Press 1964), *Alliance in Decline* (Praeger Publishers 1972), *The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War* (Longman 1984), *Japan's Struggle with Internationalism* (Kegan Paul 1993) and *Japan's Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period* (Praeger Publishers 2002). His current research focuses on Japan's attitudes towards China in the twentieth century.

MARK PEATTIE is Former Foreign Service officer (US Information Agency), with assignments in Cambodia (Phnom Penh), 1955–7 and Japan (Sendai, Tokyo and Kyoto), 1958–67. He has a Ph.D. in modern Japanese history from Princeton University (1972), and is a specialist in Japanese imperial, colonial, military and naval history. His principal works include *Ishiwara Kanji and Japan's Confrontation with the West* (Princeton Press 1975); *Nan'yō: The Rise and Fall of the Japanese in Micronesia, 1885–1945* (Hawai'i Press 1988); *Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887–1945*, with David Evans (Naval Institute Press 1997, winner of the annual award of the Society for Military History, 1999); and *Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Air Power, 1909-1941* (Naval Institute Press 2001).

GUY PODOLER is Lecturer in the Department of Asian Studies at the University of Haifa. His research of modern Korea includes exploring the connections between history, memory and commemoration – especially as manifested in museums, parks and monuments – and the relationship between sport and nationalism. He has published, among others, in *Acta Koreana*, *Japan Focus*, *The Review of Korean Studies* and *The International Journal of the History of Sport*, and contributed book chapters in English and Hebrew.

JENNIFER ROBERTSON is Professor of Anthropology at the University of Michigan. Among her books are *Native and Newcomer: Making and Remaking a Japanese City* (UC Press 1991 & 1994), *Takarazuka: Sexual*

Politics and Popular Culture in Modern Japan (UC Press 1998; 3rd printing. 2001), *Same-Sex Cultures and Sexualities: An Anthropological Reader* (ed.) (Blackwell 2004), and *A Companion to the Anthropology of Japan* (ed.) (Blackwell 2005). The General Editor of 'Colonialisms', a new book series from the University of California Press (www.ucpress.edu/books/COL.ser.html), Robertson is presently completing a book on cultures of Japanese colonialism, eugenics, biotechnologies and humanoid robots.

RONI SARIG is lecturer at the Hebrew University and University of Haifa. Her field of research is memory of the Second World War in Japan: cultural, literary, cinematic and artistic aspects. Her academic publications include 'Stories of Trauma', *Jewish Quarterly*, London (December 2005) and 'The Past We Were Told, the Truth We Were Told – Japanese Children's Literature about the Atom Bombs and Israeli Children's Literature about the Jewish Holocaust – A Comparative Study', Ph.D. Dissertation (March 2006). She has also published *All the Silk Paths* (a novel in Hebrew) (2001), *The Journey that Began in Impitom* (a children's book) (2003) and *Daughter of the River*, translation of a novel by Chinese writer Hong Ying (Bloomsbury Publishing 2004).

MARIKO TSUJITA lectured at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem until 2007. As a political scientist she is interested in political parties and politics in Israel and Japan. Her publications include 'A Short History of Contemporary Israel', attached to a translation of Y. Katz, *Israel and Its People II* (Tokyo, 1982), 'The Grand Coalition, Reconsidered', in A. Ikeda (ed.), *Contemporary Israel Politics – Issues and Development* (Tokyo, 1988), 'Israel's Eastern Border', in A. Ikeda (ed.), *Middle East Peace Process and West Bank and Gaza* (Tokyo, 1991), and 'Knesset Election Reforms in Israel', *Judea-Israel Studies* 20 (2004). Currently she is a student at Logos Theological Seminary, Kyoto.

Note on Transliteration

For Japanese words the Hepburn transliteration system is employed. Exceptions to the rules are familiar places that are commonly written without the macrons indicating long vowels (e.g. Tokyo rather than Tōkyō). For Korean, the McCune-Reischauer system is used, with the exception of well-known places and names (e.g. Seoul instead of Sŏul, and Syngman Rhee instead of Yi Sŭng-man). The Pinyin transliteration system is employed for Chinese places and names.

Introduction

GUY PODOLER

The theme of war and militarism in modern Japanese history has attracted significant interest, manifested in academic circles in a voluminous body of literature. Notable topics within this theme include explorations of the roots, causes, characteristics and legacies of Japanese imperialism and colonialism; the stories of armies and battlefields; and the effects of war and militarism on both wartime and post-war Japan. Recent studies show also a growing interest in the place which the militarist past occupies in post-war Japan's 'memory' and 'identity'.

The present volume brings together recent scholarship on issues of both history and identity in an attempt to enrich our understanding of the history-identity connection in Japan, while contributing as well to the scholarly understanding of this nexus in general. In order to make sense of the history-identity nexus with regards to the theme of war and militarism in modern Japan, the book is divided into three parts: the first part presents up-to-date historical analyses of topics on war and militarism in modern Japan; the second part is dedicated to research that sheds light on the features of identity by inferring from war-related historical events and phenomena; and, the last part critically explores conscious and intentional acts of identity formation that were affected by the history under discussion. Indeed, aspects of Japanese identity are at the centre of the latter two parts, yet the identity issue is expanded by the treatment of two other pertinent identities – Jewish and Korean (Chapters 8 and 14). Finally, although the volume is thus divided, I hope that the fourteen essays that constitute it will be seen as forming a terrain where concepts about war and militarism in Japan's history and related concepts about identity negotiate with each other. I wish to highlight several key points in this regard.

RISE OF THE MILITARY AND FALL OF JAPAN

The book opens with an analysis of a historical process that stands at the core of our field of discussion: the growing role of the military in Japanese politics. Apparently, this crucial process can be traced back to as early as the decade that followed Japan's victory over Russia in 1905. From an historical perspective, as Ian Nish demonstrates, the tugs-of-war that took place during this period not only between the military and the civilian leaders but within the army as well, signalled the path which Japan was soon to follow. Most importantly, Nish emphasizes that Japan took the path of 'limited incursions' while being aware of the risks involved. Thus, as Japan continued to experience the growing influence of the military, it also became clear that there were divergent views within the military.

Yet later, as compared with the period that Nish discusses, the military groups no longer sought to present a united front against the civilian leaders. This was demonstrated by the actions of rebellious radical officers during the 1930s, actions that peaked in the *Ni-ni-roku Jiken* (February 26 Incident) of 1936,[1] which had an immediate effect on Japan. In the aftermath of the incident the army pressed for larger budgets – claiming that this was essential in preventing similar rebellions in the future – and its involvement in both domestic and foreign affairs increased (Shillony 1997: 210). This, however, still did not mean that the military now spoke with one voice. As has already been observed (Medzini 2006: 104), during the first days following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident there were high commanders that pressed for rapid advancement into China while others called for much more cautious moves. In addition, as Naoki Maruyama shows (Chapter 2), two seemingly different approaches within the military developed against the backdrop of Japan's improving relations with Germany. One approach advocated military alliance between the two nations, while a second approach, which was supported by several business groups, attempted to improve Japan's deteriorating relations with the US by showing support for the Jewish community in Manchuria. Yet, Maruyama asserts, the Jewish card was finally taken out of the equation once Japan had clearly sided with the Axis powers in September 1940, when American capital and favourable American public opinion were no longer pursued.

Eventually, during the Second World War the military gained unprecedented influence since Japan, in the words of Ben-Ami Shillony, was engaged in a life-and-death war. The regime during this period was based on repression and total mobilization (1997: 231). Was it the decades-long growing military sway on politics, which peaked in the early 1940s, that finally led to Japan's defeat? Mark Peattie (Chapter 7) agrees that among other commonly-acknowledged factors, the lack of civilian critics that were able to curb the military leadership resulted in wartime decision-making that was 'often un-tethered to reality'. However, this

was merely a manifestation of a much more profound cause. Japan's defeat, as Peattie suggests, was a result of a series of weaknesses that an ill-suited cultural warrior tradition had exacerbated. Enthralled by the idea of the 'Japanese spirit', which was drawn from an idealized past, Japan failed to come closer to reality when creating images of itself and of its enemy 'other'. Thus, identities, or perhaps more accurately put-perceived identities – do not only matter from theoretical perspectives, but from practical aspects as well.

IDENTITIES IN ACTION

The way the past is conceived is crucial for defining and establishing the collective's identity. Therefore, both identity – which is basically 'a sense of sameness over time and space' (Gillis 1994: 3) – and history are often well placed in the eye of the storm of inter-collective relationships, academic discourse, or both. The past of a certain collective – constituted and defined by members who view themselves as belonging to the same nation, country, social group, etc. – is, I argue, a rich repository of people, events and processes that can basically be approached in three ways. First, by means of an academic approach, which strives to be objective and employs methodological tools, historical evidence and common sense in order to interpret, explain and understand. Second, a consciously selective approach often taken by groups within the collective in an attempt to promote preferred values, agendas and interests. Third, employing the first approach to make sense of the second; in other words, attempting to understand why and how a collective grasps and represents its past in a certain way, and what are the related trends, shifts and power struggles involved.

To be sure, all three approaches should not be regarded as flawless or non-controversial. And, to make matters even more complicated in this regard, one should not neglect the existence of private narratives of the past, which either support or challenge the master narrative(s) or simply subsist beside them without taking part, at least in a palpable manner, in the dynamics of collective identity formation.

Several thoughts come to mind when these observations are applied to the theme of the present volume. To begin with, a rich body of literature on Japanese empire-building supports the idea that Japan had systematically constructed and used identity moulds to advance the national cause. Indeed, claims Jennifer Robertson (Chapter 3), the Japanization of Asia was pursued through means that included, for example, education and religion. Yet one more overarching means was employed as well: entertainment. The theatre was thus a highly appreciated site for creating a 'superior us'-'inferior other' dichotomy in the service of the imperialist project. Robertson's emphasis on the role of the Takarazuka theatre 'in creating a vision of a global hierarchy headed by Japan' directs our attention back to Peattie's assertion that Japan's misleading concept about itself and its enemy navigated it towards defeat.

The formation of these perceptions is illuminated by Rotem Kowner's historical analysis of shifts and trends in Japan's treatment of its POWs (Chapter 6). Since Japan for decades continuously shaped and re-shaped images of itself and its enemy, Kowner concludes that among several possible determinants, the variance in the treatment of POWs was mainly the result of interaction between the perceived identity of the enemy and the perceived identity of Japan's reference group. These two determinants, as Kowner points out, are constructs that tend to be detached from reality.

The idea that the gap between reality and images of self and other is in itself a powerful propeller of historical processes is thus highlighted again, and encases a notion regarding yet another peculiar tension. This is the uneasiness that often characterizes the relations between the collective, or the master, narrative and the personal experience. In the course of everyday life there is a memory which is produced and circulated in personal narratives through everyday speech, anecdotes, letters, diaries, etc. It produces a history that is usually 'held to the level of private remembrance' and yet is affected by the dominant historical narrative, which commonly silences it (Popular Memory Group 1982: 210–11). The Japanese-American families that were divided in the Second World War are a case in point. According to Harumi Befu (Chapter 10), pivotal events in the lives of the people involved in this complicated situation were ignored by the master narrative(s) of the war either because they had no relevance to it, or because they had contradicted it. 'Should master narrative not reflect the experiences and voices of the people who make history . . .?', Befu asks rhetorically.

At the same time, the inverse phenomenon occurs when personal experiences are deliberately turned into a master narrative, and the collective is muted. A common notion is that post-war Japan blamed the military leaders for leading the country towards catastrophe (Shillony 1997: 305). This is an act of self-exculpation that is based on distending the role of the individual up to a point where the individual becomes the mover of the collective's history while, at the same time, he is being detached from that collective. As Sigal Ben-Rafael Galanti demonstrates in Chapter 9 by analysing discussions held in the House of Representatives, Japan's elected lawmakers have already established such a master narrative as early as the summer of 1946. Thus, the wall-to-wall agreement on the importance of democratization, argues Ben-Rafael Galanti, by no means reflected a deep self-criticism of the past.

Finally, a unique aspect regarding the role of the personal experience within the collective during a critical moment in Japanese history involves an identity which is not Japanese. It is known that hundreds of Jews took part in the Manhattan Project. Did a Jewish background and Jewish ethics play a role in these scientists 'behaviour and attitude towards the use of the most destructive weapon mankind has ever devised', wonders Meron Medzini (Chapter 8).[2] Apparently, not only is there no evidence for such influence, but given contemporaneous historical conditions, as Medzini suggests, these scientists may even

have 'attempted to downplay their Jewish origins'. Identities are thus formed and come into play through intentional acts of construction and suppression. In the post-war era this selective process of identity formation has become one of the most contentious, and politically and emotionally charged issues for both Japan and its neighbours.

REPERCUSSIONS

One sense in which the Japanese defeat in 1945 was a turning point in the country's history is that it became the prism through which Japanese intellectuals, politicians, writers, artists and others came to examine their nation's history of war and militarism and attempted to understand and define 'Japan'. The endeavour has been contentious, incorporating different ideological views, political interests and artistic styles and influences, and with the changes in times, it has also witnessed shifts and trends accordingly.[3]

Following defeat, the war experience featured prominently in the works of a long line of writers such as Noma Hiroshi, Dazai Osamu, Shimao Toshio, Ōoka Shohei, Ibuse Masuji, the ultranationalist Hayashi Fusao and many others. As both particular and universal values were being explored, some works dealt directly with the war, while in others the history of war and militarism was more an inspiration affecting contents and artistic styles. For example, one dramatic historical event, which kept resonating in the post-war era inspiring many known Japanese writers and film-makers to treat both particular and universal values, was the February 26 Incident. As a phenomenon that reflected, and was part of, global trends during the 1960s-1970s, contends David Goodman (Chapter 5), works about the incident were a contested site for dealing with the idea of 'revolution' and its meanings.

Furthermore, among the writers operating in the three decades that followed the defeat, the one who stood out by earning himself the reputation of being totally committed to his post-war beliefs was Mishima Yukio. Mishima earned this reputation through both his writing and his conduct, and it seems that the February 26 Incident had profoundly influenced him in his later years. According to Goodman (Chapter 5), 'in the last decade of his life the February 26 Incident ran like a leitmotif' through his work, and furthermore, 'the circumstances of the revolt would provide the *mise en scène* for his drama of self-immolation'. On a similar note, Irmela Hijiya-Kirschnereit (Chapter 4), too, emphasizes that Mishima was an 'extremely self-conscious and analytical artist'. Yet viewed from a different angle, a close look at his works allows Hijiya-Kirschnereit to draw a complex picture of Mishima the writer, and to argue that 'in contrast to many post-war authors, he hardly ever deals with the subject of war' in his literary works. The war in his literature, she contends, matters mainly for its aesthetic aspects – triggering moods and attitudes rather than functioning as an historical event that determines the course of the narrative.

At this stage, by approaching the identity issue from a wider perspective, it may be said that for post-war Japan and its neighbours the history of war, imperialism and colonialism converged with contemporaneous conditions and visions of the future to shape and reshape identities of self and other. As already noted, a dominant Japanese narrative attempts to free the collective from any blame concerning the pre-1945 past. History education in Japan, for example, above all values uncritical conformity (Barnard 2003: 171), as high-school history textbooks 'encode an ideology of irresponsibility' (Barnard 2003: 153). Within this context, irresponsibility has been strongly supported by the notion of victimhood: in a narrative that represents Japan as a victim, there is no place for painful self-contemplation of past wrongdoings, thus no act of assuming responsibility is called for. 'The emphasis on victimhood', writes Roni Sarig (Chapter 11), 'helped create the discourse of universal peace, and of Japan as a peace-loving, pacifistic nation'.[4] This sense of victimhood is anchored in the memory of the atom bombs, and the symbol of this notion has become the young girl Sadako Sasaki. Through the figure of Sadako, as Sarig's comparative analysis demonstrates, a narrative of victimhood became associated with a narrative of heroism that is devoid of violence, and the girl was turned into a myth that although is universal in its essence, is simultaneously a 'part of the controlling discourse in society'.

How, in this dominant narrative, is the image of the main culprit – namely, the military – constructed? In the post-war anti-militaristic environment, asserts Eyal Ben-Ari (Chapter 12), the Self-Defence Forces (SDF) has distanced itself from the Imperial Army and Navy by silencing their deaths and the deaths they caused. Moreover, by way of adopting the cultural script of a 'good' military death as it is found in other advanced democracies, the SDF establishes the armed forces of these democracies as its reference group in the place of its imperial predecessors. 'Good' military death, however, can be understood and represented in other ways as well. In the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, which, too, is considered a site where Japanese historical aggressiveness and war responsibility are effaced (see Takahashi 2008; Breen 2008), all that is associated with death in battle is replaced with a story of 'glorious death' (Takahashi 2008: 116-20). 'Good' military death as represented within the context of Yasukuni Shrine thus takes on a nationalist(ic) meaning which, in turn, challenges the pacifist anti-militaristic framework of the narrative of victimhood and lack of responsibility described heretofore. In short, although responsibility is still denied, the military is no longer the villain.

Yet lack of responsibility is by no means a consensual notion in Japanese society. The issue of history textbooks, for example, has been seriously debated and kept in the spotlight through the famous struggles of the historian Ienaga Saburo and his supporters.[5] Similarly, one recent study argues for strong popular resistance in Japan to the official renouncement of war responsibility (see Saaler 2005: 124-70). Finally,

there is a broader debate in this regard – a debate related to the 'normalization' of Japan.

The discourse of servicemen on the normalization of the SDF (Ben-Ari, Chapter 12), demonstrates the context in which the issue of Japan's normalization is commonly discussed, namely, the context of the country's international security policy. To be sure, this context frames domestic debates concerning the definition and roles of the SDF, and the revision of the constitution. Yet, as Mariko Tsujita points out (Chapter 13), 'normalization' is also a process by which Japan revives and re-cherishes its traditions, accepting them 'as integral to its identity'. This demonstrates an effort to revise the 'one-way road of growth and development', which Japan has taken following the trauma of the war. However, given also the existence, if not the rise, of nationalistic sentiments in Japan, Tsujita identifies a fragile balance between normalization and these sentiments. The collapse of this balance, she warns, 'might lead to the post-modern democratic totalitarian state'.

Among Japan's neighbours there also are fears concerning the meaning and the consequences of 'Japan's normalization'. In China, for example, some interpret Japan's normalization as being 'closely associated with the re-emergence of extreme militarism', while others assert that it is linked to a kind of nationalism that enables Japan to whitewash its history of the war (Katsumata and Li 2008). Moreover, in both China and South Korea demonstrators and the governments occasionally protest against what they perceive as signs of self-exoneration and the rise of nationalism in Japan. Such acts derive from candid viewpoints and from truly painful memories, yet they are not always devoid of political interests. As I argue in Chapter 14, a process of identity formation through the construction of a master narrative that refers to victimhood and that heavily relies on the idea of struggle and valour has taken place in post-colonial South Korea. Most importantly, the theme of Japanese colonial brutality has been used not only to define a post-colonial identity in the context of South Korea's relations with its former colonizer, but also under the conditions of both post-war inter-Korean relations and domestic developments.

FINAL REMARKS

Gaps between reality – or, sometimes, between an honest and brave attempt to remain close to reality – and constructed images of self and others, take part in shaping history. Thus, to analyse how collectives define themselves and their others, why they choose certain ways do so, which techniques are employed in the process, and what challenges the master narratives face, is to shed light on historical events and processes. In short, understanding identities is an essential facet in the historical enquiry. What follows aims to underscore that views, interpretations and representations of Japan's history of war and militarism – although they should not be regarded as a single causal factor – have been central

to the social, political and cultural developments that have taken place in both Japan and its neighbours. There is nothing to suggest that this will not continue to be the case in the decades to come. Finally, by raising the above points and thus explicating the format of the present volume, I intend to emphasize the rich terrain where history meets identity, a terrain that the following chapters form. It is my hope that this rich terrain will also inspire the reader to come up with yet more related observations.

NOTES

* I thank Shakhar Rahav for his careful reading of an earlier version of this chapter.

1 For a commonly cited work on this incident, see Shillony (1973).

2 Two Jewish scientists mentioned by Medzini – Lise Meitner and Otto Frisch – played a leading role in the actual identification of nuclear fission. During the 1930s, co-discoverers of nuclear fission, German chemists Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassmann, collaborated with Meitner. In 1938, she escaped from Germany to Sweden, yet Hahn and Strassmann continued to consult with her. In January 1939, after Meitner had consulted the physicist Frisch, her nephew, the two concluded that Hahn and Strassmann had indeed succeeded in splitting the atom (Kort 2007: 15).

3 For an illuminating discussion on these developments, see Lida (2002).

4 In *The Legacy of Hiroshima: Its Past, our Future* Shohno Naomi contends: 'We must discard absolute values regarding the nation, revise our ethical principles, and build a truly humane world order' (1986: 132).

5 For a recent comprehensive work on Ienaga, see Yoshiko (2008).

1

Japan's Tug-of-War After the Russo-Japanese War

IAN NISH

As one who has taught European history alongside Japanese history, I would like to begin this chapter by offering an insight drawn from German history. It is said of the German chancellor Otto von Bismarck that he remodelled German society in its entirety and solved many of Germany's problems but failed in one notable respect: he did not manage to integrate the military with German civil society. Though he owed his rise to power and his continuation in power to a victorious army, he found it hard to restrain the army in the aftermath of its victories. This led to a serious distortion in German society, leading up to 1914. The Japanese army in the Meiji period saw itself as a reflection of the German army and was, as I shall argue in this chapter, keen to exert its political muscle from 1905 onwards. Professor Shillony, who is honoured in this volume, wrote his first book on the army revolt in Japan in 1936. In it he assessed the roots of military frustration with civil society and the difficulties which governments of the day had in dealing with the army disobedience (Shillony 1973). I have chosen here to deal with the same theme, some thirty years earlier.

The tug-of-war in the title of this chapter refers to the tension over Japan's continental policy, prevalent among the upper echelons of Japanese decision-makers. This chapter deals with the skirmishes which took place in the decade following the Portsmouth Conference with a view to assessing the growing role of the military in politics. Broadly speaking, in Japan there existed a party of territorial expansion and a party of restraint. The members of the former were mainly military, both the political generals and the general staff, and associated with General Yamagata Aritomo and the Chōshū clan. The latter were civilian and associated with the names of two Elder Statesmen, Marquis Itō Hirobumi and Count Inoue Kaoru, whose authority as Elder Statesmen

(Genrō) derived from their closeness to Emperor Meiji. They found allies in the political parties which were anxious to reduce budgets.[1]

The army emerged from the Russo-Japanese War proud of its achievement but aware of the heavy price it had paid in human lives and in war funds. The army took the view that it had won the war but the civilian government had lost the peace. Because of the sacrifices they had made, the military felt that they had earned the right to exert influence over Japanese society in the future and to be consulted in any discussion of foreign policy and budget-making. I accept Professor Matsushita's analysis that the army emerged from the war over-confident and excessively arrogant. Even at this early stage, the army was already showing signs of following its own path and seeking an expanded military role (Matsushita 1963).

The military could take some comfort from the popular riots against the Portsmouth settlement of September which took place at Hibiya Park in Tokyo (*Kōwa hantai kokumin taikai*). These showed that the masses and some of the political parties aligned with them were dissatisfied with the compromises which had led Japan to accept inadequate terms of peace and that there was a mood of increased nationalism which would support territorial expansion. The army viewed these riots as support for its stronger line on continental policy. Moreover, it had commissioned reports on the wealth of Manchuria and the long-term use which Japan could make of it by developing the railway which she had acquired from Russia. These sophisticated surveys by junior officers were overseen by General Kodama Gentarō, who had served in Manchuria during the fighting and later became Chief of Staff. The existence of a Kwantung Army in Manchuria which was intended to protect Japan's new leased territory but in fact was determined to utilize the occupation to her own advantage, put strong pressure on the government at home (Matsutaka 2001: 81-6; Duus 1995: 203).

Against this, there were still powerful civilian groups urging for restraint over continental policy on the grounds that post-war Japan was in an impoverished state and should not extend herself too far. According to this view, before she could develop South Manchuria Japan had to receive foreign investment and this required the goodwill of the Open Door powers, United States and Britain. These thinkers held sway until the death by assassination of Marquis Itō in October 1909. I shall argue that this was a turning-point in Japanese history. There was noone thereafter of the same weight and authority to promote the causes for which Itō had worked.

In 1906, the forces of Japan and Russia still faced each other in Manchuria. Under the Portsmouth Treaty it was permitted to station up to fifteen soldiers per kilometre of railway track for its security. There was an agreement between the two armies for the evacuation of troops from Manchuria but it had not yet been acted upon. At the end of the war Russian commanders in Manchuria, judging from the intensity of the Hibiya riots, thought that there was a serious chance that the war would

be re-started by Japan in order for her to reap the war profits which her people expected. This was, of course, largely an excuse, because there was a distinct Russian lobby calling on Russia to stay on and take over control of Northern Manchuria. On the Japanese side there were financial constraints but in general, army leaders wanted to retain their forces as long as Russia was not seen to be withdrawing hers. Meanwhile, the Japanese military government in Manchuria was promoting Japan's commerce by protectionist policies. It kept the ports and markets of Manchuria even more restricted than they had been under Russian occupation from 1900 to 1904. For the time being, railways in South Manchuria continued under military control (Wolff 1999: 171–2; Inoue 1990: 146ff.).

This created major problems for the government of Prince Saionji Kimmochi which came into power in January 1906. His was a cabinet under the influence of the Seiyūkai party and favoured reducing army costs. Foreign Minister Katō Takaaki proposed that Japan should continue to uphold the Open Door principles in Manchuria on which she had fought the war; but the army representatives argued that the sacrifices made by their comrades prevented them from giving up their beneficial, but 'semi-monopolistic' position in Manchuria. In February, a meeting was called to work out a consensus between the two groups of military and political leaders over Manchuria. The ports of Dairen and later Antung and Mukden were opened. But General Kodama, with the backing of Genrō Yamagata Aritomo and Army Minister Terauchi Masatake, refused to entertain Katō's more far-reaching proposals. In turn, Katō, who was already at odds with the cabinet over rail privatization objected to the army plan for managing Manchuria and opposed Gotō Shimpei's appointment as head of the new South Manchurian Railway. Politically out-manoeuvred, he resigned in his impetuous manner on 3 March within two months of taking office (Duus 1995: 58; Naraoka 2006: 77; *Nihon gaikō nempyō narabini shuyō bunsho* [hereafter *NGNB*] 1955, 3 March 1906).

Prime Minister Saionji, therefore, had to assume the role of acting foreign minister. It was in this capacity that he took the unusual step of visiting Manchuria incognito. After the close of the parliamentary session Saionji travelled secretly throughout Manchuria from 14 April to 14 May for, as he put it, 'a personal study of affairs on the spot'. The absence of the prime minister for a month from affairs of state, so soon after forming a ministry, was an event as astonishing as the Iwakura mission of the 1870s. But this only illustrated the critical nature of the consensus which was needed. As soon as Saionji returned, he convened on 22 May a *kyōgikai*, a sort of liaison committee between the Elder Statesmen, army and cabinet. On the one side of this consultative body was the army, represented by Kodama and Yamagata, which deployed the same arguments as before. On the other side was Itō who attacked the perspective taken by the army and its spokesman Kodama in particular, saying: 'Manchuria is not our territory. It is purely part of China's territory. There is no logic (*dōri*) in exercising our sovereignty over a place that does not belong to

us' (Duus 1995: 203–204; Pooley, ed. 1915: 260–2; *Nihon gaikō bunsho, Meiji* [hereafter *NGB M*] 39/I, 22 May 1906). It was agreed that Japan should go ahead with the evacuation of her troops which was now 'accelerated' and should proceed with the opening of ports in Manchuria to international trade (which in the days of military occupation had not been allowed by the army). This decision was met with complaints by foreign powers. The military administration by the Governor-General of the occupying army was converted to a civilian one; and the railway, hitherto in military hands, was inaugurated as the South Manchurian Railway on civilian lines. Paradoxically, the Genrō and the army were united in wanting to capitalize on Manchurian resources but for different reasons. Itō and Inoue were aware of the economic potential of the territory but suggested that a continued military occupation would alienate foreigners whose support and capital would be needed there for the rebuilding of the railway which had recently become Japanese. The first round in the tug-of-war was won by the non-military group. Since Kodama died in July, the army case was allowed to slide.

RUSSIA AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE

This decision enabled Japan to sort out her problems with Russia. After the war, Russia and Japan had both agreed to an early resumption of diplomatic relations. Japan sent Motono Ichirō as ambassador to St Petersburg on 29 March 1906. He met the prime minister, Sergei Witte, who dissociated himself from the forward policy of previous years and the tsar, who assured him that he was praying for a peaceful relationship. European Russia was turning over a new leaf (*NGB M* 39/I; Lone 2000: 126-8).

Intensive negotiations lasted from January until March. Japan's prime objective was to obtain Russian recognition for her policies in Korea, while Russia wanted to extract a heavy price by getting Japan to grant similar recognition for her actions in Outer Mongolia. A number of Russo-Japanese treaties, including the all-important fisheries treaty, were signed on various dates during July 1907. Under the main treaty signed on 30 July, North and South Manchuria were mutually accepted as spheres of influence. By the secret clauses, the ports on the Sungari River were to be opened to Japanese trade. To this extent, the Japanese saw themselves as advocates of the Open Door in China against Russia who wanted monopoly over ports on the Sungari River in her sphere. This Russian detente was once again a victory for the 'civilian' party.[2]

In the background, however, remains the paradox that while this Russo-Japanese rapprochement was proceeding, Japan's defence chiefs were debating their strategic position. Although Russian armies beyond the authorized quotas had been largely withdrawn from spring 1907 in line with the withdrawal of Japanese troops, the defence establishment mapped out a plan which identified Russia as her notional enemy on land. One has to conclude that the civil programme of Japanese

diplomats and the military thinking of Japan's generals were not at one with each other.

ITŌ AND KOREAN ANNEXATION

Itō Hirobumi had been appointed as the first Japanese Resident-General in Korea (*tōkan*) in December 1905. But he lost faith in his vision for Korea within two years. He regretted the misconduct of his own nationals who had swamped the peninsula and the lack of trained administrators who could carry out his policies. He was disillusioned when the Korean court sent a delegation to the Hague Peace Conference of June 1907, calling for independence for the peninsula. He forced the abdication of the Korean emperor and found it necessary to increase his own powers and conclude a new Korean-Japanese treaty. This led to countrywide demonstrations. Itō's disappointment was manifest in his remarks to the British ambassador in Tokyo on his return from Seoul, when he admitted that he had wanted to go slowly with his reforms and gain the confidence of the Korean people but the Koreans' delegation to the Hague had upset his plans (*NGB M* 40/I, no. 530, 24 July 1907).[3] Unlike the military party, Itō was anxious to avoid actions which would antagonize the US, Britain or indeed any European colonial power. He warned the cabinet in November 1907, 'if we repeatedly follow selfish principles, the Western countries will . . . place no trust in us. As a result they may cut off the advance of capital, and our government finances would suffer difficulties.' Itō was evidently thinking of the financial depression which engulfed Japan in the final days of the Saionji Ministry and ultimately brought about its downfall in July 1908. He was also conscious of the need of Japan's local authorities for foreign loans and the first South Manchurian Railway loan which had been secured in London in July 1908 (quoted in Duus 1995: 204, fn. 5).[4]

The third ministry of General Katsura took over with a more extreme agenda for Korea. It accepted in principle the need for Japan's annexation of Korea as early as July 1909, recognizing that a long period would be needed for the implementation of such a transition. Although publicly reticent, Itō unexpectedly gave his private blessing to the proposal in April despite his long-held reservations over annexation. His retirement from the office of Resident-General took effect in June but he was still influential in his role as president of the Privy Council to which he reverted. He assigned his post in Seoul to his deputy, Viscount Sone Arasuke, who had hitherto done most of the administrative work in the territory. Sone, though of a weaker character than Itō, shared the latter's initial opposition to Korea's annexation. Like Itō, he too felt that Japan should confer first with her neighbours, Russia and China, before proceeding. Sone resigned in April 1910 because of a terminal disease from which he died shortly after (Lone 2000: 163-6; *NGB M* 41/I).

In the context of Itō's resignation, Gotō Shimpei, the home minister in Katsura's cabinet, devised a scheme which would keep Itō out

of trouble. The occasion presented itself when the influential Russian finance minister, V.N. Kokovstev, was about to pay a visit to Harbin in the course of a tour of inspection in the east, and Gotō proposed that Japan's leaders should authorize Itō to go over to meet him. Kokovstev had a special concern for the area in view of his responsibility for the loss-making Chinese Eastern Railway. All the important Russian officials in the east had been summoned for a consultation with him in Harbin. It was, therefore, a shrewd move for the Japanese cabinet to seek direct contact with the Russians at the highest level.

After moving slowly through Manchuria, Itō switched at Changchun junction from Japan's South Manchurian Railway to the Chinese Eastern Railway. On his arrival at the Russian station in Harbin on 26 October, he had a brief exchange of greetings with Kokovstev. But, while he was inspecting the Russian guard of honour at the station, he was shot by a Korean nationalist, believed to have come from Vladivostok. He died on the premises of the Chinese Eastern Railway within thirty minutes of being shot, at the age of sixty-nine. He did not hold the expected high-level talks with the Russians nor was he able to undertake his month-long tour of the wartime battlefields or his talks with the Chinese. It would appear that Itō's mission was intended as an olive branch to Russia. But Itō was so much of an individualist that, even if he had been given a specific mandate, he probably would not have complied with it (Woolff 1999: 18–21; Conroy 1960: 375ff.).

Not that the diplomatic relations with Russia were in danger of deteriorating. Secretary of State Philander Knox's plan for the neutralization of Manchurian railways made sure of that. It had been proposed in a speech in London in November 1909. Japan and Russia, the two railway powers which were trying to consolidate their stakes in Manchurian railways, found it totally unacceptable. They gladly entered into further Russo-Japanese agreements in July 1910, with their two conventions, only one of which was made public. Instead of aiming at the defence of the *status quo* as the 1907 agreement had done, they aimed at the stipulation of the special territorial interests of each. Their essence was anti-Knox and anti-American. Basically, they said that, despite the divisions between them, they would still cooperate to resist American intrusion in their spheres of influence (Inoue 1990: 250ff.).

The end of the Itō era in this violent way meant a change of direction for Japan. The governing ministry of Katsura and Foreign Minister Komura (1908-10) could proceed without fear of major complications. As a punishment for Itō's assassination by a Korean national, Japan decided that she must move from her existing protectorate in Korea to the complete annexation of the territory. During the five years of the protectorate, Japan had been careful to operate within the general parameters adopted by European imperial powers in dealing with their colonies, such as Britain in Egypt (Piggott 2003: 176–7).[5] Katsura and Komura approached the subject of annexation cautiously, consulting Itō before his death and ignoring the calls for urgency from Tanaka Giichi

and activist junior officers. They proceeded to give assurances to interested parties like the USA, Britain and France who had given their tacit support to Japan's protectorate over the previous five years, provided their treaty and property rights were safeguarded. Even then they were not bold enough to go ahead with the annexation until the opposition of Russia, whose territory was adjacent to Korea's northern frontier, was removed. That was reluctantly granted during the negotiation of the Russo-Japanese Treaty (July 1910) but, unlike the other powers, Russia specifically stressed her concern over Japan's long-term intentions.[6]

The annexation treaty was signed on 22 August 1910 with troops marshalled to the south of Seoul. The governor-generalship (*Chōsen sōtoku*) was set up on 1 October, with the first occupant being General Viscount Terauchi Masatake, a long-term proponent of the need for early annexation. He also held the portfolio of Minister for the Army in Tokyo until August 1911 and had acted as resident-general since 31 May. This new office was given more far-reaching powers in view of the need to cope with increasing nationalist insurrections. It showed that Korea was regarded as an army province and Korean affairs were to be seen henceforth as primarily an army responsibility. Policing of the territory was taken over by the *kempei* (military police) under the chief of gendarmerie, General Akashi Motojirō. The underlying message was that the office of governor-general would not, for the present, be open to civilians. This important round in the tug-of-war had resulted in an army victory (Ku 1985: ch.1).

This act of colonization which was one of staggering proportions for the Japanese state, after emerging from a period of acute recession, was completed peacefully after rigorous preparations. As might have been foreseen, the army announced that it needed two more infantry divisions because of its increased responsibilities in Korea. Thus, army funding for Korea became a major dispute in political circles in Tokyo over the next few years.

CHINA'S XINHAI REVOLUTION, 1911

Another area where army influence was on the increase was China. Japanese politicians had watched the instability of China since the deaths of the Empress Dowager and the Emperor in 1908 and her far-reaching reform programme with some paternalistic anxiety. An army position paper of December 1910 speculated that Japan's annexation of Korea and the Russo-Japanese agreement over Mongolia were accelerating the collapse of Qing China. Japan was expecting a breakdown of some sort in China and generally felt that she had a greater stake there than any outside power and must be ready for any collapse of the dynasty otherwise other powers would start cashing in.

When the revolution took place at Wuchang on 10 October 1911 and ultimately overthrew the Qing dynasty, Japan favoured a path of intervention to establish constitutional monarchy for China and agreed to

help the Qing government with arms. But she realized that she could not expect to uphold this promise on her own. Uppermost in Tokyo's thinking were the guarantees relating to Manchuria that she had been given by the Beijing government in the Sino-Japanese treaties of December 1905. It was natural, therefore, to back the central government rather than the revolutionary republicans who were not bound by earlier undertakings. The cabinet resolved on 24 October to ensure the *status quo* in Manchuria and support the central government. To this end, the Foreign Ministry tried to stabilize Sino-Japanese relations by negotiating at Beijing. Yuan Shikai asked Japan to announce its support for the monarchy if a collapse was imminent (*NGB M* 44, V bekkan (Shinkoku jihen); Etō 1986: 92–3). But Japan changed her stance when it became clear that she had underestimated republican strength in the south and was irritated by Britain's role in promoting Yuan as the party most likely to ensure stability throughout the country. When Sun Yat-sen became interim president of the new southern republic and in February Yuan took over as provisional president after the young emperor's abdication, Japan came to realize that the monarchical cause was lost. Therefore, she switched to an official policy of non-intervention alongside Britain ('Tai-Shin seisaku ni taisuru ken') (*NGNB* 1955, 24 October 1911: 356–7).

These official efforts to return China to stability in order to protect the interests and property of Japan's nationals were undermined by independent military action in the south and centre. The army was well equipped to deal with the revolutionaries there. For some time there had been in existence the category of *Shina-tsū* – well-qualified intelligence officers with regular assignments in China – and there were also Japanese officers embedded in localized Chinese armies. Officers such as Colonels Aoki Norizumi (Nobuzumi) and Banzai Rihachirō at the Beijing legation had acquired expert knowledge of China. They were now fully mobilized and widely dispersed to Chinese cities north and south. The Japanese government also benefited from the students mainly from south China who had come to Japan for education and training at military colleges (*shikan gakkō*). While their political loyalty towards Japan was suspect, they could be useful co-operators. Britain was envious that Japanese intelligence on China was of such a high quality. There were also many Japanese adventurers at large in China, keeping in touch with the revolutionaries (*British Documents on Foreign Affairs* [hereafter *BDOFA*] 1989: para. 15, p. 37; Tobe 1999: 39–42, 53–63; Woodhouse 2004: 63–4).

In the chaotic circumstances prevailing, much depended on individual initiatives which governments could not control. The military was split between those in the higher ranks in Tokyo, who sided with the cautious official line and those who thought the current opportunities should not be passed over. Junior officers were by no means satisfied with the cautious Gaimushō line.[7] They were adroit in arranging finance and covert supplies for revolutionaries in order to help them resist the central army. General Utsunomiya Tarō, head of No. 2 bureau

in the General Staff dealing with overseas intelligence, was involved in dealings with Mitsubishi, Tokyo, for loans for China. Having a considerable garrison at Hankow, Japan was keeping an eye on the fortunes of the Hanyehping enterprises in the Yangtse valley. Mitsui gave loans on condition that the beneficiaries operated under joint Sino-Japanese management. On 27 January 1912, Ōkura-gumi, in association with the Yokohama Specie Bank, completed loan negotiations with the revolutionary government to guarantee the Shanghai-Fengjing railway. Japan's shipping line, NYK, was similarly negotiating with the China Steamship Company.

Chinese revolutionaries benefited from these approaches. When he eventually returned to China at the end of 1911, SunYat-sen was not reluctant to ask for Japanese help. He approached the Shanghai branch of Mitsui which granted him several large loans. On 10 January 1912, Sun sent a telegram asking Japan to help in establishing a central bank for China. His purpose was to draw on Japan's expertise but also to tap into Japanese funds. While Japan's leaders responded positively, they were slow in proceeding and Sun found it urgent to seek an immediate loan elsewhere. When, however, Sun yielded the presidency to Yuan Shikai, his standpoint changed and he gave up his intention of setting up such a bank with Japanese aid. He conducted loan negotiations with Japan first as an agent for Yuan and later on behalf of forces against Yuan.

In this way Japan's objectives had spread during these revolutionary months from concentrating on Manchuria to assisting the revolutionary party to the south of the Great Wall. The diverse activities in which Japan was involved must have been known to the Saionji cabinet but, when challenged, the government professed it could do little because, if Japan did not grasp the opportunities available, other countries would. The cabinet did however send over General Shiba Gorō, who had previously been military attaché to the London embassy, to Hankow in 1913, in order to have some oversight over the diverse military and financial enterprises.

Manchuria and Mongolia were a central concern. The Japanese army in Manchuria was afraid that the revolutionaries might expand towards south Manchuria and considered it vital that the garrisons at Port Arthur be increased in order to safeguard Japan's substantial investments, and that parts of the Beijing to Mukden line should be occupied. It sought confirmation of Japan's railway privileges. Minister Uchida Yasuya confirmed this in the Diet in March. The Manchu warlord, Chang Tsolin, was honest in saying that nothing could be worse than the republican movement expanding from the Yangtse up to China's Northeast provinces. Contacts were opened between the Kwantung Army and Chang, who must have been aware of a possible split between pro-Qing groups in Manchuria and China and a group of *Shina rōnin* who were active in the province. However, when Yuan's republic established itself, Chang became reconciled to its existence with the help of a large sum of money (Inoue 1990: 280ff.; McCormack 1977: 27).

Meanwhile, Mongol leaders took advantage of the collapse in Beijing to declare independence from the republican government of China. In July 1911, the Mongol aristocrats had already taken steps to break up China's world order. In December, they issued the Urga declaration. President Yuan later protested; but the Mongolian rulers responded that they had no intention of returning to the *status quo ante*. Indeed they were aiming for a political union of all Mongols and seeking as much foreign support as possible from interested powers such as Russia and Japan. Both countries latched on to these anti-revolutionary movements.

This led a group of military men from the Kwantung Army and the related government authorities (*Tōtokufu*) to pursue a Manchu-Mongol (*ManMō*) independence policy of their own, with Kawashima Naniwa as the principal operator. They persuaded Prince Su to become the leader of a group of Manchu nobles to initiate this policy at Port Arthur. The Foreign Ministry was against the Kwantung movement and Kawashima's far-fetched ideas which it described as narrow. Thus, the independence movement in Inner Mongolia was disavowed by the Saionji cabinet. Su withdrew. But these ideas lingered on and were not (in Kawashima's thinking) 'live coals that could be completely snuffed out'. All the while, the Kawashima group acquired large quantities of arms from the Japanese army which were sent under Japanese escort into Inner Mongolia. On occasion these convoys led to clashes between Chinese and Japanese forces causing casualties (Kurihara, ed. 1967: 144; *Nihon gaikō bunsho, Taishō* 1965; Liu 2006: ch. 1).

These ongoing independence operations were subject to two objections. One is illustrated by the British Foreign Office's plea to Tokyo to urge those involved not to promote schemes for 'the separation of Manchuria from China' which would only destabilize Yuan's faltering regime. However, despite the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Tokyo did not welcome British intervention on such subjects and refused to accept the advice (Nakami 1999: 137-41)[8]. The other objection was that Kawashima's plans were inconsistent with Japan's policy of rapprochement with Russia at the time. Was the Kwantung Army trying to separate Mongols from Russians by trying to unite Inner and Outer Mongolia? Certainly the Tokyo government was not spoiling for a fight. The third Russo-Japanese agreement was signed on 15 July 1912, establishing Japanese and Russian spheres of influence in Outer Mongolia and Inner (Eastern) Mongolia, the latter becoming part of Japan's sphere of influence. This agreement extended the line of demarcation (*bunkaisen*) as set out in the 1907 treaty with most of Eastern Mongolia recognized by Russia as falling inside Japan's sphere.

The army was not alone in its expansionism. The diverse activities of a combination of financiers, traders and adventurers created a disorderly picture that was to damage Japan's reputation in China's eyes for decades to come. But it was not a time of strong government and there were so many secret individual initiatives in play during the months of

the Chinese revolution that the official Japanese 'policy' of studied neutrality became blurred. Japan, while mainly anxious about Manchuria, gave the impression of favouring both sides.

CONSTITUTIONAL CRISES

As 1914 approached, Japan was riven by constitutional crises. At the root of these was the conflict between the military and the political parties which had come into being with the constitution of 1889 and were becoming increasingly vociferous in the 1910s. One effect of the republican disruption in China was to induce the army to take a more active political role and try to prevent the disruption so close to Japan's shores from spreading to her new colony of Korea. Military influence increased and became more militant, fearing that Japan was about to lose a great opportunity. The army called for two new infantry divisions. This was opposed by the Saionji cabinet and the navy which itself wanted a share of the defence budget. There were differences between the parties and calls for them to bury these differences. But their standpoint was generally the same, namely that the army and navy belonged to the people and it was up to the nation's representatives to decide whether the services should be expanded. On 15 May 1912, when a general election took place, giving the governing Seiyūkai party a substantial majority of 211, the army reacted by saying that party government had led to public indifference about defence. The tug-of-war was fundamental and led to many noisy sessions in the Diet.

The Army was split into groups advocating restraint and those favouring expansion. War Minister General Ishimoto who was a Chōshū man belonging to Katsura's group and had been amenable to political realities died on 12 April. The army appointed in his place General Uehara Yūsaku from Satsuma, known to be a continental expansionist. Yūsaku, with the backing of Yamagata, was ready for a showdown over budgeting for the army. But Saionji strongly resisted pressure coming from within his government. On 2 December, Uehara expressed in the cabinet his dissatisfaction with the decision taken to reject his proposals to increase the army by two divisions. He therefore resigned directly to the emperor as the Meiji constitution allowed; and the generals refused to fill the vacant cabinet post.[9] This concerted action by the army led in December to the collapse of the Saionji cabinet which could not exist without a war minister who had to be chosen from the active list. This was an example of the constitutional powers for which the army had managed to gain acceptance (Lone 2000: 175–9). It was an all too easy way to bring down a democratic government.

To general surprise General Katsura returned briefly as prime minister. Partly he could not resist a return to politics; partly he saw himself as a moderate figure, slightly detached from Yamagata and the military party and one who might be able to forge some compromise between army and civilians. To this end, Katsura became a leader of the Dōshikai

party and posed as a conciliatory figure of moderation. But when illness struck him he was forced to resign after two months of his unpopular administration (Lone 2000: 179–82).[10]

There was a reverse in the army's fortunes in February 1913 when Admiral Yamamoto Gonnohyōe was appointed prime minister and formed his so-called 'naval cabinet' based on the Satsuma clan. The army was still calling for two new infantry divisions, a proposal which was opposed by the political parties and the navy which was now in a position to fulfil its own building plans. The same governmental crisis which had broken out in 1912 arose again in 1913. In June, General Kigoshi, the Minister for the Army, was forced to resign from the cabinet because of opposition from the military party to his views on the two new divisions and the appointment of civilians at the head of fighting services. Acting on behalf of his constituency, Yamamoto presented a budget based on a large expansion of the navy. But this was dismissed by the House of Peers. Failing to pass his budget and confronted by accusations of financial irregularities regarding the Siemens scandal, Yamamoto was not unhappy to resign in February.

A second Chinese revolution in the form of a north-south rebellion against President Yuan Shikai had broken out in August 1913. Ijuin, the retiring minister to China who was seen as the scapegoat for Japan's failed policy, had delivered a petition to the Foreign Ministry, criticizing the Japanese army for stirring up extremist elements in China (Woodhouse 2004: 128, 133–4; *BDOFA* 1993: para. 92, p. 353). As before, the Japanese army became involved. A number of attacks on Japanese civilians, officers and troops took place, most notably those which came to be known as the Yenchou, Hankou and Nanjing incidents. Japan was in no mood to tolerate such atrocities and strengthened its naval force at Nanjing in September. It then officially demanded an apology from President Yuan (Lowe 1969: 110-19; *NGNB* 1955, 10 September 1913; Tobe 1999: 51-2). Since the Chinese hesitated, Japanese opinion was stirred up. Abe Moritarō, who was head of the Political Bureau in Foreign Ministry, produced a cautious memorandum calling for a limited expansionist programme. This led to his being generally regarded as a spokesman for Japan's weak-kneed continental policy. He became the focus of widespread indignation and was assassinated by 'a jingoist youth' in September. The Foreign Ministry buildings were attacked because it was thought to be advocating moderate policies. It was generally believed that the military party was responsible for these incidents.

In the ten years following the Russo-Japanese War, there had been big changes but no need for fighting. In particular, relations between Russia and Japan, the most likely source of conflict after 1905, had not been bad. It was the instability in Korea and China which aggravated the government and the military. Britain's analysis of the China crisis of 1911–13 was that 'while the attitude of the Japanese Government has been studiously correct, the less restrained elements among the Japanese population warmly supported the revolt and even Japanese officials are

alleged to have given active help' (*BDOFA* 1993: para. 83, p. 351). But there was not an atmosphere of domestic peace in Japan. On the contrary, there was a tug-of-war – or perhaps more than one – taking place in Japanese politics and society.

In this chapter I have drawn attention to the tug-of-war within the army which came to the fore in 1912-13 between radical junior officers and the more establishment-oriented senior officers who generally came from the Chōshū group. These reflected tensions which existed also in lower ranks, similar to those which Professor Shillony describes for a later period in his studies of militarism. However, these groups contrived to present a common front against the politicians, the political parties and the bureaucrats, who found it difficult to exert civilian control over them. This second tug-of-war was reminiscent of Bismarck's failure to discipline the German army and integrate it with German civil society. As the forces of restraint and expansionism clashed in 1913, it was clear that the tug-of-war had not resulted in victory for either party and only led to distrust. It only illustrated the fragility of Japanese politics which led to cabinets often being short-lived. The scholar Yokoi Tokio, reviewing the political scene, wrote in 1908: 'If Japan were to become drunk with the glory of victory and give in to an adventurous spirit by moving increasingly toward militarism . . . the future could only be anticipated with great foreboding.'[11] While recognizing this danger, Japan pursued her national interest by limited incursions on the Asian continent.

NOTES

1 Recent studies include Duus (1995), Matsusaka (2001) and Kowner (ed.) (2007). A useful short essay is Iguchi (1994).

2 See Hayashi's memoirs in Pooley (ed.) (1915: 223-7). For the open and secret treaties see *NGB M* 40/I, no. 182.

3 Itō's attitude to his role in Korea is indicated in Kaneko (ed.) (1943: 1012–15).

4 *NGB M* 40/III, no. 2199 shows Itō's awareness of foreign countries' suspicions of Japan.

5 The phrase 'Cromerism in Korea' is used to describe Itō's approach in Lone (2000: 130–4).

6 Komura's approach to annexation is indicated in Conroy (1960: 375–9); Kaneko (ed.) (1943: 1012–15).

7 See Tanaka to Oka as quoted in Dickinson (1999: 103).

8 The Meiji Emperor told Yamagata that he was pleased that causes of conflict with Russia were to be removed. Despite the indisposition which was to lead to his death on 30 July, he attended the session of Privy Council to ratify it because he sensed its particular urgency (Keene 2002: 700).

9 On the military's approach to the Meiji Emperor, see Banno (2001: 86–7).

10 Kobayashi (2006) quotes Katsura saying that politics was his life ('yō ga seimei wa seiji de aru'). Katsura died in October 1913 at the age of sixty-seven.

11 Quoted in Oka (1982: 213–14).

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Facing a Dilemma: Japan's Jewish Policy in the Late 1930s

NAOKI MARUYAMA

INTRODUCTION

In December 1937, the Far Eastern Jewish National Conference was held in Harbin, Manchuria (North-eastern region of China). Although the Jewish community of Harbin sponsored the conference, the Japanese authorities in Harbin not only permitted the Jews of Harbin to organize the conference, but also dispatched the Japanese military and diplomatic officials to the conference. Isolated since the withdrawal from the League of Nations in March 1933 in the wake of the Manchurian Incident, Japan turned to the Fascist camp by concluding the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany in November 1936. Judging from her increasingly close relations with Nazi Germany, Japan's stance toward the Jewish conference seemed to be strange. In fact, General Higuchi Kiichiro, head of the Special Service Agency of the Army in Harbin, attended the opening ceremony of the conference and even delivered a speech. He emphasized Japan's impartial attitude towards the Jews, which differed from her European ally (without mentioning Germany by name), and boasted of Japan's generous treatment of the Jewish residents in Japan and Manchukuo. If Japan had considered the Fascist alliance as vital, it is surprising that she took the risk of irritating her ally by helping the Jews hold a conference in a city under Japan's control. Why then did Japan commit herself to the Jewish Conference?

JEWISH LIFE IN HARBIN

Harbin was a small village, but the railroad construction boom that occurred in the late nineteenth century brought prosperity to Harbin. Russia acquired the concession to construct the railroads from the

Chinese and set up base in Harbin. When the construction of the railroads started in 1898, workers and traders including the Jews came to this remote land of the Far East from all over Russia. By 1903, the Jewish population in Manchuria, mainly concentrated in Harbin, grew to five hundred and they established their community. By January 1919, the Jewish community in Harbin numbered more than ten thousand and at its peak in the 1920s it numbered approximately fifteen thousand (Shickman-Bowman 1999: 191). Over time, Harbin, the cultural centre of all Russian Jewish life in China, 'served as a base for the Far Eastern Jewish National Council, recognized by the Japanese and Manchukuo authorities as the representative body of all the Jews in China' (Bresler 1999: 200–201). When Israel Cohen, the emissary dispatched by the World Zionist Organization, visited Harbin in 1920, he wrote in his diary: 'Harbin enjoyed the three-fold novelty of being a Russian city on Chinese territory with Japanese currency' (1925: 161).

The Jews, who accounted for only three per cent of the whole population of Harbin, were engaged in businesses such as fur, construction materials, grain and soybeans. The leading figure of the Jewish community was Dr Avraham I. Kaufman, physician. However, the destiny of the Jewish community in Harbin took a turn for the worse after the Manchurian Incident of 1931. Japan's Kwantung Army occupied Harbin in February 1932. The establishment of Manchukuo was then declared in March 1932. Pogroms erupted in many parts of Manchuria, where the Jews were victimized by White Russians' hatred. The latter claimed that the Jews were responsible for overthrowing the Romanov Dynasty. Meanwhile, the Jewish population began to decrease after the Great Depression of 1929, shrinking to about 5,000 in 1931 (Oyama 1941: 74–5). Harbin was no longer safe for the Jewish residents. In 1933, a son of the owner of the Hotel Modern on the busiest street of Harbin was kidnapped and murdered in cold blood by White Russian gangs. The social and political uneasiness in the lands where Jews resided became a living nightmare for them. They were incessantly scared and harassed by White Russian Fascist gangs' pogroms. It was natural that the Jews, who were relatively vulnerable against these Russians, had no choice but to rely on Japan's policy so long as they lived under Japanese rule.

THE FIRST FAR EASTERN JEWISH NATIONAL CONFERENCE

In January 1938, Tsurumi Ken, Japanese Consul General of Harbin, dispatched a telegram to Foreign Minister Hirota Kōki, informing him of the inside story of the conference which Tsurumi obtained from Major Kawamura Aizō, head of the Gendarmerie, who had contact with local Jews.[1] According to Kawamura, the conference was first proposed by the local Jews in Harbin. Dr Kaufman called on Kawamura and said that they recognized Japan's elevated position in the Far East after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and decided to turn to Japan for help. Hereafter,

Kaufman said, they would seek ways of survival in conformity with the policies of Japan and Manchukuo. They then asked Kawamura to obtain the prior consent of Japanese and Manchukuo's authorities with the aim of organizing the Far Eastern Jewish National Council and the conference. In response to this, Major Kawamura replied: 'If you act in secrecy, it will invite distrust from outside. Japan and Manchukuo will assist those who come to turn to Japan. Therefore you should act in public.' Kawamura's advice encouraged Kaufman to advance the establishment of the Council and the conference. General Higuchi also agreed to this idea and attended the opening ceremony of the conference to give a congratulatory speech. The telegram concluded that the preparations for the conference were underway from March 1937 among various Jewish communities of the Far East, but in view of the remarkable military achievements of the Japanese forces after the start of the Sino-Japanese War, the Jews were spurred to secure their dependence on Japan. It was said that Dr Kaufman intended to unify the Jewish communities of the Far East under his leadership and promote the Jewish liberation movement (Kawamura 1970; Kawamura 1999: 362).

Twenty-one delegates representing the Jewish communities of Harbin, Mukden, Dairen, Hailar, Tsitsihar, Tientsin and Kobe as well as about five hundred Jews of the local community of almost five thousand in Harbin attended the conference. The following Japanese guests were invited to the conference: Army Major General Higuchi, Army Major Onouchi Hiroshi of the Harbin Special Service Agency, Army Major Kawamura of the Gendarmerie, Army Colonel Yasue Norihiro who took an official trip from Tokyo and Vice-Consul Taniguchi of Consulate General of Harbin.[2] From Manchukuo, Yūki Seitarō, Vice-Governor of Binjiang Province of Manchukuo, attended the conference.[3] Japan's official involvement in the conference was indubitable. Although the Jewish representatives from Shanghai and Hong Kong did not come to Harbin, the Jews of Shanghai telegraphed a congratulatory message to the conference. It was only from the second conference on that the delegate of Shanghai participated.[4]

The opening ceremony of the conference took place at the Harbin Commercial Club on 26 December 1937. Three flags – Japan's Rising Sun, Manchukuo's five-colour flag (yellow, red, blue, white and black representing five races) and the Jewish Magen David – were displayed on the wall of the rostrum of the hall and guarded by the young members of the Harbin Betar (Brith Trumpeldor – Zionist youth movement). Chairman Dr Avraham Kaufman greeted all those in attendance, and a rabbi recited a prayer in Hebrew. Kaufman again gave an opening statement: 'The world Jewry is now in most miserable conditions. However, the Jews who live in Japan and Manchukuo enjoy the rights of equality' (Third Section of the Navy General Staff 1938). Then he declared the opening of the conference, praying for the future of the Jewish communities of the Far East which would work towards the building of the Jewish nation in Palestine.

Following the opening declaration, Major General Higuchi stood up and gave an impressive speech:

> While we find quite serious Jewish problems in some European countries, Manchukuo with the national manifesto of 'Gozoku Kyōwa' [five-family harmony] offers sufficient protection for the hard-working and righteous Jewish people and tolerates their peaceful existence just as Japan does. I am sure that Manchukuo hopes to cooperate in the construction of the peaceful world of the '*Ōdō Rakudo*' [kingcraft paradise] together with the Jewish people . . . I sincerely look forward to the Jews making a great historical contribution to the objective of building the New Far East. (Third Section of the Navy General Staff 1938)

Higuchi's speech was greeted by a storm of applause from all the Jews present. Some guests became highly emotional, shedding tears of gratitude. Kaufman again rose to the rostrum and expressed gratitude to Higuchi. Then the three national anthems were played by the band of the Saint Vladimir School. In the hall, plainclothes policemen took strict precautions against any barbarism by White Russian Fascists.

GERMANY'S PROTEST

The following declaration was adopted at the end of the first day of the conference:

1. The Far Eastern Jewish National Conference (FEJNC) expresses its gratitude to the favourable treatment by the authorities of both Japan and Manchukuo;
2. FEJNC emphasizes that the correct policy, which makes possible for the Jewish people their survival as an autonomous nation and individual cultural development in conformity with their religious, national and historical tradition, has been implemented in the advanced countries of Japan and Manchukuo;
3. Although the Jews are deprived of their human rights and national rights in some countries, they enjoy every kind of national right and complete freedom in economic activities to the same degree as other nationals living in both Japan and Manchukuo;
4. There is no oppression against minorities that degrades the moral virtue of the nation and hurts the common culture of human beings in both Japan and Manchukuo;
5. The Jewish residents in both Japan and Manchukuo devote their abilities and powers as loyal subjects to the development of the country where they live in awareness of their duties to the country; and,
6. FEJNC recollects the fact that Japan took part in the declarations for the construction of the Jewish state in Palestine during the time of the First World War. (Third Section of the Navy General Staff 1938; Maruyama 1984; Maruyama 1999)

The German Government was obviously displeased with Japan's official involvement in the Far Eastern Jewish National Conference. Its Tokyo Embassy filed a protest with the Japanese Foreign Ministry, which then forwarded it to the Army Ministry. The latter inquired the Kwantung Army of the fact. However, Tōjō Hideki, Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army ignored it.[5]

THE MANCHURIAN ECONOMY

Why did Japan commit to the Jewish conference in Harbin and irritate the Germans? What was the aim of Japan's 'generous' policy toward the Jews in Manchuria? The answers to these questions need to be analysed in the context of Japan's international position in the Far East.

Manchukuo was founded in March 1932 in defiance of world-wide criticism. Manchuria promised rich mineral resources – iron, coal, coke, oil shale, etc. – to Japan. However, Manchukuo soon faced a harsh reality. At first, Japan's idle capital was introduced to develop the Manchurian economy. From about 1936, Japan's economy changed to a quasi-wartime one as military maneuvres escalated. Consequently, inflation advanced and Japan's domestic financial market ran into a shortage of capital. It became difficult for Manchukuo to attract idle Japanese capital. Meanwhile, the economic integration of Manchukuo and Japan was promoted to save the former's deteriorating economy. The Army General Staff drafted the Five Year Development Plan for Manchuria in 1936.

The Japan-Manchukuo economic integration was further advanced. In 1937 the *Manshū Jūkōgyō Kaihatsu Kabushiki Kaisha* (Manchurian Heavy Industrial Development Corporation: *Mangyō*) was established to promote heavy industries such as steel, coal, automobiles and airplanes. The *Nihon Sangyō Kabushiki Kaisha* (The Japan Industry Company: *Nissan*) was moved to Manchuria and its president Ayukawa Yoshisuke took office as president of *Mangyō*. The *Manshū Jūkōgyō Kakuritsu Yōkō* (The Outline for the Establishment of Heavy Industries in Manchuria) which was decided upon by the Cabinet on 22 October 1937, called for the introduction of foreign capital (Iguchi 2003: 48). In those days, Japan made several attempts to obtain loans from overseas financial markets in the United States, Switzerland, etc.[6] Ayukawa, in particular, was said to entertain the notion that the introduction of foreign capital from the United States, especially of American Jewish capital to Manchuria, would lead the United States to recognize Manchukuo (Murakami 1968: 393–4). Moreover, in December 1937, George R. Merrell, American Consul General of Harbin, reported the contents of his talk with a correspondent of the *New York Times* in Northern China to Washington:

> The 'Manchukuo' government hoped to raise M. Yuan 1,000,000,000, to be invested in Manchuria and that Mr Yoshisuke Ayukawa was being sent to the United States for that purpose . . . [Naoki] Hoshino

> and [Nobusuke] Kishi replied that they felt the investment of American capital in Manchuria would improve relations between the two countries and would materially assist in the development of the so-called heavy industries such as iron, steel, coal, zinc, lead, automotive and airplane industries.[7]

At the same time, among the ranks of the upper echelon of the Japanese Army, some people such as Itagaki Seishirō, high staff officer, were enthusiastic about bringing American capital to Manchuria, in order to solve its financial difficulties (Chō 1971: 131–7). Furthermore, on 3 July 1938, a month after Itagaki was appointed the Army Minister of the Konoe Cabinet, the Army compiled the document '*Jikyoku Gaikō ni kansuru Rikugun no Kibō* (The Hope of the Army concerning the Current Diplomacy)', and in the document mentioned its desire to introduce American capital (Usui 1963: 147).

THE JEWISH CARD

Ishiwara Kanji, who played a central role in the Manchurian Incident together with General Itagaki, was an ardent proponent of the Manchurian development plan. When he resigned from his post as Vice-Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army and returned home in the summer of 1938, he proposed to seriously consider the Jewish problem in the context of Japan's policy towards the United States in his memorandum '*Gaikō Kokusaku ni kansuru Shoken* (The View on the Diplomatic Policy of the Nation)'. Ishiwara regretted that the Jewish problem was not seriously studied despite its importance to Japan, pointing to the problem as a means through which to improve the deteriorating American sentiment of Japan. Ishiwara says:

> The Far Eastern Jewish National Conference which took place in Harbin at the end of last year had a great impact on all the Jewish people. However, Japan did not avail herself of this opportunity effectively on grounds of worrying about her relationship with Germany. Although German persecution of the Jews is not baseless, Japan should consider the problem calmly and judge it fairly. My view is that we ask for German consent and exploit the Jews thoroughly as well as take a more active role in building the Jewish state at the corner of the Far East. This would undoubtedly have a far-reaching influence on the public opinion in the United States. (Ishiwara 1967: 292)

Moreover, such moves raised Japan's expectations of achieving conciliation with the United States over the early settlement of the Sino-Japanese War. In the Army, diplomatic negotiations were repeatedly investigated with an emphasis on conciliation with the United States to end the war in China at an early stage (Mitani 1984: 304–306).

In short, within both the army and the business circles there were

groups that shared the same view with regard to the Jewish problem. According to the economist Chō, the army and the business circles entertained the same evaluation of the introduction of American capital to Manchuria. They believed that its introduction for the economic construction of Manchukuo and for the important strategy of controlling the escalation of the war in China, would be beneficial to actively promote Japan's conciliation with the United States by responding favourably to American demands for an Open Door policy and equal opportunity in East Asia (Chō 1971: 136).

Since the Sino-Japanese War had been prolonged, the Army eagerly pursued an alliance with Germany and Italy in order to deter Britain and Russia from aiding the Chinese. Furthermore, Russia was building up her military in the Far East. In fact, Russian forces clashed with the Japanese on the Mongolian-Manchurian border in 1938 and 1939 and imposed heavy casualties on the Japanese. Highly modernized Soviet forces in the border areas continued to constitute a formidable threat to the Kwantung Army. This being the case, the Kwantung Army had to avoid further deterioration in the relations between Japan and the United States. If the Japanese treated the Jews under their control favourably in consideration of the so-called world-wide Jewish influence, it would not seem strange to expect benefits from the Jewish communities around the world, especially in the United States. Strangely enough, within the military establishment two apparently contradictory groups – the one which advocated military alliance with Germany and the other which tried to exploit the Jewish influence from the viewpoint of Japan-US relations – coexisted until the time of the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact in 1940.

JAPAN'S INTENTION

The Japanese Foreign Ministry gave instructions to its overseas legations to report on the reaction of their countries concerning the Far Eastern Jewish National Conference.[8] At the same time, the Third Section of the Navy General Staff in charge of intelligence completed a report entitled '*Tai Eiso Shisakujō Riyō Subeki Yudaya Shidō Kaikyū no Dōkō narabi ni Eiso gawa no Kansatsu: Kyokutō Yudaya Jinmin Kaigi no Kōsa* (The Attitude of the Jewish leaders to be exploited for the policies towards Britain and the Soviet Union and Observations on Britain and the Soviet Union: Consideration of the Far Eastern Jewish National Conference) on 18 January 1938.[9] Interestingly, this report contains the following views:

1. As the countries concerned, such as Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, France, China, Germany, Italy and others, are deeply interested in the [Japanese] Empire's Jewish policy, the Empire should take serious notice of it.
2. The Empire should take note of world reactions to the policy statements made by the Jewish leaders, especially those of dependence on Japan and a strong sentiment of gratitude.

3. The Empire should propagate the results of the FEJNC to world Jewry.

These views reveal why the Japanese committed themselves to the controversial conference.

Needless to say, Japan was far from persecuting the Jews. The Jewish population in Japan is almost negligible compared with that in Europe and the United States. Since American Jewish Banker Jacob H. Schiff helped Japan's floating of war bonds in the overseas financial markets during the Russo-Japanese War, many Japanese perceived the Jews as an important factor in the context of Japan-US relations. Therefore, if the Japanese assisted the Jews of Harbin to organize the conference and made public Japan's moderate policy towards those poor Jews who were in a quandary over finding a haven, from the viewpoint of the propaganda directed at world opinion, especially in the United States, it would help contribute, in the eyes of the Japanese, to such vital interests as the introduction of American capital to Manchukuo, the improvement of the worsening image of Japan among the Americans and the consequent realization of Japan-US conciliation. Until the time when Japan entered into military alliance with Germany and Italy in September 1940, it can be said that certain quarters of the Kwantung Army and the business circles in Japan regarded the Jewish card as a means of improving the deteriorating Japan-US relations. In fact, the British Consul General in Harbin dispatched the following cynical report about the conference and Japan's motivation to London in March 1938:

> In January, Major General Higuchi called a meeting of the Jewish community at which he promised them his support. In return for this the Jewish community expressed their loyalty to Manchukuo and their satisfaction at being allowed to live in this peaceful and well-ordered state. At the end of January the Russian Fascist newspaper '*Nash Put* (Our Way)' was suppressed . . . It is known that '*Nash Put* 'was at one time subsidized by the Japanese Military Mission [Special Service Agency], so that its suppression seems to mark the beginning of a new policy. Quite why, in view of the Berlin – Rome – Tokyo axis, this moment should have been chosen to propitiate the Jews, is not known. But perhaps the Japanese are wiser than their German confrere and realize that the Jews (though not the Harbin Jews) have, in the shape of money, the sinew of war.[10]

In consequence, General Tōjō, Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, ignored the inquiry from Tokyo. Onouchi Hiroshi of the Harbin Special Service Agency who attended the First conference with Higuchi told the author the following:

> The aim of General Higuchi's pro-Jewish stance and his rescue of the Jewish refugees at the border between Manchukuo and the Soviet

> Union was to approach the American Jews from the viewpoint of his anxiety about the deterioration of Japan-US relations. The Kwantung Army approved it tacitly and Tōjō also gave his permission. Moreover, Higuchi was promoted to the General Staff Headquarters after the conference. If he did it only from the viewpoint of his sympathy to the Jews, he would never have been promoted.[11]

As a matter of fact, Higuchi climbed the ladder of promotion in the Army and finished his military career as commander of the Northern Theatre Army at the rank of Lieutenant General. Furthermore, the Far Eastern Jewish National Conference continued to be held in 1938 and 1939 in Harbin in spite of German protests. It might be said that Japan conducted her Jewish policy based on her own interests. The national spirits of Manchukuo justified Japan's Jewish policy. So long as '*Minzoku Kyōwa*' (harmony of races) was the slogan of Manchukuo, it would be altogether unimaginable to persecute the Jewish residents.

THE CIRCULAR NOTE OF GENERAL TŌJŌ

On 25 January 1938, one month after the FEJNC, Tōjō, Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, sent the outline of the Jewish policy compiled by the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army to Hoshino Naoki, Director of the General Affairs Agency of Manchukuo, and a circular note commanding him to conduct Jewish policy based on this outline.[12] The outline illuminates the attitude of the leaders of the Kwantung Army towards the Jewish problem. It says: 'It is ideal for Japan to lead the Jewish nation of the Far East that is gaining power with the change of the times to increasingly depend on Japan and Manchukuo, and then to have an effect on world Jewry.'

In order to realize this goal, the outline emphasizes:

1. The implementation of the Jewish policy should be passive for the time being, namely by avoiding the participation of the public institutions of Japan and Manchukuo, but by pursuing it in secret.
2. It should not be impatient to obtain results in carrying out the operations . . . Not be indiscreet enough to invest the Jewish capital too enthusiastically in order to introduce foreign capital.
3. The operations towards the Jews all over Manchuria are controlled by the Commander of the Kwantung Army.
4. It is important to develop a better understanding of Japan's Jewish policy in Germany and other powers in accordance with the spirits of '*Minzoku Kyōwa*', '*Hakkō Ichiu* (eight corners of the whole world under one roof)' and the cause of anti-communism. Do not invite misunderstanding.

Moreover, the Kwantung Army urges the following measures to be taken by the institutions of Japan and Manchukuo: to keep strict

fairness and be consistent in the principle of being fair and just; to control any oppression of the Jews based only on Jewishness and to carefully have them fully understand that the policy does not provide nationally preferential treatment to them.

The above-mentioned outline contains some politically sensitive content. Therefore, it is understood in the context of delicate diplomacy that General Tōjō Hideki ignored the inquiry of the Army Ministry. In 1933, Simon Kaspe, son of the hotel owner in Harbin was kidnapped and murdered by White Russian gangs. Since Japan was severely criticized in the United States because these gangs were aided by Japanese gendarmes, the Japanese had to take measures to prevent further deterioration of American and European sentiments of Japan from the viewpoint of Japan's international position. Nevertheless, the public opinions in these countries were indifferent to the FEJNC, and disappointed those Japanese who expected favourable responses.

THE COMMITTEE ON MUSLIM AND JEWISH AFFAIRS

In April 1938, Horiuchi Kensuke, Vice-Minister of the Foreign Ministry, sent an official letter to Umezu Yoshijirō, Vice-Minister of the Army Ministry, and Yamamoto Isoroku, Vice-Minister of the Navy Ministry, concerning the establishment of the Committee on Muslim and Jewish Affairs.[13] According to its by-laws, the purpose of the Committee was to 'review the basic policy regarding Muslim and Jewish affairs and carry out that policy with the offices concerned in a unified administration'. The Committee consisted of the Foreign Vice-Minister as its chairman, the directors of the East Asia Bureau, the Europe-Asia Bureau, the America Bureau, the Research Division of the Foreign Ministry, the directors of the Army Affairs Bureau and the Second Division of the General Staff of the Army Ministry and the directors of the Naval Affairs Bureau and the Third Division of the Navy General Staff, in addition to other members involved as secretaries. The reason why the Foreign Ministry took the initiative in organizing the Committee was that the Japanese faced the Jewish problem in areas under Japan's domination and recognized that if they maltreated the Jews, they would incur the wrath of the international community. At the same time, faced with the massive stream of Jewish refugees driven out of Germany into East Asia, the Japanese considered it urgent to establish a basic policy regarding the Jewish problem. The Committee, which was deeply involved in decision-making regarding the Jewish problem and played a role of liaison and coordination among the three ministries, met at the Foreign Ministry whenever necessary.

In March 1938, immediately after the closing of the First Far Eastern Jewish National Conference, several families of Jewish refugees arrived at Otopol, a Manchuria-Soviet border town, and requested permission to enter into Manchukuo. According to Higuchi's memoir, he made attempts to call Manchukuo authorities for permission and eventually

succeeded in doing so (Higuchi 1999: section 7; Sagara 1994: 56-94). Moreover, since September 1938, Yamaji Akira, Japanese Consul General in Vienna asked for instructions on how to respond to Austrian Jewish refugees who came to the Consulate to request visas to Japan.[14] In November 1938, Ōshima Hiroshi, Ambassador to Germany, cabled a report about the travel of these Jewish refugees to Japan, Manchukuo, Shanghai and other areas and also requested that the Government inform him of the decisions regarding methods of keeping the refugees under control.[15] Since German Jews did not need visas to enter into Japan by the mutual visa exemption pact, it was expected that more Jews would come to Japan. The Foreign Ministry was busy dealing with these issues. In fact, on 15 August 1938, fifteen Jewish refugees arrived at Shanghai by sea from Austria after the *Anschluss* (*Israel's Messenger* 1938). Subsequently, refugees continued to pour into the International Settlement in Shanghai where a visa was not demanded in the immigration system of the settlement. Miura Yoshiaki, Japanese Consul General in Shanghai, reported to Tokyo that the Jewish refugees from Germany and Austria reached 1,100 at the end of December 1938, increasing to 1,700–1,800 if the newcomers were added, and predicted in his report that the number of Jewish refugees would reach around 5,000 according to the estimation of new arrivals expected in January and February 1939.[16]

THE FIVE MINISTERS CONFERENCE

It was under these conditions that, on 6 December 1938, the Five Ministers Conference (Prime Minister Konoe, Foreign Minister Arita, Army Minister Itagaki, Navy Minister Yonai and Finance Minister Ikeda) decided on Japan's basic policy regarding the Jews.[17]

The main points of the basic policy were as follows:[18]

> As it is pivotal to maintain friendly relations with Germany and Italy in the Empire's diplomacy at present, it should avoid in principle actively inviting the Jews expelled by allied powers to the Empire. However, if it drives them out by extreme means as Germany does, this is not only in discord with the spirit of racial equality that the Empire has advocated for many years, but also incurs disadvantageous results from the viewpoint of the execution of war, *especially from that of introducing foreign capital necessary for economic construction, and evading deterioration of relations with the United States in the national emergency*. (Italics mine)

The policy then goes on to propose the following three courses of action:

1. The Jews now living in Japan, Manchukuo and China are to be treated fairly with other nationals. No special measures for expelling them are to be taken.

2. The Jews coming to Japan, Manchukuo and China are generally to be treated subject to existing regulations of immigration for foreigners.
3. No attempt to invite the Jews eagerly to Japan, Manchukuo and China is to be made, but such Jews with utility value as financiers and technicians are to be exempted from this.

Foreign Minister Arita informed Japan's overseas legations including Germany, the United States and Manchukuo about the decision, and ordered them to cope with the problems, including the issuance of immigration visas for the Jewish refugees based on this policy. At a glance, this policy seemed to be unique. That is, Japan took an even-handed stance between the Germany – Italy alliance and the United States: on the one hand, she thoughtfully considered the friendly relations with Germany and Italy, but on the other hand she cared for the future of Japan – US relations. However, at that particular time the idea of strengthening the Anti-Comintern Pact grew in both Japan and Germany. In early 1938, the Germans proposed to Japan their idea that the main enemies should include Britain and France in addition to the Soviet Union. Faced with growing German pressure, the Japanese Government was sharply divided between the Army who supported the German proposal, and the Foreign Ministry and the Navy who were opposed to any alliance which included relating to Britain and France as enemies. Therefore, it would be said that the basic policy adopted at the Five Ministers Conference reflected Japan's diplomatic stance towards Germany and the United States, shown in the division of views among the parties concerned within the Government on the German proposal.

THE SECOND FAR EASTERN JEWISH NATIONAL CONFERENCE

The Second conference took place from 26 to 28 December 1938 in Harbin on the memorial occasion of the thirty-fifth year of the establishment of the Jewish Association of Harbin. Instead of the Harbin Special Service Agency which contributed to the conference from behind the scenes, *Kyōwakai* (Association of Harmony) of Manchukuo, one of the political groups of Manchukuo under Japan's influence, came to the fore. Colonel Yasue Norihiro, head of the Dairen Special Service Agency, replaced Major General Higuchi, who was relocated to the Army General Staff in Tokyo. Before the conference, Kaufman, chairman of the conference, met Hashimoto Toranosuke, chief of the Central Headquarters of *Kyōwakai*. Hashimoto assured Kaufman that Manchukuo continued to adhere to the national principle. '*Minzoku Kyōwa*', and that she would never persecute the Jews in Manchukuo from the political point of view. Hashimoto said hopefully that the Jews would continue to observe the national laws and go about their peaceful lives.[19]

On the first day of the conference Dr Kotsuji Seiyū, Japanese scholar

of Judaism, greeted the audience in Hebrew and made a deep impression on the Jewish participants. The conference adopted the resolution that the Jews enjoyed their national equality and national rights in accordance with the national laws of Japan and Manchukuo, and promised to thoroughly cooperate with Japan and Manchukuo having made efforts for reconstructing the New Order of East Asia.

THE THIRD FAR EASTERN JEWISH NATIONAL CONFERENCE

After *Kristallnacht* in November 1938, the Jews remaining in Germany started leaving the country *en masse*. In Japan, the Army still sought military alliance with Germany and Italy. However, suddenly, Germany concluded the Non-Aggression Pact with the Soviet Union in August 1939. This new situation administered a grave shock to Japan's Hiranuma Cabinet and led to its collapse. The negotiation on the military alliance with Germany was naturally brought to an end. Such a change of situation seemed to have an effect on the Third Far Eastern Jewish National Conference, which was held from 23 to 26 December 1939 in Harbin (Special Branch of the Research Division of the South Machurian Railway Company 1940).

The declaration adopted at the conference demanded, first of all, that when five million Jews were now the victims of unprecedented persecution, all the Jews of the Far East would unite and do their best to assist their coreligionists. Then, it continues: 'The Third conference protests severely the persecution and oppression of religion and education of the Jews by European countries.' Although the declaration did not name any specific countries, it was clear that it condemned the Nazi policy of anti-Semitism. Moreover, the declaration expressed their gratitude to the Japanese Empire. 'The conference is satisfied at the condition that rights of equality and national cultural development of all nations including the Jews are guaranteed in Manchukuo, Japan, Northern and Central China. The conference regards it as its duty to inform the Jewish communities in Europe, America and other countries of this.'

On 26 July 1939, the US Government notified Japan of the termination of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation. Japan–US relations entered a new phase. Japan's isolation was remarkably deepened in such a rapidly changing international environment as the Nomonhan Incident, American notice of the termination of the treaty and the conclusion of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. The Hiranuma Cabinet failed to effectively respond to this change and fell on 28 August 1939. The new Prime Minister Abe Nobuyuki who succeeded Hiranuma Kiichirō, tried to mend relations with the US and Britain. In this context of Japan's domestic and international politics, the Third conference was meaningful. The declaration and resolutions adopted at the Third conference were cabled to the Jewish institutions in New York, London and Paris.

THE END OF THE JEWISH CARD

It was the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact that finally put an end to Japan's generous policy toward the Jews. The negotiation on the military alliance with Germany was interrupted in August 1939 as the result of the Germany-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. However, the Second World War broke out and Germany's quick success in the early stages dazzled the eyes of Japanese leaders. Particularly since the fall of Paris in June 1940, voices advocating alliance with Germany were on the rise again within the Government. After all, the Navy who persisted in opposing the alliance to the last was unwilling to be isolated in the Cabinet and joined the Army. On 27 September 1940, the Tripartite Pact was signed in Berlin.

The Jewish card which was expected to attract American capital to the development of Manchukuo and also to improve the American public's image of Japan, was no longer necessary since Japan took sides with the Fascist camp. The Tripartite Pact brought immediate change to Japan's stance towards the Jews. The Fourth Far Eastern Jewish National Conference which was to be held at Dairen in December 1940 was suddenly cancelled. Theodore Kaufman, son of Avraham Kaufman, says: 'We finished arranging for accommodation and sending the letters of invitation for the guests. However, a week before the conference we were ordered to cancel the conference without explanation. Probably it was owing to pro-Nazi element's influence in the Japanese Government.'[20]

The Tripartite Pact came as a deep shock to the Jewish communities in East Asia. In fact, after the conclusion of the pact, some ominous news came in from Germany. In April 1941, the Gestapo dispatched Joseph Meisinger who was notorious for his barbarous acts in Poland to the German Embassy of Tokyo as a police attaché. In May 1942, Alfred Rosenberg, Nazi ideologue and Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, warned Ōshima, Japanese Ambassador to Germany, that the Jews were troublesome and suggested segregating them as soon as possible.[21] Meisinger's main tasks, however, were to strengthen German intelligence networks in the Far East and hunt out German citizens disloyal to Hitler in order to send them back home, although there was the possibility that he might urge the Japanese to get rid of the Jews. Even if Rosenberg and Meisinger had put pressure on the Japanese to take a similar stand towards the Jews, Japan would have never followed in the footsteps of Germany.

As a matter of fact, Japan-Germany relations were not cordial. Both countries distrusted each other. Obviously, the Far Eastern Jewish National Conference and Japan's involvement in the conference offended the Germans. The conference took place two more times in spite of Germany's protest. The division of views on the military alliance within the Japanese government also irritated the Germans.

On the other hand, the Japanese did not wholeheartedly rely upon the Germans. First, the Japanese felt disgusted with Germany's pro-China stance. Since the defeat in the First World War, Germany had cultivated

and maintained good relations with China. Germany had evaded recognizing Japan's puppet state, Manchukuo, for a long time. It was in May 1938, after Joachim von Ribbentrop's taking office as Foreign Minister that Germany officially recognized Manchukuo. Ribbentrop recalled Oskar P. Trautmann, German Ambassador to China, who had pursued a pro-China policy. Second, the Japanese were displeased at Germany's surprises such as the Non-Aggression Pact with the Soviet Union in August 1939 and the German attack on the Soviets in June 1941. According to Prime Minister Konoe, Germany betrayed Japan twice. Third and most important, the arrest of Russian spy Richard Sorge who had penetrated the Konoe Cabinet and the German Embassy in Tokyo, shocked the Japanese. Thereafter, all Germans living in Japan and China were strictly watched by the police and the gendarmerie. Fourth, Nazi racist doctrine had some unexpected influence on Japan-Germany relations. In October 1933, Japanese Ambassador to Germany Nagai Matsuzō paid a call to the German Foreign Ministry and asked for an explanation regarding incidents in which Japanese citizens were harassed by members of the National Socialists and a clarification of the term 'coloured races'.[22] Nagai met the German Foreign Vice-Minister and Foreign Minister later and took up the German racist problem. Facing Japan's protest, the German Government made the excuse that the definition of 'coloured races' applied only to the Jews, not the Chinese and the Japanese, asking the Japanese Ambassador to understand its Jewish policy. The Japanese were sensitive to racial discrimination and prejudice if they perceived their people as victims. The segregation of Japanese school children in California in 1906 and the Japanese exclusion legislation in the 1920s aroused bitter hostility in Japan towards the United States.

Later in February 1943, stateless Jewish refugees in Shanghai were ordered by the Japanese authorities to move to a designated area. However, it was not correct to say that Japan followed what the Germans did in Germany and Poland. Although these Jews were driven out of their homes to move them to the area, the enemy nationals including Americans and English were detained and forced to move to the camps prior to these Jewish refugees under the wartime conditions. Moreover, these Jews were able to exit the area with special passes issued by the Japanese, while the enemy nationals were not allowed to go outside. Most important is the fact that the Jewish refugees were not subject to forced labour, not to speak of extermination.

NOTES

1 Telegram from Tsurumi Ken, Consul General of Harbin to Foreign Minister Hirota, 13 January 1938, no. 19-1, 'Minzoku Mondai Kankei Zakken: Yudayajin Mondai' (Miscellaneous Matters on Racial Problems: The Jewish Problem), I.4.6.0.1-2, folder 3, Foreign Ministry Archives (hereafter FMA), Tokyo.

2 Consul General Tsurumi decided not to attend and deliver a congratulatory address at the conference after consultation with Higuchi, lest it would disturb

the relationship between Japan and Germany. Instead, Vice-Consul Taniguchi replaced him to take part in the conference. The details are found in the Foreign Ministry memo entitled 'Zai Kyokutō Yudaya Minkai Dai Ikkai Zentai Kaigi Kaisai ni kansuru Ken' (The Matter Concerning the First Far Eastern Jewish National Conference), 6 January 1938, folder 3; telegram from Tsurumi to Foreign Minister Hirota, no. 325, 22 December 1937, folder 3; telegram from Tsurumi to Hirota, no. 320, 21 December 1937, folder 3, FMA.

3 The details of the conference were recorded in the reports of the FMA folder 3.

4 Solomon Markovich Toukatchinsky (father of Yosef Tekoah) represented the Shanghai Ashkenazi Jewish Association at the Second Conference.

5 This was mentioned in the telegram from Foreign Minister Hirota to Ambassador to the United States Saitō, no. 407, 4 February 1938, folder 3, FMA; Also Higuchi's *Memoir* (1999: 351–8).

6 For example, see the following telegrams: from Tokyo to Secretary of State, no. 596, 4 December 1937, 894.51/527, National Archives (hereafter NA), Washington, DC; from Bern to Secretary of State, no. 44, 17 May 1939, 894.51/630, NA.

7 'Mr Robertson's Conversations in Hsinking', in the report of George R. Merrell, Jr., American Consul General of Harbin to Secretary of State, no. 13, 16 December 1937, 893.01 Manchuria/1493, (LM63, R54), NA.

8 Telegrams from Foreign Minister Hirota to Ambassador to Germany Tōgō Shigenori and Ambassador to the United States Saitō Hiroshi, no. 407, 4 February 1938, and to Ambassador to Poland and Consul General New York, no. 539, 15 February 1938, folder 3, FMA.

9 Folder 3, FMA.

10 'Harbin Consular District Political Report for the March Quarter, 1938', from M. E. Dening to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, no. 15, 25 March 1938, FO 371/22129, Public Record Office, London.

11 The author's interview with Onouchi Hiroshi, 14 February 1978, Tokyo.

12 'Genka ni okeru tai Yudaya Minzoku Shisaku Yōryō Sōhu no Ken' (The Dispatch of the Outline of Policy toward the Jewish Nation at the Current Situation), from Tōjō Hideki to Hoshino Naoki, no.148, 25 January 1938, folder 4, FMA.

13 'Kaikyō oyobi Yudaya Mondai Iinkai ni kansuru Ken' (Regarding the Muslim and Jewish Affairs Committee), from Horiuchi Kensuke to Umezu Yoshijirō and Yamamoto Isoroku, no.1491, 2 April 1938, folder 3, FMA.

14 Telegram from Yamaji Akira to Foreign Minister Konoe, no. 39, 30 September 1938, folder 4, FMA.

15 Telegram from Ōshima Hiroshi to Foreign Minister Arita, no. 701, 6 November 1938, folder 4, FMA.

16 'Shanhai ni okeru Yudayajin Hinanmin no Kyūsai Mondai ni kansuru Ken' (Regarding the Problem of Rescue of the Jewish Refugees in Shanghai), from Miura Yoshiaki to Foreign Minister Arita, no. 187, 17 January 1939, folder 6, FMA.

17 'Yudayajin Taisaku Yōkō' (The Outline for the Jewish Policy) [Decided at the Five Ministers Conference, 6 December 1938], folder 6, FMA.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Telegram from Tsurumi, Consul General of Harbin to Foreign Minister Arita, no. 224, 16 December 1938, folder 5, FMA.

[20] The author's interview with Theodore Kaufman, 10 December 1981, Tel Aviv.

[21] From Ōshima to Foreign Minister Tōgō, no. 601, 7 May 1942, folder 11, FMA.

[22] 'Dokukoku ni okeru Gaikokujin ni taisuru Jiko Hinpatsu oyobi Yūshoku Jinshu Sabetsu ni kanshi Gaimudaijin tō ni Kōgi ni tsuite' (On the Protest to Foreign Minister and Others regarding Frequent Incidents for Foreigners and Discrimination to Coloured Races in Germany), from Nagai to Foreign Minister Hirota, no. 347, 23 October 1933 and 'Dokukoku ni okeru Jinshu Mondai ni kanshi Noirāto Gaishō oyobi Gaimushō Tōyō Kankei Kakarikan no Naiwa ni tsuite' (On the Confidential Talk with Foreign Minister Neurath and Staff in charge of Orient Affairs of Foreign Ministry regarding the Racial Problem in Germany), no. 452, 22 December 1933, in *Gaimushō* (Foreign Ministry) (ed.) (1997: 399-400, 405–406). See also Fox (1969: 46–50).

3

Ethnicity and Gender in the Wartime Japanese Revue Theatre

JENNIFER ROBERTSON

> The 'playing' of ethnography is a genuinely interdisciplinary enterprise, for if we are to satisfy ourselves of the reliability of our script and our performance of it, we will need advice from various nonanthropological sources . . . Ideally we need to consult, better still, bring in as part of the cast, members of the culture being enacted (Turner 1982: 90).

INTRODUCTION: CULTURAL WEAPON

This epigraphic quote from the late 'performance anthropologist' Victor Turner could have been written by his Japanese counterpart active in the 1930s and 1940s. At that time, Japanese theatre directors and critics dramatized ethnography for the dual purposes of wartime recreation and the cultural assimilation of Japanese colonial subjects. They sought to create a 'cultural weapon' by fusing theatre and ethnography. It was an ambitious – and in retrospect, chilling – plan for which they sought advice from various anthropological sources, including from the very peoples who themselves were targeted for assimilation. One theatre critic, Endō Shingo, writing in 1943 about Japanese theatrical productions about and for export to the 'southern regions' (*nanpō*), urged playwrights and directors to closely collaborate with anthropologists in order to create plausible representations of, and for, Asian and Pacific peoples (Endō 1943: 1). I shall explore the affective, aesthetic and cultural dimensions of Japanese colonialism that have previously been neglected relative to the more bureaucratic, military and political dimensions of that expansionist project. Specifically, drawing on several of my earlier publications, I shall examine the relationship, primarily during the 1930s and 1940s, between colonial anthropology and the revue theatre in Japan, focusing in particular on the representation on

stage of the various peoples and cultures subjected to Japanese domination. The theatre discussed here is the all-female Takarazuka Revue, founded in 1913 (see Robertson 2001 [1998]). The Revue's opportunistic founder (a leading entrepreneur and politician), playwrights and directors collaborated with the military state to create a popular drama with the didactic potential to shape public impressions about the peoples and cultures under Japanese rule.

Beginning with the colonization of Okinawa in 1874, followed by that of Taiwan in 1895, Korea in 1910, Micronesia in 1919, Manuchuria in 1931, North China by 1937 and much of South-east Asia by 1942, the state consolidated through brutal military force a vast Asian-Pacific domain, the so-called Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (*daitōa kyōeiken*), a rubric coined in August 1940.[1] The core literature on Japanese empire-building details four of the means through which the Japanization of Asia was pursued: the education of children, the exaltation of state Shintō, the organization of youth, and observation tours to Japan (Peattie 1988: 104). To these I would add an overarching fifth means, entertainment, which, like the preceding four, was also deployed within Japan as a means of incorporating the public into the imperialist project and ethos. An abundance of archival evidence suggests that theatre was regarded by the state and its agents as a particularly efficacious form of entertainment towards this end both within and outside of Japan.[2]

Takarazuka playwrights were especially keen on incorporating ethnographic details into wartime revues for the purpose of providing the public with 'culturally authentic', spectacular 'infotainment' (information plus entertainment). Although the relationship between the Takarazuka Revue, a private corporation, and the imperial state was one of mutual opportunism as opposed to seamless consensus, the 'cross-ethnicking' performed by the cross-dressed actors was homologous to the official rhetoric of assimilation which equated Japanese expansion with a mission to 'civilize' through Japanization the peoples of Asia and the South Seas (see Robertson 2001 [1998], ch. 3; cf. de Grazia 1981). The 'civilizing mission' of the ethnographically informed revues was two-fold. On the one hand, colonial subjects were represented on stage as objects and products of the dominant Japanese imagination of exotic yet inferior alterity. On the other hand, these representations were sometimes recirculated in performances staged abroad, as 'culturally correct' models to be emulated by the very peoples objectified on the Takarazuka stage. In this way, the theatre enacted a discourse of comparative otherness with the catalytic effect of enabling a broad spectrum of the Japanese viewing public to think that they were familiar with, knowledgeable about, and superior to manifold other cultures and ethnic groups.

European cultures and societies were also represented on the wartime Takarazuka stage. In the fall of 1941, for example, the Revue produced the play, *New Flag* (*Atarashiki hata*), which glamorized the unification of

Germany under the Third Reich. The play was described as the 'staged performance' (*butaika*) of the information on Germany available in newspapers and magazines (Hasegawa 1941: 14). A brief aside on the synergistic relationship between the print media and Takarazuka is relevant in this connection. The Revue was regularly featured in newspapers and magazines, and, during the wartime period in particular, was envisioned as a 'living newspaper' instrumental in mobilizing and indoctrinating people. The 'living newspaper' was a dramaturgical form in which current events were editorialized through dramatic metaphors and visual effects. I am using the term 'living newspaper' loosely with respect to the Takarazuka Revue in referring to the interwar practice of staging plays whose themes and subjects corresponded with those addressed in the print media.[3] The Revue's directors effectively harnessed the operatic power of these themes and subjects in an effort to both accommodate and extend the directives of the state.

STAGING COLONIALISM

Founded in 1913 by Kobayashi Ichizō, an influential businessman and Minister of Commerce and Industry between 1940 and 1941, the Takarazuka Revue was conceived in part as a novel inversion of the all-male Kabuki theatre. In 1919, Kobayashi established the Takarazuka Music Academy as part of the Revue complex and from which all actors had to graduate. The 3,000-seat Takarazuka Grand Theatre (Daigekijō) was completed in 1924, the largest Japanese theatre of its kind at the time—the original theatre was much smaller and quite rudimentary. The Grand Theatre, rebuilt after a fire in 1935, and again in the late 1980s, remains one component of an expansive 'wholesome entertainment' (*kenzen na goraku*) complex in Takarazuka, now a city near Osaka. In 1943, the complex included a hot springs spa, a library, a botanical garden, an entomology museum and a zoo noted for its white tiger. A theatre nearly as large was opened in Tokyo in 1935 and rebuilt in 2000.

Approximately 700 people presently enable Takarazuka to function, and the literature suggests that about the same number were employed during the wartime period: 400 performers and 300 specialists including producers, directors, writers, costumers, set designers, instructors and two thirty-five-piece orchestras. The actors are divided into five troupes, four of which were established between 1921 and 1933, while a fifth troupe was added in 1998. Dividing the women into troupes facilitated organizing the growing number of actors (from twenty at the outset, to about 350 in 1931 [Hashimoto 1984: 118-20]), and enabled year-round performances at different venues throughout Japan. Each troupe is overseen by a (male) member of the Revue administration. The internal hierarchy consists of a troupe manager and a vice-manager appointed from among the senior actors. The Revue's patriarchal management, strict vertical social organization, and emphasis on hierarchy determined by

age, sex and gender was confluent with the social agenda of the wartime state (see Robertson 2001 [1998], chapter 3).[4]

A conservative estimate of the total annual number of spectators at both the original Takarazuka and Tokyo Takarazuka theatres in the wartime period totals several million, a significant audience that, in the eyes of the state, could not be ignored. Partly to increase business and partly to work with the state in mobilizing the Japanese people, mobile troupes of actors from Takarazuka and other revues were dispatched, in the late 1930s, to factories, farm villages, hospitals, and even war fronts throughout China, Korea, Manchuria, South-east Asia and Micronesia to provide civilians and soldiers with 'wholesome entertainment' and to symbolically weave together the disparate parts of the Japanese Empire (Matsumoto 1939; Shasetsu: engeki bunka to engekihō 1942; Shōchiku Kagekidan 1978: 45-8; Takagi 1942; Toita 1956 [1950]: 250-2; Uemoto 1941). Revue administrators even briefly considered a plan of establishing an all-female revue in North China (Matsumoto 1939). A couple of years later the state pressured Takarazuka and other theatres into organizing the mobile troupes under the auspices of the Japanese Federation of Mobile Theatres (Nippon idō engeki renmei).

Since, as of 1934, the 1,934 drama theatres of widely varying sizes were concentrated in cities ('Monbusho goraku chōsa' 1932), regional tours by commercial theatre troupes were important components in the process of national mobilization. The intensive activities of the mobile groups of actors further popularized theatre among diverse audiences in Japan and abroad (Toita 1956 [1950]: 252) and helped to disseminate a military and imperialist ethos in the guise of entertainment. Although mobile theatre troupes have a centuries-old history in Japan, the specific use of such troupes during the Second World War was reinforced by the precedent set in Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, where portable stages brought sanctioned entertainment to the masses.

In 1944, under the auspices of an emergency economizing measure, the state closed nineteen commercial theatres, including Takarazuka and levied a stiff tax on them; the mobile units continued to be deployed (Toita 1956 [1950]: 243-4). Six theatres, including Takarazuka, were reopened the following month for a maximum of two-and-a-half hours daily during which patriotic plays and films were scheduled (Hagiwara 1954: 150-1). Takarazuka revues were resumed in May 1945 at the Takarazuka Eigagekijō (movie theatre), the main theatre having been expropriated by the Navy as an educational facility for air corp trainees. The Tokyo branch, on the other hand, had been converted into a factory for the assembly of exploding balloons made from mulberry paper.[5]

From the outset, Takarazuka revues included Japanese-style 'classical' dramas and historical subjects, such as *The Tale of Genji*, Broadway-based and European-style performances, such as *Madama Butterfly* and *Mon Paris*, as well as folk dances from all over the world. With the exception of of wartime revues, contemporary Japan and Japanese were not and are not represented and objectified on the Takarazuka stage. Generally

speaking, it was during the wartime years that 'plays dealing with the present (emergency) situation' (*jikyoku engeki*) were staged. In these dramas, time and space, history and geography were collapsed. The majority of revues produced during the late 1930s and early 1940s were about military and colonial policies and exigencies, such as the 'southward advance' (*nanshin*) (e.g. *Saipan-parao: Waga nan'yō* [Saipan-Palau: Our South Seas], 1940), immigration to Manchuria (e.g. *Shunran hiraku koro* [When Spring Orchids Bloom], 1941), patriotic school girls (e.g. *Gunkoku jogakusei* [Schoolgirls of a military nation,], 1938), and intrepid nurses (e.g. *Kaigun byōin* [Navy Hospital], 1940).

The Takarasiennes, as the Revue's actors are nicknamed, include *otokoyaku*, or men's role players, and *musumeyaku*, or women's role players. Like the Kabuki actors before them, the cross-dressed actors clinched the popular appeal of the Revue among a very broad, multigenerational, mixed-sex audience.[6] In addition to 'doing' a wide range of men and women, the Takarazuka actors also engage in 'cross-ethnicking', that is the embodiment and performance of non-Japanese characters of diverse national and ethnic backgrounds. Just as gender is constructed on the basis of contrastive physical and behavioural stereotypes about females and males, so too were ethnic characters in the wartime theatre based on reified images of 'us' and 'them'.

In this connection, it is useful to comment briefly about the specifically Japanese 'orientalism' which characterized both colonial policy and revues built around the theme of Japanese cultural superiority and military supremacy. Imperialist Japanese also engaged in orientalizing practices. Non-Japanese Asians and South Sea islanders were uniformly portrayed as inferior to the Japanese, although some were 'good' or dependent, and others 'bad' or resistant. I am using 'orientalism' in a broader sense than Edward Said's initial formulation, according to which 'the West' creates 'the East' as its diametrical opposite. I find orientalism most useful as a processual theory of oppositional, essentialized constructions of others that work to intensify a dominant cultural or national image. It does this by dramatizing the 'distance and difference between what is closer to it and what is far away' (Said 1979 [1978]: 55).[7] Orientalism in this generic sense has been deployed since the late nineteenth century by Japanese historians and ideologues in two apparently contradictory but actually mutually constitutive ways: to present *the Japanese* as culturally superior to other Asian peoples, and/or to claim an essential, mystifying uniqueness that distinguishes Japan from nation-states perceived as comparable in industrial and military power (i.e. 'the West') (cf. Tanaka 1993).[8] On the one hand, New Japan (*shin'nippon*), as the imperial nation-state was called, was an imagined community constructed from select artifacts of western material culture; a nation whose western inflections would, theoretically, allow it to withstand the encroachments of European and American powers (cf. Feuerwerker 1989). On the other hand, New Japan was also imagined to be both the repository for, and legacy of, the products of Asia's ancient

cultural histories, and thus bore the burden of salvaging Asia for the Asians.

The process of Japanese orientalizing was expressed in a two-part article on the production and goals of wartime revues published in 1942 by a Takarazuka administrator in *Gendai Engeki* (Modern Theatre), an influential theatre arts journal:

> The Japanese revue theatre is best described as a cultural engineering corps, and as such, has a role in teaching and guiding East Asian peoples. The Japanese revue must work towards purging from Asian cultures the bad influence of Euro-American revues which have all but eradicated local cultures with glorious histories spanning thousands of years. It is the responsibility of the Japanese to raise the standard of culture in East Asia; they [East Asians] are leaving that task to us. We must . . . pursue affirmative, spiritual ideals. The revue is a rich repository of cultural forms; [Asian] customs and manners must be incorporated into revues in order to capture the charm of ordinary people. The revue is a type of entertainment that can and will become deployed as war materiél (*gunjuhin*). (Komatsu 1942: 67)

The Takarazuka administrator provided an example of a hypothetical revue, *East Asian Bouquet* (*Tōa no hanataba*), inspired by the Greater East Asian theatre of war. *East Asian Bouquet* was to present various colonized Asian nationals and ethnic groups and their cultures to Japanese audiences. The ten geographically-based scenes constituting the hypothetical revue were titled, Japan, Manchuria, New China, French Indo-China, Thailand, Luzon, Burma, Malaya, Java (Bali) and a multi-ethnic finalé (Komatsu 1942: 65).[9] The people involved in its production – lyricists, choreographers, costume designers, and so on – were to travel to the featured sites where they could study the local cultures in order to better recreate 'authentic' local settings for their Japanese audiences (Komatsu 1942: 65).

There is no record of *East Asian Bouquet* ever having been performed by either Takarazuka or another revue. The closest equivalent to this hypothetical revue was *Children of East Asia* (*Tōa no kodomotachi*, 1943), a drama 'dedicated to the juveniles of East Asia, especially the sons of Nippon who shoulder the future destiny of the East'. The eighteen-scene revue was divided into three geographic parts: Manchoukou, with an emphasis on the founding of the puppet state in 1932; China, whose relationship with Japan is portrayed metaphorically as a father-son relationship; and the 'Southern Area', represented as a utopian garden whose feathered inhabitants happily chirp praises of Asian unity (Matsumoto 1943b).

East Asian Bouquet may have been a hypothetical revue, but it accurately describes the conception, dramaturgical organization, and production of wartime revues in general. The Revue's staff in fact often travelled to the countries and colonies represented on stage to gather

first hand, culturally relative material and ideas for their productions (Komatsu 1942: 65; Miyatake 1942). Some wartime revues staged by the Revue were even written by army and navy playwrights who had access to unpublished ethnographic reports and military intelligence. In addition to incorporating ethnographic data into their plays, the Takarazuka staff also wrote 'anthropological' reports about the various cultural areas they visited. For example, the script anthology in which *New Flag* appeared included an article by the playwright, Hasegawa Yoshio, which supplied readers with background information on the relationship between Takarazuka and Germany; the geology and climate of Germany; German history, ethnic composition, agriculture and industry; and a review of the consequences of post-First World War inflation – Hasegawa defines 'inflation' for the readers – which occasioned Hitler's emergence (Hasegawa 1941).

The Takarazuka playwrights and directors may have claimed to recreate specific cultural practices, but they often resorted to staging eclectic, pan-Asian spectacles, such as orchestrating Indonesian gamelan music and dances in plays set in Thailand (e.g. *Only One Ancestral Land*) (Matsumoto 1943a). Likewise, the revue *Saipan-Palau: Our South Seas* (*Saipan-Parao: Waga Nan'yō*), composed by a Takarazuka playwright following his research trip to the Japanese mandated islands, was described in a newspaper review as a '*pot-pourri* of the delicacies of South America, Mexico, Spain, and [North] America' (Matsumoto 1940). (It is not clear from the reviewer's comments that the play was actually set in Saipan or Palau.) The reviewer was disturbed not by the eclecticism of the spectacle, but by the 'mistake' the playwright made in musically representing, 'native peoples who had neither dances nor tunes of their own' (Matsumoto 1940). His assertion was, of course, erroneous and inconsistent with the well-documented ethnographic and ethnomusicological interests of Japanese colonialists and professional and amateur scholars in the South Seas since the turn of this century, including Matsuoka Shizuo, Tanabe Hisao, Katsuma Junzō and Hijikata Hisakatsu (Peattie 1988; Tsubouchi Hakase Kinen Engeki Hakubutsukan 1932: 482). Moreover, a South Seas cultural exhibition, sponsored by the South Seas Bureau (Nan'yōchō) – basically the Japanese colonial government in the South Seas (see Peattie 1988: 68-71) – was staged at the main theatre complex in Takarazuka to augment the ethnographic 'infotainment' contained in the play (Hagiwara 1954: 130).

Such cultural exhibitions tended to be held in conjunction with revues set in areas of national interest to imperial Japan. A good example is the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere series of plays and exhibitions inaugurated at the main revue theatre in Takarazuka in September 1941. *Mongol* (*Mongōru*, 1941), the first play in the series, was essentially a love story in which was embedded Japanese colonial propaganda extolling Mongolia's natural resources (coal, livestock) and its entry into the Co-Prosperity Sphere. Japanese audiences were treated to actors dressed as Mongolians and to sets featuring the yurts inhabited by nomads.

They could even learn a few key phrases in Mongolian which had been incorporated into the scripted dialogue in the *katakana* syllabary, such as *moroguchibaaina* (thank you) and *sain baaina* (how are you).[10] Mongolian folk songs and dances were also performed throughout the eighteen-scene revue (*Mongōru* 1941).

Appearing with the *Mongol* script in the October 1941 anthology, was a photo-journalistic essay by the playwright, Utsu Hideo, detailing his fact-finding visit to Mongolia earlier that year. Utsu rhapsodizes about the natural beauty of the vast landscape filled with abundant wildlife, but seems equally enthusiastic about encroaching modernization in the form of factories for the production of butter and fabric. The rest of the article details the typical Mongolian diet of goat meat and fermented goat and horse milk, clothing, housing, festivals, folk dances and various other aspects of material and ritual culture (Utsu 1941). Extending and reinforcing the colonial anthropology lesson of both the revue and the playwright's essay, was a photograph exhibition of Mongolia displayed at the Takarazuka complex that continued throughout the play's one-month run.

A similar multimedia presentation accompanied the other revues in the Co-Prosperity Series, which included *Peking* (*Pekin*, 1942) and *Return to the East* (*Higashi e kaeru*, 1942), set in Thailand and which I shall discuss shortly. In addition, radio broadcasts of some Takarazuka performances were transmitted to Mongolia, China, Thailand, India and Burma with the aim of 'introducing Japanese theatre culture to the peoples living within the area of the Co-Prosperity Sphere' (Hagiwara 1954: 141). Multiple ironies framed the transmission of the play *Peking* to Mongolia and China on 5 June 1942 (Figure 1). Chinese listeners were treated to an ostensibly culturally authentic Japanese musical representation of Beijing and its apparently bilingual inhabitants, who spoke and sang in Japanese and Mandarin (rendered in *katakana*) about their 'love' (*ai*) for Japan and the benefits of colonial rule, which included 'progress and prosperity'.[11]

Orientalism aside, the transmission of *Peking* to China was part of the colonial strategy of Japanization, which also referred to the strategic effect that Takarazuka, among other theatrical forms, was to exert on peoples subjected to some form of Japanese domination or direct colonial rule. One component of the Revue's Japanization policy involved having 'real native' members of the audience vouch for the cultural authenticity of plays set in their respective countries. For instance, after watching *Peking* at the main Takarazuka thater, the Chinese ambassador to Japan remarked that:

> *Peking* is superb. It weaves together skilfully the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and the awakening of Asian peoples. For us Chinese, what really clinches the play is the pan-Asian unity of the dancing and acting techniques. Whether staged in Hong Kong, Nanjing, or wherever Asian peoples live, *Peking* will generate appreciative applause. (Takarazuka Kagekidan 1943: 37)

Figure 1 *Peking* finale. The finale of this 1942 production featured the 'Dance of the Five-Colour Flag,' which symbolized the unity of north and central China under Japan. From Takarazuka Kagekidan (1943: 15).

Similarly, the (Thai) director of the Thai Monopoly Bureau publicly declared about the play, *Return to the East*, that 'the stage sets, acting style, and choreography were redolent with the aura of Thai culture . . . I felt as though I had actually returned to my country' (Takarazuka Kagekidan 1943: 37).

The symbolically titled revue, *Return to the East* was the second drama in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere series. The series reflected, in part, Kobayashi's efforts as Minister of Commerce and Industry in the period 1940–41 to consolidate the newly conceived Co-Prosperity Sphere.[12] Based on a novel by a Thai official, a former finance minister, *Return to the East* promoted the vision of a Japan-centred New World Order (*sekai shinjitsujo*).[13] The novelist and a Thai choreographer were consulted in the creation and production of this play.

Briefly, the fifteen-scene play focuses on the short life of Rambha, the beautiful daughter of the deposed maharaja of Misapur in North India. Concerned for his infant daughter's safety, the maharaja had entrusted her upbringing to his best friend, the Thai ambassador to France and his wife, and the girl, unaware of her royal lineage, was educated at an elite French school. (The play opens with a formal reception at the school.) When she comes of age, the ambassador recounts her biography and urges her to return to the East and devote her life to restoring her late father's kingdom in Misapur. She travels to Japan, Thailand and India in order to learn more about her ancestral domain, and soon finalizes plans to transform Misapur into 'a strong country like Japan'.

While still a student in France, Rambha had fallen in love with Paul Roy, like her an 'Oriental' (*tōyōjin*) but unlike her, he was raised in a Bombay orphanage. Paul was later adopted by a wealthy Indian who moved to France where the boy was educated. The two teenagers shared a sense of alienation from their Asian roots and bemoaned the fact that they knew little about 'the East'. When she is bitten by a poisonous snake in Thailand, Paul rushes to her side to spur her recovery. Rambha has already decided to choose her country over Paul, but just as she is about to break her decision to him, the two discover that they are siblings. Rambha, recovered and relieved, journeys to Misapur, ravaged by a cholera epidemic, and, as planned, manages to win the heart of the current maharaja, Ravana, son of the usurper. She poisons the cruel Ravana and then commits suicide by swallowing poisoned tea. Paul ascends the throne as Bhumindra, the rightful maharaja of the now liberated Misapur (*Higashi e kaeru*, 1942: 40–68).

The intertwined themes of Western colonialism, patriotism, duty, imperialism, sibling incest, murder, and suicide form a present-day allegory of a pan-Asian past and future shared by Japan, Thailand and India.[14] Let me digress here for a moment. The dominant racial ideology in Japan contends that the origins of the Japanese race were held to be mystically linked to the Imperial House and thus to constitute an 'imperial family', a principle which could be extended outward to include new populations brought under Japanese dominion, so that these too could become 'imperial peoples' (*kōmin*) (Peattie 1984: 97; see also Robertson 2001). The relationship between Rambha and Paul/Bhumindra can be understood as an aestheticized refraction of the triangulated relationship Asia, Japan and Europe. Rambha's duty is to clear the way of obstacles (read, Westernists and local Anglophiles) in preparation for the emergence of pan-Asian co-prosperity spearheaded by Japan. Like Rambha and Paul, modern Japan had become alienated from its Eastern roots, but would be able to regain its identity and preeminence through extreme sacrifices made by non-Japanese Asians who were, theoretically, incorporated into the imperial family-system. A review of the play published in the Japanese press recommended that *Return to the East* be presented throughout Asia as well as in Germany and Italy, where the Takarazuka Revue had toured in 1938 and 1939 (Matsumoto 1942).

COLONIALISM AND MONTAGE

A discussion of the distinctive features of the revue theatre that made it an especially effective didactic, anthropological medium concludes this chapter. Japanese wartime ideologues were well aware that their success in claiming and containing national and colonialized peoples alike was contingent upon the state's instrumental deployment of the entertainment media through which to shape popular consciousness. The usefulness of Takarazuka in creating a vision of a global hierarchy

headed by Japan was linked to the structure of the revue form itself. In keeping with its etymology, the 'revue' theatre represents a break from 'the past'; that is, a break from a fixed, singular, canonical reading of events past and present. Similar to photomontage – a potent medium of social critique, commentary and propaganda alike during the 1930s and 1940s – the revue offered 'completely new opportunities . . . for uncovering [and also remaking] relationships, oppositions, transitions and intersections of social reality' (Joachim Büthe quoted in Ollman 1991: 34). Revues consist of a montage-like display and concatenation of different, even contradictory, images, lands, settings, peoples and scenarios. Similarly, the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere signified a new chain of historical associations and newly historicized memories; it represented a new system of cultural artifacts in the service of New Japan. The revue theatre was to serve this new order as an important proving ground where the composite image of a New Japan could be crafted, displayed and naturalized.

The meaning of montage, whether in photography or theatre, operates through allegory, which is essentially fragmentary. Allegory depends on the separation and isolation of elements comprising the totality of the life context. To work as allegory, montage necessarily requires the viewer's or audience's concatenation of the fragmented and juxtaposed images and scenarios.[15] As Peter Bürger describes this process: '[t]he allegorist joins the isolated fragments of reality and thereby creates meaning. This is posited meaning; it does not derive from the original context of the fragments' (quoted in Buck-Morss 1991 [1989]: 225).

Like montage, ethnographies have also been described as recombinations of fragments of, at the very least, the reality of both anthropologists and their subjects. In his introduction to *Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography*, James Clifford asserts that the creator of ethnographic texts cannot avoid allegories that select and impose meaning as they translate it. Power and history work through ethnographic texts, he cautions, in ways their authors cannot fully control, and notes that 'ethnographic truths are thus inherently partial' (1986: 6–7).

The revue theatre and ethnography alike share certain salient, montage-like features which were purposefully deployed in the context of colonialism. In the case of wartime revues in particular, such as *Mongol*, it was a common practice to call for a narrator, either a character in a play or an 'emcee'-like figure, to emerge at regular intervals and synthesize the various dramatic fragments or scenes for the viewers. Theoretically, this action would reduce the degree of slippage between the performance, its reception, and its lasting effects. The simultaneous appearance of ethnographic essays written by Takarazuka playwrights and the cultural exhibitions staged at the complex, can also be interpreted as attempts to reduce – ironically, in light of Clifford's caution – through the over-determined display or concatenation of select information – the slippage between the official message of a given revue and the message(s) extracted by individual members of the audience.

As a performative and spectacular extension adaptation of colonial ethnography, the revue theatre helped to bridge the gap between perceptions of colonialized others and actual colonial encounters; it was one way of linking imperialist dreams and colonial realities. Takarazuka wartime productions functioned as a type of 'human relations area file' or archive which, along with census reports, maps, photographs, ethnographies, statistics and news-reels, worked to create and naturalize among Japanese and colonized peoples alike, a warped but pleasurable if partial vision of co-prosperity in the New World Order.

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NOTES

1 *Daitōa kyōeiken*, or Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, was an integral part of Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro's idea of a 'New Order' in which the Japanese would lead a Pan-Asian effort towards Asian self-sufficiency and stability, and resist both communism, and Western imperialism. The projected area of the Sphere covered Japan, China, Manchukuo, the former Dutch, French, and British colonies in Southeast Asia, and the Philippines. Some ideologues included Australia and New Zealand in the projected area (Hunter 1984: 42, 143–4).

2 This chapter incorporates material from earlier publications (Robertson 1995, 1998 and 2001 [1998]). There is relatively little research on the ways in which theatre interfaces with imperialism and colonialism. In the case of Japanese studies, the uses of film and radio as vehicles for the spiritual and physical mobilization of the Japanese and colonial peoples have been expertly documented and discussed (e.g. Dower 1993; Fukushima and Nornes 1991; Goodman 1991; Hauser 1991; Kasza 1988; Silverberg 1993). However there is a dearth of critical research on wartime theatre, where staged performances operated as social metacommentaries on and motivators for such interconnected practices as nationalism, imperialism, racism, militarism, sexual politics and gendered relations (cf. Bratton 1991; Pickering 1991: 229). Similarly, theatre-state relations are overlooked or ignored in the otherwise excellent scholarship on the Japanese colonial empire (Beasley 1987; Dower 1986; Duus, Myers and Peattie 1989; Myers and Peattie 1984; Peattie 1988; Shillony 1991 [1981], et al.). Rimer (1974) offers a complementary overview of the New

Theatre (Shingeki) movement through the career of the playwright, Kishida Kunio. In this chapter, I do not examine the role of 'guerilla plays' staged in China, the Philippines, Indonesia and elsewhere to oppose and resist Japanese imperialism and colonialist policies.

3 In the United States, the provocative use of the living newspaper form was associated with the American Federal Theatre Project of the 1930s. The boundary between actor and audience was blurred by the practice of planting actors in the audience to ask questions during the play or challenge the ongoing action. Housing, health care, public utilities, labour organizing and consumer unions were among the issues dramatized, and the plays 'usually concluded that working people could (and should) solve the problems either by taking action themselves or by demanding that their elected representatives act for them' (O'Connor 1985: 179–80). As a movement, the 'living newspaper' was initiated in 1923 by students from the Institute of Journalism in Moscow who formed the Blue Blouse company. A typical living newspaper programme consisted of headlines, news items, editorials, cartoons and official decrees, the intention being to make current events and themes 'penetrate the masses more deeply' (Stourac and McCreery 1986: 3, 30).

4 There were other all-female revue theatres established in the early twentieth century as well, notably the Shōchiku Revue founded in Tokyo (in Asakusa, a major working-class theatre district) in 1928, which quickly became Takarazuka's main rival in every respect. Other, much smaller, Tokyo revues included the Casino Folies (opened in 1929) in Asakusa, and the Moulin Rouge (opened in 1931) in Shinjuku, a student and intellectual centre at the time (see Seidensticker 1990: 68–87).

5 Although the main theatre was reopened after the war in April 1946, the Tokyo facility fell under the jurisdiction of the Allied Powers General Headquarters headed by General Douglas MacArthur. It was renamed the Ernie Pyle Theatre – after the popular American war correspondent killed in action in 1945 – until reverting back to Kobayashi's control in April 1955 (Hashimoto 1993: 78, 84; Toita 1956 [1950]: 244). Throughout the Occupation period (1945–52), Tokyo Takarazuka performances were staged at other local theatres, and the Revue produced special shows for Occupation personnel at the Ernie Pyle (Hashimoto 1993: 142).

6 I have published extensively on the sexual politics and gender ideology operative in the Takarazuka Revue and shall not repeat that information here in the interest of focusing on the relationship between theatre and colonial anthropology (see Robertson 2001 [1998]).

7 Unlike Carrier (1992), I find it unnecessarily complicated to divide O/orientalism into unmarked (what 'the West' does) and marked (the ethno-orientalisms of the non-West) categories. In using the lower case form, I wish to draw a distinction between the products of Orientalism (i.e. 'the West' and 'the Other') and the orientalizing process through which a national or cultural dominant is constructed and dramatized. I have retained the term 'orientalism' as both it and its overtones are salient in the context of Japanese imperialist expansion and colonial domination. As Stefan Tanaka notes in *Japan's Orient*, by the twentieth century, *tōyō* (literally, eastern seas) signified the opposite of 'the

Occident' in both a geopolitical sense and an ideological sense (1993: 4). He argues that the contested discourse of *tōyō*/the orient helped to occasion a new sense of national and cultural identity in Japan even as it revealed the ambiguity of Japan's place in Asia and the world (1993: 11–2).

[8] Some scholars have argued that Japanese orientalism was so totalizing that it obviated the need for the concomitant deployment of an equally evolved Japanese occidentalism in order to dramatize and allegorize 'original' differences. As Tanaka notes in this respect, 'Whereas Romantic [European] historians looked to the Orient for their origins, Japanese historians found them in *tōyō* [the orient]' (1993: 14). The widest line of difference was drawn not between Japan and 'the West', but between Japan and the rest of the world.

[9] New China, or *shinkō shina*, refers to parts of China under Japanese control. *Shina*, in use since the mid-eighteenth century as a name for European-dominated China, is regarded today as a pejorative term for China.

[10] This transcription is the anglicized version of the Japanese syllabic rendition of the Mongolian expression as it appeared in the script.

[11] Similarly, the 'patriotic extravaganzas' staged in English music halls at the turn of this century invariably presented the British colonies as 'willingly subservient', masking palpable tensions between the colonizers and the colonized (Summerfield 1986: 29).

[12] Kobayashi travelled to Batavia (Jakarta) in the fall of 1940 to secure Indonesia's place in the Sphere by seeking, unsuccessfully, to obtain mineral oil and other concessions from the Dutch (Beasley 1987: 228–9; Hall 1981 [1955]: 858-9; Mook 1944: 42–65).

[13] Phra Sarasas, a bureaucrat and proponent of Thai-Japanese entente who resided in Japan between 1939 and 1945. The original title of the novel, a 'fable of political morals' (Batson 1996: 156) written in 'flowery English' (Matsumoto 1942) and first published in London in 1940, is *Whom the Gods Deny*. It was translated into Japanese as *Unmei no kawa* (River of Fate).

[14] It is striking how *Return to the East* also anticipates the militant nationalist Subhas Chandra Bose's path from India to South-east Asia via Germany and Japan. In 1943, he proclaimed a Provisional Government of *Azad Hind* (Free India) and led the Japanese-supported Indian National Army, recruited before his arrival, in anticipation of an invasion of India. Bose's activity was followed closely in Japanese domestic and colonial newspapers.

[15] Because a single concatenated meaning cannot be guaranteed, montage generates a tension between the dominant meaning and the subtextual, and potentially subversive, readings of the same performance. Once an audience disperses and re-enters the wider social realm, the two-fold problem remains of how to reinforce the official text of a play, and how to accurately measure any influence that the performance may have had on their behaviour (cf. Kershaw 1992: 2).

4

'The Terrible Weapon of the Gravely Injured' – Mishima Yukio's Literature and the War

IRMELA HIJIYA-KIRSCHNEREIT

In the context of post-war literary and intellectual history, Mishima Yukio tends to be seen as a romantic nihilist and ultra reactionary, a prolific but ultimately predictable writer whose spectacular *seppuku* accentuated his artistic career. On the other hand, even though his philosophical agenda, as he developed it in a series of essays, seems readily accessible for critical evaluation, his fictional creations do not necessarily conform to this image. If Mishima – and his critics – are convinced that he was deeply shaped by the experience of the war and wartime ideology and regarded the post-war as an ultimately despicable and void period, what are we to make of the fact that, in contrast to many post-war authors, he hardly ever deals with the subject of war in his narratives? Is the war expressed at all in his literary works, and if so, what is its significance? And what conclusions can be drawn from a close reading of some of his more representative works concerning the 'meaning' of the war experience for Mishima the writer?

In Mishima's large literary output – and the vast majority of his fictional works deal with contemporary material – there are surprisingly few narrations in which the Pacific War is more than sporadically hinted at, although mentions of the war can be found in many works, even in a novel such as the idyllic Daphnis-and-Chloé tale *Shiosai* (The Sound of Waves, 1954), whereas in other works, such as in the novels *Kyōko no ie* (Kyōko's House, 1958-9) or in the third part of his final tetralogy Hōjō no umi, 'The Sea of Fertility', titled *Akatsuki no tera* (The Temple of Dawn, 1970), the protagonists reminisce war scenarios of death and destruction. We also find, in a short story entitled 'Botan' (Peonies), published in 1955, a peculiar reference to

the Nanjing massacre. This reference can be seen as evidence that at that time, these occurrences were not taboo but were still viewed as an established historical truth (Hijiya-Kirschnereit 1997). The author depicts a single scene, the visit of a first person narrator to a garden of peonies, in which each of the 580 magnificently blooming flowers has its own poetic name. While admiring the flowers, the narrator learns that the garden is tended by a man named Kawamata, a former colonel in the Imperial Army, who made a name for himself as the officer chiefly responsible for the Nanjing massacre. Although responsible for tens of thousands of atrocities, Kawamata is said to have killed only 580 people with his own hands, all of them women. The flowers are thus presented as comprising the secret documentation of the man's wicked deeds and as the glorification of this evil in the eyes of the world.

Mishima's calculated, low-key presentation, with its amoral aestheticism clearly smacks of the spirit of symbolism and European *fin de siècle,* as evidenced in many of his other works. It is nothing more than an exercise in style, and a weak one at that, and, for all we know, the story did not attract greater attention at the time.

The only work of importance in which the war seems to play a more decisive role is Mishima's novel *Kinkakuji* (The Temple of the Golden Pavilion, 1955). *Kinkakuji* is quite unanimously regarded as one of Mishima's masterpieces and has been subjected to many penetrating analyses from Miyoshi Yukio's famous chapter 'Haitoku no rinri' (The ethics of anti-moralism) in his *Sakuhinron no kokoromi* (An attempt at work-analyses, 1967) through Dennis Washburn's recent reading in his study on modern Japanese fiction and the ethics of identity entitled *Translating Mount Fuji* (2007). What has not been focused on in detail so far, however, is the question of what function the war has in this carefully plotted work. *Kinkakuji,* as is well known, tells the story of the burning of the famous Zen temple in 1950 from the perspective of the young acolyte who committed the act of arson. Mizoguchi – his name is read symbolically as meaning 'split speech/mouth', alluding to his stuttering and his inability to connect his words with reality – has been alienated from his fellows because of his ugliness and has idolized the Golden Temple since his childhood. In the ten chapters of the story, which develops from May 1942 through July 1950, we witness his mental agonies entirely in the first person, his 'escape from reality into a romanticized inner world that is suffused with the monument's imagined beauty' (Tachibana 1998: 125), as he first gets a chance to visit the temple at the age of fourteen and later is accepted to join the community at the Golden Temple as an acolyte in the summer of 1944. The distance between the idealized beauty constructed in his imagination and the real monument, as well as the unbridgeable distance between the temple and his own ugly existence, remain and produce a paralysing weariness and impotence in Mizoguchi. It is only when he realizes that the growing threat of air raids on Kyoto brings with it the possibility of

the burning down of the temple that the distance between himself and his unattainable idol shrinks and collapses in his vision of both being destroyed, and so he begins to dream of the destruction of the whole world as both inevitable and desirable. Mizoguchi falls into a dreamlike state during the war, with ordinary life receding even farther from him. The end of the war, which leaves the temple unharmed, forms a clear turning point in the story, as the protagonist, seeing the temple's eternity and everyday life restored, paradoxically begins to gradually lean towards action, a development culminating in the final destructive act of burning down the object of his desire by his own hands. Before focusing on this turning point, a brief remark on how the novel has been interpreted may be in order.

Many critical readers have observed that the novel's hero, an uneducated son of a country priest, is an incredulous first-person narrator of a novel which has also been termed a *roman idéologique* (Miyoshi Y. 1967: 417), noting, for example, that 'the narrator's sophisticated aesthetics has no endorsement in his experience' (Miyoshi M. 1974: 160). The centrality of the theme of beauty and destruction, with the carefully laid-out construction of the protagonist's relationships with antagonists such as Kashiwagi, a Mephisto-like figure who distances himself from beauty, as well as with Tsurukawa, the Abbot and a number of female figures functioning first and foremost as indicators of his relative distance from the world, *Kinkakuji* can undoubtedly be read as a 'philosophical novel' (Starrs 1994: 43). As such, its logical and ideological inevitability is convincing. Nakamura Mitsuo, however, takes issue with the fact that the protagonist's reasoning and the consequences of acts taken by him are devoid of any internal development, and that he is by no means a live young man (Nakamura 1957), a view that suggests Nakamura's expectation that Mishima should have written a more realistic piece with a more average hero's story of mental development. Other interpreters such as Duus (1968), Kimball (1973), Swann (1972) and Ross (1959), however, viewed the work as a psychological novel, as a Zen novel, and, on a metaphorical level, as an artist's novel with strong connections to Mishima's own aesthetics (Miyoshi M. 1974: 162; Pollack 1985: 388; Torrance 1994: 474-5). Most, if not all of these readings are convincing, even though they seem at times to contradict or exclude each other. Yet the multitude of possible readings only bespeaks the semantic richness of Mishima's literary creation, and it should alert us to the fact that *Kinkakuji* as an iridescent work clearly invites these multiple readings where what seems utterly improbable on one level of understanding is thoroughly convincing on the other.

I return now to one of *Kinkakuji*'s central events, which is narrated in a conspicuously straightforward manner by a simple statement appearing within the third chapter: 'The war had ended'. In each of the book's ten chapters we find references to the war (and to post-war reality such as the outbreak of the Korean War), but it seems somewhat logical that in the first three of them, these references are much more

frequent, from six in the first, twelve in the second and ten in the third chapter to four, two, three, three, two and one in the following chapters. Within the first three chapters, a growing tension is built up through the expectation of imminent destruction. The protagonist's father dies, and his mother urges him to try and succeed the Superior of the Golden Temple. Irritated by the conflicting prospects of 'possessing' the temple as the Superior's successor and its imagined destruction in war raids, the protagonist develops physical symptoms – a large red swelling at the base of his neck. 'The swelling became firmly rooted and began to press on me from the back of my neck with a heavy, hot force. In my fitful sleep, I dreamed that the pure golden light was growing on my neck, surrounding the back of my head with a sort of elliptical halo and gradually expanding' (Mishima 1959: 62). In this suggestive description, his psychopathology and his weird aesthetics of beauty and destruction attached to the golden object collapse in the somatic event in his neck, where inner afflictions come to the surface in the form of a skin disease. We also cannot overlook the visual allusions to the Buddhist temple here. When Mizoguchi develops fever and is sent to a doctor, he learns that the pain in his neck is medically known as Furunkel.[1] The doctor applies a knife to his neck. Groaning, he realizes that 'The hot, burdensome world burst open in the back of my head, and I felt it shrivelling up and collapsing' (Mishima 1959: 62). This is how the I-narrator describes how the doctor cuts open the abscess, relieving the patient from the accumulated pus, or his ailment, brought to the surface. This event practically coincides with the end of the war, for the next sentence is the one already quoted above, stating that the war has ended. This scene condenses all strands and levels of the novel and appears equally convincing whether read on a realistic plane relating to a somatic occurrence,[2] or as psychopathology, referring to the 'philosophical' as well as to the visual-aesthetic and to a symbolic plane.

In the evening of the same day on which the emperor announced Japan's surrender, the Superior, who does not mention this fact at all, presents the community with a famous Zen *kōan* – 'Nansen kills a cat', which interpreters of the work have read not only as the priest's, but also the author's comment on Japan's surrender. Clearly, this Zen riddle is also instrumental in leading Mizoguchi towards his destructive action, as he repeatedly discusses and ponders the *kōan* and recalls the night of the defeat in chapters six and nine.

Readers may wonder, though, whether what motivates the protagonist towards action really has much to do with the war after all, as Mizoguchi's antagonism towards the Golden temple, as well as with the world around him, has not really changed, despite his suggestion that a total re-evaluation of values has taken place. This idea, with its strong Nietzschean overtones, comes as no surprise in the work of an author who showed an early interest in this *fin de siècle* philosopher.

Kinkakuji, as noted above, is a well-studied work, although it still amazes readers by its multiplicity of possible readings. As for the function of the war, however, in spite of the repeated and carefully placed references to historical details and the masterful integration of the moment of the nation's surrender into the personal story of the narrator, we still get a sense that it is not history *per se* but its aesthetic aspects which are really significant to the author. The war provides the protagonist with a heightened sense of existence in the imminence of death, again smacking of a Nietzschean 'high noon', and it is the vague expectation of a disaster, *magagoto*,[3] which provides the necessary excitement in the otherwise unbearable conformity of existence. This 'disaster' is described in highly suggestive visual terms, a landscape often associated with the world's end.

Interestingly, this landscape is found in Mishima's works from his early to his latest years, and it is this landscape – we could speak of a trope or topos – which I now want to discuss as perhaps the most important and recurring, albeit abstract, image of war appearing in his literature.

His novel *Kyōko no ie* (Kyōko's House), published in two parts in 1958 and 1959, is set in the years from 1954 to 1956, in a time when Japan's reconstruction was regarded as complete. Mishima intended, according to his own words, to describe the vital consciousness of his own generation, and he termed the work his 'study in nihilism'. The characters recall a typical landscape of the final days of the war or after: '. . . in the bright light, debris spread endlessly. The sun rose from the horizon of debris and sank there again. The daily sunrise, bringing a sparkle into the broken pieces of glass bottles, made the countless shattered fragments beautiful' (Mishima 1964: 95).[4]

This seems to have been a typical sight in the summer of 1945, the city of Tokyo burnt down in wide stretches by the air raids, allowing a free view of the horizon. Indispensable visual elements of this landscape are the sun and the sparkling of pieces of glass, elements, however, which do not necessarily suggest a scene of war destruction. Yet it is exactly this kind of picture, which appears again and again in the memories of the characters as a reminder of 'the time which knew no tomorrow – in which the summer sun made the broken pieces sparkle' (Mishima 1964: 361).

One day Kyōko, the female central character and owner of the salon, which forms the local point for four male friends, talks of her impression, looking down on the reconstructed city from the rooftop of a high-rise building. It soon becomes clear, however, that she feels somewhat uneasy with the sight of normality restored. And her friend Seiichirō agrees with her feeling that in walking over the new cold streets of concrete, they will always remember and cherish the wide, refreshing sight of light over the desert of debris. Instead of rising from the ashes and turning to reconstruction and starting all over again, they value destruction, the destruction, which is part of the past as well as a

destruction in future days to come (Mishima 1964: 33–4). The scenery of light on sparkling pieces is a central trope or topos, reminding the characters of their youth and of the immediate post-war period, a time when everything seemed possible, without duties or responsibilities, a time lacking any hope, which prompts an elevated feeling in the protagonists. It is their longing for this state of mind, a longing for destruction and a definite 'end of the world' (*sekai hōkai*) in the future ahead of them, which gives meaning and vitality to the protagonists. It is not within the scope of the current article to demonstrate in detail the fascinating occurrences of this central motif and topos in the work. Suffice it to say that all five characters, Kyōko as well as the four men, are associated with this scenery of longing visualized by the sight of sparkling pieces in a wide and sunlit plane. This scene of destruction stands for different kinds of 'ends of the world', belonging to the past or the future, general or individual. It is alluded to as a premonition of death in the case of a masochist actor, when the cutting of his skin with a razor blade evokes 'the glittering of broken glass on a summer path' (Mishima 1964: 345). When one of the friends muses about the crises of the others and imagines their deaths, he again resorts to the image of glittering pieces of glass, likening their death to an individual 'end of the world' (Mishima 1964: 455). The visual element of light and sparkling fragments is firmly linked to the idea of death and destruction, and only after understanding this fixed combination, are we ready to read the symbolic meaning of other, more twisted scenes where this motif recurs in the figure of dogs playing in a public park, startling a flock of countless pigeons. 'Their flapping of wings shattered the air and hit (the friend's) faces with a chilliness of broken glass fragments' (Mishima 1964: 462). This slightly surrealist visualization pre-echoes the death of another member of the group, as we learn later on. In light of the metamorphosis of the 'world's end' motif and topos, relating to individual deaths, one might be tempted to downplay its origins in the visualization of a scene of war destruction. But other examples revive our memory in this respect.

Take for example, the scene in one of Mishima's last works, the already mentioned novel *Akatsuki no tera* (The Temple of Dawn, 1970), the third part of Mishima's ambitious attempt at dealing with Japan's history in the twentieth century by means of stories about a young hero who dies and is reincarnated every twenty years, and his friend Honda, who acts as observer and binds the four fates together by his existence. By the end of the war, in June 1945, Honda is a prosperous lawyer who, standing at the window in a Shibuya villa and looking over the burnt-down area around the station, imagines the apocalyptic scenes of the B-29 air-raids several weeks earlier:

> Here and there something glittered brightly – for the most part, the remains of shattered panes of glass, glass surfaces burned and warped, pieces of broken bottles that reflected the sun. These little fragments

> harvested all the June light they could gather to them. Honda beheld for the first time the brilliance of the rubble.
>
> The concrete foundations of houses were clearly limned under the crumbled walls. High and low, each was lit by the afternoon sun.

The detailed description of the quiet landscape of ruins goes on:

> [. . .] An area of asphalt road gleamed blackly with water spurting from a ruptured main. – The sky was strangely spacious and the summer clouds immaculately white. – This was the world presented to Honda's five senses at this very moment. (Mishima 1974: 130, 132)

A more detailed comparison of this and similar scenes in *Kyōko no ie* could reveal astounding correspondences in this scenery in which historical reality and apocalyptic vision are merged together. Not only do the scenes correspond even to the most minute visual details, but they are also associated in both works with the comforting thought of the world's end for Honda, as for Kyōko or Seiichirō:

> Honda felt no emotion as he compared this sight with the city as it had been. Only when his eyes caught the bright reflections of the fragments of broken glass in the ruins and he was momentarily blinded did he understand with the sureness of his senses that the glass, the whole ruin would disappear the next instant to make way for another. He would resist catastrophe with catastrophe, and he would deal with the infinite disintegration and desolation with ever more gigantic and all-inclusive instantaneously repeated devastation. Yes, he must grasp with his mind the instant-by-instant, inevitable total destruction and prepare for the carnage of an uncertain future. He was elated to the point of trembling with these refreshing ideas that he had gleaned from Yuishiki doctrine. (Mishima 1974: 132–3)

As in *Kyōko no ie,* this scene with its central components – the fragments of broken glass and the wide sunlit sky – is also employed in *The Temple of Dawn* as a divinatory metaphor, this time pre-echoing the heroine's death.[5] Thus, his end-of-the-world scenery is a persistent image and trope in Mishima's narrations, an image which seems to have originated in the context of evocations of war destruction but which is highly abstract and, melted down to its main ingredients, amounts to the visual effects of a wide sunlit space with glittering fragments of glass, and its association with death and catastrophe, as well as freedom and nihilism. It comes as no surprise that this image also appears repeatedly in Mishima's early novel *Kamen no kokuhaku* (Confessions of a Mask, 1949), perhaps most conspicuously, although somewhat moderated, at the very end when, in the very last sentence, a spilt liquid is 'glittering threateningly' on the table.[6]

The war, as we have seen, is cast in aesthetic, highly abstract categories. War scenes never figure directly in the plot, they are always refracted: imagined, as Mizoguchi's impatient expectation of an air raid on Kyoto, remembered such as when Honda overlooks the ruins from the window or evoked when the peony garden visitor hears about the flowers' special meaning. This distant war triggers moods and distinct feelings, as concrete associations with sceneries of death and destruction volatilize, functioning as nothing but a motive for an individual and highly aestheticized epiphany, prompting moods of nihilist ennui and an aura of nonchalant paradoxes.

If we may conclude, then, that the war in Mishima's literature is not assigned a role as a fatal historical and political event determining the course of the narrative and the characters' destiny but functions mainly as a trigger of special moods and attitudes, what about the author's image and self-image as deeply marked by the war experience? Mishima's biographers in particular have stressed this point, referring to interviews with the author as well as to his own essays. Henry Scott Stokes begins his biography, writing about his first encounter with Mishima at the Foreign Correspondents' Club in 1966, when Mishima gave a speech in English, referring repeatedly to his war experience. In his talk, which is now provided in the form of a CD-Rom in the most recent edition of Mishima's collected works, the author speaks of confronting in his memory the peaceful present with the particular stoic mood of his youth, calling it 'death memory . . . and the problem of illusion' and referring to it as 'my basic subject and my basic romantic idea of literature' (Scott Stokes 1975: 16). Obviously, Mishima is keen on forming his image on this link between his war experience and what he himself terms his 'basic subject and [his] basic romantic idea of literature', and his interpreters have generally followed this path laid out by the author himself. But when Susan Napier, to cite one example, writes that 'Mishima's full-blown obsession with the war (and the emperor) developed later in his life' (Napier 1991: 6), we should remind her and us of the fact that we find in his works evidence that he regarded the war experience as a key inspiration from a very early point in time.

Let us take a brief look at his short, though highly cryptic, essay titled 'Jūshōsha no kyōki' ('The Terrible Weapon of the Gravely Injured'), published in March 1948 in the magazine *Ningen*. Mishima paints a picture of himself as representing a generation marked by an incisive experience – the trauma of war, but interestingly enough, in spite of the title's very graphic nature, in the twisted logic of the text it never becomes quite clear who was 'gravely injured', and by what, and what the 'terrible weapon' amounts to. What comes across, though, is the author's proud statement of belonging to a generation of outsiders, criminals and nihilists who are inflicted with what he terms, in his typical paradoxical manner, the 'incurable disease called health' ('fuji no yamai no na wa 'kenkō', Mishima 1966: 824).[7] When we browse the text for indications of disease, wounds or traumatic incidents, we

come across only highly abstract tropes, as well as a few sentences describing school days with military drills and leading up to a sequence of pathetic formulas which state that the war has not hurt his generation but only made it tougher. The text is also interspersed with three lamentations deploring the gap between his generation and what he sees as normality, the lamenting subject floating between an elitist, self-assertive and exclusive feeling and a longing to merge with the banality of post-war life. And while we are cautious not to confuse literary narration and the author's personal articulations, we cannot but admit that this dramatic attitude with its highly artificial ring, its paradoxes, its aphoristic figures reminding us of Oscar Wilde, but most conspicuously, with the apparent lack of experiential substance, the abstractness of the experiences resonates with similar scenes in his novels. Neither in Mishima's literature nor in his essays do we find more than abstract hints, aestheticized and refractured visualizations, and whatever we try to read from these hints – a deep disappointment, a feeling of guilt for having survived, or desperation – Mishima has always been there before us and offered these readings himself, leaving a feeling that we may be falling into his trap after all. For a text like 'Jūshōsha no kyōki' also foregrounds its artificiality and makes us wonder what to take at face value. The author calls post-war society a 'masquerade' (*butōkai*), but if, because of the urgency of this pathetic manifesto, we decide not to dismiss it as another one of his narcissist word-plays, what is it that everyone is supposed to be hiding? Halfway through his text, the author reveals the real purpose of his essay, which is to explain his principles as a literary artist. He makes it clear that literature, in his understanding, can only be true to life as long as it is non-mimetic and anti-naturalist: if you want to hit the wizard, aim at the tree next to him (Mishima 1966: 826).

His famous early novel *Kamen no kokuhaku* (Confessions of a Mask) is a tricky example of Mishima's very self-conscious way of writing. Dennis Washburn has argued recently that the obsession with surfaces and false appearances, which dominates this work, is perhaps the most important recurring element in Mishima's writing. This raises the question of how seriously Mishima's work is to be taken, and he asks: 'Is it possible to distinguish between inauthentic art and art that is about (that critiques) the inauthentic?' (Washburn 2007: 238). What is his literature all about, in its curiously abstract references to, and its way of seemingly passing over of the war? Does this experience matter at all? Where is it authentic, and where is it not?

The end of these reflections brings us back to the beginning. One conclusion could be that Mishima, being the extremely self-conscious and analytical artist that he was, saw through the artificiality of his attempt at creating authentic experience in his literature, and this, according to Washburn, makes him an utterly modern author, and his works a work of kitsch art. The image of war in his literature is just one aspect of this kind of modernity.

NOTES

1 The English translation gives 'Flunkel' which is a mistaken romanization of the German medical term for the English 'boil' or 'furuncle'. See Mishima (1959: 62).

2 It should be noted here that the author also plays on dermatological motifs with the girl scratching her skin in Chapter 9.

3 Also note his often-quoted poem 'Magagoto', written when he was fifteen years old. An English translation to be found in Scott Stokes (1975: 77).

4 My translation here and in the following quotations are taken from *Kyōko no ie*.

5 See Mishima (1974: 264). However, the English translation unfortunately obscures the parallels.

6 'gira-gira to susamajii hansha o ageta' (Mishima 1967: 230).

7 By criminals – he also speaks of thieves – he may be alluding to the fact that war returnees often had to fight for their survival, being destitute and without employment, which resulted in many former soldiers turning into black market dealers or criminals.

5

Reenacting a Failed Revolution: The February 26 Incident in Theatre and Film, 1960–1980

DAVID G. GOODMAN

Between 1960 and 1980, Japanese writers, filmmakers, and playwrights turned again and again to the February 26 Incident. Always controversial, the abortive coup d'état by young army officers in Tokyo in 1936, the only serious attempt at revolution in Japan in the twentieth century, became a favourite topic. The works produced include Mishima Yukio's novella 'Patriotism' (*Yūkoku*, 1960), Suzuki Seijun's film *Elegy to Violence* (*Kenka erejii*, 1966), Sekine Hiroshi's long narrative poem 'Abe Sada' (1971), Ōshima Nagisa's film *In the Realm of the Senses* (*Ai no koriida*, 1976), and Satoh Makoto's plays 'Abe Sada's Dogs' (*Abe Sada no inu*, 1976) and 'The Killing of Blanqui, Spring in Shanghai' (*Buranki-goroshi Shanghai no haru*, 1979).

During these two decades, ideas about what constituted a 'revolution' were being contested globally in both politics and art. In numerous countries, the Old Left historicist model of revolution was being challenged by the anarchic liberationist model of the New Left; and the classical avant-garde was being questioned by the neo-avant-garde and postmodernism. This chapter argues that in Japan, works about the February 26 Incident were a site for this contestation. Reviewing them, it is possible to observe a growing incredulity towards the received meta-narrative of 'revolution', the testing of alternatives, and the evolution of artistic works from realistic, life-or-death tales of conviction to outlandish kaleidoscopes of doubt.

THE 1960S AND THE CRISIS OF THE AVANT-GARDE

The notion of the 'avant-garde' originated as a military term and from the time of the French Revolution was closely associated with the idea

of political insurrection (Calinescu 1987: 101). Baudelaire was critical of the avant-garde because of its subservience to politics, and it was not until the 1870s in France that a small group of experimental writers and artists applied the spirit of radical social critique to the domain of artistic forms (Calinescu 1987: 112). A tension developed between the political and aesthetic impulses of the avant-garde, but after the Russian Revolution, the avant-garde became increasingly associated with the monolithic Communist movement. Even after the war, Sartre and Camus, among many others, argued bitterly about the proper relationship between politics and art.

After 1956, a crisis developed in this relationship. That year, Nikita Khrushchev denounced Stalin's crimes to the Twentieth Communist Party Congress (25 February), and Soviet troops brutally suppressed the Hungarian Uprising (23 October to 10 November). The credibility and prestige of the Communist revolution were severely damaged and never recovered. The same year, critics began writing of the 'death of the avant-garde'. Beginning with Roland Barthes, commentators such as Hans Magnus Enzensberger, Irving Howe and Leslie Fiedler argued that the idea of the avant-garde had lost its antithetic power and was obsolete. The avant-garde's 'offensive, insulting rhetoric came to be regarded as merely amusing, and its apocalyptic outcries were changed into comfortable, innocuous clichés' (Calinescu 1987: 120–1).

The same history was repeated in Japan. During the 1920s, the avant-garde had become closely affiliated with the Communist movement, and, after suppression during the war years, this affiliation continued in the late 1940s and 1950s. By the mid-1950s, however, the Japanese Communist Party was losing its grip on the left. In 1958, a non-Communist left-wing group called the Bund took control of Zengakuren, the national Japanese student movement. After 1960, the rift between the Old and New Left became irremediable, when the mass demonstrations against renewal of the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty coordinated by the Communist Party ended in failure. By 1969 there were almost forty anti-Communist left-wing sects in Japan arrayed against only one affiliated with the Communist Party (Tsurumi 1970: 104, 108).

Around the world in the 1960s, 'revolution' was one of the most frequently invoked notions. From student rioters in Paris in May 1968 and demonstrators at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in August to protests against the Mexico City Olympics in October, the world was convulsed in 1968 by New Left activists demanding 'revolution'. In Japan, student strikes that began at Japanese universities in January escalated throughout the year, culminating in the violent siege of Yasuda Hall at Tokyo University in January 1969, when eight thousand riot police were mobilized to oust student militants who had occupied the building.

It was no longer clear, however, what 'revolution' meant. The 1968 Beatles song 'Revolution 1' reflected this lack of consensus: 'You say you want a revolution / Well you know / We all want to change the

world . . . / But when you talk about destruction / Don't you know you can count me out.' The Marxist-inspired violent revolution demanded by the newly-minted Weather Underground in their October 1969 'Days of Rage' in Chicago contrasted sharply with the conceptualist approach of artists such as John Lennon and Yoko Ono, who declared in 1969, 'War is over! If you want it!' The locus of revolution was shifting from the streets and institutions to the imagination.

It was in this context that writers, filmmakers and playwrights in Japan took up the February 26 Incident as an event through which to interrogate the idea of revolution. And as their ideas developed, so did the narratives they used to express them.

THE FEBRUARY 26 INCIDENT

On the snowy morning of 26 February 1936, a group of young officers in the Japanese Imperial Army led 1,400 troops out of their barracks and occupied strategic buildings in downtown Tokyo adjacent to the Imperial Palace, including the Diet, the War Ministry, the General Staff, government offices, foreign embassies and the official residences of the Prime Minister, the War Minister and other cabinet members. They assassinated high government officials, including Finance Minister Takahashi Korekiyo, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Saitō Makoto and Inspector-General of Military Education, General Watanabe Jōtarō.

By their actions, the young rebels hoped to precipitate a 'Shōwa Restoration', replacing Japan's parliamentary political system with direct rule by the emperor. They hoisted banners over the buildings that they occupied proclaiming themselves the 'Emperor-Revering Restoration Army' (*sonnō ishin gun*). Japan was in a crisis, they believed, because venal politicians and evil advisers had taken the emperor hostage and were preventing him from addressing the social injustices and economic inequities that plagued society. By eliminating those politicians and placing themselves – loyal and dedicated units in the imperial armed forces – at his direct disposal, the young officers believed that the emperor would move personally and immediately to save Japan.

One of the things that fascinated artists and scholars in the 1960s and 70s about the February 26 Incident was its ideological ambiguity. Despite their literal deification of the emperor and antagonism towards democracy, the rebels demanded reforms that were essentially socialist in nature (Shillony 1973: 65). They had been inspired by Kita Ikki (1883–1937), who wanted Japan to become 'a great revolutionary empire' (*kakumeiteki daiteikoku*), and two of these rebels later told Ben-Ami Shillony in 1969 that their aim had been to establish 'Imperial Communism' (*tennō-kyōsanshugi*) in Japan (Shillony 1973: 66). They were motivated by a sincere desire to alleviate the agony of a population suffering from the economic dislocations caused by a worldwide depression and years of disastrously bad harvests, which had hit particularly hard in the north-east of Japan, where leaders of the revolt were from.

From the outset, however, the emperor was 'an uncompromising adversary of the rebellion, refusing to regard it as anything but a criminal mutiny' (Shillony 1973: 172). Even unwilling to dignify it by personally ordering the rebels to lay down their arms, he directed other army units to summarily evict the mutineers. Nineteen rebel leaders, including Kita, were eventually executed, and another seventy were sentenced to prison.

A REVOLUTION TO DIE FOR

In the final decade of his life, the February 26 Incident ran like a leitmotif through the work of Mishima Yukio. He wrote three works explicitly about the Incident, which he collected in what he called his *Two-Twenty-Six Trilogy*: the short stories 'Patriotism' (*Yūkoku*, first published in December 1960) and 'The Voice of the Hero Spirits' (*Eirei no koe*, 1966) and the play 'Tenth-Day Chrysanthemum' (*Tōka no kiku*, described in Powell 2002: 170) (Scott Stokes 1975: 199). In addition, his extensive novel 'Runaway Horses' (*Honba*, 1969) is a fictionalized treatment of the assassination by right-wing militants of Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi on 15 May 1932, a precursor to the February 26 Incident; and his 1968 play *My Friend Hitler* (*Waga tomo Hitler*) dramatizes the corresponding period in German history, specifically, the events leading up to the 'Night of the Long Knives', on 30 June 1934, when Hitler purged some two hundred of his opponents and eliminated two of his earliest supporters, Ernst Röhm and Gregor Strasser.[1]

Of all these works, 'Patriotism' is unquestionably the most renowned. It describes the death of Lieutenant Takeyama Shinji, who, because he is newly married, is excluded by his unit from participating in the February 26 Incident. Fearful that he will be called upon to move against his comrades and suppress the rebellion, Takeyama commits *seppuku* after making passionate love to his new bride, who follows him in death.

'Patriotism' occupies a special place in Mishima's *oeuvre*. Written in the aftermath of the 1960 demonstrations against the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, it was a reaction to the left-wing political vision and the Left's calls for 'revolution'. 'Patriotism' became a paradigm for Mishima's alternative politics and aesthetics, which he expanded upon for the next decade. In 1965, he wrote, directed, and starred in a notorious film adaptation of the work; and in 1970, after meticulous preparation, he acted it out in real life by committing suicide.[2]

Mishima's goal in life was to die the kind of beautiful death his fictional lieutenant had died, which Mishima seems to have conceived as a Japanese approximation of the gruesome but ineffably beautiful deaths of Catholic martyrs. Throughout his life, the deaths of Catholic saints, particularly Saint Sebastian, were an aesthetic ideal for him. In his first novel, *Confessions of a Mask*, the protagonist, Mishima's alter ego, experiences his first ejaculation while gazing at Guido Reni's painting of Saint Sebastian. Later, Mishima supervised the translation of Gabriele

D'Annunzio's *The Martyrdom of Saint Sebastian* (Scott Stokes 1975: 144), and he posed as Saint Sebastian in an iconic photograph by Shinoyama Kishin.

Mishima's problem was that he had no God or, with the end of the war, no great cause to which to martyr himself. In the February 26 Incident, Mishima discovered a solution to this problem. The emperor, for whom the young rebels had given their lives, would serve as a Japanese analogue for God, and the circumstances of the revolt would provide the *mise en scène* for his drama of self-immolation. 'The purity, bravery, youth and death [of the young officers] qualified them as mythical heroes', Mishima wrote in the afterword to his *Two-Twenty-Six Trilogy*, 'and their failures and deaths made them true heroes in this world' (Scott Stokes 1975: 200).

In the same afterword, Mishima mentions Nietzsche and Georges Bataille, whom he calls the 'Nietzsche of eroticism', as significantly influential in his formulation (quoted in Scott Stokes 1975: 199). Nietzsche of course was the apostle of infinite hermeneutics for whom reality was a construction of the will. Nietzsche was important to Mishima because he authorized Mishima's conviction that he could construct an alternative reality by the sheer force of his imagination. Bataille, whose works were translated into Japanese beginning in 1959, is best known for his philosophical and aesthetic concatenation of eros, religiosity and death. Bataille's ideal was Saint Theresa, who imagined herself dying in ecstatic erotic union with Christ; and in his philosophical and creative work Bataille tried to describe how that ideal could be realized in the profane world. In Bataille's work, Mishima writes, he 'found a vivid, harsh, shocking and immediate connection between metaphysics and the human flesh . . . an anti-psychological delineation, anti-realism, erotic intellectualism, straightforward symbolism, and a perception of the universe hidden behind all of these' (2000: 81).

Mishima analogized the emperor to the Christian God in an interview he gave in March 1966 and asserted straightforwardly, 'The Emperor was the absolute for us Japanese' (Scott Stokes 1975: 201). But Hirohito was, for Mishima, a God who had failed. In his afterword to the *Two-Twenty-Six Trilogy*, Mishima identifies Hirohito's renunciation of his divinity (*Ningen sengen*) on 1 January 1946 with his response to the February 26 Incident and decries them both as unforgivable insults that made a mockery of the only absolute, transcendent, vivifying principle in Japanese culture, the only thing that could give transhistorical significance to meaningful actions in life and authorize a meaningful death (Scott Stokes 1975: 199–200). For Mishima, Hirohito's failure to affirm his divinity and thus legitimize the sacrifice of all those who had given their lives for him during the war, was of a piece with his failure to recognize and legitimize the sincere efforts of the February 26 rebels. Indeed, from Mishima's point of view, the reason Lieutenant Takeyama has to commit suicide so precipitously in 'Patriotism' is because he has to die before Hirohito reveals himself to be all-too human and hostile to

the mutineers, when he can still die convinced that his actions 'had a moral basis, and were in accordance with the Education Rescript', which defined the emperor's divine role; that his life was 'lived beneath the solemn protection of the gods . . .' (Mishima 1995: 7–8).

The fact that the February 26 Incident had failed was essential to Mishima. Failure is a prerequisite to martyrdom, and therefore failure is fundamental to Mishima's aesthetic. It is this agonism, found throughout Mishima's work that unites his classicist and modern tastes. *My Friend Hitler*, for example, is a modernist play based on Racine's play *Britannicus*, about an episode in Roman history. As Renato Poggioli has written, agonism, which he uses to mean the expectation of failure and the willingness to martyr oneself for art, is typical of modernism, particularly in the avant-garde, modernism's most extreme expression. 'The agonistic attitude,' Poggioli writes, 'is not a passive state of mind, exclusively dominated by a sense of imminent catastrophe; on the contrary, it strives to transform catastrophe into a miracle. By acting, and through its very failure, it tends towards a result justifying and transcending itself . . . Agonism means tension . . . an hyperbolic passion, a bow bent towards the impossible, a paradoxical and positive form of spiritual defeatism' (1968: 65-6).

In sum, 'Patriotism' is a reactionary work, authored as an alternative to left-wing views of politics and 'revolution'. Predicated on the failure of the February 26 revolt, it served as a model that Mishima re-enacted obsessively throughout the last ten years of his life and work.[3]

REVOLUTION AS WORLD-RENEWING VIOLENCE

If Mishima Yukio was a modernist writer who exploited the February 26 Incident as a *mise en scène* for his drama of Catholic-inspired martyrdom, the filmmaker Suzuki Seijun uses the Incident to plumb the cultural roots of the imagination that enabled it. His 1966 film *Elegy to Violence* (*Kenka erejii*)[4] begins as a comedy about the adolescent male's penchant for mindless violence but ends with a suggestion (and perhaps it is no more than that) about the sources of the February 26 Incident and, by extension, of the revolutionary imagination in general. The film is not easy, and its complexity apparently contributed to Suzuki's termination by the Nikkatsu Company, which found his films 'incomprehensible for the public' (Max Tessier quoted in Desser 1988: 70). Nevertheless, the film scholar David Desser names *Elegy to Violence* as Suzuki's most important film, and I would rank it among the best Japanese films ever made (Desser 1988: 70). *Elegy to Violence* is set in 1935–6 and follows the pugilistic career of Nanba Kiroku, a student at the Okayama Second Middle School.[5] Plagued by raging hormones, he falls in love with Michiko, the beautiful daughter of his Roman Catholic landlord. Michiko is everything Kiroku is not – sensitive, fragile, cultured and devout. Kiroku finds her irresistible, but he also longs to prove himself in male society, where physical courage demonstrated in hand-to-hand combat is the standard

by which he is judged. Adept at fisticuffs, Kiroku discovers that he can sublimate his all-but-uncontrollable sexual urges into fighting. In a dream scene, he explicitly declares in his diary, 'Michiko, I don't masturbate, I fight!' And in one of the film's more hilarious moments, Kiroku plays Michiko's piano with his erect penis. Gradually, violence becomes an end in itself, an ideology Kiroku and his cohorts call 'the *-ism* of fighting' (*kenka-shugi*), which inevitably interferes with his relationship with Michiko.

Suzuki's depiction of adolescent male violence borders on slapstick. Mentored by a dapper, older Catholic youth nicknamed 'Terrapin' (*Suppon*), Kiroku battles the forces commanded by the knuckleheaded 'Pickles' (*Takuan*). After numerous scuffles, Terrapin, Kiroku, and their gang – with cooking pots for helmets and armed with sickles, hoes and homemade cat-of-nine-tails bolos – ride in an overflowing dump truck to a dusty, windswept battlefield for their final fight. Despite their bravado, however, the would-be-warriors are still children, and they flee at the sight of a single policeman, who turns out to be Kiroku's father disguised in a borrowed gendarme's dress whites.

When Kiroku's devotion to 'the *-ism* of fighting' leads him to disobey the military drill instructor at his school, he is expelled and transfers to a school in distant Aizu-Wakamatsu in north-eastern Japan, where he has relatives. With his distinct west-Japanese accent, Kiroku is an obvious outsider. He immediately becomes a target of bullying and has to prove himself, which only increases his bravado. He takes an immediate dislike to the cowardly North-easterners, who insult a physically frail teacher they nickname 'The Duck' while obsequiously submitting to the more imposing teacher they call 'Mr Mammoth.' Challenged as he walks down the street one day, Kiroku ridicules the manifest lack of principle behind the bully's braggadocio.

Once again, Kiroku is forced to change schools, this time to nearby Kitakata Middle School, where his charisma attracts a small but devoted following. Inevitably Kiroku and his 'Kitakata Men' become embroiled in a battle with the self-styled Shōwa White Tiger Battalion (*Shōwa byakkotai*) from Aizu-Wakamatsu. In the final battle of the film, Kiroku and his tiny band defeat the more numerous and better armed White Tigers through sheer ingenuity and guts.

On the purely generic level, *Elegy to Violence* can be seen as a parody of the popular *yakuza* films of the 1960s, with Kiroku playing the role of the lone principled fighter whose sense of honour and purpose enable him to defeat more numerous but morally inferior opponents. Desser locates the film among the youth films of the 1950s and 1960s. He also notes the film's quasi-Brechtian theatricality and the structural similarities to the highly stylized Chinese martial arts films that, with the appearance of Bruce Lee, became popular in the US in the 1970s (1988: 70).

Elegy to Violence can be viewed on a more serious level, however, as a commentary on irrational (male) violence in Japanese culture, particularly the driving force behind the February 26 Incident. One day, while

meeting a friend in a lonely café in Aizu-Wakamatsu, Kiroku encounters a charismatic older man whose steely gaze and intense demeanour immediately enthrall him. Later, after his victory over the Shōwa White Tigers, Kiroku hears the news of the February 26 Incident and sees a photograph of the man again. It is Kita Ikki, the ideological leader of the rebel troops. This is fighting of an entirely different order of magnitude, and Kiroku's immediate reaction is to leap on a train for Tokyo to join the battle.

With this device, *Elegy to Violence* ceases to be a comedy and reveals itself as a depiction of the aimless idealism and inchoate violence that the ideology of Kita Ikki was able to shape and that fed directly into the February 26 Incident. It is a film about the popular energy that made the Incident possible and that was later channelled into the Asia-Pacific War. If the title 'Elegy to Violence' means anything, it is that the film is intended as a sad tribute to lost innocence, to a time when boys could be boys, when they felt themselves indestructible, immortal, and when fighting was just a way to sublimate adolescent urges and pass the time.

But there is an even more ambitious dimension to the film. From the first scene, Kiroku's violence is juxtaposed to Michiko's Christianity. In the film's final scenes, Michiko visits Kiroku in Aizu-Wakamatsu. She has come to say goodbye, because she is entering a convent, she says. Kiroku asks her to wait and to marry him, but she refuses, saying that she has discovered a 'flaw' in her body that makes marriage impossible. As she departs, walking along a narrow, snowy mountain path, she is trampled by a column of soldiers, marching double-time, presumably towards Tokyo, either to participate in or to put down the February 26 revolt. The camera focuses on Michiko's cross, a Catholic crucifix with the bloody body of Jesus attached, which has been ripped from her neck and is ground into the snow by the advancing phalanx.

That Michiko's Christianity is gendered female and the testosterone-driven '*-ism* of fighting' that animates Kiroku, Kita Ikki, the February 26 Incident, and the column of advancing soldiers is gendered male is obvious. But with these images, Suzuki is also juxtaposing alternative visions of salvation. Opposed to the pacific image of salvation implicit in the image of the crucified Christ is the indigenous vision of salvation as eternal return, revolution as *revolving* through cycles of time, where the world must periodically descend into (male-driven) violence and chaos in order to be renewed.[6] This autochthonous vision is what underlies many Japanese festivals, like Iyo (the 'Naked Festival' in Okayama prefecture) or the 'Fighting Festival' in Nada near Kobe.[7] If the vision of salvation as the end result of a linear historical process is Christian and 'foreign', then in Suzuki Seijun's view, the February 26 Incident was driven by an entirely different vision of salvation achieved through world-renewing violence that is indigenously 'Japanese'. Suzuki is suggesting that when Kiroku sets off for the 'great fight' at the end of the film, he does not conceive of himself as going to participate in a political event so much as to join in an orgy of world-renewing violence.

What Suzuki has done in this film is probe the intersection of eroticism, violence, religion and historical consciousness in the February 26 revolt in an entirely different way from Mishima Yukio's agonistic vision.

REVOLUTION'S EROTIC ALTER EGO

On the night between 17–18 May 1936 – after days of torrid love-making and while Tokyo was still under the martial law imposed during the February 26 Incident[8] – a woman named Abe Sada strangled her lover, Ishida Kichizō, sliced off his genitals with a butcher knife, and carved the words 'Sada and Kichi Together Forever!' into his thigh. Two days later, she was apprehended with Ishida's penis and testicles still on her person. Imprisoned for five years, she was released in May 1941 as part of a mass amnesty declared the previous year to celebrate the 2,600th anniversary of the mythical founding of Japan (Johnston 2005: 147).

Abe Sada was a celebrity from the moment of her apprehension, and she has been the subject of numerous books, plays, and films ever since. Indeed, 'The vast corpus of works on Abe Sada is a subject that merits a book in itself' (Johnston 2005: 161).[9] Many of these works, like Ishii Teruo's film *Scandalous Female Criminals of Modern Japan*, focus on the salacious character of Abe's crime.[10] Others, however, have dealt with the political implications of her act. As Mark Schreiber puts it, 'The February 26 military coup d'état – symbolic of male domination and violence – was very neatly offset in people's daily preoccupations three months later by [Abe Sada's crime]' (2001: 190).

A number of writers in the 1960s and 1970s juxtaposed the Abe Sada affair with the February 26 Incident and suggested or implied that Abe's act offered an alternative to the kind of political revolution epitomized in the February 26 affair. Sekine Hiroshi, for example, began his eponymous 1971 poem 'Abe Sada' with the lines, 'The conclusion of the 2/26 incident / was the war / but my incident, in the same year / is still not concluded' (Sekine 1977: 319). Similarly, Ōshima Nagisa's sexually explicit 1976 film *In the Realm of the Senses* (*Ai no koriida*, literally 'Bullfight of Love') presents the Abe Sada affair in its political context.[11] As in *Elegy to Violence*, the connection to the February 26 Incident is only obliquely revealed near the end of the film, when Ishida is returning from the barbershop along a narrow street and is passed by a column of armed soldiers. He remains lost in thought, oblivious to the world around him. As the English title of the film suggests, he is in another realm utterly distinct from the male world of political violence, a realm dominated by female passion. A politically-engaged artist with a number of overtly political films to his credit but by the mid-1970s disillusioned with the Old Left, Ōshima like Sekine suggests that erotic revolution (gendered female) offers an alternative to political revolution (gendered male). The latter inevitably leads to fascism; the former does not.

The idea that personal sexual liberation could be an alternative to political revolution was a popular notion in the 1960s. The juxtaposition was made most starkly by the German playwright Peter Weiss in his polemical 1963 play *The Persecution of Jean Paul Marat by the Inmates of the Asylum of Charenton Under the Direction of the Marquis de Sade* (customarily abbreviated as *Marat/Sade*; English tr. *1964*). With nuance and verbal flair, Weiss contrasts the idea of political revolution embodied by Jean-Paul Marat, one of the strongest advocates of violence and terror in the French Revolution, with the idea of revolution as sexual liberation embodied by the Marquis de Sade, who was Marat's contemporary. The play, which is written in verse, is set in an insane asylum and centres on an argument between Sade and Marat over the true character of 'revolution'. Weiss suggests that both lead to self-defeating excess and neither is entirely satisfactory. In Weiss's view, the point seems to be that revolution achieved through political violence must be tempered by individual, personal and sexual liberation.

Aided by a masterful production directed by Peter Brook, which was adapted into an excellent film in 1967, *Marat/Sade* was enormously popular and controversial worldwide. It was translated into Japanese in 1967,[12] and it was produced in a critical adaptation by Satoh Makoto and three other playwrights as *The Dance of Angels Who Burn Their Own Wings* (*Tsubasa o moyasu tenshi-tachi no butō*) in 1970.[13]

Five years later, in 1975, Satoh published 'Abe Sada's Dogs' (*Abe sada no inu*), the first in his brilliant trilogy, *The World of Shōwa: A Comedy*, which treats Abe Sada in the context of the February 26 Incident and uses her character to comment on the meaning of revolution in our time.[14]

'The world was roughly 1936. . .' the play begins. 'Martial law / Was in effect, / But one after the other, women in the Imperial capital continued to get knocked up' (Satoh 1976: 12, 16). In this context Abe Sada represents once again the forces of eroticism and biology, which are oblivious to politics and which even martial law cannot control. Unlike the works of Sekine and Ōshima, however, which are more or less literal transpositions of Abe's published confession, Satoh's play is a wildly imagined fantasy along the lines of *Marat/Sade* that explores the interaction of politics and eroticism and questions the premise that eroticism constitutes an alternative to political revolution.

For Satoh, the ineluctable continuity of history is the problem, and common to all three plays in *The World of Shōwa* is a trickster character who embodies it and who is the ultimate but only belatedly recognized enemy. In 'Abe Sada's Dogs' this character is 'The Photographer', a master of simulacra, whose purpose is to preserve the *status quo* and disarm any potential challenge to its equilibrium through the strategic deployment of meticulously concocted diversions. Foremost among these is the Showboat Singapore, a ship of dreams the Photographer skippers that promises to transport its passengers away from the deadening monotony of their daily lives to an exotic paradise of supernatural bliss where 'snow falls in midsummer' but which is actually

anchored immovably in the Sumida River, just upstream from Tokyo Bay.

Each of the plays in *The World of Shōwa* is headed by a quotation from Walter Benjamin. The epigraph for 'Abe Sada's Dogs' is taken from Benjamin's 'Theses on the Philosophy of History' and reads: 'A historical materialist cannot do without the notion of a present which is not a transition, but in which time stands still and has come to a stop . . . Historicism gives the "eternal" image of the past; historical materialism supplies a unique experience with the past' (Benjamin 1969: 262).[15] The final sentence of this paragraph, which Satoh does not quote, nevertheless reveals his intent in the play: '[The historical materialist] remains in control of his powers, man enough to blast open the continuum of history' (Benjamin 1969: 262). It is this 'continuum of history', represented by the Photographer, that revolution must destroy.

Revolution for Satoh, as for Benjamin, is synonymous with redemption and has a distinctly messianic meaning. It is a sudden intervention in time, not the result of a linear historical process as 'historicists' would have it. Satoh shares Benjamin's belief, which Benjamin identifies with Judaism in another passage in the 'Theses on the Philosophy of History', that 'every second of time [could be] the strait gate through which the Messiah might enter' (Benjamin 1969: 264).

In 'Abe Sada's Dogs', this idea is articulated in the final refrain of the song that concludes the work: 'Spin now, pinwheel, / While the wind is yet still / As guaranteed by the promise / Before the sun can set' (Satoh 1976: 137-9). The 'promise', of course, is the messianic promise, which Satoh knew from his early education in Christian schools and from his readings in Western philosophy. It is to be fulfilled despite the fact that the winds of history are still.

The question the play asks is, can the unbridled female eroticism of Abe Sada, in the form of a character named Atashi – which is a feminine first-person pronoun that Satoh uses to make Abe Sada a metonym for femaleness in general – overcome the infinitely reproducing continuity of history represented by The Photographer?

There is another potential antagonist to The Photographer in the play: Shōchikubai. He is an intellectual who has returned from studying in Europe, where he picked up all sorts of half-baked nihilistic notions about the world and social change. Pointing a pistol at his temple, he fantasizes a romantic death by suicide: 'A summer morning. Death in Paris. No, no death by blowfish consumed inadvertently while scavenging in the garbage. I cross the hill of Montmartre, crawl to the banks of the Seine, and expire there, my strength exhausted, a single bullet in my lung. Yes, that's the end. The ideal finale to a hot evening' (Satoh 1976: 32).

Atashi and Shōchikubai carry bundles identically wrapped in purple *furoshiki*. Atashi's bundle contains the severed genitals of her lover, Shōchikubai's a pistol. The play is structured around a complicated series of interactions that result in the exchange of these bundles. Theoretically, if the exchange is completed successfully, the boundless

revolutionary potential of female eroticism will be armed, and the intellectual will literally 'get some balls'.

The action takes place on 'Opera Boulevard, Safety Razor Township, Blue Sky Ward, Tokyo City' and revolves around the 'Long-Life Home for Unwed Mothers' operated by Shōchikubai's parents, Chitose Tsuruzō and Kame. All of these names are traditional symbols of long life, and they imply the undying continuity of the Japanese 'imagined community', which the Photographer is sworn to preserve.

Suffice it to say that at the end of the play, after an exceedingly complicated plot, we find ourselves back in Safety Razor Township, and nothing has changed. The Photographer has succeeded in exploiting Atashi's sexuality to turn Shōchikubai and the other male residents into docile canines, whom he feeds a steady diet of 'rising sun rations' (*hinomaru bentō*), who become rabid (*kyōken*) nationalists, and who are prepared to live a dog's life and die a dog's death (*inujini*) (Satoh 1976: 71-4). Far from being an alternative form of revolution, female sexuality is revealed as a powerful means of reproduction, which the Photographer exploits to reinforce the continuum of history.

THE REVOLUTION TRIUMPHANT

The third and final play in Satoh's *The World of Shōwa: A Comedy* is 'The Killing of Blanqui, Spring in Shanghai' (*Buranki-goroshi Shanghai no haru*, 1979). In contrast to 'Abe Sada's Dogs', which concerns the revolutionary potential of sexuality, especially female sexuality, 'Blanqui' takes up the question of terrorism as a means to revolution. Specifically, it asks, what would have happened if the February 26 revolt had succeeded?

The play is set in Shanghai, a moral no-man's-land like Chinatown in Roman Polanski's famous 1973 film, a liminal space where the rules of logic and even chronology do not apply. Early twentieth century Shanghai lends itself naturally to this usage: 'Morality was irrelevant or meaningless in Shanghai', Rhoads Murphy has written, 'an atmosphere which was apparent to even the casual visitor' (Murphy 1953: 7).

In order to reimagine the February 26 Incident as a success, Satoh identifies it with the Jinshin Disturbance, a palace coup that took place in 672 and is among Japanese history's few analogues to February 26. Using names associated with the Jinshin Disturbance, Satoh sets the stage: The February 26 'revolution' succeeded. With the help of the Comintern, Hirohito fled to Manchukuo, where he was installed as the leader of the soon-to-be-established 'Greater East Asian People's Republic'. Meanwhile, his brother, Prince Ōtomo-no-Miya Amahito, having led the 31st regiment of the Hirosaki Eighth Infantry in support of the rebels, usurped the throne and had himself installed as Emperor Temmu II, ending the Shōwa era and replacing it with his Asuka reign.

It is now 15 August, the day of Japan's surrender. As the play begins, 'Imperial Guards' (*kōeihei*, a homonym for Red Guards) wave red-

bound copies of the *Sayings of Chairman Hirohito* as they listen to his famous speech (*gyokuon hōsō*) announcing Japan's 15 August surrender broadcast on the radio against the triumphal strains of the Communist *Internationale* (Satoh 1979: 11–12, 28–9).

Three groups vie for power in the aftermath of Japan's defeat. In addition to the Kuomintang, led by Chiang Kai-shek and backed by the Americans, and Hirohito's Greater East Asian People's Republic, supported by the Comintern, a shadowy terrorist group known as the Shanghai Society of Seasons is at work in Shanghai. Through anarchist violence, they are plotting to establish the Greater East Asia People's Republic as a non-aligned revolutionary utopia.

The Society of Seasons is led by someone code-named Spring, whom we are led to believe is a character named the Count. The Count imagines himself to be the reincarnation of the French revolutionary, Louis Auguste Blanqui (1805–81), whom he idealizes as the avatar of revolution conceived as unrelenting violence against 'the system'.

Blanqui was the quintessential advocate of the idea that revolution could be achieved through terror. Referred to variously as the 'last Jacobin' (because of his advocacy of violence) and '*l'enfermé*' (the 'eternal prisoner', because he spent more than half his life in prison), Blanqui originated the idea of a vanguard party organized as a hierarchy of cells controlled from the top down by a revolutionary dictatorship, which influenced European radicals from Lasalle to Lenin and Mussolini (Spitzer 1957: 16–17).

Blanqui was also an amateur astronomer who used meditations on the heavens as a means of spiritual escape from the monotony of prison life (Spitzer 1957: 34–5). His astronomical musings in *L'Éternité par les Astres* (1872) illuminate his political philosophy. Blanqui described a view of the universe that illustrates his political philosophy. In this 'well-written *pot-pourri* of elementary science, philosophic insights and outlandish hypotheses' (Spitzer 1957: 35), Blanqui describes a universe governed by unvarying laws. He also describes, however, the possibility of exceptions to these laws of eternal repetition. Certain 'mutations' of physical laws are possible, Blanqui asserted, which would permit a star to lurch out of its orbit. 'In its anarchistic flight across the heavens it may collide with some other giant astral body and in this mutual destruction generate the heat which forms those whirling balls of fire which are the new stars' (Spitzer 1957: 35-6). This was also Blanqui's idea of the revolutionary, who could break out of the fixed patterns of political reality, disrupting the preordained order to hurtle across history, collide with concentrations of power, and, in an explosion of mutually destructive violence, create new, unimagined worlds of possibility.

In 'The Killing of Blanqui, Spring in Shanghai', the continuum of history is represented by a trickster character named Okamoto, who morphs through a series of identities, moving agilely to block any potential disruption of historical stability. During the course of the play,

he offers business cards that identify him as an official of the Japanese consulate (Satoh 1979: 46); the head (*iemoto*) of the Hanayagi school of Japanese dance (Satoh 1979: 79); a reporter for the *Far East Commercial Times* (a newspaper he himself has never heard of) (Satoh 1979: 80); director of market research for Far East Coca-Cola Bottlers (Satoh 1979: 122); a representative of the Flea Powder Division of National Salvation Pharmaceuticals (Satoh 1979: 171); the T'ang period Zen poet Feng-gan (Satoh 1979: 171); and Amida Buddha, Publicity Director for the Cosmic Circus (Satoh 1979: 171). The question is whether Spring and his revolutionary cabal can outwit the trickster Okamoto, whether a revolution conceived as terrorist violence can break through the continuum of history.

On 26 February 1946, the tenth anniversary of the February revolution, the Society of Seasons plots to release plague-infected fleas acquired from Unit 731, Japan's top-secret biological programme headquartered in Manchuria. The aim is to kill ten thousand labourers in densely-populated Shanghai and thus disrupt the city's financial sector, leading to widespread revolt and giving the Society of Seasons the opportunity to seize the reins of power (Satoh 1979: 149-50). The Count had hoped to use an atomic bomb for this purpose, but he failed in his attempt to acquire one from the Soviet Union.

Suffice it to say that the scheme does not succeed, Okamoto prevails and nothing changes. United States forces occupy Japan, unseat Temmu II, and return Hirohito to the throne as Japan's 'symbolic emperor'. The post-war period proceeds as if nothing had happened. Although it succeeded, the February 26 Revolution did not alter the course of history one whit.

Terrorism fails. But like Blanqui, Satoh does not entirely discount the legitimacy and potential of terrorism to foment revolution. Kasuga, a member of the Shanghai Society of Seasons, explains the failure in terms of Blanqui's astronomical metaphor.

> **Kasuga**: Comets are an indefinable substance that is not liquid, solid, or gas, and that is unlike anything that composes other heavenly bodies. Comets fall to earth. At this very moment, a comet is preparing to crash into the pavement of North Suzhou Road at the foot of Garden Bridge here in Shanghai. *Adieu, mon amour* . . . Damn! Something I hadn't even thought of just happened. The plummeting comet came to a stop in midair just inches from the ground! An immeasurable reprieve!. . . The comet, which had defied all laws and whose eccentric elliptical orbit had cut across an unimaginable space, at this last moment contracts into eternal hesitation. *Adieu, mon amour*! 15 August, 1945. . . . (*He looks through the telescope*.) Who can name that moment? That moment that remains frozen forever? (*Laughs*.) No one! No one can name it! A comet suspended in midair – call it 'nothingness' or 'eternity', it remains indefinable. (*Swinging the telescope around in another direction*.) Look for yourself. Shanghai is totally oblivious. The

> comet just hangs there. People never look back at the comet on the corner . . . (Satoh 1979: 19–20)

But all is not lost.

> **Kasuga** (*returning from the entrance and looking through the telescope*): At this moment, an infinite number of us in an infinite number of places stand stymied as we watch an infinite number of corpses being carried away. We got it wrong. We all get it wrong. But among us, there will be one group . . . just one group that will eventually get it right. It's not impossible. (Satoh 1979: 187–8)

Even if the February 26 Incident had succeeded, Satoh suggests, nothing would have changed, not simply for political reasons, but because all revolutions conceived along Blanquist lines are doomed to failure. Nevertheless, some day, someone will get it right. It's not impossible. Mutations do happen.

Satoh heads 'The Killing of Blanqui, Spring in Shanghai' with an epigraph from Walter Benjamin, noting that 'the idea of eternal recurrence intrudes into the world of Baudelaire, Blanqui and Nietzsche at approximately the same moment'.[16] As we have seen, Satoh shares Benjamin's view of revolution as synonymous with redemption and of the revolutionary moment as akin to the arrival of the Messiah, a total break in the cycle of eternal recurrence. In 'The Killing of Blanqui', in a beautiful song sung at the end of the play, Satoh alludes to 'A Sunday when nobody comes':

> A single star
> Sinking
> In the blue sea grass.
> Shining sand,
> An aquarium without fish,
> A Sunday when nobody comes. (Satoh 1979: 118–19 and 180–1)

Sunday, the (Christian) Sabbath, is when the promise of redemption is renewed; and the one who is expected but does not arrive is the revolution/the Messiah. What Satoh is saying, together with Benjamin, I believe, is that the fact that the Messiah does not come does not invalidate the promise of his arrival; that its/his appearance will not be the end of a teleological historical process but a sudden break in time, that 'every second of time [is potentially] the strait gate through which the Messiah might enter' (Satoh 1979: 264).

CONCLUSION

The form and style of each of the works considered here corresponds to its content. Mishima's modernist style in 'Patriotism' reflects his

reaction to the orthodox leftist understanding of revolution, to which he attempts to construct a more aesthetically satisfactory (from his point of view) right-wing alternative. In *Elegy to Violence*, Suzuki Seijun conceals profound psychological, philosophical and anthropological insights about the roots of the February 26 Incident and about revolution in Japan beneath the façade of a farcical commercial youth film. Ōshima juxtaposes revolution and sexual orgy in *In the Realm of the Senses*, translating the dichotomy into a sexually explicit, if not pornographic, art film. Satoh's plays 'Abe Sada's Dogs' and 'The Killing of Blanqui, Spring in Shanghai' display the 'incredulity toward metanarratives', the playfulness, and the structural anarchy characteristic of postmodernism.

This progression from Mishima to Satoh, from assuming revolution as a given in 'Patriotism' to its complete deconstruction in *The World of Shōwa: A Comedy*, parallels the global career of the idea of 'revolution' and the way it was treated around the world in literature and art during the same period. By the 1980s, an idea that had motivated millions and convulsed history for a hundred years lay in ruin. According to Japanese writers, playwrights and filmmakers – who reflected a growing global consensus – the options that remained were despair and suicide; the substitution of personal, sexual liberation for political revolution; endless, futile, but entertaining symbolic play; or prayerful waiting. The notion of a political movement, of collective action towards the incremental improvement of an imperfect world seemed, for the time being at least, beyond imagination.

NOTES

1 For an analysis of this play, see my essay (2007) 'An Aesthetic of Destruction: Mishima Yukio's *My Friend Hitler*'.

2 The famous suicide scene from the film can be viewed on the Internet at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7-8WcSpa7MU (accessed 16 February 2007).

3 On Mishima, see also Irmela Hijiya-Kirschnereit's chapter in this volume.

4 The title has been variously translated as *Fighting Elegy*, *Elegy to Violence*, *Violence's Sad End*, *A Sad Tale of Violence* and *The Born Fighter*.

5 Middle school (*chūgakkō*) in the pre-war system was equivalent to high school today, so Kiroku is seventeen or eighteen years old.

6 Mircea Eliade (1954) discusses this idea magisterially in *The Myth of the Eternal Return*.

7 See Keiko Ikeda's excellent documentary *Fighting Festival* (1984) about the Nada *kenka matsuri*.

8 Martial law remained in effect until 18 July 1936.

9 Johnston (2005) offers a brief survey of the literature in the epilogue to his book, pp. 156–62.

10 Abe Sada herself had appeared in Ishii Teruo's 1969 film *Meiji-Taishō-Shōwa ryōki onna hanzaishi* (Scandalous Female Criminals of Modern Japan).

[11] Ōshima was in fact indicted for obscenity in Japan. For his views on the question of pornography, see Ōshima's 'Theory of Experimental Pornographic Film' and 'Text of Plea', in Ōshima (1991: 251–86).

[12] *Maraa no hakugai to ansatsu*, trans. Uchigaki Keiichi and Iwabuchi Tatsuji, Tokyo: Hakusuisha, 1967.

[13] See my translation (2003).

[14] Satoh, *Abe sada no inu: Kigeki shōwa no sekai I* (1976). A literal English translation exists, but it entirely misses the point and is of little value. See Satoh Makoto (2004), *Abe Sada's Dogs*, trans. D. Kenny, in Japan Playwrights Association (ed.), *Half a Century of Japanese Theatre, VI: 1960s Part 1*, Tokyo: Kinokuniya, pp. 137–208.

[15] Japanese translation by Nomura Osamu, 1969. The entire quotation is as follows:

> A historical materialist cannot do without the notion of a present which is not a transition, but in which time stands still and has come to a stop. For this notion defines the present in which he himself is writing history. Historicism gives the 'eternal' image of the past; historical materialism supplies a unique experience with the past. The historical materialist leaves it to others to be drained by the whore called 'Once upon a time' in historicism's bordello. He remains in control of his powers, man enough to blast open the continuum of history'.

[16] The epigraph to 'The Killing of Blanqui' is a passage from Benjamin's essay, 'Central Park', where Benjamin notes that 'the idea of eternal recurrence intrudes into the world of Baudelaire, Blanqui and Nietzsche at approximately the same moment' (1985: 43). The Japanese translation Satoh used is by Maruko Shūhei, 1975.

6

Imperial Japan and Its POWs: The Dilemma of Humaneness and National Identity

ROTEM KOWNER

Modern warfare could well be summed up in two phrases: annihilation and humanitarian concern. Never before have these two contradictory impulses been so prevalent and never before have they clashed so violently. On the one hand, fulfilling the dictum of killing in battle has become easier than ever. It was the industrial revolution that brought about the mass production of efficient means of transportation, better logistics and increasingly more effective weapons with longer range and unprecedented destructiveness. As a result, wars have grown more intense, with greater numbers of participants, and far more casualties than ever. On the other hand, and partially to offset the unprecedented carnage which wars produce, conduct in combat has become more regulated and is accompanied by a growing demand for humaneness. The dead in modern wars are usually buried in well kept cemeteries and the wounded receive effective medical treatment, to the extent that their mortality rate in battle has decreased markedly.

Even more conspicuous is the transformation during the last 150 years in the attitude to defeated soldiers who have surrendered and the treatment of POWs. Their lives are usually spared; moreover, according to various conventions designed specifically to ameliorate their conditions, the POWs' captors are required to provide them with adequate food and accommodation and even pay for their labour. This attitude to POWs is without parallel in the past. Until the mid-nineteenth century no clear policy had existed as to how to deal with surrendering enemy soldiers, either in the heat of battle or soon after victory. These soldiers were often summarily executed, put to work as slaves, or imprisoned until ransom was paid for their release.[1] Alas, the great hopes in regard

to the treatment of POWs stirred by the international conventions have not always come true. Certain nations have been reluctant to follow the conventions, and worse, in some conflicts they treated their enemy prisoners with exceptional cruelty, often resulting in their death.

Among those nations who defied the new gospel of humaneness to POWs in modern times, Imperial Japan seems to hold a special but not necessarily unique place. During the Second World War in particular, Japanese treatment of Allied POWs was notorious for its cruelty and inhumanity. Ever since that war, negative images of the Japanese attitude to POWs have been sustained through scholarly books, personal memoirs and, above all, countless popular films and novels. There is more than a grain of truth in these images, but it is less known that they emerged rather late and do not necessarily reflect earlier military conduct of the Japanese. Surprisingly, before the eight-year conflict that encompasses the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–45) and the Pacific War (1941–5), Japanese treatment of POWs, Europeans in particular, was regarded as benevolent and even chivalrous. The transformation of these images is intriguing but so is the reality.

This chapter focuses on the actual behaviour and attitude to POWs held by Japan, rather than on its images. It is based on a systematic analysis of the treatment of POWs in six major wars fought by Imperial Japan from 1894 to 1945. With these data at hand, this chapter aims to uncover the determinants of the Japanese treatment of POWs, the motives for the above transformation, and their implications for national identity and attitude to self and others.

TREATMENT OF POWS AND ITS PREDICTORS

The quality of a belligerent's treatment of POWs it holds is a cardinal issue in assessing its compliance with international conventions and enforcing their terms. Regretfully, this is not a simple task, especially in wartime, since many of the actions against POWs are conducted out of sight of neutral observers and tend to remain unreported. Moreover, treatment of POWs includes a complex array of quantifiable and non-quantifiable aspects that together affect the prisoners' wellbeing during and after imprisonment. It begins at the moment of surrender, when the captors' responses may range from organized and careful transport of the POWs to the rear at one extreme to wilful killing immediately or soon after capture at the other. If killings do take place, their percentage is an important, albeit rarely available, indication of the attitude to POWs and their initial treatment.

During incarceration, multiple behavioural facets may provide additional indications of the quality of treatment. They may be broken down to more mundane aspects, such as medical care, quality of food and especially the daily calorie intake available to the prisoners, as well as the availability or deprivation of mail, payment for work, or any other rights prescribed by the conventions signed by the belligerents. Side by side

with basic requirements of humanitarian treatment, one may examine the occurrence of more rare but nonetheless significant phenomena of inhuman treatment with fatal consequences, such as collective punishments, torture and executions. The best aggregated indicator of maltreatment of POWs is probably the loss of human life, as measured by mortality through hunger, disease and disciplinary actions. Thus, the most telling figure and usually the easiest to obtain is the aggregate mortality rate, either for the entire period or per selected length of internment.

What are the determinants of treatment? The attitude to POWs, that is, a fixed way of thinking or feeling about them, is probably the most important determinant. Although attitudes and behaviour are not necessarily identical, it is reasonable to expect that what one thinks and feels about POWs will usually give rise to a particular behaviour. Theoretically, reliable methods exist to examine attitudes, but they are more applicable to the laboratory than to the turmoil of war. Instead, one may look for indirect indications of attitude, such as official policy on enemy prisoners and on one's own soldiers in enemy hands, as written in legal books; official and non-official attitudes to various conventions, the Geneva conventions in particular; attitude to sacrifice of lives, military service, patriotism, etc. Other indirect indications of attitude can be found by studying the willingness to allocate logistic means for transporting POWs to the rear and constructing habitable camps to house them, the dissemination of rules of conduct in regard to POWs by the troops at the front and the readiness to enforce them.

With no definite mechanism to assess attitude, we may resort to a number of determinants that presumably affect attitudes to POWs and shape their treatment. To date, no study has systematically analysed these determinants, so it is necessary in this study to list several aspects of the POWs' experience that presumably shape and affect their treatment, based on a survey of literature on POWs.[2] We may refer to them as predictors of treatment and examine their *post hoc* validity for the Japanese case. While precursory at best, the following section offers a brief list of several predictors that presumably serve as determinants of treatment of POWs in modern conflicts. These will presumably enable us to explore the background and motives for the Japanese treatment of POWs in modern times:

A. Predictors related to the context of the war:

1. International standards: *As international standards are more humanitarian, the treatment of POWs is better.*
2. Type of war: *As the war is more limited, the treatment of POWs is better.*

B. Predictors related to the reference group of the captor:

3. Reference group: *As the belligerents' reference group is considered more civilized and humane (in regard to POWs in particular), as the*

belligerents' desire to emulate the values of their reference group is stronger, and as the number of observers of that group attending the war is larger, the treatment of POWs is better.

C. Predictors related to the enemy:

4. Enemy: *As the enemy is less despised and considered less inferior, and as the belligerents expect postbellum cooperation more, its treatment of POWs is better.*
5. Enemy attitude to POWs (reciprocity): *As the treatment of POWs by one belligerent is better, the treatment of POWs by the other belligerent is also better.*
6. Number of enemy POWs: *When the number of POWs is within the economic and logistic capacities of the captor, and is sufficiently large enough to be recognized, the treatment of POWs is better.*

D. Predictors related to the captor:

7. Perceived threat: *As the war is perceived as less threatening, the treatment of POWs is better.*
8. Form of government: *As the captor's regime is less authoritarian, dictatorial, militant, and more democratic, its treatment of POWs is better.*
9. Local customs and adherence to international standards: *As the captor's local customs in regard to POWs are more humane, and as adherence to international standards is stricter, the treatment of POWs is better.*
10. Attitude to own POWs: *As the captor's attitude to its own soldiers falling prisoner is more tolerant and humane, its treatment of enemy POWs is better.*
11. Involvement of civilians: *As fewer civilians of the captor are involved and hurt in the conflict, the treatment of POWs is better.*
12. Gross national product: *As the captor's gross national product (in absolute and per capita terms) is greater, the treatment of POWs is better.*

JAPANESE TREATMENT OF POWS IN SIX CONFLICTS

Throughout their classical, medieval and pre-modern history, the Japanese scarcely fought a major war outside their archipelago or against an external foe. The only exceptions to this are a certain (controversial) level of military involvement in the Korean peninsula during Korea's 'Three Kingdoms' period, the two Mongol invasions in the thirteenth century, and two invasions into Korea in the late sixteenth century. This does not mean that Japan did not experience many wars. The opposite is true, but they were local wars, between Japanese forces, and often involved relatively small armies of professional warriors. The status of POWs in those internal wars was not established firmly. Often soldiers of the vanquished party were summarily killed, but in certain cases, especially regarding the rank and file in the turbulent times of the Warring

States period (*Sengoku jidai*) in the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries, they were enslaved or forced to join the victor. On the few medieval occasions that Japanese forces battled foreign foes, their attitude was harsher than in their domestic conflicts: vanquished foreign soldiers were doomed to either death or enslavement.[3]

In the late nineteenth century Japan began its modernization while increasingly looking to the Western powers as a model. After the Meiji Restoration of 1868, the local militias were united into a single national army and navy under the tutelage of foreign advisers – French, German and British in particular – and Western military thought and techniques were adopted. The reorganization of the Japanese military went hand in hand with the acceptance of existing conventions with regard to POWs, including the first Geneva Convention of 1864 ('The Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field'), to which Japan became a signatory in 1886. Due to this new and unprecedented cultural re-orientation, it is difficult to deduce, at least *prima facie*, Japanese attitudes towards POWs from the Edo era (1600-1868) until modernity. Evidently, the most prominent difference between the two periods was the establishment of a single national army and navy on the Western model and the turn to frequent armed conflicts overseas, which so rarely occurred earlier. Soon after, the Meiji Restoration Japan began to look at Korea as a potential sphere of influence, and consequently conducted its first two major wars for control of this territory.

All in all, during the fifty-one-year period from the first war against China in 1894 until its surrender to the Allies in 1945, Japan engaged in numerous military conflicts throughout East Asia and the Pacific Ocean (see Figure 1). Although the entire gamut of wars Japan fought in this period was essentially colonial in character – for territorial gain, resources and prestige, the stakes grew considerably with time. Less consistent was Japanese treatment of POWs, which varied greatly from conflict to conflict. The similar background of Japan's wars notwithstanding, many additional determinants shaped its treatment of POWs. The following overview seeks to present the background and determinants of treatment of POWs in each of the six major wars that Japan fought from 1894 to 1945.[4]

1. The First Sino-Japanese War (1894–5)

The first full-scale war in the history of modern Japan broke out as part of a struggle over control of Korea. As a colonial war, it was neither a vital struggle nor a particularly long one (nine months). Although it involved full mobilization, it involved a relatively small army, incorporating only a very limited fraction of the population.[5] Despite veneration for China and its culture for more than a millennium, on the eve of the war the Chinese foe had been somewhat disrespected and despised for more than a decade, due to a recent reorientation in Japan towards a new reference group – the West, Britain in particular. The importance of the West notwithstanding, only a limited number of Western observers

Figure 1 Geographical locations of Japan's six major conflicts in modern times (1) The First Sino-Japanese War, 1894–5 (2) The (first) Russo-Japanese War, 1904–5 (3) The First World War, 1914 (4) The Second Sino-Japanese War, 1937–45 (5) The (second) Russo-Japanese War, 1939 (6) The Pacific War, 1941–5.

and reporters attended the conflict and reported on the combat behaviour.[6] While they questioned Japan's cultural attainments, there was a consensus regarding China. Both Westerners and Japanese considered Chinese attitudes towards POWs especially barbaric. China was not a signatory of the first Geneva Convention and did not have the means to care for POWs; furthermore, its troops would torture, mutilate and then decapitate the wretched soldiers who fell into their captivity.[7]

During the war, the Japanese government and the military authorities wavered between benevolent and brutal treatment of surrendered Chinese troops.[8] The tone was set, in fact, by the outbreak of the war when the Imperial Japanese Navy ignored the drowning Chinese troops, but not the stranded European crew, of the sinking British transport vessel *Kowshing*. For this breach Japan faced harsh criticism, but to little avail (Elleman 2001: 98). Provisionally, Japan did its utmost in the subsequent land campaigns to show a civilized façade. This was government policy, to which the armed forces did not necessarily subscribe; the point was reached where the Minister of War, Ōyama Iwao, had to alert the Army repeatedly to the need to fight in accordance with the 'acknowledged rules' and 'principles' of 'civilization'.[9] Only then did the military transport to Tokyo several hundred prisoners and provide them with good medical care (Paine 2002: 175). During the entire conflict,

however, Japan took only 1,790 Chinese prisoners, most of whom were sent to camps in Japan. These prisoners were treated reasonably, at least so it was reported in the camps in Japan, resulting in the death of 218 of them (a mortality rate of 12.2 per cent).[10] The remaining POWs were released four months after the conclusion of the peace treaty. The Japanese authorities repatriated with much pomp also the body of Admiral Ting, the commander of Beiyang Fleet, who had committed suicide soon after the fall of Weihaiwei and had become a venerated figure in Japan for his act.[11]

The meagre number of POWs does not reflect the intensity of the war, as neither side took many POWs. Several thousands of surrendering Chinese were released soon after pledging to refrain from participation in further hostilities, whereas many others were killed upon surrender. Much of the Japanese conduct against surrendered Chinese would have remained unknown but for the reports in Western media of a massacre in the Chinese port town of Lushun (Port Arthur) soon after its occupation by Japanese troops in November 1894. By all likelihood, the victors did not kill up to 60,000 Chinese surrendered combatants and non-combatants, as some historians were to argue later, but nonetheless the preliminary reports were shocking.[12] They unveiled Japan's brutal attitude to the Chinese, but also its Janus face in the entire conflict, although how prevalent such conduct was before and after that event remained unknown.[13]

Of the seventy Japanese reportedly captured, barely eleven survived the ordeal until repatriation. Despite some obscurity regarding their number, it is patent they represent only a tiny fraction of the mobilized troops, the approximately 13,000 dead, or the number of Chinese POWs.[14] The small number of Japanese POWs is all the more impressive in the light of the virtual absence of an explicit ideology against surrender. At that stage no clear regulations or negative treatment implemented against returning POWs existed (Hata 1996: 256–7).

2. The First Russo-Japanese War (1904–5)

Japan fought its second war for control of the Korean Peninsula along similar lines as the First Sino-Japanese War, but this time against a Russian foe. Unlike the previous conflict, however, this was regarded as a preemptive war due to the mortal threat a Russian takeover of Korea could pose for Japan.[15] It was not a total war, but until the Pacific War it was the conflagration closest to such a conflict, involving a full mobilization which affected large segments of the population.[16] Lasting nineteen months and costing Japan some 88,400 fatalities and close to two billion yen in war expenditure, it was twice as long and far more costly than the previous conflict.[17] Despite some doubts about its industrial capabilities and military effectiveness, Japan regarded Russia as a first-rate European power. Having the largest land army and the third largest fleet in the world, it was feared and respected.[18] The West, and especially Britain, with which Japan had signed an alliance two years before the outbreak of the war,

was Japan's reference group more than ever before or after, and Western military observers and war correspondents swarmed on the Japanese side of the front.[19] Furthermore, despite the severity of the conflict, Japan expected a settlement around the negotiation table and a renewal of relations, as indeed happened two years after the conclusion of the war.

In the decade-long interim between the First Sino-Japanese War and the war against Russia, the Japanese authorities learnt carefully the lessons of the image lost due to the massacre in Port Arthur and implemented a strict policy with regard to the treatment of POWs.[20] The preparations were soon tested and proved appropriate. In the Russo-Japanese War the number of POWs on both sides was far greater than in the previous conflict, although once again the Japanese captured many more POWs than their foes. Surrendered Russian soldiers were usually spared, received medical care when necessary, and then shipped safely to Japan. Incarcerated in twenty-nine camps around the country, they apparently received reasonable treatment.[21] Numbering 79,367, the prisoners were provided with adequate food, accommodation and medical treatment, and were usually free to roam around and purchase products in local shops.[22] Benefiting from a low mortality rate (2.3 per cent), they were released soon after the peace agreement and the vast majority of them survived the war.[23]

Japan had 2,088 POWs (among them twenty-six officers) in this conflict, of whom forty-four died in captivity (2.1 per cent) and forty-four were released before the conclusion of the war.[24] Upon returning, the remaining 2,000 were welcomed with flowers and gifts, but were not allowed to return home until the completion of an interrogation regarding the circumstances of their surrender. Although none was sent before a court martial, the officers among them had to quit the service.[25] In this war the outcome of a decade-long indoctrination against surrender was first apparent, both in the education system and in the military. On returning home, many of the soldiers, especially those living in rural communities, encountered hostility and even ostracism by their communities.[26] For thousands of others, the promulgation of a modern concept of Bushido and the stress on the importance of patriotic devotion exerted heavy toll on human life. The demand for sacrifice for the sake of the nation was to be further emphasized in future events where spiritual capacity was sought to compensate for lack of resources.[27]

3. The First World War (1914–18)

Japan joined the titanic clash in Europe by taking over Qingdao (Tsingtau), a German stronghold in the Shandong Peninsula in China. The siege of Qingdao was no more than a limited war with a limited mobilization of about 50,000 Japanese troops accompanied by some two thousand British troops under joint Japanese command. While a relatively minor episode in the military history of both Japan and Germany, it nonetheless adds to the general analysis of our theme. The German foe was respected and the garrison of 4,920 men fought well

against all odds. Despite budding Pan-Asianism, Japan's reference group remained the monolithic 'West', and the presence of British troops and observers enhanced adherence to contemporary international conventions in battle.[28] By 7 November, following two months' resistance, the surviving force of 4,628 Germans and Austrians were taken prisoner with no massacre or noticeable abuse.[29] It was the only conflict in which no Japanese POWs fell into enemy hands, but after the war Japan was eager to reestablish diplomatic relations with Germany, despite some resentment over its role in the tripartite intervention against Japan two decades earlier.

The German POWs were incarcerated in no less than twenty camps throughout Japan for more than five years. By and large, the treatment was humane and fair although it varied considerably, depending often on the personality of the commanders of specific camps rather than government policy. In the camp in Kurume, for example, Japanese treatment was relatively tough, involving often punitive measures and subsequent strikes and resistance on the part of the prisoners. By contrast, the camp at Bando in Shikoku was a model of cooperation and tolerance. Prisoners there engaged in cultural activity, worked outside the camp, and were granted freedom of movement in the area.[30] On the whole, the prisoners were not used as leverage for negotiation, and were repatriated a little more than a year after the end of the war; no less than seven per cent of them chose to remain for some time in the land of their captivity.[31]

4. The Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–45)

This major war, the longest in which Japan joined in modern times, erupted as a result of a Japanese quest for greater economic and political hold in China, along with recent fears of Chinese unification and Japan's potential loss of Manchuria.[32] The war was not a vital struggle for Japan, and at least initially involved only a limited mobilization which grew considerably as the war advanced.[33] Although there was not much on stake for Japan, it soon turned into 'the most terrible and most brutal, the most inhumane and most destructive war in all Asian history' (Wilson 1982: 1).[34] The Chinese had already been for already half a century, especially in military terms. Broadly, the reference group was no longer the West, the Anglo-Saxon world in particular. Since quitting the League of Nations in 1933, Japan had still not formed an alternative reference group. In this interim, Germany remained a source of inspiration, albeit distant and mistrusted. If any, it was now the Chinese, and later other fellow Asians, who became Japan's preferred audience. Only a small number of foreign observers attended the fighting. They consisted of a small number of military advisers from totalitarian nations, Anglo-Saxon missionaries, and some businessmen and reporters, whose views the Japanese authorities did not consider important.

From the start of the war until its end more than eight years later, the Japanese government designated it an 'incident' (*Shina jihen*).

Under this term, the conflict remained beyond the law of war, with terrible consequences for the treatment of Chinese POWs and non-combatants.[35] In most cases, and despite orders against maltreatment, surrendered Chinese troops were not recognized as prisoners.[36] They were denied the rights and laws relating to POWs according to contemporary conventions, to which neither of the belligerents was signatory. In many instances, the most notable of them is during the fighting over Nanjing in December 1937, large groups of surrendered Chinese soldiers were summarily executed on the spot, or soon after their surrender.[37] Similarly, in later phases of the war, captured Chinese soldiers were considered 'bandits', and likewise executed on the spot. In times of respite, especially after 1940, when their labour was required and logistic impediments were minor, Chinese POWs were designated labourers (*kajin rōmusha*) and were given demanding physical tasks in China, Manchuria or Japan.[38] Less common but nonetheless telling was the use of thousands of prisoners as guinea pigs in medical experiments with biological weapons, which invariably killed them.[39] For these reasons, the low numbers of Chinese POWs in this conflict does not reflect its intensity.[40] The Chinese authorities, both the nationalist forces and especially the communists, did not necessarily reciprocate towards the Japanese with equal treatment. A few thousands of Japanese POWs, the majority of them captured during the last two years of the war, underwent 're-education' programmes (developed by the Communists as early as in 1939) and by and large were repatriated to Japan after the war.[41] During the war, there was a noticeable escalation in the Japanese regulation against desertion, and in some cases retrieved Japanese POWs were advised to commit suicide. In March 1941, the Japanese army in China instructed soldiers that on being taken prisoner their orders were to escape immediately or commit suicide.[42]

5. The Second Russo-Japanese War (Nomonhan Incident or Battle of Khalkhin Gol, 1939)

Some consider this relatively unknown clash on the border between north-western Manchuria (known then as Manchukuo) and Mongolia, near the village of Nomonhan and the Khalkhin Gol River, merely an extended border skirmish. In reality it was a full-scale war, albeit undeclared, in terms of the sheer number of its combatants and fatalities, its duration, and its repercussions.[43] Moreover, it adds considerably to the overall analysis since the treatment of enemy and Japanese POWs allows comparison with the first war with Russia thirty-five years earlier. This time, however, Japan did not consider the clash as having a vital importance. Indeed, in comparison with the two conflicts Imperial Japan fought in 1937 and 1941, it was a limited war with limited mobilization of exclusively regular troops. Due to the earlier Russian fiasco, the Soviet foe was not as respected as other European forces, that of Germany in particular.[44] The reference group was no longer Western, although due to the secretive nature of this conflict and the fact that virtually

no foreign observers were present at the battles, we may consider it as lacking a reference group altogether.

The fact that this clash turned progressively into a Japanese fiasco is evident in the number of POWs. Despite a policy of no surrender, and its frequent implementation in battle, the number of Japanese POWs was unprecedented in both absolute and relative terms, possibly surpassing 3,000.[45] Adhering to the terms of the local ceasefire, the two belligerents seemed eager to exchange their prisoners, but to Japanese disappointment the Soviets were willing to release captives only on a one-to-one basis. On two occasions the Japanese returned all the eighty-nine Soviet POWs in their captivity and received in turn a slightly larger number of prisoners.[46] While the quality of Japanese treatment of Russian POWs in this conflict remains obscure, it is reasonable to assume that due to the meagre number of prisoners and the relatively short engagement and incarceration period, they were held not far from the front and were interrogated intensively to obtain tactical intelligence. As for the Japanese POWs, Coox concluded that they were marked with 'ineradicable stigma' and that officers were forced to commit suicide (Coox 1985, II: 934–40).

6. The Second World War / The Pacific War (1941–5)

This last conflict in which Imperial Japan took part broke out as part of a Japanese endeavour to take over South-east Asia and establish an autarkic empire in the entire region of East Asia (the 'Great Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere'). As a result of American embargoes on key strategical materials imposed earlier, the war was perceived from the outset as vital, and indeed it turned gradually into a struggle for national survival with a ferocity that modern Japan had never previously experienced. It was the first total war Japan fought, and in less than two years it incorporated full mobilization of the entire male population. The enemy was Western (American, British, Dutch), respected for the last seventy years, but increasingly loathed, albeit with certain ambivalence, for its long racial derogation of Japan, attempts to block its 'natural growth', and since late 1944 also for its indiscriminate bombing of urban areas in the home islands. The reference group was definitely Asian, but the attitude to this group was nonetheless arrogant and patronizing.[47] With this reference group in mind, Japan's humiliation of the enemy throughout the 'liberated' region of colonial South-east Asia, as well as in Japan itself, was supposed to indicate the identity of the new masters of Asia.[48]

The number of POWs held by both sides does not reflect the severity of the war for two reasons: in the first phase of the war the vast majority of the POWs were Allied soldiers whereas in the final phase the vast majority were Japanese.[49] Apart from the outset and conclusion of the war, both belligerents generally refrained from taking many prisoners, and fighting was governed by slogans such as 'kill or be killed' and 'no quarter, no surrender' (Dower 1986: 60).[50] In total, until its surrender in August 1945, Japan held some 132,134 Allied POWs (excluding soldiers

of indigenous origin) (Hata 1996: 263) – certainly a modest number compared with any other major power during that war. Although their treatment varied considerably, it tended to be worse than in any previous war in which Japan had engaged Western forces. The prisoners were frequently treated inhumanely, in absolute terms and relative to previous conflicts.[51] In certain cases, recently captured POWs 'were forced to march long distances without sufficient food and water and without rest. Sick and wounded were forced to march in the same manner as the able. Prisoners who fell behind on such marches were beaten, tortured and murdered' (*Judgment of the International Military Tribunal* 1948: 1043–4). Despite their important contribution to Japan's war efforts in laying railroads (the most notorious is the Burma-Thailand Railway) and mining, the POWs incarcerated in prisoner camps throughout East Asia often met the same fate as the one quoted above. Many others died of malnutrition, disease, overwork, accidents or drowned in ships ('hell-ships') en route to Japan which were sunk by the Allies.[52]

In this war of 'Liberation of Asia' the Japanese maintained their earlier differential treatment of Western and Asian soldiers. Still, the treatment of indigenous prisoners fluctuated greatly, reflecting the wavering Japanese attitude to race and the unresolved dilemma of Japan's place in Asia. In certain theatres they were liberated, but more often they were used for forced labour and suffered a higher mortality rate than that of Allied POWs.[53] These tragic consequences were not only due to work conditions. Even when held in prison camps, for instance, in the Philippines, the mortality rate of indigenous soldiers was greater than that of American or European POWs due to harsher treatment and less inhibited abuse.[54] Concomitantly, and in contrast to earlier conflicts Japan had fought with Western foes, the Pacific War involved the presence and involvement of a large number of civilians. Their misfortune may slightly account for the greater severity of the fighting. While the Japanese imprisoned several thousand Allied civilians residing in the colonies of Southeast Asia, the USA interned no fewer than 112,000 Americans of Japanese origin, without taking similar action against citizens with origins in two other Axis nations. Of even greater impact was the persistent Allied bombing of urban centres in Japan, starting in late 1944 and resulting in the death of more than 180,000 people, mostly non-combatants. This death toll does not include at least an additional 210,000 people who lost their lives in Hiroshima and Nagasaki with the dropping of atomic bombs in the final days of the war.[55]

As for Japan's attitude to its own POWs, suffice it to say that the indoctrination against surrender reached an all-time zenith at this point in time. It drove soldiers to fight until the last bullet even in hopeless situations, to take their own lives rather than becoming POWs, and to evade capture even after the official surrender. True, the fierce fighting in the Pacific and the prevalence of mutual local atrocities did not encourage surrender, but even when the Allies did attempt to implement a pro-surrender policy in the last stages of the war, very few Japanese

gave in. Whereas in the first phase of the Burma campaign 142 Japanese soldiers were captured (and 17,166 killed), mostly wounded and even unconscious, during the Battle of Okinawa in March-June 1945, 7,455 were captured (and about ten times more were killed).[56] As a result, the percentage of Japanese POWs remained extremely low, in both absolute and relative terms. During the entire war some 42,000 Japanese soldiers were held by the Allies, the majority of them in the final stages of the conflict.[57]

Among Japanese POWs, this indoctrination led in many cases to extremism uncommon among prisoners of other nations: either incessant opposition to the captors in the form of revolts and suicides, or full cooperation with them, beyond what was necessary.[58] By and large, they were treated well, to exclude any pretext for negative reciprocity by the Japanese authorities. However, when the war was over and great numbers of surrendered personnel were incarcerated, the reasonable treatment deteriorated quickly for various reasons, notably of Japanese POWs in Soviet hands.[59] During the war, the Japanese were less inclined to reciprocate. True, there were some external factors that exacerbated their treatment.[60] And yet, when only examined for what they were accountable, the Japanese government and military authorities were responsible for dreadful treatment with catastrophic outcomes for Allied POWs, regardless of their nationality. This is especially evident in comparison with German treatment of POWs of the same nations. The death rate of Anglo-American POWs in Japanese captivity, most of them imprisoned for more than three years, reached some 27 per cent, whereas the death rate of their compatriots in German captivity was 4 per cent.[61] The disparity for American POWs was even greater: whereas 41.6 per cent died in the captivity of the former only 1.2 per cent died in the captivity of the latter.[62]

JAPANESE TREATMENT OF POWS: ACCOUNTING FOR MAJOR TRENDS AND TRANSFORMATION

The Relevance of Predictors of Treatment to Japanese Experience

The above brief overview of six major conflicts in which Japan engaged over a fifty-one-year period reveals broad variance in the quality of treatment of POWs and humanitarian concern, ranging from relative benevolence in the First World War to extreme inhumanity in the Second Sino-Japanese War (for a summary see Figure 2). Yet from an international perspective this great variance is not unique, and despite Japanese notoriety none of the modes of treatment of POWs at the hands of Imperial Japan is exceptional. For instance, the difference in German treatment of Russian soldiers in the two World Wars was even greater; furthermore, during the Second World War the death toll and mortality rate of Soviet POWs in German captivity was greater than any parallel figure in Japan.[63] In the same vein, none of the factors that determined the Japanese behaviour was extraordinary or unknown, although their

	Enemy (Enemy Group)	Reference Group	Type of War	Japanese Population during Conflict (in millions)	Japanese Troops Mobilized	Japanese Troops Mobilized as Percentage of Population	Foreign Observers in Front	Japanese Civilians in Front	Japanese POWs	Japanese POWs as Percentage of Troops Mobilized	Enemy POWs	Ratio of Japanese to Enemy POWs
SJ War I (1894–95)	China (Asia)	West	Colonial; Limited mobilization; No vital threat	43	240,000[1]	0.6%	Few	None	c. 70	< 0.1%	1790; Several ten thousands summarily killed upon or soon after capture	1/26
RJ War I (1904–05)	Russia (West)	West	Colonial; Full mobilization; Imminent vital threat	47	c. 1,110,000[a]	2.3%	Many	None	2,088	0.2%	79,367	1/38
WWI (1914–18)	Germany (West)	West	Colonial; Limited mobilization; No vital threat	52–55	c. 60,000	0.1%	A few Britons	None	None	0%	4,628	1/~
SJ War II (1937–45)	China (Asia)	Asia?	Imperial expansion; Large mobilization; No vital threat	70–72	c. 3,000,000	4.2%	Limited number	None	8,000+	< 0.3%	Several ten thousands interned; Several hundred thousands summarily killed or used as forced labor	1/50+
RJ War II (1939)	Russia (West)	?	Border conflict; Minor mobilization; No vital threat	72	75,738	0.1%	None	None	c. 3,000	4.0%	c. 100	c. 30/1
WWII (1941–45)	USA; Great Britain Holland, etc. (West)	Asia	Total war; Full mobilization; Immediate vital threat	74–72	c. 9,100,000[2]	12.5%	A few German; Many colonial subjects	Growing involvement as the war advances to the home islands	c. 50,000[3]	0.5%[4]	132,134	c. 1/3.1[5]

Figure 2 Comparative features of Japan's six major conflicts in modern times.

	Japanese Dead	Japanese Dead as Percentage of Troops Mobilized	Ratio of Japanese POWs to Dead	Attitude to Japanese POWs	Attitude To Enemy	Attitude To POWs	Treatment of POWs
SJ War I (1894–95)	c. 13,000	5.4%	1/186	Positive	*Negative* Despise and emphasis on cultural distance	Negative	*Negative* Frequent killings and a few major massacres in front; reasonable treatment at POW camps; substantial mortality rate (12.2%) within less than 1-year internment
RJ War I (1904–05)	c. 88,400	7.9%	1/42	Ambivalent; interrogation upon return, court martial to officers	*Ambivalence* Respect, fear	Positive	*Positive* Limited killings and a few minor atrocities in front; reasonable treatment in POW camps; low mortality rates (2.4%) during 0.5–2 year internment
WWI (1914–18)	c. 415	0.7%	1/~	Ambivalent	*Positive* Respect for military & cultural attainment	Positive	*Positive* No killings in front; reasonable treatment in POW camps; low mortality rates during more than 5-year internment
SJ War II (1937–45)	c. 389,000[6]	c. 12%	> 1/100	Negative	*Negative* Arrogance & despise	Highly negative	*Very Negative* Frequent killings and major massacres in front; Brutal exploitation of POWs as forced labor
RJ War II (1939)	c. 3000	10.6%	1/2.7	Highly negative: Induction into suicide	*Ambivalence* Arrogance in the initial phase > respect	?	*Reasonable* Limited killings in front; reasonable treatment in POW camps
WWII (1941–45)	c. 1,557,000[7]	17.1%[8]	1/31[9]	Highly negative; Abandonment, ostracism	*Ambivalence* Respect, hostility > despise & arrogance > respect, fear	Negative	*Negative* Apart from the opening phase, frequent killings and atrocities in front; brutal treatment in POW camp; high mortality rates of POWs (25–42%) during 3–3.5-year internment

Figure 2 (continued).

Unless written otherwise, references for the figures in this table are provided in the main text of this chapter.
[1] This figure does not include non-combatant coolies.
[2] This figure includes the troops stationed and fighting in China.
[3] This figure is based on the number of Japanese POWs in all fronts, including in China (about 8,000) as to August 15, 1945.
[4] Excluding the China campaign, The figures for the Imperial Army (26,304 POWs and 1,140,000 dead out of 6.4 million) and Imperial Navy (12,362 POWs and 410,000 dead out of 1.86 million), were 0.41% and 0.66%, respectively. In Nakamura 1982: 35.
[5] This figure is based on the ratio of Japanese POWs (excluding those in China) to Western (non-indigenous) POWs.
[6] This figure includes the dead until the end of the war in 1945. The number of dead in China until the outbreak of the Pacific War was 185,647.
[7] This figure includes the dead in China since December 1941. Apart from that front, the total death toll of combatants in the war was about 1,354,000.
[8] This figure is based on the death toll of Japanese troops in all fronts, including China since December 1941.
[9] During the war this ratio diminished gradually. In the Philippine Campaign, for example, it began with ratio of 1:100 during October-November 1944, went down to 1:65 during March 1945, and ended in 1:7 in June-July 1945. In Gilmore 1998: 154.

Figure 2 (continued)

exact blend over time was probably idiosyncratic to Japan, as happens with any aggregated national behaviour.

From an academic viewpoint, however, Japan's participation in multiple conflicts and the variance in treatment of POWs has an obvious advantage. The highly divergent treatment meted out to soldiers of different nationalities, in various forms of conflicts and a changing context, may enable us to identify some of its major determinants.[64] When examined throughout the entire period, Japan's *enemy* appears to be the most significant predictor of treatment even when not moderated by other determinants. Aiko Utsumi has recently argued that in the course of the war with China starting in 1931, and later during the Pacific War, 'Japan developed a *two-tier policy* concerning classification and treatment of prisoners' (italics are mine), with unequivocal distinction between Western and Asian foe (Utsumi 2004: 119).[65] Indeed, Japan consolidated this policy in the 1930s, but its roots go back much earlier. Since its first modern war some forty years earlier, Japan's military authorities made an unmistakable distinction between Asian foes, such as Chinese, Taiwanese, and Koreans, and Western foes, among whom they included any 'white' peoples (*hakujin*), including Russians, but not the indigenous soldiers fighting in their service. Throughout this fifty-one-year period, and regardless of any other determinant, Asians foes invariably received worse treatment than Westerners. In most cases they were not even recognized as POWs and did not receive institutional protection, to the extent that there are no official figures regarding their treatment. More often than not, Chinese soldiers were executed soon after their surrender, although occasionally they were used as labour forces and in certain circumstances even released unconditionally.

Of almost similar importance is Japan's *reference group* before and during each conflict. By and large, Japan had two reference groups during this period. For much of the time it was the West – a demanding and relentless monolith containing a group of technologically developed and culturally civilized nations, at least in Japanese eyes. From the mid-1930s, however, Japan turned half-heartedly to Asia as its audience, harbouring a stinging sense of disappointment with the seemingly arrogant and hostile West. As long as Japan referred to the West as its reference group and adhered to its humanitarian conventions, its treatment of POWs, regardless of their identity, was far better than when its reference group became Asia, whatever this meant.

These two determinants, *enemy* and *reference group*, interact with each other and enhance their respective impact. Their interaction yields a 2x2 matrix, in which five of the six case studies can be arranged (see Figure 3).[66]

This matrix alone seems to offer a highly reliable explanation for the treatment of POWs by Imperial Japan. It suggests that when the reference group was the West, captives from the Asian (Chinese) enemy were treated worse than those from the Western enemy, and when the reference group was Asia treatment of POWs was worse for both groups.

Enemy \ Reference Group	Western	Asian
Western	Russo-Japanese War World War I	Pacific War
Asian	First Sino-Japanese War	Second Sino-Japanese War

Figure 3 Japan's modern conflicts arranged according to enemy and reference group.

Accordingly, Western enemy POWs received the most benevolent treatment when the reference group was the West, whereas Asian enemy POWs suffered the most brutal and inhumane treatment when the reference group was Asia (see Figure 4).

In this respect, the Nanjing Massacre, as the mass execution of tens of thousand surrendered Chinese soldiers soon after the fall of republican capital in December 1937 is widely known, was not an accident or a whim pursued and perpetuated by low rank Japanese soldiers. It was rather the inevitable outcome of a long-term and semi-official policy set by the Japanese state and adhered to by its military authorities since the early years of the Meiji era. And yet, the fact that a massacre of such a scale occurred only in Nanjing (and to some extent also in Port Arthur in 1895) suggests it cannot be accounted for by two determinants (*enemy* and *reference group*) alone. That is, being an Asian POW without relevant Western onlookers was an incentive for abuse and harsh treatment but not a sufficient motive for grand massacre.

Indeed, apart from these two crucial determinants, several additional determinants seem to enhance our understanding of the Japanese treatment of POWs. The *local customs* in regard to POWs became gradually

Enemy \ Reference Group	Western	Asian
Western	+	–
Asian	–	– –

Figure 4 Treatment of POWs in Japan's imperial wars, ranging from positive and benevolent (+) to very negative and extremely brutal (--).

stricter, and from the late 1920s *adherence to international conventions* became steadily weaker, thereby enfeebling the moral pressure of the Geneva Convention. Similarly, throughout this period the Japanese *attitude to its own POWs* became harsher. This attitude is evident in the extremely low number of Imperial Japan's POWs in most of its conflicts, in both absolute and relative numbers. During the major conflicts of the first half of the twentieth century, no other power could boast such a low percentage of POWs (0–0.5 per cent of the mobilized troops), or such a low ratio of POWs to dead (at least 1 to 27).[67] The sparsity of Japanese POWs was not a coincidence. The military authorities strove hard to instil in their soldiers the knowledge that surrender was shameful to the individual, his family and the nation. There is an unmistakable correlation between the reinforcement of the regulation against surrender in Japan and the deterioration of treatment of POWs it held. Obviously, a nation cannot provide benevolent and humane treatment to enemy POWs while making the very act of surrender among its own soldiers despicable.

In contrast to expectations, the *perceived threat* seems to display very limited validity. In highly threatening conflicts, such as the first Russo-Japanese War, treatment of POWs was relatively benevolent, whereas in a less threatening conflict, such as the Second Sino-Japanese War, treatment of POWs was abysmal. Although there are examples to the contrary, this determinant seems relatively marginal in the Japanese case. In the case of *type of war*, however, it is patent that the last two major conflicts Japan took part in (the Second Sino-Japanese War and the Pacific War) were not only the largest, when measured by their length, the number of troops mobilized, and the number of casualties, but also among the worst in treatment of POWs. The importance of this determinant is even more evident when it is correlated by *enemy*. Both the Second Sino-Japanese War and the Pacific War were greater wars than earlier conflicts against similar enemies (the Second Sino-Japanese War vs. the First Sino-Japanese War; The Pacific War vs. The Russo-Japanese War), and in both of them the treatment of POWs was far worse than before. The seeming importance of *type of war* notwithstanding, the first two conflicts Japan was involved in suggest that the *enemy* is a much more important determinant and might moderate the impact of the former. So despite the fact that the Russo-Japanese War was a much larger conflict that the war against China a decade earlier, the treatment of Russian POWs was by far better than that of Chinese POWs.

TURNING POINTS IN JAPAN'S ATTITUDE TO POWS

The treatment of POWs in Imperial Japan underwent two major transformations. The first of these, during the late nineteenth century, was related to the identity of the enemy. After the opening of Japan under American coercion in 1854 and the subsequent blow delivered to the two domains of Satsuma and Chōshū in the early 1860s, Japan began to

make a clear distinction between two fundamental types of foes. The first type was associated with the West, to which Japan accorded civility and respect in varying degrees. The second type was associated with Asia, to which traditional customs applied, namely violent and vengeful retribution familiar in the region from olden times. The treatment of a delinquent was meant to match his or her cultural development rather than his or her act alone. Effective punishment, argued jurist Ogawa Shigejirō in 1904, 'had to be adjusted to a people's overall "level of civilization" (*mindo*): *backward people* would only understand *backward punishment*' (italics in the original) (quoted in Botsman [2005: 213]).[68] Similarly, the application to POWs of humanitarian conventions, to which Japan first became a signatory in 1886, resulted in a differential treatment of the enemy, with evident advantage to Western combatants. Combatants of Asian nations that did not subscribe to such conventions, such as Imperial China, were especially vulnerable to Japanese discriminatory policy, as they were entitled at the most to a thin veneer of the humanitarian treatment that their Western counterparts received.

The second transformation began to take shape in the late 1920s and culminated during the following decade. It was more momentous than the first, since it was here that Japan cast off all restraint with regard to any kind of POWs, regardless of nationality. The change of attitude to Westerners had a further detrimental effect on the treatment of Asian POWs. The roots of this transformation can be traced to the First World War and its consequences, particularly the sudden power vacuum created by the collapse of major empires such as China, Germany and Russia, and the rise of the USA as a world power. In Asia it inevitably 'enabled, indeed forced, [Japan] to engage in a kind of geopolitical and strategic thinking for which few of the old rules applied' (Jansen 1984: 122). In the early 1920s, Japan's new position in Asia was countered by American and British attempts to limit its military expansion and political influence, leading to a vicious cycle of alienation. Whether the 1930s were indeed 'a watershed in the move from liberalism and internationalism towards totalitarianism and nationalism' (Doak 2003: 30), as many historians have contended, or the process had begun slightly earlier, the early years of this decade were surely momentous for the Japanese attitude to POWs. The rising ultranationalism and militarism at home in the latter half of the 1920s prompted a move into independent lanes, reaching its pinnacle with the takeover of Manchuria in 1931 and the establishment of the puppet state of Manchukuo a year later. The great uproar and criticism sounded by a number of democratic nations in the West led to further distancing, notably the break from the League of Nations in 1933 and the renewal of a naval arms race two years later, and to renewed attraction to pan-Asian sentiments.[69] Japan's imperialistic policy and defiance of Anglo-Saxon criticism on the one hand, and the making of pan-Asianism Japan's hegemonic (albeit not official) foreign policy on the other, had sharp repercussions. Beyond ceasing to view the West as its reference group, Japan began to consider it the archenemy.

The First World War was another milestone in Japan changing attitudes to POWs. Although Japan took only a very minor part in this war, the appalling carnage in the European theatre contributed to its reconsideration of the part POWs played in determining victory and defeat. First and foremost, Japanese military authorities were shocked at the huge number of POWs in the war.[70] Eliminating this hazard by strict discipline, they concluded, would be a requisite in time of total war, especially for a nation limited in resources such as Japan. Second, they were impressed by the success of the harsh policy adopted by the admired German army against guerrillas and civilians (Towle 2000: 2–3). Moreover, strict German discipline and patriotic indoctrination in that war resulted in unswerving obedience with no necessity for strict measures of coercion.[71] Starting in the late 1920s, it is possible to detect in retrospect a number of events that heralded the deterioration of Japanese treatment of POWs. In 1929, the Japanese government was reluctant to adopt the Third Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War, on the grounds that it contradicted Japanese law. Using the pretext of greater burden on the Japanese side, the authorities did not oppose their own grant of proper treatment to POWs but rejected such treatment of their own soldiers to avoid incentives for surrender.[72]

Another landmark was the sensational suicide of Major Kuga Noboru, a commander of a battalion engaged in skirmishes against Chinese forces in Shanghai in 1932. He was captured by the Chinese, but was released a day later and soon faced Japanese interrogation for his misconduct. It was soon proved that he was knocked senseless by the explosion of a hand grenade and subsequently woke up in a Chinese hospital. Despite the eventual praise for his heroism, Kuga was determined to redeem his shame. He returned to the exact spot where he was captured and committed suicide with his revolver. He instantly became a national hero. All Japan's seven major movie companies produced films featuring the heroic death.[73] 'The suicide of Major Kuga', proclaimed the Japanese military spokesman in Shanghai, 'has aroused the greatest sympathy and admiration in Japanese military and civilian circles here' (*Time* 1932). The emphasis on sacrifice was not new in the short history of the Imperial Japanese army and navy.[74] Now, however, it incorporated senseless suicide rather than surrender after shooting the last bullets in a model of sacrifice, and the hardening of this patriotic indoctrination relied on ever-growing brutalization of the rank and file. By the late 1930s indoctrination with regard to surrender was complete. Falling in enemy hands and becoming a POW was the most shameful fate a soldier and his family could experience.

Nevertheless, the second transformation involved an incomplete alteration of Japan's reference group. In this phase, Japan began to abandon the West as its audience and increasingly believed that the once admired European colonial variety was dissimilar to the Japanese variety, but was also 'an obstacle to Pan-Asian unity' (Peattie 1988: 243).



Figure 5 Japanese treatment of POWs in modern times: Major trends and their determinants.

Departing from the political and cultural sphere of the West, Japan felt itself freed of its humanitarian constraints. The abandonment of the conventions on POWs was perceived to boost Japan's capacity to challenge an enemy of superior resources, such as the Anglo-Saxon nations and the Soviet Union. Asians, however, did not receive now better treatment since Japan's new anti-colonial rhetoric involved a growing racist twist. During the war with China, treatment of by then long colonial subjects, such as the Taiwanese and Koreans, turned stricter and more demanding. This link between power and severe treatment of Asians deteriorated further with the outbreak of the Pacific War.[75] The vacuum created by the ousting of the white colonialists was filled promptly: the Japanese were Asia's new 'master people'. Thus, the fundamental interaction between *enemy* and *reference group* seems to account for the gradual deterioration of Japanese treatment, along with the everlasting divergent treatment of Westerners and Asians. It was even further enhanced by three determinants: *type of war*, *attitude to own POWs*, and *local customs and adherence to international standards*, and it is no coincidence that all three determinants emerged at about the same time (see Figure 5).

CONCLUSION: ATTITUDE TO POWS AND JAPANESE IDENTITY

The fluctuating treatment provided to POWs in the above six case studies reflects the identity crisis Japan has experienced in modern times. In part it stemmed from Japan's attitude to the world, its neighbours in particular, and projected its view of its place in the international community. The treatment of POWs appears to be an excellent indicator of one's identity since it reflects self-images, the identity of one's reference group and the attitude to it, as well as the national priorities and ambitions in times of constraint. Sailing the rough seas between the Scylla of desire to be a genuine member of the civilized nations' club and the Charybdis of their racist bar, Japan ended up with furious rejection of their lofty humanitarian ideals. Adopted in the late 1930s, this new course had dire repercussions. The victims were not only Allied POWs but also Asians, with whom the Japanese could not identify.

While intriguing at first, it is understandable why the interaction between no more than two determinants, *enemy* and *reference group*, could bring about such variance in treatment. In contrast to many other presumed determinants, the *type of war* in particular, both tend to lean heavily on stereotypes and to be detached from reality. The same enemy can be portrayed on different occasions as friendly or hostile, benevolent or vicious. Similarly, one's reference group is an image constructed to manipulate national goals: when it is no longer useful it can be discarded. No wonder that Japan's two major reference groups in modern times and the values associated with them were often far from what the Japanese believed at certain points of time. The supposedly monolithic West was not as civilized and the Chinese were not as brutal or susceptible to violent persuasion. The distance from reality facilitated the idealization of these reference groups in certain periods, but their demonization in others. The attitudes to both, not surprisingly, became transformed in a matter of a few decades. As the identities of the enemy and of the reference group were meant to serve the nation, so was the treatment of POWs. When necessary, they were treated well to create valuable impressions of a civilized nation; when necessary they were sacrificed and abused, to display toughness and defiance before local and foreign audiences.

During the entire period under consideration, Japan's identity crisis was never fully resolved. Although the Pacific War represented a total rupture of Japan's relations with the West, it did not solve the Japanese dilemma. At this bleakest moment of relations with the West, Japanese racial identity remained 'like a coin with two contrasting sides', as Furuya Harumi has picturesquely noted. 'It was marked, on one side, by its aspiration to be the "white", the superior race, and on the other side, by its latent animosity towards the white race which had subjugated and continued to denigrate the Japanese as a "yellow" race' (Furuya 2000: 133). This ambivalence could not escape the POW arena. Even in this colossal clash for the supposed liberation of Asia, Asian POWs were treated worse than their Western brethren.

With Japan's defeat in 1945 its identity conflict was wholly settled, despite the reorientation to the West. The post-war era witnessed the birth of a new national army, the Self-Defence Forces, following American patterns. Pacified Japan became once again a signatory to the Geneva Convention, and humanitarian concern has become its trademark. Initially, its reference group was the USA, but within three decades a new wave of self-assertion and quest for unique identity (known collectively as *nihonjinron*) engulfed Japan. The biggest difference from the past, however, did not concern identity. Since the Pacific War, Japan has not taken an active part in any armed conflict and has not held POWs. Should Japan ever participate in a future conflict, the treatment it provides POWs might vary, but its underlying determinants probably will not.

NOTES

1 For a brief survey of the history of the pre-modern attitude to and treatment of POWs, see Levie (1977: 2–7).

2 This lacuna notwithstanding, for a detailed description and analysis of the relevance of these determinants, see the preliminary study of Kowner (2009).

3 For Japanese treatment of POWs in premodern Japan, see Hata (1998, I: 3–6). On the enslavement of prisoners in feudal Japan, see Nelson (2004) and Isogai (2007).

4 During this fifty-one-year period, Japan fought foreign enemies on more than these six occasions. It fought Soviet forces during the Siberian intervention of 1918–22, during the border skirmishes in Changkufeng (Battle of Lake Khasan) in 1938, and against attacking Soviet troops in Manchuria and Korea during the final days of the Pacific War in August 1945. Japan also fought Chinese forces during the Boxer Uprising of 1900–1, the landing in Shandong Peninsula in 1928, during the large-scale takeover of Manchuria in 1931, and in Shanghai in 1932 (as well as earlier during the landing in Taiwan in 1874). Japanese forces fought irregular Taiwanese forces in 1895 and Korean forces, regular or irregular, on several occasions (1884, 1894, 1904 and in 1910 onwards). I decided to exclude all the above clashes and minor wars because they were not full-scale engagements between regular armies, because insufficient data are available on the number of POWs and their treatment, or simply because they do not add much to the analysis. Furthermore, at least on superficial examination none of them seems to contradict the findings in the six cases presented. Finally, the analysis below does not aim to provide a full overview of the Japanese attitude to POWs and their treatment in modern times. For such overviews, see Hata (1998) and Utsumi (2005).

5 Estimates for the Japanese population on the eve of the war suggest a population of about 42 million, while the strength of the army and navy was about 240,000 men, of whom about 174,000 took part in the battlefield, as well as about 154,000 non-combatant coolies. For the military figures, see Lone (1994: 52, 75).

[6] For overviews of the First Sino-Japanese War, see Lone (1994) and Paine (2002).

[7] For such pre-war and wartime views, see Paine (2002: 172).

[8] For general discussion of Japanese treatment of POWs in this war, see Utsumi (2005: 64–71), Hata (1998, I: 6–9) and Hasegawa (1955: 69–101).

[9] 'War Items', *The Japan Weekly Mail* (Yokohama), 29 September 1894: 321–2; 3 November 1894: 509, quoted in Paine (2002: 210).

[10] Among the 1,790 Chinese POWs, 1,113 were sent to Japan and 677 were incarcerated on the continent. The figure for the 218 POWs who died in captivity includes sixty who were shot for 'disobedience' in Pyongyang (excluding this group, the Chinese mortality rate decreases to 8.8 per cent). Curiously, none of the sixty Chinese officers captured in the war died in Japanese captivity. In Hata (1998, I: 7).

[11] On the Japanese treatment of Chinese POWs in the First Sino-Japanese War, see Saikami (1969: 11–22).

[12] For example, Fujimura (1973: 132).

[13] For initial reports on the Japanese behaviour in Port Arthur, see Creelman (1894), *The Japan Weekly Mail* (1894: 702), and *The Times* (1895: 6). Extended first-hand reports were published subsequently in several books, such as Villiers (1895), Allan (1898) and Creelman (1901). On the massacre and its repercussions in the West, see Dorwart (1971: 106–10), Paine (2002: 210–16), and Lowe (1994: 154–61).

[14] The figures for the veneration of warrior spirits at the Yasukuni Shrine do not qualify as an accurate count of losses but appear to provide a reliable estimate of them. At the two ceremonies held after the first Sino-Japanese War, 12,877 warrior spirits were enshrined. See Yasukuni jinja (1983, I: 319–27) and Harada (1986: 212).

[15] For overviews of the Russo-Japanese War, see Warner and Warner (1974), Connaughton (1988) and Ōe (1976).

[16] Estimates of the Japanese population on the eve of the war suggest a figure of about 47.5 million, whereas the strength of the army and navy, including the reserves, was about 850,000 men.

[17] There are minor inconsistencies regarding the number of casualties in the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy during this conflict. According to one source the army suffered 60,083 killed in battle (among them 1,926 officers) as well as 21,197 who succumbed to disease (among them 278 officers); see Ono (1935: 752). At the ceremonies held at the Yasukuni Shrine after the war a total of 88,131 spirits (85,206 of the army and 2,925 of the navy) were enshrined; see Yasukuni jinja (1983, I: 319–27) and Harada (1986: 212). Following the war the Imperial Japanese Army reported 88,401 dead (over 60,000 killed in battle) and 130,000 wounded; see Ōe (1976: 131, 220–2). For a comprehensive summary of the Japanese and Russian casualties in this conflict, see Kowner (2006a: 80–1). The total figure of troops mobilized during the war is about 1.2 million. This figure includes 1,062,899 fighting men and 154,000 non-combatant civilians in the army, and some 50-60,000 men in the navy. In Ōe (1976: 218) and (Kowner 2006: 42).

[18] See Swinton (1995), Mikhailova (2000) and Shimazu (2005). On the cultural impact of Russia on Meiji Japan, see Berton, Langer and Totten (eds) (1981).

[19] On the military observers and reporters and their role during the war, see Greenwood (1971) and Towle (1998) and (2007).

[20] On the implementation of new policy on POWs following the Sino-Japanese War, see Valliant (1974) and Kowner (2001).

[21] Although ethnically the majority of the soldiers of the Russian army were of Russian origin, many others were Ukrainian, Polish, Finnish, Baltic or Jewish.

[22] For the number of Russian POWs and a detailed breakdown by their sites of capture, see Hata (1998, I: 11). Among the Russian POWs, 72,408 were shipped to camps in Japan, 5,506 were released during the war, and 1,453 before being interned in Japan. See Utsumi (2005: 78). On the Japanese treatment of Russian POWs, see Saikami (1969), Towle (1975), Checkland (1994), Kowner (2000) and Matsuyama Daigaku (2004). For praising testimonies of Japanese treatment made by Western visitors to prisoners camps in Japan, see Seaman (1905: 60-3) and (McCaul 1904: 201). On the international efforts Japan exerted before and during the war to sustain a humane public image, see Valliant (1974) and Kowner (2008).

[23] The mortality rate of Russian POWs in Japanese captivity seems very low by contemporary standards. Throughout the entire war 1,869 Russian POWs died (2.4 per cent), of whom the majority died before internment (presumably due to injuries and complications) and only 383 died in camps in Japan (less than 0.5 per cent of those interned!). See Rikugunshō (1995, 8–9). For very similar but not identical data, see Hata (1998, I: 11) and Utsumi (2005: 78). Among the various camps, the figures from Matsuyama seem sufficiently reliable to allow us to calculate the mortality rate. The number of dead among the 4,043 Russian POWs incarcerated for almost two years was ninety-eight, yielding a mortality rate of 2.4 per cent. Admittedly, Matsuyama was the site where foreign visitors were invited to observe and thus the physical conditions and treatment there were probably more favourable than in other camps. Nonetheless, there are no testimonies of different treatment in other camps, and so we may conclude that these figures roughly represent the upper limit of mortality of Russian POWs among the various camps due to the relatively long period of incarceration (opening and closing its gates on 18 March 1904 and 20 February 1906, respectively, Matsuyama was the first and last POW camp in this war). The death toll in the camp is based on a list of tombs in Matsuyama Russian cemetery. For the list, see *shiryō 1*, in Matsuyama Daigaku (2004: 217–19).

[24] For a breakdown by rank, see Ōe (1976: 352).

[25] On the attitude to repatriated Japanese POWs, see Hata (1996: 257–61). On Russian treatment of Japanese POWs, see Saikami (1983) and Datsyshen (2007).

[26] See Hata (1998: 18–21).

[27] On the indoctrination for sacrifice and militarism in school songs since the early 1890s, see Eppstein (2007).

[28] For Japan's involvement in the war and the internal politics associated with its participation, see Dickinson (1999). On the siege of Qingdao and Japan's military involvement in the First World War, see Jones (1915), Lowe (1969) and (2004), and Burdick (1976).

[29] This figure is for 31 December 1914, based on Japanese military statistics; in Utsumi (2005: 97). According to Burdick and Moessner (1984: 128), the POWs consisted of 4,306 Germans (including 186 officers) and 286 Austrians (including nine officers). There is no explanation for the missing thirty-six men in the latter source.

[30] On the harsh treatment in several camps (in Osaka, Kurume, Matsuyama and Fukuoka), see Utsumi (2005: 103–10). On the particularly benevolent treatment at Bando, where 1,028 POWs were incarcerated from 1917 to 1920, see Tomita (1991) and Utsumi (2005: 100–103). For a favourable report on the conditions of the camps written by a Swiss physician, Fritz Paravicini, who visited the POWs in 1918, see Paravicini (2005).

[31] On the Japanese treatment of German POWs in the First World War, see Burdick and Moessner (1984) and Klein (1993). For the percentage of prisoners who decided to stay in Japan after liberation, see Sander-Nagashima (1998: 65).

[32] For somewhat different views on the short-range motives for the outbreak of this war, see Hata (1983) and Usui (1990).

[33] In May 1936, the China garrison comprised 5,600 men, but within two months of the outbreak of the war, there were in China sixteen Japanese divisions with more than 200,000 men. By 1940 the Army deployed twenty-seven divisions in China. The Army as a whole grew from twenty-four divisions in 1937 to thirty-four division in 1938, forty-one in 1939 and fifty in 1940, mostly due to the war in China. In Spring 1944, on the eve of the Ichigo campaign, Japan mobilized its largest force in China during the entire war, reaching some 800,000 men. Throughout the entire war, Japan mobilized to China an estimated force of about three million men. See Boyd (1988: 138, 158) and MacKinnon (2007: 348).

[34] For additional overviews in English on the Second Sino-Japanese War, see Morley (1983), Barrett and Shyu (2001), and Mackinnon (2007).

[35] See Utsumi (2005: 125-30). Curiously, the Chinese regime did the same and did not declare war until after United States declared war on Japan in December 1941, so it could receive the assistance of neutral nations.

[36] For such orders, issued on 15 October 1937, see Hata (1998, I: 102).

[37] Although there is a heated debate on the number of Chinese casualties in Nanjing and its surroundings in late 1937, there is a full consensus among scholars that the Japanese army executed many thousands of surrendered Chinese soldiers in this episode. For testimonies of Japanese soldiers regarding about such killings, see, for example, Iguchi et al. (1989: 131–41), Kaikōsha (1989: 100, 501; 1993: 435), Ono et al. (1996: 219, 326). For various views on the Chinese death toll and the difficulty of providing an accurate figure, see Chang (1997), Yamamoto (2000), Wakabayashi (2000) and Yoshida (2006).

[38] On the attitude and treatment of Chinese POWs, see Utsumi (2004: 136–8). On the use of Chinese POWs of the 8th Route Army as forced labourers, see Ju (2007: 214–17) and Zhuang (2007: 239).

[39] On the use of Chinese prisoners for biological experiments by Unit 731, see Gold (1996) and Harris (2002).

[40] On the Japanese treatment of Chinese POWs in the Second Sino-Japanese

War, see *Judgment of the International Military Tribunal* (1948: 1014–15). On the massacre of several hundred Chinese soldiers in Hankow in October 1938 and in Changsha in September 1941 see *Judgment of the International Military Tribunal* (1948: 1020, 1022).

[41] There seems to be some incongruence between the various figures with no clear figure of the total number of Japanese POWs in this war. Nonetheless, in August 1945 and *prior* to Japan's surrender there were 8,317 POWs in Chinese captivity. In Hata (1998, II: 531). For a table of Japanese POWs held by the Communist Eighth Route Army (a total of 2,407 from September 1937 to May 1944), see Hata (1998, I: 117). For a table of various sites where Japanese POWs were held by the Nationalist government (about 2,000 from 1937 to 1946), see Hata (1998, I: 122). For a table of Japanese POWs in Chinese captivity with a detailed breakdown by their sites of capture (a total of more than 2,230), see Hata (1998, I: 124).

[42] I could not obtain reliable figures for the number of Japanese POWs in this conflict. The number of Japanese dead is about 389,000. This includes 185,647 for the four year period until the outbreak of the Pacific War and another 202,958 for the remaining four years. In Dower (1986: 297).

[43] The standard overview of the Second Russo-Japanese War, the so-called Nomonhan Incident, is Coox (1985). During the four-month engagement the Japanese committed some 75,738 men and received at least 18,000 casualties, among them about 8,000 dead. In Coox (1985, II: 915–16).

[44] On the Japanese image of Russia at this stage see Mikhailova (2000).

[45] On the Japanese side's no-surrender policy, see Coox (1985, II: 1083–4). Estimates of the number of Japanese POWs range from 1,000 to 4,000. Coox provides several attestations to the feasibility of these figures, and concludes that the most credible figure is probably above 3,000. In Coox (1985, I: 929–51). For a lower figure, based on the gap between the number of missing soldiers and repatriated POWs, see Nomonhan Haruhagawa Sensō Shinpojiumu Jikkōiinkai (1992: 50–1).

[46] This figure matches the number provided by Hata (1996: 263), but he highly underestimates the figure for Japanese POWs, mentioning only the 159 captives who were officially exchanged by the Soviets.

[47] On ambivalence to the West, the lingering admiration of its people and its legacy during the Pacific War, see Shillony (1991), Dower (1986) and Furuya (2000). On the Japanese attitude to Asians during the war, see Dower (1986). On the desire to derogate and abuse specifically white POWs, see Utsumi (2004).

[48] For an overview in English on the Pacific War, or the Asian chapter of the Second World War, see Ienaga (1978), Spector (1985) and Dower (1986). On the dispatch of prototypic 'white' POWs to Japan during the war for propaganda purposes, see Utsumi (2004).

[49] By the end of 1942 Japanese POWs in Allied hands numbered slightly over a thousand; not until the onset of the campaign in Luzon as late as in October 1944 did the number of Japanese POWs in Allied hands first exceed 5,000. The number of Japanese soldiers captured in the South-west Pacific area exemplifies this trend: 1,167 soldiers were captured in 1942; 1,064 in 1943; 5,122

in 1944; and 12,194 in 1945. The figures were compiled by Gilmore (1995: 196); see also in Krammer (1983: 70). At the end of the war the majority of the Japanese soldiers in the hands of the Allies were 'Surrendered Enemy Personnel', who voluntarily placed themselves in Allied custody soon after Japan's surrender on 15 August 1945.

[50] See also Gilmore (1998: 62–4).

[51] For an overview of the highly divergent treatment in various camps, in terms of food, medical treatment, forced labour, corporal punishment and mortality rate, see Waterford (1994).

[52] There is a vast primary and secondary literature on the Japanese treatment of Allied POWs in the Pacific War. For overviews see Daws (1994), Kerr (1985), and La Forte, Marcello and Himmel (1994).

[53] As many of the deaths of South-east Asian forced labourers were not documented, their estimated mortality rate varies from 20 per cent to 76.6 per cent. See Wertheim (1956: 263–6).

[54] During the first year in Japanese captivity, roughly 80 per cent of the 12,000 Filipino scouts died, compared with a mortality rate of about 30 per cent among the American POWs. See Waterford (1994: 142).

[55] For the figures, see Dower (1986: 298).

[56] For the figures, see Miller (1949: 310-11). According to another source the number of Japanese POWs captured in Okinawa (1 April – 30 June) was 7,401. See Appleman (1948: 489). During the entire three-year campaign in Burma, some 1,700 Japanese were captured while approximately 144,000 were killed. In Kinvig (2000: 48).

[57] There is no consensus as for this figure. The total number of Japanese troops captured prior to the formal surrender was 41,464 according to American reports (The War Reports [1947: 267]) and 42,543 (of whom 3,877 were non-combatant) according to the Japanese POW Information Bureau (Hata 1998, II: 529). Hata (1996: 263) assesses the total number to be about 50,000, but this figure seems to include more than 8,000 Japanese POWs in Chinese captivity. For the number of POWs in China at the end of the war, see Hata (1998, II: 531).

[58] There are several studies of Japanese behaviour in captivity during the Pacific War, notably Krammer (1983), Nimmo (1988), Straus (2003) and Sareen (2006). Two large-scale mutinies of Japanese POWs in captivity are well known. The first was in February 1943 at Featherston in New Zealand, ending with fourty-eight Japanese dead; the second was in August 1944, at Cowra in Australia, with 234 Japanese dead. On these uprisings, see Asada (1972), Carr-Gregg (1978), Gordon (1994) and Sanders (1990). On the cooperation of Japanese POWs with their captors and their deliberate decision never to return to Japan, see Benedict (1946: 38–42), Krammer (1983), and Gilmore (1995) and (1998: 94–8). For notable memoirs of Japanese captives in American, British, Chinese and Russian captivity, see Sakamaki (1949), Hokari (1962), Aida (1966), Uchimura (1985), Komada (1991), Ōba (1996) and Ooka (1996). On the soldier's considerations and dilemma of becoming a POW, see Fujii (2000: 182–8). For studies and narratives of Japanese soldiers who avoided surrender after the war and remained in the jungles of the Philippines and

other south-west Pacific islands, see Sankei Shimbun (1972), Onoda (1974), and Gillin and Etter (1983).

[59] Some half of the 594,000 Japanese soldiers who fell into Soviet hands in August 1945 never returned to Japan.

[60] While still accounting for only little of the difference between the Japanese treatment of POWs compared with the German, recall that on average the American POWs in Japanese captivity were incarcerated for longer periods than their compatriots in German captivity; that the tropical area under Japanese control was more prone to fecal-oral and airborne transmission of infectious disease than the areas under German control; and that several thousand POWs in Japanese captivity, but very few in German captivity, died of drowning through the sinking of their prison ships by the Allies.

[61] Among the 235,473 Anglo-American POWs in German captivity in this period, 9,348 died (4.0 per cent) (Waterford 1994: 145), whereas among the 132,134 Anglo-American POWs in Japanese captivity 35,756 died (27.1 per cent) (Dower 1986: 48). Among the 50,016 British POWs in Japanese captivity, 12,433 died (24.9 per cent), see Mellor (1972: 836-7), and among the 22,376 Australian POWs 8,031 died (35.9 per cent).

[62] While the data are inconclusive for the entire mortality of American POWs in Japanese captivity, the Army (including the Army Air Forces) had 28,256 POWs, of whom 11,516 died in captivity (40.8 per cent). See *Army Battle Casualties* (1953: 8–9). Among the 25,580 American POWs captured in the Philippines, some 10,650 died (41.6 per cent). See Kerr (1985: 339–340). In the European theatre, however, of 93,941 Army and Air Corps POWs only 1,121 died (1.2 per cent). Navy casualty data are allocated to naval vessels, not to theater of operations. However the Navy (including the Marine Corps) had 1,343 men who died as prisoners in Japanese captivity. See US Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (1950: 171–4). Marine Corps personnel captured in the Philippines from December 1941 to May 1942 totaled 1,388. Data on numbers of those dying during captivity, repatriated, and still living are not available separately for the Philippines. See US Department of Veterans Affairs (2006: 6).

[63] Whereas the mortality rate of Russian POWs in German captivity during the First World War was about 4 per cent it soared to 57.5 per cent in the Second World War. For the figures, see Rachamimov (2002: 39–42) and Schulte (1988: 181), respectively.

[64] Due to space constraints, I do not discuss here the predictors found irrelevant to the Japanese case. They include the following: *Form of Government*, *International Standards, Enemy Attitude to Japanese POWs*, *Number of POWs, Involvement of Civilians*, *GNP*. For a discussion of these predictors, see Kowner (2009).

[65] In her major book on this topic, however, Utsumi (2005) traces two phases, as this chapter does, in the distinction between Westerners and Asians, the first from 1874 to 1937 and the second until 1952.

[66] The Second Russo-Japanese War (Nomonhan Incident or Battle of Khalkhin Gol) is excluded from this table due to the absence of a definite reference group (from a Japanese perspective) in this conflicts.

[67] I omitted here the Japanese figures for the First World War and the Second Russo-Japanese War due to the limited scale and duration of the conflicts.

[68] On the introduction of flogging in Japan's new colonies in the years after the Russo-Japanese War, concurrent with dramatic expansion in the powers of the colonial police to dispense summary justice (by this means), see Botsman (2005: 211–20).

[69] On the revival of pan-Asianism in Japan during the 1930s and its culmination in the early 1940s, see Saaler (2007: 11–16).

[70] For this insight see Ferguson (2004).

[71] Only eighteen Germans were executed during the First World War for desertion and cowardice. See Bruntz (1938: 206).

[72] The main argument against the adoption was lack of reciprocity: 'Although to be taken prisoner is contrary to the ideology of the Japanese servicemen, those of foreign nations may think differently. Accordingly, although this Convention in form appears to impose reciprocal obligations, in actual fact it would impose duties only on us' (quoted in Hata [1996: 254]).

[73] On the film industry and Kuga's myth making, see Young (1998: 75–6).

[74] For the myth making of the heroic death of Hirose Takeo in 1904, see Shimazu (2004).

[75] On the harsher Japanese attitude to Taiwanese and Koreans since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, see Shao (2007: 93-8) and Robinson (2007: 98), respectively.

7

Japan's Defeat in the Second World War: The Cultural Dimension

MARK PEATTIE

Japan's defeat in The Second World War has been given many explanations. In the American triumphalist perspective, we see it as the consequence of the overwhelming industrial/material superiority of the United States, of superior American logistics and management of the war, all linked to a righteous cause. American historians have long held that there was no way that the Japanese could have defeated America and certainly could not have imposed the drastic demands we, in fact, imposed on defeated Japan: the abject surrender of the enemy, the abolition of his armed forces and the extended occupation of his homeland. This judgement has been voiced in a number of noted works on The Second World War, such as John Ellis' *Brute Force* (1990), which argued that American brute strength determined the outcome, and Richard Overy's *Why the Allies Won* (1996) which argued that it was the astute American management of modern war, including superior logistics and pioneering in operational analysis which made America victorious.

More simplistic and even more triumphalist in their arguments are the myriad of popular books and articles in the United States that have trumpeted the primacy of sophisticated American weaponry – both hardware and the tactics and techniques with which they were employed – in our victory over the Axis powers. As John Ellis has pointed out, the problem is not with these works themselves, but rather that, too often, they examined these technologies in exhaustive detail without discussing them in the context of the real operational world in which they were employed (1990: 526).

There is no denying the validity of both arguments – superior American resources and sophisticated American weaponry – in explaining the

American victory. But the vast disproportion in American and Japanese material strength has long been examined in numerous studies. More importantly for me, as an historian of modern Japan, it is more interesting to attempt to explore why Japan was defeated rather than to explain than why America was victorious.

The question of Japanese defeat has been taken up by a number of Western and Japanese historians. Some have seen the defeat as the result of disastrous strategic mistakes which inexorably led to the vanquishing of Japanese ambitions in the Pacific. Misguided strategy as critical to the eventual Japanese defeat has been a well-worn historiographical path for a range of distinguished historians who have written on the Pacific War, among them Hata Ikuhiko (1994), Ikeda Kiyoshi (1982), James Clayton (1986), Paul Kennedy (1983), Koda Yoji (1993), Seno Sadao (1974) and H.P. Willmott (1982 and 1983). Others, in recent years, have framed this argument in counterfactual terms, arguing that if Japan had done such and such it might well have come off much better at the end of the war.[1]

There can be little doubt that deficiencies in Japanese institutions, weaponry, strategy and tactics all played a significant role in bringing Japan to its knees. Similarly, it is clear that disastrous strategic decisions *were* fundamental to the Japanese defeat. Yet Japan's problems in the conduct of its wars in Asia and the Pacific went deeper and were more inherent in Japan's historical evolution than mere military hardware or strategic decision-making. I suggest that many of Japan's wartime deficiencies were centuries in the making and were essentially cultural. I do not argue that a different cultural character would have guaranteed military success in the Pacific War, but I do maintain that most of Japan's critical failings in the conflict had their origins in the traditional Japanese value system. I freely include in my explanation a range of institutional deficiencies that hobbled Japan's ability to conduct a modern war, a series of disastrous strategic choices that were profoundly damaging to Japan's prospects in the war, and most importantly, a basic Japanese misapprehension of the conflict already from the outset, as to the kind of war that it would have to wage. Yet all of these, in my opinion, were related to the narrowness of the value system of Japan's military leadership.

INSTITUTIONAL DEFICIENCIES RELATED TO JAPAN'S DEFEAT

I begin by noting that at the outset of the Pacific War, Japan's military preparedness was weakened by a fundamental cultural impairment, less obvious at the time than it is nearly seventy years later. I refer to the dominant and baleful influence of the military over national affairs and national decision-making. With no civilian critics in positions of authority willing and able to compel the military leadership to justify or think through the consequences of its strategic choices, Japanese wartime decision-making was fatally dogmatic and often un-tethered to reality.[2]

Advancing my argument, I suggest that even worse than the stranglehold of the military on Japan's foreign policies, was the stultifying influence of Japanese warrior traditions on Japanese military thinking. Among these traditions I would include a conviction as to the primacy of the warrior class and its interests in Japanese society; a belief that Japan's greatest values – bravery and loyalty – were best demonstrated on the battlefield; an extreme devotion to death before dishonour; a belief that on the battlefield 'spirit' was more important than materiel; a distrust of foreigners and foreign ideas; and an adamant refusal to compromise. While these attitudes strengthened the ability of Japanese armed forces, particularly the army, to face fearful odds and to bear grinding hardships, it also obscured an understanding of the mundane but essential requirements for successfully waging modern industrial war.

A few examples of this inflexibility come readily to mind: the assumption by each of the two armed services that its interests overrode any other national interest, those of the government and public included; an ingrained refusal to admit error or recast plans that had misfired; an utter rejection of all conduct – specifically including retreat or surrender – seen as compromising Japanese military honour (a principle which led to a great waste of manpower); and an excessive reliance on mystical samurai 'spirit' (*seishin*) which often led to a disallowance (though not an ignorance) of the realities of modern firepower and mechanization.

There were, as well, two related weaknesses in the pre-war Japanese political system which exacerbated these military proclivities. The first was a basic flaw in the political arrangements established under the Meiji Constitution of 1889 which confirmed the Emperor as sacred and inviolable but not accountable for any actions taken in his name by any elements in the Japanese government, specifically by the two armed services – a fatal combination of absolute authority and undefined responsibility. A related defect was the 'Right of Supreme Command' whereby the general staffs of each of the two services were unfettered in their authority over operational matters relating to its own service – a recipe for runaway military and foreign policies.[3]

Institutional weaknesses also splintered the military itself. Chief among these was the corrosive nature of inter-service rivalry and distrust, an animosity which stemmed from traditional Japanese military hubris and from modern competition between the two services for pride of place, for public attention, and for claims upon the public purse. A direct and injurious consequence of this inter-service hostility was the failure to create a truly coordinated high command. The Imperial General Headquarters, re-established in 1937, was not a unified decision-making body, but rather a forum in which strategic priorities, plans and responsibilities were debated and negotiated as between two separate and independent institutions. This bureaucratic stalemate frequently prevented rapid response to any sudden change on the battlefield or on the international diplomatic scene.[4]

The dead weight of the warrior tradition also had a warping effect

upon the Japanese armed forces themselves – on their operational capabilities, on their training, on their doctrines, on their planning and on their force structures. This was most obvious in the Japanese navy whose ongoing emphasis on offensive operations was born out of a conviction that only this type of operations provided a scope for individual glory, heroics and prestige that were core values for the traditional military class.[5] Hence, the holy grail of Japanese naval doctrine was decisive battle (*kessen*) – huge, all encompassing and crushing. To that end, all doctrine, tactics, training, weaponry and force structure were shaped.[6]

Early on, Japanese naval doctrine established the primacy of fearless and relentless close-in attack. To increase the potency of such tactics the navy devoted decades of intensive research on certain wonder weapons: the oxygen torpedo, super-battleships, the Type-91 armour-piercing shell and midget submarines; secret combat techniques – 'underwater gunnery shots', long-distance torpedo firing by surface ships and the famous 'turning-in' maneuvre in fighter combat – all of which were intended to overcome American material superiority. The problem was not that these weapons and tactics did not have combat value (though some had considerably more than others); the problem was that their fixed place in Japanese naval thinking, because of Japanese obsession with battle *per se*, led the navy to neglect those aspects of modern warfare that were ancillary to battle (Evans and Peattie 1997).

A few examples may illuminate this negligence towards the requirements of twentieth century naval warfare. Prime among them was the Japanese neglect of logistics – a vital if tiresome and tiring matter of planning, calculation, timetables, loading and shipping – none of which appealed to the battle-driven mindset of the traditional Japanese warrior. On land, the result of this deficiency was the failure to develop base construction capabilities like those of the American 'Seabees' which could establish advanced air bases with amazing rapidity. At sea, one notes the failure of Japanese fleet organization to move beyond the 'strike force' concept, capable of only one brilliant hit-and-run raid like the attack on Pearl Harbor. For its part, the US Navy built towards the 'task force' which, supplied with a large fleet train, could stand off a land target for days on end, pounding it into submission.

If logistics had little interest for the ambitious Japanese naval officer, a career in naval intelligence seemed only marginally better. What intelligence was collected more often than not concerned prospects for immediate battle rather than a holistic perspective on enemy strength. Thus, on the eve of the Pacific War, the Japanese high command had a dead-on accurate assessment of American military strength in the Pacific and South-east Asia, but little understanding of the culture, politics, psychology and leadership of the American people. Such an understanding might have prepared the Japanese leadership for the outraged American response to the nature of the Japanese attacks which opened the war and, hence, the American determination to exact crushing revenge for Japanese 'infamy' (Evans and Peattie 1997: 422–3).

For the Japanese navy and merchant marine, no deficiency proved more desperately crippling than the failure to develop an effective anti-submarine warfare capability. It stemmed in part from the narrowness of Japanese submarine doctrine which viewed the submarine primarily as a weapon to be used against enemy fleet units, not as a commerce raider. More importantly, it arose from the Japanese failure to recognize that Japan, an island nation like Britain, was vulnerable to blockade and economic strangulation. By early 1944, it became apparent that Japan's conquest of the treasure house of the East Indies in 1942 had added little to Japan's supply of strategic resources because Japanese shipping from the Indies was being ravaged by the American submarine campaign. Too late, Japanese navy men came to realize that the vast effort and expense that went into the creation of Japan's two super-battleships, the *Yamato* and *Musashi*, should have gone into the construction of shoals of drab little corvettes, frigates and other ASW vessels especially equipped and armed to hunt down enemy submarines (Oi 1986).

Part and parcel of Japanese operations was the conviction that quality would always trump quantity. All that the military services attempted in terms of training, weapons and equipment was based on that assumption. It was, for example, a conviction manifested in Japanese pilot training policy. Whereas, the United States Navy trained thousands of 'good' fighter pilots, the Japanese navy and army air services, through incredibly rigorous selection and training that weeded out all but the most brilliant aviators, graduated only a few hundred pilots annually. Those pilots were, for a brief period, probably the best fighter pilots in the world, but as their ranks dwindled through combat or operational losses during the war, there were few to replace them (see Peattie 2001: 133–4 and 191). As the Japanese were to learn to their sorrow, quantity has a quality all its own.

There are two other explanations for all these neglected initiatives and policies in the lead-up to Japan's participation in modern industrial war. First, was the colossal misjudgement by both services about the war into which Japan had entered in December 1941. H.P. Willmott, some years ago, remarked upon the Japanese notion that its opening lightning assault was the modern equivalent of the traditional Japanese swordsman's initial slashing movement – the *iai* – which would disable the opponent and bring him to his knees with one stroke (1982: 130). In reality, the enemy giant stumbled but did not fall and Japan soon found itself locked in a long grinding war of attrition for which the nation was not materially prepared. After a period of balance – the summer of 1942 to the summer of 1943 – the American industrial machine began to produce an avalanche of weapons, munitions, equipment and supplies whose scale (and even quality) Japan could not hope to match. Just as unrealistic was the Japanese blind faith in bringing about one colossal confrontation in which Japanese 'spirit', offensive tactics and wonder weapons would be decisive. Such a notion overlooked the fact that in

the nineteenth and twentieth centuries major wars were not often won 'at the tip of the spear', but by superior economic resources and superior logistical and managerial organization.

If the Japanese navy largely entrusted its combat prospects to qualitatively superior weapons and techniques, the Japanese army possessed little of either, aside from excellent light infantry weapons and rigorous training. What it did have in quantity was tough, battle-hardened infantry, skilled in small unit tactics and night combat, able to endure a much lower caloric intake than the Allied forces, capable of marching with incredible speed and endurance, and displaying a remarkable élan which belied their often scruffy physical appearance.

It was indeed this spirit that was critical to the courage, resilience and ferocity of Japanese infantry in combat. The keystone of that esprit was the fanatical devotion of officers and men to the Japanese warrior traditions of military honour, traditions which brooked no compromise and preferred death before dishonour.[7] It is true that most armies have a code of honour that demands sacrifice of life if the situation on the battlefield requires it. But the Japanese code of honour was unique in that it held honour as a value sufficient unto itself even if no practical purpose was attached to it. Western military culture has long held the defiance of terrible odds as heroic and admirable and Western history and legend is laden with episodes of 'forlorn hope' in the defence of a besieged position or the assault on a vastly superior enemy. Thermopylae, Roland at Roncesvalles, Pickett's Charge at Gettysburg and the defence of Rorke's Drift come readily to mind.

But these were sacrifices made with a reason: the defence of a pass, the rallying of resistance, or the delay of an enemy advance. What bewildered and ultimately infuriated Allied forces in combat with Japanese troops was that so often Japanese resistance unto death was carried out even when it served no tactical purpose. Similarly, Western armies have long accepted the concept of surrender when there is no longer a practical objective to be gained by continued fighting. But traditional Japanese military honour simply did not accept surrender as possible in *any* situation and thus many battles in the Pacific War were prolonged far beyond the point of decision, a fact which increased Allied as well as Japanese casualty rates.

Because Japanese military tradition dismissed surrender as unacceptable for Japanese forces, it held an enemy who resorted to it as beneath contempt and thus deserving of the harshest punishment upon entering Japanese captivity. Such an attitude is fundamental to the understanding of an atrocity such as the Bataan Death March. Inevitably, such atrocities inflamed Allied attitudes against the Japanese, led to Allied battlefield atrocities against Japanese, and made it less likely that Allied forces would accept anything less than unconditional surrender at the end of the fighting. All these elements are fundamental to an understanding of the 'war without mercy' that was fought in the jungles of the south-west Pacific and south-east Asia.[8]

GRAND STRATEGIC MISJUDGEMENTS ABOUT JAPAN'S PLACE IN THE WORLD

Even before the outbreak of the Pacific War, one of the further consequences of Japan's dominant warrior tradition was the inability, by disposition and training, of the military to deal with international instability. This was particularly true of the period between the world wars. More precisely, it was the military's unwillingness to think realistically about Japan's place in a changing world. There can be little doubt that, in the interwar period, Japan had been dealt some unfortunate cards: the rise of ideas, ideologies and nationalisms hostile to Japan's imperial interests in East Asia; the international naval arms limitations agreements forced on Japan that seemed particularly inimical to Japan's naval interests; the collapse of the international trading order in the late 1920s; and the consequent panicked protectionism against Japanese trade by the Western powers.

With a certain degree of justice, Japan regarded these developments as both unexpected and unmerited. Understandably, it responded with a determination to 'go at it alone', to obtain by force those strategic objectives that it had failed to obtain through international cooperation. Yet a less emotional survey of the world situation might have resulted in the conclusion that it was in Japan's best interests to maintain agreed-upon limits to naval armaments and to preserve the international trading order rather than to destroy it in favour of the chimera of East Asian hegemony. But a measured and reasoned response to Western pressure was unthinkable to the Japanese military whose influence had become paramount by the early 1930s.

Related to Japan's turn towards forceful solutions to the nation's dilemmas was the misreading of Japan's own recent military history. In particular, the Japanese military and political leadership took heart in the recollection of the nation's resounding victories in China in 1894–95 and over Russia a decade later, triumphs which gained Japan a major foothold on the Asian continent and a seat at the table of the world powers. But these had been regional successes conducted without direct military intervention or interference from outside powers during the period of actual combat. In 1941, Japan advanced its interests in league with an axis coalition which the Anglo-American maritime powers were determined to annihilate. That the Japanese leadership could not see the difference between these two situations was a tragedy not just for Japan, but for the world.

I do not intend to propose a mono-causal explanation of Japan's utter defeat in The Second World War. Indeed, as I acknowledged at the outset of this essay, Japan's downfall had a dozen reasons. I have not touched upon a range of weaknesses in Japan's military position when it went to war in 1941. Among these I would count the nation's limited scientific and technological research base to promote military technologies; the strategic errors made by the Japanese in the early stages of the war, such

as the reckless expansion of Japanese conquests beyond the capacity of Japanese armed forces to defend them; and, lastly, the disastrous asymmetry between ends and means, of which the disconnect between the ideals of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and the ruthless exploitation of south-east Asian peoples by the Japanese occupation was only the most flagrant case.

But I would argue that the Japanese warrior tradition, ill-suited to the requirements of modern industrial war, exacerbated all these weaknesses. This held true for both armed services, but it is probably most relevant to the Imperial Japanese Navy, the service with which I am most familiar. Perhaps I may be permitted, therefore, to end this essay with a statement which closes a book which I co-authored some years ago. I wrote:

> This then was the Imperial Japanese Navy's ultimate failure . . . the failure to understand and prepare for modern naval war . . . The furious dedication to training, the obedience unto death, the tactical discipline, and the formidable array of naval weaponry were perfected for one great naval maneuver that, carried out with clocklike precision, was to insure Japan's triumph over its enemies . . . Though its courage was unrivalled and its tactical skills undoubted, in its focus on battle and its insistent claim on the nation's resources to prepare for it, the Japanese navy showed how parochial were its interests and how shallow was its grasp of contemporary naval strategy. (Evans and Peattie 1997: 516)

NOTES

1 Notable, in this regard, are Wood (2007) and Tsouras (2001). Both of these books offer some brilliantly intriguing insights. But counterfactual history, while of appealing interest, is a seriously flawed approach. It is too often selective in the 'facts' its practitioners choose to alter while the rest of the actual world in which those altered facts existed remains unchanged by those who choose to use the concept. The consequence is an unrealistic combination of fact and non-fact. Other defects in the counterfactual or fictional history are discussed in that devastatingly logical pathology of historiography by David Fischer (1970: 15–21).

2 In the twentieth century, the Japanese military was not unique in this regard, of course. Prior to The First World War, General Schlieffen's plan for the conquest of France was fatally flawed in its oversight of the political consequences it would bring about. During the war, the decision by the German navy, supported by generals Ludendorff and Hindenburg, and backed by the Kaiser, to launch unrestricted warfare against Britain and thus risk American entry into the war, was made without serious consultation with the German civilian government. As we know, the consequences for Germany were disastrous. See Ritter (1958) and Herwig (1997: 312–25).

3 These matters are discussed in Maxon (1973: 24–8).

4 Nor was this all. Within each service itself there were fissures – of historical

tradition, regional loyalty, professional function and technological orientation – which hampered service unity. While such rifts were and are to be found in the armed services of other nations, I would argue that they were particularly severe in the Japanese army and navy.

[5] Nowhere was this thirst for individual glory and heroics more evident than in Japanese fighter plane tactics which exemplified the warrior tradition of individual combat. Japanese fighter pilots, flying fast and manoeuvrable aircraft like the Mitsubishi Zero fighter, had a strong preference for individual dogfighting over the more restrictive combat formation flying favoured by American air combat doctrine. Eventually, even faster and more rugged American aircraft and devastating new American air combat techniques made Japanese dogfighting tactics suicidal. See Peattie (2001: 113, 135).

[6] These concerns are discussed throughout in Evans and Peattie (1997).

[7] In speaking of Japanese military traditions one must be careful in the use of the term. While some writers have referred to them as originating in ancient times, it is clear that they go back no further than the Tokugawa period of the seventeenth, eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and that they were the product of a selective use of Tokugawa military traditions by the twentieth century Japanese military. See Friday (1994).

[8] They are explored in Eric Bergerud's fascinating study (1996: 403–25).

8

Jewish Scientists, Jewish Ethics and the Making of the Atomic Bomb

MERON MEDZINI

In his book *The Jews and the Japanese: The Successful Outsiders*, Ben-Ami Shillony devoted a chapter to the Jewish scientists who played a central role in the development of nuclear physics and later in the construction and testing of the first atomic bomb. He correctly traced the well-known facts that among the leading nuclear physics scientists, there was an inordinately large number of Jews (Shillony 1992: 190–3). Many of them were German, Hungarian, Polish, Austrian and even Italian Jews. Due to the rise of virulent anti-Semitism in Germany, especially after the Nazi takeover of that country in 1933, most of the German-Jewish scientists found themselves unemployed, with no laboratory facilities or even citizenship, and had to seek refuge in other European countries. Eventually, many of them settled in the United States. A similar fate awaited Jewish scientists in other central European countries that came under German occupation, such as Austria, or German influence as in the case of Hungary. Within a short time, many of these scientists who found refuge in America were highly instrumental in the exceedingly elaborate and complex research and work that eventually culminated in the construction of the atomic bomb at various research centres and, since 1943, at the Los Alamos site. In this facility there were a large number of Jews occupying the highest positions. Of the heads of sections in charge of the Manhattan Project, at least eight were Jewish, led by the man in charge of the operation, J. Robert Oppenheimer. Among them Edward Teller, Eugene Wigner, Leo Szilard, all Hungarian Jews, stood out. From Vienna came Victor Weisskopf. Max Born, James Franck, Hans Bethe and Otto Frisch were born in Germany. Some of them studied under Niels Bohr, a Dane whose mother was Jewish. Others were native-born Americans – Isadore Rabi, Richard Feynman and Eugene Rabinowitz. Joseph Rotblatt came from Poland via Britain (Jungk 1958: 19–34).

Other well-known scientists involved in the development of nuclear power were also Jews; Albert Einstein led the list and he was the one who, at the insistence of Leo Szilard, wrote in August 1939 the famous letter that alerted President Roosevelt to the military uses of atomic power. Szilard was also among the scientists who met with Roosevelt later that year to discuss the significance of nuclear fission and its possible use in the coming war (Lanouette 1992: 209–13). Other Hungarian Jews who figured prominently in the development of nuclear physics were Theodore Von Karman, George de Hevesy, Michael Polyani and John Von Neumann. Emilio Segre was an Italian Jew. Enrico Fermi had a Jewish wife and escaped from Fascist Italy to protect her (Fermi 1954: 139).

Given the large number of Jews so deeply involved in various capacities in the Manhattan Project, I have often wondered if the fact that they were born Jewish influenced in any manner their thinking regarding the new and terrible weapon they were building, and to what extent their being born Jewish, or holding any Jewish religious sentiments, or growing up on Jewish ethics, played any role in their behaviour and attitude towards the use of the most destructive weapon mankind has ever devised. This chapter sets out to discuss some of the following questions: Was their experience with anti-Semitism an important factor in their work? Did they have knowledge regarding the Holocaust taking place at the time they were busy in Los Alamos and other laboratories in the United States? Did they know anything about Japan prior to the war? Did they set out to prove to their superiors, chiefly General Leslie Groves, that they were more loyal to America and even greater patriots than their American-born colleagues? I was further curious if anyone among them was a practising Jew, was it possible at all for an observant Jew to practise his religion in Los Alamos? Did they observe the Sabbath, eat only Kosher food? Did they fast on the Day of Atonement? I also wondered if they were involved at all in the decision-making process regarding the use of the bomb on Japanese targets that could involve civilian casualties? Were there any Jewish scientists who were totally opposed to the use of the bomb on enemy targets and if so, did they have any influence?

A cursory examination shows a number of factors that may help provide preliminary and partial answers to some of these questions. Most, if not all, of the Jewish scientists who were born in Europe were Jews only by birth. From their own autobiographies or biographies, it clearly emerges that none of them was a practising Jew. In America, J. Robert Oppenheimer and his Jewish colleagues had no temple or synagogue affiliation (Smith and Weiner, eds 1980: 2–8). They came from assimilated Jewish families. Leo Szilard was born Leo Spitz, but his father decided to Hungarianize the family name (as was the case with another illustrious Hungarian Jew, the renowned conductor Sir George Solti, whose family name was originally Stern) (Lanouette 1992: 13–14). Hans Bethe did not think of himself as a Jew. He later wrote: 'I was not Jewish.

My mother was Jewish and until Hitler came that made no difference whatsoever' (Rhodes 1988: 188–9). He may have not realized that according to the Jewish tradition the mother's religion determined one's own. He met Jews for the first time in America, but even afterwards, most of his friends were immigrant Jewish scientists from Europe like himself. Lise Meitner preferred to keep quiet about her Jewish ancestry. She claimed she never felt Jewish and was even baptized as a child (Sime 1996: 138–9). None of them, and that includes Oppenheimer, went through a Bar Mitzvah ceremony (Smith and Weiner, eds 1980: 2–8). This was noted by Emilio Segre who wrote in his memoirs that many decades later he attended his grandson's Bar Mitzvah in a synagogue in Israel. His daughter married an Israeli and lives in that country (Segre 1993: 35).

The Hungarian-born scientists grew up in middle-class homes, in which their parents sought to assimilate into the non-Jewish environment as fast as they could so as to be considered loyal citizens of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. None were sent to Jewish day schools. As was the custom among assimilated Jewish families, they attended state or even church oriented public schools, where many of them encountered the ugly manifestation of anti-Semitism for the first time, usually in high school or the gymnasium. Teller and Szilard recall that they suffered much taunting and abuse from school principals, teachers and fellow students (Rhodes 1988:185–9).

The Hungarian Jews began to realize the viciousness of Hungarian anti-Semitism especially after the failure of the 1919 Communist uprising in Hungary led by another Jew, Bela Kuhn. The reaction to that uprising was particularly harsh and many anti-Jewish edicts were adopted by the authorities, among them a quota system that limited their numbers in universities and hampered job opportunities (Teller with Shoolery 2001; Lanouette 1992: 47–8). It was then that a number of them underwent conversion to Christianity. Szilard's biographer, William Lanouette, noted that Szilard became a Calvinist, Wigner became a Lutheran and Von Neumann adopted Roman Catholicism. It was obvious that they went through the conversion rituals to escape anti-Semitism (Lanouette 1992: 76).

The spiritual aspects of Christianity had no impact on them and they were not known to be regular church-goers. They never publicly renounced their Judaism. It was an act of convenience, not a matter of belief in the inferiority of their faith or the superiority of the faith they now embraced. Unfortunately for them, their conversion made little impression on the non-Jewish environment and did little to help them escape their Jewish origins. They were always considered Jews: in Hungary, in Germany, in Britain and later in the United States.

Having graduated from high school and in some cases from university as well, a number of these scientists studied in Germany in the 1920s and early 1930s. The majority of them gravitated to Gottingen, then the acknowledged world centre of physics. To that group belonged

also Vienna-born Victor Weisskopf, who later also played a key role at Los Alamos. From America came Robert Oppenheimer (Jungk 1958: 28-35). In the early 1930s, they witnessed the rise of Hitler. This was followed almost at once by the loss of their teaching and research jobs and facilities. Most decided to leave Germany because of the Nazi racial laws. Among the first to leave was the renowned physicist James Franck, already a Nobel Prize winner. Teller left Germany in 1933 with the help of the Jewish Rescue Committee and initially went to England, to Copenhagen a year later, and then to America. Lise Meitner ended up in Sweden. Szilard initially settled in England before going to the United States. Szilard was very much aware of the plight of Jewish scientists escaping from Germany and sought to elicit the help of fellow scientist and then president of the World Zionist Organization, Chaim Weizmann, to obtain financial aid from wealthy British Jews to set up a centre for exiled, mainly Jewish, scientists. There is no evidence that anything tangible ever developed from this scheme.

Part of the tragedy of these scientists was that while they did not view themselves as Jews, the non-Jewish environment did, with horrendous results. They all knew that the Nazis called Einstein's theory of relativity 'Jewish physics' and understood that the faster they got out of Germany, the better off they would be. Having experienced virulent Nazi anti-Semitism and persecution, and knowing the advanced state of nuclear physics research in Germany, they were imbued with a sense of urgency that Nazi Germany must not be allowed to win the race and build the first atomic bomb. They felt they were engaged in a race against time. America must possess the atomic bomb before Hitler's scientists could build a similar device and win the war and rule the world.

The American-born scientists were first-generation Americans whose parents emigrated from Eastern Europe. Among them were Isadore Rabi, Eugene Rabinowitz, Richard Feynman and Felix Bloch. But unlike their Central European Jewish counterparts they had a stronger Jewish upbringing, even spoke some Yiddish and attended Jewish day schools. In his memoirs, Emilio Segre noted that he once tried to translate from Italian to English for Isadore Rabi and a Russian-born Jewish scientist called Moise Haissinsky. He told them to try speaking in Yiddish and they were off like a shot and did not require his translation skills (Segre 1993: 102).

The American-born scientists also had their share of anti-Semitic experiences in America, mostly in finding suitable teaching and research positions in colleges and universities during the depression years of the 1930s. But this was polite anti-Semitism, unlike the brutal Nazi version. Such covert anti-Semitism was attributed to some leading American scientists and military officers. Among those who were later accused of being anti-Semitic was General Leslie Groves. One of his biographers wrote: 'Whatever degree of racism and anti-Semitism may have been present in Groves was probably shared by most Anglo-Saxon Protestant males of his day' (Norris 2002: 236–7).

Some of the American Jewish scientists did not go out of their way to help absorb the European Jewish scientists, partly because of the competition for scarce university or research laboratories positions, partly because of the fear of polite native anti-Semitism. Oppenheimer initially did not go out of his way to help some relatives escape from Germany in the late 1930s (Rhodes 1988: 445)

Once Oppenheimer gathered his group of scientists in Los Alamos in 1943, there are not many details on how the Jewish scientists felt on many issues that were at the top of the agenda both in the United States and elsewhere. For example, there is almost no written evidence whether they were fully aware of the Holocaust that was taking place in Europe or whether it was a major subject of discussion amongst them. This is quite surprising because, after all, some of them left their families behind in Hungary, a country governed by the anti-Semitic Horthy regime, and from March 1944 taken over and ruled directly by the German army who ordered the Hungarian authorities to round up the Hungarian Jews, the majority of whom were sent to Auschwitz. Teller's family survived both the Holocaust and the ensuing Communist rule. Once the war in Europe ended in May 1945 with the surrender of Germany and the magnitude of the Holocaust became known world-wide, apart from Teller, we do not know of any attempts made by these scientists to trace colleagues and friends from the pre-war era to discover their fate (Teller with Shoolery 2001). True, in the few weeks immediately after the war in Europe ended, the scientists were under massive pressure to complete the preparations for testing the first atomic device and insuring that it would be operational against Japan in order to avoid the need for a land invasion of the Japanese home islands, which could have resulted in a huge loss of lives.

In Los Alamos, some of the Jewish scientists encountered anti-Semitism once again, this time in the form of arguments and conflicts with the man in charge of Los Alamos, General Leslie Groves. This is how Szilard's biographer described Groves:

> Grove's animus towards Szilard grew from several causes. Groves was an all-American boy, active in sports and devoutly Christian, a patriotic militarist and engineer, while Szilard was an Eastern European immigrant, active in science and spurned both the military and engineering. Grove's authoritarian rectitude and anti-intellectual swagger clashed with Szilard's austere reason and playful erudition. Unlike his colleagues, Szilard also seemed pushy and arrogant to Groves, outspoken on any subject, from physics to politics. In addition, Grove's anti-Semitism was focused and personified in Szilard, in all making him a perfect villain (Lanouette 1992: 237).

Groves was apparently unimpressed with the fact that Szilard and some of the other originally Jewish scientists had converted to Christianity. For him they were born and remained Jews. Interestingly, Groves

maintained very cordial relations with both Oppenheimer and Teller, perhaps due to the fact that he needed the support of these two leading scientists to complete the project as fast as possible.

Unknown to many of the scientists, they were under constant FBI surveillance because they were suspected of leftist leanings and association with left-wing, and in some cases even pro-Communist, organizations. In fact, as early as 1942, Groves suggested to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson that Szilard be interned as an enemy alien. The truth was that a number of these scientists technically were enemy aliens. Fermi and Segre were Italian citizens, while others were Hungarian and even German nationals. We can only imagine what would have happened to the Manhattan Project were these scientists put in detention camps for the duration of the war. Cooler heads prevailed. Szilard and the others were simply too valuable in Los Alamos to be sitting in an internment camp during the war. Szilard became a naturalized American in 1943. It was no secret that in the late 1930s Oppenheimer espoused a number of leftist causes, signed some petitions and even contributed money to anti-Fascist causes. All this would emerge fully during the hearings held in 1954 that resulted in the removal of Oppenheimer's security clearance at the height of the McCarthy witch-hunts (Smith and Weiner, eds 1980: 420). Curiously, there is no evidence that the European Jewish scientists, with the notable exception of Einstein, had any interest in Zionism or ever thought of emigrating to Palestine as a viable option.

In Los Alamos itself, in spite of the presence of hundreds of Jews, there is no evidence of the existence of a synagogue, or a Jewish club, nor of the availability of Kosher food or the celebration of the Sabbath or Jewish holidays (Hales 1997). There is a pervasive feeling that the Jewish scientists, mainly the immigrants from Central Europe, attempted to down play their Jewish origins and prove to their American colleagues that they were no less patriotic Americans than the rest, and were even more so. Some of them did not yet acquire American citizenship and perhaps did not want to act in any way that could hamper the process of becoming American citizens. All of them had to go through security clearance checks and were probably afraid that high visibility could create problems for them. Apparently, there were also a few minor anti-Semitic incidents. Groves was not happy when the Hungarian-born scientists spoke Hungarian among themselves in the dining room. He was convinced that they were making jokes at his expense and insisted they speak in English, which they did with a heavy accent (Rhodes 1988: 522). They certainly had no desire to demonstrate that they had a personal account to settle with Germany for what its Nazi regime had done to Jews in general; and to them, personally.

Most of the sources consulted do not provide much evidence to support the argument that there was serious consideration given to the idea of using the first atomic bomb against Germany. It is highly uncertain that this option ever occurred to any decision-maker or that there was any such possibility. Some of the scientists may have discussed this

possibility among themselves but there is no evidence to indicate that they recommended the bombing of Germany with the new weapon. However, it can be safely assumed that the Jewish scientists would not have had much hesitation employing the bomb against military or industrial targets in Germany. But this is academic speculation. The war in Europe was over before the bomb was even tested. There were rumours at the time that some American generals were considering the bomb as a weapon against the Soviet Union, then technically an ally. This may have led Joseph Rotblatt, who was brought to Los Alamos by the British Government in 1943, to leave the site a year later saying his conscience was against what they were doing there. He returned to England and was probably the only 'conscientious objector' among the scientists building the bomb.

According to the available evidence, none of the Jewish builders of the atomic bomb had ever been to Japan or knew much about this country and its people, save for the manner in which Japan was described by wartime propaganda, which sought to demonize and dehumanize the Japanese people, and especially their leaders, so well described by John Dower in his monumental work *War without Mercy*. The only one who had been to Japan, but did not take part in the construction of the bomb, was Albert Einstein, who visited Japan in 1922. We also do not know if the scientists were aware that Japan was not involved in the Holocaust, and in fact several Japanese officials were quite active in saving Jews from Poland and later protecting the Jewish communities of Harbin and Shanghai (see Naoki Maruyama's chapter in this volume). The Jewish scientists shared the general consensus in Los Alamos that Japan was going to be the target.

As the war in Europe drew to an end, Szilard was able once again to convince Einstein to write to President Roosevelt suggesting that he meet with him to discuss the growing communication gap between the scientists and members of the cabinet responsible for formulating the policy deriving from the scientists' work. Already then Szilard was becoming concerned with the enormous destruction and vast loss of human life that would ensue if the bomb were to be used against a Japanese city. The Einstein letter was written on 25 March 1945. Roosevelt died some two weeks later and may have never even seen it.

Once Germany surrendered and the bomb's development was almost completed, Szilard drafted a petition among scientists in May 1945 calling for renewed thinking about the use of the bomb against Japanese cities. This petition, signed by many of his colleagues, with the notable exception of Oppenheimer who declined to sign, was the cause of another fierce clash with Groves who was insistent that this weapon, which by then cost some two billion dollars to build, must be tested over a Japanese target. At the end of May, Szilard, by then no longer in Los Alamos but back at the University of Chicago, travelled to Spartanburg, South Carolina, to meet with James Byrnes, a close associate of President Truman and soon to become Secretary of State, in an attempt to persuade

Truman not to use the bomb on civilian targets. Byrnes later complained that Szilard was insistent that Truman must do as he (Szilard) proposed and the meeting turned sour. There was no meeting of minds between the Hungarian Jewish scientist and the Southern politician who had little experience of Jews.

The wording of Szilard's petition does not include any reference to Jewish ethics about saving lives or not taking lives of innocent people. On 4 July 1945, Szilard wrote to Teller asking him to sign another petition addressed to President Truman, based on purely moral considerations. The petition stated the opposition of the scientists to the use of the bombs in this stage of the war. Szilard wrote to Teller, saying that scientists must raise their voices so as not to be like Germans who did not protest against what Germany did in the course of the war. He added that the scientists working on the bomb must raise their voices even if this could create some inconvenience to those now responsible for the work on nuclear power. Oppenheimer banned this petition which was drafted by Szilard and signed by sixty-seven scientists. This time Oppenheimer was supported by Teller. They felt that the scientists should not necessarily have a say about the military use of the weapon which they had developed and built. The July 17 petition was phrased in such a manner as not to give any offence to the authorities and called on the United States to give adequate warning to Japan. But Szilard did propose that a public announcement be made to the Japanese that the United States now possessed a new weapon and under certain circumstances may find itself forced to resort to the use of this bomb, but such a step ought not to be made at any time without seriously considering the moral implications and responsibilities involved.

This petition was written a day after the Trinity test in Alamagordo proved to be a huge success. Oppenheimer himself was so awed that he cited from the Bhagavad-Gita: 'I am become death, the destroyer of worlds' (Jung 1958: 173). He did not resort to Jewish scriptures probably because his knowledge of them was scant. It can be safely assumed that he did not see the atomic bomb as part of the Jewish concept of Tikkun Olam (fixing or improving the world).

Apart from Oppenheimer, the Jewish scientists had no influence on the decision to use the bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Oppenheimer was a member of the scientific sub-committee of the Interim Committee appointed by Stimson in May 1945 to deal with the new weapon and was involved in making the recommendations to use the bomb on Japanese cities and may have even been part of the team that recommended Hiroshima as a target (Rhodes 1988: 641–9).

Did any of the Jewish scientists working in Los Alamos ever consider leaving the facility as an expression of their opposition to the construction of nuclear weapons? Apart from Rotblatt, the others remained in Los Alamos until the war ended and Japan surrendered. After two bombs destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki, some of the scientists became very much involved in attempts to ban the bomb. A case can be made that

they remained at their post in spite of being caught in a terrible dilemma. They were the ones who pushed for the development of atomic power for military uses, a process started by the August 1939 Einstein letter to Roosevelt, and now that the weapon was ready after years of hard work and massive investment, they were afraid of being seen as opposing its use against Japan. There could have lurked in their mind the feeling that they would be accused of developing the bomb to be used against Germany with whom they had accounts to settle, whereas Japan was not their direct enemy but the problem of America. Perhaps some feared that they would be seen as pro-Soviet, since the Russians at the time did not yet possess the secrets of the bomb, although they knew well enough what was taking place in Los Alamos thanks to information supplied to them by several Jewish technicians, among them Gold and Greenglass, relatives of Ethel and Julius Rosenberg, later executed as Soviet spies.

Finally, has there been any reference by Japanese anti-Semites over the role played by Jewish scientists in the making of the atomic bomb? The evidence does not point to this. Much of Japanese anti-Semitism is in fact anti-Americanism, and the role of the Jews in the bomb has not been specifically mentioned. One can agree with Shillony when he wrote about the role Jews played in occupation reforms after the surrender of Japan that can also be applied to the Japanese attitude towards Jews and the bomb: 'Any attempt as made by some Japanese to detect "a Jewish plot" in the occupation is totally groundless' (Shillony 1992: 199).

Therefore, it may have been an historic accident that so many prominent scientists who fled from Germany, Hungary and Austria because of anti-Semitism and who were involved in the initiation and later in the research and construction of the bomb, were of Jewish origins. Many of them were alienated and assimilated Jews who had few roots in the Jewish tradition. This was not the case with Eastern-European-born Jews or American Jews working alongside them.

There are still many unanswered questions to the central theme of this chapter: in what way were they influenced in their work by the fact that they were born Jewish and did they at any time conceive of the possibility of using atomic bombs on Germany? What is certain is the fact that after the war they had a tremendous sense of remorse over their part in obliterating two Japanese cities and causing the death of some two hundred thousand Japanese, the majority of them innocent civilians.

9

The Memory of the Second World War and the Essence of 'New Japan': The Parliamentary Debate Over Japan's Democratic Constitution

SIGAL BEN-RAFAEL GALANTI

The debates over the essence of 'New Japan' (post-war democratic Japan) reveal a fundamental polemic on the country's attitudes towards the Second World War. Understanding these attitudes is crucial for comprehending post-war Japan, and especially the real significance they ascribe to its *raison d'être* as a democratic nation. It is of importance to discuss whether the Japanese were aware of their wrongdoings in regard to the Second World War, and if that is indeed the case, was that awareness considered a drive to retain and develop the country's post-war democratic regime; or, were the political changes that followed the Second World War perceived in Japan in purely instrumental terms – as a means for recovering from the war and regaining powerful status? What is more, questions about Japan's memory of the Second World War naturally address specific issues, such as the contemporary political culture of the Japanese elite and the goals of its domestic and foreign policies since 1945. This issue, however, also relates to a far more general question, namely, the extent to which people can learn retrospectively from history – especially from their wrongdoings – and redraw their future on the basis of recognizing their negative past. On the historian's task, Carol Gluck goes even further by insisting that recognizing past wrongs must play a considerable role in regime transitions. Historians, she maintains, are obliged to write good history in a manner that generates ambitions warranting a better future (Adelson 1999: 1).

Discussing New Japan means considering two main issues. On the one hand, Japan's post-war regime was imposed by its American occupiers (1945-52) – who, among other demands, handed the Japanese government a pacifist democratic draft to be discussed and ratified by the Japanese Imperial Diet, as Japan's new basic law. This, of course, was due to the country's militaristic aggressiveness since the 1930s and particularly during the Second World War – a conduct that often took the form of 'crimes against humanity' towards other nations. On the other hand, unlike countries that turned their backs on enforced democracy (such as the Republic of Korea),[1] Japan has remained loyal to its democratic structure ever since formally adopting it. Despite its militaristic past, since the ratification of the post-war constitution in 1946, Japan has exemplified a thriving parliamentary culture and a civic society (Shillony 1997: 318–30). All the same, as noted previously, scholars still debate whether, and if so to what extent, Japan embraced its imposed democracy as an expression of deep self-criticism. Or rather, was it a means to overcome the crisis it was undergoing as a defeated nation and a practical means to re-emerge as a leading power?

More precisely, many assert that post-war Japan rebuilt itself on the basis of a sense of responsibility for its past conduct and was intent on 'repairing' its damaged infrastructure. Some underscore the fact that, after 1945, Emperor Hirohito favoured a full pacifist democratic regime for his country. The former grand steward of the Japanese imperial household, Tomita Tomohiko, records that as of 1978 the emperor ceased visiting the Yasukuni shrine, where Japan's fallen soldiers in its modern wars are honoured due to the enshrinement of the worst of the Second World War criminals in the shrine (Cited in Takahashi 2007).[2] Others cite the apologies for past deeds, expressed by Japanese political figures. Among the latter is the former chief cabinet secretary, Kōno Yōhei, who in August 1993 addressed the issue of the 'comfort women'[3] and declared 'We [the Japanese people] shall face squarely the historical facts . . . instead of evading them, and take them to heart as lessons of history. We hereby reiterate our firm determination never to repeat the same mistake . . .' (Hongo 2007). One can also mention the June 1995 National Diet resolution expressing 'deep remorse' for Japan's wartime actions and the 'heartfelt apology' by socialist prime minister Murayama Tomiichi on 15 August 1995, for the damage and suffering caused by Imperial Japan (Cited in Dower 1995). In a similar vein, the historian John W. Dower refers to many more statements and documents where politicians and intellectuals denunciate Japan's conduct during the Second World War. Dower, who concedes to the ambivalence of some of these texts, nevertheless concludes that viewed collectively, they convey the impression of a serious engagement with fundamental issues concerning the country's past, present and future (1995).

Other scholars point out that Japan never assumed true responsibility

for its war crimes, despite intentions to retain and develop a liberal democracy and human rights. They highlight, for example, the numerous visits that Japanese officials paid to Yasukuni shrine, and the government's indirect involvement in the enshrinement of war criminals in the shrine.[4] Takahashi Tetsuya shows that since the Second World War ended, leading Japanese politicians have preferred to deny their country's wrongdoings against its once-conquered populations (2007). Jane W. Yamazaki, who studied Japan's post-war apologies to Asian nations and the international community, contends that although the Japanese have apologized multiple times for past aggression, some areas of wrongdoings remain unacknowledged (2006). Similarly, Carol Gluck underlines the Japanese attitude to the war that separates pre-war Japan – dominated by a relentless regime that inflicted immense tragedies on the people – from post-war Japan, where democracy is viewed as a key to flourishing once again as a strong nation. In this perspective, the Japanese were the victims of a militaristic caste that led the country into the Second World War but they were by no means to blame for wrongdoings to others (Adelson 1999: 1).

This debate certainly relates to the impressive spectrum of Japan's political attitudes towards the Second World War. However, it seems to pay insufficient attention to attitudes towards the Second World War at the precise moment when Japan's post-war democratic constitution was being ratified. This is especially true when considering the elected House of Representatives (HR) of the Imperial Diet (which would soon become the National Diet). At that point in time, the HR was Japan's first and only political organ that had been fully transformed into a democratic one: it was the most crucial organ in the process of adopting the new constitution. The lawmakers of this house formed the main cadre possessing formal and effective power to shape and mould New Japan. Thus, in a way, it was in the HR that lawmakers of all political parties were forced to discuss, explain and clarify the links between the Second World War and the endorsement of the new constitution and regime, in contrast to Japan's past. Moreover, by doing so, not only did they laid the foundations of New Japan, but they also set up the basis for Japan's collective memory of the Second World War. Hence, focusing on these parliamentary stances may contribute to a better understanding of Japan's attitudes towards the Second World War and of its essence in general.

Accordingly, the present study focuses on the discussions and standpoints regarding the Second World War voiced in the HR during the ninetieth session of the Imperial Diet in the summer of 1946 – the special session dedicated to ratifying Japan's post-war constitution. The research provides a close look at how Japan's elected lawmakers, who were already benefiting from and appeared committed to the new democratic arrangements, perceived both the war and the new democracy they were implementing, and thus justifying it.

LAWMAKERS' STANDPOINTS: THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND JAPAN'S NEW REGIME

Investigating the debates over Japan's post-war constitution in the HR reveals immediately that democracy won full support from the elected lawmakers. The regime change was even explained as an essential lesson to be drawn from 'past experience'. However, that past experience was mostly described as a process in which the Japanese people were victimized by persons or circles. The major difference between the various political forces lay in their opinions on who was the guilty party that propelled Japan towards the Second World War, and more particularly, towards its ultimate defeat. While some blamed the bureaucratic and militaristic elites, others viewed the capitalist circles as the prime responsible entity. As for the victimization of other nations by the Japanese, neither those on the coalition benches nor those on the opposition benches mentioned Japan's wrongdoings against other nations. The speakers have not invested serious efforts to bring Japan as a nation to take responsibility for crimes against humanity. One could even say that in the HR there was clearly no intention of presenting New Japan as the necessary outcome of self-criticism over incidents for which Japanese society as a whole was responsible.

The ministers were the chief speakers of the ruling coalition, and made sure to present their positions in compliance with their parties' programmes, although quite a few Diet members of the coalition delivered important speeches. Yoshida Shigeru, the elected prime minister and president of the rightist conservative 'Liberal Party', explained the draft constitution's main principles. Eager to please the American occupiers, he showed his enthusiasm for endorsing a pacifist democratic regime. Yoshida also made it clear that such a regime would help Japan solve its social and economic problems and provide a means for regaining a role in the international community. 'Japan must become a democratic country and thereby enhance its reputation in the world', he noted (*Official Gazette Extra Issue of the Ninetieth Session of the House of Representatives of the Imperial Diet* [hereafter, *Official Gazette Extra*] 24 June 1946: 1–2). At the same time, the prime minister explained that Japanese democracy would not harm the nation's fundamental characteristics and promised that Japan's new regime and the Emperor would co-exist. He declared: 'Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration [the Anglo-American-Sino declaration which was the basis of Japan's surrender agreement] after having assured herself that her national character would be preserved' (*Official Gazette Extra*, 25 June 1946: 25). Yoshida even emphasized the Diet's joy and gratitude over the Allied Powers stance that did not blame Emperor Hirohito for the Second World War.

In the same vein, concerning the Second World War, he asserted '. . . the war, in my opinion, resulted from the fact that militarism and ultra-nationalism destroyed our parliamentary and party politics which were in the process of positive development' (*Official Gazette Extra*, 25 June

1946: 25). He insisted that defeat was caused by '. . . the disaster and the deplorable state of affairs! . . . the spirit and the significance of the [imperial] constitution were so distorted as to produce such an abnormal political condition which has led the country to its tragic fate' (*Official Gazette Extra*, 26 June 1946: 11). His government, Yoshida maintained, was making efforts to bring to trial those responsible for the war (*Official Gazette Extra*, 25 June 1946: 25). Referring to the special connection between the war and constitutional pacifism, he mentioned that the 'most recent wars have been waged in the name of self-defence. This is the case with the Manchurian Incident and so is the war of Greater East Asia', though the 'suspicions concerning Japan is that she is a war-like nation that threatens world peace'. Therefore, according to Yoshida, 'Japan should firstly set right this misunderstanding and show the world that it's a peaceful nation, willing to disarm by law.' On that basis, he added that Japan should 'renounce voluntarily the right of belligerency . . .' (*Official Gazette Extra*, 27 June 1946: 4). In other words, Yoshida had learned a great lesson from Japan's militaristic past, and demanded the adoption of a pacifist democracy for his victimized people, while clearing them of committing any wrongs against others.

Kanamori Tokujiro, a conservative legal specialist and the minister in charge of constitutional revision, expressed similar ideas to Yoshida's. He explained that for Japan, revising its imperial constitution according to the spirit of the Potsdam Declaration was necessary for a fast retrieval of international faith, for expediting its reconstruction and for preventing ideological confusion (*Official Gazette Extra*, 25 June 1946: 26–7). On the issue of pacifism, he insisted that '. . . in order to become an independent country Japan should adopt the pacifist agenda and take the lead in making a world of peace' (*Official Gazette Extra*, 28 June 1946: 5). This was conditional on the new regime not contradicting the country's basic national character and the Emperor's existence (*Official Gazette Extra*, 25 June 1946: 26–7). To be sure, Kanamori did not bother to link Japanese responsibility over the Second World War to the new regime. Education minister, Tanaka Kotaro, for his part, thought that in contradiction to militaristic education 'towards becoming an inherent part of a group' as was the case 'under the Nazis and the fascists', it was time to educate the Japanese people to develop their own selfhood. He too contended that 'Japan must transform from a "national defence state" to a "cultural state"' (*Official Gazette Extra*, 25 June 1946: 16). That is to say, he supported democracy and was aware of the evils of Japan's Imperial regime but, like his colleagues, did not blame Japan as a whole for crimes against humanity.

Among the Diet members of the coalition, there was a variety of positions, ranging from moderate to extreme rightist ones. Starting with the governing Liberal Party, a realistic view was stated by the senior member Ashida Hitoshi (who soon joined the conservative 'Progressive Party'). At that time, Ashida headed the 'Parliamentary Constitutional Amendments Committee', appointed by the Diet to be responsible for

modifying the draft constitution to accord with the Diet's stances. Like the ministers, he fully supported democracy with a conservative flavour and agreed to maintain the imperial institution as Japan's symbol. Moreover, although he did not negate the idea of a constitutional pacifism (imposed by the Americans) he believed that the pacifist clause of the draft constitution was over-extreme. Consequently, his committee rephrased this clause in a manner that could be interpreted as leaving pacifist Japan the prerogative to rebuild self-defence forces. In relation to the Second World War, Ashida explained, like others, that 'the new constitution reconstructs our fatherland from ashes in the wake of an unprecedented defeat' (*Official Gazette Extra*, 26 August 1946: 2–11). He declared that 'the major aspect of the constitution resides in the renunciation of war' which is 'what everyone aspires for, after the bloody war that cost tens of millions of human lives'. Finally, Ashida pointed out that Japan was the first nation in history to abolish the right of belligerency, and its new constitution would face the challenge of the atomic bomb's existence '. . . it was modern science that brought the atomic bomb into being and . . . in the case of another war between powers, tragedies never seen before could now occur. Therefore, there is a place to lead the world towards eternal peace', he concluded (*Official Gazette Extra*, 26 August 1946: 2-11). As already seen, Ashida was not alone in considering the Second World War a reason to transform Japan into a pacifist democracy and, like others, did not even bother to mention Japan, let alone blame it for wrongdoings. On the contrary – he hinted that his country, as a victim of the atomic bomb, bore a responsibility to lead the world towards an international regime of peace.

Among the progressive voices was that of Abe Shungo, enthusiastic about endorsing fundamental human rights, though he told the Diet that it was due to the 'national cry for liberty' based on Japan's history and tradition. The Second World War was only mentioned as an outcome of the improper administration of Japan by the 'military ascendancy' (*Official Gazette Extra*, 29 June 1946: 1–4). Similarly, Kitagawa Keitaro insisted that democratic reforms in education should be adopted, but his reason for this was the post-war world order according to which Japan should become part of the 'West'. If it failed to do so, Kitagawa predicted, Japan would have no chance of preserving the main elements of its national tradition (*Official Gazette Extra*, 26 August 1946: 15–7). In other words, adopting democracy was not perceived by this opinion as a dictate or remedy following wrongdoings, but as a positive policy which would contribute to Japan's development.

More conservative stances were espoused by Kita Reikichi and Kitaura Keitaro. Kita – an extreme rightist intellectual – thought it pointless to abolish or change the imperial constitution. He was aware that upon its surrender, militaristic Japan had accepted the Potsdam Declaration and was therefore obliged to become a pacifist democracy. However, according to him there were some reasons to stay with the imperial constitution. Firstly, although in the past the imperial constitution had been

abused by the militarists, since Japan's disarmament in 1945 there was no longer any risk of such abuse. Moreover, the imperial constitution contained many democratic elements, sufficient for a people who were not explicitly seeking democracy – 'People [the Japanese] are talking vaguely about democratization . . .', he declared (*Official Gazette Extra*, 26 June 1946: 3–4). Still, as the constitutional deliberations continued, Kita, who joined Ashida's committee, became willing to accept the new constitution, though his basic attitude towards the war remained the same. 'The Japanese fell into a tragedy and the constitution may be a solution to handle and overcome the tragedy,' and '. . . though democracy is not a fruit of Asian culture, it must be given a chance,' he resumed (*Official Gazette Extra*, 26 August 1946: 22). Kitaura thought that after its defeat Japan should try to adopt a new human rights agenda, while leaving the imperial institution as its symbol (*Official Gazette Extra*, 27 June 1946: 5–10). Concerning the war, he too blamed parts of the military and the bureaucrats for Japan's intervention in the war: others had simply been good patriots. 'Are all officers and non-commissioned men guilty of offence?' he asked (*Official Gazette Extra*, 27 June 1946: 7). His main struggle was to convince the government to assist the families of dead soldiers who had been sent to the Second World War, and those injured in the battlefields. 'During the recent war the military and the bureaucrats sent the young men of this country saying: "man" life is now shortened to twenty-five years . . . lay down your lives for the sake of the Emperor, render meritorious service to your fatherland. Please go to the front and die fighting for your country . . . and we shall take care of your bereaved families' (*Official Gazette Extra*, 27 June 1946: 6). 'But the government is not doing anything to protect all those families who lost soldiers – they must get pensions and grants,' he explained (*Official Gazette Extra*, 27 June 1946: 6), adding that 'Those poor youths must have thought of their parents, their wives, their children at home before they died.' 'Is it not a great sin a country commits against its people?' '. . . our country was defended in the war.' He summed up by declaring that 'if the government won't take care of bereaved families, the people will not trust the constitution . . .' and pointed out as well that '. . . the same can be said of war-sufferers. The country owes a great debt to the air-raid victims' (*Official Gazette Extra*, 27 June 1946: 8).

In the 'Progressive Party', the coalition's second-largest party, the same views were discernible. Hara Fujiro perceived the new constitution as part of Japan's obligations to its occupiers. He also supposed that the regime change could expedite Japan's independence, but was uncertain if the people understood that (*Official Gazette Extra*, 27 June 1946: 1–2). Inukai Ken added: 'In the eternal course of evolution of Japanese history we now find ourselves confronted by a great transmutation period, and burdened with the duties of making the most significant revision of the Constitution' (*Official Gazette Extra*, 26 August 1946: 24–5). A somewhat different case was Yoshida Yasuji's speech. This lawmaker, surprisingly, not only supported the adoption of democracy, he favoured a Japanese

apology for historical acts against other nations – 'Is it not natural that a nation defeated in war will apologize herself, saying that she will not fight a new war?' he asked (*Official Gazette Extra*, 28 June 1946: 3). Nevertheless, at the same time he added also that in any case Japan's wrongdoings should not justify neutrality and the abolition of its defence forces; the constitution's pacifist clause should not be a 'token of Japan's sincere apology for the serious offence she has committed in waging war against the peaceful nations of the world' he argued (*Official Gazette Extra*, 28 June 1946: 3). Yoshida Yasuji closed his speech by explaining that Japan's conduct in the Second World War resulted from 'an exaggerated obedience to laws and false policies', and that a reform in the regime could lead to a change (*Official Gazette Extra*, 28 June 1946: 1–4). Hence, like the Liberals, most Progressives were not at all eager to link Japan's past crimes with its adoption of the American draft constitution. An exception was, of course, Yoshida Yasuji who admitted Japan's past wrongs, but was not at all ready to pay the full price for them.

At the centre of the political map, speakers of minor parties and independent Diet members were more aware of events in Asia during the Second World War, though they too did not connect Japan's democratization with its past wrongs. Sasamori Junzō of the 'New Japan's Democratic Party',[5] claimed that Japan's adoption of democracy was part of a world-wide project, following President Woodrow Wilson's dream (after the First World War) to make a safer world with democracy. Nevertheless, when talking about the war, he maintained that 'Although our country was defeated in the war, it does not mean that we were destroyed and enslaved.' Sasamori was even wise enough to request an investigation of the damage caused by the atomic bombs to the Japanese people, 'for the sake of peace' (*Official Gazette Extra*, 25 June 1946: 13). The 'Democrat' Toshiaki Nuno referred to Germany and Turkey – two countries that reconstructed themselves after a cardinal defeat in the First World War – as models for defeated Japan. He acknowledged that many people and institutions, including the Diet, shared responsibility for Japan's post-war conditions – particularly for its starvation – though he advised the Japanese political elite to fully grasp the essence of democracy 'in order to arrive at the remarkable outcome of a new democratic Japan' (*Official Gazette Extra*, 29 June 1946: 7-8). Kita Katsutaro, of the conservative social democrat 'Cooperative Party' supported the draft constitution, but was still deeply concerned with Japan's social and economic problems in the aftermath of the Second World War. 'Today the Japanese people are not eager to work; their minds are confused; capital is left unutilized; contradiction, confusion and rivalry prevail everywhere,' he declared, blaming the 'old capitalistic regime' for Japan's involvement in the tragic war (*Official Gazette Extra*, 24 June 1946: 11).

The members of another conservative group, the 'Shinko [literally: promotion] Club', were no less worried by Japan's economic and social problems. Matsubara Kazuhiko thought it right for Japan to inaugurate a new peaceful democratic regime – 'After the war, all Japanese

are in distress and many starve,' therefore 'no one would like to start wars anymore,' he asserted. Even so, Matsubara was at the same time deeply troubled over the possibility that the emperor might be blamed – unjustly – for the war. 'Since the war was waged in the name of the emperor . . . he might be held responsible, while the truth is that facts were hidden from him when he gave the green light for the war', he stated and added that the emperor should be praised for ending the warfare in Asia once it became an atomic campaign. Finally, he pointed out that the emperor was even more worried about Japan's post-war condition (*Official Gazette Extra*, 25 June 1946: 1–2). Kanemitsu Hososeko, a member of the same party, mentioned 'political responsibilities' in New Japan, but blamed the ministers for Japan's intervention in the war and for the humiliation it suffered following its defeat (*Official Gazette Extra*, 29 June 1946: 5–6). Tanaka Hisao of the 'Independent Club' explicitly stated that Japan was a militaristic state, although he outlined the need to become democratic as a way of eliminating feudalistic elements and achieving eternal peace (*Official Gazette Extra*, 26 August 1946: 29–30). The independent Nakano Shiro supported the 'brilliant draft constitution' and was very critical of the fact that people who were part of the imperial establishment took part in moulding New Japan, but did not dare to step over those lines (*Official Gazette Extra*, 25 June 1946: 10). Again, none of these pro-democratic speakers – all strongly aware of the war's damages – held Japan responsible for any wrongdoing.

It was Ozaki Yukio, an independent Diet member at the political centre, who was the most fault-finding speaker regarding Japan's past. Ozaki, a former mayor of Tokyo (1903–12) and a well-known anti-militarist liberal, who had been imprisoned in both World Wars, was supportive of the draft constitution and well aware of Japan's grave problems in the past. He mentioned political assassinations, unjust Diet laws, and the monopolizing of power by the army and navy – nevertheless, he too, did not consider Japan responsible for crimes against neighbouring peoples (*Official Gazette Extra*, 26 August 1946: 33–5).

In the Socialist camp, speakers demanded the adoption of a social democratic agenda, binding it to the lessons to be learnt from the war. Katayama Tetsu, the moderate leader of the Japan Socialist party, insisted that the ideal of 'peaceful social democracy' was compatible with the Potsdam Declaration. 'After the tragedy of the Second World War,' he pointed out, 'we all agree that war itself must be banished and peace be assured for all time . . . after Japan's defeat . . . we must call for the establishment of democracy, the implementation of socialism and the victory of pacifism – all these together.' He even insisted that the world should know that 'the Japanese are lovers of peace and will make any effort to respect peace and international morality'. Accordingly, his conclusion was that 'after Japan's defeat in the war, it would do well to establish socialism, democracy and pacifism' (*Official Gazette Extra*, 22 June 1946: 3–4). Finally, Katayama also thought that pacifism and equality should become the basis of Japan's 'new culture' and a 'positive aspiration for

its reconstruction' (*Official Gazette Extra*, 26 August 1946: 25–7). Thus, he chose to present the Second World War as a tragedy for the peace-loving Japanese people, who should resolve their post-war problems by adopting social democracy. Another moderate socialist, Suzuki Yoshio, doubted whether it was the right time to deliberate on a regime reform when people were starving. 'The constitution itself cannot fill the stomach,' he said, though he too admitted that 'a good administration is the basis for everything' (*Official Gazette Extra*, 27 June 1946: 11–18). As for ties to the past, he insisted that 'Japan should become a really new, brighter and democratic country, entirely free from deep-rooted evils of the past many years, even though the revision of the constitution has been necessitated as a result of our defeat in war' (*Official Gazette Extra*, 27 June 1946: 12). Morito Tatsuo made a solidly socialist speech, and explained the same issues. Like others, he demanded 'a maximal public debate over the constitutional revision' (*Official Gazette Extra*, 28 June 1946: 10) and the abolition of most institutions of the imperial era, such as the Diet's House of Peers. It was clear to him that the old regime had made more than a few mistakes and had brought misery to Japan (*Official Gazette Extra*, 28 June 1946: 7–11).

Katō Kanjū, a radical socialist, believed that Japan's extreme capitalism had made it a victim during the Second World War. 'It is the capitalistic order that subjugated Japan and forced it to support imperialism, on behalf of the hegemony of financial capital. This is why the Japanese people are now the objects of unspeakable humiliation and pain, as citizens of a defeated country,' he declared. He even demanded that all supporters of the capitalistic order in imperial times be brought to trial in an 'International War Tribunal' as 'enemies of civilization' (*Official Gazette Extra*, 24 June 1946: 16–17). Hence, left-wing socialists insisted on adopting social democracy and world peace as remedies for defeated Japan. They were very much aware of the damage done by the old regime – but like the rightists and the political centre, blamed specific groups for victimizing Japan.

The communists followed suit. The party's intention was to promote its own radical constitution proposal and its speakers did everything possible to postpone the vote on the government's (American) draft constitution. As such, they employed such slogans as 'Food before the constitution'. Their speeches referred in detail to the American draft. For example, Tokuda Kyuichi accused Prime Minister Yoshida for adopting a capitalist democracy instead of understanding what the world had undergone during the recent war. Similar to Katō the socialist, he contended that 'the war broke out because of internal contradictions in Japanese imperialism' and because 'the Tenno system [the Imperial regime] warranted a coalition of interests of the military, the bureaucracy, the capitalists and the landlords that could no longer be maintained due to internal contradictions' (*Official Gazette Extra*, 25 June 1946: 16–17). Moreover, like most of the other Diet members from all political camps, Tokuda defined Japan as a victim of the war, though

according to him those who suffered the most were 'the labourers, farmers and servicemen who were sacrificed in the interest of militarists, bureaucrats, big capitalists and landlords'. He demanded a far-reaching investigation to bring to trial all those involved in war crimes against the Japanese nation, in order to construct a peaceful socialist, democratic and egalitarian society. As a final point, Tokuda was no different than the rightists when he demanded that concrete help be provided to 'those who suffered from the war, repatriates and the demobilized – all those who never received any kind of help', although he was unique in insisting on the release of pacifist soldiers jailed during the war (*Official Gazette Extra*, 25 June 1946: 16–17).

Another communist speaker who participated in the constitutional deliberations was the party's ideologue, Nosaka Sanzō. This Diet member agreed with many others that the draft constitution aimed to rebuild Japan as a peaceful democratic nation and saw it as a key for re-entering the legitimate family of nations. His main problem with the government's draft was that it was not sufficiently socialist and that it was exceptionally pacifist, phrased in a way which forces Japan to rely on other nations. Nosaka even drew a distinction between unjustifiable wars, such as the wars of imperialist Japan ever since the Manchurian incident, and justified wars of self-defence (*Official Gazette Extra*, 29 June 1946: 9–15). It almost goes without saying that, like his colleagues, Nosaka made no attempt to connect Japan's past crimes with the adoption of the new regime (*Official Gazette Extra*, 29 June 1946: 9–15). This was in contrast to the communists' behaviour outside the Diet, where the party organized demonstrations and rallies in which it sought to blame the Emperor for war crimes (Hoyt 1992: 154–60). That is to say, where matters were formally decided (in the HR), one can assume that the party leaders refrained from describing Japan as blameworthy. Hence, like all the other speakers, the communists accepted the thesis according to which the defeated Japan should adopt a new regime, though they preferred the one set out in their own draft constitution, while simultaneously describing post-war Japan as a victim of capitalism.

CONCLUSION

As shown, at the very moment of ratification of Japan's new constitution, when given the task of moulding New Japan, Japanese politicians from all ideological camps in the House of Representatives – the most crucial organ in the process of shaping New Japan – considered democratization the country's best option under the circumstances which existed following the Second World War. They were conscious not only of the heavy cost of their country's defeat, but also of the indefensible case of the war itself. Nevertheless, all participants in the debate ascribed Japan's involvement and failure in the war to notions such as militarism, capitalism or colonialism, and identified the guilty party in specific groups or figures. Surprisingly or not, none blamed the conduct of the Japanese

as a society, or as a nation, towards other peoples. Hence, democracy was presented as the basis for a better future – but it was by no means understood to be a conclusion deriving from a deep self-criticism of past wrongdoings involving the Japanese as a collective.

In a way, this study of politicians' perceptions of the relations between Japan's democratization and its historical wrongdoings in the Second World War strengthens the thesis arguing that New Japan has not yet taken full responsibility for its problematic pre-democratic past. It also contributes to the understanding of Japan's internal and external attitudes since occupation times – such as seeing itself firstly as a Western power, rather than a part of Asia in many epochs, or the continuing visits paid by leaders to Yasukuni Shrine. Finally, as for the lessons to be learned from history, it may be true that societies grow and develop out of historical learning, but the present study demonstrates that there exists another possibility according to which wide-ranging political transformations may occur in the midst of a process of denial.

NOTES

1 Although post-war South Korea was asked to adopt a democratic regime, it took some forty years until its realization.

2 Japan's war criminals were those judged and found guilty by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East which functioned in Japan at the start of the American occupation.

3 Young women and girls – especially of Korean origin – who were enforced to become sex slaves by the Japanese Imperial Army during the Second World War.

4 See for example Takenaka (2007).

5 Not to be confused with the 'Democratic Party' that was established several months later on the basis of the Progressive Party.

10

Lives Divided in the Second World War: The Individual and the Master Narrative of War

HARUMI BEFU

INTRODUCTION

Families divided by war and individuals whose lives were torn apart by war are legion. One is tempted to say that such tragedies are always a by-product of war. In the context of Japan's Pacific war, perhaps the most widely known are the tens of thousands of women and children who were separated from their families and left behind in north-east China immediately after the war. Between 1972 and 1999, more than 6,000 households are said to have repatriated from China.[1] Other notable examples, closer to this chapter's topic, include Japanese-American families divided by the war on each side of the Pacific, as told, for example, by Sodei (1998) in *Were We the Enemy?* and its more elaborate Japanese version (1995) by Knaefler (1991) in *Our House Divided*. In fictional form, Yamazaki Toyoko (1986) told the story of brothers who became separated during the war in *Futatsu no Sokoku*. On 14 August 2006, Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai (NHK) aired a documentary programme titled 'Nihon to tatakatta Nikkeijin', in which Harry Kitsuji Fukuhara, who served as a member of the US Military Intelligence Service (MIS) during the war, went to Japan with the Occupation and met his mother and brother who spent the war years in Japan. In a 3 August 2006 article entitled 'Sensō ga hikisaita shitei,' *Asahi Shinbun* (international edition) featured a brother and his older sister who were separated by the war.

The purpose here is not to examine war tragedies as such, but to examine the problems inherent in the relationship of the individual narrative and the master narrative of history. My focus is to examine the relationship between the experience of individuals and families

during the Second World War on the one hand, and the 'master narrative' of the war on the other. The paper questions the adequacy of the master narrative as a collective summation of all individual and family narratives, and also questions how well the master narrative informs individual and family narratives which purportedly contribute to the master narrative.

MEMORY

Excavating the individual past depends very much on memory. Thus it is important to clarify my position on what 'memory' means. Simply put, memory is a device by which one rationalizes the present self. It is a device with which to render a narrative of the past cogent and persuasive to the present self. It is an attempt to construct a self that is personally meaningful and satisfying.

In too many cases of the burgeoning genre of life history known in Japan as *kojinshi* or *jibunshi,* memory is naively accepted as a true reflection of the past. In the process of re-telling the past, however, the past is always 'edited', sometimes even ingeniously; some of the past may be intentionally deleted, forgotten, exaggerated or even 'invented', all in an effort to create a presentable self in the present.

MASTER NARRATIVE

What constitutes a 'master narrative' is admittedly controversial. A common-sensical definition is to consider it to be the commonly understood narrative of history, as is for instance, told in history books. But there are history books and there are history books. Some are alternative histories with views of history quite contrary to received views. For the time being I would like to put aside this issue and temporarily view 'master narrative' as the collective view of the overall current events of a country.

In the context of the Second World War and families divided on both sides of the Pacific, 'the master narrative' varies depending on which side of the Pacific we have in mind. The master narrative acceptable to Japan and that acceptable to the United States are obviously quite different from each other.

Historical narratives vary also from one historic time to another. The master narrative of Japan during the war is quite different from that of today. The same may be said of the American side. One major reason is that the master narrative is constructed to serve a certain constituency whose ideology changes from time to time. The problematic issue in this paper is how the individual and the family are related to the master narrative of the time in which they lived. How the master narrative is told after the war is not always relevant to understanding the wartime actions of individuals.

Examination of *Kike Wadatsumi no Koe* (Nihon Senbotsu Gakusei Kinenkai ed. 1996), those quintessentially canonical voices supposedly

protesting the war in letters and other documents of innocent wartime student-soldiers, speaks eloquently to this point. This anthology was compiled for the specific purpose of voicing protest against the war perpetrated by Japan's war-mongering leaders. The noteworthy fact is that this anthology excludes 'near pro-war voices' and 'excessive voices of Japanese spiritualism' ('Nihon seishin shugi') for fear that the anthology may cast an 'adverse', i.e. pro-war, impact on the reader. The editors collectively made a decision to eliminate ultra-nationalistic and pro-emperor voices simply to rescue student-soldiers from being labelled 'emperor-worshippers' or 'super-patriots' and to exonerate whatever 'guilt' or 'crime' they may have committed for being super-patriots. Therefore, *Kike Wadatsumi no Koe* does not accurately reflect the full range of student-soldiers' voices.

PRELUDE TO THE WAR

Unno Kunio, the father of the principal protagonist of this paper, Unno Haruo, emigrated in 1910 or thereabouts to Mexico.[2] At this time, anti-Japanese feelings were already running high on the west coast of the United States, blame being directed towards the rapidly increasing number of immigrants – from 6,000 in 1895 to 54,000 in 1904 (Sakaguchi 2001: 275). The so-called 'Gentlemen's Agreement' between the two countries that was concluded in 1907-8 foreclosed further immigration from Japan except for immigrants' immediate relatives. This helped alleviate the growing anti-Japanese sentiments on the west coast.

From Mexico, Kunio and his compatriots crossed the border to Texas and then came to California. He started tenant farming in the San Luis Obispo area of California. Buying land for farming was impossible because of the 1913 Alien Land Act which prohibited ownership of land by those ineligible for naturalization, namely the Japanese.

Thus, immigration from Japan from the latter part of the nineteenth century onward created anti-Japanese feelings in the United States, also fuelled no doubt by the anti-Oriental racism (the so-called 'yellow peril'). According to Mamiya Kunio, it was this anti-Japanese immigrant feeling which triggered argument, on both sides of the Pacific, about a possible US-Japanese war, especially in 1905–25. Thus, as a backdrop for the Pacific war, we should keep in mind that immigration of Japanese to the United States was an important factor in the ensuing war (Mamiya 1997).

In 1921, Kunio returned to Japan and married Yamane Tomi. Kunio was able to bring Tomi to the United States, because she was his wife.[3] Five sons were born to the Unnos – in 1921, 1923, 1925, 1927 and 1930. They were named Tamotsu, Shigeru, George, Manabu and Haruo. Their births were not registered at the local Japanese consulate and thus they did not acquire Japanese citizenship (*koseki)* at birth. This probably reflects the increasing anti-Japanese feeling in the United States which

extended to the issue of US-born Japanese (Nisei), who automatically gained United States citizenship by birth, seeking the citizenship of a nation now becoming increasingly hostile to the United States. The United States was increasingly leery of the Nisei obtaining citizenship of a potential enemy country. Feeling the pressure from the United States, the Japanese government began to move to reform its citizenship law to allow those with dual citizenship to drop their Japanese citizenship and to discourage the Japanese in the United States from obtaining Japanese citizenship for their children. It was probably partly due to this move on both sides of the Pacific that the Unno boys were not registered with the Japanese consulate at birth (Kumei 1997).

Around 1925, the Unnos moved from San Luis Obispo to the Los Angeles area and Kunio worked in the wholesale produce market before he became a gardener, an occupation he retained until his death in 1961, except during the war years, when he was incarcerated, along with 110,000 other Japanese Americans. Behind his move from farming to non-farming occupations was probably the enactment of the California Alien Land Act of 1920, which prohibited not only ownership but even renting of farmland by the Japanese, thus shutting out the Japanese from virtually any kind of farming.

Due to the strong prejudice and discrimination of American society, Japanese immigrants had no chance of assimilating. Also, Japanese immigrants' strong sense of shared culture was largely responsible for creating an ethnic community of their own, complete with social and civic organizations, as well as schools and religious (Buddhist and Christian) groups. The Japanese immigrant community was basically a closed society whose members minimally interacted with the outside, mainly for earning income, and constituted a virtually self-contained social universe.

In the autumn of 1936, when Haruo was six years old, his mother Tomi took him and his two immediately older brothers, George and Manabu, to Japan. According to Morimoto Toyotomi, in the 1930s a large number of Nisei were sent from the United States to Japan. In the greater Tokyo area alone 1,500 Nisei students were studying at this time, about 80 per cent of whom arrived between 1933 and 1938 (Morimoto 1997: 76–7). The three Unno brothers going to Japan seems to have been part of this 'wave' of repatriation.

George, eleven years old at the time, was to be adopted by his uncle, Mitsuzō, who himself had been adopted into a Kojima family. Since Kojima Mitsuzō did not have issue of his own, Kunio, Mitsuzō's older brother, promised one of his sons to him for adoption. This type of family adoption of a child of any age was a common practice in pre-war Japan. However, for a child who grew up in the United States, this was a totally incomprehensible practice. Without being consulted, George was thrust into a totally new kinship environment. The traumatic impact on him must have been incalculable.

Haruo was to stay with George at Mitsuzō's in Kobe, and Manabu was to live with his father's other younger brother, Umino Tadashi in Kyoto.

(Tadashi did not like the name 'Unno', and changed it to 'Umino'.) Henceforth Manabu Unno was to be known as 'Umino Manabu'. At the time of their arrival the three brothers naturally spoke to each other in English. Their attire was distinctly American, and they grew their hair long like American boys. Therefore, they were identifiably different from any Japanese, and that spelled trouble. By 1936, anti-American sentiment was already quite strong and on the rise, in good part due to government propaganda. The 1922 Washington Naval Treaty forced Japan to accept a humiliating ratio of naval forces in comparison with Great Britain and the United States, and Japan abrogated the Treaty in 1934. Unfavourable conditions in relation to the two powers were again forced on Japan in the 1930 and 1935 London Naval Conferences. In 1933, Japan withdrew from the League of Nations. In addition, Japan's move into the Korean peninsula and Chinese continent beginning in the nineteenth century was a cause of major friction and objections from the United States and European powers. In response, anti-Western arguments and rhetoric in the Japanese press and public opinion became increasingly vociferous.

It was in such a hostile international and geopolitical climate, as told in the master narrative, that the three brothers found themselves. They immediately became targets of harassment and bullying by neighbourhood children, who taunted the brothers as 'American spies'. Moreover, the brothers were taunted as *ainoko*, meaning 'mixed blood' or 'mongrel' with definite derogatory implications. The Japanese master narrative of the time touted the ideology of the purity of 'the Japanese race'. 'Mixed bloods' were definitely inferior to the pure race. One important observation here is the conflation of race and culture, which is reflected in the ambiguous term *minzoku*, which refers both to race and ethnicity. Simply because the three brothers manifested the *culture* of white Americans, they were assumed to be *racially* part white, i.e. of mixed blood and of inferior 'race'. This conflation was rooted in the master narrative and had percolated down to the common folk level, including children.[4]

Faced with this verbal lynching, the three brothers quickly changed their behaviour patterns to conform to indigenous practices, shedding their American clothes, getting crew cuts at the barbershop and totally ceasing to use English in public. Practically overnight, the three brothers were forced to change their external identity and at least pretend to be Japanese.

About three months into their stay in Japan, Tomi, the mother of the three boys, disappeared without telling them. To cope with this traumatic event, Haruo totally obliterated the event from his memory. Of forgetting, Rudolf M. Bell (2005: 96) says in his analysis of atrocities in an Istrian village:

> The very process of remembering fosters forgetting, while the attempt to memorialize facts results in the invention of traditions, phenomena also noted by scholars Oren Stier (2003: 191–217) for the Holocaust and

Yael Zerubavel (1995: 197–213) for Masada. At the intimate crossroads of the village as well, collective forgetting, not collective remembering, is the way people get on with their daily lives.

As it is with collective forgetting, so is with individual forgetting.

The third son, George Unno, was told that henceforth his name was to be *Kojima Shōji*. Although in those days changing one's commonly used name was not at all unusual in Japan, for one who grew up in America, it was virtually unheard of. His uncle, Mitsuzō, entered George, now Shōji, into Mitsuzō's family registry (*koseki*). For Manabu and Haruo, separate registries of their own were created. The three boys thus became Japanese citizens. With the change of names, George became Japanese in his everyday appellation and also legally a member of the Kojima family registry. To be entered into a Japanese family registry is legally a much more profound change with political consequences. However, in terms of everyday living, the change of names which are used on a daily basis has much more profound psychological consequences than legal changes, which are unnoticeable in daily life.

The fifth son, Haruo, was not legally adopted into the Kojima family. Nonetheless he was known at the elementary school where he was enrolled as 'Kojima', instead of Unno, Haruo's own surname. Moreover, Haruo's given name was changed to Akio for everyday usage. Thus was created a Japanese boy, 'Kojima Akio', out of an American, Haruo Unno.

In the meantime, in 1937, less than a year after the boys' arrival in Japan, the infamous Marco Polo Bridge Incident (Rokōkyō jiken) took place, which the Japanese army used as an excuse to expand the war against China which had started in 1931. The Marco Polo Bridge Incident was reported as a Chinese provocation, which Japan used as an excuse to justify armed conflict. This is how Akio (Haruo) understood the events in China. The fall of Nanjing and other major cities was celebrated with much fanfare, with lantern marches at night and flag marches during the day in all major cities. The Nanjing Massacre, which was exposed after the war, was virtually unknown to any Japanese back home, including, of course, Akio. Akio (Haruo) sometimes joined the marches and other times watched them from the sideline. He knew no better than to accept government accounts of the 'victorious' war. His mind was a *tabula rasa*, unequipped with the means with which to question the government position and propaganda. He was no different in this respect from the entirety of Japanese school children, called *shō-kokumin* ('small subjects'), ready to serve the country no matter what. He was blissfully ignorant of his citizenship status: he never even thought about it. The war was a holy war to him as well as to his classmates, as publicized in government propaganda. In 1940, the 2600th anniversary of the mythological founding of Japan was commemorated with much display, in good part, of course, to drum up patriotism for the war. Haruo was an ardent participant in the pageantry.

THE WAR

1. The Three Brothers in Japan

AKIO (HARUO)

Akio (Haruo) remembers well that on the morning of the Pearl Harbor attack, the school principal informed the students of the outbreak of the war at the morning assembly. There was an impending feeling that something important had happened and that life would not be the same from now on. But neither he, nor most Japanese, had any idea that this event was to lead to the defeat and devastation of Japan in four years. Most Japanese probably thought of the new war as an extension of the 'victorious' war on the continent.

The war was known as Dai Tōa Sensō – the Great East Asia War. It was taught and touted in school as a holy war to build the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. *Kokumin Seishin Sōdōin* ('Total Spiritual Mobilization'), *Kichiku beiei* ('Demonic beasts, UK and US'), *uchiteshi yamanu* ('We shall never cease to fight'), and other slogans filled the pages of newspapers and giant billboards outdoors. Japan was quickly and irreversibly moving towards a total war, in which 'the ABCD enclosure line' (meaning *A*merica, *B*ritain, *C*hina and *D*utch closing on Japan) had to be broken. *Zeitaku wa tekida* ('Luxury is our enemy') was a ubiquitous slogan that drove out expensive lifestyles.

Political parties were done away with, and Taisei Yokusankai, as the only political party and the party supporting the government, came into existence. Patriotic songs like *Aikoku kōshinkyōku* (Patriotic Marching Music), *Gunkan kōshinkyoku* (Battleship Marching Music), *Taiheiyō kōshinkyoku* (Pacific Marching Music) and many others were sung in a variety of venues. As reports of death tolls increased, Akio heard *Umi Yukaba* (If Gone to the Seas), a song which, sung in a deep, low funerial minor key, extolled dying for the emperor. He himself sang it on many occasions. After all, this was a divine nation, *shinkoku* or *kami no kuni*. Books like *Kaigun* (The Navy), *Rikugun* (The Army) and *Mugi to Heitai* (Wheat and Soldiers) became bestsellers and helped to promote patriotism. Akio was no exception in reading these books and being deeply moved by them. Transliterated English words were considered anti-patriotic and were changed to Japanese words, such as 'baseball' to *yakyū* and 'catcher' to *hoshu*. The name of the popular brand of cigarette, *Bat,* was changed to *Kinshi*, meaning 'golden crow' after the mythological crow which is supposed to have led the first emperor of Japan, Jimmu, to Yamato.

Sending care packages (*imon-bukuro)* to the frontline became a regular part of life. Akio saw women standing at street corners asking passers-by to stitch the 'one thousand-stitch stitchery (*sen-nin-bari)*', which, when worn by soldiers, supposedly protected them from bullets. An increasing number of daily necessities became rationed, and the rationed allotments gradually decreased in quantity. Correspondingly, the black market increasingly thrived, escaping the surveillance of the police. Akio began to see charcoal-run buses and trucks. In short, the entire mood

of the country was immersed in the exigencies of the war, from which there was no escape. Akio was a regular Japanese boy who simply acted according to the dictates of the time. To call him a 'patriot' suggests a factor that was not quite there. There was no awareness of national identification in him, whether with the United States or with Japan. He was ready to fight in the war, but was afraid to fight at the same time.

Akio (Haruo) did not question whether his action was a betrayal of the country of his birth. It did not even occur to him to ask such a question. He participated in the war effort as much as any of his classmates. Along with his classmates he shouted '*Tenno heika banzai*' (Long Live the Emperor) without feeling strange or like a traitor to his country of birth, and he memorized the Imperial rescript for Education, since students were already supposed to be little soldiers.

In trying to understand Akio's war experience, it is important not to use terms like 'the Second World War', 'the Pacific War', or 'the Fifteen- (or the Thirty-) Year War', which are post-war constructions. Such terms create a false distance between the subject Akio (Haruo) and the events impacting him. To put it succinctly, he was not experiencing the Pacific war; he was in the midst of the holy Great East Asia War and was in every sense of the word, 'part of it', contributing his part towards accomplishing Japan's self-ordained mission.

He entered a middle school in 1943, where military training was a requirement. So was daily homage to the emperor by bowing towards the east (towards Tokyo where the emperor resides). From time to time his class was mobilized to rural villages for farm work, such as rice planting and rice harvesting. As if that were not enough, his class was sent to Wakayama, an area suspected to be a prime target for an allied invasion for the all-out attack on Japan after the Okinawa campaign. There, students dug networks of caves and tunnels, as in Iwojima and Okinawa, for Japanese troops to make their last stand against the onslaught of the enemy. Teachers were drafted into the army one by one. Those who were not qualified for the draft left school by government order to work at munitions factories.

In 1942 or 1943, a visitor who had returned from the United States on an 'exchange boat' came to the home of Shōji (George) and Akio (Haruo), saying that he had lived in the same relocation camp as Shōji and Haruo's parents. He came to bring news about their family in the camp. The brothers were not aware of the exchange boat programme, detailed in a recent publication by Tsurumi, Katō and Kurokawa (2006).[5] Nor did they know that their family, and in fact, over 110,000 Japanese Americans on the west coast of the continental United States, had been interned in some ten camps throughout the Midwestern and Western states. They were told that the family was safe, though living conditions were far less than desirable. Totally unexpected news was that the brothers' mother was pregnant, and they were to have another sibling.

In a war climate in which the United States was the greatest enemy, most schools either drastically reduced hours of English instruction

or discontinued it entirely. At a time when such action was in fact considered patriotic, the principal of Akio's middle school refused to reduce even one hour of English class, maintaining that in order to win a war, we need to know the enemy, and that language was the most essential and effective means of doing so. When Akio's teacher for morals (*shūshin)* was drafted into the military, the principal took over his class and taught English instead. One day he distributed copies of Franklin Delanor Roosevelt's 1944 presidential campaign speech, in which Roosevelt implored the voters against 'changing horses in the middle of a stream'. The principal went on to praise the leaders of other warring nations – Stalin, Churchill, Roosevelt, Chang Kai-shek, Hitler and Mussolini – for their sustained leadership from the start of the conflict, and lamented the frequent changes in the premiership of Japan from the time of the war against China – Yonai Mitsumasa to Konoe Fumimaro to Tōjō Hideki to Koiso Kuniaki to Suzuki Kantarō. He further took advantage of school assemblies, where the entire student body and faculty gathered on such occasions as the New Year's Day and the emperor's birthday, to repeat the same message. Strangely, he was never arrested or imprisoned for these seemingly unpatriotic or even treasonous acts. The master narrative tells us of the rigid thought control prevailing during the war, where many leftist and even not-so-leftist liberals were arrested and tortured for not being patriotic enough (Tsurumi 1976, 1982). Perhaps facile equation of the Japanese case with the Nazi or Stalinist thought control in the master narrative needs to be tempered.

In the spring of 1945, Akio's class was permanently mobilized to work at a naval munitions factory producing bombs, where he and his classmates worked until Japan's defeat. When the factory was bombed by B29s, workers had to run to a nearby floodplain for shelter. Akio lost classmates in these bombings and took a critically injured classmate to a nearby hospital full of injured patients and witnessed them dying. Out of sheer fear, many students stopped coming to the factory after the bombings, but Akio kept going until 15 August, not necessarily out of patriotism but simply as the good student he perceived himself to be.

One day in the spring of 1945, Akio received a postcard from the Japanese Army summoning him to a nearby school. Hundreds of similarly-aged boys from different schools were on the school grounds. They were given a cursory physical examination by an army physician and were all declared fit, and therefore eligible to enlist in the army. An officer stood at the only exit from the room to accept applications as boys left. Akio, not wanting to enlist, told the officer that he had applied to the Naval Accounting School (Kaigun Keiri Gakkō). The officer accepted the excuse and allowed Akio to leave. Akio's lie was not a case of 'resistance' based on any ideological conviction against the war or due to his loyalty to the United States. It was, more than anything else, his inability to face up to the death enlistment foretold.

Manabu

The fourth son, Manabu, now Umino Manabu, was in middle school in 1944 when he applied to the elite Naval Academy. He was not altogether happy at the Umino home, where the two older daughters and their parents maintained a distance and did not quite include him as a genuine member of the family. He passed the examination and was enrolled at the Etajima campus of the Academy. Fortunately, the war ended before he graduated from the Academy. Had he graduated, he thinks he probably would not have lived.

Graduates of the Academy had three choices, according to Manabu. The most desirable choice, in terms of prestige hierarchy, was to join the air force, which meant signing up as a Kamikaze pilot, resulting in certain death. The second choice was to sign up for a position in a submarine. Again, this meant carrying out suicidal attacks on battleships approaching Japanese shores. The third and least prestigious choice was to be a marine. It was the least dangerous position, but no one would volunteer for it. Did graduates all truly desire the first choice? The master narrative of the time says, 'yes, most certainly'. After all, they were taught to die for the emperor and many indeed believe in this cause. But the post-war narrative insists on the coercive nature of the war-time ideology in an effort to rescue common soldiers from any hint of what post-war apologists consider to be conspiracy, as argued above concerning *Kike Wadatsumi no Koe*. Given the ideological air of the time, apologists would say, it was difficult, if not impossible, for anyone not to choose the first option without feeling unpatriotic. This post-war narrative, however, makes sense only in terms of the post-war ideology which denied the legitimacy of the war.

Shōji (George)

Kunio's third son, now Kojima Shōji, did not want to be drafted, so he entered a normal school because students of teacher training schools were exempted from the draft. In 1945, however, as the war situation worsened and an invasion by the allied forces became more and more evident as well as imminent, normal schools were no longer exempt, and Shōji was eventually drafted. But fortunately for him too, the war ended before he had to face any enemy soldiers on the battlefront. Here again, Shōji's enrolment at a teachers college is not a conscious act of 'resistance' to authority. It was merely a strategy to avoid the draft which would put him one step closer to death.

2. The Unno family in the US

With the 'treacherous attack' of Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 by the Japanese, the anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States, which had been on the rise since the beginning of the twentieth century, came to a head. Early the following year, President Roosevelt saw fit to issue Executive Order 9066 to remove all persons of Japanese descent – without due process – from the West coast of the continental United

States, on the grounds that they were a security threat to the United States.

The Japanese on the West coast were sent to ten relocation camps in very inhospitable environments throughout the Midwestern and Western states. The Unno family was sent to Colorado. Today's master narrative indicts the United States government for transgressing the United States Constitution by forcibly removing these people, confiscating their property and freezing their assets, without due process, as well as for the inhumane conditions under which the government imprisoned them for the duration of the war. In fact, the constitutionality of the relocation order was challenged in court and was successfully refuted – though not for some forty years – and each internee was awarded $20,000 in compensation.

Unno Tomi, the mother of the three sons sent to Japan, however, had a different view of her incarceration experience. She said:

> Until relocation, we had to work every day from dawn to dusk, even many Sundays, to eke out survival living. In the camp, we didn't have to work for three and a half years – not a single day. And we were fed. We didn't have to worry where the next meal was coming from. Camp life was not easy, to be sure, living in the desert, where it was beastly hot in summer and we had to endure heavy snow in winter. Still, it was a vacation. (Personal communication)

This view was shared by many Japanese who enjoyed their leisure time in the camp. They organized hobby groups for various arts and crafts, such as *shigin* (Chinese poetry recitation), gardening, weaving, flower arrangement, etc. and enjoyed each others' company without being encumbered by a work schedule, although some did work and earned a maximum of twenty-five dollars a month.

In the political climate of today, Tomi's admission is considered politically incorrect, betraying the mainstream cause of the Japanese American, where actions of the United States government are to be thoroughly criticized and indicted. There should not be anything redeeming in the camp experience. Clearly, Tomi's testimony is politically incorrect, though it may be true. This wide gap between the post-war master narrative and the subjectivity of the internees needs to be squarely admitted.

Tamotsu

Unsurprisingly, Unno Kunio, like virtually all other Issei who migrated from Japan to the US, took Japan's side, believing in Japan's legitimacy in starting and carrying on the war. American-born Nisei, on the other hand, generally sided with the United State's position. Kunio's oldest son, Tamotsu, firmly believed that justice was on the side of the United States. According to Tamotsu's mother, Tomi, the two quarrelled every single night about this issue. According to Tamotsu, after a while he and his father did not speak to each other for about six months while

living in the same single-room quarters. The two spent every day in an unimaginably tense, boiler-pressured silence.

Partly to escape this unbearable environment but, more to the point to demonstrate his patriotism, Tamotsu decided to enlist in the newly created all-Nisei 442nd Regiment Battalion of the US army, which was to become the most decorated battalion of the war – but at the expense of some of the highest casualties.[6] He went to Denver to enlist, but unfortunately he was rejected because of his near-sightedness. Had he been accepted, chances are that he would have lost his life on the front line in the European theatre. He returned to the internment camp, only to face the same excruciatingly tense situation with his father. Tamotsu left the camp, and this time stayed away until after the war. He went to the East coast and earned a degree in landscape architecture at a state university. It seems ironic that he chose to take up a field of study most closely related to his father's occupation – gardening.

The master narrative of Japanese American history is unambiguous in pointing out the chasm between the Issei generation siding with Japan and the Nisei generation siding with the United States. However, the master narrative is silent on how this generational chasm was played out in the barracks of the internment camps, in the rooms where Issei parents and Nisei sons and daughters taking opposite sides on the war had to live face to face, in close quarters, day after day.

Shigeru

Kunio's second son, Shigeru, did not share his older brother's passionate patriotism, and did not enlist of his own free will even when the opportunity arose. However, he did not resist the draft when the time came. He was sent to Fort Snelling in Minnesota and enrolled in the US Army's Japanese language school where men were taught how to interrogate Japanese prisoners of war. Upon completing his training he was to be part of the Military Intelligence Service, and be sent out to the Pacific theatre. Fortunately, the war ended before his graduation.

POST-WAR

On 15 August 1945 the emperor's message was heard on the radio announcing Japan's 'unconditional' surrender. Yet the media continued to use the term *shūsen* (end of the war), rather than *haisen* (defeat in war) or *kōfuku* (surrender). *Shūsen* became the standard expression in the master narrative, disguising the harsh reality of defeat.

What *Akio* experienced in his subjectivity was defeat as a Japanese, not victory as an American. The experience included being constantly hungry, surviving only on basic staples, seeing erstwhile soldiers turned beggars on the street, and commuting to school through the bombed out rubble of the city. The defeat triggered a total reversal of the values and ideology into which he had been indoctrinated. Everything that he had been taught to believe as sacred and good about Japan, including the

imperial institution, the family tradition, and the political system, was now bad, and was, he was now told, the very cause of Japan's defeat.

Umino (Unno) Manabu was discharged from the Naval Academy and returned to the Umino home. Because his Uncle Tadashi, insisted that Manabu study dentistry, which he disliked, the relationship between the two deteriorated so much that Manabu chose to leave and went to live with his brothers. He subsequently entered a business college. Kojima Shōji (George Unno) was also discharged from the Japanese Army following Japan's defeat. After returning to the Kojima home once, he left and began working for the Occupation Forces in various capacities.

Akio (Haruo) returned from the munitions factory to resume studying at his middle school in preparation for college entrance examinations. On the way home from school one day he heard a member of the Japan Communist Party, just released from prison, speak at a public gathering. He ridiculed the emperor for his conduct in the course of the war. It was strange to hear this when only a few weeks before any such expression would have landed the speaker in prison. His attacks on wartime and pre-war values were thorough and relentless. For Akio and his fellow youths, who had been thoroughly indoctrinated into the patriotic ideology of wartime, the speech was like listening to an atheist speak in a hallowed church. For them, there was no ideological and normative hold left after the war. They were left in an ideological vacuum. 'Democracy' was introduced to Japan with fanfare, as the ideology to replace the wartime's ideology. But what it meant no one knew. It was a phantom concept which was bandied about because now it had a sacred aura. Invocation of 'democracy' assuredly placed anyone on the winning side, on the side of justice – even though no one was sure of its meaning – just as invocation of the emperor only a few days back would have silenced any opposition. And it was so often those who had self-servingly invoked the emperor during the war that now unabashedly invoked democracy. This deepened Akio's ideological agnosticism towards politics.

Several months after the end of the war, Shigeru, the second Unno son who was in the United States Army, was stationed in Wakayama, south of Osaka, as part of the Occupation Forces. He came to Osaka to meet his three brothers. For ten years there had been no communication and no contact between Shigeru and the brothers in Japan. He was a 'brother' in name only. It was an encounter of strangers, as far as Akio was concerned.

Shigeru was assigned to an army major as his interpreter, and lived in a hotel in Shirahama with the major, rather than in the barracks where most GIs lived. One of the duties of the major and Shigeru was to explore the interior of Wakayama in a jeep for caves and tunnels where the Japanese army might have hidden munitions and other materiel, unbeknownst to Akio, who helped to build some of these tunnels and caves only a few months prior. It was only many years after Shigeru's discharge from the United States army that they discovered this coincidence.

One thing Haruo had learned was that America is thoroughly a land

of democracy. Haruo learned that in the United States democracy was an inviolable, hallowed ideology whose sanctity no one was allowed to question, though one might argue about different definitions of it. This total and blind belief in democracy felt so similar to the total and blind belief he had held in the emperor and the divine nature of Japan. He saw no difference between the two. His reaction was a total disbelief in democracy in the same way that he espoused disbelief in the national and imperial polity of Japan after the war. To this day, Haruo has no trust in any political system.

Manabu, having served in the Japanese Imperial Navy, in its elite officer training school, had been a veritable 'enemy combatant' against the United States. There was therefore some doubt about whether Manabu could obtain a United States passport. But Manabu argued to the United States consulate in Yokohama that he was less than eighteen years of age when he was discharged from the Naval Academy, and thus a minor and not responsible for his actions. Whether this argument persuaded the consul we do not know, although he believes this argument earned him his passport to return to the United States.

After returning to America, Manabu was drafted into the United States Army during the Korean War and was sent to the Army Language School in California to study Chinese. Upon graduation, however, he was sent to Japan. Manabu thus ended up serving both in the Japanese and the United States military.

Finally, on Kojima Shōji's part, he sued the Japanese government and forced it to nullify his registration in *koseki* on the grounds that his registration in *koseki* was not executed with his own consent or that of his guardian (father), and, therefore, that he was never legally a Japanese subject, and hence the Japanese government did not have the right to draft him. This was a rather precarious argument, but Shōji won the lawsuit. His name was deleted from the *koseki*, and he regained his American citizenship as well as his name, George Unno.

CONCLUSION

Is the master narrative of a nation a summation of all individual narratives? We have seen that although the master narrative does involve individual lives, events of critical importance to individuals take place which do not concern the master narrative. There are many critical incidents and events that took place in the lives of the three brothers in Japan – the sudden and unexplained return of their mother to America, the demand of their uncle, Kojima Mitsuzō, to call him 'father' – which were pivotal life events and yet had nothing to do with the master narrative of the war. The master narrative, representing a 'collective memory' of the people ignores individually significant events which do not relate to the grand narrative of history. Individual incidents and events which do not add to the collective memory that is the master narrative are irrelevant and not included in the master narrative.

As mentioned above, at present we use such terms as 'the Second World War', 'Fifteen-Year War' and 'the Pacific War'. But what the three brothers experienced during the war was *Dai-Tōa Sensō*, or 'the Greater East Asia War', preceded by *Shina Jihen*, or 'China Incident', which was precipitated by the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of 1937. In order to understand the subjectivity of the three brothers in Japan during the war, it is imperative to understand that they were immersed in the wartime milieu that was *Dai-Tōa Sensō*. They lived *Dai-Tōa Sensō*; they did not live 'the Second World War' or 'the Pacific War'. The latter terms use the master narrative constructed after the war as the framework of understanding wartime events and create a disjuncture of understanding.

Kojima Shōji (George Unno) and Umino Manabu both served in the Japanese military while holding United States citizenship. Manabu states that the navy must have known he held the United States citizenship. But never once did this fact become an issue and he was treated exactly as everyone else at the Naval Academy. How are we to comprehend this fact of accepting citizens of an enemy nation into the military? For the United States, they were veritable 'enemy combatants', as much as Jose Padilla is considered a 'treasonous' American. But some sixty years ago the United States government never made any issue of the fact that George and Manabu were 'enemy combatants' with United States citizenship. They were never taken into custody or interrogated. The United States government did not hesitate to re-issue the United States passports to them after the war. This is patently at odds with the master narratives of both countries, Japan taking in citizens of an enemy country for its own defence and the United States not making an issue of its citizens serving in the military of its enemy nation.

Shōji entered normal school in order to avoid the draft. Akio (Haruo) lied to an army officer in order to avoid enlisting. They did not take these actions because of some lofty patriotic belief that a United States citizen should not fight against his own country. Shōji and Akio simply did not want to come one step closer to death by becoming soldiers. At the same time, Shōji did not avoid the military because of some lofty ideological belief that the war was wrong, or because as an American citizen he could not serve in the army of an enemy nation. Manabu did not enlist in the Naval Academy because of his patriotism to Japan or loyalty to the emperor. He had more immediate, personal reasons for wanting to leave the Umino family. In the wartime exigency of total mobilization, enlisting with the Naval Academy was an honourable escape. To impute interpretations of 'resistance' for avoiding Japanese military service or of blind patriotism for joining the Naval Academy, is to fall prey to false consciousness.

Akio told a lie. He had never applied to the Naval Accounting School. It was simply a ploy to escape from a tight situation. It was a shameful act in the context of the master narrative of the time. This fact can now be revealed because non-cooperation with the 'bad war' is now considered

an heroic act. The master narrative of the time would not have allowed Akio to reveal his lie. It is only the post-war narrative which made it legitimate for him to make an open confession.

In the context of the post-war narrative that denounces the war, it is fashionable to claim that one had maintained an anti-war ideological stance during the war. Many Japanese intellectuals do in fact make such claims. Without contemporary evidence, such as a diary, arrest or prison records, these claims are suspect. The master narrative of the time has one hundred million patriotic Japanese sacrificing themselves for the emperor. No doubt some Japanese truly believed in the righteousness of the war, and gladly died for the emperor. Many others must have died with varying degrees of patriotism, or scepticism for that matter. Ideologically, Japan was far less unified to fight for the cause of the war than the wartime narrative would have it. How are we to deal with this variation in human motivation in terms of the master narrative?

We need to distinguish between the collective narrative and an individual or personal narrative. The collective, master, narrative tells us only selected events of history. However, there are many master narratives, depending on what the focus of the narrative is. If our concern, for example, is Jewish-Japanese relations in the same time frame, a totally different master narrative would emerge. If our concern has to do with family relations in the same time frame, still another narrative would be written in which many of the incidents and events excluded from the war narrative would be included. Also the master narrative of collective memory can vastly vary depending on which collective group is at stake, in this case, the Japanese or the Americans.

Moreover, we have seen events contradicting the master narrative, such as Akio's high school principal's public indictment of the Japanese government, which cannot be expected in the master narrative of the time. Can further refinement of the master narrative accommodate such contrary events? Or, perhaps such events need to be accounted for in a separate, subaltern narrative.

Master narrative is always controversial. Witness the current furor in Japan, especially among Okinawans, over the government's deletion from the currently approved school textbooks of military involvement in the mass suicides of civilians that took place during the allied invasion of Okinawa. The government version of the master narrative (*tsūsetsu*) thus diametrically contradicts what Okinawans experienced. Should master narrative not reflect the experiences and voices of the people who make history and be revised accordingly, rather than be ideologically driven?

NOTES

[1] See http://www.kikokusha-center.or.jp/resource/ronbun/kakuron/24/top.htm.

[2] All personal names in this chapter are pseudonyms.

[3] Many Japanese resorted to the so-called 'picture bride' to bring their wives into the USA. In other words, single men in the United States would be shown pictures of potential brides in Japan, and with the consent of both parties, the women would be registered with the local government office in Japan as legally married, and travel to the United States as wives coming to join their husbands. Kunio, for some reason, did not opt for this method.

[4] Minoru Sumida, a Hawaiian who travelled to Japan in 1942 by the first US-Japan exchange boat, about which later, was called by his neighbours Merikenko, which in this double entendre, on one hand means 'American kid' but at the same time pejoratively refers to flour, as flour was first imported from the US. Cf. 'Genbaku o tadoru tabi' (Journey to Trace Back the Atom Bombing) in *Asahi Shinbun* (International edition), 4 June 2006. Similarly, Isamu Noguchi was made to feel miserable by the taunting of neighbourhood children because of his biracial appearance (Duus 2000: 128).

[5] According to Murakawa Yōko (1997: 127), four persons from Relocation Camp(s) returned to Japan in 1942 on the first exchange boat and 314 from Relocation Camp(s) returned on the second exchange boat in 1943.

[6] For example, after the Battle of Cassino in Italy, only 521 men of the full battalion of 1,300 men remained.

11

Sadako Sasaki and Anne Frank: Myths in Japanese and Israeli Memory of the Second World War

RONI SARIG

In constructing narratives of the past, especially a traumatic past, nations and groups often employ stories of individuals whose life and death have become symbols of heroism or victimhood. These symbols may be understood in various ways, and may receive new meanings according to the manner in which they are narrated. It may also occur that symbols and myths which have already gained certain meanings, sometimes different or even opposed to the national discourse, are embraced by the national discourse in society and used in it after they are narrated in a manner that fits the main discourse.

The Japanese girl Sadako Sasaki, and the German-born Jewish Dutch girl Anne Frank, are two victims of Second World War atrocities, who became posthumous worldwide symbols and myths, universal in their essence. It is interesting to follow the stories of these two girls, to examine the ways in which they have become symbols and myths, and to illuminate the meanings these myths created. This chapter examines the stories, symbols and myths of Sadako Sasaki and Anne Frank, and the use made of these two girls as part of the narrative of the memory of the Second World War in the national discourses of Japan and Israel; it further looks for the reasons which enabled or forced the inclusion of these myths in these discourses.

THE NARRATIVES OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR IN JAPAN AND IN ISRAEL

The memory of the Second World War in Japan was constructed mainly through the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the

very last days of the war, before Japan's surrender. It became a memory of victimhood, which created entailed forgetting about Japan's aggression and atrocities in Asia and the Pacific. The emphasis on victimhood helped create the discourse of universal peace, and of Japan as a peace-loving, pacifistic nation, that fights against the worldwide use of atomic weapons because of its experience as a victim of this destructive weapon. Hiroshima was the city which led this narrative-line of the call for universal peace, as the first city in the world to have been devastated by an atomic bomb. But the narrative of Hiroshima became the narrative of Japan.[1]

In Israel, the memory of the Holocaust was used by the Zionist movement in establishing the new state. The Holocaust was perceived as a hard-learned lesson about the need to establish an independent Jewish state with a Jewish army, and in creating a society of farmers who will work their own land in the land of Israel. The Holocaust narrative was thus told primarily as a Zionist one, and was necessarily connected to the existence of Israel. It emphasized heroism, power and victory by surviving and by establishing the State of Israel, and combined them with the narrative of victimhood (Zertal 2002).[2]

SADAKO SASAKI, ANNE FRANK: LIFE AND LITERATURE

Sadako Sasaki

Sadako Sasaki was born in Hiroshima in 1943. In 1945, when she was two years old, she was exposed to the radiation of the atomic bomb. Nine years later, when she was eleven, she became ill with leukemia, caused by the long-term effects of radiation. In the hospital, until her death fourteen months later, she kept folding paper cranes from any small pieces of paper available, such as medicine wrapping paper, hoping that if she folded a thousand cranes she would be cured.[3] The attempts to cure her failed and she died in 1955, at the young age of twelve.

In 1956, Austrian journalist Robert Jungk visited Hiroshima and heard of Sadako and of the attempts to build a monument to her memory. He then published a book titled *Strahlen aus der Asche* which fictionalized elements of Sadako's story, such as the number of cranes she folded, and how she died. Jungk's book began the worldwide Sadako myth. In 1961, a novel based on Sadako Sasaki's life and story, entitled *Sadako Will Leben!*, was published. The novel was written by the German author Karl Bruckner and was translated into dozens of languages in thirty-four countries. It later won many literary prizes, including the International Andersen Special Award.[4]

Bruckner's novel presents the background to the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, describing Japanese aggression in Asia and the war propaganda in Japanese society. The supreme commander of the army, for example, admits in Bruckner's novel, in a conversation with a senior officer, that: 'We executed thousands of civilians in China without any trial . . . We executed pilots, American war prisoners,

violating war rules . . . We robbed whole cities . . . We let countless people die slowly of hunger behind the wire fences, in the concentration camps we have built . . . We will be blamed in all this! We are guilty!' (Bruckner 1968: 38).

The novel ends with a short epilogue, titled 'The Memorial Monument', describing the statue of the girl and the crane in the Peace Memorial Park in Hiroshima, in memory of Sadako Sasaki. It then says:

> Through this monument [Sadako's friends] wanted to make it heard to all mothers and fathers around the world: remember Sadako Sasaki! Remember your children! Don't say it will be wise to prevent our children from knowing what happened. This is not right! Anyone who does not recognize danger – will eventually be destroyed by it.
>
> And don't forget: thousands of hydrogen bombs are ready! The destructive power of a bomb of this kind is one thousand times stronger than the uranium bomb, which destroyed Hiroshima in a few seconds.
>
> In the Peace Park of Hiroshima
> Stands the warning monument (Bruckner 1968: 38.)

In later years, dozens of children's books were written in Japan and in other countries around the world, telling Sadako's story. The most famous books were written by Eleanor Coerr (1979, 1997). The historical context of Bruckner's novel was left out of these books, and instead, the message of victimhood, human heroism and universal peace was presented, as in the epilogue of Bruckner's book.[5]

Anne Frank

Anne Frank was born in Frankfurt, Germany, in 1929, to a Jewish family. After the Nazi party rose to power in 1933, the family emigrated to the Netherlands, and Anne's father established his company in Amsterdam. Two years after the German invasion of the Netherlands (May 1940), fearing deportation to concentration camps, the Frank family went into hiding in the annex of the building of the father's company, together with a family of friends. The fears, tensions and conflicts between the people in the hiding place were reported in Anne Frank's diary, which she had received as a present for her thirteenth birthday two years earlier.

The people in hiding were eventually extradited and discovered by the Nazis in 1944, and were transferred to Auschwitz-Birkenau death camp. Anne Frank and her sister were further transported to Bergen Belsen death camp, where, a few weeks before the camp's liberation by the British army, they died of typhus. Anne Frank's father was the only survivor of the eight annex residents. He received his daughter's diary after the war, together with notebooks and sheets of paper containing her notes, from Miep Gies, who had kept them since 1944.[6]

The diary was first published in Dutch in 1947, and later translated into German, French and English. It was further translated into some

seventy languages, with more than thirty million copies sold since its first publication.[7] The diary reveals Anne Frank as a sensitive and most humane person, with a sense of humour, sharp eye, talent and an ability to describe with liveliness the many details of the lives of the eight people, under the circumstances which made them live together. Anne Frank also discusses moral and humane issues, her Judaism, the nobility of their helpers, and the characteristics of the people around her, as well as the relationships between them, with all the weaknesses and difficulties created by the need to hide for such a long time. Another aspect of the diary is her feelings as a teenager, with thoughts and emotions about love and sex.

NON-LITERARY EXPRESSIONS AND THE GROWING OF A MYTH

Through the written stories and the published diary, Sadako Sasaki and Anne Frank became symbols and representatives of the child victims of the atrocities that killed them. Each girl became a symbol whose impact and exploitation go far beyond written literature. The expressions include museum exhibitions; worldwide educational programmes for students; visual documents such as art exhibitions, photo albums and videos; plays, films and documentaries; memorial and educational centres around the world; libraries in the memory of these victims; an industry of products related to these stories; and a vast number of internet websites, including educational activities, industry of crane folding, songs, and many activities for peace.

Sadako Sasaki

On Children's Day, 5 May 1958, The Children's Peace Monument was erected in the Peace Memorial Park in Hiroshima. Dedicated to the child victims of Hiroshima, the monument stands in a central place in the park: a three-legged statue on top of which stands a bronze statue of a girl representing Sadako, holding a golden crane high above her head. Flanking the monument on both sides are a statue of a boy and a statue of a girl, 'symbolizing hope' (Kosakai 1996: 54). Inside the tower hangs a bell, modelled after an ancient bell, contributed by the Nobel Prize winner for physics, Dr Yukawa Hideki. A golden crane suspended from the bell creates the sound of a wind-chime. The donor's words are inscribed on each side of the bell: 'A Thousand Paper Cranes' (on the front) and 'Peace on the Earth and in the Heavens' (on the back). This part of the monument is presently exhibited in the museum. Under the monument, carved on black granite block, are the words: 'This is our cry. This is our prayer. For building peace in this world,' written by a junior high school student. The monument is also called 'Tower of a Thousand Cranes' because of the legend connected to Sadako's story and because of the many folded paper crane chains sent and presented to the statue all year around.

According to the *Hiroshima Peace Reader*, a leaflet describing the history of town, the atrocity of Hiroshima and the different monuments

in the Peace Memorial Park, the Sadako statue symbolizes the 'hope for a peaceful future'. The initiative to build the monument came from Sadako's classmates who wished to 'comfort Sadako's soul and to express their desire for peace' (Kosakai 1996: 54). Their idea spread through Japan and became a movement promoting the erection of the monument. It was designed by Kikuchi Kazuo and sponsored by the Hiroshima Children and Students Association for the Creation of Peace. Funds also arrived from contributions from 3,100 schools in Japan as well as from schools of ten other countries (Kosakai 1996).

The symbol of Sadako is also presented inside the museum: part of the museum's exhibition is dedicated to her life and the story of the cranes. The exhibition is modest, situated in a corner end of the museum, although it was expanded to a larger exhibition in recent years. Temporary exhibitions are also presented from time to time, telling Sadako's story in detail. The leaflet of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum introduces, in addition to other details from the museum's collection, a picture of five paper cranes titled 'paper cranes folded by Sadako', and a few words telling her story (Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum 2002).

Another leaflet created by the museum, *The Outline of Atomic Bomb Damage in Hiroshima*, gives a detailed description of the atomic bombs and the damage they inflicted, including much scientific information. The last part of the leaflet, titled 'Peace Memorial Park', presents the three main monuments out of the many scattered in the park: the Cenotaph for the A-Bomb Victims, the Children's Peace Monument, and the A-Bomb Dome. The text of the Children's Peace Monument tells the story of Sadako in a similar (but shorter) way to that given in *Hiroshima Peace Reader* but with more heroic words and sentiment: Sadako is described as a 'vivacious' girl who 'bravely' folded paper cranes until the day she died. Her classmates are described as 'grieving' and as having a 'sincere passion' to build a monument to her memory and to the memory of all the other children victims of the atomic bombing. The statue of the young girl symbolizes, according to the leaflet, 'the hope of all children for a peaceful future' (Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum 1998: 28). After the description of this monument, the following text appears: 'In and around Peace Memorial Park stand numerous monuments to A-Bomb victims. Each and every one of these monuments, beyond its specific purpose, embodies the common desire that nuclear weapons be abolished and world peace is realized' (Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum 1998: 28).

Similar memorials were established in the United States and other countries, together with ceremonies commemorating Sadako, all emphasizing the message of universal peace. Much information about the spread of Sadako's story in Japan and throughout the world is presented in the website of the 2001 exhibition on Sadako in the Hiroshima Peace Museum. Three annual memorial days are mentioned: a ceremony in front of the Children's Peace Monument in July is initiated by Noboricho municipal junior high school (Sadako's school) to express the

students' 'hopes for peace'; the Paper Crane Day on Sadako's day of death, also organized by the school; and Sadako Peace Day on 6 August in Santa Barbara California (as of 1996), organized by the city to commemorate her and to 'prevent other children from being injured and killed as a result of war' (Hiroshima Peace Site website).[8] Apart from memorials in Japan, three memorial monuments and parks exist in the United States: Sadako Peace Park and a statue of Sadako in Seattle constructed in 1990; Children's Peace Statue in Santa Fe from 1995; and Sadako Peace Garden in Santa Barbara, built in 1995. On the statue in the park in Seattle the inscription reads: 'Sadako Sasaki / Peace child / She gave us the paper crane / To symbolize our yearning for peace in the world / A gift to the people of Seattle' (Hiroshima Peace Site website). Part of the Santa Fe statue is designed in the shape of the globe, with the five continents covered with plants and animals. The Santa Barbara garden was created following the initiative of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, an international organization focusing on issues of international peace and security. Large rocks with carved cranes honour all people who strive for peace and a world free of nuclear weapons.

A survey in the exhibition reveals that in Japan, 61 per cent of the people sending cranes to Hiroshima know the Sadako story. Worldwide, 93 per cent of the people know it. The survey summary says:

> Sadako and paper cranes are more tightly associated overseas than in Japan. Regardless of country or age, most people who learn about the story are moved by Sadako's single-minded desire to live, by the friendship among the children, and their strong desire for peace. The fact that the overall message of the story is the 'desire for peace' is the primary reason it has received so much widespread sympathy. Non-Japanese tend to see the 'courage to face hardship' in Sadako's continuing to fold paper cranes right to the end. She is praised because 'In the face of a hopeless situation, suffering from an incurable disease, Sadako continued to do what she could right to the end' (Hiroshima Peace Site website).

In addition to the above, dozens of internet websites help create and preserve this narrative.[9] The story of the folded cranes, both in websites and in other citations of the story, added to the growing myth of Sadako's story. Part of the story deals with the number of folded cranes, claiming Sadako almost folded the last crane, but died just before she finished it; in reality, the number of cranes she folded was probably more than 1,000.

Anne Frank

The Anne Frank House in Amsterdam is a museum located in the building where Anne and her family hid before they were caught by the Nazis and sent to concentration and death camps. It is a highly visited attraction: in 2004, according to information given by the museum, almost one million visitors visited. The museum opened in 1960, after

preservation work was done on the building. It includes an exhibition in the rooms of the secret annex where the eight people lived, with quotes from Anne's diary and many other objects, stories of the fate of the people after they were sent to the camps, and an exhibition of the many translated versions of the diary, as well as a shop displaying various items for sale including many books written about Anne Frank. The museum is involved in various educational activities, and also funds and supports educational and research activities around the world.

The museum information sheet mentions the goals of the institute: '. . . Keeping the memory of Anne Frank alive is directly connected to the concepts of "freedom", "human rights" and "democracy".' The Anne Frank House 'hopes . . . to inspire people from all over the world to become actively involved with these ideas' (Anne Frank House, No year mentioned).[10]

Non-literary expressions of Anne Frank's story are extensive. Memories, photographic books, research, criticism, films, plays, documentaries, music, various items for sale, museums, Anne Frank centres, travelling exhibitions, internet sites are all among the various expressions which have appeared throughout the years, creating and expanding the myth of Anne Frank.

A 2004 exhibition titled 'Anne Frank – a History for Today' travelled through more than a hundred cities around the world, especially in Europe and the Americas, in various schools. Its objectives, according to the information presenting the exhibition in the Anne Frank House official internet site, are four:

1. To 'inform the visitor about the history of the Holocaust from the perspective of Anne Frank and her family'.
2. To 'show the visitor that there are differences between people in every society . . .'
3. To 'challenge the visitor to think about concepts such as tolerance, mutual respect, human rights, democracy, etc.'
4. To 'make the visitor realize that a society in which differences between people are respected does not come about on its own . . .' (Anne Frank's House website).

Other Anne Frank centres in the world include the Anne Frank Zentrum Berlin, the Anne Frank Trust London, the Anne Frank Center New York, and the Anne Frank-Fonds Basel. The quotations on the websites of these centres, and other publicity, include parts of the diary which talk about universal issues. Examples are: 'One day this terrible war will be over. The time will come when we'll be people again and not just Jews!' (11 April 1944) or: 'One of the many questions that have often bothered me is why women have been, and still are, thought to be so inferior to men. It's easy to say it's unfair, but that's not enough for me; I'd really like to know the reason for this great injustice' (13 June 1944) (Anne Frank-Fonds website).

The Basel foundation was established by Anne's father in 1963, and its purposes were: 'to promote charitable work and to play a social and cultural role in the spirit of Anne Frank. It was a particular wish of the founder that the Fond should contribute to better understanding between different religions, to serve the cause of peace between people and to encourage international contacts between the young' (Anne Frank-Fonds website). The Anne Frank Center New York, USA, established in 1978, presents its purposes as 'a not-for-profit organization that promotes the universal message of tolerance by developing and disseminating a variety of educational programs, including exhibitions, workshops, and special events. Based on the power of Anne Frank's diary . . . [it] aims to inspire the next generation to build a world based on compassion, mutual respect, and social justice' (Anne Frank Center New York, USA website). Similar objectives are declared by the Anne Frank Trust London, launched in 1991 '. . . to inspire and educate a new generation to build a world of mutual respect, compassion and social justice' (Anne Frank Trust London website).

Since 1985, and for over a decade, an exhibition titled 'Anne Frank in the World: 1929–1945' presented the biography of Anne Frank and her family and provided a profile of the totalitarian society of Nazi Germany. It drew attention to racism in many parts of the world, especially in Europe and North America, and among other things it intended to 'provoke viewers into thinking about the choices they are making today' (Rittner 1998: 105).[11]

THE USE OF THE SYMBOLS AND MYTHS IN THE NATIONAL DISCOURSES

The symbols of Anne Frank and of Sadako Sasaki are universal in their essence. At the same time, they were and still are made use of by different groups for emphasizing different goals and interests.

Sadako Sasaki

It is interesting to note that the non-literary expressions of Sadako's story did not follow the narratives in Bruckner's novel, but independently created their own narrative-line, which emphasized the narrative of the victim and the struggle for worldwide peace. The thorough criticism raised in the book against war, and the call for peace, describe processes as well as the responsibility of factors and individuals in society, both in Japan and in the United States. However, the non-literary expressions of the symbol tell only the part of the narrative which regards the victim.

The leaflets of Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park and the memorial monument, as well as the museum exhibition, present a narrative of the victim: part of this narrative is the prayer and struggle for world peace – the universal message of peace which is detached from historical context; the other part is the presentation of the innocent victim – the child, the young girl, who was hurt as a baby and died early in life as an adolescent. Another part of this narrative is the creation of a heroine

after her death. This is based on the emphasis of Sadako as courageous and optimistic in addition to being an innocent victim of the war.

In his research about the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park, Benedict Giamo examines the meanings which rise from the monuments and exhibits, including the monument of Sadako, and argues, that:

> The role of museums and public history in examining the question of moral justification is critical. With respect to their roles as public educators . . . the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum/Park have proved disappointing teachers, either . . . an adamant refusal to even tell the tale, or adopting deceptive myths that promote a distorted and self-serving awareness of the past. This is done not in the service of full historic consciousness but rather to guard and preserve cherished and long-held beliefs about how . . . Japanese see themselves and how they want to be seen by others . . . The display is not about the search for historic accuracy; it is about the politics of memory . . . (Giamo 2003: 724).

The desire for future world peace is a recurring theme in the publications regarding Sadako Sasaki's memory as well as those regarding other memories of Hiroshima. This wish for peace always appears as detached both from an historical context and from factors or individuals responsible to it. Thus, regarding peace, the texts talk about 'peace on the earth and in the heavens', cry and prayer 'for building peace in this world', 'hope for a peaceful future', the 'desire for peace', and 'the hope of all children for a peaceful future' as the leaflets read. This peace is not connected to the past but rather is presented only through the symbol of the innocent victim represented by Sadako, unaccompanied by the name and address of victimizer.

It is significant to note that most of the Sadako myth was created by non-Japanese (through Bruckner's and Coerr's books and through other factors) and spread worldwide even more than in Japan itself. The Sadako exhibition in Hiroshima Peace Museum in 2001 concludes that 'as the story spread throughout the world, Sadako has made a powerful appeal concerning the sanctity of life. She has become associated with "peace" which is a common and eternal human theme' (Hiroshima Peace Site website). But whether in Japan or worldwide, the narrative was identical, universal in its essence, emphasizing world peace, personal courage and innocent victimhood.

The narratives using the symbol of Sadako Sasaki follow the controlling narratives that appear in Japanese society. Sadako's narratives are essentially universal, and were created mainly through non-Japanese factors. Nevertheless, they served not only international and other organizations outside Japan, but also contributed to the continuity of the Japanese narrative of universal peace and of victimhood.

The 2001 Sadako exhibition in Hiroshima Peace Museum discusses the issue of the narratives created from this story in an attempt to

explain motives of these narratives. In the part of the exhibition titled 'Sadako from Different Perspectives – Spreading throughout the World While Changing with the Times,' it is said that 'the historical Sadako was a young girl who lived her brief life intensely, holding fast to the end to her desire to live. She did not fold paper cranes for some political purpose out of religious belief. However, some people who were touched by the Sadako story have moulded the image of Sadako to fit their own beliefs.' It then continues:

> From 1950 to 1980, when the US and the Soviet Union (now, Russia) were locked in a prolonged standoff, Sadako was used by political and social movements. Thus, from one period to the next, Sadako has spread through the world bearing different messages attached by different people . . . In the West (the US and other capitalist countries), the movement to ban atomic and hydrogen bombs and peace activities introduced Sadako as a young girl who opposed nuclear weapons and wanted peace . . . In the East (the Soviet Union and other socialist countries), Sadako was introduced as an innocent young girl who fell victim to an inhumane weapon developed by the US, which was in the Western bloc . . . The Sadako story contains elements easily incorporated into teaching materials – the sudden death of a young girl, friendship, war and the atomic bombing, paper cranes, and more. This is why it was utilized as teaching material immediately after her death. (Hiroshima Peace Site website)

The narrative of Sadako's story served the Japanese narrative and was constructive to it. Thus the Japanese both took part in creating Sadako's narrative (for example, as seen in the Memorial Peace Park) and adopted and promoted it after it was created also by non-Japanese and spread throughout the world (for example by encouraging the phenomenon of sending paper cranes to Hiroshima from all over the world). In 1995, as quoted in the exhibition, 'at the International Court of Justice (The Hague, Netherlands), which was asked to pass judgement on whether or not the use of nuclear weapons violates international law, the mayor of Hiroshima gave an address in which he introduced Sadako Sasaki as one of the victims of the bomb. Sadako has become a symbol of the city's appeal to the world for the abolition of nuclear weapons and the realization of world peace' (Hiroshima Peace Site website). Although Sadako became the city's symbol much earlier than 1995, we can see how her narrative continues to be used even today by Japanese factors in their narration of the war.

Nevertheless, Sadako Sasaki's myth is meaningful to the Japanese narrative of victimhood, because it added a new and essential aspect to it: it is also a narrative of courage, of human victory, and of a kind of heroism without violence. In this sense, it strengthens the Japanese narrative and adds national pride to it. It is thus at the same time a very universal and very national message.

Anne Frank

Similarly to the narrative of Sadako Sasaki, the memory of Anne Frank reflects an innocent girl who became a victim only because of her Judaism; the memory emphasizes her characteristics, such as optimism, liveliness, courage, talent, sensitivity, sharp eye, sense of humour, honesty and strong character; and above all, underscores a universal message for peace, anti-racism, human rights, and understanding of the other. Anne Frank has become one of the main symbols of the Jewish Holocaust, but in a very universal way.

Otto Frank, Anne's father who survived the Holocaust, helped link his daughter's memory to these values. He devoted himself to issues of human rights and mutual respect. In response to the many thousands of letters he used to receive and answer from people all over the world regarding his daughter's story, he said:

> Young people especially always want to know how these terrible things could ever have happened. I answer them as well as I can. And then at the end, I often finish by saying: 'I hope Anne's book will have an effect on the rest of your life so that insofar as it is possible in your own circumstances, you will work for unity and peace' (Anne Frank-Fonds website).

The Anne Frank House, the major institution which publicizes the memory of Anne Frank around the world, creates narratives connected to the Jewish history of the Second World War and the Holocaust, and at the same time spreads universal narratives of values such as human rights and tolerance. The universal narratives are derived from the historical context and do not ignore it, although the main activities of the institute emphasize current political and social context and lessons to the story of Anne Frank around the world. The various Anne Frank centres, however, carry mainly and sometimes only the universal message of world peace, tolerance and acceptance of differences between people, and use the diary to promote these narratives, by quoting and emphasizing those parts in the diary and in Anne Frank's story which discuss humanistic and universal values.

The websites in English and in other languages, as well as the many other expressions of Anne Frank's memory, clearly show how the symbol of Anne Frank has become universal. Huttenbach argues that Anne Frank has become 'a legendary figure, a symbol of the Holocaust child-hero, a metaphor for the victims of genocide'. Moreover, her memory was transformed into travelling exhibitions and promotional brochures, her name is fought over by different organizations, and the Anne Frank House and the Anne Frank Foundation went to court, each claiming the rights for souvenir manufactures using Anne Frank's name. She has become a minor industry with over 15 million copies of the diary sold in the world (1998: 79). With such extensive publicity, Anne Frank's narratives are both necessarily universal and at the same time

may be different from each other according to the groups by which they are used. Mostly, however, they tend to be simplistic and heroic, especially in popular memories and in many of the ways Anne Frank's story is taught by educators.

One of the problematic uses in the myth of Anne Frank was made by the Dutch national discourse. According to arguments against the Dutch narratives of the war, these narratives have used the diary to create a mistaken image of the behaviour of Dutch society towards Jews during the Second World War as the 'good Dutch'. Some researchers argue that the Dutch have used the diary for public relations to create the impression that in the Netherlands 'all Jews were in hiding and that the entire Dutch population was in resistance' (Coljin, 1998: 95).[12] It is further argued that the Dutch easily blamed Germany and point out racism in other countries, while removing any responsibility from themselves. The Dutch, according to this argument, let almost the entire Jewish population in the Netherlands be deported. Anne Frank's diary has been used 'to feed the myth of the "heroic" Dutch who resisted the Nazis . . . by hiding Jews' (Coljin, 1998: 95).[13]

We have seen that the myth of Anne Frank, in a similar way to the myth of Sadako Sasaki, is mostly universal. Sadako Sasaki's narrative fits rather easily the Japanese discourse; however, in the case of the narrative of Anne Frank it is less clear why this symbol and myth are used in the Israeli discourse, which emphasizes national and Zionist narratives. Yet, it is used in many ways: the diary has been translated into Hebrew; plays in Hebrew were produced according to the story, broadcast also on the national television on the Memorial Day to the Holocaust; Anne Frank's memory is presented in national memorial museums such as Yad Vashem; educational programmes use this myth; and new translations of children's books about Anne Frank are still being published in Israel.[14]

We may assume that, as much as other groups outside Israel made various uses of the narrative in order to fit it to their interests, a similar process happened in Israel: the narrative of Anne Frank was used only or mainly as much as it fit the controlling and existing narratives in Israel. Thus, Anne Frank is remembered in the Israeli discourse mainly as a Jewish victim, a representative symbol of the many Jewish children victims of the Jewish Holocaust, but is also remembered in her characteristics of courage and optimism narrated from the diary. She is certainly not detached from her Judaism and the historical context in the Israeli narratives, but symbolizes and represents them.

At the same time, we could also assume that because Anne Frank became a worldwide symbol and myth, her memory could not have been ignored in the Israeli discourse, and so it was used even when there was a universal message in it; furthermore, attempts were made to fit the Anne Frank narratives to the prevailing Israeli narratives of the Holocaust.

Within the diary itself, Anne Frank's Judaism is emphasized a few times, as in the entry from 11 April 1944:

> We've been strongly reminded of the fact that we're Jews in chains, chained to one spot, without any rights, but with a thousand obligations. We must put our feelings aside; we must be brave and strong, bear discomfort without complaint, do whatever is in our power and trust in God. One day this terrible war will be over. The time will come when we'll be people again and not just Jews!
>
> Who has inflicted this on us? Who has set us apart from all the rest? Who has put us through such suffering? It's God who has made us the way we are, but it's also God who will lift us up again. In the eyes of the world, we're doomed, but if, after all this suffering, there are still Jews left, the Jewish people will be held up as an example. Who knows, maybe our religion will teach the world and all the people in it about goodness, and that's the reason, the only reason, we have to suffer. We can never be just Dutch, or just English, or whatever, we will always be Jews as well. And we'll have to keep on being Jews, but then, we'll want to be.
>
> Be brave! Let's remember our duty and perform it without complaint. There will be a way out. God has never deserted our people. Through the ages Jews have had to suffer, but through the ages they've gone on living, and the centuries of suffering have only made them stronger. The weak shall fall and the strong shall survive and not be defeated! (Frank 1997: 259–60).

Anne Frank's diary expresses the personal thoughts and feelings of a young Jewish girl during the Holocaust in Europe. The diary can be read from more than one perspective, and can be quoted from many aspects. Thus, in spite of its worldwide fame and universal uses, it could be used within the Israeli Zionist discourse as well, with an emphasis on the Jewish victimhood and moral victory of Anne Frank. In the same narrative-line, the other expressions of this myth emphasize Judaism as the cause of the personal and national atrocity.

The memory of Sadako Sasaki, and the memory of Anne Frank became myths, universal in essence; yet, they were re-told in the Japanese and in the Israeli discourses in ways which preserved the universal message in them, and at the same time enabled them to be part of the controlling discourse in society, and to become national symbols and myths of the atrocities of the Second World War.

NOTES

[1] Various researchers have written about the 'victim consciousness' of the Japanese society and about the amnesia regarding the war crimes committed by Japan in Asia during the Second World War, and various cultural and social aspects of this discourse have been researched. See, for example, Yoneyama (1999) for constructing the memory of Hiroshima, and Orr (2001). See also my research (Sarig 2006) for discussion of the Japanese discourse of the Second World War in children's literature.

[2] Zertal discusses processes in the Israeli society, especially those regarding power and national strength, and demonstrates how they stemmed from the ways in which the Holocaust discourse was shaped, and how they continued to shape and use this discourse.

[3] The crane is a traditional symbol in Japanese culture of longevity and prosperity. According to tradition, folding a thousand paper cranes can help in regaining health and in curing one from illness.

[4] Jungk's book was first published in 1959 in German and translated into English in 1961, under the title *Children of the Ashes*. Bruckner's novel was first published in the same year. My following translations of the novel are from the Hebrew version published in 1968.

[5] See also Takayuki (1997).

[6] Miep Gies, one of the Dutch persons who helped to hide Anne Frank and her family, wrote about it later in her memoirs. See Gies (1987).

[7] The quotations in this chapter were taken from the English version of the diary, namely Frank (1997).

[8] From the Hiroshima Peace Site: *Let's Look at the Special Exhibit*: www.pcf.city.hiroshima.jp/virtual/VirtualMuseum_e/exhibit.

[9] See, for example, Stomfay-Stitz's (2003) references. She mentions, among others, the following websites as educational: Bearable Times: The Kids Hospital Network – Sadako Cranes for Peace: www.cranesforpeace.org; Sadako Peace Project: www.sadako.com; Sadako Story: her letters to friends and her mother: www.sadako.org/sadakostory.

[10] Museums about the Holocaust all over the world exhibit the story of Anne Frank as part of the Holocaust narrative. In Japan, for example, a library and museum of the Holocaust in Fukuyama city, Miyuki, near Hiroshima, is dedicated to the million and a half children murdered in the Holocaust, and commemorates Anne Frank.

[11] The book lists many sources of selected bibliography, videography and teaching resources, most of which are connected to Anne Frank. It also suggests a study guide for educators to prepare students for the exhibit, to encourage discussion about Anne Frank and her diary, and to discuss the issues of 'the ever-present dangers in society of racism, discrimination and the rise of totalitarianism' (Rittner, ed. 1998: 106) Although the themes are universal, the guide connects all of them to the historical context of the Jewish Holocaust, Nazi Germany and the story of Anne Frank, also by raising various questions for thought and discussion.

[12] See also Yanow (2000) and Goldstein (2003). Anne Frank as a symbol was also used in the French discourse about the war, as is demonstrated by Wolf (1999).

[13] Coljin also points out that 'at the core of Anne Frank's story is the fact that she is a Jew, and we betray her memory if we downplay the very reason she died'. He further argues that parts of Anne Frank's narratives give redemption and forgiveness to the failure of Christianity in the Second World War (1998: 99–101).

[14] Two of the recent translated children's books are Davidson (2007) and Paul (2005).

12

Death and the Japanese Self-Defence Forces: Anticipation, Deployment and Cultural Scripts

EYAL BEN-ARI

INTRODUCTION

Death encompasses many questions that imbue our lives: Any death is cognitively, emotionally and socially disruptive and thus always carries with it potential elements of disorder, crisis and anxiety (Bloch and Parry 1982: 3–4). As Berger observes, '[w]itnessing the death of others (notably, of course, of significant others) and anticipating his own death, the individual is strongly propelled to question the *ad hoc* cognitive and normative operating procedures of his "normal" life in society' (1967: 32–3). Thus, as social scientific scholarship suggests, deaths can provide rewarding entry points for addressing fundamental questions about social organization and social life because it is during such occasions that many of the social fissures, ties, relations and cultural assumptions about order emerge. This chapter presents an analysis of how military death is handled by the contemporary Japanese Self-Defence Forces (SDF). Concretely, it is an investigation of the ways in which 'anticipating' – expecting, forecasting and considering – death in ongoing and future military scenarios may help us in understanding the character and dynamics of the SDF. My argument in this chapter is that the case of the Japanese SDF is a unique one, through which it is possible to explore the management of death as it is related to what may be called the 'future' orientation towards demise.

DEATH, VIOLENCE AND THE SDF

In what contexts does death appear in the SDF? First, it must be noted that the Japanese armed forces tend to downplay mentions of deaths among their ranks (see Field 1993). Thus for example, while the demise of personnel in various training accidents, traffic collisions and suicides are referred to in the media, they are usually reported about anonymous persons (*Japan Update* 5 September 2003 and 29 July 2002; *Japan Times* 14 January 1997). There are usually no names given and only extremely rarely are short biographical pieces about the dead soldiers published. Second, death, or its possibility, often appears in relation to the victims of natural and man-made disasters such as earthquakes, floods, torrential rain, or airplane crashes and leaks in nuclear power stations. In these cases, death regularly appears in the 'heroic' portrayal of SDF soldiers saving lives during such disasters or searching for the bodies of missing persons. These kinds of portrayals are very often found in the media and in the plethora of public relations material published by the SDF and frequently materialize in rather modest museums that have been established on military bases around the country that are run and maintained by uniformed troops. The museum at the Iruma Air Self Defence Forces base, for example, contains photographs of rescue activities performed after numerous earthquakes, displayed next to letters of gratitude handwritten by rescued victims. Death and its possibility are thus very much part of the public images that the Japanese forces portray to themselves and towards external publics.

Third, the SDF tends to 'silence' or 'manage' the memory of the Imperial Army and Navy and their deaths and the deaths they inflicted during the Second World War. The reasons for these circumstances are related to the highly problematic image of the Imperial military in present-day Japan and the attempts by the SDF to create narratives that distance themselves from these forces. This move can be seen in the same Iruma museum, where some Imperial military paraphernalia is indeed displayed but in a clearly separate room. In a similar vein, the Imperial roots of the post-war forces are rarely mentioned at the SDF's Academy. Indeed, these efforts are a part of wider trends. Yoneyama (1999), for example, demonstrates how in the monuments built to commemorate the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the suffering caused by the war and the responsibility of the perpetrators are forgotten in light of conjuring up the 'bright' post-war themes of peace and prosperity. And Piper (2001) examines how adopting a victim identity allowed many Japanese to forget their role as perpetrators of violence and the existence of other victims.

There is a fourth, perhaps curious, context within which for approximately the past ten years death appears, although it is not concrete deaths that are involved. The SDF, and many other organizations in Japan, pay great attention to 'anticipating' the deaths of its soldiers. This future orientation is related, at this point in time, to Japan's

participation in the allied efforts in Iraq but has been part of the debates about and within the SDF ever since Japan began to deploy forces outside its borders. The SDF, whose task had long been strictly limited to national defence, engaged in its first overseas mission when the Maritime SDF helped sweep mines in the Persian Gulf after the Gulf War in 1991. With the deployment to Cambodia in 1991-1992, one piece of writing (SDF 110 Ban 1994) conveyed the anxieties that soldiers and their families harboured regarding the possibility of death. The same kind of apprehensions and debates were later voiced when SDF forces were deployed to Honduras, The Golan Heights, East Timor and Mozambique. After 11 September 2001, Prime Minister Koizumi pushed through a law to allow the SDF to go to the Indian Ocean to help with supplies for the war in Afghanistan, providing logistical support within an ongoing conflict for the first time – even if from a safe distance. Yet the anxieties and deliberations have heightened in and around the current deployment to Iraq.

These kinds of preoccupations, however, are not uniquely Japanese. While the military (along with the police) is *the* organization most strongly identified with the legitimate use of violence (Boene 1990; Bourdieu 1999: 58–9), the armed forces of the industrial democracies have found that they must 'deal' – manage, interpret or account for – the casualties perpetrated by them and suffered by their own members to a much greater degree over the past two decades than ever before. The reason for this development centres on the emergence of an entire rhetoric relating to casualty aversion. Indeed, van der Meulen and Soeters (2003) talk about a globalized obsession with what is variously called casualty-shyness, casualty-dread, casualty-aversion or casualty-tolerance. Kümmel and Leonhard (2003) suggest that these terms, and the issues they implicate, have become a permanent element of contemporary political, military, media and academic debates.

The militaries of today's industrialized democracies have been undergoing sweeping shifts in their domestic status, structure, missions and, most importantly, in the ways in which they employ the violent means at their disposal. Their greater participation in peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations, for example, is indicative of problems centred on justifying the use of state violence in situations external to any one state (Ben-Ari and Elron 2002; Elron, Ben-Ari and Shamir 1999; Ignatieff 1998). Similarly, the greater sensitivity of military leaders to the political repercussions of their actions (both domestically and externally) demonstrates the importance of new criteria for assessing military exploits (Boene 2000: 75; MacKinlay 1989). Cultural transformations in the advanced democracies have led to heavy stress on keeping casualties to a minimum and to a questioning, both within the military and especially outside of it, of the morality and justification for using military power (Burk 1998: 12; Moskos, Williams and Segal 2000: 5–6).

The Japanese case, however, is marked by a rather peculiar character. The country's post-war forces manage their existence in an environment

that is marked by considerable anti-militaristic sentiment. While the armed forces of any country are charged with killing and destroying, it is precisely the close link between violence and the military that is so problematic and that has become increasingly problematic during the past decade as the SDF has adopted new roles outside of Japan. A shift is taking place, at least since Japan's contribution to the 1991 Gulf War which once again brought several points of contention to the surface: questions of constitutional interpretation, approaches to US-Japan relations, and the need to define the position of the SDF in Japan and internationally. Because of the problematic relation between the SDF and violence (*the* professional expertise of the military) it offers a unique case through which to explore issues related to death in the military.

MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS AND DEATHS

While the official use of the military term 'casualty' is a broad one – covering dead, missing and wounded persons – popular understandings and academic scholarship tend to restrict the term to the more widely held notion of dead soldiers. Indeed, as the military's activities and goals are centred on the 'management of violence', the injury and demise of its members, and of various enemies, are invariably 'normal' occurrences. Yet the very 'normality' of military death, its very 'expectedness', entails certain social and organizational problems. As Smith (2003) notes, military death in combat areas is one of the few kinds of demise that we routinely attach meaning to. Unlike deaths due to traffic accidents for example, such military deaths are popularly seen around the world as though they 'should' have a meaning. From the perspective of present-day circumstances, the stress on minimizing casualties by and within the armed forces of the industrial democracies seems to pose particularly severe problems of meaning. Indeed, a number of scholars (Manigart 2003; Moskos 2003; Smith 2003) point to the unrealistic expectations of zero-casualty precision wars based on the use of advanced, stand-off technology and weaponry and consequently, the special problems of justifying deaths that do in fact occur in armed conflicts.

In the Japanese context, these kinds of expectations have been intensified because of the general anti-militaristic ethos of the country and the specific understanding that its forces would not be deployed to locations in which there is a chance that they may have to kill others or endanger their own lives. Such considerations were very important in previous deployment of SDF troops outside the country and in the current deployment of SDF forces to Iraq. I shall present three short excerpts from the media regarding the use of Japanese soldiers in Iraq in order to underscore the kinds of expectations and understandings underpinning it. Before Japan sent about 1,000 troops to Iraq, many decision-makers were preoccupied with projecting possible casualties that the SDF would incur.

> If Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi is able to push through his plan to post a contingent of Self Defence Forces to Iraq – which will happen in November at the earliest – their supplies are likely to include plenty of body bags. Asahi Geino (August 28) bases this claim on what transpired July 26 at a top-secret meeting held at the Defence Agency Headquarters in Ichigaya, Tokyo . . . 'We understand that about 1,000 GSDF troops will be dispatched,' says the source. 'Assuming the 8 to 10% casualty projection is accurate, that tells me we're looking at as many as 100 fatalities over the next six months.'. . . If the posting to Iraq becomes prolonged, moreover, Mr Asahi says the Japanese contingent might eventually suffer as many as 300 to 400 fatalities. (*Japan Today* 22 August 2003)

About half a year later, the *Asia Times* (23 January 2004) reported that 'the prime minister says, in remarks to the Diet, that Japanese troops will go home if fighting breaks out in this "non-combat" area or for other reasons. The other reasons are not spelled out, but probably include Japanese soldiers getting killed.' Finally the *Nikkei Daily* (10 August 2004) has recently reported that three mortar shells were believed to have landed near the SDF camp in Iraq:

> Three artillery shots, likely mortar shells, were heard and believed to have landed several dozen metres north-west of the Japanese ground troops' camp in the southern Iraqi city of Samawah Tuesday morning, but no injuries were reported, the Defence Agency said . . . The agency said the attack, which took place at 2 a.m. local time in Samawah, was the closest to the camp since Japan deployed about 550 Ground Self-Defence Force troops on an aid mission in Samawah beginning in February. No artillery shells were found inside the camp, it said.

What kind of concerns and considerations underlies such contentions? The vast majority of interpretations of such situations have been political. Analysts and scholars have focused on issues such as the implications of Japanese casualties for Prime Minister Koizumi's support and his place within the ruling LDP, the impact on the security alliance with the United States, and how the deployment of these troops represents a change on the part of Japan from 'cheque-book diplomacy' to a more aggressive military stance. Almost all of these explanations are predicated on estimates about changes in public attitudes and the question of whether Japan's political leaders are able to win public support for their actions. A focus on public attitudes, however, represents a focus on a rather gross variable. One may well ask about how the 'public' – or more correctly publics – decides on its stance? How are public attitudes formulated? In other words, the questions that arise are related to the criteria by which demise within the military is appraised and valued.

CULTURAL SCRIPTS AND THE 'GOOD' MILITARY DEATH

The wider social scientific literature on death may assist us in answering these questions. Scholars have noted that a key social problem that arises when death occurs has to do with its legitimation and explanation (Berger 1967: 52). Organizationally, the need for justification is related to wider issues centred on support of the armed forces, the continued motivation of people to join them, and the retention of present members. The manner in which the state and the military take care of its dead members is thus connected to its relations with families of current and future soldiers, politicians and political groups, the media and social movements, or potential recruits. But there is more to this point of legitimation and explanation. Suzuki's (2000: 125ff.) ethnography of a Japanese funeral home provides an interesting suggestion in this respect. In describing the work of the staff of this institution, she notes that sometimes workers are called upon to pick up and handle a corpse of a person that has died an unnatural death (*henshitai*). In the 'management' of decomposed bodies or corpses that are disfigured, the staff of the home tend to treat these cases as out of the ordinary. But what is it that turns these cases into 'unnatural' or out of the ordinary? While Suzuki does not, as such, deal with this question, it seems that such deaths somehow deviate from popular expectations about the most common form of death which is that of elderly people at the end of their lives. But what is it exactly that underlies expectations about death?

Many of the problems underlying attitudes towards, and the treatment of, fatalities in various contexts may be related, following Snodgrass (2001: 689), to approximations of, and deviations from, a 'cultural script' – that is, a taken-for-granted, and widely-accepted social scenario – of a 'good' death. Culturally, 'good' deaths represent ideals enacting a symbolic victory over corporeal and social demise and the regeneration of life, while 'bad' ones represent the opposite, leaving survivors despairing and helpless in the face of meaninglessness or evil (Abramovitch 1999; Bloch and Parry 1982: 14; Glaser and Strauss 1968; Seremetakis 1991: 101). In Japan, a number of scholars have discussed elements related to such a script of a 'good' death. Woss (1993), for instance, reported the existence of special Buddhist temples 'specializing' in answering the prayers of elderly people for a swift (as opposed to a prolonged) death. Traphagen (2000: 147–50) explains how the elderly Japanese people he studied, talked about the advantage of a sudden (*pokkuri*) death since it would not burden anyone and the idea that a 'natural' death is one that takes place at home and not after a long illness or in a hospital.

What then constitutes a 'good' death in the military, an organization that specializes in the management and handling of violence? Within the militaries of most of the industrial democracies, the cultural script of a 'good' death involves the following elements: death in combat-related activities within publicly-accepted conflicts of young, often unattached men and (rarely) women; retrieval of the entire body or all of its parts;

the conduct of a full military funeral and official commemorations accompanied by informal rites of remembering (within the soldier's unit); and some kind of psychological resolution for kith and kin accompanied by compensation. I argue that it is this script, or a departure from it, that is used to appraise how 'good' the military death is to be considered and that is what underlies many of the popular and scholarly analyses of military deployments around the world. Let me trace out some of the elements involved in this script in order to highlight the special problems found in the Japanese case.

The relatively young age of the dead soldiers (often at the height of their physical power) turns their demise into something that is 'unnatural' and exacerbates the problems associated with explaining and justifying their deaths. As a consequence, such deaths are potentially chaotic and may both disturb the military's organizational order and challenge the very bases of its legitimacy. The demise of young soldiers carries political implications for it looms as a highly symbolic and sensitive issue in domestic politics. A good example is contemporary Israel where during the past twenty years older, and presumably married, reserves were not deployed in Southern Lebanon and are now less and less deployed in the occupied territories. In our case, *Japan Today* (22 August 2003) reported that while the quota of volunteers for the detachment of ground forces was quickly filled, 'not all of them will be accepted', says a source. 'Oldest sons and daughters in a family; soldiers who are only children; those who cannot obtain their family's consent; [or] those not in good health.' Such a policy is thus based on the premise that soldiers who do not fit the domestic and family ideals (within the scenario of a good military death) are not to be sent to Iraq.

A related emphasis was sounded in regard to inexperienced or unproven soldierly worth of the SDF soldiers:

> There are concerns over whether the Self-Defence Forces are suitable for a place as dangerous as Iraq. The troops, though backed by the world's fourth-largest military budget, are so new to hot spots that those soldiers chosen for Iraq duty required special training on matters as basic as how to handle their guns . . .
>
> 'The pressure is tremendous for the men of the SDF,' said Yoshinobu Okubo, editor of the Tokyo monthly magazine *Military Study*. 'This operation is a totally different level of danger for them. . . . Their training with live ammunition is very limited. Just about once a year, the ground forces . . . freely train with live ammunition in a realistic situation. Their training zone is small and limited, and done all in an extremely prescribed way. You can fire only from certain angles, for instance, to avoid accidents with civilians.' . . .
>
> But analysts say that most Japanese appear to believe there are no safe places in Iraq and view *the untried young troops* as venturing

> into uncharted territory. (*Washington Post* 10 February 2004, italics mine)

Notice how the emphasis on the inexperience of the Japanese troops and their lack of proper training makes their participation and possible death in Iraq somehow unfair or questionable. Another example is provided by the *Mainichi Shimbun* (4 July 2003):

> Reactions among SDF members who are expecting to be dispatched were mixed. 'I'd love to go because I want to help people in countries of need,' a thirty-four-year-old GSDF officer stationed in Chitose, Hokkaido, said. 'But my family is worried (about the safety of the mission). I am a little concerned by the fact that we'll be armed only with rifles. I think we need at least recoilless guns.'. . .
>
> Another officer at the GSDF base in Itami, Hyogo Prefecture, admitted that he didn't feel good about it. 'US and British troops are dying virtually every day. The situation is totally different from (UN) peacekeeping missions (which the SDF was previously involved in),' the officer in his thirties said. 'Going into a new mission is a challenge but my gut feeling for this one is "no thanks".'

And, in the *Washington Post* (10 February 2004) 'I don't want to shoot anyone,' Nobuo Magariyama, a young soldier training for Iraq duty, told Japan's NHK television network. 'But if my fellow members and my life are at stake, then I will have to shoot. I feel that maybe we are living in a time where we have to shoot someone even if we don't want to.' As stated earlier, such apprehensions are not new and have been around ever since Japan began to deploy forces outside the country's borders. Accordingly, one article (SDF 110 Ban 1994) showed that with the deployment of about six hundred SDF troops to Cambodia in 1992-3, many soldiers were as anxious about the possibility of death as about material problems such as salaries or insurance.

Next, the script of a 'good' death involves compensation and remembrance. As Kümmel and Leonhard (2003) observe, deaths of soldiers transcend the military sphere: they are social deaths in that the soldiers may be mourned publicly or be the subject of political dissension. As a consequence, the armed forces around the world have developed procedures and rituals with a variety of objectives such as offering condolences to the families of the dead soldiers, showing the organization's interest in the individual, fostering identity construction amidst the military, and showing the public that those serving and dying for the community are much respected and honoured. In Japan, while no 'battle' deaths have occurred since the Second World War, this element of the cultural script may be appreciated through the military's anticipation of possible reactions on the part of soldiers' families. Concretely, matters related to compensation touch upon how the SDF expects families to react and

to grant or withhold legitimation for the forces' actions. Accordingly, *Japan Today* (22 August 2003) noted that for 'SDF forces who die in the line of duty, the state arranges to pay 60 million yen in compensation to families. But an employee at the Defence Agency says negotiations are under way to boost this by another 30 million yen, plus an additional 10 million "special benefit" to those who are actually killed in the course of a military engagement. In other words, the family of each dead soldier would be tabbed to receive 100 million yen.' These practices all seem to derive from the desire of the military and various groups outside it (primarily politicians and senior administrators) to assure the acceptance of possible deaths by troops' kin in a manner that fits with the idea of a good military death.

A no less important matter entails the variety of rites and ceremonies held for dead soldiers. Because of death's potential for undermining social order, societies around the world have developed various rites-of-passage assuring both the proper conveyance of the deceased to another world, and the proper 'handling' of those who are left alive (Adam 1994). Indeed, it seems that such practices are often predicated on an assumption that if death is not 'handled' properly in its initial stages then it can be a source of future problems (Turner 1967: 97-8). In the case of the Japanese forces, again because no one has died in battle as of yet, no public ceremonies have been held to honour deceased soldiers. A focus on the ceremonies held for detachments going abroad and coming home and which are invariably reported by the media may, however, provide interesting insights into this point. Thus, for example, a navy officer who described himself as someone who had always thought of the emperor in a rather disparaging manner, told Frühstück and Ben-Ari (2002) in an almost embarrassed way how honoured he felt about being greeted by the emperor when he returned to Japan from a peacekeeping mission. He could remember every word the emperor had said to him and reported of his own feeling of having been 'touched by something higher'. It was this very brief encounter with the emperor, he told them, that had made him realize and feel something like 'a national identity as a Japanese', 'what it really meant to be a soldier', and his 'responsibility of guarding one's country'. Similar sentiments can be found in reports about the deployment to Iraq. The *Japan Times* (2 February 2004) described how in one SDF camp in Hokkaido:

> Hundreds of troops received a ceremonial send off Sunday before leaving for Iraq on a humanitarian mission that will be the largest and most dangerous deployment by the military since The Second World War. 'You are not going to war,' [Prime Minister] Koizumi told the assembled soldiers as they stood at attention in a meeting hall packed with hundreds of family members and VIPs. 'You are going to help the people of Iraq in their hopes to rebuild their country.'. . . [Defence Agency Director General] Ishiba emphasized the humanitarian nature of the operation. 'There are Iraqis who need water, who want hospitals,

> who want schools,' he told the troops after handing over two regimental flags they will carry to Iraq. 'Japan must extend a helping hand.'

The *Kyodo News Service* (14 February 2004), for its part, noted that:

> A Maritime Self-Defence Force (MSDF) transport ship assigned to move supplies for Ground Self-Defence Force (GSDF) troops in Iraq left Kure port in Hiroshima Prefecture on Saturday afternoon to pick up vehicles and equipment in Hokkaido before heading to Kuwait. The 8,900-ton *Oosumi* is heading to Muroran, Hokkaido, where it will be loaded with light armoured vehicles, water-tankers and supplies for the ground troops already in Iraq. The departure of the MSDF vessel marks the first time since establishment of the Self-Defence Forces (SDF) after The Second World War for Japan to deploy all three branches of the forces for an overseas operation. GSDF and Air Self-Defence Force units have been in Iraq and its vicinity since last December. 'The seriousness of self-defence officers raises the support (to help Iraq's reconstruction) among Japanese,' Defence Agency Director General Shigeru Ishiba said in a ceremony before the ship's departure, adding, 'The mission is dangerous, and that's why the SDF are going (to Iraq). They must assume Japan's responsibility.'

To be sure, such ceremonies are not the same as the funeral rites dictated by the cultural script of a good death but as rites of parting these nationally-reported cases are clearly aimed at providing meaning to missions, the dangers soldiers may face there and the possibility of casualties they many incur.

NATIONAL CAUSES, HUMANITARIAN MISSIONS AND JUSTIFYING DEATH

As these ceremonies underline, probably the most talked about aspect of 'good' military deaths involves the armed conflict within which they occurred. In the American case, Bartone and Ender (1994: 33–4), explain that 'many family members appear to have less trouble adjusting to the death of a loved one when the loss is construed as serving a noble or "good cause" such as defending one's country or family as opposed to a senseless event like a car accident or natural disaster'. In this regard there are wide differences between contemporary societies. Israel is perhaps a case where the more conventional emphasis on justifying arbitrary and cruel military deaths is based on assuring the survival of the nation. Turkey is another case where the justification for combat actions by the military enjoys widespread consensus despite the dangers of death that it represents.

In this respect, post-war Japan and Germany represent instances where the framing of soldiers' death is not formulated as a patriotic sacrifice. Both the Self Defence Forces in Japan and the *Bundeswehr* in

Germany are linked to multinational efforts dedicated to peace-making and humanitarian efforts. Indeed, it is only since the 1990s that German forces have suffered 'real' casualties: that is, out of area deaths because of peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and nation-building missions (Kümmel and Leonhard 2003). The deployment of troops abroad and the possibility of incurring casualties are explained via notions related to 'doing good', to images of humanitarian missions, and growing sentiments that Germany and Japan must take their 'rightful' place in the world and contribute their share to the international community. Yet the Japanese and German cases bear broad significance. Because justifying participation in peacekeeping operations and humanitarian assignments has now been accepted by the people of many nations (Ignatieff 1998), it may be argued that deaths in such missions represent new elements within the cultural script of good military deaths.

Indeed, an emphasis on 'doing good' has been at heart of most Japanese deployments overseas as in the current mission to Iraq. This thinking was at the core of the July 2003 Diet enactment of the Law. Accordingly, SDF soldiers posted to the country have engaged in humanitarian activities such as supplying water and medical services and rebuilding schools, roads and buildings. At the same time, the case of Iraq represents a subtle change from previous deployments. First, the Iraq Reconstruction Law specifies that military personnel be sent only to 'non-combat' zones and thus, as the *Washington Post* (10 February 2004) reported, 'In Iraq, Japanese scout teams have spent months combing the country, pinpointing the safest place to send troops, officials have said. They settled on Samawah, about 150 miles south of Baghdad, an area Koizumi has described as a "non-combat" zone.' In effect, however, because of the instability in Iraq, deployment has meant being posted into a violent area where death is a distinct possibility. Second, and no less importantly, the posting to Iraq is the first time that Japanese troops have been deployed abroad not for peacekeeping but for the maintenance of Japan's national interests. As the *New York Times* (16 January 2004) commented:

> In addition to talk of helping the Iraqi people, the government is for the first time drawing in stark terms a direct link between its forces' overseas activities and Japan's national interests. Shigeru Ishiba, the defence minister, pointed out in an interview that Japan imports 90 per cent of its oil from the Middle East, the largest share of any country. 'The reason we can lead such an affluent life, such as using electricity to this extent,' Ishiba said, waving his hands at ceiling lights in his office, 'driving cars as much as we like, avoiding the cold and having summer fruit in winter – it is because we have a stable oil supply from the Middle East, isn't it?'

In fact, it is this issue which has figured most prominently in the critiques of the deployment. *Newsweek* (9 August 2004), for example,

reported that public opinion is split over the dispatch. In February 2004, a poll showed 48.3 per cent in support of the troop deployment, while 45.1 per cent opposed it. Asked if Japan should withdraw its forces if a soldier was killed or wounded, 54 per cent said yes. And in addition, a host of parliamentary and extra-parliamentary opposition groups have waged demonstrations, rallies and protests against the deployment.

COMBAT AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Other anomalies in terms of the scenario of a 'good' military death centre on the special rules regarding how and when Japanese soldiers may use their weapons. While the scenario found in most countries is based on an idea of combat – the localized, violent conflict between two or more adversaries – as the quintessential context for death and casualties, the Japanese example is atypical in this regard. Take for example the entire problem of what military people call 'force protection'. *The Weekly Post* (26 January – 1 February 2004) noted that:

> As SDF advance troops entered Samawa, they were guarded by Dutch soldiers protected by armoured vehicles . . . Japan's SDF soldiers will be envied by the other allied forces as the 'safest forces in Iraq'. When Japan's troops start their real mission, the world will see that they will be slowly marching through the desert, entirely guarded by Dutch troops and sturdy young Arab soldiers. The armband of the guard forces will say, 'volunteer soldiers guarding Japan's SDF in Samawa'. (http://www.weeklypost.com/040126/040126a.htm)

Within these circumstances, it seems, if the dreaded eventuality of the death of Japanese troops does materialize, it would be somehow dishonourable since they are guarded by Iraqi and Dutch forces. Their deaths as soldiers, in other words, would not fit the scenario of troops independently guarding themselves and their comrades.

It is in a similar light that the rules of engagement, the regulations governing the circumstances under which Japanese soldiers may use their weapons, should be viewed. The *Washington Post* (10 February 2004) noted that the 'strict rules of engagement [directing SDF troops] do not allow them to fire unless it is clearly necessary for self-defence. That calculation, many fret, may cause soldiers to pause for a fatal split second.' The point here is that because the SDF are not considered a military in the full sense of the term, the rules of engagement that they operate under are much stricter than those under which American and other forces operate: 'The forces will be better equipped than they have ever been on an overseas mission. But unlike a real military, they will likely operate under "passive" rules of engagement, said Tetsuya Nishimoto, a former chairman of the Self-Defence Forces' Joint Staff Council' (*Herald Tribune* 16 January 2004). The rules specify appropriate ways to respond, for instance, to 'suicide attacks', he said. Indeed, these rules apply to all

of the SDF's deployments. Thus for example, the Force Commander of the UN forces on the Golan Heights explained to me in an interview:

> But the Japanese soldiers, you won't see them patrol like here. They can't because their rules of engagement will not allow them to defend other UN personnel that are coming under fire. They can only defend Japanese, only. So if you have a Canadian and Japanese on patrol and the Canadian comes under fire the Japanese cannot open fire to protect him. Now all the other countries can.

In another interview, the chief administrative officer for the Canadian contingent in the same UN force continued:

> The Canadians find the Japanese rules to be incredibly restrictive, the Americans would find the Japanese rules to be unworkable, they are that restrictive. For instance, they cannot defend anybody but other Japanese soldiers. Regardless of the situation, that is their law . . . If a risk comes down to there are people that are going to shoot at us, or there are people going to put us, and when I say us the Canadians in danger. We would have to think very seriously about what we could use them for. We can't use them as gate guards, they have soldiers here the same as we do corporals and privates, but we cannot use them as gate guards, for instance. I mean, here is a restriction, they are members of this unit but they don't do a rotation . . .

To return to the present argument, operating within such restrictive circumstances Japanese troops would not be participating in combat in the same manner as other forces making up the various UN or allied frameworks within which they participate.

CONCLUSION: ANTICIPATING DEATH

In this chapter I have presented an analysis of the manner in which the Japanese SDF anticipate death in ongoing and future military circumstances. My argument has been that underlying various debates and contentions about the possibility of incurring the death of soldiers during deployment is a cultural scenario of a 'good' military death. It is this scenario – or, more specifically, the elements that comprise it – that provides the criteria by which to appraise whether a concrete death is a 'good' or 'bad' one. The wider context of my argument is related to the strategies utilized by the SDF – and related politicians and administrators – to manage their especially contested or problematic link to violence. By way of conclusion let me emphasize three points.

The first point entails understanding the place of current deployments within a wider process by which the character of the SDF and its place in Japanese society are slowly changing. Take a report by the *New York Times* (16 January 2004):

> Iraq will amount to a big step in a series of smaller steps taken by the Self-Defense Forces in the last 10 years. Indeed, if the force is not yet a military, it is no longer the force it was a decade ago. Back then, severely restricted by the Japanese revulsion at their military past, the forces' sole mission was to defend the country against an attack, as stated in a 1976 national defense program outline.
>
> In a 1995 outline, after Japan was criticized for its so-called checkbook diplomacy during the Gulf war, the forces' priorities were enlarged to include, in order of importance: Japan's defense; responding to large-scale disasters; and contributing to creating a more stable security environment.
>
> Like the United States military, the Japanese forces are now undergoing another transformation that includes introducing two missile defense systems from the United States. With the focus shifting away from countering an invasion, the number of tanks, for instance, is expected to be cut in favor of raising spending to address missile and terrorist threats . . .
>
> An overseas mission was unimaginable. Katsutoshi Kawano, 49, a rear admiral in the Maritime Self-Defense Force, said that popular suspicion of the military was one of the reasons behind Japan's failure to participate in the Gulf war.
>
> 'At the bottom of that debate was a sense of distrust among the public,' he said. 'In those days, because of the memory of Japan's history, the pre-war era and the war, people were allergic to the military, which was passed on to the Self-Defense Forces.' In the last decade, with the forces participating in peacekeeping missions in places like East Timor and Cambodia, they have gained the trust of the population, he said.

In a previous article with Sabine Frühstück (Frühstück and Ben-Ari 2002), we suggested that the distinction that SDF personnel make between 'remilitarization' and 'normalization' is an important one. It provides the central frame of reference for their self-perception and informs their agenda for organizational changes. Commanders and officers are less preoccupied with remilitarization (in the sense of establishing a stronger military and the preeminence of military considerations above civilian ones) than with the 'management' of the SDF's contested existence and their claim for its acceptance as a legitimate arm of a democratic, civilian-controlled state. Contemporary soldiers and officers do not speak about *re*militarization but rather about normalization: how the SDF should be turned into a 'normal' military. Hence, when they speak of a 'normal' or 'real' military, they do not refer to their predecessors, the Imperial Army and Navy, but to the armed forces of other advanced industrialized democracies. The most frequently mentioned examples were the US Armed Forces and – in a different way and far less frequently – the German military. From the perspective of this chapter, this normalization implies the acceptance of the cultural script of a 'good' military death as it is found in the armed forces of the other industrialized democracies.

My second point is related to how we make sense of popular and scholarly contentions about the centrality of the casualty factor in deciding upon military action in many contemporary societies. What seems to have happened is that people use terms related to risks, casualties or military commitment as mediums for talking about, or evoking images of themselves and their countries. Thus the discussion about casualties is not only about calculations, risk and decision-making. It may, and often does, carry wider messages: how the armed forces of the industrial democracies handle military deaths is directly related to a host of questions about how they manage their identity as the wielders of the means of violence. In the Japanese case, the *Washington Post* (10 February 2004) observed that: 'The Iraq deployment is altering the very concept of the Self-Defense Forces, which was formed by U.S. occupation forces following World War II solely for the purpose of defending Japanese soil, and whose brochures still feature cute logos of the force's Defense Boy and Future Girl.' It goes on to remark that: 'Some even see a rekindling of the old samurai spirit. "Befitting the nation of the way of the samurai, the SDF will accomplish our mission in a disciplined and dignified manner," Col. Bansho Koichiro, who is leading the Iraq mission, told the troops at a ceremony in Hokkaido last week.' My point here is that deployment in Iraq together with the dangers, risks and fatalities it may entail are means through which the SDF – and a variety of its publics – discuss the very character of contemporary Japan.

My third point is theoretical and centres on the management of death as it is related to what may be called the 'future' orientation towards demise and the social anticipation of death. I emphasize that the imagining of death in this case is not individual but collective. In the Japanese case it is not the Naikan therapy method of imagining oneself to be dead (Lebra 1976: 212), nor the imagining of death after suicide (Lebra 1976: 192), but rather something in which a society actively and formally imagines its soldierly dead. Theoretically, I argue that a concentration on the anticipation of death is something that has not been dealt with adequately in the scholarly literature of the social sciences. What this case demonstrates is that these imaginings are constructed along the lines of 'good' and 'bad' deaths.

13

A Fragile Balance between 'Normalization' and the Revival of Nationalistic Sentiments

MARIKO TSUJITA

In his introduction to 'Japan Thirty Years after the Occupation: Political, Economic and Cultural Trends' Ben-Ami Shillony thus summarized Japanese attitudes towards history:

> This reluctance to record historical dates in the annual calendar may be part of a wider Japanese inclination to refrain from pondering over things past and to instead turn a new page whenever possible. So, while the past is not forgotten, it does not constitute a burden on the present. Thus have the Japanese succeeded in conserving their tradition without being obsessed by it. (ed. 1984: 5)

As a world-renowned expert on Japan, Professor Shillony flatters the Japanese for their ability and tendency to 'move on' to the next stage without being overloaded with tensions between tradition and modernization. In a way, I wish that his judgement were right. But being raised in the post-war period, I have witnessed a rapidly decreasing interest in tradition, along with little interest in 'conserving' it. Neither can I be so optimistic about the Japanese inclinations to 'not be obsessed' by the past, to avoid conflicts, and to follow the majority or trend. The tendency to avoid conflicts necessarily causes frustrations to accumulate, and each time these frustrations have erupted Japan has changed its course, without serious examination of the past, even the most recent one.

In this chapter I shall deal with the implementation of the so-called 'normalization' of Japan and the recent 'Japanization' trend of re-evaluating Japanese traditions at this crucial turning point in the post

'post-war era'. First, I will describe the healing process that the society has undergone in order to regain Japanese identity, from the drastic trauma of the defeat and the occupation, and recent tendencies of what we may call the 'Japanization of Japan', as strange as that may sound. Second, I shall list some of the main public debates and recent parliamentary decisions in order to determine whether Japan is leaning politically towards the right whether you call it 'normalization' or 'reactionary'. Finally, I will emphasize that Japan now finds itself at the threshold of a fragile balance between its determination to become a normal state, freed from the shadows of the defeat and the occupation, and the revival of nationalistic sentiments, which might lead to the postmodern democratic totalitarian state, a more unified and intolerant society under the name of democracy.

NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS: 'JAPANIZATION' OR NORMALIZATION?

There is no need to re-emphasize how traumatic the defeat in 1945 was for the Japanese. The Japanese people actually believed in their victory – whether or not they harboured questions or doubts – and sometimes felt 'excited joy' in their belonging to the Japanese entity – whether or not that excitement was voluntary or with hesitation. The Japanese felt a great loss and emptiness by the total collapse of their value system, which situated the emperor high above his subjects and Japan at the centre of the world. They believed the emperor should have watched over and guarded his 'beloved' subjects. What they had believed in had betrayed them, and they were left in ruins, spiritually and physically. There was general resentment towards the army, which had forced so much sacrifice; disappointment in the emperor; and contempt for the war, poverty, hunger and restrictions. Ordinary citizens attempted to rebuild their lives, but each had to cope with open wounds of emptiness. This vacuum had to be filled sooner or later. Nevertheless, the search for alternatives and answers would last a long time. Only a handful of individuals attempted this type of search, while the majority chose not to concern themselves with goals that could not be attained right away.

What was the place of tradition in the wartime ideology? During the war, 'everything Japanese' was superior to 'everything foreign'. Strangely enough, however, any form of the arts, including traditional ones, was considered extravagant and destined to be suppressed. When people were starving, they sold gorgeous kimonos and valuable old paintings in exchange for a few cups of rice in order to survive. Valuable ancient swords were taken from houses, supposedly to be sent to the front. Though there were groups of intellectuals who tried to re-evaluate 'Japan' and what constitutes Japan culturally (e.g. Nihon Roman-ha), wartime nationalism was, for the most part, a very modern and military-led totalitarianism. An extreme form of Japanism was stressed only to enhance the 'Japanese spirit', the content of which varied from speaker to speaker. Wartime nationalism was a product of modernism up-rooted

from tradition, respecting tradition only as a concept and neglecting it in reality, and exploiting the image of 'beautiful Japan' in order to mobilize the population for militaristic ambitions, which coincided with the political and economic needs of Japan at that time to expand to the continent in order to secure resources for further advancement of industrial Japan.

The defeat meant the end of the corybantic fever. The sobered Japanese simply returned to their hard work, now focusing on rebuilding their ruined lives and country. They were determined to change course and to survive in order to achieve the prosperity they had sacrificed during the wartime period. This change in direction was not actually the opening of 'a new page', but rather a shortcut or detour, depending upon the result, back to the same road Japan had been marching on consistently since Meiji Ishin in 1868 and on which it continues even today. Although the wartime period was extraordinary in its extreme form of totalitarianism, Japan fundamentally remained consistent with its ambition to be equal with world powers and to enhance the status of Japan in the eyes of other nations around the world. In this sense, it was not surprising that Japan could alter its course immediately after the war, becoming cooperative and obedient to the occupation forces.

In addition to the traumatic experience of defeat, Japan had to cope with its first experience of being under occupation. The exaggerated pride during the war was replaced by a general anxiety for the future and specifically for how new rulers would behave. Though it was a 'soft' occupation, the campaigns for the 'democratization' of Japan reached almost every sphere of everyday life. The Japanese enjoyed a new wave of liberalism after the harsh social restrictions of the war. When the occupation forces dismantled Japan's armed forces, they abolished also its militarism and all that was related to it. The occupation forces viewed militarism as having blossomed out of Japanese 'feudalistic' culture and concluded that the best way to enforce a 'democratic' way of life was to disconnect the people from their past. Upon purging all those who were thought to be connected to the militaristic regime, drastic policies were employed in order to decentralize existing powers, to redistribute farming land and eliminate large landlords, to free women from the patriarchal social system, to ensure a 'democratic' education system, and even to offer a most innovative constitution that denied Japan's right to maintain any form of 'war potential'. It was forbidden to sing the national anthem or raise the flag in public, to commemorate dead soldiers, or even establish monuments for the victims of the atomic bombs (naturally, it was forbidden to publish or teach the catastrophes of Hiroshima and Nagasaki). Japanese soldiers who had left behind their dead comrades in foreign battlefields could not express their wish to collect their remains to bring back home, or at least to properly bury them in the foreign countries where they perished. Though the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo) was held in order to judge top leaders of Japan for their crimes against humanity

and peace, most Japanese viewed the proceedings as a farce, and the occupation force succeeded in blaming everything on top military and political leaders and freeing the emperor from his responsibility. Thus, US-led tribunals were staged in order to show that both the emperor and the citizens were the victims of vicious leaders who themselves carried sole blame for the war, and by punishing them, the rest of the nation could start a new 'democratic' way of life. It was not only the Japanese who put aside any real examination of the past; the occupation forces also blocked any chance for Japan to do so, and encouraged the Japanese to step towards the given democracy, without looking back.

A lack of self-confidence, caused by the collapse of an entire value system, brought about the blind worship of a new 'democratic' value system, which elderly citizens were more or less acquainted with during Japan's course of modernization before the war. Those who felt betrayed by the restrictive, coercive and self-censored wartime regime changed their mantra to that of the new American dreams. It was natural that those who had lost almost everything in the war had no time or resources to reflect on preserving tradition, and they deserted it as a hindrance to progress. The Japanese started the post-war period, setting aside anything that might remind them of that dark era of totalitarian self-restraint.

Since then, the United States has become 'the world' for Japan, and for the Japanese, something American means 'international'. Products made outside Japan were considered to be better than Japanese products, and products with foreign brands were seen as more sophisticated and advanced. Even today, we recognize such phenomena in various fields. For instance, all Japanese cars exhibited in the Toyota Museum that were manufactured after the war have model names in Katakana and Roma-ji. This is the case also for most electric appliances manufactured in Japan for Japanese households. I recall that Toshiba started to name its new vacuum cleaner *Hayabusa* (Falcon) only in the 1980s, and that it sounded odd at the time. Since then the number of cases of products with Japanese names has increased, but even today it is not common practice.

This excessive use of Western names rests on the image of the West as modernized, industrialized, advanced, fashionable and free, and the image of Japan as pre-modern, backward, unattractive, old-fashioned and repressive. Against this background, the US occupation, with the support of so-called 'progressives' in Japan and the silent majority, campaigned to disregard what belonged to the past, viewing it as a hindrance to the achievement of so-called 'true' democracy.

What followed was obvious. Fewer and fewer people became interested in traditional arts, customs, clothing and traditional way of life. People viewed the traditional way of Japan as an obstacle to the advancement of prosperity. Efficiency replaced the old virtues. There was widespread neglect, disrespect and indifference towards traditional Japan and a clear tendency to separate tradition from everyday life. Being traditional became synonymous with being inconvenient and outdated.

As time passed, the Japanese slowly escaped their traumatic state of mind and regained their confidence, together with the reconstruction and economic achievement of the nation. The Cultural Property Protection Law was enacted in 1950 and the support for the traditional art specialists began from 1960 to sustain those who were facing perishing traditions. In the sixties, the period of economic growth started with the construction of the Tokyo Olympics infrastructure and the Shinkansen bullet trains. These two events demonstrated to the population that Japan was again on its feet, and that Japan was getting out of the post-war poverty. At the same time, a movement encouraging the public to purchase products 'made in Japan' was enacted by the government, but not much was improved regarding the 'image' of Japan itself. In the seventies, various attempts were made to re-evaluate, rediscover and appreciate traditional Japan. Kokutetsu (Japan National Railways, now Japan Railways) initiated a campaign called 'Discover Japan' in order to promote domestic tourism, which encouraged the Japanese to rediscover the old and forgotten Japan. This campaign appealed to a sense of nostalgia, and at the same time showed that Japanese households succeeded in having a dispensable income for travelling. With the economic boom – and especially during the so-called 'bubble boom' of the late eighties – numerous shrines started to revive their festivals, and some even renewed forgotten festive ceremonies through studying their own historical documents. Local shrines that were once deserted now attracted new residents to participate in carrying portable shrines. Though fewer and fewer people wore kimonos in their daily life, parents began to buy expensive kimonos for their daughters for the national, coming-of age ceremonies marking their twentieth birthdays. Once, students were thought to be progressive and anti-traditional, but over time it became fashionable to wear traditional Hakamas (kimono trousers) at the graduation ceremonies. Though many Japanese still preferred to be married in Western church weddings, the number of traditional weddings at Shinto shrines has definitely increased.

From the late nineties onwards, television stations started to combine Japanese elements in their news shows. It was an eye-catching event when Fuji TV launched a news programme in 2001 called *Hodo 2001* (Reports 2001) on Sunday mornings with a striking opening picture of a Noh figure landing at the heliport of the TV building and with a studio set of a Noh stage. It was quite original and innovative, especially in contrast with the ordinary news programmes with one-patterned Western outlook studios, TV monitors and clocks hanging on the wall. Since Fuji and Yomiuri began questioning the post-war tendency of neglecting the 'Japanese way', it would seem that they came to the conclusion that the time had come to combine traditional elements and motifs in their production, and that they would not be risking negative responses from their audience. On the other hand, Asahi with its so-called 'progressive' attitude preferred the introduction of subtle Japanese scenery with classical music in their news shows (this began in the late 1980s).

More serious attempts to re-evaluate Japanese traditions gradually increased in the media. Several series of documentaries on traditional arts and festivals have been produced. One of the more courageous television programmes to deal directly and positively with tradition is an NHK educational programme. NHK, Japan's only public TV station, launched a new programme for children on its educational channel in 2002. *Nihongo de Asobo* (Let's Play with Japanese) is broadcast every morning for fifteen minutes. This programme should be highly regarded as it successfully incorporates isolated traditional customs and arts to capture children's hearts. It was intended to enrich children's literary worlds not only in order to enlarge their vocabulary but also to expand their cultural background. Disregarding the child's language capacity, it sought to confront them with Japanese classical literature or modern classics, presenting beautiful flows of Japanese language, letting children recite verses even without understanding them. The famous and very talented Kyōgen actor, Nomura Mansai, has participated enthusiastically in this production and he tries to present Kyōgen in a way that children can feel the formality but at the same time enjoy it. He succeeded in capturing children's hearts by using a modern outlook while still retaining authentic elements of traditions.

Noh and Kyōgen may be the most refined masterpieces of Japanese traditional performing arts, but their popularity has declined drastically in the post-war period. Nowadays, the majority of Japanese have no opportunity to be at a Noh performance. This television programme most certainly changed the image of Noh and Kyōgen in the minds of children from something difficult and boring to something mysterious and exciting.

Following the success of *Nihongo de Asobo*, NHK launched another programme in 2003, *Karada de Asobo* (Let's Play with Your Body). The modern part of this programme is very innovative and well prepared, such as exercises for children and exiting encounters with top athletes who demonstrate to the children the fascination of each sport. We can also credit this programme for its challenge to introduce body movements of traditional performances such as Kabuki. Children loved the dance arranged by a Kabuki actor and they asked their mothers to take them to see Kabuki. After knowing that traditional motifs do create impact on children, the programme started a new feature called 'the courtesy of Samurai', showing children basic traditional manners that have almost been forgotten in today's everyday life, and which reflect the hierarchical value system of the past. This trial ended up with merely its ambition to be sensational. Here the traditional motifs are used intentionally to draw children's attention. While in *Nihongo de Asobo* the use of traditional motifs is integral, incorporated, essential and natural, in *Karada de Asobo* it is artificial, unconnected and arbitrary, a very poor example of manipulating traditional elements.

As we have seen, there is a clear trend of nostalgically returning to traditional Japan and a renewal of forgotten traditional ceremonies.

Surely the rising appreciation of Japan by outsiders, culturally and economically, has contributed to this re-evaluation of Japan by Japanese. The image of traditional Japan is now changing to a positive one, something familiar yet mysterious, attractive and comforting. This reflects the fact that Japan is recovering from the trauma wrought by spiritualism and extreme nationalism that followed the war. Not only in the post-war period did we disregard tradition, but we have been doing so, though gradually, since the beginning of Meiji. I believe that this tendency to revive and re-cherish traditional arts is a positive effort to revise the one-way road of growth and development. It is a process of normalization for Japan, accepting its tradition as integral to its identity and attempting to preserve what we can and pass it on to the next generation.

SERIES OF EVENTS: GOING 'RIGHT', OR A RISE IN NATIONALISM?

Though the substance of 'left' and 'right' differ according to the society and the period, in post-war Japan there have been certain criteria broadly accepted by its citizens in determining what is 'right' or 'left'. These criteria are not, of course, precisely defined, but they are used intuitively to locate ideas. We can list some ideas that are supported by the 'right' (and objected to by the 'left'):

1. The revision of the constitution, especially to change Article 9 in order to make the Self-Defence Force (SDF) a constitutionally recognized army.
2. The importance of nationalistic symbols, such as the flag and anthem.
3. The need to nurture nationalistic, patriotic feelings through education, and to teach Japanese history through Japanese interpretations and not according to Western views.
4. The importance of traditional social values as basic human morals, such as respect for elders, preservation of family frameworks, excessive praise for altruism.
5. Emphasis on the uniqueness of Japan and its culture, including the emperor and his family.

After listing these criteria, I shall now present a selection of relevant events that occurred, one after another, since the late 1990s.

On the Constitution

A. Constitutional debates

Though there had always been a group that advocated the revision of the constitution in the conservative camp, it is clear that in the 1990s, constitutional revision arguments intensified and gained more legitimacy. This resulted in the establishment of the Parliamentary Commission on the Constitution in 1999. Debates became concrete and

open and in 2003 and 2004 constitutional drafts were published both by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Democratic Party (DP), though Yomiuri Newspaper pioneered this debate by publishing its own version of the constitution already in 1994. In April 2007, the National Referendum Law was passed as a preparatory step allowing the revision of the constitution.

B. Other events related to the status of the Self Defence Force

(a) The status of the SDF has been controversial because of Article 9, which prevented Japan from possessing any kind of 'war potential'. The presence and operations of the SDF have depended solely on the government's interpretation of Article 9, that the constitution does not restrict the immanent self-defence right of Japan. Accordingly, the image of the SDF in society has been rather negative, and the SDF has laboured to improve its status by offering its contribution to society in relief operations during natural disasters. It regained higher social recognitions in the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War, by dispatching its forces overseas for the first time after the war, thus making an international contribution, at the request of the United Nations.

(b) After the dismantling of the Ministry of War, the Agency of Defence was formally established in 1954, but it actually started in 1950 with the establishment of the police reserve, the former SDF, following the US requests at the time of the Korean War. As I have mentioned about the SDF, the Agency of Defence was kept as an agency in the Cabinet Office, in order to keep a low profile on military matters. Together with the shift towards the SDF, it was decided that the Defence Agency could be upgraded to a Ministry at any time, and it indeed became one early in 2007.

National Flag and Anthem

A. Flag (hi-no-maru) and anthem (kimi-ga-yo) at school

As mentioned above, raising the flag and singing the national anthem in public ceremonies were forbidden by the occupation authority. Some were distressed by this restriction, while others felt relieved since the flag and the anthem represented the suppressed war-period. This restriction was softened in 1949, and even before the occupation ended, the Ministry of Education advised that it would be desirable for public schools to raise the flag and sing the anthem at school ceremonies and national holidays. Not many schools responded immediately, since a majority of teachers still remembered how students were pushed to the war fronts as a result of the chauvinistic education. The anthem (*kimi-ga-yo*) was printed in the music textbooks, but until the 1970s it was presented as an ancient Japanese song and not as a national anthem. There are very few youngsters today who can sing it by heart. For quite a long time, against repeated instructions from the Ministry, this situation continued. Those who attribute the disrespect to the flag to the occupation policy and to the leftist-dominated teachers union, would argue that this is a testimony

to the lack of respect for the nation and a result of extreme left-wing education. The Ministry of Education has intensified its efforts to enforce the use of the flag and the anthem at school ceremonies and even started to penalize those who disobey this instruction. It is reported that since 1994 there have been more than 300 cases in Tokyo of teachers being penalized for not standing during the singing of the national anthem.

B. Enactment of the National Flag and Anthem Law

The months of March (graduation ceremony) and April (welcoming ceremony) are a time of severe disagreements between the teachers union and the principals who are under the guidance of the Ministry over whether to raise the flag and sing the anthem. The news of a suicide of one high school principal in Hiroshima one day before the graduation ceremony in March 1999 shocked the nation. Prime Minister Obuchi immediately started to prepare a law concerning the flag and anthem. The law itself is concise, stating that the national flag of Japan is *hi-no-maru* and the national anthem is *kimi-ga-yo*. With a large majority (403 against 86 at Lower House [Shugi-in]), this law was passed in both houses of the Diet in August 1999.

C. Flag and Anthem at home

Not many households possess a flag and post it in front of the house on national holidays, as used to be the case in the pre-war period. An overwhelming majority recognizes the *hi-no-maru* as the national flag and *kimi-ga-yo* as the national anthem, but they do not see an urgency in enacting a law regarding this issue. Most citizens do not feel a need to display a flag in order to prove their identity.

Nationalistic Education

A. History Textbook Controversy

Some conservatives blame the teachers union for being irresponsible and ideologically biased for not appreciating Japanese history and tradition. They argue that there should be a less 'masochistic' explanation of Japanese history and more descriptions of the uniqueness of Japanese culture and tradition in order to encourage pupils to have pride in being Japanese. The Society to Create a New History Textbook was established in 1997, and its textbook was approved as one of eight history textbooks for junior high schools in 2001. Although the society has invested a vast amount of money in advertising and circulating the textbook, less than one per cent of the schools adopted the new textbook.

B. Amendments in the Basic Law of Education

The Basic Law of Education was enacted during the occupation, in 1947, in accordance with the spirit of the constitution. It has been considered as the safeguard of democratic education. With the gradual weakening of the teachers union, amendments and revisions were made in 2006 to strengthen the Ministry of Education's control, to aim for

fostering patriotism and to cherish tradition and Japanese culture, and the importance of family values.

We have studied three of the five criteria that I listed above. Concerning numbers 4 and 5, these have already been explored in section one. As is clear, Japan is definitely leaning 'right' according to the implicit criteria, and we know that this series of events aroused uneasiness and suspicion amongst neighbouring Asian countries and at least a part of the Japanese population. The question here is whether this rightward tendency should concern us as being symptomatic of reactionary chauvinistic nationalism or whether it is part of the process of normalization, of a swinging back from the abnormal state into which Japan had been forced after the war.

SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE PRESENT SITUATION

In the cover of his book *Towards a Beautiful Nation*, Prime Minister Abe re-phrases 'beautiful nation' to 'towards [a] Japan that we can be confident and proud of'. It seems that he thinks most Japanese lack confidence and pride in – and love for – their nation. Students I encounter in universities enjoy their lives and have never even thought of emigrating to other countries. For them, Japan is the only homeland in which they are content. This raises the question: for what reason does Abe need to emphasize confidence and pride?

His own Cabinet Office depicts quite a different picture. The opinion polls conducted by the Cabinet Office in 2007 show that almost 52 per cent of respondents feel a 'strong love' towards Japan, and only 9 per cent confess that they have 'weak love' for their country. Throughout the years 1977 to 2007, those who have 'strong love' range from 47 per cent to 52 per cent, and those who do not know whether their love is strong or weak changes from 41 per cent to 38 per cent. This may be understood as showing that, actually, a great majority of Japanese do love their country. The results of the same polls also show that approximately 40 per cent of the respondents consistently answered that they are proud of Japan's long history, its traditions, outstanding culture and arts, and the natural beauty of its landscape. In another set of opinion poll questions relating to the need to nurture love for the nation, more than 80 per cent replied positively and only 9 per cent denied that there is such a need. It seems that most respondents conceive that 'love for the nation' is something that has to be consciously formed and they expect that there be someone to teach the prototype of 'love for the nation'.

In his book, Abe explains that in 1955, two conservative parties merged and formed the LDP with two goals in mind: to achieve economic recovery, and to regain independence (2006: 28). These were implicit understandings, but in the official platform and documents concerning the establishment of the LDP, the goals Abe mentions do not appear. Only in its party missions do we find a sentence that analyses the situation in 1955, that 'patriotism and the spirit of independence is lost, politics

are in confusion, the economy is far from self-sustained, people's livelihood is still unstable, independent regime is not yet organized and upon that there were growing class struggles aiming at dictatorship'. All of these were correct in 1955, but Abe does not hesitate to say that the first goal has been achieved but the second one has not yet been attained. I understand that he inherited the frustrated narrative of old conservatives that the constitution had been forced on the people by the occupation (though the opinion polls at that time show otherwise), and that unless the constitution was revised there is no 'true' independence for Japan. I imagine there is no one in the world who actually questions Japan's independence. His intention is to revise the constitution, to secure legitimacy in the existence of SDF, and eventually to recognize it as an army, to have legitimacy for sending troops outside Japan in order to gain international recognition, and to raise Japan's status in the international community.

What Prime Minister Abe claims has already been stated by other politicians. One prominent example is Ozawa Ichirō, now leading the largest opposition party, the Democratic Party. In 1993, Ozawa published *Nihon Kaizo Keikaku* (Blueprint for a New Nation) (1995), just before he left the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, and in it he advocated revising the constitution to recognize the SDF and called on Japan to become a 'normal state' that shares responsibilities and duties for world peace. It was a manifestation of his political thoughts and goals.

A problem with Abe is the ease with which he links these political objectives with the need to strengthen patriotism and national consciousness. He uses empty rhetoric to convince the public that people currently lack self-confidence and pride in their nation because Japan is not free of the shadow of the occupation. He goes on to claim that all that is negative in Japan such as its materialism, and its lack of values – such as family bonds, patriotism and nationalism – that transcend materialism, derive from Japan's lack of true independence (2006: 29).

It seems to me that Prime Minister Abe failed to learn from the war experience. He doesn't seem to remember that there had been a rigid totalitarian regime in which his 'respected' grandfather was the minister of commerce, albeit for a short period, and that people suffered from restrictions on every sphere of life, not having the freedom to cry over one's own son's death, and the restlessness of being monitored by neighbours all the time. People gave up everything without demanding anything from the state. They endured the harshness of life, hunger, their homes burnt by air bombardments, the children's evacuation from the city, just to mention domestic experiences. But the worst memory of all with which ordinary citizens must still cope is a sense of guilt stemming from the fact that they supported the war and believed in the cause of the war. The knowledge about the sacrifices and sufferings of the people of Asia after the war has added another layer upon this guilt. But Abe seems to not know about such a war. He cites some letters of kamikaze (*tokko*) students, and says how wonderful it is to have something to give his life for (2006: 107), and he says that people are allergic to the word

'patriotism'. He claims that the national anthem of Japan has perhaps the most pacifistic lyrics in the world (2006: 84), as if there has been no reason for the people to feel uncomfortable singing it.

I am aware that some scholars rightly point out that there is no immediate danger that the Japanese be carried away with the rise of nationalism (Saaler 2005). They say that those who advocate patriotism are ineffective and remain fringe groups. Rosenbluth and others (2007) would characterize the new nationalism of Japan as a 'cool nationalism' and do not see any real threat in the near future. Judging objectively, there is not a mass feeling to support nationalism. Elderly citizens who often visit Yasukuni Shrine, and demand that politicians visit, do so out of their sincere wish to commemorate their loved ones who were lost in the war but who have not been appreciated as they should have been in the post-war period. Middle-aged Japanese who had been brought up in peace and democracy are busy working, but at the same time they are usually quick to reject any attempt to revive nationalistic sentiments and are receptive to external trends and ideas. Youngsters who do not have any resentment towards the Japanese flag and national anthem cheerfully support the soccer team of Japan with the flag and anthem, but they are far from being chauvinistic nationalists.

Then what am I afraid of? I have inherited the lesson from my parents that anyone can turn out to be a 'model citizen' in a wave of extreme nationalism, when everybody in that given society thinks alike. Whenever there is a strong consensus, it is very hard to judge fairly and to have a perspective above that consensus. I realize that a consensus is achieved when members of a given society believe that there is no alternative. In that sense, this is a state without options and a state with a lack of information. We know that mass media now has a far greater power than it had at the period of totalitarianism in forming public opinions. It is easier now to manipulate people's minds to form and direct a certain type of judgement.

I agree that Japanese democracy is meanwhile steadfast. The trends to re-evaluate and preserve tradition are valuable. Some of the demands of politicians to search for ways to cooperate with other nations in establishing peace might not be that dreadful. But what I fear is an attempt, like that of Abe, to rationalize political goals with the use of nationalistic sentiments. Japan avoided facing the reality of the arms-racing world. We have never tested how civilian control on our army would really work. When there will be any kind of military threats, I do not know how to prevent the freely-elected rule of the well-educated majority who might agree to form a kind of self-restricted regime that is intolerant to 'others' in the given society. When I see a kind of nostalgia towards traditional Japan, and at the same time the on-going right-ward tendency, I feel that it is more than essential to be aware of what might happen when the delicate balance between demands for change and the rising of nationalistic sentiments will collapse.

14

The Effect of Japanese Colonial Brutality on Shaping Korean Identity: An Analysis of a Prison Turned Memorial Site in Seoul

GUY PODOLER

INTRODUCTION

A group of boys engaged in a football game on a sunny afternoon, and a bride and groom having their pre-wedding photos taken on a familiar location are two sights commonly seen in Seoul as they are in many other places around the world. However, these events seemed to me quite unusual having witnessed them during two of my visits to a site that seemed completely out of context with regard to inspiring such activities: Sŏdaemun Prison History Hall (Sŏdaemun hyŏngmuso yŏksagwan). The joyous and festive nature of these occurrences appeared to be at odds with both the historical background of the place and the characteristics of the structures and exhibitions that construct it in the attempt to convey certain messages, which are deemed important for defining national identity.

The concept of 'identity' is understood in this context as a subjective and dynamic phenomenon, which is basically 'a sense of sameness over time and space' that is not only sustained by remembering but also defines what to remember (Gillis 1994: 3). Furthermore, as both identities and memories 'have no existence beyond our politics, our social relations and our histories' (Gillis 1994: 5), I draw from Jacobs, whose evaluation of the relationship between British imperialism and the challenges made to it by 'post-colonial formations' leads her to assert that politics of identity and power 'do not just occur *in* space' but 'articulates itself *through* space and is, fundamentally, *about* space'

(1996: 1). Accordingly, this chapter highlights the act of objectifying memory (Gillis 1994: 17) by focusing on one historical and memorial site in the Republic of Korea (South Korea; hereafter ROK). Since it is beyond the scope of this chapter to elaborate on the trends and shifts related to the decisions on what to remember in post-liberation ROK (see Podoler 2004; Shin, Park and Yang, eds 2007), it shall suffice to point out that Sŏdaemun Prison History Hall encapsulates the central elements constituting the mainstream ROK notion of post-colonial national identity. In comparison with the other chapters of this part of the book, this chapter seeks to illuminate the post-war repercussions of Japan's militarism overseas rather than in Japan itself. To understand Sŏdaemun Prison History Hall, I would argue, is to understand the essential effect that Japan's aggression towards Korea has had on the shaping and the features of national identity in the ROK. In this context I particularly emphasize the role of the extreme Japanese brutality as it is conveyed at and by the site, in constructing the interrelated fundamental identity factors of bravery, legitimacy and the 'we'-'other' dichotomy.

BRIEF HISTORY OF SŎDAEMUN PRISON

Following the Russo-Japanese War, Japan became the dominant foreign power in Chosŏn Dynasty Korea (1392-1910) and it enforced the latter into signing the Protectorate Treaty in November 1905. Later, in July 1907, the Korean Emperor Kojong was forced to relinquish his throne in favour of his son after sending a secret mission to The Hague Peace Conference to protest Japan's aggression, an act that the Japanese perceived as violation of the Protectorate Treaty. On 24 July, several days after the abdication, the Japanese imposed another treaty on Korea that encroached on whatever was left of its sovereignty. This new treaty (called Dai-sanji nikkan kyōyaku by the Japanese, and Chŏngmi 7 choyak by the Koreans) strengthened Japan's control over Korean affairs including judicial functions, and it stipulated, among other things, that nine prisons were to be established with Japanese personnel at their highest echelon as well as constituting half the total staff.

Against this background, construction immediately followed and on 21 October 1908 the Japanese opened a prison under the name Kyŏngsŏng kamok (Kyŏngsŏng Prison). The name was changed in 1912 to Sŏdaemun kamok because a different prison that was then built received the name Kyŏngsŏng kamok, and finally, in 1923, the facility was renamed Sŏdaemun hyŏngmuso – Sŏdaemun Prison (*hyŏngmuso* and *kamok* both mean prison, jail). Originally designed to accommodate five hundred prisoners, more buildings were added between 1915 and 1929 to meet the growing demand, and it was especially during the nationwide anti-colonial March First Independence Movement of 1919 that a sudden increase of 3,000 detainees occurred.

In the 1930s, facilities on the prison's grounds included, among others, detention buildings, sports facilities, work buildings, a leper's building, underground cells (covered in 1934) and an execution building. In October 1945, shortly after Korea's liberation, the US Army amalgamated Kyŏngsŏng kamok with Sŏdaemun Prison, and the facility continued to serve the post-colonial ROK governments until its closure in November 1987. Seoul Prison (Sŏul kuch'iso), as it was called at the time, was then moved to the town of Ŭiwang in Kyŏnggi Province (Chŏng, Yŏm and Chang 1996: 220). Among the structures that now stood empty, three prison buildings and the execution building were designated National Historical Site No. 324 on 20 February 1988.

In December of that year, at an investment of approximately $11.5 million (Chŏng, Yŏm and Chang 1996: 217),[1] a renovation project was initiated and on 15 August 1992, which is Independence Day, the new Sŏdaemun Independence Park (Sŏdaemun tongnip kongwŏn) was opened with the prison as a memorial site on its grounds. In 1998, after three years of construction and reconstruction, Sŏdaemun Prison History Hall was opened in its current layout. According to the site's booklet, the place was built 'to pay tribute to the souls of the patriotic martyrs who rose to resist Japanese aggression despite imprisonment, atrocious torture and suppression', and it is 'a living education spot of history aimed at enlightening the descendants about our forefathers' spirit of sovereign independence' (Sŏdaemun hyŏngmuso yŏksagwan n.d.: 6).[2]

The function of the place as a familiar and an especially meaningful site is evident from the approximate number of half a million visitors who visit it yearly (Interview with curator Yang Sŏng-suk 2002), and from visits by high-level international figures. In October 2001, for example, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō came to the ROK for a visit intended to deal with some of the problematic issues related to Japan-ROK relations, including the questions of history and memory as manifested by the disputes over history textbooks and the Yasukuni Shrine visits. During this visit he toured Sŏdaemun Prison History Hall and declared that he 'toured the exhibits with sincere regret and apology for the serious damage and pain inflicted on the Korean people under Japan's colonial occupation' (Kohari 2007). Furthermore, another highly-symbolic visit came in August 2005 when a delegation from the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (North Korea; hereafter DPRK) of some 180 officials headed by Kim Ki Nam – Secretary of the Worker's Party of Korea – arrived in the ROK to take part in the celebrations of the sixtieth anniversary of liberation. After visiting Sŏdaemun Prison History Hall a joint statement was announced calling on Japan to 'stop distorting the past and pay as a nation compensation for its past invasions and crimes' (*Chosun Ilbo* 2005). In order to fully grasp how Japanese crimes are displayed and what their role is in shaping Korean identity, an analysis of the way the site relates to its close surroundings is first required.

THE SPATIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF SŎDAEMUN PRISON HISTORY HALL

Sŏdaemun Prison History Hall functions as the central theme of Sŏdaemun Independence Park, a park that includes an assortment of relics and monuments scattered on its approximately 109,000 sq m of grounds.[3] In light of that variety, the Mayor of Seoul's Sŏdaemun District considers the park to be no less than a 'sacred ground' (*sŏngji*) (Sŏdaemun hyŏngmuso yŏksagwan n.d.: 2).

In addition to Sŏdaemun Prison, there are two other historic structures in the park, Independence Hall (Tongnipkwan, not to be confused with the monumental Independence Memorial Hall in South Ch'ungch'ŏng province) and Independence Gate (Tongnimmun). Independence Hall was originally China Adoration Hall where Chinese envoys were entertained, and which was renamed Independence Hall at the same time as the construction of the Independence Gate. The Independence Gate was constructed between 1896 and 1897 and measures 14.28 m in height and 11.48 m in width. It is styled in the shape of the Arc de Triomphe in Paris, and was Korea's first tangible modern nationalist symbol, built at the exact location where Korean kings used to greet envoys from China through a gate called Yŏng-ŭn Gate that was erected back in 1430. Yŏng-ŭn Gate, the symbol of Korean subservience towards China, was demolished in 1895 to clear the symbolic spot for the construction of the Independence Gate. Two cornerstones preserved from Yŏng-ŭn Gate were placed in front of the Independence Gate, and they carry an ambiguous meaning. On the one hand, they are totally dominated by the much larger gate, thus what is projected is the notion of overcoming a past weakness. On the other hand, they are cherished as an historical relic, designated in 1963 as National Historical Site No. 33.

De Ceuster asserts that the result of incorporating the Independence Gate into Independence Park was that 'both the layout and the intention of the park marginalize the Independence Arch' (2000: 85) and that since the main theme of the park is the 'heroic independence struggle' conveyed by Sŏdaemun Prison History Hall, the gate, located at the opposite end of the park, is left 'ever more isolated' (2000: 86). In my opinion, however, the gate's positioning should be considered quite differently, namely with the theme of 'constructing continuity' borne in mind. I shall explain this point below.

Regardless of the intention to elevate the status of the gate,[4] the coupling of this monument with the Prison History Hall creates a defined space that binds colonial history, represented by the prison, to the emergence of modern Korean nationalism, represented by the gate. This notion is further supported by several means. To begin with, the following lines from the text appearing in front of Independence Hall connect the two older relics to the colonial struggle through the association of a spirit of independence: 'Together with the nearby Independence Gate . . . the Independence Hall was a symbol of Korea's spirit of national independence towards the end of the Joseon [Chosŏn] period.' Second, after

the Japanese had demolished it, special care was taken to reconstruct the Independence Hall in 1996 as part of the park's overall theme. Third, in the basement and first floor of the Independence Hall, memorial tablets for anti-colonial fighters, as well as other related historical relics are on display. Fourthly, it should be noted that the decision to name the park Sŏdaemun Independence Park was not only a result of a wish to indicate the place of the site (Sŏdaemun-gu, Seoul). The title itself is meant to create links between Sŏdaemun Prison History Hall and both the Independence Gate and Independence Hall, and signifies an actual historic scene for historical education regarding national suffering and the independence movement (Sŏultae han'guk munhwa yŏn'guso [SNU Research Institute of Korean Culture] 1988, quoted in Jung 1999: 46).

Finally, when standing in front of the gate, a clear view of another icon – March First Declaration of Independence Monument (3.1 Tongnip sŏnŏn kinyŏmt'ap) – is visible through the gate's arch. This monument, dedicated to the most revered manifestation of anti-colonial national struggle in the ROK, was erected on 15 August 1963 on the grounds of Seoul's Pagoda Park – the actual spot where the anti-Japanese March First Movement of 1919 commenced. The monument comprises a bronze sculpture of a group of demonstrators with the Declaration of Independence inscribed on a stone screen behind them. In 1979, during major renovation works on the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of the movement, the monument was dismantled, but was later rebuilt at its current location in 1992. The meaning of its resurfacing is thus explained in a Sŏdaemun Prison History Hall publication: 'For twelve years [the monument] was neglected but, in 1992, it was reconstructed in Sŏdaemun Independence Park – the site of an anti-Japanese independence movement – after voices from every sphere of life were raised' (Sŏdaemun hyŏngmuso yŏksagwan n.d.: 41). Thus, the two different objects, Independence Gate on one side, and the March First Declaration of Independence Monument that is located at the opposite end of the grounds, are set in such a way that a straight, uninterrupted symbolic line of vision runs between them.

The addition of two more monuments in Sŏdaemun Independence Park conveys the message of historical continuity between the rise of modern Korean nationalism and the anti-colonial national spirit. The first is a statue of Sŏ Chae-p'il (Philip Jaisohn) (1864–1951), a nationalist intellectual who, among others, initiated the construction of the Independence Gate.[5] The second monument is the Patriotic Martyr Monument (Sunguk sŏnyŏl ch'unyŏm t'ap), which comprises a 22.3 m high obelisk and a 40 m long granite screen that was constructed between 15 August 1991 and 15 August 1992. It was erected 'to honour the patriotic martyrs who rose to fight against Japanese aggression for [the cause of] national independence' (Sŏdaemun hyŏngmuso yŏksagwan n.d.: 40). In the context of the layout of Sŏdaemun Independence Park and the dialogues that the various structures on its grounds conduct with each other, Sŏdaemun Prison History Hall contributes a conspicuous

image of a severely brutal oppressor as part of the narrative centred on the force of the anti-colonial spirit.

COLONIAL BRUTALITY: AN ASSURANCE OF THE 'WE' AND A LINCHPIN OF KOREAN VALOUR

From the moment one passes through the entrance to the site an image of entering a dark and threatening prison, and not simply a memorial site, is projected: the visitor buys the ticket and enters the site through a red brick wall with a watch tower situated high above. The original wall surrounding the prison was 4.5 m high and 1,161 m long, of which a 79 m long section at the front and a 208 m long section of the rear part were restored. The restored imposing watch tower overlooking the entrance was built in 1923 and stands 10 m high.

The total area of the site is approximately 29,000 sq m, and on its grounds is a combination of original buildings that were preserved or restored, alongside monuments and exhibitions projecting what and how should be remembered and commemorated. Of the fifteen buildings remaining in 1987, when Seoul Prison was moved to Ŭiwang, seven detention and imprisonment buildings were preserved, as well as the leper's building and the execution building. Also, the underground cells were restored, and the security building, which the Japanese used for interrogating prisoners, was preserved and transformed into Sŏdaemun Prison History Exhibition (Sŏdaemun hyŏngmuso yŏksajŏn sigwan) – the first building the visitor meets after passing through the entrance.

The exhibitions in this building are well invested and very informative, and include ample photographs, maps, three-dimensional models and historical artifacts. The first floor is called 'A Place of Reverence'. With the help of a video room, a touch-screen computer and a small library, it is dedicated mostly to providing information regarding the prison and its history, personal details of the prisoners and the independence movement in general. In addition, it holds a small exhibition room. Over the course of my several visits to this room the photographs along the walls have been replaced, but the exhibits that dominate the room remain constant: glass cases showing shackles, the humiliating *yongsu* masks, which were put on prisoners when transferred under guard, and short sticks used for beating and whipping inmates. Also exhibited is a wooden cross on which prisoners were tied and beaten, along with the heavy clubs used for this form of torture. Thus, as the visitors make their way along the walls to view the photographs and texts (in Korean only) relating to Korean patriots and the national struggle, they are constantly being reminded of brutality and suffering brought about by the use of objects that are placed in the centre of the room.

The second floor is called 'A Place of History', and two texts should first draw our attention. One explains that the Japanese invasion put an end to previous Korean custom, according to which the philosophy was 'to build prisons, but keep them empty'. By the same token, through

another text the curators explain that in post-liberation times, the prison was no longer a facility of colonial oppression (*sikminjihwa t'anap kigwan*) but a correctional facility for Korean society (*han'guk sahoe ŭi kyojŏng kigwan*). Besides being a rare reference to the post-colonial function of the prison, this statement conveys the message of a more positive use of the facility by the Koreans as compared with the negative Japanese use of it. The thousands of Korean political prisoners incarcerated at Sŏdaemun by post-liberation authoritarian governments have been 'forgotten'. Both texts draw a clear demarcation line between the Korean 'we' and the colonial Japanese 'other'. The acknowledgement that 'we' – or at least a segment of the 'we' – may have oppressed in a similar manner to the way our 'demonic other' had oppressed is problematic, not only because it might be classified as an act of self-hatred, but because it is also an act that might undermine the senses of moral quality, of sameness and of national strength.

As the embedded idea of an especially brutal Japanese occupier is at the core of Sŏdaemun Prison History Hall's 'tangible narrative', its potent graphic manifestation deserves some consideration. To start with, at a section called 'In-Prison Life' a text specifies the horrors that the Japanese were responsible for in the prison – diseases, violence, torture and a severe shortage of food that even led prisoners to eat mice – and explains that 'these barbarous and vicious acts were designed to root out the national independence movement'. Glass cases here exhibit various instruments used for torture, swords of warders, clubs, *yongsu* masks, shackles and rice bowls. Photographs on the walls portray prison scenes including prisoners suffering from malnutrition and prisoners with amputated body parts. Also, there are three replicas of a 'wall-coffin' (*pyŏkgwan*) – a niche originally built in the wall of Japanese police stations and in which Korean detainees were squeezed. From the inside of one such niche, the face of a bleeding prisoner stares at the visitors, while the other two, in addition to a solitary cell, are open to the visitor for the purpose of a 'personal first-hand experience' (Sŏdaemun hyŏngmuso yŏksagwan n.d.: 22). Also in this section is a miniature model of an execution yard, with an attached television that screens a dramatic staged re-enactment of an execution. The short drama shows arrest, torture and execution, and the final frame in the film is that of the Korean flag waving proudly. The visitor then exits the room through a replica of heavy iron prison doors, and is then directed towards the 'Place of Experience' in the basement.

The 'Place of Experience' is where 'the moans of the tortured patriotic ancestors can still be heard', and it was designed so that the courage of those people could be experienced first hand (Sŏdaemun hyŏngmuso yŏksagwan n.d.: 25). The basement is dark and intimidating, and it exhibits reconstructed detention and torture rooms. Through the bars of the cells the visitor views hideous scenes of torture demonstrated by a tableau of mannequins, including various forms of beating with clubs, water torture, whipping, electrification and sexual torture (Figure 1).

Figure 1 Scene from the 'Place of Experience'. Photograph by author.

Two dominating effects are the 'blood' that covers the bodies and walls, and staged audio recordings of prisoners' screams and torturers' interrogations. Audio and motion effects are electronically activated when the visitor crosses hidden sensors. Brutality is not created only through the acts themselves. The facial expressions of the effigies of the Japanese officials, showing toughness, enjoyment or indifference, are a central contribution to this image. Furthermore, in an official booklet the curators describe the Japanese imperialists as employing 'methods of brutal torture intolerable to human beings' and explain that they ruthlessly tortured patriotic fighters on a regular basis. 'It was a standard practice' for them to 'drag both male and female Korean patriots and to beat them with a bat', while they also committed 'an inexpressible brutal method of sexual torture' (Sŏdaemun hyŏngmuso yŏksagwan n.d.: 28).

Equipped with the visual historical experience of brutality and suffering as transmitted by the first building at the site, the visitor is now prepared to fully absorb the significance of the other buildings he enters. The preserved structures serve as an authentic historical testimony, thus, their power as agents of both an historic and emotional experience is completely conditioned by the visitor's previous knowledge of the events that took place within their bare walls (Figure 2). These preserved buildings, therefore, constitute a tangible manifestation of the notion that atrocities are committed by humans, not monsters, and they take place in earthly places – in ordinary looking unimpressive buildings that now stand empty. This is an important message for people who did not experience such acts themselves, but only learned about them as an inseparable part of their history of which they are continuously reminded.



Figure 2 A look inside one of the preserved buildings. Photograph by author.

The preserved Auschwitz concentration camp in Poland, and its function in the Jewish memory of the Holocaust, is similar in this regard to the Sŏdaemun Prison site and its place in remembering the colonial period in the ROK. The ordinariness, or the normality, of the preserved buildings convey the disturbing message of an un-mystified evil that originates from and is accepted by humans, an evil that is not an act of a certain 'demonic out-of-this-world' perpetrator. Thus, in Sŏdaemun Prison History Hall it is the tension created by the conjunction of the

Figure 3 A reconstructed execution room scene. Photograph by author.

diabolic colonizer presented in the exhibition hall, with the ordinary surroundings in which evil was inflicted, which creates the image of an extreme form of brutality and suffering that were perpetrated on and endured by man.[6] Recently, though, the curators of the site have made changes, which represent a phenomenon that Irwin-Zarecka termed 'an increasing *commercial* value of the past' (1994: 106).

In the summer of 2003, two new permanent exhibitions opened in two of the prison buildings on the grounds. These exhibitions depict more graphic images of Japanese brutality including the execution room (Figure 3) and a chair simulating torture by electrification: the visitor is invited to sit in the chair, and while observing a scene of a Korean prisoner being electrified, vibrations are sent through the chair to the visitor every time the Japanese torturer sends an electric shock to the tortured Korean prisoner. To be sure, these depictions are in line with the attempt to transmit the image of the cruel Japanese oppressor, and there is no doubt regarding the usage of such tortures during colonial times. However, I believe that in no small measure, under the influence of the tourism industry, these exhibitions are representative of a tendency to market the past as an attractive commodity. Accordingly, it is my view that this exhibition item represents a gradual encroachment on the concept of colonial brutality, and, in the words of Irwin-Zarecka, 'the attractive packaging may end depriving the past of its prime power, that of legitimation' (1994: 109).

More texts are placed inside the preserved buildings, and further emphasize the brutality of the Japanese. For example, the solitary cells 'were built to conduct physical torture and impose psychological and mental suffering', 'the Japanese aggressors suppressed them [patriotic fighters] with ruthless torture', living conditions were close to that of 'a pen for animals', and the plaque attached to the 'corpse removal

exit' – discovered when the Independence Park renovation project took place – explains that 'the Japanese imperialists covered this exit in order to hide their barbarity'.[7] The final structure on the visitor's course is the underground cells where female prisoners were housed and tortured. These underground cells, which the curators decided to name 'Yu Kwan-sun Cave' (Yu Kwan-sun gul), interlock memory and commemoration: it is a structure that shows preserved and renovated cells, while at the same time it is dedicated to commemorating – through plaques, photographs and title, Yu Kwan-sun (1902–20) – a young girl who is perhaps the most famous martyr of the March First Independence Movement.[8] This underscores the general concept of Sŏdaemun Prison History Hall that is manifest in the site's layout, brochures, texts and exhibitions. These all function as a living historical testimony to the horrors of the time and the ability to overcome them, as well as a place for commemoration and education for generations to come.

In that context, the idea of an especially brutal Japanese colonizer supports an important message essential for the shaping of national identity: the harsher the oppression, so the ability to resist is much more admirable. In a section called 'National Resistance Room' on the second floor of the Sŏdaemun Prison History Exhibition building, various familiar events of the anti-colonial struggle are exhibited. Its dialogue with the exhibitions that focus on Japanese cruelty and Korean suffering thus enhances the image of a powerful national spirit of resistance. Enveloped in that image of struggle is also the notion of legitimacy. Much is dedicated to the role of the Korean Provisional Government (KPG), which was established in Shanghai shortly after the outbreak of the March First Independence Movement. In the aftermath of the liberation, its former members returned to the ROK, including Syngman Rhee who became the first president in 1948. 'Until 1948', explains one scholar, '[it] played the role as the spiritual prop and stay of the Korean people, as well as the uppermost representative body of the Korean independence struggle' (Yi 1999: 193–4). Thus, while this body is disdained by the DPRK, it is commonly revered in the ROK which by presenting itself as its natural successor, projects the message of being the legitimate representative of pre-divided Korea. Accordingly, the site's booklet stresses that the KPG 'integrated and commanded the independence movements both home and abroad' and 'until liberation of the homeland it served as the central body of the independence movement' (Sŏdaemun hyŏngmuso yŏksagwan n.d.: 19). The legitimacy-resistance bond is further tangibly expressed through the manner of dealing with one of the most sensitive post-colonial issues: collaboration.

EXHIBITING THE DEVIL'S LACKEYS, SECURING THE SPIRIT OF RESISTANCE

On 28 February 2002 the Korea Parliamentary League on National Spirit (KPLNS) (Minjokchŏnggi rŭl Paroseu nŭn Kukhoeŭiwŏn Moim)

– a group of twenty-nine lawmakers from both the ruling Millennium Democratic Party and the opposition Grand National Party – published a list of 708 names of people who they defined as pro-Japanese collaborators during the colonial period. This was the first time in the ROK that legislators had taken such a step, and it immediately sparked public debate. The reactions evolved around several familiar questions regarding the issue of collaboration, for example: how exactly should 'collaboration' be defined; who has both the authority and the right to establish such a definition; and, what is best for 'the nation' – to discuss the issue of collaboration and research it, or conversely, to conceal it.

A central point regarding the term 'collaboration' in the context of colonial Korea is that Koreans commonly use the term *ch'inilp'a*, which literally means 'pro-Japanese faction'. Hence, materialistic opportunists, pragmatists who sought to adapt to the harsh reality, as well as nationalists and ideologists who believed that for the time being cooperating with the authorities would be best for the nation, are commonly lumped together with true pro-Japanese under the *ch'inilp'a* label. The shades of grey that colour 'collaboration' in its looser sense are thus darkened by this derogatory term. We should also bear in mind that the first post-colonial administration, the one of Syngman Rhee (1948–1960), relied heavily on former employees of the Japanese colonial apparatus, and that former president Park Chung-hee, who led the country between 1961 and 1979, had served in the Japanese army. Thus, in the master narrative of the ROK, collaboration is minimized to a few national traitors, 'useful scapegoats', involved in the annexation of the country (De Ceuster 2002: 217), and in that way, the poignant issue of accountability is efficiently dealt with. Kim Minchŏl observed that to record and remember the wrongdoings of pro-Japanese does not only mean the materialization of historical justice, but also, from the standpoint of the present, to deeply consider the matter of responsibility (2002: 26). However, 'by blaming a small number, the majority of the population can cast off any sense of responsibility or guilt' while concomitantly relieving the burden of the collaborationist past from the post-colonial regimes of Syngman Rhee and Park Chung-hee (De Ceuster 2002: 217).

Who, then, are these scapegoats? Mostly they are Koreans who cooperated with the Japanese between 1904 and 1910. Song Pyŏng-jun, the leader of the Ilchinhoe (United Advancement Society), is one such example. The Ilchinhoe supported Japan in its 1904-05 war with Russia, and continued to cooperate with Japan until it was disbanded in early 1910. Song appears seven times on the February 2002 list of collaborators under various categories. Yet despite Song's notorious role in the master narrative, the most despised figure in the context of treachery is Yi Wan-yong. Yi, 'the darkest name in Korean history' (Cumings 1997: 145), signed all three crucial treaties which both formalized and gave substance to Korea's colonization. As the Minister of Education he was one of the 'gang of five', or 'the five traitors', that signed the Protectorate Treaty on 17 November 1905. Later, as Prime Minister he was one of

seven who signed the Chŏngmi 7 choyak of 24 July 1907, the treaty that gave the Japanese Resident-General authority on all administrative matters. And finally, again as Prime Minister, he signed the Treaty of Annexation on 22 August 1910. Yi appears no less than ten times on the list of 708 collaborators for his roles in signing those treaties and acting in various colonial bodies.

Accordingly, as 'collaboration is understood as an aberration that is hardly more than a footnote in the history of the nation' (De Ceuster 2002: 217), Yi and other demonized figures appear as no more than a footnote in the exhibitions of Sŏdaemun Prison History Hall. At the same time, however, when they are referred to, a special technique is used to represent them in that context. The photographs of Yi Wan-yong, Pak Che-sun, Yi Chi-yong, Yi Kŭn-t'aek, and Kwŏn Chu-hyŏn, the five ministers who signed the 1905 Protectorate Treaty, are exhibited under the title 'Ŭlsa 5 choyak', the Korean name of that treaty. What draws the attention here is the juxtaposition of these traitors with an identified hero. Exhibited next to 'the five traitors' is the photograph of Min Yŏng-hwan – the traitors' contemporary and a respected official and military aide-de-camp to the Korean Emperor Kojong. Following the signing of the Protectorate Treaty, Min committed suicide and left an impassioned plea for the nation's independence in an act of protest that was followed by other officials. Thus, the arrangement of the exhibition further marginalizes the historical significance of the collaborators, and establishes a clear boundary between Korean traitors and Korean heroes. Through this national exoneration, post-colonial identity remains strictly revolved around the solid axis of valour.

IDENTITY: CONSTRUCTED AND CONTESTED

In their comparative study on patterns of conceiving the past, Schwartz and Kim write that 'given a history of attacks by stronger neighbours, victimhood has become a major element in Koreans' collective identity and memory' (2002: 211), and while the sense of victimization is saturated with self-blame, 'suffering is a vehicle for the display of virtue and faith' (2002: 223). According to the poll they conducted, the most frequently mentioned source of dishonour, disgrace and shame was Japanese colonial rule (2002: 212–13).

Yet in the master narrative of the ROK, a shift from a heavy reliance on victimhood towards a much stronger emphasis on the theme of resistance and heroism occurred in the early 1980s as was manifested in the decision to establish the huge Independence Memorial Hall (Tongnip kinyŏmgwan) in Ch'ŏnan, South Ch'ungch'ŏng province. The site was finally opened in 1987 and the many projects that were soon to follow further systematically anchored the theme of valour (see Podoler 2004). Interestingly, also in museums in China, Japanese brutality has been the inspiration for those two modes of representation, namely victimization/suffering and heroic resistance (Denton 2007). In comparison with the ROK, however,

the shift was the other way around; as Denton shows, the trend was from a focus on heroism to a much stronger emphasis on atrocity and victimization (2007).[9] In any case, the brutality of Japanese colonial rule in Korea was indeed expressed in many ways, including, among others, the shooting and burning of unarmed demonstrators and civilians, the torture of detained men and women and the attempt to annihilate Korean sense of identity and nationalism. In the aftermath of liberation, that aspect of colonial rule has been highlighted by both Koreas in the context of each state's preferable master narrative of valour and resistance.

Sŏdaemun Prison History Hall, in this regard, functions as both a showcase and a shaper of the master narrative's concept of national identity, and five key aspects of that identity derive from the site's strong emphasis on Japanese brutality. First, a clear dividing line between the (Korean) 'we' and the (Japanese) 'other' is drawn. Second, the image of an atrocious powerful colonizer makes the Korean ability to resist ever more commendable. Third, rooted in the idea of that heroic resistance is the leading role of the Korean Provisional Government, through which post-colonial legitimacy for the ROK is claimed in the context of a divided nation. Fourth, post-liberation ROK governments further claim legitimacy, domestically, by 'forgetting' their post-colonial use of the facility. And finally, 'forgetting' the role of former collaborators in administrating the state and juxtaposing the selected ones with familiar heroes legitimizes not only, again, post-liberation governments, but to an extent also Korean society as a whole as it was the source of a larger number of collaborators than commonly acknowledged. The result is a Korean identity that draws its strength from a continuing spirit of resistance and independence, devoid of any sordid taint.

Being an identity agent of the sort sketched above, the site does not operate in a vacuum. Similar messages are found in other familiar places of memory, history and commemoration such as Independence Memorial Hall, the exhibitions at the National Cemeteries in Seoul and Taejŏn, and more (see Podoler 2004). In addition, at Independence Memorial Hall – which is the largest and most famous museum and memorial hall in the country – a tangible symbolic reference is made by exhibiting one replica of the front gate of Sŏdaemun Prison at the exit of a hall named Japanese Aggression Hall, and a second replica at the entrance to the following hall called March First Movement Hall. The image of the prison is thus the one selected and mobilized to create a direct spatial and cognitive link between Japanese brutality and Korean suffering and valour. At the same time, however, we should keep in mind that an identity in the shape preferred by the master narrative is a dynamic phenomenon, which under certain socio-political conditions in various historical crossroads may be particularly vulnerable to contesting trends.

Seeds of such challenges already existed in the ROK during the time of the authoritarian regimes. In the early 1980s, for example, dissidents defied the hegemonic narrative promoted by the state and developed an

alternative historical interpretation bearing implications for the features of post-colonial identity. This contesting narrative was critical of the post-colonial ROK governments and it rejected the notion of a North Korean 'other' by suggesting that from an historical point of view the struggle of the Korean people is actually against American imperialism (Jager 2003: 59-61). Since the democratization of the late 1980s, such different voices, and many others, have bloomed to become increasingly noticeable. The prevailing concept of Korean identity as advanced by the most powerful agent of identity formation, i.e. the government, is now faced with a variety of demands coming from citizens' groups and certain academic circles as the idea of 'settling/cleansing the past' (*kwagŏ ch'ŏngsan*) stands at the centre of public discourse and is high on the agenda of political leaders.

Debates focusing on previously taboo issues such as collaborators, state violence – including the massacres of ROK citizens on the eve and during the Korean War, the massacre of innocent Vietnamese by Korean troops during the Vietnam War and more[10] – and the call for a more complex approach to the colonial period,[11] are all pressing for a finer tuning of the ROK's conventional idea on 'Korean identity'. Thus, it is unclear whether the joyous activities at Sŏdaemun Prison History Hall, described in the opening of this chapter, derive from the master narrative's failure to instil the desired messages or whether it is a subconscious expression of a more intricate Korean identity. Only time will tell how sites of memory and identity such as Sŏdaemun Prison History Hall adapt to the changing circumstances taking place.

NOTES

1 In this source, the figure is given in wŏn (the Korean currency): eighty-five ŏk (ŏk=one hundred million). I have converted this to dollars on the basis of a rough average of the wŏn to dollar exchange rates of the time.

2 Unless stated otherwise, all translations from Korean are my own. .

3 For a full analysis of the park using theories of semiology, see Jung (1999). Accordingly, Jung emphasizes in this research the existence, or the 'being', of the Independence Park as a continuous process of the formation, transformation and extinction of the signs that are found on its grounds.

4 To be sure, since its heyday at the time of its initiation, the gate never again regained its symbolic significance. On the construction of the gate and on its history as a national icon, see De Ceuster (2000: 81–7).

5 Sŏ Chae-p'il returned to Korea in 1896 after earning a medical degree in the United States. That same year, along with other reform-minded young activists, he helped to form the Independence Club (Tongnip hyŏphoe), an association that, in the words of Robinson, 'signalled the advent of modern nationalism in Korea' (1988: 27). The voluminous material dedicated to the Independence Club reflects the historical significance attributed to it by the ROK.

6 There is nothing ordinary, of course, in buildings that house, or housed, a gallows or torture facilities, and to the average person there is nothing

ordinary in prison buildings. This is, however, exactly my point: it is, first, the fact that they all are man-made objects, and second, the fact that man-made unimpressive buildings housed atrocities, that supports the message regarding suffering and brutality in sites such as Sŏdaemun Prison History Hall. For a reference to the nature of the museum in Auschwitz, see Irwin-Zarecka (1994: 179–80).

7 A tour guide at the site once pointed out to me one more form of psychological torture called 'the road of death'. The warders led prisoners from the buildings to 'death intersection' (*samjŏngmok*) where only there, at the last moment, they told them whether to continue straight forward to meet relatives who had come to visit them, or to turn right towards the execution grounds.

8 For a discussion on the commemoration of Yu Kwan-sun and the March First Independence Movement, see Podoler (2005).

9 For a full analysis of the reasons behind these trends in China and the ROK see Denton (2007) and Podoler (2004) respectively.

10 On these debates see Shin, Park and Yang (eds) (2007) and the special issue of *Korea Journal* (2002). .

11 Among the growing literature in this regard, two sources that exemplify the trend are Shin and Robinson (eds) (1999) and Kang (2001).

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Index