JAPAN AND THE SPECTER OF IMPERIALISM

MARK ANDERSON

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

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Acknowledgments

This book took shape during my graduate years at Cornell University. Doing coursework for Naoki Sakai I became interested in the Meiji period nationalization and institutionalization of classical Japanese literature. In one of my first courses in the department, Brett de Bary presented the challenges of Ozaki Kôyô's *Konjiki yasha* (*The Gold Demon*, 1897–1903) in a way that immediately had me hooked. This book is my attempt to think through those two projects, ultimately brought together by what I came to see as the intersection of international law, evolutionary discourses of civilizational hierarchy, and competing discourses of domesticity in late nineteenth-century Japan and occupied Korea of the early twentieth century.

I initially met Naoki Sakai at the University of Chicago in 1985 and rather than pursue anthropology at Chicago (which would have been a much more direct path to a graduate degree given my undergraduate training in anthropology and philosophy at the University of Illinois and my work at Chicago with Bernard Cohn and Jean Comaroff), I chose to follow him to Cornell for graduate training. I must mention that during my time at Chicago, Bernard Cohn introduced me to the problems of post-coloniality in a way that has formatively affected my intellectual life ever since. Sakai's theory of translation and his critical application of Derrida and Kristeva to Japanese cultural studies was transformative for me. While the decision to move to Cornell and change disciplines made my graduate training an even more extended monastic stint than it otherwise might have been, I've never regretted that decision. I found the late 1980s and early 1990s at Cornell in the Department of East Asian Studies to be one of the most intellectually exciting periods of my life.

Undertaking coursework and graduate training with fellow students such as Michael Bourdaghs, Nina Blake, Peter Button, Endo Katsuhiko, Joanne Izbicki, Ayako Kano, Susan Klein, Joe Murphy, Sarah Pradt, Christina Sharpe, Jon Solomon, Bob Steen, Stuart O'Nan, and Alok Yadav still strikes me as a truly extraordinary embarrassment of riches. I learned much from all of them as both thinkers and people. Mike Bourdaghs, in particular, unfailingly provided thoughtful feedback on the dissertation at

those times when it was most desperately needed. Mark Driscoll, Richard Calichman, and Setsu Shigematsu helped liven things up as I was on my way out of town.

The larger situation of the humanities at Cornell was unusually dynamic at that time. The intellectual environment provided by faculty such as Sakai, de Bary, Victor Koschmann, Karen Brazell, and Tim Murray was always both tough-minded, yet, at the same time, welcoming of idiosyncratic directions of one's own. I became Naoki Sakai's first advisee at Cornell because of my great faith in his intellectual ability and his commitment to the politicality of thought. He has lived up to the great potential that I first saw in him in Chicago in the mid-1980s. I wouldn't have made it out of the program at Cornell without Brett de Bary's intellectual and emotional support. Thanks again.

Fellow travelers during mid-1990s research forays to Japan included Sharon Hayashi and Anne McKnight, both of whom are both brilliant thinkers and artful people. I will always consider both of you dear friends. Our times together down and out in Tokyo will always be among my fondest memories. Thanks to the Kobayashi family and Nikki Makri for showing me that fun and eccentricity are truly international. Thanks to Fukuda Rikka and Miyazaki Osamu for taking me under their wings, for being into the music, and for being my first true Japanese friends. Thanks to Kurokawa Kazumi, Jin Yi, and Mochizuki Minako for the good times. Thanks to the Japanese Society for the Promotion of Science and the Fulbright Foundation for support during the period in which this manuscript was being refined. Thanks to Yoshimi Shunya for sponsoring a long overdue and much needed break from teaching at the University of Tokyo in 2007.

During the late 1990s I taught a couple of terms at McGill University and greatly benefited from the collegial fellowship and support of Ken Dean, Tom LaMarre, Tom Looser, and Iwakabe Shigeru. Montreal is a wonderful city. It was marvelous to finally live abroad in a city other than Tokyo. It was an additional and intriguing challenge to work through a critique of U.S. foreign policy in a Canadian context.

Since moving to Minneapolis, first as an adjunct and then as a tenure-track faculty member, I've deeply enjoyed working with Sarah Pradt, Terry Kawashima, Nick Kaldis, Simona Sawhney, Christine Marran, Jason McGrath, Bali Sahota, Maki Isaka, Ajay Skaria, Hiromi Mizuno, Chris Isett, Shaden Tageldin, Bruce Braun, Richard Leppert, Tim Brennan, Leo Ching, and David Chang. I'd like to thank Ann Waltner, Ray Wakefield, and Dan Brewer for their mentorship and support. I'd like to

thank Kevin Doak, Doug Howland, and Greg Pflugfelder for a number of thoughtful exchanges on Japanese intellectual history over the last few years. Doug Howland, Lydia Liu, Jan Bardsley, Christine Marran, Nick Kaldis, Jo Lee, and Arthur Groos all provided invaluable feedback for refining the manuscript. Special thanks to Kimoto Takeshi and Fujiwara Manako for proofreading the translations.

The last few years have been an astonishing, exhausting, and literally mind-bending jumble: marriage to Christine Marran and making a family with our motley pair of dogs; joy at the birth of our son, Lorenz; hanging with my musical comrades Chadley Koppenhaver, Barbara Meyers, John Munson, and Mike Michaels; the excitement of finally making progress on my research agenda despite its interruption by the tedious banality of relentless sinus problems, including a third surgery; the economic and psychological terrorism of the probationary tenure process; and last but not least, running with the geezer basketball crew at the rec center at noon on Tuesdays and Thursdays. A special thanks to Nick Kaldis and my sister Cathy for the head checks and the abiding friendship. Thanks to my parents for their example and for always being there.

To Lorenz, who didn't see me more than one day a weekend for his first two and a half years, here's looking at you, kid.

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Introduction

The Ansei Treaties and the Specter of Imperialism

> Miya, you—you whore! Your bitch's . . . nothing but faithlessness from you has driven the man, Hazama Kan'ichi, to the madness of despair. A valuable life becomes [just] a mistake. School, whatever, I give up. Because of this resentment, I will become a demon even as I live, determined to eat the flesh of beasts like you, you bitch . . .[1]
>
> Ozaki Kôyô, *Konjiki yasha* [*The Gold Demon*]

> Ah, is this the Japan of the Japanese people? Is this the Japan of the constitution? Or is it the Japan of a few moneylenders (*kanekashigyô*)? I can't help feeling despondent. This is not just the case in Japan alone—now the politics of the world is entirely managed for the sake of capitalists . . .[2]
>
> Kôtoku Shûsui, "Those Who Decide on Peace and War"

In the first epigraph, the primary male character in the turn of the nineteenth-century novel, *The Gold Demon* (1897–1903), Kan'ichi, in concert with his unsavory gender politics, vows to become a demon in response to his perception that his former fiancee desires money more than a romantic relationship with him. It turns out that in 1897, becoming a demon means becoming a loanshark, a usurer. In response to the contamination of romantic spirit by material desire, Kan'ichi essentially vows to become an automaton, a specter of desire without bounds, an abjected personification of the limitless demand for capital accumulation arguably at the heart of the new economic order. Later in the work, another character draws a parallel between the Meiji state's enforcement of usurious moneylending practices domestically and the great powers' abuse of international law.

In the second epigraph, the anarcho-socialist, Kôtoku Shûsui, presents his vision of early twentieth century Japan. He describes a state that

betrays workers by doing the bidding of a cabal in the world of banking and finance. He sees the life of workers internationally as threatened by the spectral, dead hand of moneylenders. He figured this general sense of foreboding in the title of his later book, *The Twentieth Century Monster: Imperialism* (1901).[3]

Japan and the Specter of Imperialism is intended to improve our understanding of capitalism in nineteenth-century East Asia by mapping competing Japanese conceptions of national life and death—and the related, mutual implication of discourses of the foreign and the domestic—as Japan confronted its coerced integration into the international market under the Ansei treaty regime (1858–1910). This book is thus organized around an effort to outline vitalist ontologies of Meiji period Japanese nationalism and the discourses of the domestic sphere that were such an integral part of them. That is to say, it seeks to trace the manner in which competing conceptions of the Meiji nation-state variously situated family, society, political economy, national community, emperor, and state in relation to the positive valence of life associated with national survival. This also involves accounting for various perceived threats to that survival, the threat of the degeneration or potential death of the nation-state. Given that present-day champions of neoliberalism, such as Thomas Friedman, continue to condemn the nationalism of others as organismic and backward, and continue to promote cosmopolitan universalism aligned with their own equally organismic nationalism, this book both investigates the shifting relationship between disciplines of knowledge in East Asian history from a global perspective and traces a genealogy of contemporary intellectual constructs.[4]

The work of Pheng Cheah has revealed the manner in which discourses of nationalism consistently invoke a sacrificial tendency toward death in the name of projects designed to ensure national survival, to preserve the nation's association with life. The association of order with reason and autonomy vis-à-vis nonorganic nature led to the conception of political organizations as organized, living forms that seek to resist and exclude death. From the late eighteenth-century, the nation has been both commonly figured as an organism, and, at the same time, offered as a means of participation in a spiritual life that transcends biological finitude. From this perspective, national spirit is seen as by nature active and thus free. By contrast, the opposition between the spontaneous and the mechanical, or the automaton, is frequently figured in terms of an opposition between life and death.[5]

In this book, specter refers to the uncanny effect when one side of this founding opposition constituting a particular vision of the nation is

disturbed by the other: when the life of the economy is disturbed by the dead hand of the state; when the sovereignty of the state and the nation is threatened or qualified by the dark and overwhelming military and economic force of foreign powers; at the individual level, when love is contaminated by money; when an individual national subject is overwhelmed by dubious threats of economic destruction and ruin.

Japan and the Specter of Imperialism thus situates Hazama Kan'ichi's decision to become a demonic moneylender as a specter that stages one respect in which late nineteenth-century Japanese conceptions of family, nation, and love were haunted by the increasing penetration of the market into Japanese society, by the increasing commodification of relationships previously conceived in less exclusively economic terms. It situates Kôtoku Shûsui's twentieth-century monster as a specter that stages the contemporary worker as haunted by the dead hand of the state doing the bidding of narrow financial interests opposed to the common good.

Such constructions of the nation are conceived in the terms of a vitalist ontology, in terms of an opposition between national life and death. Such a vision requires that the sides be kept apart. When they are not, an uncanny specter is produced that continues to haunt until the tension is resolved in some way, until the threat is eliminated, or opposing forces are seen as having been effectively incorporated within the national body. Absent such resolution, the pure and the corrupt, the healthy and the degenerate, the native and the foreign, the communal and the selfish, the natural and the artificial, are observed to disturbingly and uncannily exist alongside one another.

In the context of Japan studies and Japanese history, the prevailing reading of turn of the century Japanese nationalism—exemplified by Ishida Takeshi's critique of Inoue Tetsujirô and Maryuama Masao's identification with Fukuzawa Yukichi and Kuga Katsunan—has been a condemnation of state-centered constructions of the Japanese political body as "unhealthy" organismic nationalism, combined with an embrace of the purportedly more universalist thought of figures such as Kuga Katsunan, which has been valorized as "healthy" nationalism.[6] For thinkers such as Ishida and Maruyama, organismic articulations of the Japanese social body are by definition opposed to liberalism and social progress. They unavoidably displace more desirable and liberal alternatives associated with rationalism, cosmopolitanism, and universal humanism.

As this study reveals, however, an organismic paradigm of the social body was as central for Japanese intellectuals who drew on British thought as it was for those who developed their positions in dialogue with German idealism. Indeed, this book demonstrates that nationalisms in

semicolonial Japan inflected by German idealist thought such as those of Shiga Jûkô, Kuga Katsunan, and Miyake Setsurei championed the nation in universal humanist terms and did so in heated, polemic opposition to constituted state authority. Indeed, this study also demonstrates that—as received in Japan—the purportedly cosmopolitan universalism of British liberalism, the avowed economic liberty of Spencerian evolutionism, and the range of Japanese nationalisms inflected by German thought were all *equally* driven by the same organismic ontology.[7]

Japan and the Specter of Imperialism takes its point of departure in the wager that the dominant figure of such spectrality through the first half of the Meiji period was the challenge posed to Japanese legal, political, and economic sovereignty by the Ansei treaties. Under late nineteenth-century international law, liberal imperialism required that Japan be both included in the larger system of international law, yet refused it the recognition required for incorporation within the family of Euro-American nations requisite to enjoying full international legal, political, and economic autonomy. Japan was thus subject to international law, even as its agency under such law was radically restricted. It interacted with the "civilized" world powers, yet was not legally recognized as one of them.

This book pursues the conflict of competing sovereignties in Japanese debates over the structure of knowledge appropriate to various disciplines that attempted to establish a proper place for Japan within a liberal-capitalist world characterized by colonial hierarchy and largely conceived in terms of evolutionary survival. These debates took place between competing visions of Japanese national identity and competing strategies for situating Japan as both modern and Japanese. The following chapters explore how conflicting Japanese modes of governmentality—various discursive practices of ethical, cultural, and economic value—were haunted by imperialism and the hierarchies of coercion and exploitation that accompany capitalism. Japan's confrontation with the Ansei treaty regime in East Asia is thus examined as a set of competing Japanese modes of governmentality. My research finds that they draw on Spencerian evolutionism and Fichtean idealism in particular and ultimately involve rapprochement with Japan's own economic and territorial expansionism.

In the following chapters, specters of social crisis in the discourses of this period will be traced by way of three complementary methodologies: Michel Foucault's theory of governmentality, Anthony Anghie's postcolonial analysis of international law, and recent scholarship on the role of gender relations in articulating a domestic sphere and masculine ideal intimately involved in international relations and the construction of personal and national identity. The latter includes work by Ann Stoler, Amy

Kaplan, Nishikawa Yûko, and Jason Karlin. The perspective of Foucault's concept of governmentality underlines the degree to which all competing conceptions of nineteenth-century Japanese national identity—of both pro- and anti-Western stripes—were forced to come to terms with the demands of the global market on the Japanese social body.[8] It thus helps to clarify the degree to which both pro- and anti-Western Japanese cultural strategies were forced to establish a *modus vivendi* with the demands of the international economy in domestic Japanese law, economy, culture, and family structure. Anghie's work identifies a politics of culture in the civilizing discourse at the heart of successive paradigms of international law that suspended international law vis-à-vis colonized states that this book's analysis reveals characterized the Ansei treaties imposed upon Japan in the nineteenth century.[9]

A core thesis of *Japan and the Specter of Imperialism* is that gender studies sheds essential light on Meiji Japanese attempts to rearticulate identity and community in response to the Ansei treaties. I find that such attempts were often efforts to constitute alternative conceptions of the Japanese domestic sphere, in the sense of both the nation and the family. The book demonstrates that constructions of the foreign and the domestic, as well as the political and the familial, were consistently and mutually implicated in one another. Threats to Japanese national identity were frequently interpreted in familial terms and the family in its turn was consistently defended and purified as a locus for the production and improvement of national citizens. The specter of imperialism is consequently one of several specters marking a crisis of Japanese freedom and sovereignty, but at the same time was a threat that discourses of Japanese domesticity typically attempted to either resolve (vis-à-vis the treaty powers) or disavow (expanding the Japanese Empire).

The preponderance of twentieth-century research on Japan in the Ansei treaty era has tended to fall into one of six categories: (1) Marxist theories of imperialism;[10] (2) diplomatic, missionary, and social histories that examine prominent figures in largely sympathetic terms;[11] (3) accounts in an evolutionary framework arising from the discourse of the "yellow peril" and Allied understandings of World War II that portray Japan as a non-Anglo-Saxon and non-liberal power and therefore as an intrinsically dangerous nation and culture;[12] (4) modernization theory approaches that generally build upon prior evolutionary frameworks,[13] (5) Japanese imperialism studies;[14] and (6) studies designed to conform to the protocols of neoliberal globalization by adopting a multidisciplinary and international approach.[15]

More recently, postcolonial theory and translation theory have emerged as two new approaches to the period. The postcolonial perspective of Stefan

Tanaka, Oguma Eiji, and Alexis Dudden has focused on disciplinary practices we tend to think of as related to Japan's territorial colonization and exploitation of the regions it controlled prior to 1945. While Tanaka's work foregrounds Japanese views of China and Dudden's work focuses on Korea, Oguma examines the shifting border between Japan and the non-Japanese others against which it has defined itself.[16] All three scholars have made a profound contribution to explicating competing models of Japanese colonial practice and to reexamining the disciplinary practices, such as historiography and international law, that worked to erase or obfuscate the suffering and exploitation that arose out of the colonial process, which had been studiously marginalized and avoided by much of the academic work of previous generations.[17] Tanaka masterfully demonstrates how accounts of Oriental history located East Asian historical agency exclusively within Japan and defined Japanese expansion as an altruistic mission on behalf of East Asia as a whole. Oguma's work forcefully reveals that the articulation of boundaries between Japan and its others has fluctuated wildly over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, demonstrating that such identities are always problems to be examined rather than contexts from which explanations may take their point of departure. Dudden has convincingly traced out how hypocritical conceptions of international law developed to obfuscate Western expansionism were deployed to great effect in legitimating Japanese control of Korea.

One of the core challenges facing us in an increasingly global and multi-polar world is accounting for the economic agency and hegemony of non-Western forces, both national and transnational. Arif Dirlik and Aihwa Ong have noted that the story of contemporary neoliberal capitalism is no longer a strictly Western story.[18] Confucianism and Islam have become grounds for legitimating hegemonic modes of governmentality in present day East and Southeast Asia. Tanaka, Oguma, and Dudden's focus on discourses enabling territorial colonialism has tended to elide the sort of informal empire practiced by liberal free-trade imperialists of the nineteenth century and that foreshadowed current neoliberal agendas.[19] There is thus a moral manichaeism at the heart of much postcolonial theory that makes it very difficult to acknowledge and account for the rise and hegemony of non-Western economic power.

Japan and the Specter of Imperialism is framed in such a way as to take account of the critical points that the work of these scholars has raised but in a manner that remains attentive to the contradictions of liberalism and neoliberalism, as well as territorial colonialism. Lastly, the approach taken here allows us to understand the Ansei treaty regime as, in many ways, a precursor of the disaggregation of sovereignty and citizenship we

have lately come to recognize as defining contemporary modes of neoliberal globalization around the world, most typically manifested in special economic development zones and American status of forces agreements. While much 1990s discussion of globalization was devoted to sharply distinguishing the explicitly hierarchical categories of nineteenth-century evolutionary racism and territorial colonialism from the nonterritorial operations said to characterize present-day neoliberal capitalism, this book seeks to recover a deeper history of liberal imperialism and underline significant continuities between late nineteenth century structures and the very powerful but consistently disavowed hierarchies of globalization generated by contemporary neoliberal governmentality.

As works in translation theory, Douglas Howland's *Translating the West* and Mark Metzler's *The Lever of Empire* introduce a perspective that is not only international, but recognizes the construction of national borders and systems as always involving a process of interaction and mutual constitution.[20] Howland demonstrates that the idealism of many academic approaches to Japan has led to a failure to recognize distinguishing aspects of Meiji Japanese liberalism and to a disavowal of internal contradictions in Euro-American liberalism that has often served to rationalize unfounded claims of Western moral superiority. Howland's emphasis on intellectual history within the frame of the Japanese nation, however, prevents him from directly addressing the sorts of postcolonial issues that are at the center of this book. Indeed, his conclusion emphasizes the significance of the very interpenetration between the international and the domestic around which this book is organized. Howland states: "But the context of international competition and conflict—which, in many minds, corrupted the integrity of Western liberal theory—had the effect in Japan of diverting self-determination and autonomy away from the domestic context to the international context of competitive capitalism and colonialism. As we have seen in Chapter 5, state right took precedence over the people's right(s)."[21]

Metzler shows that Japan's integration into the international financial system, which was grounded in the gold standard, gave Japan an institutional position that distinguished it from other Asian powers, but that this integration resulted in Japanese imperialism necessarily taking the form of second-class dependent imperialism because of its exposure in the English and American financial markets. He also demonstrates that the belief of Japanese administrators in free-market fundamentalism was clearly a major force in causing the suffering of Japanese citizens through much of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. This is a position that has been all but taboo in English language scholarship on Japan through much of the twentieth century, so Metzler's work is a watershed in that regard. *Japan*

and the Specter of Imperialism seeks to further develop the interactive, translational approaches pioneered by Howland and Metzler, but with greater attention to the cultural aspects of their inflection by colonial hierarchy and with an eye toward ultimately examining the question of continuity and change regarding the production of hierarchy under nineteenth-century governmentality and that of contemporary neoliberalism.

As this study will make clear, many contemporary opponents of the Meiji government's position in the debate over treaty revision called for a restoration of what they saw as illegitimately qualified Japanese sovereignty. They effectively argued that in various sites of discourse—civil and international law, economy, education, and moral pedagogy—the Meiji state had either been denied sovereignty by virtue of the unequal treaties (as evidenced by extraterritoriality and the loss of tariff autonomy) or seemed inclined to further surrender sovereignty in other areas for the purposes of regaining control over those state functions specifically denied by the treaties. This study suggests that postcolonial theory reaches a certain kind of limit case in the context of a country that suffered from semi-colonial domination even as it contemporaneously rationalized its own expansion in the name of both a pro-Western "yellow man's burden" and anti-Western colonial resistance. In concluding that a critique of Japanese imperialism requires squarely confronting the Euro-American imperialism so important in rationalizing it, the book addresses two serious *lacunae* in English-language Asian and Japan studies, namely a persistent effort to discount the level of economic and military coercion associated with the spread of capitalism into East Asia and a tradition of isolating discussion of Japanese colonialism from the colonial and neocolonial context contemporaneously imposed by Japan's Euro-American rivals.[22]

This study contends that Japan's absence of economic and legal autonomy under the unequal treaties constituted a discriminatory suspension of international law as theorized by Anthony Anghie.[23] The unequal treaties were unequal precisely insofar as discriminatory exceptions were made to the purportedly rational and universal rule of law for the purpose of sustaining authority over a subject people. In the Japanese case, this domination was semi-colonial, rather than colonial, in that the government at the time was nominally indigenous, and the treaty powers did not directly control territory outside the treaty port settlements (this has conventionally been referred to by the Japanese-Marxist tradition as a *hanshokuminchitekina*, or "half-colonized," situation).[24]

This study does not claim to be comprehensive. It arose out of two separate projects, one an attempt to read Ozaki Kôyô's *The Gold Demon*, the other to think through the logic of Haga Yaichi's institution of classical

Japanese literature as an object of study. Chapters 1, 2, 3, and 4 emerged from an effort to pursue discourses of the foreign and the domestic that seemed necessary to read *The Gold Demon* in an intellectually and politically serious way. It was only when further research revealed that Haga's philology was not only concerned with raising Japan's international status, but with articulating a concept of domesticity that functioned as a mode of governmentality in both Japan and Korea that I became comfortable putting the Haga material together with the other chapters as part of a single project. If much of the book strikes the reader as an elaborate preparation of the ground for a reading of *The Gold Demon*, that's because in many ways that is how it was initially conceived. I was surprised to discover in the course of my research, however, that the texts addressed in each of the chapters are consistently held together by a related concern to address or redress the specters of failed Japanese sovereignty, abjected Japanese masculinity, and failed personal autonomy. Such conflicted institutions and anxieties were most typically provoked by a combination of legal and economic forces, and most consistently identified with the challenges and far-reaching unintended consequences of the Ansei treaty regime.

The following chapters examine various organismic articulations of the Japanese social body as competing responses to treaty power demands for access to Japanese markets and resources and the accompanying discourse of civilization. They connect Japanese identity and "the civilizing process" to major issues in the debates over the structure of knowledge appropriate to Japan in that era, including ethics, aesthetics, and cultural preservation.

Chapter 1 situates John Luther Long's *Madame Butterfly* (1898) as an American-authored text specifically set in the historical context of unequal treaty-era Japan. It explicates the Ansei treaties as a mode of capitalist governmentality imposed upon Japan whereby the affairs of the Tokugawa empire were to be translated into the terms of Euro-American contract and property law. The chapter frames *Madame Butterfly* as deeply ambivalent: as simultaneously depicting both female Japanese victimhood and Japanese potential to take up a paternalistic U.S.-missionary variety of spiritual agency associated with the domestic sphere. In certain respects it challenges the discriminatory and hierarchical discourse of civilization that qualified Japanese agency and sovereignty under the Ansei treaties, even as it offers paternalistic U.S. conceptions of domesticity as an implicitly Christian and feminist antidote.

The chapter argues that Herbert Spencer's evolutionary sociology was the hegemonic paradigm of capitalist governmentality the Japanese confronted during the middle Meiji period. While Spencer's sociology

promoted a global shift from the militant regime of status grounded in coercion to an industrial regime of contract grounded in voluntary individual agency as the mark of European civilization, the chapter concludes that the unequal treaty regime imposed by the treaty powers presented a "civilizing" regime of international law that was simultaneously a regime of contract and status, a regime of agency and coercion. It also argues that *Madame Butterfly*'s negotiation between the missionary identification of middle-class U.S. domesticity and white, civilized status with the related but significantly distinct demands of a rising Japanese middle-class with its own developing conception of Japanese domesticity gestures toward antagonisms explicitly addressed by later Japanese attempts to meet the challenge of late nineteenth-century capitalist governmentality for Japanese purposes.

Chapter 2 examines Mori Arinori's (1847–1889) distinct appropriation of Herbert Spencer's evolutionary theory, as he attempted to translate the contemporary Japanese situation into a mode of discourse compatible with the hierarchy of civilization presumed by the Ansei treaties, focusing especially on the physical and moral education policies that Mori designed to make Japan competitive in a global economy. For Mori, Japan was haunted by the specter of an irrational, inefficient, and emasculating Chinese and Japanese tradition that threatened Japan's economic competitiveness, a tradition that included linguistic usage of the Chinese characters Mori sought to do away with. The chapter concludes that Mori's biopolitical policies and his construction of the social body recoded the Japanese social formation with capital as the ground of social value, thereby articulating an alternative Japanese mode of governmentality that incorporated liberal market logic. At the same time, it argues that Mori's conception of international economic competition as a form of total war is a significant departure from Spencerian liberalism, effectively rejecting Spencer's optimism concerning the future direction of human social development and his understanding of the interests of the market and the state as intrinsically opposed. I conclude that Mori's insistence that a late-developing nation necessarily required a strong alliance between the state and the economy constituted a Japanese mode of governmentality significantly distinct from that of Spencer's evolutionist liberalism.

Chapter 3 examines the role of aesthetic discourse drawn from German idealism in the new conceptions of Japanese national identity emerging in art education, art history, and cultural preservation in the 1880s and early 1890s. Beginning with the work of the Meiji period connoisseur and Japanese bureaucrat Ernest Fenollosa, it traces the changing relations between visual and verbal texts in middle-Meiji Japan and the discourse of cultural preservation that, when combined, enabled a new articulation of

Japanese national community based on the emperor, aesthetic judgment, and Japanese particularity. This section reveals the degree to which Japanese claims of traditional national unity grounded in aesthetics intrinsically required the prosthetic supplement of foreign conceptions of aesthetic discourse, cultural preservation, and academic disciplines in order for Japan to become "itself" through a process of self-formation and *Bildung*. The rest of the chapter follows the extension of aesthetic discourse beyond the art world to nationalist projects that challenged the universality of scientific reason by examining the texts of Shiga Jûkô, Miyake Setsurei, and Kuga Katsunan. Shiga and Kuga both drew upon the thought of Johann Fichte in their effort to articulate an alternative, non-Western Japanese modernity tied to a uniquely moral and spiritual Japanese domestic sphere.

Chapter 4 looks at a subsection of the many debates surrounding the *Imperial Rescript on Education* as a response to Mori's philosophy of education, focusing particularly on the work of Kuga Katsunan (1857–1907) and Inoue Tetsujirô (1855–1925). The former led the debate against the government position on treaty revision, which he saw as complicit with the powers and fatal for national sentiment. Where Kuga envisioned foreign capital as an invasion of the social body, Inoue's interest in evolutionary utility implicitly envisions a Japanese capitalism for which he claims moral superiority to the West by virtue of its supposed elevation of the interests of the social whole over those of the individual. The refusal to distinguish between civil society and the state seems to have functioned as a Japanese claim to autonomy in response to the treaty powers' insistence on instituting discrimination through the unequal treaties and legal reform. For these thinkers, the discourse of aesthetics allowed a reinterpretation of Japanese tradition as anachronistically civilized in Western terms even before the Japanese encounter with the West. They articulated two alternative Japanese modes of governmentality, one an organismic utilitarianism that claimed moral superiority over the West on communal grounds, the other organismic and challenging Western reason even as it identified with the logic of Japanese capital. I suggest that both Inoue and Kuga articulate alternative Japanese modernities significantly at odds with one another, but both of which directly challenge Eurocentrism.

Chapter 5 takes up Ozaki Kôyô's (1867–1903) serialized novel, *The Gold Demon* (*Konjiki yasha*, 1897–1903), which, I argue articulates a melodramatic discourse of the abject. In my reading, this melodramatic discourse of the abject functions as a culturally conservative and moralizing resistance to the decoding of the market. It appears to serve as a site of cultural reterritorialization in response to the larger legal and economic deterritorialization of Japanese society as governmentality infiltrated

Japan during the period. The chapter shows that *The Gold Demon* is not only haunted by the hierarchies of exploitation that characterize both domestic class stratification and international imperialism, but that it also stages the increasing commodification of domestic social and romantic relations that accompanies market capitalism. Thus, *The Gold Demon* is consistently aligned with Shiga and Kuga's articulation of a Japanese social body according to which freedom and life are identified with organismic national community while foreign capital and state authority are seen as agents of uncanny alien powers that sabotage the realization of both personal autonomy and national sovereignty. Japanese capital, however, may be successfully incorporated in the body politic as long as it is presented as consistent with the national common good. It thus also demonstrates the deep interpenetration and mutual implication of Japanese concepts of the domestic and the foreign in response to the expanded authority of governmentality and the manner in which the domestic is deployed to defend and define the national.

Chapter 6 interprets Haga Yaichi's foundation of classical Japanese literary studies as a mode of governmentality designed to translate the caste-based, feudal Tokugawa Empire into the terms of civilized, national legitimacy at the expense of Japan's East Asian neighbors. It argues that Haga Yaichi's institution of the discipline of classical Japanese literary study represents the erasure of—rather than the study of—historical, ethnic, and linguistic difference for the purpose of accumulating symbolic capital that supports Japan's case for international status as both a civilized nation and a great civilization in its own right.

Haga gained popular recognition as a best-selling writer who celebrated Japanese imperial difference and moral superiority. He claimed that differences grounded in imperial Japanese domesticity justified Japanese rule over its colonial subjects in Korea. Where the earlier chapters reveal appeals to Japanese domesticity in efforts to resist or inflect Western colonial discourse, Haga articulated a paternalistic claim that the moral superiority of the Japanese domestic sphere authorized and required Japanese control over newly annexed Korea. Further, Haga articulates a pioneering variety of the neoconservatism we continue to confront in contemporary Japan and North America in that he disputes any intrinsic opposition between modernity and spirituality in principle, invoking an alternative modernity that identifies spirituality and morality as the grounds for a Japanese civilizing mission in Korea.

The epilogue of this book reviews the argument of the previous chapters and reflects on the implications of this study for our understanding of differentiated sovereignty, governmentality, and globalization in the present.

It points to parallels between unequal treaty period developments and the U.S. status of forces agreement in Japan after 1945, as well as the numerous post-war U.S. bases in other nations. It argues that the initial post-war Japanese resistance and gradual capitulation to the neoliberal model of capitalist development, the U.S. trade embargo of Iraq in the 1990s, and the Asian economic crisis of 1997 all involved the discriminatory suspension of international law and the threat of economic or military coercion.

It further argues that the situation of late nineteenth-century Japan under the unequal treaty regime is in many respects a significant forerunner of the militarized globalization exemplified by the foreign policies of the current U.S. and Japanese states and that current alternatives continue to be regulated by competing, organismic conceptions of economic and political freedom genealogically tied to the paradigms explored in this book. The book suggests that we must consider the possibility that the Ansei treaty regime may be an important paradigm for contemporary globalization in both its coercively "negotiated" and directly militarized forms. Aihwa Ong has persuasively argued that contemporary East Asian modes of governmentality simultaneously challenge Western-centered conceptions of world history and cultural authority, even as they are consistently implicated in their own regimes of neoliberal exploitation.[25] While Ong asserts that many of these formulations are novel products of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, *Japan and the Specter of Imperialism* establishes that East Asian modes of governmentality that simultaneously defy Euro-centrism and yet identify non-Western tradition with capitalist development go back to at least late nineteenth-century Japan. Late nineteenth-century Japanese modes of governmentality thus also appear to be directly implicated in the vicissitudes of neoliberalism and neoconservatism in contemporary East Asia and North America.

A clear-eyed view of recent history—including events from forcible regime changes on the part of the United States to agreements imposed by the International Monetary Fund—reminds us that economic and military coercion have long been important components in making liberal capitalism the force it is in the world today.[26] Numerous Asian and Japanese commentators have compared the 1997 Asian financial crisis to such coercive acts as nineteenth-century gunboat diplomacy and the unequal treaties under which Western powers forcibly opened markets and subverted the legal and economic sovereignty of non-Western nations under the guise of a civilizing mission.[27] This suggests that a deeper understanding of nineteenth-century developments in East Asia may also give us greater insight into many of the international tensions and injustices that currently face us in an increasingly global and multi-polar world.

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CHAPTER 1

JOHN LUTHER LONG'S *MADAME BUTTERFLY* AND IMPERIAL DOMESTICITY

JAPAN AND THE SPECTER OF IMPERIALISM EXAMINES the Japanese response to the Ansei treaties as a mode of nineteenth-century governmentality.[1] The topic is challenging as, on the one hand, the Ansei treaty regime suspended the rule of national and international law in a manner that this book argues serves as an important precursor of economic development zones in contemporary East Asia and U.S. status-of-forces agreements around the world. On the other hand, the legal doctrines that rationalized such unequal treaties throughout the non-Western world in the nineteenth century were deeply imbricated in what Anthony Anghie has described in a different context as a "dynamic of difference"; the claim that Western powers are paradigms of civilization and that any non-Western cultural deviation marks a lack that calls for the Euro-American imposition of a civilizing process.[2] While proponents of neoliberal globalization argue for a sharp break between a nineteenth century dynamic of difference and neoliberal practices, Anghie has made a forceful argument for significant elements of continuity in the way cultural difference is used to marginalize non-western others even at present. Claims that deviation from a Euro-American cultural standard was a sign of inferiority served to rationalize the legal reduction and qualification of sovereignty under international law that defined unequal treaty regimes in the name of a paternalistic "civilizing process." In the late nineteenth century, such cultural deviation on the part of non-Western groups, including Japan, was typically figured in the biopolitical terms of contemporary evolutionary theory and eugenics. Explicit theories of evolutionary hierarchy were thus an unavoidable aspect of the scene this chapter examines.

An important part of the story of Japan's response to the Ansei treaties is an account of the treaty regime itself, of the legal, economic, and cultural demands it placed on Japan. This chapter has two parts. The first

part examines two components of the Ansei treaty regime: the legal and economic policies governing the treaty ports as a specific mode of governmentality and the contemporary discourses of civilization that served as integral, cultural components of the biopolitics instituted in the treaty ports. The chapter begins to explore the manner in which discourses of domesticity figured in the dynamic of difference invoked to rationalize and legitimize the differentiated sovereignty that characterized the Ansei treaty regime and that led to their being referred to as "unequal treaties." It is in this context that the chapter takes up John Luther Long's *Madame Butterfly* (1898).

The second part of this chapter looks at domestic Japanese legal reform as incorporating economic demands of the Ansei treaties within the structure of the Japanese state and the Japanese cultural responses to the discourse of the civilizing process as a dynamic of difference, many of which inverted it. In this way, many Japanese critics of the state policy asserted a moral superiority of Japanese tradition and domesticity in direct condemnation of Meiji state policies consistently depicted as policing foreign, market-driven conceptions of social order. It seems that Japanese notions of moral economy often served as a mode of resistance to the market grounded in what were understood to be traditional hierarchies of patriarchal benevolence. The book will argue, however, that such theories of a transcendent Imperial Japanese morality often came to serve as principles on the grounds of which interested parties articulated alternative modernities and specifically Japanese modes of capitalist governmentality.

The Ansei Treaty Regime as Governmentality

Studies of nineteenth-century imperialism have come to recognize a phase of imperialism grounded in free market liberalism, which led to the establishment of informal empires explicitly designed to avoid the burdens and responsibilities of territorial colonialism.[3] In Britain's case, informal empire in the Pacific was administratively centered in the treaty system imposed on China in the wake of the Opium (1842) and Arrow Wars (1858).[4] While British merchants were initially suspicious that American advisers in the Japanese Foreign Office were helping to spread the "protectionist heresy" among the Japanese,[5] the liberal, free-trade premise of British intervention in both China and Japan was widely recognized and relatively undisputed: "To many in contemporary Britain, freedom of trade and freedom for traders were so axiomatic as to justify the use of force to secure a more liberal entry to the Chinese market. Such men were rapidly becoming powerful in British politics. It is no accident that a ten-year period, starting with the Reform Act of 1832, witnessed

both the abolition of the East India Company's monopoly and the first Anglo-Chinese War."[6]

The American Senator Willie P. Mangum offered the American Whig party version of the free-trade imperialism argument: "The goal was commerce—not territorial expansion or agitation for democratic principles—the expedition was not an 'intervention.' It would not intervene in existing governments, as would an attempt to liberate Cuba, but instead would pursue U.S. self-interest and the common good of free trade. While the Monroe Doctrine divided the world politically and militarily, this formulation of U.S. commercial influence accepted no such divisions. To spread democracy through commerce was not going ahead in search of monsters to destroy but rather taming monsters with trade."[7]

Mangum's speech hints at the vitalist ontology of free-trade imperialism. Free trade was to "tame monsters" through the forcible imposition of a common good. Opponents to free trade are depicted as spectral figures of death and destruction. Free trade is an intrinsically positive and hopeful life force opposed to the death of close-minded opposition to global economic progress.

Alfred Thayer Mahan was probably the most celebrated and widely read promoter of this view in the United States.[8] It was this strategic vision that led to Theodore Roosevelt's doctrine of international police power.[9] The series of events that led the Tokugawa Empire to enter into the Ansei treaties and their subsequent renegotiation involved both the threat and the application of military force, initially that of the U.S. Navy. In 1853, U.S. Commodore Matthew Perry appeared in Uraga Bay just outside Edo (the city now known as Tokyo) and demanded a treaty providing access to fuel, water, and ports for military and commercial vessels of the United States. Perry's threat to use force if his demands were not met directly referenced his recent participation in the Mexican-American War in 1847, just five years prior to his arrival in Japanese waters.[10]

Perry's demands eventually were met, and a series of treaties were formalized between the Tokugawa state, the United States, Great Britain, Russia, and Holland. Just three years after Perry's bullying reference to American colonial expansion into Texas, Arizona, and California, Townsend Harris advanced the fantastic claim that the United States made no annexations by force of arms as motivation for Japanese acquiescence to a treaty with the United States rather than its rivals, who he falsely insisted might be immanently arriving with overwhelming naval force and belligerent intent.[11] In 1858, the Tokugawa state signed the Harris treaty, a trade treaty with the United States that required the opening of treaty ports for international trade. Harris directly stated that free

trade was the core part of the trade treaty.[12] Later that same year, the Tokugawa state signed treaties analogous to the Harris treaty with Britain, France, Holland, and Russia. Collectively, the 1858 treaties were referred to as the Ansei treaties. Given British economic and naval predominance in the Pacific, Yokohama in part became one of a network of imperial British cities in the Pacific that included Hong Kong and Shanghai.[13]

The opening of Japan also figured as a significant imperial moment for the United States. American propagandists often emphasized that seclusion had hindered Japan's development and that civilization and progress demanded its opening.[14] Here again, U.S. claims in the Pacific are grounded in a vitalist ontology that identifies civilization and progress with life and development while depicting Japanese resistance to U.S. demands as a Japanese effort to oppose its own development, to degrade or obstruct its own economic life. Japanese resistance to U.S. policy goals was thus cast as the Japanese embracing social death over social life.

The legal system the United States practiced in the Japanese treaty ports was grounded in legislation initially written to govern consular courts in China. Appeals went to courts in the newly acquired colonial territory of California. In practical terms, a presence in Japan extended the United States' ability to project naval power in the Pacific in order to compete for trade with China in the new era of steam power. Japan's opening also served as a mode of militarized globalization that opened a new market to trade with the United States and other treaty powers.[15]

Henry Wheaton's *Elements of International Law* (1836) was the first legal text translated in its entirety into an East Asian language. The text was translated into Classical Chinese by William Martin in 1864 and was reprinted by the Tokugawa *bakufu i*n 1865. The work appeared in Japanese translation as *Bankoku kôhô* (1868) shortly thereafter. Wheaton's account of extraterritoriality argued in a positivist vein that extraterritoriality was not a natural right and therefore required negotiated agreement between the states in question. He also made an exception to the liberal principle of international legal equality by arguing that more advanced nations could reasonably impose their judicial institutions on less advanced, non-Western countries for the sake of increasing international trade. Wheaton's *Elements* thus made it clear to Japanese intellectuals and officials that the discourse of civilization legitimized suspending international law in the case of non-Western countries that exhibited any notable cultural difference as compared to the treaty powers.[16]

The imposition of the financially destabilizing and unwanted treaties eventually led to individualized terrorist resistance. The terrorism in turn led to treaty power[17] demands for reparations and threats of collective

punishment in the form of military reprisal.[18] Increasingly militant resistance and domestic economic convulsions related to foreign exchange rates led to a *bakufu* attempt to close the treaty ports in 1863. At this point, the renegade southern domain of Chôshû declared that it would enforce closure of the treaty ports by force of arms. A multinational treaty power force sailed to Chôshû to challenge this policy. Chôshû forces fired cannon on approaching French, U.S., and British ships but failed to deter the seizure and destruction of coastal fortifications at Shimonoseki. Demands for a $3 million indemnity or lowered tariff schedules were held out as sticks to encourage the opening of more treaty ports, but the *bakufu* chose to pay reparations and lower tariffs rather than expose the empire to the even further economic and political chaos that was sure to follow from additional treaty ports.[19] In 1866, *bakufu* officials negotiated the Edo Convention—in the shadow of treaty power pressure—for the opening of more treaty ports as reparations for Shimonoseki. In response to these demands, the convention set a drastically lower, uniform tariff schedule for foreign imports.

The Ansei treaties may be elucidated by the application of Michel Foucault's work on biopolitics and governmentality.[20] The treaties introduced a biopolitical mode of governance that centered on the capacity and potential of both individuals and the population as living resources that could be harnessed and managed by governing regimes. Imperialist liberalism in the Pacific interacted with regimes of ruling and regimes of citizenship to produce conditions that changed administrative and citizenship practices such that Japanese subjects became partially embedded in the territoriality of global markets at the expense of the conventional territoriality of national citizenship. Perhaps most significantly of all, the treaties imposed graduated sovereignty on the Tokugawa Empire. That is, the treaties constituted special zones known as treaty ports that were excepted from the economic and legal sovereignty of the Tokugawa state.

Within the treaty ports, both foreigners and Japanese subjects were subjected to legal authorities and obligations that differed from those in other parts of the Tokugawa Empire. The first objective of the treaties was to provide treaty power access to Japanese markets by establishing the treaty ports as a special zone excepted from the administrative authority of the Tokugawa *bakufu*. As a coercive, imperial variety of "liberal" free trade policy, the treaties governed economic intercourse and imposed low tariff rates (averaging 5 percent), thus removing Tokugawa economic sovereignty within the treaty ports. The second objective of the treaty was extraterritoriality: the extension of treaty power property, contract, and criminal law to Tokugawa territory by removal of Tokugawa legal

sovereignty in the treaty ports. The third objective was the constitution of a military police power capable of enforcing such treaty privileges and exceptions. Because of the incorporation of a most–favored nation clause, all such privileges and legal and economic exceptions accrued to any succeeding treaty powers.[21]

The Ansei treaties were centrally concerned with instituting a system for the enforcement of contracts. Foreigners in the treaty ports relentlessly complained about the lack of effective sanctions for the breaking of contracts.[22] Under the positivist school of legal interpretation, indeed, coercive contracts imposed by Western powers were resolutely defended as carrying out the civilizing mission of instituting and enforcing the "rule of law":

> Nineteenth century writers such as Wheaton claimed that international law was the exclusive province of civilized societies . . . For Wheaton and the jurists who succeeded him . . . this gap was to be bridged not by a universal natural law but by the explicit imposition of European international law over the uncivilized non-Europeans . . . in the final analysis, non-European states are lacking in sovereignty because they are excluded from the family of nations . . . Sovereignty, society, law: each of these concepts which acted as founding concepts to the framework of the positivist system was precisely defined, correspondingly, in ways which maintain and police the boundary between the civilized and uncivilized. The whole edifice of positivist jurisprudence is based on this initial exclusion, this determination that certain societies are beyond the pale of civilization . . . under the positivist system, it was legal to use coercion to compel parties to enter into treaties which were then legally binding . . . The non-European state thus existed in a sort of twilight world; lacking personality, they were nevertheless capable of entering into certain treaties and were to that extent members of international law . . . The basic method of resolving the problem of personality comprised a complex process of determining the status of the non-European entity through the doctrine of recognition.[23]

Such coercive treaties were legitimized in large part by the common assumption that contracts are voluntary by definition. In the context of the discourse of the liberal civilizing mission, unequal treaties were purportedly designed to promote modern social structures organized around the concept of the voluntary contract rather than coercive feudal hierarchy. In actual fact, however, the Ansei treaties were contracts signed under duress and enforced by military power. In other words, in the name of the civilizing process, coercive feudal hierarchy was replaced by a regime of coercive contracts, enforced by the threat of military arms. Thus, while the contract was held up as the principle mode of social organization that

defined the civilized, industrial state, the Ansei treaties as contracts were contaminated by the very coercion that the rule of law was supposed to displace as part of the civilizing process. In this sense we may say that the rule of international law as instituted by the Ansei treaties was spectral. Even on Euro-American terms, the purported life of the civilized rule of law as instituted was constitutively haunted by the purported death of premodern modes of social coercion.

As Tokutomi Sohô often noted in his early writings, Spencerian evolutionary theory maintained that integration of global markets would produce international mutual dependence that should eventually lead to world peace and demilitarization. Both Spencer and Tokutomi were able to distance liberal doctrine from capitalist governmentality by insisting that any coercive aspect of global market integration must be atavistic by definition, a regression to pre-liberal practices, and thus not relevant to judging liberalism. Like most positivist and liberal understandings of the world, Spencerian liberalism explicitly disavows any account of how the disciplining structures of family, community, work, travel, and nation (that is, modes of governmentality) shape and transform subjects and their practices under liberal capitalism.[24]

Oguma Eiji's research on Japanese colonies and Ann Stoler's research on the Dutch East Indies have emphasized that, rather than a simple imposition of the ways of a colonizer on the colonized, encounters and exchanges in colonial circumstances often actively articulate and police boundaries on both sides.[25] As Stoler's research would predict, among the boundaries subject to exception and dispute in the early period of the Japanese treaty ports, many elite foreign officials had "Japanese marriages" (widely considered a variety of contractual prostitution) or mistresses. Often the women were not formally acknowledged as wives, but the children were recognized as legitimate children. Marriage between treaty power figures and Japanese became more common during the 1880s and 1890s. Foreign resident children were schooled in segregated schools. Demands were made that "Eurasian" children be removed from the British public school. Travel was organized so as to minimize contact with the Japanese as even the Japanese bourgeoisie were considered suspect with regard to clothing, management of children, and other matters.[26]

Much of treaty port culture, particularly from the British perspective, involved self-congratulation on one's elite status and active distancing of foreign treaty power residents from Japanese locals. Indigent foreigners were an embarrassment in this regard. Public anti-Japanese feeling was extremely vehement and deep-seated. Japanese were occasionally excluded from racetrack meetings in Yokohama. Foreign banks in the

same port even refused to cash the checks of Japanese. Foreigners who agreed to work for supposedly inferior Japanese were considered to be of questionable character.

The definition of treaty port residents was also very restrictive. Soldiers and seamen were not included as legal residents subject to consular jurisdiction. The Chinese were the single largest group of foreigners in the Japanese treaty ports after 1875, but they were not regarded as foreign residents in the manner of treaty power subjects.[27]

Missionaries in the treaty ports resented being confined to the treaty port areas as it interfered with proselytizing. Their interest in opening up travel to the Japanese interior made them early and adamant advocates of treaty revision on terms the Japanese desired. They were widely known to disapprove of the drinking and gambling, as well as the open "Japanese marriages" of elite foreign males in the treaty ports. Missionary approbation was met with the widespread sentiment among other foreign residents that the missionaries held a suspicious, overly pro-Japanese attitude.[28] Female missionaries considered themselves "mothers of civilization" and aimed to reform Japanese society by teaching Japanese girls how to create moral, Christian homes; they believed that regenerating the private sphere would ultimately regenerate the public sphere. They became something like diplomats of domesticity, a domesticity they considered many foreign resident males in the treaty ports to have personally trampled upon.[29] The missionaries thus promoted a vitalist ontology of their own, the claim that the word of Christ and the civilized domestic sphere were pathways to eternal life in conflict with the way of death represented by Japanese tradition and overly secular and irreligious aspects of treaty port culture.

Mixed Residence in the Interior

Efforts to articulate a Japanese domestic sphere in opposition to the imposition of the Ansei treaties were highlighted in debates over "mixed residence in the interior" (*naichi zakkyo*) during the 1880s and 1890s. Cohabitation of foreigners and Japanese in a legally integrated space was presumed to be a logical consequence of treaty revision, yet widely held notions of racial hierarchy and white supremacy, most often grounded in Spencerian evolutionary theory, suggested that head-to-head competition between Euro-American whites and an inferior Japanese race was a growing danger that had to be addressed. Japanese free traders such as Taguchi Ukichi favored open borders and the immediate abolition of the treaty ports. Minami Teisuke and Takahashi Yoshio promoted racial reform through intermarriage, eating meat, and studying English. The British

consular court's exoneration of the captain and crew of the *HMS Normanton* in a case of shipwreck where all British aboard the ship survived, but all Japanese on board were lost, led to a backlash against both the treaties and the assimilationist schemes for racial reform that sustained white supremacy.[30]

At this juncture, Inoue Tetsujirô argued that because the Japanese were physically, morally, and intellectually inferior, exclusion of foreigners would be necessary for the foreseeable future. Inoue was above all concerned with maintaining national homogeneity. Katô Hiroyuki similarly argued that the Japanese were bound to lose a race struggle with foreigners and thus exclusion would be necessary for some time.

Herbert Spencer was consulted by Japanese officials on these matters at the time. He advised against intermarriage as inevitably leading to racial degeneration. He suggested avoiding mixed residence in the interior as at least a temporary floodwall against the Western colonization he considered to be nearly inevitable. Where Inoue and Katô promoted a Japanese domestic sphere that excluded foreigners and a national homogeneity designed to institute a specifically Japanese and relatively protectionist mode of capitalist governmentality, the free-trade liberal Taguchi Ukichi promoted a more de-territorialized, free-trade mode of governmentality that embraced Japanese assimilation of foreigners at home and promotion of Japanese culture abroad through Japanese emigration.

Official Japanese Domesticity

In the name of reviving and sustaining ancient Japanese tradition, the Meiji constitution posited the Japanese emperor as an agent in the terms of Euro-American international law. This was a claim to international sovereignty in the name of a benevolent patriarch, a melodramatic display of the imperial institution aimed as much toward the treaty powers as toward the Japanese people. The constitution was written and presented in a tone of patriarchal benevolence—as a gift from Emperor Meiji to the people—as was the *Imperial Rescript on Education* with its instructions to consider the relation of the emperor to his subjects as analogous with that of a father to his children. The photo that was released concurrently with promulgation of the education rescript analogously portrayed the emperor in European-style military uniform in accordance with reigning Euro-American codes of masculinity.[31]

The ceremony in which the constitution was promulgated not only set the tone for all subsequent imperial pageantry, but it was also an explicit translation of European royalty's mode of familial display. This form of royal display included the female members of the Imperial Household in

defiance of all previous Japanese tradition—never before in Japanese history were the women in the Imperial Family part of a public ceremony. The front of the room in which the constitution was promulgated was filled with members of the Imperial Family, including the empress, and one entire side of the room was largely filled with princes and princesses of the family blood. By translating the Japanese aristocracy into terms commensurate with royal European *civilité*, Japan introduced an entirely new class system based on European models, even as previous Japanese caste statuses were legally abolished.

Widespread ritual exclamations of *banzai* date from the ceremony for the promulgation of the Meiji constitution. Recent research has established that Mori Arinori, the first Japanese minister of Education and the former Japanese ambassador to England, was responsible for inventing and instituting this practice.[32] *Banzai* is widely held to be a translation into Japanese of the expressions "long live the king" and "long live the queen" from the melodramatic mode of European royal display. The phrase was developed to express the individual subject's love and respect for the emperor on a personal level. Prior to this, Japanese pundits had sometimes criticized the Japanese people for tending to greet the emperor in a fearful or confused manner when judged by the protocols for European treatment of their royalty.[33]

With reference to nineteenth-century British law, politics, drama, and literature, Elaine Hadley develops a strikingly fresh take on melodrama as a mode or category that transcends literary genre, as a mode that repeatedly appears across a wide range of discursive contexts, including law, political activism, and official royal ceremony, as well as on the dramatic stage and the novelistic page. In part a development of E. P. Thompson's concept of a peasant moral economy applied to an urban context, Hadley argues that melodrama is a category of discourse that insists on the continued vitality of traditional public social formations, especially patriarchal status hierarchies that constitute identity in terms of familial and communal relationships. In the melodramatic mode, all forms of social organization or subject position are construed in terms of the patriarchal family. Most insistently, the melodramatic mode is a culturally reactionary (though not necessarily politically reactionary) form of communal resistance to the privatizing effects of the market. Also critical for the purpose of this book, melodramatic tactics are centrally concerned with articulating and policing the shifting set of boundaries between the domestic and the foreign.[34]

This mode often takes the form of resistance to the classificatory procedures by way of which the state, the market, or the corporation—that

is, modes of governmentality—insist on resituating subjects in ways that disrupt an idealized traditional community. For example, coercively situating and isolating subjects by way of economic class or panoptic discipline successfully interrupts an ostensible, and to some degree increasingly mythologized, community of patriarchal affiliation that presumes caste harmony and deference to traditional authority. It presumes a society that does not admit of class conflict as it consists of respectful and obedient subjects ruled by a benevolent patriarch.[35] This chapter contends that in Ansei treaty period Japan, moralizing melodramatic resistance was an important mode of reterritorialization in response to the demands of governmentality.

Hadley finds that the British royal ceremony organized for Queen Victoria begins to incorporate a variety of the melodramatic mode in the late nineteenth century. This is the point where Victoria's status as "queen mother" of the English people begins to be emphasized. Victoria's public processions were orchestrated to project the domestic virtues of the wife combined with the social virtues of the traditional aristocratic gentlewoman, thus enacting the face-to-face and public interplay of benevolence and respect thought to be crucial to a moral society. Public media presentations of Victoria's private acts of charity similarly functioned as benevolent performances of patronage and were designed to generate a sense of familial intimacy between Victoria and the people, to superimpose the intimate and the local over a national sense of Englishness. The implication was that while the lords of most actual estates may have left both their estates and the people on them behind, the queen had not abandoned her estate or her people. For Hadley, this melodramatic mode of British royal ceremony sought to redress the alienation of the market at home and colonial exclusion within the expanding British Empire abroad.[36]

The Japanese Imperial procession to and from the promulgation ceremony for the constitution was directly informed by observation of Queen Victoria's royal processions. Indeed, the carriage in which the emperor and empress rode was an English carriage with Japanese ornamentation. Five thousand students from schools directly administered by the Ministry of Education were stationed to perform various songs and activities as the procession passed their area. The novelty of the Imperial couple riding in the carriage together was widely understood to have never been seen before in all of Japanese history and indicated the new importance assigned to the empress in the melodramatic mode with which the Imperial Family had chosen to present itself to the public.[37] Imperial celebrations were also often coordinated with organized acts of Imperial benevolence and patronage to further the people's sense of intimacy

with the Imperial Household. Such acts included cash gifts to the elderly, culinary treats for state prisoners, and the release of political prisoners.[38]

With the Japanese state's emphasis on the virtue of loyalty in the constitution and the *Imperial Rescript on Education*, Japan's comparatively high divorce rate had become an issue considered to reflect poorly on the "beautiful customs" of Japanese tradition.[39] Through the 1890s, Japan had an unusually high rate of divorce by contemporary international standards.[40] As early as the 1880s, Japanese opposition parties challenging government negotiations on unequal treaty revision derided a long list of high government figures as philanderers and libertines whose unbridled personal desires made the government morally illegitimate. Rather than rational, civilized gentlemen, its opponents caricatured government leaders as debauched and sexually promiscuous—a quality they insistently associated with misguided over-identification with the West.[41]

At this point, the Meiji state determined to institute a version of the *ie* system that emphasized continuity of patriarchal family lineage as the foundation of the state. These conceptions were incorporated in sections of the civil code promulgated in 1896 and 1898. This system gave exceptional powers to the family head, resulting in inequality within the family, the superiority of male children in general, and the eldest son in particular. In essence, a variant of the samurai family was made universal. The most fundamental changes to precedent were that what had once been considered property of the entire family was now legally defined as the individual property of the head of the family register and was at his disposal. Additionally, where the traditional family system had been subordinated within a larger structure under the authority of a han, village community, or merchant association, under the new Meiji Civil Code the *ie* (family line) served as an administrative category within the family register system of the centralized Meiji state.[42]

Reformers such as Kishida Toshiko and the Christian-inspired Iwamoto Yoshiharu began to promote and popularize a conception of the home, or *katei*, calling for a nuclear, family based domestic sphere organized around mutual affection between the spouses and their children and an identification of familial intimacy and Christian religious salvation. Iwamoto founded the magazine *Jogaku zasshi* to popularize these ideals in 1885. While many accounts depict a rivalry for supremacy between the *ie* and *katei* models supported by contemporary polemics, recent scholarship has begun to emphasize the notion that *both* models appear to have been effective in articulating ties between individual family lines, nuclear families, the developing Japanese economy, and the Meiji state. While differing significantly in detail, in this regard they were ultimately

complimentary. Aspects of the *katei* paradigm are now broadly considered to have risen to a complementary, if somewhat conflicted, hegemony just after the turn of the century. A transitional notion of "good wife, wise mother" (*ryôsai kenbo*) was made the official goal of state-administrated women's education in 1898.[43]

In his commentary on the *Imperial Rescript on Education* entitled *Chokugo engi*, Inoue Tetsujirô argues that harmony between a married couple is the ground of the nation, that domestic harmony is one's duty as a national subject.[44] At the same time, Inoue explicates the nation as an expanded domestic sphere defined in terms of lineage:

> However, this mode [*hô*] of love for all [*hakuai*] must involve a certain order. If you do such things as abandon your own family and give precedence to another's family or give precedence to the people of another country with whom we have no relations, that would be a failure to accord with this mode [*hô*]. Therefore when we show kindness [*aigo*] to our family, we are fulfilling our obligations. The families of others should first be shown kindness [*aigo*] by others. The people of other countries should first be shown kindness [*aigo*] by the people of other countries. Consequently, love [*ai*] begins with one's close relatives [*kinshin*] and should then gradually extend to the populace [*shûsho*].[45]

In addition to mandating observance of the previously *samurai* class family practice of primogeniture for all Japanese subjects, the new civil code (1898) made divorce more difficult to obtain by privileging the lineage, making certified consent of both spouses mandatory, and changing registration requirements. Between 1897 and 1899, the Japanese divorce rate fell by 50 percent.[46] There was a general call for taking marriage more seriously, often with reference to Christian wedding ceremonies.[47] This led to a new importance being granted to the wedding ceremony and the development of a reformed Shinto wedding ceremony designed to convey the seriousness of the rite in Christian nations. The moral seriousness of marriage and the wedding ceremony was becoming increasingly identified with the moral seriousness of Japan as a newly defined "family state."[48]

The particular manner of publicly celebrating the Imperial couple's twenty-fifth wedding anniversary (1894) and Crown Prince Yoshihito's Shinto wedding (1900) was developed in the course of a survey of the English monarchy's practices.[49] They are thus a further example of the translation of European mores into a Japanese idiom that functioned as both a melodramatic mode of presentation of the Imperial Family and as a pedagogical example for all Japanese subjects to emulate. The newly heightened association of wedding ceremonies as public religious rituals

meant that weddings came to carry more symbolic, economic, and social weight.[50] "Reflecting on the wedding of the crown prince, one writer for the *Chû Shinbun* remarked that 'the essence (*taiyo*) of the restoration of imperial rule [had] consisted of making the Imperial Household and the subjects intimate and eliminating the smallest distance between them."[51] Similarly, "A writer for the *Miyako shimbun* . . . correctly pointed out that both international and domestic concerns had led to the imperial family's adoption of the twenty-fifth wedding anniversary celebration . . . the author believed that the emperor wished to make the celebration of wedding anniversaries a regular custom so that 'the people, without distinction between the noble and the mean, would value the sanctity of marriage and uphold public morality (*fukyo*); and in so doing increase their happiness.'"[52]

Madame Butterfly and Civilization

Amy Kaplan has uncovered a schema in mid-nineteenth-century U.S. history and literature that she refers to as "manifest domesticity," which is the notion that a distinct female domestic sphere plays a cultural role complementary to that of the more overtly political and colonial notion of manifest destiny.[53] Both Kaplan and Jane Tompkins have demonstrated that domesticity became a marker of Anglo-Saxon civilization and that improvement of women's lives around the world became an important premise legitimizing American expansionism as God's work, whether by the force of U.S. arms or through the work of missionaries (who were often female). Manifest domesticity notably converted scenes of international or military conflict and economic exploitation into narratives of imperial romance, thus obfuscating the real-world effects of U.S. invasions of Mexico, Cuba, and the Philippines. By painting U.S. expansion as the voluntary submission of foreign females to the attractions of American manhood and their civilization, manifest domesticity articulated a mode of American exceptionalism whereby European expansion was tyrannical and exploitative, but American expansionism could only be an expression of altruistic, paternal concern for the desires of others. This chapter finds that *Madame Butterfly* tells the tale of a particularly ambivalent imperial romance and holds that the discourse of manifest domesticity is important for thinking through what is at stake in the narrative.

A related variety of U.S. exceptionalism of the period was the claim that the United States had never undertaken territorial colonialism and was thus distinct from and morally superior to its European rivals in China and Japan. As we have seen, such exceptionalist attitudes were central to American self-righteousness in the Japanese treaty ports, even as

U.S. representatives parlayed threats of force, from itself and other treaty powers, into treaties and trade. In addition to examining the interrelation between U.S. expansionism and the domestic sphere in imposing treaty ports on Japan, another purpose of this chapter is to revisit claims of American exceptionalism as they played out in the context of late nineteenth-century Japan.

As this chapter has argued, imperial domesticity—the notion of a distinct domestic sphere denoting the superiority of one's civilization in an imperial context—was a distinguishing mark of treaty power civilization vis-à-vis Japan during the Ansei treaty period. From the perspective of imperial domesticity, distinct Japanese conceptions of family and nation indicated an inferiority and lack on the part of Japan that it was hoped the civilizing regime of the Ansei treaties might help to ameliorate, most likely by way of U.S. missionary intervention. The Japanese themselves, however, very shortly began to articulate and promote various distinct, but relatively commensurable, notions of Japanese domesticity for their own purposes.

Initially, notions of a distinct and valorized Japanese domesticity were modes of resistance to treaty power demands and the associated dynamic of difference. Later, the Meiji state undertook legal reforms that codified many of the treaty port demands. This meant that patriarchal deference hierarchies began to function as a means of legitimizing distinctively Japanese varieties of capitalist governmentality. Eventually, as will be discussed in Chapter 6, Japanese modes of governmentality, including an imperial domesticity of Japan's own, were invoked to legitimize Japan's annexation and administration of Korea.

This section of the chapter considers John Luther Long's *Madame Butterfly* (1898), situating it as a work of American literature set in Japan during the unequal treaty period and in dialogue with American missionary conceptions of the United States' civilizing mission in Japan.[54] The narrative of *Madame Butterfly* foregrounds the significance of the discourse of domesticity in a larger imperial and political context that the second half of this chapter, as well as later chapters, examines from Japan's distinctly different position within the contemporary hierarchy of race and civilization.[55]

While *Madame Butterfly* is widely recognized as an iconic representation of the conflation of international and gender relations, it has rarely been examined as an American response to the specific discursive and historical context in which it is set—unequal treaty Japan in the early 1890s. *Madame Butterfly* is widely understood to figure the politics of race, nation, and gender in U.S.-Asian relations. As Mari Yoshihara has noted, it

has generally been interpreted as a melodramatic construction of Orientalism—a Western perception, understanding, and representation of the Orient that is founded on unequal power relations between the West and the East, and on a belief in an essential difference between them. As many Euro-American cultural representations of the East attest, such notions of power and difference were typically expressed in gendered terms: the powerful West was associated with virile masculinity, while the subordinate East was portrayed with passive femininity. For such readings of *Madame Butterfly*, Lieutenant Pinkerton symbolizes a dominant masculine America, while the vulnerable, exotic beauty Cho-Cho-San stands for a subordinate, feminized Japan and Asia.[56]

The work of Ann Stoler suggests that we should consider reading the Ansei Treaty regime in association with the civilizing discourse that also articulates and polices middle-class and colonial identities. Amy Kaplan and Gretchen Murphy persuasively argue for a discourse of literary domesticity as central to nineteenth-century conceptions of the Monroe Doctrine.[57] The Monroe Doctrine was supposed to legitimize U.S. intervention in Central and South America at the expense of rival imperial powers due to the United States' special relationship to the region even as the United States claimed the same state of exception for its territorial expansion thousands of miles into the Pacific. Walter LaFeber notes that, even as the United States began to demand an open door in China, it closed the markets of its new colonial territories of Hawaii and the Philippines.[58] Standard American accounts of the Ansei treaties often go to great lengths in an effort to distinguish the United States' noble and sympathetic treatment of Japan from the morally flawed territorial, colonial, and exploitative schemes held by rival treaty powers. Such hypocritical American self-righteousness in this context is only possible on the ground of internalizing the Monroe Doctrine ideology that territorial U.S. expansion was "internal," whereas European territorial colonialism was "external," and therefore morally debased. In effect, the doctrine of manifest destiny remains in force within popular and academic U.S. memory such that U.S. expansion is frequently disavowed as the territorial, colonial expansion that it often was. This work seeks to challenge such claims to U.S. moral superiority vis-à-vis rival treaty powers.

In one of the most thoughtful readings of John Luther Long's *Madame Butterfly* to date, Mari Yoshihara observes that the limits of a binary scheme of interpretation exclusively focusing on Pinkerton and Cho-Cho-San become clear when one considers the critical role played by Mrs. Pinkerton.[59] Yoshihara's reading suggests that the questions the narrative raises are thus simultaneously about race and gender relations in

the United States, U.S. engagement with Japan, and race and gender relations in Japan (a point that receives less attention in her analysis).[60] While Yoshihara is most centrally concerned with delineating U.S. perspectives on the role of white women and how gender relations in the United States inflect U.S. relations with Asia, her reading also implicitly demonstrates that the Mrs. Pinkerton character directly ties *Madame Butterfly* to U.S. politics of the domestic sphere. Yoshihara finds the Mrs. Pinkerton character to be a depiction of a white woman who does not take Asian women seriously. Additionally, she finds that the character's attitude suggests that white women are more closely aligned with American men than with Asian women and that they are more concerned with their own womanhood at home than with the lot of women across the Pacific.[61]

Brian Burke-Gaffney's *Starcrossed: A Biography of Madame Butterfly* (2004) begins the process of trying to think through the narrative in the context of its setting in Nagasaki. He particularly emphasizes that Long conflates prostitution and marriage in a manner that erases the brutality and exploitation of the contemporary Japanese system of prostitution with which Cho-Cho-San would necessarily have been involved. This is an important point that supports my strategy of reading *Madame Butterfly* as negotiating the wishful thinking and projection of contemporary U.S. missionary discourse in Japan as much as or more than it depicts any realities on the ground in Nagasaki.[62]

Ann Stoler has argued that the sort of colonial exchanges we see taking place in treaty port Japan were often critically important to the construction of middle-class sensibilities in the home country, which in the case of *Madame Butterfly* was the United States. While much previous research on *Madame Butterfly*, including Yoshihara's, has followed Said's approach to orientalism, that is, reading it as an imbalance of power that produced a one-way transfer of effects from the colonizer to the colonized, Stoler argues that such exchanges involve the construction and policing of boundaries for *both* colonizer and colonized. Finally, she argues that such exchanges typically define racial and civilized status in terms of one's adherence to the mores of middle-class domesticity.

Stoler argues that Said's approach is ultimately Freudian and that his conception of orientalism is grounded in the psychoanalytic concept of projection. She finds that such approaches read international relations as the expression, repression, or projection of desire. Stoler reminds us that this is the opposite of what Foucault's approach calls for.[63] Freudian models actually intersect and resonate with many prevailing myths of Orientalism: "The notion that Western civilization has become increasingly restrictive and that the colonies have provided escape hatches from

it runs deep in early Orientalist traditions and remains resonant in their contemporary form."[64]

What would a reading of *Madame Butterfly* that seeks to historicize Freudian notions of desire look like? Arthur Groos has noted that John Luther Long's sister was the wife of a protestant U.S. missionary stationed in Nagasaki. Decades after publication, the sister publicly claimed that the novella was inspired by a true story from the early 1890s that she herself related to John Long. Long even conveyed in a letter to her that he wrote the novella to promote the cause of feminism. What might such a statement mean in relation to *Madame Butterfly* within the milieu of an American missionary's wife in Nagasaki and her sympathetic brother?[65]

Building on the historical research of Arthur Groos, it seems worth revisiting common interpretations of the narrative by accounting for missionary perspectives on the Ansei treaty regime and missionary investment in the project of founding a feminine domestic sphere in Japan as an integral part of God's work. In *Madame Butterfly*, Lieutenant Pinkerton participates in a marriage ceremony with a Japanese woman, but then proceeds to marry a white American woman when he returns to the United States. If marriage law were consistently applied to him, he would be guilty of bigamy. The apparent premise of his actions is that he refuses to recognize a Japanese woman as a proper moral or legal subject, whereas he does recognize a white American woman as such. This view may be read as a gendered inflection of the racial hierarchy central to the Ansei treaty regime's discourse of civilization. Pinkerton's actions are thus implicitly in accord with the ideology of the treaty regime. Yet, the narrative registers ambivalence about this decision. Pinkerton's dialogue suggests to the reader that he is quite self-centered. Internal dialogue focalized in the American consul draws that conclusion fairly directly. The consul and Pinkerton have the following exchange:

> "And you advise me also to become a subject for remorse? That's good of you."
>
> "It is not quite the same thing. There is no danger of you losing your head for—" he glanced uncertainly at Pinkerton, then ended lamely—"any one. The danger would probably be entirely with—the other person."[66]
>
> Unless Pinkerton had changed, he had probably not thought of her again—except as the prompt wife of another man. He never explained anything . . . There was a saying in the navy that if any one could forget a played game or a spent bottle more quickly than Pinkerton, he had not yet been born. Providing her with a house and money meant nothing.[67]

Later in the story, narration focalized in the consul remarks:

> He saw in her attire the pitiful preparations to welcome the husband he now knew to be a craven, and in her face what it had cost to wait for him. But in specie the lie was difficult.[68]

A second aspect of the narrative even more directly related to international law is that at this time in the United States there were significant social sanctions for an upper-class white male who sought to divorce a white woman of quality in favor of a white female coworker. Ernest Fenollosa, for example, was essentially forced to resign his job at the Boston Museum of Fine Arts when he divorced his wife to marry a woman who was working as his research assistant at the museum.[69] On the other hand, under the still extant laws of extraterritoriality, any U.S. laws applicable to Lieutenant Pinkerton's behavior would have been subject to enforcement only by the U.S. consul and would have fallen under consular jurisdiction. Under the Ansei treaties, Japanese law would not have had jurisdiction over Pinkerton. Sailors were not even subject to the jurisdiction of consular courts. Pinkerton was thus able to break his marriage contract with Cho-Cho-San, in part due to the Ansei treaty system.

The man invested with the sole legal power to potentially punish or hold Pinkerton legally responsible would have been the U.S. consul who appears in a later section of the story. The consul clearly feels sympathy for Cho-Cho-San and thinks Pinkerton is an irresponsible cad, but there is no indication that he is about to take any action that might hold Pinkerton legally responsible for what would have been the crime of bigamy if he had acted in the same way on U.S. territory with two white American women of quality. The only sanction he appears to impose on Pinkerton is a distinctly lower personal opinion of him.

The narrative intersects with the biopolitics and legal structure of the Ansei treaty regime in two respects. First, contrary to the premise of *Madame Butterfly*, divorce in late nineteenth-century Japan was relatively commonplace and was generally not considered particularly traumatic. Marriage was often viewed as something on the order of a "trial marriage." If it worked, fine, if not, the dowry was returned and that was the end of it. This was a situation that began to change in the 1880s when suicides related to marital difficulties began to dramatically rise. In the mid-1890s in particular, there was an increased Japanese anxiety that a high rate of divorce might potentially sustain treaty power claims that Japan was uncivilized. There was concern that it reflected negatively on perceptions of Japan's relative level of civilization. The Japanese state thus began to exert increasing pressure to reduce the rate of Japanese divorce.

Madame Butterfly was published in 1898. That same year, the Japanese state introduced a civil code that raised the significance of marriage by

legally mandating registration with the state and increasing the difficulty of getting divorced. The premise of *Madame Butterfly* thus intersects with contemporary Japanese debates over marriage directly tied to Japan's status under international law. From the missionary perspective, *Madame Butterfly* thus makes a paternalist case for Japan's agency and potential to become civilized—thanks to the prosyletization of American Christians and Cho-Cho-San's demonstrated interest in a version of the U.S. domestic sphere, which missionaries so often conflated with religious conversion. The narrative also implicitly depicts U.S. colonial and semicolonial expansion into the Pacific as potentially progressive and as raising the status of foreign women, albeit from a patriarchal Christian perspective that would challenge the status quo in the treaty ports.

The novella depicts Cho-Cho-San as a potential convert to an American conception of domesticity whose possible faith is both invited and challenged by Pinkerton's cynical and narcissistic irresponsibility: "At first she decided to run away from him. But this, she reflected, would not probably please her relatives, since they had unanimously agreed upon the marriage for her. Besides, she preferred to remain. She had acquired a strange liking for Pinkerton and her new way of life."[70]

The narrative suggests that Pinkerton attempts to substitute a false cult of personality for the more admirable and legitimate missionary conception of domesticity: "Pinkerton . . . would provide her a new religion, if she must have one—himself again."[71]

Cho-Cho-San insists on being addressed as "Mrs. Pinkerton." She is quite proud of running an American-style household where everyone should speak English. She is explicitly depicted as assuming a sense of privacy thanks to her contact with Pinkerton that would have been inconceivable for a typical Japanese woman of the time.[72] In conversation with a go-between who attempts to interest her in remarriage to a Japanese man, Cho-Cho-San extols the superiority of U.S. marriage over Japanese marriage at great length:

> "Yes; a beautiful woman like you must have a husband."
>
> "Yaes. Thangs; I got one. Do you perhaps mean more?"
>
> "I mean a Japanese husband."
>
> "Oh-ah? That will have me a month, and then divorce me? And then another, and another, and another?"
>
> She was becoming belligerent.
>
> "How is it better with you now?"
>
> She recovered her good humor.
>
> "At America one is married foraever—aexcep' the other die. Aha! What you thing? Your marriages are not so . . . Aeverybody got stay marry at

> United States America. No one can git divorce, aexcep' he stay in a large court-house, all full judges with long faces . . ."[73]

It seems that Cho-Cho-San's faith in American domesticity grants her a religious and spiritual agency by virtue of her attempted conversion to the domestic sphere that contemporary Christians so closely associated with religious conversion. While Cho-Cho-San perhaps converts to this variety of domesticity, it is important to recognize that she merely expresses interest in conversion to the religion of Christianity. The two must be carefully distinguished in order to trace the forces at work in the story. It seems there is supposed to be a tragic aspect to the tale as she has taken up the cause of domesticity and is concerned with the sanctity of marriage.

Pinkerton, by contrast, continues to treat her as if she were any other heathen, semicivilized Japanese without moral agency of any sort. This is presumably part of the thinking that would lead him to marry a white American woman as if his marriage to Cho-Cho-San had never happened. While the cynical Chrysantheme in Pierre Loti's *Madame Chrysantheme* simply counts her money when the contract of her naval customer expires, for Cho-Cho-San, "Japanese marriage" has become a matter of life and death. She sees marriage as an institution that requires reform along the lines of the superior American counterpart in which she is so deeply invested and with which she so deeply identifies for most of the story.

Seen in this light, there is a heroic, missionary aspect to the tale: even though Pinkerton's treatment of Cho-Cho-San is irresponsible and inexcusable, she is portrayed as exhibiting a mode of spiritual grandeur that we are to presume is a direct result of her exposure to U.S. notions of spirituality, and more specifically to what is presented as effectively a religion of domesticity. Though she does not ultimately die from it, the reader is presented with the prospect of Cho-Cho-San as a martyr suffering from an American man's betrayal of the code of the domestic sphere. While Japan had a well-known tradition of love suicide, of lovers committing suicide in order to live together in the next life, the text seems to suggest that her encounter with the U.S. culture of domesticity made life and love more powerful and thus furnished additional motivation for suicide, perhaps along a European romantic trajectory of an individual female suicide as the ultimate testimony of her devotion to the male object of her unrequited love. This ambivalence toward the relation of love and death is clearly in significant tension with the narrator's attempt to simultaneously claim that American domesticity is on the side of life while Japanese tradition is on the side of death.

> She had not forgotten the missionary's religion; but on the dark road from death to Meido it seemed best now to trust herself to the compassionate augustnesses, who had always been there.
>
> Then she placed the point of the weapon at that nearly nerveless spot in the neck known to every Japanese, and began to press it slowly inward. She could not help a little gasp at the first incision. But presently she could feel the blood finding its way down her neck . . . She pressed the sword, and a fresh stream swiftly overran the other . . . But even as she locked her fingers on the serpent of the guard, something within her cried out piteously. They had taught her how to die, but he had taught her how to live—nay, to make life sweet. Yet that was the reason she must die. Strange reason! She now first knew that it was sad to die. He had come, and substituted himself for everything; he had gone, and left her nothing—nothing but this.[74]

Though the passage is ambiguous, the conventional present-day assumption is that Cho-Cho-San does not die. From that perspective, her decision to live would be a decision to choose domestic life with her child. Her conversion to the religion of domesticity would thus be proven by her insistence on living for the sake of her child. Still, it may be argued that the prospect and spectacle of her death scene stays with the reader much longer than the somewhat awkward, abrupt, and cryptic ending. The ambivalence of the ending requires that Cho-Cho-San be *both* a victim of Western male exploitation *and* a woman capable of an act of will that transcends her colonial situation.[75]

As Burke-Gaffney has pointed out, a top missionary priority would certainly have been that the child of a presumably Christian father have a Christian upbringing.[76] This would lead to broad support for the idea of Pinkerton's white Christian wife obtaining custody of Trouble. But the ending of the novella chooses rather to focuse on Cho-Cho-San. I suggest that from a missionary perspective, Cho-Cho-San may be interpreted as a martyr to a spiritual conception of marriage and love brought from the United States. As a consequence, her marriage to Pinkerton is simultaneously figured as both a ritual that issued from individual subjective agency, but also as a tragedy where the sentimental and spiritual faith and belief of a supposedly semicivilized Japanese woman towers above the faithlessness of Pinkerton, a hopeless cad who still adheres to the belief that a Japanese woman is a Japanese woman and as such does not possess moral or legal agency worthy of recognition. In other words, the missionary perspective insists on the agency of a Japanese woman in a way that the unequal treaty regime does not allow, albeit in a paternalistic and proselytizing manner that produces moral agency through conversion to modes of U.S. civilization and religiosity that are more strongly identified

with institutionalizing a distinct sphere of female domesticity than with conversion to Christianity per se.

Arthur Groos has established that if *Madame Butterfly* were based on a historical anecdote, it would necessarily date from the early 1890s. Interestingly, because of the contemporary Japanese state's incorporation of laws promoting the seriousness and import of marriage and the shame of divorce, Cho-Cho-San in a sense foreshadows the middle-class and colonial convention that the Japanese state was to shortly begin enforcing on the Japanese population. It seems that various Japanese translations of Euro-American domesticity would be depicted as traditional Japanese values in very short order.[77]

There is one last respect in which *Madame Butterfly* resonates with the enunciative position of imperial romance: it has Cho-Cho-San speak in a dialect familiar from depictions of southern black slaves and the discourse of nineteenth-century minstrelsy.

> "I egspeg I ought be sawry? She sighed hypocritically.
>
> "Exactly why, my moon-maid?"
>
> "Account they outcasting me. Aeverybody thing me mos' bes' wicked in all Japan. Nobody speaks to me no more—they all outcast me *aex*cept' jus' you; tha' 's why I ought be sawry."
>
> She burst into a reckless laugh, and threw herself like a child upon him.
>
> "But tha' 's zag' why I am *not!* Wha' 's use lie? It is not inside me—that sawry. Me? I'm mos' bes' happy female woman in Japan—mebby in that whole worl'. What you thing?"[78]

This passage argues in favor of Amy Kaplan's suggestion that the U.S. foray into Asia was at least as marked by the racial politics of north and south as it was by the east versus west politics of the closure of the western frontier.[79] *Madame Butterfly* thus locates racialized U.S. discourses of manifest domesticity in the Japanese treaty port of Nagasaki. It is interesting to note that the resolution of *Uncle Tom's Cabin* involves the colonization of Liberia by former American slaves, another effort that served to expand the U.S. empire of domesticity even as it purified white America of non-white influence. In addition to commanding the U.S. naval forces at Vera Cruz during the Mexican-American War and the squadron that "opened" Japan, Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry was also a widely noted proponent of and participant in the project to "repatratiate" former U.S. slaves to Liberia.[80]

MEIJI LEGAL REFORM VERSUS JAPANESE DOMESTICITY

After the Meiji Restoration in 1868, Japanese legal reform was in large part an effort to develop a legal code that incorporated the liberal capitalist logic of the Ansei treaties in a manner that made them compatible with conventional notions of national sovereignty under international law as applied to Western nations.[81] There were a number of key respects, however, in which Meiji legal reforms adopted to facilitate escape from the Ansei treaties enforced market-based claims that defied traditional Japanese notions of moral economy and thus led to popular resistance to capitalist governmentality. This section again calls on Elaine Hadley's notion of melodramatic resistance to an invasive market.

For example, commoner farmers often expected (or purported to expect) ruling class benevolence in times of crisis to a degree that would enable survival and subsistence. While there were in effect tenant farmers even prior to Meiji legal reform, it was only after the government's land tax reform of 1873 that "real" landed property became legally convertible into a commodity and became legally alienable.[82] Previously, tribute to one's lord was paid in kind and as a percentage of the harvest, so the amount of tribute paid varied with the yield. The new land tax, however, was computed based on a percentage of the land's estimated sale price, a figure that did not vary in accordance with crop failure or other factors. Land titles were cleared, land became an investment, and absentee landlordism exploded.[83] Due to deflationary government policy, frequent crop failure, and the inflation of commodity prices by hundreds of percent that did not ease tenant farmer tax payments still made in kind, many tenant farmers were unable to make their tax payments and were forced to borrow money from usurers (oftentimes their own landlords) at high rates of interest (banks in Japan's new banking system only did business with wealthier merchants and landlords).[84] Land was typically posted as collateral for these loans and a very high percentage of such land ended up being repossessed by usurers.[85]

Traditionally, farmers could negotiate with the village headman, the lord of the domain, or *bakufu* officials for relief in hard times or regarding grievances stemming from poor policies and corrupt officials. Failure to meet demands often resulted in riots of property destruction, including the smashing and burning of grain warehouses or of the houses and records of moneylenders, and even the destruction of public records of outstanding tribute and loan payments. While the leaders of uprisings were always punished—typically executed—the grievances that led to the uprisings were nevertheless often addressed afterward by lowered tribute payments or the removal of problematic officials. There was a nearly

formalized, customary aspect to the operation of the moral, or benevolence, economy in many rural areas.[86]

A common source of farmer grievances was seizure of control over land posted as collateral for loans. This type of seizure radically accelerated under the reformed Meiji tax law and the state's deflationary policy. To make matters worse, where Tokugawa period law had officially limited interest rates to 12 percent, this law was repealed in 1872. Tradition held that once a lender was repaid, the land should be returned even if the originally contracted loan period had expired. While a new interest-limiting law was reinstated in 1878, it was part of the civil rather than the criminal code so penalties were not particularly daunting and the law was not very vigilantly enforced. Moreover, it involved vague language regarding how overpayment of interest should be calculated that took years to be resolved in court. Worst of all, the new Meiji legal regime and its expanded police powers actively enforced the claims of creditors, including usurers. Attempts to negotiate through traditional channels or customary forms of popular intimidation were met with brutal police force in direct violation of popular assumptions of moral economy. Common wisdom, known as *honsen kaeshi*, dictated that interest payments should in no case exceed the value of the original money lent, such that the outstanding debt could never surpass double the principal. Meiji law enforcement officials routinely enforced creditor demands for much larger sums and directly violated what were popularly considered to be the entirely justified demands of debtors to have interest limited and to have payment periods extended.[87]

The Meiji state's installation of a regime of private property at the center of the new social formation meant that the state's laws themselves directly violated the demands of the traditional moral economy and made them prime targets for melodramatic modes of resistance. The Meiji state's own laws were thus interpreted as violating a competing conception of Japanese domesticity. In this regard, peasant resistance in early Meiji sometimes functioned as a mode of melodramatic resistance to incipient capitalist governmentality.

Domesticity in the Japanese Workplace

Labor organizations were just beginning to form in the late 1890s. Journalists for magazines such as *Kokumin no tomo* and *Nihon*, and newspapers such as the *Heimin shinbun*, the *Kokumin no shinbun*, the *Yorozu chohô*, and the *Osaka Mainichi*, were documenting the extreme and rapidly rising poverty of the Japanese lower classes. Both groups, often with vocal support from state bureaucrats, were beginning to actively campaign for

factory laws to protect workers from unsafe and exploitative conditions in the workplace. In the face of this initiative, managers of corporate Japan routinely turned to an argument in the melodramatic mode in order to fend off and delay state legal involvement in business management and working conditions.

> By the late 1890s, business spokesmen who opposed factory legislation were placing heavy emphasis on what they claimed were unique to Japanese labor relations—the special feelings of affection and loyalty that traditionally had governed dealings between employers and employees . . . The Tokyo Chamber of Commerce described affection as essentially an extension of familial sentiments: "In our country, relations between employers and employees are just like those within a family" . . . Soeda Juichi, president of the . . . Kogyo (Industrial) Bank in 1908, saw a somewhat different parallel: "The master—the capitalist—is loving toward those below, and takes tender care of them, while the employee—the worker—respects those above and will sacrifice himself to his work. The spirit of loyalty and love of country . . . is by no means limited to the relationship between the sovereign and subject."[88]

By the late 1890s, management was pointing to potential state labor laws as the greatest threat to the deferential, even familial, management-labor relations they believed tradition had mysteriously bequeathed to even the most modern, mass-scale industrial concerns. "Even in factories that employ hundreds of workers it is extremely rare [to find a case where] workers have rebelled because of cruel treatment by their employer. Truly this is [because of] the beautiful customs characteristic of our country. We must not fail to preserve these beautiful customs permanently. Why recklessly make laws and forcibly interfere in the relations between employer and employee?"[89] Indeed, at the turn of the century corporate paternalism was even advanced as a rationale for installing pro-management labor supervision—company foremen—in place of the traditional village headman (*oyakata)* institution of labor gang leaders previously utilized.[90] Similarly paternalist arguments were presented for why it was sensible for young single women to work in textile factories away from home and why the Meiji state should not intervene to improve working conditions that regularly and fatally exposed them to tuberculosis.[91] Corporate leaders essentially argued that granting workers legal rights would introduce self-interest and class conflict into an otherwise perfectly harmonious community characterized by unilateral managerial and market coercion and laborers left with a basic choice between obedience or unemployment.

On the other side of the debate, most advocates of a factory law apparently saw it as a melodramatic mode of resistance to the coercion of the

market: "In the debates of the late 1890s, most advocates of a factory law saw it as a *substitute* for antiquated old paternal customs destined to wither away as modern industry advanced."[92] They saw it as taking up the role of the rapidly disappearing and benevolent patriarch obligated to paternally protect his charges and who had been effectively replaced by the rapaciousness and economic classification of the market in the form of the very corporate leaders pleading the cause of beautiful customs. One point this debate reveals is that Japanese advocates of liberal *laissez-faire* business practices self-consciously took up the mantle of benevolent paternalism in the melodramatic mode regardless of the degree to which this may have led their employees to shake their heads in astonishment and disbelief. That is to say, Meiji period Japanese *laissez-faire* liberals often tended to cloak advocacy of *laissez-faire* policy in communally oriented, "traditionalist," paternalist rhetoric with a melodramatic flavor. In this respect, Japanese management philosophy shares with Victorian liberalism a disavowal of the classificatory consequences of market and corporate coercion and the identification of resistance to exploitation with moral depravity, but appears to have been somewhat more reticent regarding the corollary liberal claim that private capital accumulation is a public virtue.[93] In the emerging urban workplace, melodramatic tactics were thus invoked as *both* a form of resistance to liberal governmentality *and* as a new mode of proudly and distinctly Japanese governmentality that incorporated liberal market logic.

Domesticity and the Specter of Imperialism

While turn of the century Japanese corporate leaders were still carrying on about beautiful customs in their scandalously dangerous factories and mines, Kôtoku Shûsui was coming to the conclusion that political democracy could not be achieved in Japan without economic equality and that the current system was not particularly conducive to that end. He considered nationalism to be a superstition. He found the civilization claimed by imperialism to be haunted by the animalistic barbarism it purported to oppose.[94] He argued that war was a disease that had been transmitted to many by Alfred Thayer Mahan.[95] Americans are opposed to the assimilation of Japanese. Why do they need markets in the Far East?[96]

Kôtoku argued that militarism does not just interfere with the benefits of social civilization; it is a poison that undermines and destroys them.[97] For him, Kipling is simply a barbarian. Kôtoku charged that militarists aestheticize war, claiming that it is necessary to develop the courage and spirit of real men and to prevent the world from becoming one of weak women.[98] Japanese imperialism, from his perspective, was even more

pathetic than Euro-American imperialism, as at least the foreign variety turned a profit for someone.[99]

These positions entail Kotoku turning the vitalist ontology of imperial power civilizing discourse on its head. The powers had identified life and growth with law and trade, and death with resistance to progress. Kotoku insists that true trade and progress, true life, lies on the side of reason and international socialism. The implication is that capitalist trade and the states that enable it is the true barbarism, the truly regressive promotion of a culture of death. For Kotoku then, capitalist imperialism is a spectral phenomenon that purports to be on the side of life, but in actuality is haunted by rapacity and death. He hopes that by exposing its mendacity, the spell may be broken, that the ghost of capitalist civilization may be exorcised.

To his mind, socialism should undermine the capitalists' monopoly on profits to be distributed. In effect, he implies that the capitalist economic order itself installs a class-based state of legal exception.[100] Workers become automatic, inhuman machines, a haunted, abject form of life that is neither alive nor dead. With the image of twentieth century imperialism as a monster, Kotoku conceives imperialism as a specter of death that haunts the state and the workers upon whom the state enforces such misguided ways of life.

He finds that all of these issues are relayed through the domestic sphere as well. He observes that with each passing day, people have more to say about the "woman problem." While it may be good that women's issues are being researched, when you actually examine what such studies are attempting, he argues, they are essentially conducting surveillance on women and trying to think of new ways to control them. Opponents of socialism like to say that socialism calls for women to be held in common, but such replies are not even intelligible. For Kôtoku, such responses show that male opponents of socialism do actually think of women in the terms of property.[101] For all his cosmopolitanism, Kôtoku also engages in the rhetoric of the melodramatic mode. He writes, "Banzai!" for a Russian grandmother of the international revolution, thus shifting the term from a melodramatic celebration of the Emperor as the center of Japanese familial and national community to a celebration of the familial and revolutionary community of international anarchism.[102]

Kôtoku published his views on the international situation in *Imperialism: The Twentieth-Century Monster* (1901) and in an editorial in the *Heimin Shinbun* entitled, "Those Who Decide on Peace and War" (Feb. 7, 1904). He felt that Japan's wars could only benefit the Japanese military and others who mistakenly advocated militaristic national expansion.

There is a decidedly melodramatic flavor to Kôtoku's reading of the situation: a cabal of monied interests plot the downfall of the Japanese people and the emperor for their own selfish, evil, and market-driven reasons—they must be stopped for the sake of the common domestic and international good. He writes, "Ah, is this the Japan of the Japanese people? Is this the Japan of the constitution? Or is it the Japan of a few moneylenders (*kanekashigyô*)? I can't help feeling despondent. This is not just the case in Japan alone—now the politics of the world is entirely managed for the sake of capitalists. . . ."[103]

Kôtoku's variety of melodramatic resistance flips the notions of foreign versus domestic, and us versus them into an opposition between a community of victims of economic exploitation and those who undertake to make it happen and profit by it that transcends the boundaries of a particular nation-state. For Kôtoku, politics and the state, then, come to signify a false universality. It is precisely the false pretense of a common domestic sphere that Kôtoku makes us realize is a fiction that grounds the Meiji state's efforts to enable agricultural, industrial, and gender-based forms of exploitation by way of not just police power, but false claims of a common, domestic Japanese interest being served. For Kôtoku, the subjects of the Meiji state, like the subjects of any other industrializing or industrialized state, are haunted by the specter of social Darwinist rapacity masquerading as the common good. Further, the transnational project of governmentality presented in the guise of "civilization" is depicted as haunted by the very bestiality and inhumanity it claims it is dedicated to overcoming in others. The very project of civilization in the form of capitalist governmentality is revealed as a mere semblance of humanity—as a mode of abjection by which the vaunted liberal "civilizing mission" haunts those of all nations and cultures and races it designates as less or other than itself.

Mark Metzler's superb *Lever of Empire* implicitly establishes that Kôtoku was on the right track in his efforts to make sense of turn of the century Japan's international predicament. Metzler shows that the international finance system of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century was a hierarchical system of translation in relation to gold that situated Japan as a bona-fide imperialist, but an imperialist that commanded only second tier status as compared to imperial states with capital surpluses. As an imperial power with a credit line, Japan was an imperial power, but a power with a debt to service. Japan was thus a second-class, dependent imperialist that had to get along with foreign financiers as a matter of national survival and as the condition of undertaking imperial expansion of its own.[104] Imperialist Japanese governmentality was thus

racked with crippling internal contradictions, many of which came from *excessive* Japanese credulousness and deference toward the demands of liberal governmentality as practiced in the financial markets of London and then New York.

Conclusion

This chapter has analyzed the Ansei Treaty regime as a Foucaldian mode of governmentality that instituted the demands of the international market, most of which were eventually incorporated into domestic Japanese law. It suggests that the discourse of civilization that accompanied the treaties not only served as a pretext for the qualification of Japanese sovereignty but that the policing of such boundaries was an integral part of the social formations of the treaty powers as well as of the Japanese.

U.S. missionaries in Japan strongly favored revision of the treaties in order to gain access to potential Japanese converts beyond the treaty ports and focused centrally on the promotion of a Japanese domestic sphere as the most immediate target of a reform agenda grounded in spiritual conversion conceived as a civilizing process. The chapter finds that John Luther Long's *Madame Butterfly* is in dialogue with this U.S. missionary agenda and that the main character evinces a deep interest in and identification with what she understands to be a superior U.S. approach to marriage and the domestic sphere. The depiction of Cho-Cho-San's marriage as a life or death matter resonates deeply with contemporary Japanese state efforts to raise the seriousness of marriage as part of a larger project of civilizing Japanese in the eyes of the treaty powers. This coincided with the implementation of a new civil code designed to reduce the incidence of divorce.

The ambivalence of the novella's conclusion requires that Cho-Cho-San be both a victim of Western male exploitation and a woman capable of transcending her colonial situation in an embrace of Christian missionary notions of the domestic sphere seen as part of a civilizing process intimately associated with religious conversion. *Madame Butterfly* also may be seen as an ambivalent variety of imperial romance as defined by Amy Kaplan. This is so not only in its allegorization of international power relations as personal romance but also in its use of a "mammy" dialect familiar from U.S. abolitionist depictions of naïve southern slaves ripe for Christian conversion to convey Cho-Cho-San's dialogue.

The chapter finds that Japanese concern with a Japanese domestic sphere extended to debate on mixed residence in the interior and a new melodramatic mode of display that was incorporated into imperial ceremony from the 1890s. The emperor's *Imperial Rescript on Education* drew a direct

parallel between the relation of parents to their children and the status of the emperor toward his subjects. Official state commentary on the rescript reinforced this point, defining the nation as an expanded domestic sphere.

The chapter finds that Meiji period reform of property law in response to the Ansei Treaties directly clashed with traditional notions of moral economy. Traditional moral economy is interpreted as a form of melodramatic resistance to the market grounded in a patriarchal deference hierarchy. It is noted that related modes of melodramatic resistance were deployed in opposition to and in support of proposed factory laws during the period.

Lastly, Kôtoku Shûsui deployed figures of domesticity in a cosmopolitan manner that located community among the economically oppressed of the world and challenged competing identifications that located community in the national people or in identification with capital. Where opponents of socialism claimed that socialists sought to institute the communal sharing of women, Kôtoku argued that this proved that it was in fact capitalists who insisted on relating to women in terms of property law. For Kôtoku, Japanese wars fought to defend a Japanese domestic sphere were simply a pretext to confuse the people on all sides who would suffer and die for the sake of defending the privileges of capitalists and financiers. He characterized this situation as Japan having become the nation "of a few moneylenders." For him, civilization as brought by the treaties and capitalism was the false face of a modern, animalistic barbarism of exploitation and abjection. For all the suffering it caused, Kôtoku saw Japan as a dependent imperialist power that lost money in the event, even failing in its effort to exploit others from a strictly economic perspective. He saw the Japanese state and international workers as abjected and haunted by the spectral presence of the capitalist culture of barbarism, rapacity, and death, opposed in principle to the culture of life he considered to be embodied in the reason and civilization of socialist revolution.

The remaining chapters of *Japan and the Specter of Imperialism* examine competing articulations of a Japanese domestic sphere as responses to the Ansei treaties as a mode of capitalist governmentality. Mori Arinori develops an evolutionary discourse of Japanese masculinization and purification, racial reform, and improvement in global competitiveness. The following chapter examines these thoughts and policies in Mori's capacity as Japan's first Minister of Education.

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Chapter 2

The Science of Making Men

Moral Fitness for Global Competition

> The aim of education . . . is to cultivate the various aptitudes with which people are endowed and to increase the pleasure received by way of them insofar as possible. There are three aptitudes: the intellectual, the moral, and the physical . . . In my view, that which our people most lack is one of the three essential aptitudes, the physical . . . If we wish to supply this deficiency now by undertaking physical education, we must first identify these causes as the etiology with which a physician treats an illness . . . as for the damage caused to the bodies of our countrymen, we must avoid them and together investigate the best method to remove it.
>
> Mori Arinori, On Education: The Aptitudes of the Body[1]

> This book is solely for the teaching of ethics (*rinri*) such that a standard is clarified sufficient to judge right from wrong . . . The method of teaching morality (*dôtoku*) is to explain the distinction between good and evil . . . The relation of morals to ethics is . . . that of principle and rule, with ethics being the principle and morality the rule . . . This book is for use as an ethics text in the final year of high school and in teachers' colleges.
>
> Mori Arinori, *Ethics Text*[2]

This chapter examines Mori Arinori's[3] (Minister of Education 1884–1889) ethics and physical education policies as particular articulations of Meiji Japanese governmentality in response to the market logic imposed by the Ansei treaties. The purpose of this chapter is to trace out Mori"s articulation of the Japanese national body vis-a-vis capital, its relation to Herbert Spencer's project, and to the hierarchy of civilization implicit in Spencerian govenmentality and the related contemporary suspension of international law.

This chapter contends that competing appropriations of the work of Herbert Spencer were at the heart of many middle-Meiji period debates over the most desirable direction of future Japanese development. While previous readings of Mori have debated whether or not he was a pro-individualist liberal or a pro-state nationalist with several leading scholars on both sides of the debate, this chapter pursues a somewhat different line of inquiry. This chapter examines what is required to realize both Mori and Spencer's shared concern to dissolve feudal practices incompatible with industrial capital and commerce. It discovers that they both sought to install a new regime of governmentality that privileged the discourse of evolutionary science and aligned the accumulation and reproduction of capital with social life per se. It also finds that gender, language, capital, and national identity all became mutually implicated at various points in Mori's writings and policies.

It may be observed that to some degree the legacy of Mori Arinori—and even more so that of Herbert Spencer—has been significantly repressed from academic and public memory. Even what has been retained from both often takes the form of one-sided caricatures and misunderstood slogans. In such a context, it may be hoped that this chapter's reexamination of Mori and Spencer will set the stage for later consideration of contemporary issues as well. A brief discussion of the general reception of evolutionary thought in Meiji period Japan will serve to situate Mori's particular appropriation of it.

Evolutionary theory was first taught by E. S. Morse and Ernest Fenollosa at the University of Tokyo. Morse introduced the work of Charles Darwin to Japan.[4] Fenollosa, recruited at Morse's recommendation, lectured on philosophy, economics, and political science from 1877 to 1886. Fenollosa's lectures on religion and social evolution were largely presentations of Spencer's views. His course on philosophy also took Spencer's work as its point of departure. He strongly criticized students who took part in the freedom and popular rights movement.[5] Fenollosa's position will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter, but he clearly sided with the gradualist position that legitimated the genrô (elder statesmen with extraconstitutional authority) coalition that controlled the Japanese state. Toyama Masakazu and Ariga Nagao also lectured on Spencer's sociology at the University of Tokyo. Katô Hiroyuki, president of the University of Tokyo from 1880–1893, claimed to have repudiated his own previous position in support of natural law and natural rights as a result of his encounter with the evolutionary thought of Spencer and Haeckel (though Spencer explicitly advocated a natural law position).

Spencer has been called the most widely read and possibly the most influential Western social and political thinker in Japan during the 1880s. Five books and articles written by Spencer were translated prior to 1882. The first translation of Spencer's works was an abridged translation of *Social Statics* in 1877. A full translation appeared by 1883. Between 1877 and 1890, twenty-three translations of his work were published. These included four translations of *Representative Government* and three translations of *Education*. By contrast, between 1891 and 1970 there were only seventeen translations, so interest in his work clearly peaked in the mid-Meiji period.[6] Shimizu Ikutarô has emphasized that Spencer's thought was important for both the pro-parliament opponents of the government and the gradualist position of the ruling coalition. In this sense, we may say that much of mid-Meiji political debate turned on competing articulations of governmentality derived from Spencer.

There is consensus that Spencer's thought was largely disseminated through three primary channels: the freedom and popular rights movement, the Meiji government, and classes taught at Tokyo University. Leaders of the freedom and popular rights movement, such as Itagaki Taisuke and Baba Tatsui, relied upon Spencer's *Social Statics*, a book widely recognized as a key text for the freedom and popular rights movement as a whole. It was Spencer's critique of centralized state power in particular that appears to have made *Social Statics* attractive to them.

Tokutomi Sohô was a writer and journalist during the mid-1880s who shared many of the goals of the freedom and popular rights movement. He was a proponent of Spencer as a libertarian and he was arguably as influential outside the state as Mori Arinori was in his status as ambassador and then Minister of Culture. Tokutomi founded a widely read magazine known as *Kokumin no tomo* (*The Nation's Friend)*. Its approach was inspired by the nineteenth-century American magazine, *The Nation*. Tokutomi turned to Spencer's *Principles of Sociology* as his point of departure and analyzed the direction of world events using Spencer's schema of a militant, feudal regime of status gradually giving way to a peaceful, industrial regime of contract. Tokutomi considered that Japan should jettison the past, equating civilization with modernization. This included radical reform of the Japanese domestic sphere—family and women's role in society—an issue Tokutomi addressed loudly and often. Tokutomi was widely considered the voice of his generation through the early 1880s.[7]

Itagaki Taisuke, Baba Tatsui, and Tokutomi Sohô all variously insisted that radical and immediate reforms were necessary if Japan were to evolve in the direction of the industrial regime based on contract and voluntary cooperation in the foreseeable future. This means that the liberal

Japanese interpretation of Spencer saw him as proposing a mode of capitalist governmentality grounded in an account of the enunciative position of Japan in the 1880s that conflicted with the gradualist view promoted by the state. For the freedom and popular rights activists, Japan ought to be viewed as an emerging industrial society so that rapid and immediate reforms could be taken which recognized an already nascent popular sovereignty and autonomy. For the gradualists, popular sovereignty or autonomy were decades away, to the degree that they were desirable at all. Very slow reform guided by the government in a paternalistic fashion was the only measure the gradualists deemed appropriate for a country with Japan's lack of representative political traditions. Attribution of a specific evolutionary stage entailed a corresponding social policy in the present and immediate future. This debate was made more complex by the fact that Spencer saw the advanced Euro-American societies themselves as still at a transitional point between the feudal and industrial regimes.[8]

Spencer's own gradualism came from his division of social evolution into successive stages. For Spencer, government intervention in the economic life of Great Britain was a form of tyranny because the English were on the road to freedom and government was a roadblock obstructing that end. For him, government activity beyond the administration of justice amounted to the state treating an emerging industrial people in a coercive, feudal manner.[9] Social evolution was a transition from centralized feudal state control to the decentralized self-governance of the private sector. Within this schema, social welfare policy administered by a central state bureaucracy could only be interpreted as a return to feudal state tyranny over a properly independent civil society. Yet Spencer, like Mill, believed that a society must pass through all stages of social evolution before it could be fitly adapted to freedom (i.e., so that it would have internalized the law of property, etc.). Centuries of external feudal authority were conceived as a necessary stage on the path toward industrial society in which public law was to be replaced by private morality and more ethical structures of desire. The gradualist position required situating Japan further down the evolutionary ladder than Great Britain and allowed colonial, semicolonial, and domestic oppression to be rationalized as part of the civilizing process. Mori, Fenollosa, Toyama, and Katô, like Spencer, justified their advocacy of gradualism in the name of a belief that social relations are largely grounded in sentiment and habit. They assumed that several generations must surely pass before democratic institutions could be internalized by the Japanese people at the level of unconscious habit. That is to say, Spencerian liberalism suspended liberal egalitarianism or national recognition in the case of those considered

to be less civilized than their industrialized contemporaries of the late nineteenth-century.

Mori Arinori was appointed a commissioner to the *Monbushô* (Ministry of Education) in 1884. He headed the ministry from December of 1885.[10] Mori saw Japan as caught in the midst of a global competition that was both commercial and military, a struggle for national survival. Mori's policies designed the school system so as to meet the demands of economic growth in the face of extreme fiscal constraints on the state. Applied science was thus emphasized above pure science, national goals above personal achievement, and a system of universal elementary education was to be sought at the least possible expense to the state. Mori instituted a two-track system of primary education, the first for the purpose of general education, and the latter for the purpose of elite education.[11] As a nationalist, he saw fit to replace all foreign deans with younger Japanese deans.[12] During his term as the first education minister, he supervised the consolidation of the University of Tokyo in 1886. This involved the establishment of five new faculties with their own graduate schools: Law, Literature, Medicine, Science, and Engineering. With the 1886 restructuring, the University of Tokyo acquired Imperial status and became Tokyo Imperial University.

While stationed in Washington D.C., Mori read extensively in the works of Herbert Spencer and John Stuart Mill. Mori first called on Spencer personally in 1873, asking advice about the reform of Japanese institutions. He was probably the first Japanese to meet Spencer. As Japanese ambassador to England, he was an honorary member of a prestigious intellectual men's club called the Athenaeum where he cultivated close personal ties to such figures as Herbert Spencer and Alexander Bain. Spencer and Mori became regular billiard partners at the club. The notoriously unsocial Spencer went so far as to give a dinner in Mori's honor at the Athenaeum on May 19, 1881 on the occasion of his return to Japan. The dinner was attended by Alexander Bain and John Morley, among other significant intellectual figures of the time.[13] Spencer had just begun work on Part 5 of *Principles of Sociology* at the time.

Principles of Sociology laid out Spencer's tri-partite schema of social evolution. The three basic modes of social assemblage were identified as anarchic barbarism, the feudal regime of status based upon compulsory cooperation, and the modern, industrial regime of contract-founded-on-voluntary cooperation.[14] He found the most advanced societies of contemporary Europe to be a hybridized, and he hoped transitional, mixture of the latter two. Spencer expected adaptation to the industrial regime of contract would lead to individual incorporation of the law in the form

of moral conscience and a consequent withering away of the state and external law. This was to be accompanied by the gradual replacement of international military struggle by economic competition. In other words, Spencer assumed a vitalist ontology according to which life is on the side of society, economy, and freedom, but the state is associated with death and the static, authoritarian qualities of premodern social formations.

Spencer was very interested in Mori, and Mori served as Spencer's primary informant on Japan. Japan figured as a paradigmatic feudal, or "militant" (Spencer's term), society in Spencer's account. For his part, Mori adapted and developed the work of Spencer as a way of conceiving an autonomous Japanese national education system that could compete with European systems on their terms. As will be seen in Chapter 3, many of Mori's opponents contended that his thought was in need of decolonization. For them, Mori's views disseminated a foreign religion incompatible with the national essence and amounted to an apology for the Meiji government's complicity in the great powers' exploitation of Japan via the Ansei treaty regime—a status premised upon Japan being viewed as uncivilized and a foreign refusal to recognize any significant positive value in Japanese tradition.

Mori Arinori clearly and relentlessly spoke of how he conceived his primary responsibility as education minister as involving what we would now classify as the biopolitical management of the Japanese population—the institution of a mode of capitalist governmentality designed to improve Japan's international economic competitiveness by way of discipline, education, and personal and social reform. Mori remarks upon international economic competition in an interview with *The Pall-Mall Gazette* (Feb. 26, 1884) as follows:

> You ask me about standing armies, and the impression which is produced on the Oriental mind by a continent converted into an armed camp. That spectacle, I am free to confess, impressed me far less than the *war of commerce* which, under the name of "competition," goes on unceasingly. In military warfare there is sometimes peace . . . But the war of commerce never stops. *The competition of nation with nation for the monopoly of the trade and industry of the world is constant and cruel*. I don't complain; nor do I affect to censure. I am taught that the progress of the race is by the survival of the fittest and the elimination of the weak by a process of natural selection; and the commercial competition is one form by which superior organisms triumph over the lower. In that competition I hope Japan will now take a much more prominent part then she has hitherto done. The feudal system from which we have only recently freed ourselves was not favourable to the development of commercial and industrial activity . . . Now we have changed all that.[15]

Here Mori lays out a conception of civilian life as the continuation of war by other means. Foucault discusses such a reversal of Clausewitz' famous maxim in *Society Must Be Defended*, the Foucaldian version being that "peacetime" politics sanctions and reproduces the disequilibrium of forces manifested in war.[16] "Survival of the fittest" was a description of natural selection coined by Spencer to describe Darwin's theory (a theory about which Spencer expressed some ambivalence).[17] Where Darwin focused on species change, Spencer was much more concerned with mapping a progressively increased deferral of gratification and division of labor (and hence "cooperation") in the development of human societies. Mori's usage of the phrase thus reveals him to be speaking in a Spencerian idiom, but one coined to describe Darwinian conceptions.[18] In Mori's insistence that economic competition was war by other means rather than a more civilized successor to military struggle, his view of international economic competition significantly diverged from that of Spencer. Mori understood the militant values Spencer would abandon as part of feudalism to be fundamental to success as an industrial civilization. In other words, where Spencer opposed capitalism to militarized, feudal society, Mori saw the militant values of hierarchical feudal society as a necessary component of industrial capitalism. Mori's thought thus challenged Spencer's understanding of industrial capitalist progress as a movement away from conflict.

This also means Mori's ontology was distinct from that of Spencer. Where Spencer identified life with the private sector and generally viewed the state as the hand of death, Mori rather saw the hand of death in the threat of imperialism and economic competition from abroad. Mori saw an alliance between Japanese society and the Japanese state as obviously necessary to Japanese national survival. For Mori, the state's service to society and the nation apparently aligned it with the forces of life.

Mori's policies focused on narrowing and erasing the gap between Japan and the nations currently ranked above it in liberal imperialism's international hierarchy. Mori's speech at Saitama Normal School (Dec. 19, 1885) directly addresses this issue:

> Indeed, to change the subject again, when we carefully consider the meaning of war, it is not necessarily a matter of whether people are killed or not—on reflection *there are no everyday human affairs that are not a matter of war. In other words, the war of commerce and industry with foreign countries, the war of knowledge, or our present day endeavor to establish ourselves, determine our will to make our country Japan an excellent country. Without exception these are all matters of war*. If we have no concern for Japan, if Japan decides to join the world powers and becomes satisfied with its

> lowest position, war preparations would serve no purpose to begin with. In this way, though we may refer to it as the Japanese empire, in fact it would become weak to the point that it could not be called a country. The following must become the resolve of Japanese males—if they are to be real Japanese men they should make every effort to advance: if the country of Japan has until now been in the third rank, it must advance to the second. If it is in the second rank, it must proceed to the first rank, until, finally, it works at the head of the international order. Nevertheless, achieving this will not be easy at first. All we can rely on is that the teachers' schools that are the foundation of general education perform their function well. In the end, remaining attentive to the educational and economic administration of the teachers' schools is what strengthens this foundation above all. Apart from this, it is said that the method of advancing international alliances will create many options, but 80 to 90% of these opportunities depend upon the teachers' schools.[19]

Mori Arinori's biopolitics has two primary aspects. First, for the sake of international economic competitiveness, Mori devotes great attention to improving the physiological health and hygiene of male Japanese students—and ultimately the Japanese population as a whole. Second, his discussion of capitalism on the model of the social organism and the materials he develops for ethics education diagram a biopolitics of the Meiji Japanese economy as a matter of social physiology. He reads economic relations in an organismic mode as determined by "nature" and the accumulation of capital as the reproduction of social "life."

Given Mori's conclusion that (contra-Spencer) commercial competition required a certain military aspect, Mori turned to military training as a disciplinary practice he found necessary for Japan to become globally competitive in an economic sense. Before turning to a discussion of Mori's program of military training, it will be necessary to review his sense of the importance of physical education generally.

In Mori's *Kyoikuron: Shintai no n ryoku* (*On Education*: *The Aptitudes of the Body*, [1879]), he details his views on physical education and the urgent need to raise its profile within the Japanese educational system as a whole. Mori holds that neglect of physical education is the problem that reform of the Japanese educational system must address most immediately. Diet, clothing, housing, traditional educational approaches in Chinese, and Buddhism are cited as the causes primarily responsible for shortcomings in the physical condition of the Japanese people. As regards traditional Japanese dwellings, Mori finds that sitting on *tatami* mats leads to bad posture and idleness.[20] Viewed from the perspective of physiology, the premise of Mori's analysis here (as is true of Spencer) is that the individual body is a microcosm of the social body, the social macrocosm.

Both interpreted individual problems as social problems at the atomic or cellular level. Mori and Spencer's theories thus both articulate an analogical and allegorical relation between the individual and society.

Mori's project is therefore an attempt to draw a new boundary against which a modernized Japanese subject might be defined. He posits a new set of high and low oppositions and exclusions against which modern Japaneseness can be made visible. Stallybrass and White suggest that in Bakhtin's work there is a germinal notion of transcodings and displacements effected between the high and low image of the physical body and other social domains: "'The whole concept of body-image boundaries has implicitly in it the idea of the structuring of one's relations with others' . . . body images 'speak' social relations and values with particular force."[21] This seems to fairly characterize what is at stake in Mori's new paradigm of high and low oppositions and exclusions.

In Tokugawa contexts, social space was largely regulated in accordance with caste segregation and intracaste gender segregation. The appropriate comportment of the individual body was thus determined by acting in accordance with the social space within which one was inserted. With his objections to the "consequences" of Japanese interior design of the nineteenth century, Mori steps out on a reverse course in which social space itself must be reformed for the purposes of disciplining and producing the desired model of the physiological body conceived in the image of capitalism and nationalism. A single homogeneous masculine paradigm is to be enacted across caste and region. Mori's demand to veil the specificity of social space and subject position thus constitutes a particular Meiji Japanese variant of the internal distancing from the popular which Stallybrass and White locate in the English construction of the bourgeoisie. For Stallybrass and White, this is a subject position that mystifies and explicitly refuses hierarchies in the name of democracy and equality, by the rejection of all specific and particular domains. This suggests that the abstraction of bodies and social space was likely an important component of the construction of the Meiji middle-class as well, albeit with a distinct political inflection.[22]

The reader will note that the virtues Mori promotes are consistently virtues associated with economic productivity and competitiveness, while the virtues he castigates are typically associated with the reverse. Mori's opposition to "traditional" Japanese clothing as insufficiently functional similarly erases lines of caste and regional variation.[23] He argued that long sleeves hinder free physical movement and thus lead to laziness. Mori sets up a high and low opposition within which modern efficiency and functionality is implicitly contrasted with a posited traditional inefficiency

and laziness. Again, rather than having the subject conform to social space by wearing the appropriate caste-based attire and behaving accordingly, Mori would have the aspects of social space embodied in clothing remapped in accordance with a single, homogeneous model for a single national and social male body. Mori's description clearly does not take into account the clothing practices of those who traditionally undertook manual labor, many of whom did not even wear clothing on the upper body. Mori's project thus erases clothing-coded caste boundaries in the name of technical and economic efficiency. As it happens, for the purposes of unequal treaty revision the minimal attire of the Japanese laboring classes was already being reformed by the government in the interest of presenting Japan as a civilized country in the eyes of the Western powers. It was in this context that Mori came to the conclusion that the introduction of military-style Western clothing for all students in all public schools of the nation was the obvious solution to the problem.

Mori introduced military training into the teacher education curriculum in 1886. In 1887, he wrote a short essay presenting his views on military training entitled, *A Proposal on Military Gymanastics* (*Heishiki taisô ni kansuru kengen an*). This followed his previous essay in dividing education into three components along Spencerian lines, intellectual, moral, and physical. He argued that increased focus on physical education would empower the nation and strengthen popular love of country and the emperor (*chûkun aikoku*). This aspect of teacher education was delegated to officers in the Japanese army as he considered military training a prerequisite and the civilian teaching staff had no such background.[24]

Mori's introduction of this new regime of discipline in school dormitories institutionalized three factors Mori cited in his earlier essay on the body: a modernized and Westernized diet, a reform of interior architectural space, and clothing reform.[25] Meat was introduced into student diets, *tatami* mats were replaced by Western-style beds, and traditional *kimono* were replaced by European-style military uniforms. Mori suggested that an exclusively vegetarian diet would disturb the proper development of muscle and bone and prevent the blood from achieving proper consistency.[26]

With the proliferation of military uniforms, Mori's school reform significantly contributed toward instantiating a newly militarized image of masculinity as more or less synonymous with modern masculinity per se. From 1882 to the present, most school-age Japanese boys have been required to wear military-style uniforms on most days of the year in which they attend school. Articulation of the masculine, the modern, and the military were thus closely intertwined with one another. This

new militarized, Western-derived image of the modern Japanese male was strikingly deployed in Japanese graphic arts as early as popular depictions of the Sino-Japanese War in 1894.

Under Mori, military gymnastics were largely identified with a game called "capture the flag." In this game, children were divided into a red group and a white group. The goal of each team was to capture the flag of the other group. It was thus a sort of war game that interpellated the students as members of a fictive national community.[27] Yoshimi Shunya's analysis suggests that exercise fairs, which were the most visible public aspect of Mori's physical education policies, disciplined the bodies of children as subjects within an emperor-centered construction of national community.[28] According to Yoshimi, "it was necessary to ceaselessly place the bodies of children trained by military gymnastics within the frame of the nation-state that Meiji Japan was attempting to create. Conversely, this national frame itself became a possibility with the disciplinization and training of children's bodies in military gymnastics . . . For Mori, the school was a place where children's bodies were trained as subjects of the modern nation-state required by the Japan of the future. At the same time, it was a place for these trained bodies to be displayed before the gaze of the state."[29]

Yoshimi draws on an unspecified notion of "the gaze" to situate his analysis. He notes that it became very common after 1885 for the emperor or one of his representatives to formally observe the exercise fairs, just as they formally observed army and navy exercises. For Yoshimi, the organization of the exercise fairs situated the bodies of the participants as national bodies and thus Imperial subjects insofar as they adhered to Mori's new regime of military gymnastics.

The exercise fairs were required parts of the curriculum in Japanese elementary and middle school starting in 1886, with onset dates differing from prefecture to prefecture. Prior to this point, track and field was the most common type of competition, but after this point, capture the flag, tug of war, and calisthenics became the most common forms of competition, with primary emphasis being placed on the military spirit of gymnastics. The individual was the central unit of competition in the former case, but the group became the primary unit in the latter. By 1887 these exercise fairs were held in all the school districts of the entire nation. At the time of the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), they were already a fundamental school activity. By the mid-1890s, they had even spread to Hokkaidô, Okinawa, and Taiwan.[30]

But Mori's militarization of the teacher's schools went even further. Political speeches were restricted. Students were organized into platoons,

companies, and battalions with ranked uniforms and military salutes required. Student treatment of personal effects in the dorm was supervised with the relentless, obsessive discipline of a military barracks. The regime of military training came to include rifle training, long marches, and the routine assembled recitation of the *Imperial Rescript for Soldiers*.[31] A later proposal from Mori advocated extending the program of twice weekly military training to all males between the ages of 17 and 27 whether they were in school or not.[32] As Hasegawa Seiichi has noted, while previous research has often emphasized that Mori claimed not to be interested in producing soldiers per se, there is no disputing that he not only sought to redefine the education system as a military-derived disciplinary space, but even attempted to extend this space into the community of Japanese male youth at large. His vision was in large part realized.[33] From the perspective of this book, the fact that Mori consistently presented military virtues as virtues of capitalist governmentality and state strengthening rather than strictly military virtues per se is hardly a mitigating factor. After all, he had directly stated that Japan was effectively in a state of total war. Mori's policy of militarizing the educational system pursued the logic of that world view with impressive, if somewhat discomforting, clarity.

Previous accounts have suggested a tie between Mori's physical education policy and the pedagogical philosophy of Herbert Spencer. As previously discussed, it is clear that Mori was familiar with Spencer's work and that Mori himself may have influenced a number of Spencer's own positions. Nevertheless, the suggested continuity between Spencer's conception of pedagogy and that of Mori Arinori must be very seriously qualified. Whereas for Spencer the aim of industrial civilization was to replace the militant regime of feudal society with a peaceful, contract-based regime of commerce, for Mori the contract-based regime of industrial civilization was a form of total war fought in the context of everyday life. Such war had to be fought with military as well as commercial virtues intact. Where Spencer would replace the militant, feudal regime of status with the industrial regime of contract, Mori's writing and policies consistently marry the two so as to produce a hybrid, militant-industrial regime.[34]

In *Education: Intellectual, Physical, and Moral*, Spencer emphasizes above all else conformity to nature such that the student is forced to suffer the consequences of his or her own actions. For Spencer, obedience to another's will defined the premodern, militant type of society. He held that modern industrial societies, by contrast, were organized around voluntary cooperation. He hoped and expected a shift toward an industrial order of voluntary cooperation might be advanced if children developed

an autonomous appreciation of the consequences of their own actions without particular consideration for the will of their instructor. Sports and games are promoted as means of channeling children's primitive urges in constructive directions. The image of the dogmatic, feudal father as absolute ruler whose will must be obeyed is to be replaced by the figure of the coach who offers advice and encouragement for the purpose of achieving a common goal. Military command embodies the regime of status characteristic of the feudal stage of civilization. The sports coach embodies the regime of contract characteristic of the contemporary, industrial stage of civilization.

While Mori explicitly conceives Japanese reforms as overthrowing feudal aspects of Japanese culture that hinder the commercial competition characteristic of the modern world, his insistence on obedience, gymnastic drill, and the inculcation of courage explicitly oppose related aspects of Spencer's pedagogical model. Asceticism, unthinking obedience, and rote repetition were precisely what Spencer's educational doctrine was designed to eliminate. For Spencer, drill is feudal, whereas sports are democratic. In *Facts and Comments*, Spencer explicitly attacks proponents of the virtues of gymnastics as gravely mistaken. Muscular strength and constitutional strength are not to be identified. He suggests that the abnormal demands of gymnastics may actually undermine the physical constitution. Further, for Spencer it is important that exercise be pleasurable, rather than a dull routine:

> As certain as it is that a country walk through fine scenery is more invigorating than an equal number of steps up and down a hall; so certain is it that the muscular activity of a game, accompanied by the ordinary exhilaration, invigorates more than the same amount of muscular activity in the shape of gymnastics . . . Alike among early civilized races and among barbarians, war originated gymnastics and the theory and practice of gymnastics have all along remained congruous with the militant type of society . . . But with the advance towards a peaceful state of society, the need for making strength of limb a chief qualification in the citizen diminishes, and along with its diminution, coercive and ascetic culture loses its fitness. In place of artificial appliances for bodily development come the natural appliances furnished by games and spontaneous exercises.[35]

Even allowing for slightly divergent understandings of the term gymnastics, Spencer and Mori clearly part ways on this question. While Mori emphasized military gymnastics as a means toward spiritual discipline and obedience, his successor, Inoue Kiyoshi, based his reforms on medical advice and shifted to a focus on hygiene and health. He carried forward

Mori's reforms insofar as he saw a focus on book learning to the exclusion of physical activity as detrimental to student health. Both of them emphasized eliminating the deleterious physical and developmental effects of current educational practices as their first priority. Both of them also perceived these as a threat to Japanese masculinity.

Inoue altered Mori's program, however, insofar as he emphasized health along medical lines over courage and discipline. It is thus Inoue, rather than Mori, whose policies most fully approximated Spencer's position—Inoue and Spencer both advocated vigorous, healthful fun in place of obedience and drill.[36] Inoue also takes up the discourse of evolutionary degeneracy.

> Before we can actively reap the benefits of education, we must consider how to avoid the injury which education currently involves. This means we must consider hygiene above all else . . . As for the educational abuse that we must consider, in referring to history, the weakening of the body through effeminacy is to be feared the most. No logic or academic discipline may be taught successfully if natural development has been harmed.
>
> When the physical constitution of the national people has fallen into weak effeminacy, however courageously the spirit [*kokoro*] may be appealed to, the delicate man [*yasa otoko*] should be abandoned as a national characteristic.
>
> Correcting degenerate customs is one thing, but when it comes to civilization, a generation that cannot successfully correct physical degeneracy is at the same time a race that has become feeble. There are many historical examples in which moribund countries exhibit this symptom. We must be sufficiently attentive to this issue today.[37]

With Inoue, in addition to instilling labor discipline and contributing toward economic efficiency, the physical education reforms initiated by Mori remain within the national frame described by Yoshimi and continue to function as an effort to masculinize Japanese and Japanese culture, but Mori's stated aim of spiritual and physical asceticism and discipline is replaced by a regime that promotes maintaining and enhancing the male physical constitution through enjoyable games designed in accordance with the advice of medical experts. In terms of physical education, Inoue largely completes the Spencerian conception of the social body that Mori began the process of installing within Japanese society. In Spencer's analysis of the social organism, as will be explicated below, nutrition equals investment in the social. Due to the analogical structure of Mori's thought, these policies implicitly installed a similar notion of the nutritionally fortified body of capital at the level of the individual.

Spencer's project, as first stated in his essay "The Social Organism," and later developed in *Principles of Sociology*, is grounded in an analogy between physiological and economic growth. The vascular system corresponds to middle-class trading and blood cells correspond to money. This means that issues of nutrition and sound physiological growth are a microcosm that corresponds to sound investment practices, capital formation, and economic growth in the social macrocosm.

> That there may be growth, the commodities obtained in return must be more than sufficient for these ends; and just in proportion as the surplus is great will the growth be rapid. Whence it is manifest that what in commercial affairs we call profit, answers to the excess of nutrition over waste in a living body. Moreover, in both cases, when the functional activity is high and the nutrition defective, there results not growth but decay . . . if in the body politic, some part has been stimulated into great productivity, and cannot afterwards get paid for all its produce, certain of its members become bankrupt, and it decreases in size.
>
> One more parallelism to be here noted, is, that the different parts of the social organism, like the different parts of an individual organism, compete for nutriment; and severally obtain more or less of it according as they are discharging more or less duty . . . So, likewise, in a society, it frequently happens that great activity in some one direction, causes partial arrests of activity elsewhere, by abstracting capital, that is commodities . . . almost unawares we have come upon the analogy which exists between the blood of a living body, and the circulating mass of commodities in the body politic.[38]

For Spencer, the distribution of commodities in society is thus analogous to the nutritive system of the biological organism. The distribution of money is to the social body as the distribution of blood is to the body of the organism. The accumulation of capital would correspond to the excess of nutrition over waste, or profit. In other words, a doctrine of nutrition is invoked as a theory of political economy and vice versa. Spencerian evolutionary theory thus offers a biopolitics of capitalism that conflates biology and economy, a discourse that still remains very much with us in monthly and annual statistical measures of national "economic growth" that are routinely interpreted in a manner that similarly misrepresents profit-taking and capital accumulation as synonymous with general social welfare.

When we think through the body-image with which Spencer seeks to define social relations, his conception of the social body is grounded in developments in evolutionary physiology. Science in general is privileged, and the biological sciences are presented as those most relevant for thinking the social body. Contested domains of discourse and practice are thus

a part of the attempt to define the true nature of the social body. The progress of science is appealed to as an authority that legitimates the analogy.[39] Like Edmund Burke, Spencer seeks to establish that the discourse of manufacture and human agency transgresses its proper scope when it would seek to address issues involving people as well as things. In other words, he seeks to establish that society is a growth, not a manufacture.[40] It is in this respect that Spencer's conception of capitalist governmentality intersects with the thought of F. H. Hayek (neoliberal) and that of Leo Strauss (neoconservative), both of whom insist that any self-conscious human agency applied toward egalitarian social objectives is inherently pathological in principle.

This appeal to biology has immediate and radical consequences for the social relations that Spencer's anatomy of the social organism envisions. The circulation of money through and the accumulation of capital as the social body in accordance with the "natural laws" of classical political economy are translated into biological terms such that the "laws" of classical liberal economics are reconceived and mystified as biopolitical "laws" of social survival. Conceiving the anatomy of the social body as founded on the body of capital produces a body-image for which human social relations derive their value by way of their relation to capital. Capital is conceived as the nutrition of the social body, without which it must die. Deprivation of capital is social death. Interference with the flow of capital toward the end of capital accumulation leads to social pathology. Sustained derangement of the accumulation of capital leads to social pathology and ultimately to social bankruptcy (i.e., social death). Thus Spencer defines social "life" as the reproduction of capital. People, then, acquire their value insofar as they contribute to this reproduction. This value is presented as concrete and functional contribution toward the ends of the capitalist social organism. Spencer writes, "The different parts of the social organism, like the different parts of an individual organism, compete for nutriment; and severally obtain more or less of it according as they are discharging more or less duty."[41]

Good nutrition in a social body thus defined is the rational distribution of capital from the perspective of capital. The social life that Spencer seeks to preserve above all else then is the life of capital, the imperative of infinite accumulation. For Spencer, the periodic, unfortunate, but predictable sacrifice of individual cells (i.e., human individuals) from the body of capital for the sake of capital's long-term reproductive health is a "natural law" that must simply be suffered as such. The reproduction and accumulation of capital is the social state to which human individuals and human societies must adapt or die. The point of this analysis is not

to oppose recourse to "nature" rather than "society" per se, but rather to point to the inscription of a particular biopolitical construction of nature and society vis-à-vis capital as an over-arching measure of value. Indeed, Spencer's adherence to the concept of acquired characteristics makes his position indifferent to the distinction between nature and culture.

I suggest that Mori reproduces this aspect of Spencer's industrial regime translated into the language of dietary and physical education reform. The difference between the two is that Spencer refuses to associate the suffering caused by capitalist competition with military, premodern, or feudal discourse. Perhaps by virtue of Japan's exceptional international legal position vis-à-vis the Ansei treaty regime, Mori was better able to acknowledge international economic struggle as an aspect of the system implicated in the power relations arising from military force from which Spencer sought to distinguish them.[42] In other words, Mori, like Spencer, prescribes a mode of capitalist governmentality for the Japanese social body at the level of both the national economy and individual physiology, but with a measure of semicolonial difference.

A like conception of the social body is further articulated in Mori's writing and policy on morality and ethics. The groundswell of attacks on the Education ministry in response to Mori's elimination of Confucian-based morals education, led Mori to direct Nosei Sakae to prepare an ethics textbook, the *Rinrisho*. It was first published by the Education ministry in March 1888, and was reprinted again the same year. The *Rinrisho* was written as an ethics text for ordinary middle schools and teacher's schools. It outlines an ethics based on "common sense" that is grounded on the premise that proper behavior is transmitted through habit and custom. In addition to two introductory sections, it has three parts: a first section on the origins of conduct, a second section on the will, and a third on the standard of conduct. Mori advocates as his standard of conduct *jitaheiritsu*, which he glosses as "the cooperation of self and other."[43] The *Japan Weekly Mail* of June 29, 1889 included a review of the book.[44] The reviewer observed that Mori and Herbert Spencer were well acquainted, that Mori's conception of *jitaheiritsu* was very reminiscent of Spencer's position in the *Data of Ethics* (that egoism and altruism are both necessary), and disclosed that he had "good authority" to state that "the Standard of Ethics adopted by the late Minister was intended to be in entire accordance with Spencerian principles."[45]

On my reading, Spencer's self-appointed task in *The Data of Ethics* was a deterritorialization of religious and feudal mores for the sake of industrial society and the replacement of such mores by a secular regime of capitalist governmentality reterritorialized on science.

> This last part of the task it is to which I regard all the preceding parts as subsidiary. Written as far back as 1842, my first essay, consisting of a letter on *The Proper Sphere of Government*, vaguely indicated what I have conceived to be certain general principles of right and wrong in political conduct, and from that time onward my ultimate purpose . . . has been that of finding for the principles of right and wrong, in conduct at large, a scientific basis.
>
> Now that moral injunctions are losing the authority given by their supposed sacred origin, the secularization of morals is becoming imperative. Few things can happen more disastrous than the decay and death of a regulative system no longer fit, before another and fitter regulative system has grown up to replace it . . . immense benefits are to be anticipated from presenting moral rule under that attractive aspect which it has when undistorted by superstition and asceticism.[46]

Mori follows Spencer in defining conduct as the adjustment of acts to ends. This was in fact Spencer's definition of evolution per se (epistemological, psychological, economic, and moral).[47] In adopting Spencer's notion of the cooperation of self and other as the basis of his ethics, Mori also adopts the capitalist organizing principles at the heart of Spencerian evolutionary theory. For Spencer, evolution of the social organism is an increase in the complexity of the division of labor. Social development thus equals progressively greater social productivity. Spencer's conception of the social organism is that participation in the social division of labor is a form of cooperation with other working members of society who themselves, in turn, depend on the labor of others for the everyday necessities of life. In other words, the capitalist division of labor and the social reproduction of capital are at the heart of the "cooperation of self and other." What Mori refers to as the "standard of conduct" thus frames society in terms of productivity and efficiency even though his position is couched in ethically and morally coded terms.

As regards biological evolution, I would argue, Spencer effectively projects a British middle-class world-view of productivity and functional efficiency onto nature. While Mori's writing and interviews routinely take a hierarchical survival of the fittest to be the obvious principle of world order, in the earliers stages of his career Spencer's equation of the civilizing process with the industrializing process produced a rank order among nations every bit as hierarchical. He writes, "In studying the doings of the highest of mammals, mankind, we not only find that the adjustments of acts to ends are both more numerous and better than among lower mammals, but we find the same thing on comparing the doings of higher races of men with those of lower races."[48]

Mori shares the focus on society as the critical level of analysis. His understanding of the will, however, differs radically from Spencer. For Mori, "It is the faculty of knowledge that clarifies proper action and judges right and wrong. Thus the will obeys the judgment of the intellect and regulates desire and action by this means . . . The proper use of the will is to follow propriety and to regulate appetite, desire, and emotion."[49] Spencer saw overthrow of the will in psychology as an essential part of his project of democratizing society, so this aspect of Mori's policy was in fundamental and essential conflict with Spencer's views.[50]

While seldom recognized as such, Spencer's position does allow for a certain degree of cultural relativity, even as it would see difference as generally and ultimately hierarchical. Mori shares and extends that aspect of his thought.[51] He writes, "As for judging standards of right and wrong, they are not uniform. There are differences between countries, and even within the same country there are differences between historical periods. The standard in the Orient is different from the standard in the West. The morality of antiquity is immoral today. The accounts of scholars also differ. There still is not a single theory."[52]

With the progress of society the distance between morality and happiness is to be reduced, and a tendency emerges in which they are unified.

> If they are already united, than one should achieve happiness; those who seek happiness should necessarily act morally. In other words, there should be a principle that unifies happiness and morality [*fukutoku itchi*] . . . if human society is viewed impartially with reference to common sense [*chikaku*], there is one standard that already exists and that has been practiced in society. That sort of place in which it is practiced well, irrespective of time or country, is called a moral society. This comes from the necessary force of human affairs—it already occurred when scholars still did not know of it—this is what orders society.[53]

Mori focuses on cooperation, yet he seemingly does not distinguish between the compulsory cooperation of the feudal regime of status and the voluntary cooperation of the industrial regime of contract. While it is true that his writings on religion support freedom of conscience, his military gymnastics demand obedience first and last. At the same time, he presumes the structure of Spencer's social organism insofar as it relates to economic function. The cooperation of self and other is the division of labor found in the social organism characteristic of the industrial regime.[54] This suggests that to the degree that the social division of labor is extended, social interdependence will rise, and society will become

more altruistic. It thus appears that for Mori, increased complexity in the division of labor is a marker of civilization and ethical attainment.

The contrast between Mori and Spencer's understanding of cooperation and Karl Marx's take on the social division of labor in industrial societies could not be more stark. Mori and Spencer's ethical ideal is for Marx a qualitative revolution in the meaning of labor and a monstrous objectification and diminishment of the worker.

> Manufacture proper not only subjects the previously independent worker to the discipline and command of capital, but creates in addition a hierarchical structure amongst the workers themselves. While simple cooperation leaves the mode of the individual's labour for the most part unchanged, manufacture thoroughly revolutionizes it, and seizes labour-power by its roots. It converts the worker into a crippled monstrosity by furthering his particular skill as in a forcing house, through the suppression of a whole world of productive drives and inclinations . . . Not only is the specialized work distributed among the different individuals, but the individual himself is divided up, and transformed into the automatic motor of a detail operation . . . [it] represents man as a mere fragment of his own body . . . the division of labor brands the manufacturing worker as the property of capital.[55]

Mori and Spencer's definition of heightened civilization and ethical altruism is thus Marx's definition of worker abjection and exploitation. For Marx, the greater the division of labor, the more radically crippled the laborer will be. Marx exposes how the historical division of labor in all periods is consistently reduced by middle-class economists to the division of labor as it operates in manufacture, but for the purpose of legitimacy, the capitalist division of labor is identified with pre-capitalist modes of production as interchangeably necessary to social survival, thus erasing the specificity of capitalist relations of production.[56] Where Marx posits life on the side of the proletariat as the universal class, and death on the side of capital, Mori situates life on the side of an alliance between capital, the nation, and the state.

In this respect, it is clear that Mori and Inoue's regimes of physical education performed an important service in disciplining the bodies of students for the purposes of an industrializing society, whether in the school room or on the shop floor. Mori's speeches repeatedly reiterate that physical education policies will be fundamental to Japan's progress toward global economic competitiveness in the context of an economic war for national survival. This regime effectively demands a sense of both national community and industrial discipline.

Marx's intervention also reveals the way in which Mori and Spencer deterritorialize social formations incompatible with the reproduction of capital and reterritorialize them by way of axioms of evolutionary science that enable capital to more efficiently reproduce and "live on." Mori and Spencer thus share an investment in social, and for Mori, national, survival that identifies social life with the reproduction of capital. Attending to social survival is then attending to the reproduction of capital. Mori's programs designed to enhance national competitiveness were pedagogical programs designed to discipline the bodies of Japanese youth in a way that would strengthen the nation by enhancing Japan's rate of capital accumulation.

Mori Arinori's position on language education also takes a decidedly biopolitical turn. Mori's discussion of Confucian and Chinese language-based education sets up a series of high and low exclusions serving to frame a modernized, nationalized, and masculinized Japan. The Confucian education that had previously defined warrior- and merchant-class masculinity and maturity for most, he now remarkably construes as a threat to the physical health of male Japanese youth and as a degenerate external and feminizing influence on a properly masculine national body.

The status of evolutionary science as a domain of discourse is particularly highlighted here. The authority of evolutionary science is appealed to for the purposes of abolishing Confucianism and Chinese-language based education as competing domains of discourse.

> With *bungaku* [Chinese language-based study of the Confucian canon], I do not argue that it is not noble and deep, but since the introduction of Confucianism and the Han writing system that came with it, the letters that are the instruments with which to learn the literature cannot be used without expending great labor and diligence over many years, beginning from first looking at their form, then practicing and copying them until they are understood. Further, the people who do learn them sink into the habit of sitting quietly and thus lose their health. It is regrettable that students become thoroughly effeminate [*nyûjaku*] and thus many discontinue their studies. The damage to the body suffered during this learning period varies. In this way, with Chinese learning [*kangaku*] people not only fall into the vice of effeminacy, but the methods of the doctrine itself are not appropriate . . . it invites students to a vain purpose, by teaching as if there were no other way of rising in society other than embracing and moving toward the [political] enterprise of the world and the nation. This is the origin that brings about the vice of effeminacy [*bunjaku*] in the world.[57]

It would seem that here Mori conceives the national body in exclusively male terms. Surely effeminacy and softness would not be a frightful prospect for Mori in the case of a female student. At the same time, it is

the Chinese language and the Confucian canon that are being tied to the vice of feminizing the Japanese male student body. Confucianism is charged with transgressing the boundaries of the national body from the perspective of nation, gender, physiology, and, implicitly, capitalist efficiency.

This schema ramifies in several directions. Mori places language reform at the center of curriculum reform because of purported ties to physical education. This relation to physical education is also designed to resolve a perceived threat to Japanese masculinity. Exclusion of Chinese language-based education is thus simultaneously an exclusion of backward, Asian, and foreign elements as an aspect of modernizing and nationalizing Japanese culture. It was a move toward a new, national Japanese culture of masculinity and economic competitiveness. The diatribe against the premodern irrelevance of Confucianism also informed his ongoing polemic with Motoda Nagazane.

Mori's conception of language reform overturns a dominant regime of translation of the Tokugawa period within which classical Chinese and study of the Confucian classics was a benchmark of educated Japanese masculinity. Many early Meiji translations of European texts adapted them to the *kanbun* regime of translation.[58] Mori's position is part of an opposed assemblage of enunciation in which the protocols of European texts are increasingly seen as a benchmark of a new, reformed, and nationalized Japanese linguistic propriety. While this new regime of translation demotes and nationalizes China in articulating Japanese identity vis-à-vis Euro-America, it is also clearly overdetermined by figures of gender as well.[59]

Significantly, Mori's ethics reform involved a turn to oral instruction in place of traditional Confucian rote memorization of characters and texts. This aspect of ethics pedagogy installed a logocentric, or voice-centered, understanding of language. The logic of physiological and educational development that Mori insists upon here invokes a notion of individual development that distinguishes the child from the adult in a manner analogous to the sociological distinction of the primitive and the civilized. Childhood is thus the term that designates the human being before it has internalized the coordinates of national and adult subject positions. "Natural" teleological development toward these national and adult subject positions is precisely what Mori's evolution-based pedagogy is designed to produce. It should be noted that the development of the child into the adult is precisely analogous to the evolutionary development of Japan into civilized nationhood.[60] There is thus a sense in which evolutionary theory replaces history with the logic of individual development. (This issue also ramifies for the analysis of literary and cultural discourses framed by evolutionary theory such as melodrama and gothic fiction. This point will be

further developed in Chapter 5.) Again the microcosm and macrocosm structure of evolutionary theory is in evidence.

Although Karatani does not clearly articulate the connection with orality himself, in this respect Mori's ethics education participates in the discovery of childhood that Karatani Kojin would locate in the middle Meiji period.[61] Insofar as Mori at times called for the replacement of Tokugawa-style Japanese language with English and the replacement of Chinese characters with the alphabet, it may be said that Mori demanded a reform of the body of the Japanese language as well. The potentially pictographic character was to be replaced by the generally logocentric letter as the body of the properly Japanese language.

In summary, this chapter offers new readings of both Japanese and non-Japanese primary materials from the 1880s and the 1890s—a reading of the ethics and physical education policies of Mori Arinori in connection with the work of Herbert Spencer, including Mori's articulation of gender, language, capital, and national identity in his capacity as the first Japanese minister of education. I contend that Mori's ethics and the physical education policies of Mori and his successor, Inoue, draw upon an image of the body that connects capitalism to physiology at the level of society and the individual. Their physical education policies also answer to a perceived threat to Japanese masculinity stemming from *kanbun*-based language practices and competitive Western-capitalist social practice. The chapter finds that Mori's policies expanded military discipline into the educational system and beyond as an aspect of the capitalist governmentality he found necessary to successfully engage in what he understood to be a form of economic warfare upon which the survival of the nation-state depended.

Lastly, it is true that Mori spent his career positing cultural oppositions and identifying and outlawing traditional practices that transgressed his model of the properly modernized Japanese national body. Still, we should not forget that his own life was taken by an assassin opposed to his policies who claimed that Mori himself had transgressed a competing conception of the national body organized around the sacrality of the Ise shrine. In the next chapter, I will suggest that Kuga Katsunan, Miyake Setsurei, and other critics of Mori opposed him in large part as a consequence of their different conception of the proper relationship between capital and the social body.

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Chapter 3

Imperial Aesthetics and the State in Meiji Japan

> As regards today's politician's fraudulence, at least they maintain the image of the politician in part. Today's educators, however, are almost without the image of the educator . . . It appears as if most of them mistake the fundamental principles of education . . . When one examines the theories of those connected with the educational institutions of society, it appears that they desire to infer everything from scientific principles. It appears as if they take Spencer's academic theory and even desire to apply it to ordinary education.
>
> Kuga Katsunan, *On Vocations*[1]

This chapter examines the role of aesthetic discourse in rehabilitating the Japanese past as always having been civilized in western terms by way of newly emergent conceptions of Japanese national identity in the 1880s and early 1890s. My research suggests that most of the Japanese thinkers discussed in this chapter—Okakura Tenshin, Shiga Jûkô, Miyake Setsurei, and Kuga Katsunan—claimed a self-orientalizing alternative Japanese modernity grounded in "Eastern" aesthetic sentiment. They consistently took up this posture in self-conscious opposition to "western" reason. This strategy was designed as a polemic challenge to Eurocentrism and Enlightenment conceptions of modernity. It offered an alternative mode of governmentality that challenged contemporary state policy, yet was compatible with Japanese capitalist development.

The chapter is divided into two sections. The first discusses the introduction of aesthetic discourse into Japan in connection with art education, art history, and cultural preservation. The focus is on a reading of important articles and lectures by the first Professor of Philosophy at Tokyo University, Ernest Fenollosa. It traces the changing relation between visual and verbal texts in mid-Meiji Japan and the discourse of cultural preservation which, when combined, enabled a new articulation of Japanese national community based on the emperor, aesthetic judgment, and Japanese particularity. The second section details the extension

of aesthetic discourse beyond the art world itself into nationalist projects that challenged the universality of scientific reason. This section reads texts by Shiga Jûkô, Miyake Setsurei, and Kuga Katsunan. It lays out their claims for an alternative, non-Western Japanese modernity tied to a uniquely moral and spiritual Japanese domestic sphere. These thinkers associated a distinctively Japanese modernity with the emperor, but avowedly opposed it to the contemporary state policy they tended to identify with the demands of the treaty powers.

This chapter also highlights the issue of the suspension of international law under which Meiji Japan labored. As discussed in Chapter 1, this was a discriminatory exception to purportedly universal law for the purpose of sustaining privilege and authority in a semicolonial context. Given that the Meiji state was nominally indigenous, it obviously could not be immediately identified with colonial interests. Yet as this chapter will make clear, opponents of the Meiji government's position in the debate over unequal treaty revision effectively argued that in various sites of discourse—civil, criminal and international law, economy, education, and moral pedagogy—the Meiji state had either been denied sovereignty by virtue of the treaties themselves, as evidenced by extraterritoriality and the loss of tariff autonomy, or seemed inclined to further surrender it in other areas for the purposes of regaining control over those state functions specifically denied by them. Thus, the claim of those who opposed the government position on treaty negotiation was that the Meiji Japanese government was in effect acting as an instrument of colonial oppression and that anything short of complete legal, economic, and cultural autonomy situated the state itself as enforcing a semicolonial suspension of sovereignty upon the Japanese people. The primary focus of this chapter will be to trace out the articulation of national tradition and community on the basis of which these claims were made.

In speaking of art, it has been claimed that aesthetic discourse always speaks of freedom and legality, of spontaneity and necessity, of self-determination and autonomy, and of particularity and universality.[2] Typically, the idea of the work of art functions as a certain kind of subject. While it focuses on the sensory particular, it generally also involves a relation of sense to reason. The discourse of aesthetics typically installs a function of representation. The laws of aesthetics, like the laws of the bourgeois state, are regarded as a form of self-rule. In other words, issues of identity and recognition are tied to subordination such that through the recognition of the self in the law, subordination is understood as autonomy or self-rule. In Kant, the aesthetic involves an imaginary relation to reality. It ensures spontaneous, noncoercive consensus. It particularizes general laws

by situating the particular vis-à-vis the universal, and it offers an image of self-determining autonomy. It thus serves as a paradigm for both the individual subject and the social order. Through the concept of taste it involves the construction of a communal "we" with which the individual is supposed to be in accord. By way of an internal appropriation of the law, what appears as subordination to the state or to others is conceived as self-determination. This conception of an internal appropriation of the law is thus characteristic of both the work of art and the process of political hegemony.

The privileging of custom is at the root of Hegel's critique of Kantian morality. Hegelian reason engages and transforms bodily inclinations so as to bring them into spontaneous accord with universal, rational precepts. Hegel understands his project as an overcoming of the opposition between the bad "particularism" of custom or bourgeois civil society and the bad "universalism" of the legalistic state. An important aspect of aesthetics is the idea that the bond between the individual and the universal must be ceaselessly constituted through pedagogical methods, through the rational education of desire. Aesthetic discourse is commonly gendered such that reason, figured as male, is construed as penetrating sentiment or feeling, figured as female.[3]

The German romantics were concerned that art had been expelled from the constitutive, cognitive, and practical mechanisms of social modernity. Once art is conceived as an autonomous realm of discourse, it is situated as outside truth, reason, and morality. On the other hand, to the degree that art really is outside reason it cannot speak truthfully or rationally. To make a case for the truth of art within the discourse of reason, therefore, is to beg the question in favor of reason. The challenge to present-day examination into questions of aesthetics is thus to trace out the interpenetration of truth, morality, and beauty. It is to map the parasitic dependence of art and truth upon one another, to read art as cognitive and reason as sensual. Art was expelled from truth and goodness by the fact and value distinction and the doctrine of the autonomy of art—the claim that artistic and moral worth must be separated. The Kantian conception of the aesthetic object as an end in itself embodies this view. This chapter endeavors to read art as cognitive by way of explicating the changing relation of verbal and visual texts in conjunction with which the new regime of aesthetically grounded Meiji national community was articulated.

My readings of Miyake, Kuga, and Ônishi will take as their point of departure the manner in which they territorialize German idealism's reason and sentiment binary as a civilizational discourse pitting Western reason against Eastern sentiment. In other words, I situate their intriguing critique

of reason and the Enlightenment as always also the articulation of an alternative modernity that functions as a mode of capitalist governmentality explicitly designed to promote and sustain Japanese capitalist development.

Intellectuals as diverse as Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida, and Adorno have turned to aesthetic discourse as the point of departure for a critique of enlightened modernity. They have also argued that this requires a reconceptualization of politics and the political. Kant's *Critique of Judgment* is generally regarded as the site at which the modern domain of the aesthetic first emerges. The categorial separation of the domains of truth, morality, and beauty constitutes a deterritorializing or decoding of previous metaphysical orders. Insofar as Schiller, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel conceived of the categorial divisions of the Kantian critical system as indicating the fragmentation constitutive of modern societies, the German idealists' endeavor to overcome Kant can be read as a critical attempt to overcome modernity. The division between critics and supporters of enlightened modernity and the division between English language analytical philosophy and Continental philosophy can be located around the legacy of Kant's *Critique of Judgment*. The analytic tradition reads the third *Critique* as successful in establishing an autonomous domain of aesthetics and thus concentrates on truth-only cognition and takes on the project of supporting and sustaining enlightened modernity. The continental tradition reads the third *Critique* as an undoing of the categorial divisions between knowledge, morality, and aesthetics. This path involves a critique of enlightened modernity.[4]

It is a central claim of this book that the appropriations of aesthetic discourse taken up in this chapter ultimately articulates a logic of national identity that challenges enlightenment reason and modernity by recourse to the discourse of aesthetics. I maintain, however, that these projects do not fundamentally challenge the categorial divisions between knowledge, morality, and aesthetics. On the contrary, they seek to rearticulate these divisions in a manner that more perfectly comports with the demands of celebrating "oriental" and Japanese particularity in opposition to universal reason conceived as "Western" by virtue of its association with the Ansei treaty regime and the Westernizing reform policies of the Meiji state.

It appears that moral and aesthetic discourse served to fill in a gap in the emerging Japanese social order left by the dismantling of the *bakuhan* system presided over by the Tokugawa *shogunate*. The expansion of the capitalist market and the Meiji state's Westernizing policies increasingly abstracted and atomized the Tokugawa social order such that custom, piety, intuition, and opinion had to be reformulated so as to make them

cohere and so as to gratify the Japanese subject's urge for self-identity. In the language of Foucault, aesthetic discourse offered itself as the ground for a novel mode of capitalist governmentality formed in response to the decoding and abstracting operations of the capitalist market. This chapter will trace out the particular modalities in which Japanese intellectuals and government figures of the 1880s and 1890s articulated conceptions of capitalist governmentality on the grounds of aesthetic discourse.

As regards the introduction of aesthetic discourse into Japan there are three points to be emphasized: (1) The establishment of the identity of Japan was a form of self-constitution that was established in the course of comparison between the Western and Oriental worlds; (2) Aesthetic discourse was tied to the nationalist tendency that led toward the emperor system; and (3) This self-constitution and self-orientalization of Japan was accomplished by way of translating and appropriating various Western logics, disciplines, and systems. What do these points entail for specific cases in the Meiji period artistic field?

Two of the most influential figures of this period were Ernest Fenollosa and Okakura Tenshin. Their art histories, and their related self-understanding of *Nihonga*, or the Japanese school of painting, all adhere to this description. Their projects came out of a comparative perspective on Western and Oriental art. *Nihonga* developed through a confrontation with Western art that promoted development of a "new traditional art."[5] It is extremely important to realize that this specific articulation of Japanese art was instituted at a particular historical point in time. It has a quite self-consciously constructed character built on the axes of a system of artistic values and a historical view of emperor-centered national history. It was not simply art objects that were produced in modernity, but also the artistic values and the historical perspectives upon which they were founded. Further, while the intellectual background of emperor-centered national history was lost with the Second World War, Satô Dôshin notes that the fundamental structure of Japanese art history has not been fundamentally destroyed or restructured, but continues to the present. This is connected to the issue of why there has not been a history of art history to this point.[6]

There were two discourses related to what we now think of as art objects that emerged in the 1880s. The first was a discourse of promoting export-oriented arts and crafts as one aspect of economic policy. Within this discourse, the objects were regarded as saleable commodities that would favorably affect the Japanese balance of trade. This policy was carried out by the Interior Ministry, the Finance Ministry, and the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce. The second was a discourse of *geijutsu*,

or fine art. This position emerged in its most influential form in lectures given by Ernest Fenollosa at private Japanese art groups. It was characterized most importantly by a demand for an autonomy of aesthetics and the art object vis-à-vis economic relations. The first was a lecture entitled "Truth of Art" ("*Bijutsu shinsetsu*") that was presented to the *Ryûichikai* in 1882. This was a group concerned with art preservation as one aspect of the promotion of art objects as items of export. Its membership was composed largely of bureaucrats from the ministries responsible for those policies. I will return to a discussion of "Truth of Art" and *Nihonga* later.

On the metaphorical axis of identity, "Truth of Art" constructed Japanese identity along an East versus West divide. Metonymically, as a mode of enunciation, it involves the question of a new schematism, or a new articulation of the sensory vis-à-vis cognition. I will demonstrate this by tracing Fenollosa's part in the revision of the previously hegemonic relationship between verbal and visual texts. The term *geijutsu* itself arose out of translations of lectures Fenollosa gave to the *Ryûichikai* and another private art group he was largely responsible for organizing, the *Kangakkai*. The *Kangakkai*'s main concern was to reform the Japanese art world that it perceived to have been overtaken by Western styles of painting that were inferior to traditional Japanese styles. It can be seen as an effort to reform or modernize traditional Japanese art on the basis of certain assumptions of Western aesthetics, such as the supposition that art ought to be expressive of the individual and the nation, the privileging of painting and sculpture as art forms, and the demand for artistic originality. Fenollosa and Okakura's projects were the first successful installation of this problematic in Japan and may be seen as having constituted the possibility of Japanese art objects as such. This is evidenced by the fact that the most important Japanese vocabulary used to indicate art objects such as *bijutsu* (art), *chôkoku* (sculpture), and *kaiga* (painting), were all coined as translations of display categories at either domestic or international exhibitions they were generally responsible for organizing.[7] Within the system of art promoted by Fenollosa and Okakura, there was no place for Western art. After Okakura replaced Fenollosa as director of the Tokyo Art School, Western art was admitted into the curriculum in 1896.

I will now return to a discussion of Fenollosa's lecture to the *Ryûichikai*. In "Truth of Art," Fenollosa was concerned to challenge two separate discourses. The first was the hegemony of Western realist painting. The second was unreformed traditional painting.[8] Having posited that the artistic value of a painting was defined by the inscription of an idea, or by communicating a spiritual value, Fenollosa argued that Western realism failed to realize such an idea or spirit. With his revised aesthetic standard

of judgement, he contended that certain schools of traditional Japanese painting did communicate an idea; therefore they were superior to Western realistic painting because they were more spiritual, hence more artistic. In effect, Fenollosa translated the *kiin* of the Kanô (the most popular school of painting with the samurai class) and *bunjinga* schools (the literati mode of painting and poetry modeled on the Southern School of Ming China and represented by Buson) into the ideal or spirit of his own neo-Hegelian evolutionary thought. This position was hardly a wholesale endorsement of traditional painting practices, however.

Fenollosa called for a novel, neoclassical practice of painting that came to be called *Nihonga*, or Japanese painting. It was to take methods, materials, and practices from traditional schools, but incorporate the demand for personal originality, and certain tenets of painting as representation that he insisted on as essential to painting as artistic expression. Because of this insistence on painting as representation, there were traditional schools of painting that Fenollosa could not allow into the canon. For him, by definition the work of such traditional schools was not art. The following manuscript lays out Fenollosa's criteria as a criticism of the school of literati painting known as *bunjinga*. This passage is particularly important because it details the schematism, or relation of sense to cognition, that Fenollosa utilized in his art criticism.

> Japanese painting was formerly great. In later times it was much crushed out by *bunjinga*. Many gentlemen, even at the present day, suppose that *bunjinga* is good art. We can now prove that it is not. It ignores the essential difference between literature, poetry, and painting. We said before that the idea of subject must be unified with the idea of the form. Now the form of poetry is words in succession. The form of painting is lines, shades, and colors in coexistence. Consequently those subjects fit for one, are not for the other. Painting conceives the subject in space, not in the form of a process. Poetry conceives of its subject in the form of a process. If either takes the subject of the other it fails . . . *bunjinga* makes this mistake. The picture suggests a poem to the literary man. But it does not suggest a picture, for it has no unity or beauty of form. It then is not the fine art of painting, and there is no painting idea in it at all. This mixture of literature with art is the 3rd cause of degeneration of the latter, in both East and West . . . Japanese look largely at touch in a picture. But Europeans look at the effect of the whole . . . The Japanese are here wrong . . . the belief that touch is all, is the 4th cause of degeneration of painting in Japan. Modern Japanese critics see nothing but touch in an old picture. But it is certain that the artists themselves saw great ideas . . . Japanese must learn to follow their own and old Chinese masters of painting, whose style was but a means of realizing effect.[9]

The reader will have noticed that Fenollosa's discourse of degeneracy clearly installs yet another vitalist ontology, this one identifying life with the spirit of the nation as expressed in aesthetic terms. Death is thus a characteristic of divergent, implicitly premodern and uncivilized modes of expression that fail to conform with his particular representational and national aesthetics. By way of a biopolitical discourse of evolutionary degeneracy, Fenollosa demands a clear distinction between the act of writing and the act of painting. In other words, to the degree that calligraphy functions as an art object it must be framed as a visual text. It may not be "read" in the manner of a verbal text and still function as art. It must be seen and not read. At the age of twenty, Fenollosa's student, Okakura Tenshin, wrote an essay entitled "On Reading 'Calligraphy Is Not an Art,'" in which he made a case for preserving calligraphy that Western-style Japanese artists sought to dispense with, but as an exclusively visual art. The same goes for what Fenollosa refers to as "touch" in a painting. In his lecture notes he specifically refers to the celebrated work of Buson as exemplifying the way in which *bunjinga* fails as art.

Fenollosa demands a further categorial division between the genres of poetry and painting. He requires that the representation of objects and the inscription of words must be clearly delineated. The writing versus painting distinction is a demand for a subject of representation to be inscribed within the painting. He requires a clear frame between the words and the objects, such that the inscription of words and writing does not interfere with the inscription of objects to be represented and the observer's recognition of them. Insofar as words are to be associated with a painting, they are to transparently refer to or designate the object of the painting. Tokugawa-period paintings such as the work of Buson frequently juxtaposed poetry and painting such that the graphic elements articulated an image of the scene of enunciation.[10] The graphic elements were thus included within a larger textual economy. In other words, in the 1880s Fenollosa proscribes a mode of enunciation that was widely admired and influential through most of the Tokugawa period and into early Meiji. For Fenollosa, the visual text must be effectively contained and framed by the verbal text.

Western realist painting meets his demands in this regard. This aspect of Fenollosa's argument thus does not distinguish his preferred genre from realism. Both Western realist painting and Fenollosa's new conception of *Nihonga* are grounded in a schema of painting as representation. At the beginning of the chapter I referred to a description of modernity as coterminous with installing the distinction between the true, the good, and the beautiful. In his criticism of Western realism, Fenollosa explicitly

argues that realism does not properly distinguish between the true and the beautiful, between cognition and aesthetic judgment.

> What then is artistic quality? I will now explain. We have seen that it is not to instruct us either as to skill or as to nature; that is, it does not appeal to our faculties of knowing; also that it does not appeal to our moral faculties or desires, that is to our will. Then it must appeal to the third set of our faculties, namely our feelings. But we have also seen that it is not to our feelings of pleasure, then it must be to some other kind of feeling still undefined.[11]

Fenollosa installs a new conception of the Japanese subject that includes a faculty of aesthetic judgment as well as faculties of epistemological cognition and moral reason. In this new textual economy, he is demanding a further deterritorialization of the Japanese mode of enunciation such that it is doubled upon the subject of the enunciated, rather than on an image of the enunciating subject. Given that the framing of the mode of enunciation, also known as the assemblage of enunciation, is a framing of the speaker or painter or observer's body, such a realignment of the intertextuality of verbal and visual texts is also a realignment of the body vis-à-vis the social formation. Fenollosa is legislating the classic structure of the regime of subjectification characteristic of the structure of law that enables capitalist modes of exchange. He is demanding a separate sphere of operation within which aesthetic judgment is not reduced to cognition. There is nevertheless a surplus that Fenollosa would locate above and beyond the represented object that he would recuperate as expressive of idea or spirit. He is simultaneously installing a demand for painting to express the subjectivity of the painter and the nation.

Within Fenollosa's project, connoisseurship will then be the legislation, in the guise of aesthetic discrimination, of which paintings properly represent (or express) the Japanese painting subject or the Japanese national subject. Fenollosa is rejecting fundamental aspects of painting tradition and he is rejecting fundamental aspects of contemporary educated opinion in Japan, all in the name of aligning subjectivity and nation in the artistic realm. For Fenollosa, both practice and evaluation must be reformed. He suggests that Japanese must learn to follow their own and old Chinese masters of painting. In other words, he argues that Japanese people must learn to become themselves. They must learn to become who they have always been, to become true Japanese subjects in the realm of art, to comport with the taste that he argues best represents the nation. Fenollosa imagines he is teaching Japan how to become properly Japanese.[12]

The reader will recognize Fenollosa's position as a variant of the *Bildung* model of education familiar from German idealism. Pedagogy is presented as the necessary route for a people to make themselves into who they truly (always already) are, but which they have yet to realize. Fenollosa's installation of an evolutionary neoidealist aesthetic within middle Meiji Japan was a demand for a reduction in the rich diversity of enunciative modes that characterized contemporary Japanese painting. At the same time, at the metaphorical level of identity construction, Fenollosa's position successfully established a discourse of Japanese cultural autonomy as non-Western—an alternative Japanese modernity—that was not only intelligible in the West's own terms, but that posed as an important spiritual resource in overcoming the rationalist materialism of late nineteenth-century capitalist modernity.

Ultimately, Fenollosa situated the Japanese art object as expressing the cultural subjectivity of the Japanese national community it was helping to construct and in which the observing Japanese subject was supposed to recognize him- or herself. It is in the course of constituting this process of recognition that a new sense of national community is established, grounded in a presumption of "common sense" or common national taste. On the one hand, when addressing European enthusiasts of *Japonisme*, Fenollosa claims to be honoring the cultivated taste of the indigenous gentleman in privileging painting over prints and household utensils. On the other hand, he refuses to recognize *bunjinga*, the most highly regarded and popular school of painting in the country at the time, as art. In other words, he sought to disqualify it as capable of teaching Japanese people to recognize their true selves in the manner painting he recognized as art would be.

Interestingly, the school of painting Fenollosa chose to hold up as representative of the entire nation of Japan was the Kanô school, a school of painting with deep historical ties to the samurai class of warrior-bureaucrats. Just as the *Imperial Rescript on Education* and the new civil code were to implicitly legislate that warrior-class tradition was the sole recognized "tradition" of the very diverse group of people who were now the subjects of the emperor, Fenollosa also drew upon a form of painting explicitly tied to the warrior class as the canonic example of painting expressive of the entire national community. In the immediate aftermath of the *Seinan War* (1877–1878), in which the last serious warrior-class rebellion was defeated on the battlefield, Fenollosa was arguing for warrior-class culture to be incorporated and translated as a newly nationalized cultural form to be henceforth representative of all classes of subjects from any region within the nation.

The genre of painting that attempted to practice the aesthetic project Fenollosa and Okakura laid out for new painting came to be known as *Nihonga*. This category, which can be translated as "Japanese-style painting" does not include Western painting. When Fenollosa first presented "Truth of Art," the only form of drawing and painting taught at the state's technical school was Western-style realism. By October of the same year, the Western-style school had been closed, and efforts were already underway to organize a school for *Nihonga*. State-sponsored exhibitions also eliminated Western painting from the exhibition for several years. *Nihonga* was initially conceived as an Oriental antithesis of Western painting. This means that "Japanese-style painting" in effect stands in for the entire Orient. It constitutes a core aspect of Japanese cultural exceptionalism. This clear cultural imperialist tendency later found its way into museum administration as well. Takeuchi Yoshimi has noted that the state institutionalization of Japanese art as non-Western was the exception that proved the rule of Western universalism in Meiji state practice. He specifically contrasts the situation of Meiji art with that of music education which whole-heartedly and unapologetically incorporated Western music technique in an unqualified way.[13]

The instability between the Japan versus Orient dualism characteristic of both Fenollosa and Okakura was surely one reason Okakura's conception of art history proved so amenable to recuperation by those who celebrated later Japanese expansion in the name of Pan-Asianism. In all these contexts, the distinction between Japan and the Orient had to be both maintained and ignored for the discourse to function properly. The Orient was a supplement of Japan vis-à-vis the West which differentiated it from the West, but was at the same time ultimately reducible to Japan itself for the purposes of establishing Japanese national identity. On this view, the spirit of both Japan and the Orient lived on only within the modern disciplines of culture that Japan had appropriated from the West. Fenollosa and Okakura effectively say that Japan will have to teach Asia to become Asian, just as Fenollosa had taught Japan to become Japanese.

It bears mentioning that Fenollosa shared a trait common to many Americans who sought refuge from the alienation of late nineteenth-century industrial civilization. Fenollosa tended to view nineteenth-century Japan and medieval Europe as comparable and nearly interchangeable antidotes to contemporary nineteenth-century Europe. This is the implicit premise of Fenollosa's own description of his teacher in the ways of Buddhism as exemplifying "spiritual knighthood." He wrote, "His Reverence the Archbishop Keitoku, of the Tendai sect at Miidera temple on Lake Biwa, I still look up to as my most inspired and devoutly liberal teacher

in matters religious. Precious were the days and nights I had the privilege of spending with him in the vicinities of Kioto, Nara, and Nikko. He was a lofty living exemplar of the spiritual knighthood. He passed from the visible form in 1889."[14]

While Fenollosa's manuscripts for "Truth in Art" make direct reference to James Whistler's appropriation of Japanese painting techniques, Fenollosa's critical stance toward nineteenth-century industrial civilization as lacking in spiritual values shares at least as much with John Ruskin's project of reviving what he understood to be the communal values of gothic, medieval Europe. Charles Norton, a close friend and confidant of John Ruskin, helped Fenollosa select the art school at which he received his initial education as a painter in Boston just after his graduation from Harvard. Fenollosa's aesthetics as communicated in his lectures at the Tokyo School of Art consistently evidenced the general arts and crafts movement concern to revitalize the crafts that they felt had been degraded by mechanical civilization through integration of the artist into both the design and execution of crafts products.

The discourse of the gothic repeatedly emerges as an important resource in the late nineteenth-century articulation of Japanese difference from contemporary Europe as a point of superiority and pride, that is, as a self-conscious and superior alternative modernity rather than a premodernity for which Japan would have to apologize. In effect, gothic discourse positions Japan as possessed of a spirituality that transcends, overcomes, or resolves the contradictions of European modernity. As symbols of what must be excluded in the civilizing process, both the gothic and the oriental thus take on the erotic attraction of that which is excluded from modernity in closely analogous ways.

Previous varieties of art history in Japan had not included Asian or Japanese cultural production. Fenollosa's private art history research began as early as 1880. He studied with a member of the Kanô school of painting and received a Kanô name in 1885 which certified him as qualified to make official Kanô school appraisals of paintings. On the basis of Kanô school information, Fenollosa began constructing genealogical trees of painting schools, developing models of painting style according to period, and evolving accounts of painters in terms of personal style. He made chronological charts documenting important paintings, and began a connoisseur-based project of attribution, history of schools, chronologies, and period histories; in other words, the fundamental tasks of art historical research. This was all organized in accordance with the principles of Spencerian sociology.[15] Fenollosa made public lectures on the discipline of art history in 1883 and 1884, originally for the purposes of appraising

and researching classical painting. The second lecture was presented to the *Kangakkai*, which began a series of painting exhibitions organized in accordance with Fenollosa's view of an art history that included Japan.[16]

Fenollosa's view of art history at the time of the *Kangakkai* lectures was elaborated in his English-language review of a book on Japanese art by Louis Gonse. Fenollosa was particularly concerned to challenge the general Euro-American *Japonisme* celebration of wood-block prints [*ukiyo-e*] and Japanese arts and crafts at the expense of the fine arts, such as painting. Fenollosa argued that the foreign celebration of *ukiyo-e* was a misguided fashion that showed insensitivity to true art and that ignored the tastes of cultivated Japanese. He would rather found a new aesthetics of Japanese art that conceived Japanese painting as its highest expression. *Ukiyo-e* and arts and crafts would have a place, but a much lower place, in Fenollosa's canon of Japanese art.[17] This strand of his argument is quite resonant with certain present-day criticisms of the celebration of primitivism in some modernist art.[18] In essence, where those who fawned over *ukiyo-e* read it as the expression of an immediate, unalienated, and ultimately premodern Japanese identity with nature, Fenollosa wanted to articulate a conception of spirit and idea that would reposition Japanese tradition as civilized. In other words, Fenollosa challenged what he took to be a modernist orientalism prevailing in France with a variety of neoromantic, evolutionary humanism that, he felt, was more compatible with the nationalist agenda of Japan and the United States.

Fenollosa's entire argument is pervaded by a discourse of the sublime versus the abject, such that the work of Japanese artists he values is noble and pure, while those he would marginalize, such as Hokusai, are mongrel, coarse, dirty, and vulgar. He explicitly evokes the discourse of evolutionary development to discuss these issues.

> It may, perhaps, be odd to some, that painting is not everywhere an identically defined process, extending over all its particular cases the domination of a single set of laws. But the truth is, that each school or possible system of painting is like a new race, or a new species, in which the points of difference are as vital and lawful as the points of resemblance; and this truth must be borne in mind before all others, in a definitive attempt to estimate Japanese painting.[19]

It has been suggested that this evolutionary aspect of Fenollosa's art history derived from the Spencerian sociology upon which he lectured in his position as Professor of Philosophy and Economics at Tokyo University. Be that as it may, there is little doubt that it comprises an organismic model of the accepted modes of national artistic production.

Just as the account of Spencer's evolutionary thought in Chapter 2 showed it to be indifferent to the culture vs. nature distinction, Fenollosa's position similarly evidences a strong claim for cultural relativism based on a notion of idea and spirit that nevertheless proves to be ultimately grounded in racial discourse. Fenollosa demanded a new priority for Chinese and Japanese civilization in world history that previous Euro-American forms of knowledge did not allow.

One of the strongest disagreements between Fenollosa and his former student Okakura was over Fenollosa's insistence that the realistic methods of sculptural modeling present in Buddhist temple sculptures in the Nara area were Greek in origin, having been transmitted to Japan by way of India during the Alexandrian invasion. In other words, Fenollosa argued that certain founding aspects of what he constituted as the Japanese artistic tradition were valuable as a consequence of their genealogical ties to Greco-Roman civilization. Okakura, by contrast, insisted on a strictly non-Western origin of Asian civilization and Japanese art.[20]

For the purpose of relating what is at stake here to the contemporary situation, it is important to note that Fenollosa found the new centrality of China in the world to be an argument that required criticism of Eurocentric world history for the sake of raising the status of both East Asia and the United States. A world in which Japan, China, and East Asia generally played a more important role was also a world in which U.S. importance was enhanced relative to Europe.[21] In other words, my research reveals that critique of Eurocentrism at the level of identity was already an important aspect of the nationalist projects of not only late nineteenth-century China and Japan, but also of the United States.

While in a sense the state's art surveys also served to carry on Fenollosa's research, they can be traced to a different aspect of the cultural unification of Japan under the emperor system. Fukuzawa Yukichi wrote the first essays (*Teishitsuron*, 1882; *Sonnōron*, 1888) discussing the importance of cultural preservation as a means of extending the authority of the emperor system at home and abroad, and for inculcating loyalty and patriotism (*chûkun aikoku*) among the subjects of the emperor. The surveys were undertaken to preserve and protect what had been broken or damaged in anti-Buddhist activity of the late Tokugawa and early Meiji period, to catalog and control the sale of valuable items to foreigners, and to serve as a basis for historical purposes. Such surveys were conducted at different times by the Interior Ministry, the Imperial Household Ministry, and the Education Ministry. A former student of Fukuzawa's, Kuki Ryûichi, was the person most directly responsible for making these views actual state policy.[22] Kuki worked for the Education Ministry from 1872–1884.

Fukuzawa had argued that cultural preservation ought to be directly administered by the Imperial Household as cultural artifacts were not something that state bureaucrats could be trusted to handle appropriately. He thus implicitly expressed the view that the emperor and the Imperial Household were somehow not part of the state bureaucracy, but were in some sense an aspect of a private, civil society opposed to the state. The surveys were originally a part of the promotion of art for export as industrial policy. Fine examples of past work were to serve as models for improved crafts production in the future.

Fenollosa was hired by the Education Ministry to participate in a survey of Kansai shrines and temples to be conducted in the summer of 1884. It was during this trip that Fenollosa and Okakura had their famous encounter with the unveiling of the Yumedono sculpture in the Horyûji temple complex. The Interior Ministry, the Imperial Household Ministry, and the Education Ministry were all involved in the surveys. The Education Ministry had a particular responsibility for painting surveys. In 1884, the Shôsôin was transferred to the administrative control of the Imperial Household Ministry. In 1887, Fenollosa was in direct contact with Itô Hirobumi and was hired by the Imperial Household Ministry with responsibility for antique art preservation and surveys.[23]

The system along which art was ultimately institutionalized by the state was significantly influenced by a committee appointed during 1886 for the purposes of surveying art education practices, school administration, museum administration, preservation, reproduction, and art historical research around the world, and making recommendations to the state for the system to be introduced into Japan. Upon his return to Japan in 1887, Ito appointed Kuki director of cultural preservation efforts within the Imperial Household Ministry and later director of the Imperial Museum in Tokyo. In 1889, the Imperial Museum came under the control of the Imperial Household Ministry. In 1890, administration of Buddhist treasures also became an Imperial Household Ministry responsibility. The 1897 law on temple and shrine preservation expressly called for preservation of temples and shrines under the guise of art and architectural preservation, not in connection with religion. Once again, aesthetic discourse served to nationalize and homogenize a diverse group of cultural practices in a way that was organized around the emperor as expressive of a single unified national cultural tradition. A state system for administering art was established in early 1888 based on the recommendations of a committee that was essentially controlled by Fenollosa and Okakura. The museums and cultural treasure surveys were brought under the administrative purview of the Imperial Household with the express

intent of extending the authority of the emperor at home and abroad and inculcating loyalty and patriotism in the subjects. Through the discourse of aesthetics and cultural treasures preservation, a monological Japanese tradition and common sense that symbolized national community were simultaneously created as objects and identified with the emperor and the Imperial Household Ministry. From this point on, viewing museum exhibitions, visiting sites of national cultural treasures, and observing exhibitions of *Nihonga* painting all functioned as regimes for interpellating a Japanese observer's self-recognition as a member of the national community that these displayed objects expressed. *Bildung* is precisely education toward self-recognition in a particular regime of social community.

My research demonstrates that this new notion of national community identified with the emperor through aesthetic discourse was taken on by nationalist intellectuals of the Ansei treaty period as a means of opposing contemporary state policy. Writers such as Shiga Jûkô and Miyake Setsurei of the journal *Nihonjin*, and Kuga Katsunan of the newspaper *Nihon*, all subscribed to varieties of this position. When *Nihonjin* first began publication in 1888, Inoue Kaoru's recent attempt at treaty revision had just collapsed. Inoue had offered the treaty powers freedom to travel, buy property, and conduct business within Japan outside the treaty port areas in return for tariff autonomy and the elimination of consular courts. Foreign judges would be allowed to sit on Japanese courts, and their numbers and duties would be expanded in cases involving foreigners. Two ministers and one foreign advisor within the government saw the treaty as surrendering Japanese legal autonomy in perpetuity. *Nihonjin* and *Nihon* were generally allied with Tani Tanjô, the minister of Agriculture and Commerce who had expressed similar concerns about the state conceding a potentially permanent loss of sovereignty. Inoue argued that opening the country would create competition that would lead to progress, that it would strengthen rather than damage the economy. Tani felt that immediate, unfettered access to the economy by foreigners would undermine it. The state had a duty to regulate foreign trade and capital.

Inoue was succeeded by Ôkuma Shigenobu. Ôkuma developed a new proposal under which tariffs would be set at 15 percent and consular courts would be eliminated in five years. Ôkuma's proposal also allowed foreign judges to sit on the Japanese supreme court. The Imperial constitution was promulgated in 1889. That same year, the United States, Germany, and Russia all agreed to the proposal. It appeared that England and France were also about to agree when Kuga gained access to a copy of the proposal being made and published it. All of the negotiations had been conducted in complete secrecy. The revelation that once

again the state was negotiating away the legal sovereignty of Japan was a political bombshell. Kuga argued that foreign judges would undermine the spirit of the constitution that had just been promulgated, and thus defy the Imperial will. A broad coalition of groups quickly allied in opposition to the proposal. As Ôkuma left the foreign ministry on October 18, 1889, a bomb was thrown into his carriage by a member of a group opposed to the treaty. Ôkuma lost his leg and his treaty revision proposal met its death. It is against the backdrop of this struggle over how Japan should position itself vis-à-vis Asia and the West for the purpose of treaty revision that I would like to address the issues raised by the appropriation of aesthetic discourse in the work of Shiga Jûkô, Miyake Setsurei, and Kuga Katsunan.

Takagi Hiroshi has observed that both Shiga Jûkô and Kuga Katsunan invoke a discourse of "preservation" in their nationalist works of the 1880s and 1890s. He suggests a tie to the discourse of cultural preservation.[24] I would like to pursue this observation and supplement it with attention to specifically aesthetic discourse as well. Shiga Jûkô was a founding member of *Nihonjin*. Both Shiga and the journal came to be identified with the phrase "*kokusui hôzon*." *Kokusui* was a translation of the English word "nationality." *Hôzon* means preservation. Thus, the entire phrase calls for preservation of nationality or national characteristics. In Shiga's first, and perhaps most widely disseminated discussion of *kokusui*, he describes Japanese nationality in terms of an artistic sensibility, or "*bijutsuteki no kannen*."

In an article entitled "The Spiritual Energy of the Yamato People," Shiga discusses how early nineteenth-century Germany was under the cultural and military control of France. He relates that they were not considered a civilized people and that they attempted to improve themselves by adopting French styles of dress, French ways of writing poetry, and French styles of art and technology. Lessing and Klopstock were instrumental in drawing attention to the situation as damaging to German nationality. They argued that Germans should stop trying to import foreign culture and concentrate on refining their own. They called for Germans to use their own language, to develop specifically German ways of writing, and so forth. Such writers as Goethe and Schiller responded to this call with great works. Thanks to German literature, the spiritual energy of the German people was awakened, they began to respect their nationality, patriotism advanced, various German dialects emerged, and the Imperial Germany of Shiga's day was realized.

Shiga states that there is not a great difference between Japan's Meiji period condition and the situation of Germany under French colonial control in the Napoleonic era. Japanese are feverishly trying to import anything and everything from Europe. He cannot agree with those who

say that the enlightenment of the Yamato people should simply mimic the enlightenment of the West. The Yamato people should attempt to gather a kind of spiritual energy of their own. This is what he refers to as an "artistic sensibility."

Here, Shiga is calling for Japanese to envision their situation in the vitalist ontology of Fichte. From this perspective, life is on the side of the Japanese people and their sentiment of national community. Reason, and influences from abroad or from the state that contaminate the purity or immediacy of national life, are implicitly on the side of death. Properly understood, they contaminate and abject the nation.

According to Shiga, the Western Enlightenment was derived from the physical sciences. The foundation of the physical sciences is analysis, and thus the strongpoint of the West is the physical sciences that involve methods of analysis. Analytical sensibility came to pervade all aspects of European society. It resulted in egotism, self-interest, and the collapse of morality.

Shiga declares that Japanese enlightenment is something that should be completely opposed to European enlightenment. It finds its origin in harmony. Harmony is the foundation of art. As opposed to analysis that divides things, art synthesizes objects so that they come together in a harmonious way. For example, if you analyze the features of a person and the face is beautiful, you can't necessarily say that their overall appearance is beautiful. A sensibility of beauty takes things that have been dissected though analysis and synthesizes and harmonizes them. In this way, all of the beautiful aspects, strengths, and distinguishing characteristics of the Yamato people exist in their "beautiful sensibility."

The novel of Murasaki Shikibu, the painting of the Kanô school, potted utensils, *sashimi*, and side dishes all become things that are enveloped in an atmosphere of beauty. If the existence of the beautiful aspects, strengths, and characteristics of the Yamato people is indubitable, Shiga wonders, then isn't the preservation and advancement of Japanese art the greatest duty of the Yamato people? He protests that those who argue for the sheer imitation of the West do not recognize the unique (*tokusei*) beauties, strengths, and characteristics of the Japanese people (*nihon kokumin*). With their capricious affection, respect, and reverence for European enlightenment, such people are unable to realize independence under the ideals of the Yamato people.

Shiga wants to be clear, however, that the issue is not that he thinks Japan shouldn't learn from Europe. On the contrary, he claims that such learning should be done in a way that benefits Japan and advances Japanese nationality rather than undermining it. He writes, "Only that which

advances nationality and its preservation, that is what I advocate as the most important policy for the country's independence, that is all."[25] Shiga thus translates the organismic mode of Fichtean idealism into a Japanese context in which formerly French reason is territorialized as Western, and formerly German sentiment is territorialized as uniquely Japanese and Oriental.

Shiga's equation of 1880s Japan with Germany's situation under French domination explicitly situates Japan as a politically and culturally colonized nation. He argues that, like Germany, Japan must refine its culture such that its national spirit can prevail over the servile mentality that has enabled cultural imperialism to the present. Even if the Ansei treaties can't be changed immediately, national self-consciousness can be raised such that cultural, if not political, colonization can be immediately resisted. Shiga, like Fenollosa, argues that Japanese infatuated with the West should develop the ability to recognize themselves and a common national essence in indigenous objects newly framed by aesthetic discourse. According to Shiga, then, the specter of the West haunts Japan in such a way that the ability of Japanese to positively recognize themselves in the products of their own tradition has been lost. Their very specular identification as Japanese is obstructed by the specter of Western cultural influence.

His reference to Kanô school painting as particularly representative of Japaneseness suggests at least a passing familiarity with Fenollosa's position. Shiga's reference to aesthetic harmony as the characteristic that distinguishes an Oriental Japan from a reason-based West is the rearticulation of another aspect of Fenollosa's position into a realm beyond strictly aesthetic discourse—the explicit interpellation of Japanese subjects toward a self-recognition in a concept of national community grounded in aesthetics. An additional characteristic of Shiga's thought is that the discourse of spirit and aesthetics are reserved as the special preserve of the Orient, and to Japan as the representative of the Orient vis-à-vis the West. It is as if Kant's first two critiques are assigned to designate the West, but Kant's third critique is reserved as the exclusive property of the Orient. The West is metonymically reduced to reason and analytical science, while the East is reduced to aesthetic intuition and harmony.

Shiga registers the positive and defining characteristics of Japan as Japanese particularity in opposition to the universalism of Western reason. The celebration of Oriental particularity is thus simultaneously the celebration of an alternative Japanese modernity—a Japanese national particularity enabled by aesthetic judgment in opposition to universal reason. Japan's Orient and Japan's identity as Oriental are thus erected as an empire of aesthetics and alternative modernity in opposition to the purported rationality of European modernity.

While Miyake Setsurei's early writings largely expressed the views of Gotô Shôjirô's school of popular rights activism, after his disillusionment with politics in 1889 he turned to writing on the question of spirit. He referred to his own variety of nationalism as *kokusuishugi*. He especially emphasized the particularity of the Japanese nation, and the necessity of preserving its spirit. For Miyake, the state (*kokka*) is a historically formed organism.[26] The aim of this organism is to extend the sway of the ideals of truth, good, and beauty. In order to realize truth in the world, Western culture's invasion of the world has to be resisted. Miyake's highest goal was to protect Japanese particularity from Western power and thus protect the diversity of world culture. Toward this end, Miyake called for moderate reforms in the structure of knowledge such that it was compatible with and expressive of Japanese particularity. Miyake's argument that morality must be drawn upon in an effort to resist the inroads of Western capital was implicitly a criticism of the Japanese government as effectively overseeing an economy that reproduced colonial difference. This meant that it served what he saw as the interests of capital originating outside the Japanese social body.[27]

Miyake thus installs a vitalist ontology closely resonant with that of Shiga. Life is on the side of Japanese popular community and foreign influence is the influence of death. For Miyake, native capital may be sublated by Japanese national community, but foreign capital is a specter that threatens to contaminate and endanger its survival. Morality is to play an important role in promoting the forces of national life.

His answer was to articulate an oriental, Japanese domestic sphere that would transcend the demands of semicolonial economic relations at the level of identity, if not at the level of economy. Even as Miyake emphasized spatiality over temporality as a sign of oriental difference, his identification of the duties or aims of the Japanese social body as the extension of the realm of the true, the good, and the beautiful clearly situates him well within the bounds of the modern project.

Miyake redeploys the modern disciplinary formation of science, ethics, and aesthetics such that they are compatible with identity as Oriental and Japanese. His project of extending cultural diversity thus paradoxically requires the articulation of Japanese culture in the terms of modern disciplinary practices. His stance toward Korea evidences continuity between the articulation of Japanese identity in a semicolonial context and the rationalization of Japanese expansionism. Miyake gives the same reasons for invading Korea as he does for deploying morality at home—to counteract the power of Euro-American capital.[28] Thus Miyake's invocation of aesthetics also ultimately serves the purposes of an alternative

Japanese variety of capitalist governmentality, albeit one that discriminates between Japanese and non-Japanese capital and identifies with the former. In effect, Miyake invokes aesthetics for the sake of claiming Japanese capitalism as an alternative non-Western modernity. His position is thus not strictly critical of capitalism or material exploitation per se. He effectively moralizes the accumulation of capital coded as Japanese.

Miyake grounds ancient Japanese autonomy in morality. He nevertheless finds morality to be particularly important in the contemporary Meiji context as well. For Miyake, only morality is capable of resisting the power and attraction of foreign capital. Since Japanese treaty negotiators were fundamentally free-market thinkers, Miyake's opposition to the free reign of foreign capital put him at odds with state policy on treaty revision. But his concern with this issue did not stop at the newly expanded borders of the Japanese state.

Miyake ultimately promoted the invasion of Korea, again for the purpose of resisting the sway of Western capital. Miyake considered that under a benevolent Japanese rule, Korea could develop national independence in a way it could not under direct Qing dynasty influence or at the mercy of Euro-American capital markets. Ultimately, he hoped that China and Korea could ally with Japan to oppose Western domination. It is important to emphasize, however, that while Miyake emphasized Japanese particularity, it was always as a dialectical supplement to a larger universality of world culture to which it contributed. In this respect, Miyake was ultimately a humanist in favor of cultural pluralism, such that nationalism was ultimately aligned with universal world culture rather than opposed to it. He promoted new methods of research and academic endeavor that he hoped would showcase Japanese strengths and deepen Japanese self-knowledge as a consciously oriental, rather than Western, country. He was content, however, to allow the particularity of Japanese culture to contribute toward the richness of a universal world culture that was comprised of the cultures of all nations. It is clear that the liberal universalism of Miyake's position in no way conflicted with his moralistic support for Japanese economic and territorial expansion. Indeed, he saw them as mutually requiring one another.

Kuga Katsunan's ultimate goal was to preserve and develop national particularity as it has unfolded over the course of history and, by demonstrating national particularity, to influence world civilization.[29] Kuga used the word *kokuminshugi* as a direct translation of nationality and he considered nationality to be a quality that encompasses a specific character independent of other nations. World civilization and national particularity were related in the following way:

> There can be no doubt that world civilization, just like the civilization of any society, develops through the union of different kinds of capabilities and competition among different kinds of powers. If one considers it a natural duty of the nation to influence world civilization, then in order to carry out this duty one must endeavor to preserve and develop the specific powers and particular capabilities that constitute the nation. This is the most cherished ideal of the nationalist faction, and the essence of all our arguments about national policy can be derived from this ideal. Because the nationalists have such a higher purpose, they do not move toward an exclusively political dimension like other political parties.[30]

For Kuga, there are two distinct aspects of national life. One can be called cultural life and the other political life. Political life has its foundation in the state, and cultural life has its foundation in society. While the former legislates the organization of material life, the latter freely develops as spiritual life. Politics leads to discipline. Culture tends towards refinement. Kuga thus distinguished state from society and attributed political life to the former and cultural life to the latter. He made an analogous distinction between political relations and family or social relations. He claimed that politics operate according to reason, yet family and society operate on the basis of sentiment. Whereas the intellectual life generally has a cosmopolitan character, sentimental life is thoroughly national. Kuga's dichotomy of politics and culture is thus very reminiscent of Shiga's *kokusui*.

Kuga's concept of society attached great importance to the emperor. He writes, "The culture of European countries emanated from the people, but Japanese culture has always emanated from the Imperial House."[31] For Kuga, the emperor was the source and origin of the people's culture, morality, and human relations, and in this sense he saw the emperor and the people as inextricably connected. The emperor was clearly aligned with the people on the side of family and society as opposed to the state. For Kuga, social relations are more fundamental than politics. Kuga states, "We must understand that politics may be the furnishings of a country, but social relations are its very cornerstone. That is why no matter how one reforms the political structures there will never be permanent results if the underlying structure of social relations is not sound."[32]

Kuga insisted that the reform of morality, religion, education, and the family system was a necessary condition for any successful reform of the state, such as laws and institutions. The foundation and limitations of the state were located in society—in the spirit, integrity, customs, and manners of the people. He further considered that the will of the monarch always represents the will of the people.[33]

Kuga outlines his views on the relationship between sentiment and reason, morality and law in his essay, "Family Life or Political Life." He argues that reason should not rule sentiment and sentiment should not rule reason. Political life emerges from natural reason. Family life emerges from the morality of nature. Archaic feudal or family head politics is the tyranny of sentiment over reason. Nineteenth-century Euro-American society, in its enthusiasm for popular rights in opposition to the power of their sovereign, has endeavored to replace the sentiment of family life with the legalism of political life. In this case, reason has improperly triumphed over sentiment. While reason must continue to progress in the political realm, with the movement for freedom and popular rights, the balance has been lost, and the theory of rights has come between family members dividing them. Japan has become a rulerless and fatherless society. The tyranny of legalistic reason over familial sentiment must be removed.[34] Like Shiga, Kuga frequently invokes Fichte and Germany's colonial situation under Napoleonic rule as instructive examples for Japan. In the context of the semicolonial situation of middle Meiji Japan, Kuga thus articulates a conception of the nation grounded in the particularity of aesthetic discourse that challenges the claims of Enlightenment modernity and universal reason as the sole sources of civilized status.

The notion of a national community united in sentiment also mediated Kuga's conception of economics. He saw Manchester school laissez-faire economics as giving rise to new classes of the wealthy who would predictably divide the national community in the future as completely as outdated notions of feudal privilege ever had in the past. Kuga's position on treaty revision was in large part motivated by a demand for the state to limit and rein in the overwhelming power of foreign capital. Insofar as he saw the state's policies as capitulating to the demands of foreign capital, for Kuga, the Meiji government was in effect a proxy that did the bidding of Western capital.

Kuga thus uses a conception of aesthetic judgment to construct a national community aligned with the emperor in which the people are to recognize themselves, but in opposition to the state and its bureaucracies that are identified with science, reason, and ultimately, Western oppression. For Kuga, the state's complicity with reason is effectively complicity with Western domination of Japan. Where Hegel attempts to educate desire such that it ultimately accords with reason, for Kuga this is a duality that ultimately cannot be erased without dire consequences for both society and politics. Kuga's frequent criticisms of government policies in Korea largely follow the logic of his criticisms of the domestic government. He held that the Japanese government was attempting to reform

the state and the law when what really needed to be reformed were customs, morals, and everyday practices.

In summary, Fenollosa's art education and art historical criticism served to install a new intertextuality of verbal and visual texts characterized by a process of subjectification in which the enunciating subject is doubled onto the subject of the enunciated. This shifted the relation of verbal and visual texts from supplementarity to one of sharp disjunction. The new status of *bunjinga* and calligraphy exemplify this. Within Fenollosa and Okakura's schema, *bunjinga* could not be recognized as art. Calligraphy was only recuperable as art to the degree that it was resituated as an exclusively representative, visual text. This shift in intertextuality within aesthetic discourse thus embodied the deterritorialization of the enunciative position of the Japanese speaking subject in a manner which conformed to the faculties and categories of modern philosophy. It simultaneously served as a mode of governmentality grounded in a notion of "common sense" compatible with capitalism's regime of subjectification but distinct from scientific positivist modes of governmentality that tended to marginalize or eliminate aesthetics as a distinct discursive field.

Standard accounts of Shiga, Miyake, and Kuga have generally been concerned to situate them as heroes who successfully came to the defense of Japanese culture in its time of need. Their articulation of a new form of political philosophy has been widely recognized, but little previous work has explored the specific status of aesthetic discourse in their work.[35] Great energy has also been devoted to presenting them as advocating "healthy" nationalism compatible with cosmopolitan, universal humanism rather than a "bad," particularist nationalism that would not allow for a similar form of cultural transubstantiation.[36]

I find that these two competing poles of interpretation seek to choose between identification with all capital as the ground of the social body, or a disjunctive identification with only Japanese capital as properly constitutive of the social body. My contention is that both conceptions are organismic and are grounded in a vitalist ontology. Clearly Shiga, Miyake, and Kuga conceived their projects as a form of opposition to contemporary state policy. Read from the perspective of Foucauldian governmentality, however, despite their important displacement of universal scientific reason, all three are content to articulate a new conception of Japanese identity that sustains the relation of capital to the social body even as it discriminates against foreign capital. Shiga, Miyake, and Kuga all ultimately posit a form of common sense that assumes a sentimental immediacy among all members of the Japanese national community.

I suggest that with Fenollosa, Shiga, Miyake, and Kuga, we can see the installation of this regime in something intelligibly anticipating its early twentieth-century form. Insofar as this conception of community legislates homogeneity of affect and identity, it precludes the exteriority of thought that allows for singularity. The fact that their thought is ultimately premised on the conception of a legislator subject aligns it with liberal varieties of capitalist governmentality. While Shiga and Miyake's positions are interestingly qualified through their distinctive appropriations of evolutionary theory, Shiga and Miyake's conception of the unity of the faculties in the *cogito* ultimately raises the demands of "indigenous" capital to an absolute in the guise of common sense. It also invokes a highly polemicized notion of Japanese domesticity as on the one hand a challenge to Eurocentrism, but on the other hand as a rationalization for extending the empire of Japanese capital. Their identification of Japanese domesticity and Japanese capital is perhaps connected with why this aspect of their position was so easily appropriated by Inoue Tetsujirô for state purposes. The same holds true for Miyake and Kuga's expansionist views regarding Korea. Miyake and Kuga advocated Japanese colonization on the grounds of Korean autonomy and humanist interventionism. Their appeal to universality was the premise of their call for Japanese expansion, not a brake upon it. The relation of Kuga's position to state reason seems much more mediated, but he too ultimately concedes the political sphere to reason. His quarrel is ultimately over the form of Japanese particularity that shall be articulated in relation to political reason.

Their thought thus articulates a mode of governmentality compatible with the rule of Japanese capital. They ultimately insist on subordinating thought to a model of the true, the just, or the beautiful as the philosophical categories of German idealism require. While their thought is an important critique of universal scientific reason, it does not challenge the logic of capitalist governmentality in any significant way. Their project to install an "empire of aesthetics" in the form of Japanese national community was a resounding success. It will not do to allow the important and legitimate claim of their work to have displaced scientific reason to result in overlooking its own complicity in the accumulation of Japanese capital and forced cultural homogenization, in spite of its tactical opposition to specific aspects of then contemporary state policy. This issue will be further explored in the next chapter in relation to their criticism of Inoue Tetsujirô's commentary on the *Imperial Rescript on Education*.

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Chapter 4

Aesthetics and the Moral Capital of the Family State

This chapter examines the role of aesthetics in the debate surrounding interpretation of the *Imperial Rescript on Education*.[1] I argue that the rescript can be seen as a critical response to the ethics policies of Mori Arinori that displaces discursive authority for morals education policy from the Education Ministry to the Imperial Household Ministry. I then turn to an examination of the de facto official Education Ministry interpretation of the rescript, Inoue Tetsujirô's *Chokugo engi*, and criticisms of it by Miyake Setsurei, Kuga Katsunan, and Ônishi Hajime.

The issues of aesthetics and national community discussed in Chapter 3 were quite emphatically brought to bear on competing conceptions of a uniquely Japanese domestic sphere in the debate surrounding the *Imperial Rescript on Education*. The *Imperial Rescript on Education* was promulgated on October 30, 1890, a year after the announcement of the Imperial constitution and the assassination of Mori Arinori. The *Education Rescript* was an oath to be taken by all primary school students throughout the nation. It consisted of statements issued by the Imperial Household specifying who does and does not constitute a subject of the Greater Japanese Empire. As an official state oath, it functions as what Foucault refers to as "order words." The student bodies' power of affecting and being affected vis-à-vis their families, the state, and the emperor were articulated and territorialized by way of the *Education Rescript*. It thus articulated a new collective assemblage of enunciation which ascribed specific properties to the bodies of the members of the society.[2]

Precedents evidencing some of the logic of *The Imperial Rescript on Education* are identifiable as far back as 1879. In "Kyôgaku taishi," Motoda Nagazane, the Confucian lecturer to the Emperor Meiji, argued that Western-style ethics texts put knowledge above morality and thus undermined the morals of the country. Motoda considered that loyalty

to the state and the traditional family system were being threatened and his position counted as the emperor's position. He argued that education could only find its proper foundation in the doctrine of the Imperial family, and in the moral precepts taught by Confucius, namely benevolence, loyalty, and filial piety. This doctrine was made Education Ministry policy in 1881.[3]

In a move perceived by many as tied to the government's efforts to Westernize Japan for the sake of treaty revision, the appointment of Mori Arinori as Education Minister in 1885 signaled a reverse course in this policy. Mori quickly moved to prohibit the use of Confucian texts in the classroom for a variety of reasons (discussed in Chapter 2).[4] Motoda continued a heated exchange with Mori and Itô Hirobumi regarding the future of morals education under the watch of Mori, a man he suspected to be a Christian by virtue of his education at a Christian university in the United States. Motoda pointed to religion in general and Mori's policies in particular as the source of moral decline in Japan. Interestingly, Mori and Motoda both agreed that the primary goal of education should be to instill the values of loyalty and patriotism (*chûkun aikoku*), and that educational practices based on the written word alone were not sufficient for proper ethics education. Whereas Motoda proposed pedagogical methods that used pictures, such as had been adopted in the teaching of Western science, Mori advocated physical education as the best means to instill values in students—by action rather than argument.[5] Between 1886 and 1888, Nishimura Shigeki developed the idea that responsibility for administering morals education should be transferred from the Education Ministry to the Imperial Household Ministry, making a formal proposal to that effect in 1888.[6] Mori was adamantly opposed to this idea and nothing came of it. Mori's own textbook based on evolutionary principles (also discussed in Chapter 2), had been published by the Education Ministry and the order to use it had already been issued prior to his death.[7] His assassination in February of the next year cleared the way for a shift in policy.

When Yamagata Aritomo became Prime Minister (1889–1891, and once again from 1898–1900), he reached an agreement with Motoda that set the policy course for promulgation of the rescript.[8] Yoshikawa Akimasa was appointed the new Minister of Education in May 1890 with this idea in mind. While the rescript was actually written for the most part by Inoue Kowashi and was merely edited by Motoda, the manner of its promulgation indicated a site of discourse above and beyond the channels of secular state bureaucracy. Though previous Imperial rescripts concerning education had simply been issued as government orders by

the Education Ministry directly, the *Imperial Rescript on Education* was presented in a ceremonial box to the Prime Minister and the Minister of Education in an official promulgation ceremony at the Imperial Palace in the manner of the *Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors* of eight years before. Further, the document itself was not cosigned by the responsible minister, the minister of education, in the standard manner. This was expressly avoided so as to distinguish it from previous rescripts on education and to allow the education rescript to be presented as having been personally composed by the emperor himself.[9] In other words, with the *Imperial Rescript on Education* the locus of authority and site of discourse for morals education was in effect transferred from the Ministry of Education to the Imperial Household Ministry. The Education Ministry's role changed from that of policy-making to that of administration and enforcement of policy set by the Imperial Household Ministry.

The complete text of the official English language translation of the *Imperial Rescript on Education* is as follows:

> Know ye, Our subjects:
>
> Our Imperial Ancestors have founded Our Empire on a basis broad and everlasting, and have deeply and firmly implanted virtue; Our subjects ever united in loyalty and filial piety have from generation to generation illustrated the beauty thereof. This is the glory of the fundamental character of Our Empire, and herein also lies the source of Our education. Ye, Our subjects, be filial to your parents, affectionate to your brothers and sisters; as husbands and wives be harmonious, as friends true; bear yourselves in modesty and moderation; extend your benevolence to all; pursue learning and cultivate arts, and thereby develop intellectual faculties and perfect moral powers; furthermore, advance public good and promote common interests; always respect the Constitution and observe the laws; should emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously to the State; and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of Our Imperial Throne coeval with heaven and earth. So shall ye not only be Our good and faithful subjects, but render illustrious the best traditions of your forefathers.
>
> The Way here set forth is indeed the teaching bequeathed by Our Imperial Ancestors, to be observed alike by Their Descendents and the subjects, infallible for all ages and true in all places. It is Our wish to lay it to heart in all reverence, in common with you, Our subjects, that we may all attain to the same virtue.[10]

To further complicate the situation outlined above, officials such as Motoda who conceived the situation in more or less Confucian categories viewed the emperor as himself a site of discursive authority inappropriately limited by an implicitly foreign-influenced, semicolonial state. From

this perspective, the shift of policy-making authority from the Education Ministry to the Imperial Household was itself a shift from the state to a familial "domestic" sphere whose mediated relation to the public sphere being installed by the state's Westernizing reform efforts was a measure of semicolonial compromise. Even the clause in the rescript itself demanding obedience to the constitution and laws of the state was resisted by Motoda as undermining the appropriate authority of the emperor. Motoda was reportedly overruled on this point by the emperor himself. Thus, for Motoda, the British conception of a civil society comprised of separate public and private spheres violated the propriety of a domestic Japanese sphere that ought properly to be simultaneously familial, communal, and national.

Where Mori Arinori's ethics text and his regime of physical education stressed loyalty and patriotism, the rescript distinguished itself from Mori's conception by an emphasis on private family morality as continuous with the issue of loyalty to the sovereign. This translated older Mito-school, nationalist Confucian discourse on the family and the sovereign into a new semicolonial context under which it also functioned as a mode of capitalist governmentality. Conceptually, where Mori referred to ethics (*rinri*) as a scientific discipline derived from the implicit logic of common sense, Motoda's discussions insisted on privileging morality (*shûshin*), an issue of respect behavior toward one's superiors conceived in familial terms up to and including one's lord. The rescript evoked Confucian conceptions of morality while carefully avoiding exclusively Confucian language. While Mori's conception endeavored to inculcate discipline, obedience, and patriotism, the rescript introduced a notion of family as its object that included both immediate family and one's distant ancestors. The doctrine extended the category of ancestors to include the Imperial family, thus constructing all subjects of the empire as ultimately members of the Imperial family in some capacity. The object constructed by the rescript thus shifted discussion away from logical rules of behavior toward a natural order of things presented as reflecting the will and deeds of one's ancestors. From this perspective, comportment toward the Imperial sovereign was to be a measure of personal devotion to one's own ancestors.

The shift from *rinri* to *shûshin*, from ethics text to imperial rescript, is thus a shift from one's own attempt to logically determine appropriate behavior to a problematic within which proper behavior has already been defined by the ancestors. The only remaining task is thus to carry out the will of the ancestors going forward. Where Mori insists on a qualified freedom of will and personal autonomy, the rescript displaces the question of the intention and will of present day subjects with the question

of the intention and will of the ancestors and the emperor. True Imperial Japanese subjects are thus constituted by adherence to their duty of obeying the will of the emperor and the ancestors.

This is where the issue of enunciative modality comes into play. Mori grounds his discourse in the logic of evolutionary science and Japanese global competitiveness. The discourse of the rescript locates agency as a Japanese subject in adherence to the virtues deemed representative of the concept of national tradition (a tradition it performatively served a central role in constituting). The virtues of loyalty, filial piety, brotherly affection, matrimonial harmony, benevolence, and sacrifice to the state in times of crisis are thus constituted as the core values of a single national tradition over an area that was characterized in fact by wide regional and caste diversity in norms of behavior and belief over a vast span of time as well. In the terms of the rescript, the authority to determine what is truly representative of the national community is clearly vested in the emperor and any claim to the agency and subject position of a legitimate member of the national community is now effectively contingent on obedience to the will of the emperor and implicitly, to those who rule in the name of the emperor. Thus claims to agency were relocated from secular science and national love for the emperor to loyalty toward what is enacted in the name of the ancestors and canonized as official tradition with a strongly warrior-class inflection. From this point on, in a certain sense, all Japanese subjects were in effect required to conceive of themselves as members of the *bushi*, or warrior, class in some respects. In the discourse of the rescript, the family was identified with the national community and the refusal of a distinction between state and society was asserted as the distinguishing mark of a properly Japanese national and domestic sphere.

One further point to be observed is that Japanese school students were required to recite the rescript before their classmates, their teachers and, as a general rule, before a portrait of the emperor. Thus the gaze of the Imperial authority considered "private" by Shiga, Kuga, and Ônishi was incorporated by their opponents into the ritual recitation of the education rescript oath in all primary and secondary schools in the entire educational system under the purview of the Education Ministry.

Recitation of this oath would constitute one of the order-words Foucault points to as the ground of linguistic function. Reciting the oath with sincerity would constitute one as a proper Japanese subject that would in turn affect the form of authority implicit in any further mode of personal expression one might adopt. Failure to conform to this ritual would deprive one of the authority to speak as a legitimate subject of the empire. In what might be construed as irony, the modern Japanese disciplinary

ritual of the oath of allegiance within the modern school system thus appears to have been implemented for the purpose of regenerating a conception of domestic (familial) moral tradition that propagandists held the school and the state to have been responsible for undermining. In other words, the state educational apparatus was itself used to install a notion of a national domestic sphere purportedly antagonistic to state authority. Thus, direct state bureaucratic intervention was to insulate the national domestic sphere from usurpation by that very same state bureaucracy.

This ritual recitation also served as an opportunity to police conformity with official state interpretations of the rescript. The issue was highlighted by a "disrespect incident." Inoue Tetsujirô attacked the high-profile Christian, Uchimura Kanzô, for failing to bow to the Imperial portrait during recitation of the education rescript oath, arguing that such conduct was a sign of disrespect for the emperor. Inoue framed Uchimura's behavior as symbolizing a fundamental contradiction between the practice of Christianity and "proper" loyalty to Imperial Japan. Failure to adhere to what became ritual observance of canonic interpretations of the rescript consequently came to bear upon the legitimacy of one's claim to membership and one's agency as a legitimate member of the national community. On this ground, Christians, socialists, anarchists, feminists, and ethnically marginal groups were all rapidly accused of having fallen away from the national community in various respects and were accordingly treated as "UnJapanese" (*hikokumin*), as less than true subjects of the nation.[11]

The debate surrounding the educational rescript is important in that the various positions within it all contest the proper structure of the social formation even as they recognize and legitimate the hegemony of the rescript itself. Examining the debate over the intent and consequences of the rescript addresses the question of the agency of peoples subjected to centralized regimes of power and their ability to inflect or resist these regimes. Though Foucault's periodization of modern history in *Discipline and Punish* describes a pre-modern regime of authoritarian display succeeded by a modern, regime of power employing technologies of the subject, the modern period hardly dispenses with the threat of force. The various less-transparent forms of hegemonic discipline are necessarily positioned in relation to this ever-present threat of escalation to the level of force of arms. The Meiji state responded to pro-democratic and antitreaty revision forces in middle Meiji with a combination of both tactics. Even as force was used to limit or ban political speech and public meetings, the promulgation of the Imperial constitution and the *Imperial Rescript on Education* constituted efforts to achieve ideological hegemony

that would situate the state and the Imperial household as plausibly representative of the national community. The rescript thus effectively promoted self-discipline, a modern disciplining of the national subject.

In effect, those who contested the interpretation of the rescript were forced to tacitly recognize significant respects in which the rescript had shifted the grounds of debate. The debate over Christianity raised the issue of alternative sources of authority and agency quite directly. Beyond that, participants in debate over the imperial rescript were left to contest the particular respects in which acknowledged imperial authority was to be articulated in relation to the social body. The debate became essentially a dispute over competing modes of implementation. These positions nevertheless had to participate in the implementation of the rescript to have any say in the matter at all.

Inoue Tetsujirô's *Chokugo engi* was effectively commissioned and published by the Education Ministry. The authority thus invested in his particular interpretation and its widespread use as a textbook and influence upon other textbooks made it a point of departure for the debate—a debate over the significance of the rescript and its mode of implementation. Inoue Tetsujirô was selected by members of the Imperial Household Ministry and the Education Ministry to write an official commentary and interpretation of the rescript that was then published by the Education Ministry. While published under his name, Inoue in fact consulted with over twenty scholars in the course of developing and refining the draft. There is nevertheless strong academic consensus that the central features of the work are attributable to Inoue. The work also stands as a sign of increased Imperial Household Ministry influence over the Education Ministry.

Inoue's intellectual career demonstrates a consistent interest in the evolutionary theories of Ernst Haeckel and Herbert Spencer.[12] In terms of thematic and conceptual structure, Inoue's commentary on the education rescript, the *Chokugo engi* [*Commentary on the Rescript*], indeed demonstrates a grounding in evolutionary theory. He writes, "Furthermore, like the cell in an organism, the family is in fact the basis of the country. When every family is reconciled, the country also may be tranquil. When conversely there are those among all families who are not in harmony then the multitude certainly cannot be of one heart and consequently, national power must also be diminished."[13]

One of Inoue's primary authorities on evolutionary theory, Ernst Haeckel, himself used the biological discourse of the cell and the organism to articulate the human social formation.[14] Haeckel had embraced Bismarck both literally and figuratively. His discourse of the individual as the cell of the social organism was designed to rein in what he saw as the

hubris of humanist individualism. The individual was instead to receive whatever value he or she may have only insofar as they furthered the ends of the race and the nation. For Haeckel, the biopolitical criterion of "social health" was the ultimate criterion of judgment. He thus concluded that as a matter of course the individual cell—in this case a person—should thus be expendable on behalf of the larger social organism.

Inoue lays out an unavoidably vitalist ontology here. The nation-state is conceived as an organism. It is served by individuals in their capacity as members of the families that make up the legal subjects of the empire.

Inoue's position follows Haeckel in conceiving racial and national unity as the highest priority. He diverges from Haeckel in that he qualifies the position of the individual already completely subordinated to the social organism even further by additionally mediating that relationship through the family. The logic of Inoue's position is that the individual is not even a cell of the social organism, but is an organ of a cell in the larger social organism (the mitochondria of a cell in the social organism, as it were). The family would thus be a unit that is completely subordinate to the function of the larger social organism and the individual would in turn be completely subordinate to the family that serves that larger social function. With this privileging of the family, Inoue translates Haeckel's evolutionary discourse into a means of situating Japan as simultaneously modern and yet non-Western.

Inoue shares with Spencer and Haeckel a biopolitical concern with eugenically protecting the purity of the race, a concern evidenced in his discourse of degeneracy. In the course of his commentary on the section of the rescript calling for harmony between married couples, he states that early marriages by couples with poor skills will produce weak children and thus a weak country. He insists that a strong country must keep these sorts of weak citizens to a minimum.[15] Despite his displacement of the individual by the family as the "cell" of the social organism, Inoue maintains the Spencerian notion that the biological status of the individual human is tied to the status of the nation generally as microcosm to macrocosm. For Inoue, the health of individuals equals the collective health of the race or nation.

For Inoue, the biopolitical status of the family becomes a matter of explicit concern for management of the nation's population as a whole, it becomes a new biopolitical mode of governmentality. Loss of familial harmony is logically therefore always also a loss of racial and national harmony.[16] Inoue explicates the traditional respect of a child for its parents in the terms of evolutionary theory. Inoue argues that a child's special love for his or her parents arises from the physical tie between them. He

writes, "A child's special sentiment toward its parents arises through the blood relationship and emerges out of an entirely natural feeling. That is to say, the body of the child is something that has been given life by the parents. The parents are something in which the child originates. It is for this reason that they ought to feel piety [*kô*] toward the parents. Indeed, it may be said that this becomes an unavoidable consequence [ikioi]."[17] For Inoue, it is the extraordinarily long infancy of the human child that sets the human species apart from other species. Piety toward the parents is the natural result of their responding to the requirements of the child through its first twenty years.[18] Inoue declares that the role of the father is outside the home and that the proper role of the mother is in the home. For this reason the education of children must be gender specific. The education of female children is particularly important in that they are to be responsible for the upbringing of all the children of the nation.[19] Inoue's vitalist ontology requires drawing a line between the higher life of human spirit and lesser forms of life. For Inoue, this requires drawing a fundamental line between the value of human life versus animal life.

It is worth remarking that the claim that the man's place is outside the home and the woman's place is in the home, in addition to being commonplace in the middle classes of the United States and England in the nineteenth century, also appeared in various editions of the canonic Tokugawa-period text on female upbringing, *Onna daigaku*, reprinted without interruption from the early 1700s. The idea that education must be gender-specific was also important given that it was assumed female children would marry out of the family and become members of another lineage, never to return. *Onna Daigaku* refers to the mother's responsibility for guiding children toward the Confucian way and teaching the *soroban* (a traditional type of calculator that uses wooden beads in a frame), but evolutionary discourse on the length of human adolescence was unsurprisingly not in evidence.[20]

For Inoue, the family as a mode of governmentality grounds the individual's relation to the sovereign as well.

> As parents are to their children, so is the lord of the country to his subjects. In other words, a country is an extension of the family. There is no difference between when the lord of a country issues an order to his subjects and the tender feeling with which parents guide their child. Thus when the entire nation is called upon by the emperor, you, the subjects, should respond with deep attention and a heart filled with the respect one would have for one's strict father and affectionate mother.[21]

Because of his insistence on conflating family, race, and nation, Inoue conceives all levels of community in terms of kinship relations and race.

> Humankind [*jinrui*] has the spirit of inheriting the achievements of their ancestors and passing them on to their children. In other words, humankind has a historical form of thought [*rekishitekina shisô*]. Humans are quite distinct from other animals as [animal] parents forget their children and [animal] children forget their parents, leading lives on their own that are completely different from one generation to another. It is precisely so-called piety [kô] that enables the continuity of a family. This is in fact the respect in which humanity is greatly superior to other animals . . . Fulfilling this obligation is the [beautiful] virtue [*bitoku*] of man."[22]

Inoue thus defines humanity in biopolitical terms as consciousness of familial and racial continuity. In other words, Inoue translates the Confucian, "oriental" moral discourse of humankind (*jinrui*) into evolutionary language, articulating modernity in terms of a distinctively Japanized theory of capitalist governmentality. Science is appealed to as an authority in support of Japanese and Oriental tradition even as those traditions themselves are being invented in a newly nationalist guise. The evolutionary discourses of race and genealogy are thus the ground upon which Inoue conceives "Japanese tradition" without respect to time or place. Nevertheless, even as Inoue insists that this uniquely human relation grounding Japaneseness is a law of nature, he concedes that this "nature" can only be brought forth through pedagogical discipline. Thus the child and education become the focus of much of his concern. He argues that the over ten years of reform in the Meiji period have mainly been improvements in form (*keitai*) alone. What is essential is a reform of spirit. He maintains that when an entire generation of children who were brought up under a truly national education matures, the country will be unified and such a reform in spirit will have been achieved.[23]

For Inoue, the constitution is the founding law of the rights of the subjects of the nation. Law organizes the relations between the state and the subjects, and between the subjects themselves. While law rules outside the home and morality rules within the home, law is said to have originally been a part of morality. Law is thus conceived as essentially a development and extension of the family and subsumed under morality. This suggests that, as opposed to many of his critics, Inoue ultimately conflates emperor, state, and family.[24] This situates Inoue on the side of the state in the contest over where to properly locate national sovereignty. Shiga, Miyake, and Kuga clearly call on aesthetics to challenge the state and to locate national agency in the people's relation to the emperor rather than in the central

government and the law. In opposition to those critics who would claim that the government could not be representative because of its complicity in the reproduction of colonial difference, Inoue unflinchingly insists that the state is representative of the emperor and the people. Shiga, Miyake, and Kuga situate life on the side of the people in opposition to the state. Inoue seeks to sublate the mechanism of state bureaucracy within a larger, organismic order of community as simultaneously familial and imperial.

It is when Inoue confronts the issue of cultural difference in a properly national education that he initially refers to aesthetic discourse: "There is no doubt that Japanese art possesses a different, non-Western, kind of beauty. Therefore, one must know that—in addition to Western art—our country's art must be promoted. Art should not be put to only commercial use. It adds to the pleasure of the [national] people, and at the same time has the additional effect of enobling sentiment [kanjô], the will [ishi], and the like."[25]

Here Inoue makes several claims. First, he implicitly refers to discussions by those such as his primary instructor in philosophy, Ernest Fenollosa, and other students of Fenollosa's such as Okakura and Miyake that non-Western art such as Japan's is of comparable value to that of the West and that the value of the art object is defined by its transcendence of the commodity relations of capitalist society.

As previously discussed, Fenollosa had been concerned to shift the Japanese government's policy of crafts production as a form of commodity export into a discourse of aesthetics that allowed Japanese tradition to be conceived as simultaneously civilized and modern, yet non-Western. For Fenollosa, Okakura, Miyake, and now Inoue, the Western discipline of aesthetics enables claims for an alternative, non-Western modernity and civilization in Japan.

With regard to education, Inoue extends this claim regarding art to Japanese culture generally. He writes, "Taking science [*gakujitsu*] as the strongpoint of the West, if science is a particular shortcoming of the Orient [*Tôyô*], a person with the slightest determination will quickly raise this up and thereby nurture the elements of civilization . . . Yet at this moment our research in such things as the ancient literature and history of the Orient should expand all the more rapidly. They certainly should not be totally abolished for the sake of pursuing Western learning. The study of this country must become the foundation of each individual's education. This is in fact where the principle meaning of national education is to be found."[26]

In this way, the particularity of reflective aesthetic judgment grounds the study of Japan itself on the non-Western side of an Occident versus

Orient (and reason versus sentiment) divide. Again, Inoue appropriates the modern Euro-American disciplines as means to implement a strategy establishing an avowedly non-Western, alternative Japanese modernity and non-Western national tradition. As with Miyake, Inoue argues that while Japanese may not be familiar enough with their past to say exactly what it is, they may nevertheless claim it as a legacy of Japanese subjects. For Inoue, the academic disciplines of history and literature thus serve the strategic purpose of establishing the particular authority of the indigenous researcher whose research will contribute to what all Japanese must conceive as their own identity. A research program into oriental history will thus be a cornerstone of the new cultural politics of middle Meiji nationalism.

But Inoue also makes an additional claim. He asserts that art involves the refinement of national sentiment and will. In other words, at this point the discourse of aesthetics and the discourse of morality and ethical autonomy significantly converge. This position appears to constitute a challenge to the categorial divisions of modern thought according to Kant. Inoue's effort to ground the particularity of oriental and Japanese morality is specified more directly in a later section of the work:

> There should be a spirit of making progress with rapid strides. However, we should not fall into the mistake of abandoning the beautiful customs that have come from our ancestors or abandoning the tradition of loyalty for the sake of this end. The only thing we should improve are our shortcomings.
>
> Certainly, our country's abundance of beautiful landscape is something to take pride in before people of other countries; however, beautiful landscape is something that is produced by nature, in fact it is not something that has come about through the merits of our countrymen.
>
> We Japanese continue to pass on our ancestral traditions to our descendants without losing our beautiful customs of loyalty and innocence. By doing this, we should become a [national] people with a superior beauty in the Orient. This is what we really have to be proud of before the people of other countries.[27]

Inoue implicitly refers to works such as Shiga's *Fûkeiron [On Landscape]*, a runaway bestseller, which invoked geography and aesthetic discourse to establish that the landmass now controlled by the Japanese government exhibited a natural beauty and particularity that made it the equal of any other, thus implicitly identifying the geological landmass of Japan with the social body of the Japanese people.[28] Pride in the Japanese landscape was thus to inculcate pride in Japanese particularity, in Japanese difference. Inoue argues that if the discourse of aesthetics allows the Japanese landscape to serve as a point of identification for the Japanese national community, surely the moral tradition of the nation that more

clearly reflects the agency of the ancestors and the people is a more perfect aesthetic object. In other words, Inoue effectively argues that national moral tradition itself is an aesthetic object that it is the duty of the nation to preserve.

Inoue thus extends the discourse of the museum and the national park into the realm of national morality. Reconstituting national moral tradition is understood as a duty of the people and is constructed along the lines of aesthetic discourse. In this way, Inoue undertakes to collectivize bodies as Japanese by way of a morality and ethics of the Imperial Household. He effectively defines Japaneseness as an unquestioning obedience to the imperial will that simultaneously functions as an aesthetic object.

The reader will recall that Kuki Ryûichi utilized the discourse of aesthetics in order to bring national art and architectural preservation under the administrative guidance of the Imperial Household. Intellectuals such as Tokutomi Sohô took offense to this, and saw Kuki's policy as sustaining, rather than displacing, Western condescension, as ultimately feminizing Japan. Inoue reconstructs this notion of Imperial beauty as the basis of a uniquely Japanese morality. In effect, this strategy realizes a masculinization of Japanese and Asian beauty. The beauty of the Imperial family thus comes to stand for the unquestioned authority of the patriarch whose authority in turn derives from that of the absolute patriarch, the Japanese emperor. Where some intellectuals had found fault with Kuki's program as simply capitulating to orientalist, feminizing European conceptions of Japan, Inoue's position reclaims this potentially feminizing discourse for the ends of Japanese patriarchy. With Inoue, the particularity of Japanese art and tradition legitimized by the previously "feminizing" discourse of aesthetics is extended to the moral realm in support of patriarchal obedience to father and emperor. This strategy successfully identifies the interests of a newly national, authoritarian Japanese patriarchy expressly articulated in opposition to Western liberalism and the celebration of particularity constitutive of aesthetic discourse. Where previous studies (such as the work of Ishida Takeshi) have been concerned to situate Inoue on the "premodern" side of the tradition versus modernity divide by virtue of his organismic model of the social community, my reading suggests that rather than expressing a premodern position, he self-consciously articulates a masculinist discourse of alternative modernity.

This is so as Inoue explicitly confronts the collapse of older social codes under capitalist deterritorialization and only invokes older codes in articulating a new variety of authoritarian, anti-individualist, capitalist governmentality. In accord with standing Japanese property laws, the agent of this new capitalist social formation is the family head, rather than

the individual subject. This is the reason that the *inkan*, or family stamp, rather than the individual signature, represented the authority necessary to conclude a legal and binding contract.

Inoue implicitly invokes the notion of aesthetics and its transcendence of economic categories as the mark of a selfless oriental morality he privileges over purportedly selfish Western morality. He states, "A person does not seek solely to profit themselves, but the general public. Even if it results in personal loss, when it profits the general population he discards his personal profit and seeks the general public's profit—such is altruism [*ritashugi*] and an extremely beautiful aspect of morality."[29]

Unfortunately for the logic of Inoue's position, to the degree that he has identified aesthetics with the transcendence of economic commodification, and has further identified traditional morality with the aesthetic category of beauty, this aspect of his argument is in great tension with his utilitarian definition of spirit as the effectively commodified life of the social organism. He states, "Those who do no good for the country are no different from those who are dead. Though their body exists in the world, their spirit has died."[30]

Inoue neglects to maintain a consistent ontology, a lapse for which his critics will harshly judge him. On the one hand, Inoue has identified spiritual life and morality with aesthetic discourse in its transcendence of the commodity relations of capitalist society. On the other hand he has identified the historical spirit of the nation with the passing on of moral traditions in the terms of evolutionary utility. As with Mori Arinori, Spencer, and Haeckel, at this point in his commentary Inoue comes down on the side of evolutionary theory. His position suggests that the life of the social organism is defined by the reproduction of capital, and economic loss is a form of social death.

Mori and Inoue's conceptions of governmentality all distinguish themselves from Spencer in that for them the accumulation of capital can only be valorized in the guise of accumulation on behalf of the nation-state as a whole. While there are passages where Inoue identifies personal profit with national profit, there are others where he explicitly opposes them. At this point in his argument, he expressly states that national welfare must win out when it conflicts with personal profit. The relative strength or weakness of the nation as a whole is defined as the degree to which the subjects are willing to place public profit before personal profit. He suggests that if independence and self-interest gain the upper hand, the country will collapse.[31]

At times, Inoue effectively demands a pedagogical process of recollectivization expressly designed to overcome secular Western individualism,

a would-be restoration of organismic community undermined by Western influence. At other times, he calls for the expansion of personal profit as the path toward national strength and wealth.[32] His recourse to aesthetic discourse supports the former and does not comport well with the latter, leaving the *Chokugo engi* as a compromise formation of sorts. Inoue's critics foreground this glaring inconsistency in his argument. It is to a discussion of these critics that I will now turn.

Kuga Katsunan wrote his response to the *Imperial Rescript on Education* and the *Chokugo engi*, on November 3, 1891, just days after the publication of Inoue's work on October 30, 1891. Kuga warmly welcomes the rescript as responding to the moral disarray of contemporary Japan. He begins his discussion on the premise that each country has its own particular history and customs. While he insists that the progress of civilization must not be abandoned, he finds that controversy surrounding new legal codes based on foreign models and confusion concerning morality have destroyed Japanese customs and led to a loss in national unity. The sentiment of the nation is unsettled and not on a par with that of other countries. Kuga is concerned to distinguish the education rescript issued by the Imperial Household Ministry that values tradition properly from efforts by the Education Ministry that to his mind do not properly value tradition. He strongly denigrates previous efforts of the Education Ministry to dictate education policy, stating that such is not their responsibility. Kuga associates these previous Education Ministry efforts with Spencerian academic theories, implicitly referring to Mori's ethics textbook. For Kuga, the reason of academic principle is opposed to the sentiment that is the proper ground of national custom. He opposes the Japanese particularity of the Imperial household, indigenous custom, and sentiment to the universal reason of the Education Ministry.

For Kuga, the rescript is a wonderful thing, but the Education Ministry's response to it has created a problem. Kuga finds that Inoue's *Chokugo engi* effectively repeats many of the same mistakes as Mori Arinori's ethics textbook.

> Today's educators . . . know only the disciplines related to the business of educating and they do not know that the field of education itself is entirely distinct from the academic disciplines. It appears as if most of them mistake the fundamental principle of education. This is not just true of individual educators, but also of those who debate education. As regards educators or those who debate educational policy, we pass on this criticism of immodesty against educators and those who debate educational policy because it is unavoidable. When one examines the theories of those belonging to the educational institutions of society, it appears that they

> desire to infer everything by way of scientific principles. It appears as if they take Spencer's academic theory and even desire to apply it to normal education. Filiality to parents, fraternity among siblings, harmony between spouses, trust between friends, or loyalty to the Imperial Household are all ethics particular to the Japanese nation. They are historical customs of the Japanese nation and elements upon which Japanese society is founded. They are not to be inferred with academic principles, they are to be judged with sentiment. Thus these educators will question all the customs of the nation by way of academic principle, and if they do not get their theory across, they call them the fantasy of a previous age. In their eyes, there is academic reason alone—an incomplete academic reason—a cold academic reason—and none of the gentleness of sentiment. The foundation of academic principle is inferential reason (*suiri*). The foundation of education is sentiment. They have already lost this foundation—how can they be educators? . . . When these eloquent educators read the Imperial Rescript, how could they receive or understand it? If it were interpreted by way of this incomplete academic reason, this sacred imperial work must raise many doubts. Those who pass on these doubts do not know what the education of the nation means. It is as if they desire the further collapse of Japanese education. Such people should be considered outlaws to their vocation and we do not desire to debate education with them. Thus these educators or those who debate educational policy should be referred to as outlaws who almost make this discipline the same as that of their immoral superiors.[33]

Where Inoue aligns the state and the education ministry with the emperor and evolutionary reason, Kuga aligns the people with the emperor and aesthetics—with the particularity of national custom and sentiment—in express opposition to reason and the state. He clearly situates life on the side of sentiment and death on the side of reason.

For Kuga, the emperor and aesthetics are intrinsically opposed to the state and universal scientific reason in the guise of the Education Ministry. Kuga posits the logic of aesthetic judgment and national community based on sentiment as a source of national unity with which the state must not be allowed to interfere. Kuga implicitly argues that to the degree that the state would invoke universal reason for the purposes of reforming Japanese particularity, the state implicitly carries out the work of foreign colonial powers and destroys the particular customs of the nation that are its very foundation. We may thus say that Kuga advocates an ethnic nationalism in opposition to Inoue's state-based nationalism.[34]

It must be added that for Kuga, as for Fukuzawa, the destiny of education in Japan was tied to the destiny of Korea and Asia. He argues that education in Japan cannot be separated from the situation created by the Ansei treaties. Japan has a duty to become the teacher of Asia. Extraterritoriality

limits the effective function of Japanese autonomy that would in turn become an object lesson for Japan's northeast Asian neighbors.

He argues that Japan's current national character was first fixed by the unequal treaties. The current treaty regime harms the nation in various ways and requires extraterritoriality (which Kuga refers to as "domestic" or "homeland" interference [*naikanshô*]). He argues that to despise oneself is to forget one's own dignity. He implores the reader to understand that the proper path to renegotiating the treaties is Japan's own self-recognition as an equal of the treaty powers and the demand that any future treaties must treat Japan in a similarly respectful manner. For Kuga, aesthetic discourse is essential for this process of self-recognition as an autonomous nation. In essence, Kuga argues that foreign influence creates a spectral condition under which the nation may no longer recognize itself. He suggests that the restoration of Japanese sovereignty, in effect the life of Japanese spirit, may sublate the foreign interference within a new organismic vision of the nation.

He argues that the resolution of Japan's situation vis-à-vis international law will serve as an example for the rest of Asia. Consequently, education must strengthen national unity through the support of national morality and custom. In turn, only when Japan has taught this lesson to itself, can it then teach this lesson to the rest of Asia. He is certain that a Japanese policy toward Korea cannot succeed if that policy does not recognize the importance of particularistic custom rather than universalistic law as the foundation of education.[35] This discourse of Japan as having a duty to serve as the teacher of the Orient demonstrates that the Japanese abjection provoked by the Ansei Treaties is deeply implicated in the legitimation of Japan's own colonial ambitions and must be addressed in any serious effort at the decolonization of Japanese culture. Japan's achievement of its own self-identity will thus constitutively require a moment of *Bildung*, a prosthetic discipline that teaches Japan to how to become or restore its proper self.

Miyake's criticism of Inoue was first presented as a lecture on April 28, 1893, and was published in the journal *Tetsugaku zasshi* in May 1893. Miyake supposes that the Education Ministry has chosen to publish a commentary on the education rescript because its own various attempts to prepare an ethics textbooks in-house, such as the ethics textbook prepared under the direction of Mori Arinori, provoked a degree of controversy that they may expect commentary on the rescript will presumably avoid.[36] He finds it dubious that a text written in the straightforward manner of the rescript really requires a commentary. The general tone of Miyake's remarks is quite sharp and dismissive. He finds that Inoue's commentary has a variety of problems. He asserts

that Inoue drags in apparently unrelated issues which complicate rather than clarify the text,[37] he includes passages that are simply incomprehensible,[38] he digresses on topics that don't even appear in the rescript,[39] and his choice of examples is generally confusing. He finds that Inoue refers to well-known, but seemingly irrelevant and historically distant examples,[40] or that the examples are taken from obscure texts that are not the least bit helpful.[41] Beyond his general dismissal of the quality of Inoue's intellectual performance, Miyake makes two fundamental points.

First, he finds that Inoue has an unfortunate proclivity to focus on attempting to explain why such-and-such virtue is moral or why a particular form of behavior is to be promoted. Miyake challenges Inoue's mode of enunciation, or the position from which he purports to write. Miyake states very directly that when Inoue proceeds to dogmatically enunciate why something is so-and-so in the guise of interpreting the *Imperial Rescript on Education*, he is either writing in the name of the emperor or he is writing in his own name based upon his personal judgment. He declares that for Inoue's entire text to be viewed as interchangeable with the words of the emperor, it would have to be in perfect agreement with the thoughts of the emperor. Miyake clearly finds this suggestion comical. He concludes that if this is not the case, Inoue is randomly introducing his own personal views into a discussion that purports to be explaining the emperor's words. Miyake concludes from this that Inoue has not only neglected the best interests of the subjects of the nation, but has betrayed the academic standards to which he should be held accountable.[42]

In essence, Miyake argues that the *Chokugo engi* presents itself as a national dogma that attempts to deny any distinction between the words of the emperor and the words of an academic commissioned by the Japanese bureaucracy. In other words, Miyake insists on drawing a distinction between the state bureaucracy and the Imperial Household that Inoue's commentary is designed to erase. Where Inoue would identify the emperor with the state, Miyake is concerned to sharply distinguish the two. Ultimately, his polemic is part of a contest over the degree to which the aura of the emperor should carry over to the official decrees of the state bureaucracy, in this case the Education Ministry.

Secondly, Miyake is just as unimpressed with Inoue's efforts to rationalize or explain particular moral values. He writes that Inoue's would-be explanations of filial piety (*kôtei*), loyalty (*chûshin*), and benevolence (*hakuai*) are based on a conception of use-value common to utilitarians.[43] He remarks that in this respect the *Chokugo engi* is not significantly different from the essentially Spencerian ethics textbook previously prepared by the ministry.

In connection with this, Miyake's central quarrel with Inoue appears to stem from Inoue's partial and contradictory appropriation of aesthetic discourse. The standard, post-Kantian definition of moral autonomy parallels that of the work of art. It holds that the morally autonomous human being—like the work of art—is an end in itself. Both the work of art and the morally autonomous human are supposed to transcend use-value. But Inoue's constant resort to evolutionary utility repeatedly and illogically pulls aestheticized moral questions back into the realm of use-value such that they are instrumentalized and commodified. In effect, he finds fault with Inoue's presentation of an inconsistent and self-contradictory ontology that first identifies life with aesthetics and morality, and death with capital and utility. Then he reverses himself and identifies life with capital and utility. Miyake ultimately suggests that Inoue is not an academic of established reputation or ability and that it would therefore be pointless to blame him for the results of a job that was more or less forced upon him. In other words, he suggests that the Education Ministry as an institution, rather than Inoue personally, should be held responsible for the work it commissioned and published. He further adds that Inoue's campaign against Uchimura Kanzô on the pretense that Christianity is fundamentally incompatible with national education was groundless and without merit.[44]

Ônishi Hajime also fundamentally challenges the mode of enunciation Inoue takes up in the *Chokugo engi*. He claims that the rescript simply enumerates particular virtues to which the nation ought to adhere. Surely, he assumes, the text is not so difficult that it requires a detailed commentary to be understood.

> I do not think the education rescript is something that can be properly expanded into a particular theory of ethics. In ethics theory, because the rescript does not show the fundamentals of virtues, within the theory many virtues are not regarded as ultimate . . . there are those who nevertheless say that if one follows the rescript, it relates the foundation of ethics and morality, and that different moral views go against the meaning of the rescript . . . it is clear that a person who makes this sort of argument has confused the rescript with ethical theory.[45]

Ônishi charges that if the rescript could be expanded into a particular theory of ethics, it would effectively banish academic freedom by making one particular school of ethics the official Imperial school of ethics. Since the rescript does not lay out a foundation for ethics, attempts such as Inoue's to explain it as absolute must be based upon his own personal theory of ethics. For Ônishi, such attempts to absolutize one's own particular,

personal theory in the name of the education rescript do not comport with the intention of the rescript. Ônishi also challenges Inoue's approach on the grounds of intellectual rigor. Thus, Inoue's attempt to draw the further conclusion—that those who disagree with him are traitors—is also without basis in the text pf the rescript.

Ônishi quotes from the rescript to the effect that the moral way explicated in the rescript is not particular to time or place. He suggests that the rescript must refer to a universal way that nevertheless changes the form of its appearance with time and place. Otherwise, it would not be logically compatible with the progress of rapidly changing Meiji Japan. Onishi writes, "Indeed, in what country and in what society are loyalty and piety not necessary? It is just that in various cases, the condition in which it appears is different . . . As times change, the theory of loyalty and piety also changes. In this way, it doesn't deviate from the progress of contemporary society. This is the true aim of the rescript. If it is not, in what way could it inform both past and present without deviation?"[46]

In other words, Ônishi charges that Inoue dogmatically presents a personal and generally utilitarian view of ethical theory as the sole, absolute interpretation of the rescript. He implies that Japanese political power should respect the reason and judgment of Japanese subjects and strongly suggests that Inoue's approach is inappropriately rigid and authoritarian. He charges Inoue with misrepresenting the position from which he writes. He finds that Inoue presents his own personal views as if they are the views of the rescript itself, thus erasing his own agency in the act of interpretation. Ônishi insists that all interpretations reflect the agency of the person making the interpretation and that principled disagreement is the foundation of free academic practice. For Ônishi, in disingenuously misrepresenting his own agency, Inoue thus also endeavors to deny the agency of others to legitimately present rival interpretations. Ônishi concludes that this can only be described as cowardice.

There are thus several steps in Ônishi's criticism of Inoue. On the grounds of his own understanding of ethics as necessarily universal but historically variable, Ônishi criticizes Inoue for attempting to reduce a universalist education rescript to a variety of dogmatic particularism. For Ônishi, it is the dogmatism of Inoue's particularism that implicates him in a misguided regime of power and knowledge. In the name of the emperor, he would deny the authority of interpretation to anyone but himself, thus foreclosing the public sphere of free academic investigation that Ônishi believes is the proper sphere for negotiating competing interpretations of the rescript. Inoue thus seeks to turn a particular regime of knowledge into a regime of power by attempting to deny those

who disagree with him, such as Uchimura Kanzô and Ônishi himself, status as legitimate interlocutors—or even as true Japanese subjects. Inoue attempts to identify his particular interpretation of the rescript with the will of the emperor and the state itself. Anyone who disagrees with him is thus not a true Japanese subject and is implicitly guilty of treason.

Where Miyake, Kuga, and to some extent Inoue, invoke aesthetic discourse for the purpose of celebrating Japanese particularity, Ônishi makes the status of Japanese aesthetics a matter of comparative study in the context of a universal world history of aesthetics. Ônishi finds Shiga and Miyake's celebration of Japanese aesthetics to be misguided in the authority they grant to foreign appraisals of Japanese culture absent independently judging the legitimacy of foreign appraisals on their own merits. In effect, he asserts that their claims on behalf of oriental and Japanese particularity in opposition to the West themselves reproduce a servile, semicolonial relation to Western academic authority.

For Ônishi, the positions of Shiga and Kuga neglect to address the relative status of the various arts in the name of which Japanese art has been celebrated. The majority of these tendencies have involved household utensils that are relatively low in the hierarchy of aesthetic media. He finds celebration of the nation in the name of such lowly genres to be a capitulation to demeaning appraisals of Japanese culture by foreigners. If Japanese nationality is a consequence of a national artistic sense such as Shiga Jûkô suggests, then it must be an artistic sense at the level of utensils, i.e., crafts.[47] It is tantamount to celebration of Japan as a nation of craftsmen. For Ônishi, this is to identify the Japanese nation with a stage of development prior to the technological revolution in methods of production which it is undergoing at the present time and which cannot be turned back. It is thus a serious mistake.

Further, even when such positions involve praise of higher genres such as painting and sculpture he finds that there has been an almost complete absence of careful attention paid to examining the degree to which Japanese sculpture and painting are successful as forms of artistic expression. There has simply been a general waving of the hands in the direction of Japanese accomplishment because a few foreigners have said flattering things in limited contexts. Further, the status of Japanese aesthetics must be evaluated comparatively in the context of the world history of aesthetics. Miyake and Kuga are concerned to articulate a notion of Japanese identity as oriental and thus displace the Occident from the center of world history to some extent. Ônishi, by contrast, seeks to expand the universality of extant world history so that it becomes less Eurocentric and includes the artistic expression of Asian countries among its objects

of analysis. He does not call for any significant adjustment in the humanist structure of knowledge within which he thereby situates Japan.[48] In this regard, Ônishi significantly anticipates elements of the later and more widely known work of Nishida Kitarô and Tanabe Hajime.

Lastly, as reflected in the fact that one of these two essays was published in a Christian women's magazine, *Jogaku zasshi*, Ônishi argues that aesthetics are only alive for those who are educated in them. As the aesthetic sense of the nation will be a function of the aesthetic education of women, aesthetics must be made a priority in women's education generally.[49] A remarkably high percentage of all middle Meiji period aesthetic discourse was published in women's magazines. Ônishi thus furthers a general tendency of the period that situates Japanese women as vessels or repositories of cultivated tradition in the guise of aesthetics. For Ônishi as well, a notion of Japanese culture that successfully responds to the demands of international capital will centrally involve the dictation of the terms of women's education and the articulation of an appropriately middle-class and nationalized domestic sphere, which he sees as integral to the project of Japanese national culture as a whole.

In conclusion, critics have typically classified Inoue Tetsujirô on the side of a "bad" particularist nationalism opposed to a "healthy" nationalism compatible with universal cosmopolitanism. Ishida Takeshi, for example, focuses on Inoue's organismic conception of society as the root of the problem that made his particularism oppressive. In the course of my research I have yet to encounter a middle Meiji political discourse that does not assume an organismic, vitalist ontology, so I do not find that this particularly distinguishes Inoue from his contemporaries. Because of widespread criticism of his position as utilitarian at the time, he has generally been lumped together with Katô as an evolutionist. While Inoue's appropriation of aesthetic discourse has been little explored, this chapter establishes that it is fundamental to his work, though he is often at odds with himself on this issue.

The boldness of Inoue's eclecticism in the *Chokugo engi* led Miyake Setsurei to derisively label it as a "*zuihitsu*," the generic, classical literary term for essayistic ramblings in one's personal journal. Certainly, Inoue does produce a compromise formation in his simultaneous appeal to evolutionary utility and the moral realm's transcendence of the commodity relation. He translates what Tokutomi Sohô found to be the feminizing discourse of Japan as a nation of artists into a means of legitimizing Japanese patriarchal authority and an authoritarian alternative modernity implicitly identified with the state, Japanese capitalism, and thus functioning as a mode of capitalist governmentality.

While Inoue's basic discourse emerges from his own very particular appropriation of Spencer and Haeckel's evolutionary biology, he realigns the emerging anti-state aesthetico-moral discourse with the state. Ônishi's position is quite distinct in that where Shiga, Miyake, and Kuga take aesthetics as a point of departure for valorizing oriental and Japanese particularity, Ônishi calls upon aesthetic judgment to weigh the relative worth of Japanese tradition in the context of world art history. Ônishi thus actively seeks to integrate Japanese particularity within a universal scheme distinct from that of Miyake and Kuga. Nevertheless, all three must ultimately invoke universality at some point so as to make their valorization of Japanese particularity intelligible. While I acknowledge the import of their criticism of scientific reason in a semicolonial context, I conclude that their positions nevertheless function as competing Meiji-Japanese varieties of capitalist governmentality.

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Chapter 5

Capitalist Governmentality and Melodramatic Resistance in Ozaki Kôyô's *Konjiki yasha*

This chapter examines the work of the Meiji period author Ozaki Kôyô, with a particular focus on his last novel, *Konjiki yasha* (*The Gold Demon*, serialized from 1897–1903). By contextualizing Kôyô's writings within his social, professional, and political affiliations and activities, in tandem with a careful reading of his landmark serialized novel, *The Gold Demon*, I demonstrate how Kôyô's literary career is characterized by a struggle with unstable and rapidly transforming social and literary codes that in part responded to the Japanese state's implementation of a mode of governmentality that enforced the logic of the market. This approach to literature addresses specifically textual issues while at the same time mapping the close reading of texts out onto the larger social formation.

Among the modes of governmentality that help determine and are produced by literary discourse of the time, I focus on family structure, gender relations, and semicolonial national identity, which figure so importantly in the breakdown and reformulation of social codes during the Meiji era. Attending to aspects of Kôyô's novel that respond to capitalist governmentality sheds light on numerous issues of critical interest in our understanding of Meiji-era culture and society, especially from the perspectives of feminism, gender theory, postcolonial theory, and the critique of liberal capitalism.

I will first begin with the contextual, analyzing the contemporary critical discussion of *The Gold Demon* by Japanese intellectuals of the time. Contemporary critics explicitly connected the work to the global

transformation of capitalism and biopolitical evolutionary discourse that defined capital accumulation as the life of society. The terms of that debate therefore, conclusively situate the work as a response to the problematic of state-enforced capitalist governmentality explored in previous chapters. This is followed by a textual analysis and a close reading and interpretation of *The Gold Demon*.

My reading suggests that the novel articulates a vitalist ontology that conceives love and national community as on the side of life and the commodifying forces of the market personified in the figure of a userer as on the side of death. Kan'ichi, a male character of samurai-class lineage on a career path to become a salaried public official, is engaged to marry Miya, the daughter of his adopted father. She chooses instead to marry a *nouveau-riche* rival of the merchant class. In his bitterness, Kan'ichi throws away his professional prospects and becomes a moneylender so insatiable he describes himself as no longer human. Miya lives to regret her decision and nearly dies of a broken heart after her attempt at reconciliation is rejected by Kan'ichi. Kan'ichi eventually redeems himself in a qualified way by using his money for the benefit of new friends, who are presented as a new metaphorical family, only this time brought together by voluntary association. Kan'ichi is presented as the father figure of the new "family."

While Kan'ichi's internalization of the automatism of the imperative of capital accumulation figures him as a spectral figure, neither alive nor dead, his character is ultimately reconciled with the forces of life in turning his accumulated wealth to the service of a family and community larger than himself. The natural landscape is also transformed into a figure of the maternal as an alchemical transaction between the forces of life and death is realized. In this way, the *techne* of capital accumulation the novel initially associates with death is ultimately sublated by the life force of family and community.

I find that the novel develops this vitalist ontology in discourses of melodramatic abjection and the gothic. Melodramatic resistance functions as a culturally conservative and moralizing resistance to the cultural disruption of liberal market logic. I refer to this as a discourse of *shimpa* resistance (*shimpa* is the colloquial term for *melodrama* in modern Japanese). The chapter notes other instances of abjection in *The Gold Demon* related to the discourse of gothic fiction. By elucidating the moralizing aspects underlying the melodramatic and gothic discourses of *The Gold Demon*, the chapter demonstrates how turn of the century *shimpa* functions as a site of cultural reterritorialization in response to the larger legal and economic deterritorialization of Japanese society

taking place as the Japanese state adopted modes of governmentality that imposed and enforced capitalist market logic, initially in response to the Ansei treaties.

Contemporary Critical Reception of *The Gold Demon*

The Gold Demon was a phenomenon of such proportions that it permanently altered perceptions of serial fiction in Japan.[1] In addition to the great popularity of the novel in serialized and book form and the *shimpa* (conventionally defined as a reformed Kabuki-style in a contemporary setting) dramatic productions of it, seventeen silent film versions of the work were produced in Japan between its publication and 1936, when the talkie began to make inroads into Japanese film production practices.[2] The novel was also translated into Korean and Chinese soon after its publication and proved very successful throughout East Asia for a number of years.

At the time of his death in 1903, Ozaki Kôyô was considered by many to be the greatest novelist of modern Japan.[3] The popular response to his funeral at a national level served to install Kôyô as a founder of the canon of modern Japanese literature.[4] At the same time, it also served to legitimize modern Japanese literature itself as a more socially respectable and financially viable career path. It has been suggested that Kôyô's example was instrumental in Natsume Sôseki's decision to resign as professor of English Literature at Tokyo University and become a full-time, professional writer of newspaper fiction.[5] Kôyô served as fiction editor for the *Yomiuri* newspaper from 1889 to 1902, during which time he served as ally, mentor, editor, and literary agent for the members of the *Kenyûsha*, a diverse group of writers he cofounded in 1885.

The *Kenyûsha* largely dominated the Japanese literary scene in the 1890s, thanks in large part to Kôyô's editorial power. The *Kenyûsha* was widely associated with a revival of the literary style of Saikaku, a writer of popular tales from the 1690s whose works Kôyô had a personal hand in editing for republication. This rediscovered interest in an older writer such as Saikaku, who was not widely read at the time, was understood to be connected with a general cultural turn away from the West, though it also enabled new modes of narrative enunciation that allowed a flexibility of narrative focalization characteristic of recent European fiction. It was also associated with a growing concern to preserve what was increasingly understood as indigenous Japanese national culture.

Ozaki Kôyô and Kôda Rohan were considered leaders of the literary aspect of this turn toward Japanese tradition and thus had a personal hand in stopping and even reversing certain aspects of the contemporary

language reform movement known as *genbunitchi*. *Genbunitchi* is said to have attempted the unification of the spoken language, *gen*, with the written language, *bun*. Through the 1890s, *genbunitchi* retained an air of foreignness due to its origin as a regime of translation for European texts. While Kôyô was a vocal and influential opponent of the *genbunitchi* movement throughout the late 1880s and early 1890s, his novella, *Tajô Takon* (*Much Passion, Much Grief*), was considered by some contemporaries to have been the first truly polished and successful literary work in *genbunitchi*.[6] Published in 1896 just after the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War, it was once suggested that *Tajô takon* almost single-handedly established *de aru* as a standard literary form of the copula for some time.[7] It is notable that *The Gold Demon* was not written in the *genbunitchi* style.

Kôyô was a prolific translator and adaptor of foreign literature (from the English, but including translated French and Russian works), as well as a powerful literary editor. His greatest public triumph, however, came between 1897 and 1903 with the serialized publication of *The Gold Demon*, a melodramatic novel we now know to have been in large part an adaptation. *The Gold Demon* was explicitly concerned to depict a conflict between love and the desire for material gain and thus takes part in contemporary debates over the proper form of male-female relations and family structure in Japan. I will attend to the issue of translation as it relates to *The Gold Demon* shortly.

The work became a national sensation during the period of its publication. Numerous *shimpa* productions of the work were staged while the novel was still in progress. These productions were perhaps even more popular than the written version of the first part of the work. They in turn fed back into popular interest in the development of the story as it appeared daily in the pages of the *Yomiuri* newspaper in one-column installments.[8]

Takayama Chogyû's "In Criticism of Un-Japanese Novels," was published in his own journal, *Taiyô*, in April 1898. *Taiyô* is widely held to have displaced Tokutomi Sohô's *Kokumin no tomo* as the journalistic center stage of the Japanese literary and intellectual world after 1895 when it began publication. Takayama himself came to national prominence as a translator of Goethe's *The Sorrows of Young Werther* and as the writer of the well-received novella, *Takiguchi nyûdo*. By 1898, however, he was perhaps more widely known as an editor and intellectual than as a novelist. His work evidences a deep interest in aesthetics generally. He was instrumental in introducing the thought of Emerson and Nietzsche to Japan. By the time Takayama's essay on *The Gold Demon* was in circulation, 143 of the 242 installments of *The Gold Demon* that Kôyô eventually completed had been serialized in the *Yomiuru shinbun* [*Yomiuri Newspaper*].[9]

Takayama's essay addresses the relation between popular opinion and the *bundan*, the circle of Japanese novelists and critics in Tokyo, in general terms, but it specifically comments on Kôyô's entire career at various key points up to and including *The Gold Demon*. Takayama framed his doubts concerning the work strictly in terms of their perceived purport for the nation:

> Literature exists for the sake of people. People do not exist for the sake of literature . . . Literature exists for the sake of making me happy. And what makes me happy? Only literature that satisfies the demands of my character and sentiment. Thus, in other words, literature that does not satisfy the character of the [national] people . . . what purpose can it serve for the nation? I am attempting to ask, in what respect does the *shajitsushugi* novel of the past ten years interpret or satisfy the national character or sentiment?[10]

Takayama defines national literature as literature that satisfies the character of the nation. Takayama's discussion of literature and aesthetics is a call for an edifying literary criticism driven by the consequences he perceives literature to have for the moral life of Meiji Japan. Takayama defines Meiji Japan as optimistic, militaristic, chivalrous, and courageous. He asserts that the moral level of Japan is so high as to be beyond compare with any other nation in the world. In this essay, he claims that Japanese morality is most essentially characterized by the weight it gives to inheritance of the household as a unit and concern for the destiny of the nation. For Takayama, in other words, the family and the nation are linked through the conception of a domestic sphere figured in relation to the Imperial family.

Takayama asserts that contemporary literature in 1899 is at a low point compared to 1887. He implicitly categorizes *The Gold Demon* as falling into the category of *shajitsushugi* literature. He charges such literature with contempt for the national character by virtue of its claim to aesthetic autonomy. He claims that its portrayal of Japanese society inverts the admirably moral national reality he observes around him. Takayama finds that the Japan depicted in the *shajitsushugi* novel is sorrowful, pessimistic, effeminate, prone to weeping, unethical, immoral, and concerns itself with love suicides, popular rights, and equality. In its indifference to the authority and legitimacy of patriarchal and imperial authority, Takayama insists that it demonstrates contempt for Japanese national character that he considers to be properly founded on loyalty and filial piety to one's own father, ancestors, and the emperor. In short, he finds that such literature does not adequately represent the ideals that he insists constitute

the reality of contemporary Japan. Takayama, like Inoue Tetsujiro, thus challenges the categorial separation of morality and aesthetics that characterizes modern thought after Kant.

Takayama lays the blame for this state of affairs squarely at the door of Tsubouchi Shôyô and the untoward influence of the theory of *shajitsushugi* he elaborated in his 1885 essay, "The Essence of the Novel." Takayama concedes that the essay may have served a useful purpose in its time and he purports to share its objective of displacing earlier forms of literature centered on Confucian conceptions of virtue and vice. He also allows that it was critical to the immense strides Japanese literature made in the years since its publication. He insists nevertheless that it has been interpreted as an argument for the absolute autonomy of literature beyond any connection to the real world. In essence, then, he charges the latter day followers of Shôyô's literary theory of ignoring the real world on principle.

He specifies Shôyô's latter-day followers as including Ozaki Kôyô, Kôda Rohan, and Yamada Bimyo, all of whom he says began their careers at the high tide of *shajitsushugi*. His discussion largely refers to their publications between 1891 and 1895. *The Gold Demon* is mentioned indirectly. He observes that the "current novel" by Kôyô induces young girls to crying and to shortness of breath, and he judges it monotonously effeminate and narrowly conceived.[11] These are all characteristics he had earlier attributed to the *shajitsushugi* novel. He thus argues that it is this type of novel's indifference to the national ideals of filial piety and loyalty to family and emperor that has led to the decline of contemporary literature, and that *The Gold Demon* is a *shajitsushugi* novel in this sense. In other words, Takayama is concerned to police the boundaries of the foreign and the domestic by excoriating and attempting to marginalize *shajitsushugi* literature as un-Japanese on moral and quasi-religious grounds. Takayama advances a variety of degeneracy discourse that identifies a morality of patriarchal nationalism with life, and any public divergence from that orthodoxy as weakening or undermining national life.

As proof of his claim that *shajitsushugi* literature has divorced itself from the national character, he cites reports that at its height, such literature never sold more than around three thousand copies of a work in a country of forty-five million people.[12] While writers and literary critics insisted that sales are low because the literary taste of the nation is not developed, Takayama retorts that they simply refuse to patronize such distorted and unrecognizable depictions of themselves. He cites the surging popularity of Tokugawa-period fiction such as Bakin's *Satomi Hakkenden* and the Kabuki play *Chushingura*—in spite of critical indifference to

such work within the *bundan*—as testimony that these older works more accurately reflect the national character and are probably more popular as literature because they are better written.

In his construction of contemporary Japan in terms that could have been taken from Inoue's *Chokugo engi*, Takayama also raises the issue of the mutual implication of morality and aesthetics that arose in Chapter 4. As with Inoue, Takayama elaborates a doctrine of Japanese particularism on aesthetic grounds. Even as he performatively constructs and legislates the taste of the Japanese people, Takayama refers to it as a reality that must orient all other behavior. In other words, while the language of Takayama's critique is moralistic, he grounds it in aesthetic theory in a manner very similar to Inoue's aestheticization of morals in the *Chokugo engi*. Takayama elaborates upon the intellectual's duty to consider national morality in other essays, on the Japanese intellectual's duty to edify in a manner that conforms to his predetermined notion of its proper form. It is difficult to avoid concluding that "In Criticism of Un-Japanese Literature" is not only a moralistic theory of literary nationalism, but also an attempt to enforce a militantly patriarchal mode of Japanese governmentality in the literary sphere. Takayama's aesthetics militantly advocates a particularism of the Japanese domestic sphere in a culture war mode. It calls upon writers to do their part to reproduce and police Japanese morality along the lines he advocates. For Takayama, life is on the side of imperial and patriarchal morality and any competing views strengthen the forces of national and familial degeneracy and death.

The second important contemporary discussion of *The Gold Demon* the chapter will take up involved Mori Ôgai and Kôyô himself. At a roundtable discussion conducted in 1902, Ozaki Kôyô suggested that the primary female character, Miya, was intended as a depiction of the Meiji-period Japanese woman, but also as a woman who had the potential to be more than that.[13] Mori Ôgai developed his reading of the work in response to an invitation to the roundtable from the journal *Geibun*. The event ultimately involved sixteen different discussants and was published in August 1902 after the first three sections of the novel had been completed.[14]

From Mori Ôgai's perspective, *The Gold Demon* is a novel about a moneylender. Acknowledging that Kôyô is a personal friend, he suggests that the moneylender may be the most appropriate representative of a certain aspect of the contemporary world (*genseken*). An important point in Ôgai's framing of the work is that he defines "contemporary world" in a manner that is not confined to Meiji Japan; rather, with this phrase he refers to the entire world at the end of the late nineteenth century. He

contrasts the main character, Kan'ichi, with Shakespeare's famous moneylender, Shylock. He suggests that Kan'ichi's character develops in the course of the narrative, whereas this is not the case for Shylock.

Ôgai suggests that Miya's interest in wealth and personal advancement situates Miya herself as a "quasi-moneylender." He assumes that Kan'ichi is close to the personal sentiment of the author, Kôyô, but surmises that a majority of readers will more likely sympathize with the plight of Miya.[15] For Ôgai, the narrative presentation of Miya's desire consistently collapses romantic and monetary desire in such a way that her thought is also the thought of a moneylender. He suggests that this thought is significantly representative of global contemporary thought.

Ôgai specifically cites William Rolph's *Biologische Probleme, zugleich als versuch zur Entwicklung einer Rationellen ethik* [*Biological Problems, as also an Investigation into the Development of a Rational Ethics*], which explored a biopolitics of morality.[16] Rolph argues that human life forms are ideals of sorts, but that these ideals emerge from biological competition. They are not predetermined in heaven. Yet, on Rolph's interpretation, the dominance of the superior individual over the inferior individual characteristic of Darwin's struggle for survival simply results in maintenance of the status quo. Rolph insists that, on the contrary, the development of ideals results from a constant struggle for the expansion of life (*kampf um lebensmehrung*). Humans are not satisfied with simply existing; rather, they constantly aim to increase life. For Rolph, insatiability (*unersättlichkeit*) is thus the real character of human beings.

Ôgai associates this notion of the expansion of life with Nietzsche's will to power. He argues that when you follow through the logic of Rolph's position, if the real character of human beings emerges out of what circumstances permit and morality is founded on this real character, then the moneylender must be the realization of this morality. If what is desirable requires developing the contemporary form of life and this form of life determines that capital is what is desirable, surely the moneylender is that ideal. He suggests that Miya's series of frustrated and ultimately abandoned choices—her dissatisfaction with her lover Kan'ichi, her attempt to gain the wealth of Tomiyama, her lack of satisfaction with wealth, and her subsequent attempt to reclaim Kan'ichi—all dramatize the philosophy of insatiability. If this is true, Ôgai concludes, Rolph's philosophy is the philosophy of *The Gold Demon* and thus *The Gold Demon* is a novel of insatiability.

Ôgai further suggests that while Miya embodies this new philosophy of insatiability, her character is interesting in that she is nevertheless haunted by a sense of social propriety that may be associated with Kant's categorical imperative or Nietzsche's slave morality. Both Kan'ichi and Miya are

unfortunates within a society founded on the increase of life and capital. Ôgai speculates that readers of the novel likely share this philosophy that demands the increase of life. He observes that this is a philosophy very much of its historical moment. Ôgai suggests that even in Europe there are almost no writers who have yet been able to realize this philosophy of insatiability in a fictional character and that Kôyô's achievement in the novel is thus quite impressive.[17]

Ôgai thus joins in the contemporary chorus that regarded Kôyô as an important Japanese writer. He goes on to suggest that Kôyô is not simply the most important writer of Japanese fiction, but that he may be an important writer in the context of world literature generally. This point arises out of a key aspect of Ôgai's response, his framing of the work in terms of "the late nineteenth century form of life" rather than reading it from within the bounds of Meiji Japan alone. Just as the economic capital Ôgai places at the center of his analysis crosses international boundaries, Ôgai reads contemporary society as not bounded geographically by national borders. He sees it rather as bounded temporally by the emergence of evolutionary forms of life and thought on a global scale. These evolutionary forms of life and thought are in turn tied to the development of contemporary global capitalism.

The reader will recall that analysis of Mori Arinori and Herbert Spencer in Chapter 2 established a convergence between their rhetoric concerning the survival of the social body and the reproduction of capital. Thus, life and capital are equated in the evolutionary thought of Mori, Spencer, Rolph, Ôgai, and—if we follow the logic of Mori Ôgai's analysis of *The Gold Demon*—Ozaki Kôyô. All articulate a biopolitics that equates capital accumulation with social survival; therefore, as far as the equation of social life and capital is concerned, Mori Arinori, Herbert Spencer, Mori Ôgai, William Rolph, and Ozaki Kôyô appear to be in agreement.

Ôgai asserts that the necessity for the expansion of life (conflated with capital) expresses a philosophy of insatiability—Miya being the primary case in point. He thus argues that the value placed on capital itself impinges on morality. From Rolph's claim that social ideals emerge out of competing forms of social practice, Ôgai infers that social practices that value capital will give rise to a morality that itself values capital. In Ôgai's mind the moneylender emerges as a telling symbol of the period—as a larger practice particulary associated with Miya.

Ôgai concludes by observing that it is Miya's regret (Nietzsche's slave morality) that makes her character sympathetic to the reader.[18] He implies that Miya's twinges of conscience (which Kôyô imagined elevate her

above the average Meiji woman), may also be described as a lingering investment in a morality of the common good at the expense of her own potential as an exceptional and superior individual.[19] Be that as it may, the accumulation of capital would elevate one's status for Mori Arinori, Herbert Spencer, and so-called "social Darwinists." The important point is that for Mori, Spencer, Rolph, and Ôgai, the accumulation of capital indicates a superior individual.

Ogai thus interprets *The Gold Demon* as staging capital accumulation in terms of the "demonic" and the insatiable. Ôgai sees Miya as a type of this superior individual characterized by insatiability for individual purposes at the expense of the common good, but who, upon later reflection, regrets her flouting of "slave" morality and desires to be reintegrated into the social body as defined by "slave" morality, i.e., the interest of the masses as opposed to the newly powerful elite. This reading is relatively persuasive, given Tomiyama's portrayal as *narikin* (*nouveau riche)* and Kan'ichi's clear resentment of Tomiyama's social position. The narrative thus foregrounds economic class antagonism as challenging caste status.

Ôgai portrays Miya's character as hesitating between two subject positions. The first is a position of insatiability that threatens to displace a body of professionals predominantly of former samurai-class lineage with a group of men from various backgrounds who increasingly identified with capital and the market. The second position attempts to recuperate capital through a distancing operation organized around the discourse of love. Through reconciliation with a notion of the domestic sphere, the second subject position reintegrates Miya into a morality of the Meiji national body as implicitly defined by capitalist *bushi*, or warrior class, standards. Ôgai's positive response to the work on the ground that it captures the *zeitgeist* in literary form is somewhat surprising given his avowed sympathy for German idealism in opposition to what he saw as the amorality of French naturalism.

It is striking that Ôgai's claim for *The Gold Demon* as the first Japanese literary work to deal with a theme of truly global import is logically analogous to a point made in recent research by Mark Metzler. Metzler points out that adoption of the gold standard in 1899 incorporated Japan into a truly global network of financial translation for the first time in world history.[20] In other words, there is an intriguing parallel between Ogai's assertion of Japanese cultural sovereignty in the global literary system on behalf of Kôyô's *The Gold Demon* and Japan's analogous late nineteenth-century assertion of relative sovereignty in the systems of global finance and international law.

The Gold Demon as *Shimpa* Resistance

Four melodramatic newspaper novels were serialized between 1897 and 1905, a period during which the Ansei treaties began to be lifted and Japan took its first steps toward establishing an empire of its own in Taiwan, Manchuria, and Korea. The novels explored the nexus of love, the market, gender, family, and empire that dominated Japanese public attention. These four novels were Ozaki Kôyô's *Konjiki yasha* (*The Gold Demon*, 1897–1903); Tokutomi Roka's *Hototogisu* (*Cuckoo*, 1898–1899); Kikuchi Yûhô's *Ono ga tsumi* (*My Sin*, 1899–1900); and Okura Tôrô's *Biwa uta* (*Biwa song*, 1905). Not only wildly popular at the time of their publication, all four works shared a public reception across performance and media platforms so enthusiastic that their "box office" currency spanned decades. This group was set apart from contemporary novels, each having been produced on the *shimpa* stage at least fifteen times between 1897 and 1945, and each having been adapted for film on at least fifteen occasions between 1908 and 1945 (the vast majority of them by 1923).[21] This section of the chapter focuses on an examination of *The Gold Demon* in its serialized novel form as one example taken from the larger field of the discourse of melodramatic resistance.[22]

The *shimpa* theater, a school of drama that initially reformed Kabuki to suit contemporary story lines but retained male actors playing the female parts (*onnagata*), quickly became identified with the sort of melodramatic fare these four works represent.[23] Japanese film productions of these and similar narratives began in 1908 and were initially simply film recordings of performances by particular *shimpa* troupes. From 1921, once Shochiku and other studios moved toward more naturalist acting styles (*shingeki*) and Hollywood production techniques, such narratives came to be referred to as "*shimpa*" or "*shimpa higeki*" (shimpa tragedies) regardless of whether or not the films were made using *shimpa* troupes and performance styles. In other words, over time *shimpa* and *shimpa higeki* came to be the prevailing Japanese terms for sentimental melodrama.[24] The remarkably sustained popularity of *shimpa higeki* suggests that a serious analysis of the genre should tell us much about the desires of the audiences that appreciated them, the competing discourses of gender, family, state, and market in play at the time, and how the shifting international position of Japan at the turn of the century both inflected and was inflected by discourses of Japanese domesticity.[25]

This chapter frames discussion of *shimpa higeki* with Elaine Hadley's concept of the melodramatic mode discussed in Chapter 1. This allows an operation of translation by way of which we may discern a *shimpa higeki* mode in the Japanese context. With reference to nineteenth-century

British law, politics, drama, and literature, Hadley develops a strikingly fresh take on melodrama as a mode or category that transcends literary genre, as a mode that appears across a wide range of discursive contexts, including law, political activism, and official royal ceremony, as well as on the dramatic stage and the novelistic page. In part a development of E. P. Thompson's concept of a peasant moral economy extended to an urban setting, Hadley argues that melodrama is a category of discourse that insists on the continued vitality of traditional public social formations, especially patriarchal status hierarchies that constitute identity in terms of familial and communal relationships.

In the melodramatic mode, all forms of social organization or subject position are construed in terms of the patriarchal family. Most insistently, the melodramatic mode is a culturally reactionary (though not necessarily politically reactionary) form of communal resistance to the privatizing effects of the market. This mode often takes the form of resistance to the classificatory procedures by way of which the state, the market, or the corporation, that is modes of capitalist governmentality, insist on resituating subjects in ways that disrupt an idealized, traditional community. For example, the melodramatic mode takes the coercive situation and isolation of subjects by economic discipline as interrupting an ostensible, and to some degree increasingly mythologized, community of patriarchal affiliation that presumes caste harmony and deference to traditional authority. The melodramatic mode assumes a society that does not admit of class conflict because it consists of respectful and obedient subjects ruled by a benevolent patriarch.[26] In sum, I argue that moralizing *shimpa higeki* resistance is a signature variety of reterritorialization in response to the demands of capitalist governmentality in turn-of-the-century, Ansei–treaty-era Japan.

What might a reading of *The Gold Demon* in terms of the melodramatic mode suggest? The opening scene of the novel follows Tomiyama Tadatsugu[27] to a New Year's party where his enormous diamond ring and the beauty of another attendee, Shigisawa Miya,[28] become the talk of all present. Though Miya is already engaged to Hazama Kan'ichi—the orphan of her father's close friend, who has been adopted into her family as future heir—she eventually jilts him in order to marry Tomiyama, a *nouveau-riche* merchant-class banker's son. In the most iconic tableau of the novel, it is on the beach at Atami that Hazama Kan'ichi confirms that Miya intends to marry Tomiyama. Kan'ichi declares that a year from then, on the next January seventeenth, his tears will cloud the moon and Miya will look up and realize the gravity of what she has done. Miya begs him not to spurn her and insists she still has something to tell him that

she cannot yet divulge. He responds by kicking her, but she continues clinging to his leg in an effort to prevent him from leaving.

Kan'ichi bursts into tears and calls her a whore (*kampu*).[29] He vows to become a usurer—from a Buddhist perspective, a subhuman beast trapped by worldly desire—and live the rest of his life emulating the desire he purports to see in Miya, a grasping for money rather than love, but with a difference. At some level he seemingly still prefers love to money and thus his life as a usurer is depicted as a monstrous form of masochistic or ascetic abjection he chooses to impose upon himself and the rest of the world indefinitely. Indeed, it seems that Kan'ichi's subject position may be read as an abjected variation on Weber's famous thesis on capitalism, as something like *The Anti-Buddhist Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. This quality of abjection means that Kan'ichi's identity is constitutively penetrated by otherness.

Kan'ichi's desire for the infinite accumulation of wealth is figured as an antisocial, self-aggrandizing form of corruption from the perspective of Buddhism, as perhaps a death wish or a form of self-loathing rather than as a secularized form of religious salvation as Weber would have it. The structure of *The Gold Demon* figures Kan'ichi as a martyr who suffers the selfish desire of another he has chosen to encrypt within himself. He insistently and abjectly chooses to live according to a desire he still somehow experiences as alien, that he never quite incorporates as his own. He self-consciously refers to himself as neither alive nor dead, as no longer human, as a man become beastly or monstrous. In this regard, Kan'ichi's character takes on the quality of a specter from the perspective of a vitalist ontology. In its transcendence of materiality and commodification, the spirit of romantic love, family, and nation is identified with spiritual life. Possession by an infinite desire to accumulate wealth is figured as a material automaticity that devours Kan'ichi's latent spiritual potential, situating him as a living being possessed by the deadening *techne* of the market, neither quite in the realm of the living or the dead, but as a specter that blurs those boundaries.

Even in this short synopsis of the first section of *The Gold Demon* we meet the offspring of one broken family, the orphan Kan'ichi, who has tentatively formed a new family with Miya. Before it may be realized, however, this family is undone by the desire expressed through Miya and promoted by the market more generally—that wealth is the ultimate value, even beyond personal virtue or character. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that Kan'ichi has quite respectable professional prospects and will inherit a Shigisawa estate more than adequate to sustain a very comfortable lifestyle.

Miya has nevertheless thrown those prospects aside for the very highest echelon of lifestyles organized around conspicuous consumption and commodified identity construction. Kan'ichi is strongly supported by his community of fellow students who consider themselves his brothers and regard his relationship to a beauty such as Miya as an accomplishment that reflects positively on all of them. They clearly have little regard for Tomiyama and, from the perspective of the melodramatic mode, serve as the community by which much of the action early in the novel is to be judged. Miya inclines toward keeping her decision to marry Tomiyama a secret as she is too conflicted to reveal such a thing to Kan'ichi in person. She only indirectly reveals the situation in their exchange at Atami. It is at that point that Kan'ichi performs the melodramatic ritual of histrionically and self-righteously exposing and passing judgment on what he sees as Miya's selfish, market-driven, family and community-destroying treachery for all of the community of *The Gold Demon* readers and spectators to see and similarly pass judgment on—to repair the rupture to community by casting her out for disrupting it.

In effect, the privileges of the community of elite higher middle school students with bright professional prospects and largely *shizoku* backgrounds is under active challenge by the meteorically rising social status of *nouveau riche* business types whose way of life appears to be defined by personal accumulation rather than public service, as was also held to be the case with samurai positions before Meiji (1868) or the public bureaucratic and professional career tracks that had largely taken their place by the 1890s. The implicit association of the entire private sector, of non-professional, non-public servant social roles, with usury characterized as "beastly" or "subhuman" means that here the melodramatic mode vehemently but indirectly contests the very process of classification itself, in this case the ascription of personal identity and worth in terms of economic wealth rather than communally grounded standards of social status or personal virtue.

The tale includes rivalry between two men for the regard of a single woman, which Eve Sedgewick terms "homosociality."[30] Sedgewick finds homosociality structurally definitive of much gothic fiction, but in this case much of what agency there is in the scenario largely falls to the main female character and her struggle with how to define herself in relation to her romantic and class options. The description of Kan'ichi's mirroring of Miya's desire as "inhuman" also clearly characterizes the substitution of the classificatory economic logic of capitalist governmentality for community-based moral judgment in a very negative light. The ethic of the "human" as opposed to the "beastly" elaborated in *The Gold Demon*

demonstrates the species line between the human and the animal is also at the center of boundary construction between human groups within this narrative. This ethic credits community and public service from the perspective of elite track higher middle school students (which is not to suggest that the characters live up to the ethic) and frequently castigates (with one important exception, to be discussed later) the accumulation of wealth as a zero-sum game that intrinsically produces economic victims out of those who ought to be treated with paternal benevolence or deferential respect as fellow members of a patriarchal community.

More detailed reading of *The Gold Demon* requires a discussion of translation in two respects. First, though long believed to be an original work, recent scholarship has established that *The Gold Demon* falls somewhere between an adaptation and a translation of a late nineteenth-century English-language novel by Charlotte Brame, titled *Weaker Than a Woman*.[31] Second, as discussed in Chapter 1, through the 1870s and 1880s Japanese society itself had undergone revolutionary transformations that involved incorporation of important elements of English and other European societies for the sake of narrowing the dynamic of cultural difference by way of which the treaty powers continued to legitimize enforcement of the unequal treaties. My research establishes that many of these cultural translations provoked resistance in the melodramatic mode. From the mid-1880s on, coercively imposed market-driven transformations began to generate a significant backlash, a culture war against those things associated with the West. This backlash frequently opposed images of ostensibly authentic Japanese masculinity to those of Japanese men scapegoated as Westernized and therefore scorned as emasculated and effeminate.[32]

As Mark Metzler's recent research on Japan's relation to the gold standard (previously discussed in Chapter 1) demonstrates, the international finance system of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was a hierarchical system of translation in relation to gold that situated Japan as imperialist, but with second-tier status as compared to imperial states with capital surpluses. As an imperial power with a short credit line, Japan was an imperial power, but an imperial power with a deficit—a second-class, dependent imperialist that had to get along with foreign money-lenders as a matter of national survival.[33]

How might the perspectives of the melodramatic mode of resistance and the gold standard as a hierarchizing institution of translation and civilization guide a reading of *The Gold Demon*? The opening scene of the New Year's *karuta* party makes it clear that wealth and the market have divided what the reader might expect would be a relatively cohesive group of college students enjoying themselves at a New Year's party. Tomiyama is

introduced as a veritable inventory of laughably tasteless personal accessories seemingly chosen for their exaggerated and garish ostentation. He has a roman letter "T" monogrammed onto his kimono where most would have a family crest or character, a diamond so large no one had ever seen anything like it set in a gold ring, and along with the ring, his glasses, the decorative threads in his kimono—even the ornamental beads hanging from his kimono—were all made of gold.

The tone of the scene is as mocking as it is melodramatic. Kôyô writes, "Were a woman to receive the glory of being by his side, there would not only be incomparable visual pleasure for the eyes [being able to see his enormous diamond ring—ed.], but, for the nose as well, there would be the unusual scent of violet perfume that one cannot smell so often."[34] It acknowledges and mocks emerging notions of class conflict of the time. As Tomiyama and Miya sit down to play *karuta* together:

> Moreover, when Tomiyama and Miya sat beside one another, everyone was thrown into an uproar as if evening and afternoon had arrived at the same time. In an instant, a group calling themselves the socialist party emerged beside them. Their doctrine was complaint and their goal was destruction. In other words, they attempted to disturb the fortune and peace of the group by way of brute force alone . . . Four brawny boys to the left and right formed the Expedition Army, those on the left side were called the Commit Outrages squadron, while those on the right side were called the Trample Corps, but in fact their purpose was none other than to knock the diamond off its perch. In the event, as would be expected, the group in question [Miya and Tomiyama] was utterly defeated . . . The men chanted, "Banzai!" . . . Tomiyama was mercilessly destroyed, outrages were committed upon him, and he was trampled. Quite frightened by this uncivilized game, Tomiyama secretly escaped back to the host's sitting room. His hair was arranged as if he were wearing a wig, and it was mussed as if it were a broom of palm leaves . . . The strings of his *haori* were dangling at his sides, with one of the rings lost, like a gibbon trying to grab the moon. "What happened? Your hand is bleeding . . ."
>
> "They are mocking me" . . . "In any event, it cannot be helped because they are so rough."[35]

The narrator notes that within minutes the young men playing *karuta* had divided into factions organized along opposing lines of self-ascribed economic class antagonism. Rather than deferential community, the scene presents us with market-driven social division—it is Tomiyama's ostentatious display of wealth that is polarizing the group. This scene thus somewhat cynically alludes to the contemporary discourse of the

"social problem" discussed in Chapter 1. While the narrative tone is at least equally dismissive of and disinterested in the "socialists," and even takes a passing shot at a Tokyo Art School student who wishes he could see Miya naked, the scene is perhaps most unforgiving in its biting depiction of Tomiyama as Westernized and effete to the point of caricature.

Recent research has remarked that in the 1880s freedom and popular rights activists known as *sôshi* consistently mocked their opponents as overly Westernized and effeminate.[36] It is striking that here Kôyô makes similar sport of the *nouveau-riche* (*narikin*) banker's son Tomiyama. With his violet cologne, Tomiyama literally reeks of Japanese masculinity made effete by the tragicomic pretension and ignorance of misguided "high-collar" forms of commodified and Westernized identity formation.[37] In this sense, the text's relentless disparagement of Tomiyama articulates one conception of the proper boundary between the foreign and the domestic, a dividing line between an un-Japanese masculinity and a presumptively more native or proper Japanese masculinity.

Tomiyama's affected Western ways are apparently intended to present him as "civilized" in the misguided and failed "high-collar" sense. As the reference to "uncivilized game" uses the very same word for civilization (*bunmei*) promoted by the government in Westernizing reforms (*bunmei kaika)*, there is a double irony in a lack of "civilization" startling the sensibility of an overly and superficially Westernized Japanese man. This is brought to the reader's attention by students whose contempt for his caricature of Westernization appears to be one of the main targets of their abuse.

The popular rights activists referred to above were typically private citizens targeting public officials. In *The Gold Demon*, it is rather a *narikin* private businessman who is mocked as effete and overly Westernized. Such assertions of authentic Japanese masculinity were a melodramatic mode of marginalizing competing male factions with mockery and of reducing power struggles and questions of policy and justice to questions of gender and familial propriety. This mode of emasculating mockery was clearly transferable and potentially utilized by various competing groups toward a range of ideological ends.

The students are portrayed as having bad manners and playing rough, but while the passage condescendingly implies they are politically naïve, unserious, and likely place too much faith in brute force, beyond establishing class antagonism the overriding effect of the scene is surely to emasculate Tomiyama. We are shown that he simply cannot defend himself. His embarrassingly gauche efforts at conspicuous consumption are turned into an opportunity to torment an effeminate fop. The scene depicts Tomiyama as more of a fussy old lady than a real Japanese man. It

would seem that scapegoating a male villain as a pretentious, badly Westernized, effeminate dandy is a key grammatical element of the *shimpa higeki* mode of resistance.

Lastly, as mentioned in Chapter 1, the expression "*Banzai*!" by way of which the student vandals celebrate getting their licks in on Tomiyama, was newly translated from a European language and institutionalized by Mori Arinori for the purpose of staging Imperial ceremony as a ritual of patriarchal deference in the melodramatic mode. In other words, "*Banzai*!" is an expression that performatively produces a variety of the mythological community that the melodramatic mode presumes and that it holds up as a cultural defense against the market logic of state-imposed governmentality.

Perhaps the most vividly and widely recalled tableau in the work is the scene on the beach at Atami where Miya confesses that she intends to marry Tomiyama even while pleading with Kan'ichi not to judge her too harshly and to which he replies with tears and then a kick. What is staged here? As the discussion of Meiji land-tax reform and the reformation of the Meiji social formation around private property in Chapter 1 suggests, the real property that had played such a large part in organizing the deference hierarchies of Edo-period public space had now been commodified and had become contractually alienable. In effect, with this further advance of the market, deference hierarchies themselves now became contractually alienable. While in the case of real property social status could potentially be largely determined by kinship and lineage, with property's commodification, kinship alone is no longer determinative. The increased emphasis on reducing divorce and promoting the wedding ceremony as a more serious ceremony of religious import implies that marriage is beginning to perform new cultural work. It appears that marriage and female virtue begin to replace kinship as a site for the recuperation of social contradiction. In addition to serving as a resource for populist resistance, this model thus also appears liable to co-optation for the purposes of capitalist governmentality.

Why is Miya vilified in the scene at Atami? The logic that Miya presumably follows in choosing Tomiyama over Kan'ichi as her mate is the logic of contract, integral to the state's newly imposed mode of capitalist governmentality. Kan'ichi insists that they are already married and Miya is breaking their marriage contract and thus she is an adultress. Additionally, he describes the suggestion that Miya's family use the money gained from marrying into the Tomiyama family to send him abroad for his education as selling his wife or making him Miya's kept man, as the abjecting commodification of a properly domestic matter.[38]

Miya is therefore being vilified as a female who chooses to act in an economically rational way—for choosing rational maximization of her assets and upward social mobility. Given that Miya is being punished for upward mobility, an achievement young Japanese males of the day longingly aspired to realize themselves, it is difficult not to conclude that the model for the middle-class Japanese family offered in the narrative, a combination of the *ren'ai* promoted by Christians and the harmonious family promoted by the state, incorporates an anticontractual element of female submission (typically conceived in terms of *kaigo* [repentence]).[39] It seems that the couple in love or in harmony with one another effectively becomes a form of deference hierarchy framed within the domestic sphere.

What defines the "love" of female characters in these sorts of narratives? Almost without exception, it is supposed to be demonstrated by unquestioning female faith, devotion, and submission, especially in the face of hardship. In more egalitarian couples the submission may be mutual, but it is relentlessly required of most female characters with obvious exceptions proving the rule. Female submission appears to be a very predominant aspect of love as depicted in the *shimpa* discourse of this period.

With the shift to alienable property, the ideological significance of marriage is apparently transformed. In the first half of the novel, Miya is the new woman of a market socially unregulated by deference hierarchy. For those such as Kan'ichi and his friends who identify with older forms of deference hierarchy, that means she is an actress playing the part of a loving wife, a wife who is essentially a prostitute. The less-than-subtle charge is that she marries for money, not love. Miya's character thus represents the possibility that the wrong conception of family structure and gender relations may potentially fail to sustain the virtue of the patriarchal family unit, may fail to represent the new home in an appropriately melodramatic mode. While this scenario lays out the love-marriage as potentially a form of patriarchal deference hierarchy, it also demonstrates that it may or may not succeed from this perspective. It thus reveals that even the family may potentially be infiltrated by the market and the logic of contract—even though the new discourse of love-marriage seems designed to challenge that logic in the terms of an increasingly individualized moral discourse.

Whether or not we conclude that *The Gold Demon* successfully articulates the variety of *ren'ai* (spiritual love) promoted by contemporary Christians and literary critics such as Kitamura Tôkoku, it is relatively clear that the narrative of *The Gold Demon* promotes honor and the *katei* (the family grounded in love-marriage). It thus initially scapegoats Miya for choosing the logic of contract over the familial honor that female

virtue defined in terms of love-marriage is now supposed to carry with it from this perspective. A recurring subplot of the last two-thirds of the narrative is Miya's *kaigo*, her seemingly endless series of ascetic acts of repentance for having forsaken feminine and familial honor for the logic of the market. The seemingly endless heartache and misery she endures in the face of Kan'ichi's relentlessly masochistic (vis-à-vis himself) and sadistic (vis-à-vis Miya) intransigence serve as the stage upon which Miya performs her newfound dedication to the union of honor and *katei* in the form of female devotion and fidelity to her man—potentially even to the death. Indeed, she is depicted as nearly expiring from lovesickness, the ultimate testimony to her newfound devotion to the female virtue so foundational for familial honor after the commodification of real property.

Through the selfless sacrifice of the woman, it seems that *shimpa higeki* establishes female devotion to the ideal of love-marriage as the foundation of familial cohesiveness, thus maintaining the privilege of the patriarchal family even as it is reconceived in *katei* terms. It seems the alienating influences of contractual and proprietary culture are to be transubstantiated by *shimpa higeki* virtue and remade as compatible with maintaining the moral foundation of family and society. The discourse of *kaigo* as the internalization of female virtue that reunites honor and *katei* thus appears to be another constitutive element of the grammar of the *shimpa higeki* mode of resistance to the market.

Ultimately, however, *shimpa higeki* must be seen as articulating an alternative mode of capitalist governmentality, albeit in tension with some varieties of the official, state-sponsored mode of governmentality that were less invested in the nuclear couple and the discourse of spiritual love between man and woman. It may thus be seen as a popularly disseminated alternative or supplement to officially sanctioned modes of governmentality.[40] That does not, however, mean that it identified the Japanese social formation with the accumulation of capital any less strongly than its official rivals, though it does mean that emotional and spiritual mediation between the self and the market had become more complex.

Kan'ichi's extreme reaction to Miya's decision to break their engagement and forsake marriage altogether resonates with the general promotion of the nuclear couple so central to the melodramatic mode as instituted in Imperial ceremony and the new civil code of 1898. Kitamura Tôkoku had harshly criticized Kôyô's previous work for articulating only Edo-style lust (*koi*) and failing to demonstrate an understanding of love (*ren'ai*) as a spiritual matter in the Christian sense. By making the male-female relationship a matter of life and death for both Kan'ichi and, later in the plot, for Miya, the work embraces the widespread call for taking

marriage more seriously, establishing a translational mimesis with Christian forms of marriage as religious ritual. Kan'ichi's reference to Hamaji in Bakin's *Hakkenden* as a model of female devotion that Miya does not live up to maps the male-female relationships so highly moralized in Bakin's work through an eclectic mix of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Shinto onto a contemporary, post–land-tax reform melodramatic premise. This allusion directly responds to Tôkoku's charge of frivolity in Kôyô's earlier work due to his neglect of *ren'ai*. It also responds to the contemporary nationalist demand to treat marriage as a more solemn affair and thus raise Japan's status in the eyes of the civilizing discourse of the treaty powers. The lovesickness that nearly takes Miya's life near the end of the work articulates a fairly direct discourse of *ren'ai*, often in language associated with psychoanalysis such as "hysteria."

Kan'ichi's declaration at Atami that he will no longer live as a human being is one of the more histrionic moments in the work, but it also outlines a moral economy between the "human" and the "beastly" that consistently structures the work.[41] The figure of the *yasha* (demon) is drawn from the Buddhist tradition. Where Buddhism is grounded in the attempt to surrender one's attachment to this world and the desire that binds one to it, the *yasha* is a figure of unquenchable, seemingly infinite desire. The *yasha* is thus the antithesis of Buddhist enlightenment, a worst-case scenario of submission to materialistic, this-worldly ends. *Konjiki yasha* personifies the schema of private property and infinite personal accumulation inscribed at the heart of Meiji governmentality, first in Miya and then in Kan'ichi, as potentially menacing or tragically fallen figures when viewed from the perspective of Buddhism. The discussion of Kan'ichi's abject state, of being half-alive and half-dead, foregrounds his separation from society and social sentiment and his estrangement from the community promoted by melodrama. The narrator also points to Kan'ichi's state of suffering as a failure from a Buddhist perspective to surrender the deep resentment (*urami*) he felt at having been jilted for gold. Just as he feels resentment at the way Miya treated him, his activities as a moneylender analogously inspire *urami* in all of those whom he himself exploits. Near the end of the work, in Miya's last letter, she evidences a form of salvation in her surrender of *urami*. She says, "my body isn't long for this world, but I no longer harbor any resentment."[42] It seems that the economy of *urami*, of resentment and its release, is also a constitutive element in the grammar of the *shimpa higeki* mode.

While the narrator frames Kan'ichi's undead state in terms of *urami* and a Buddhist spiritual failure to successfully release desire, I am fascinated by the resonance between Kan'ichi's description of himself as an

undead beast, and Kôtoku Shûsui's rhetoric in *The Twentieth-Century Monster: Imperialism (1901)*. Both Kan'ichi as "beast" and Kôtoku's capitalist "monster" are figures of abjection. It is hard to think of a better image than the specter or the monster to describe the ruthlessness of the economic processes Kan'ichi's character personifies than the social-Darwinist rapaciousness Kôtoku uses to describe the imperialist attitude Japan adopted after the Sino-Japanese War (both at home and abroad).[43] Kôtoku was specifically concerned with Japan's extortion of a massive gold indemnity from China under the guise of liberating Asia. To Kôtoku's mind, Japan had effectively signed on with the forces of social-Darwinist evil when it chose to cooperate with the Euro-American treaty powers in policing and enforcing unequal treaties in the course of putting down the Boxer Rebellion (1900). Indeed, the Japanese troop contingent was the largest in Beijing on the side of the treaty powers. From Kôtoku's perspective, the fruits of that evil were being siphoned off to bankers rather than to the common people in any of these nations. He concluded that Japanese wars were now being fought for the sake of monied interests, rather than the people. He declared that Japan had become a nation by and for, though not of, moneylenders.

It is difficult to avoid concluding that when Kan'ichi takes up the path of moneylending, when he self-consciously forsakes the path of humanity to become a "beast," within the domestic sphere he effectively takes on the role of the spectral twentieth-century monster that Tôkoku indicates in his book title. He embraces abjection by organizing his identity around a lack—the demand for insatiable accumulation of personal property—and by encrypting within himself precisely that which he reviles.[44]

In an extended conversation between Wanibuchi Tadayuki (Kan'ichi's usurer boss) and his son, Tadamichi, they debate the possibility of distinguishing just and unjust ways of doing business in middle Meiji Japan.[45] The son remarks that he just read a newspaper account of serious injuries to Kan'ichi that the newspaper has previously and mistakenly reported as injuries to Tadayuki. The paper speculated the injuries were presumably in retribution for the suffering caused by his usurious loan practices. Tadamichi wants his father to quit the family business, whatever the financial cost. He observes that this sort of retribution could be fatal and that no line of work is worth that. Tadamichi thus outlines an understanding of business in terms of moral economy.

According to Tadamichi, everyone has to work to support themselves and perhaps make enough to pass on something to their children, but he argues that in their own case they already have far more than they will ever need to support themselves. Because of the immoral line of work his

father is in, he, Tadamichi, will not accept a single *sen* in inheritance, so his father can have no reason to continue exploiting and angering people just to collect even more money for which he will never have any constructive use. Tadamichi asks his father to stop conducting a business practice that invariably makes people not only suffer, but angry enough to do him physical harm.

While Kan'ichi's personification of the social imperative of capital accumulation is alienated and conflicted, Wanibuchi Tadayuki, conversely, is adamant that such people have nothing to apologize for. Tadayuki is the only character in the work willing to unqualifiedly justify social Darwinist governmentality without qualification. He not only presumably believes that the state should not regulate business, he proceeds to explicitly argue that those who suffer poverty are simply suffering the consequences of their own lack of character—to be poor is in effect to be immoral. Tadayuki says, "You talk about the people's resentment and the world's slander, but the resentment of those who are in the same business as we are is nothing but the selfish grumbling of losers. For the most part, the world's slander is only envy. The evidence for this is that those who don't work are pitied because they become poor. Regardless of vocation, those who make money receive some kind of attack from the world, don't they?"[46]

This is the sort of market-driven classificatory discipline that melodrama typically opposes. Tadayuki's claim is that poverty is a sign of moral failure. He uses the logic of economic class to draw conclusions about the presence or absence of personal character. But Tadayuki does not stop there. For him, the accumulation of wealth itself is a moral obligation to both self and society for explicitly biopolitical reasons. Just as with Spencer and Mori, for Wanibuchi Tadayuki, the accumulation of wealth is the very life of society.

> You say if you already have all of the money you need, there is no need to seek more money, don't you? But that is an academic's way of thinking. If people had enough things for themselves, were satisfied with that and stopped trying, the country would die instantly! The business of society wouldn't advance! If everyone in the country became a young retired person, what would you do? *Desire without limit is the life of the [national] people* . . . We loan money at hight interest. However high the interest may be, why is that acceptable? Because we don't require collateral, that's why! . . . Because we lend it at high risk, the interest is high. Everyone borrows knowing that. What is unjust about this? Why is that dirty? If you think high interest is unjust, you shouldn't be borrowing money to begin with. In today's society, there are many difficulties that create emergencies from which we cannot escape without being rescued even by borrowing money at high-interest. If you say loan-sharking is unjust, then the society

> that created loan-sharking must be unjust, right? . . . *If making money from borrowing and lending based on an agreement is unjust, all business must be unjust, right*?[47]

The infinite accumulation literally demonized in Kan'ichi is Tadayuki's definition of social advance and progress, the very life of society itself. His argument takes refuge in the juridical logic of the contract. All of these people signed a contract, he says. If they cannot adhere to the terms of the contract they themselves have chosen to enter into, they should not sign it to begin with. How could they not simply be irresponsible if they are breaking their own word and defaulting on a contractual obligation?[48]

Tadayuki thus employs a positivist legal argument. This school of law seeks to actively ignore the circumstances that lead to a contract, and is interested only in the contract on paper. Positivism involves a willful disavowal of the economic, political, or physical coercion—the mode of governmentality—that structures a social Darwinist society in brute, biopolitical terms.

The Ansei treaties extorted from the Tokugawa Empire by way of the oxymoronic practice of "gunboat diplomacy" and that used the threat of military force to extort trade treaties are textbook examples of binding legal contracts within the discourse of legal positivism. Tadayuki effectively defines the life of society in terms of the accumulation of capital, the accumulation of wealth. In other words, within the social-Darwinist logic of capitalist governmentality, money does not live to serve society, people and society live to serve capital. The only true and important life, the life that defines society, is the life of capital, the surplus of return over investment. People are only valuable or even moral to the extent that they successfully service the needs of capital and the market that produces it. Tadayuki argues that if you are really serious about finding fault with moneylending, to be logically consistent, you have to find fault with the market, with capital accumulation or the regime of private property itself. As established in Chapters 1, 2, and 4, this definition of capital accumulation as the life of society is one that Wanibuchi Tadayuki shares with Mori Arinori, Herbert Spencer, and Inoue Tetsujirô. Indeed, Tadayuki's views were commonly held notions of governmentality in his day.

Tadamichi responds with more from the perspective of moral economy. He asserts that offering someone a high-interest loan when they are desperate and helpless is a cowardly form of coercion and abuse. For him, this type of moneylending is no different than the beating given to Kan'ichi. Where Tadayuki insists that complaints about wealth from the world are simply carping, for Tadamichi the world is the community of people with whom we all must live. It is easy to say you do not care what

they think, but we have to live in the world with them. They are angry and they detest loan-sharking as if it were a demon from hell. When the family reputation is so sullied by such a line of work, one's own world grows smaller due to a sense of shame and ostracism. It is one thing to suffer ostracism for the sake of family or honor, but to suffer ostracism for wrongs you have actually committed is inexcusable. Tadayuki claims that family reputation rests on the ability to accumulate wealth that is in turn a positive reflection on one's character. For his son, Tadamichi, any reputation based on the accumulation of wealth by extorting or destroying the desperate by way of a coercive contract can only be a negative, unwanted reputation.[49] It seems that *meiyo* (honor or reputation) is another critical component of the grammar of *shimpa higeki*.

Shortly after this discussion, a deranged elderly lady comes to Wanibuchi's house eight evenings in a row. She stands in the street eerily staring and smiling, waiting for Wanibuchi. Her short widow's hair stands on end, and she speaks in an eery voice, calling Wanibuchi a great liar and an extraordinarily evil person. She repeats that her son Masayuki was such a filial son he must have been deceived to have been found guilty of a crime. Her young son Masayuki's life was ruined by the threat of a one-year jail term for inability to pay a ten yen late-payment penalty on a loan taken out by a friend for whom he agreed to cosign. Under the current criminal code he was guilty and the state would enforce the contract of the usurer. The mother calls out to Wanibuchi Tadayuki, "You deceived Masayuki! [To her dead son], I'll take your revenge so witness this! . . . She unfolded a knot of the *furoshiki* she was carrying on her back and spread out the oilpaper in front of [Wanibuchi] Tadayuki, "Your head goes in here . . . Drop it immediately without being difficult. . . . "[50] On the ninth day she is nowhere to be seen, but the wind blows up near twilight and the Wanibuchi house burns to the ground.

The uncanny, sublime terror of the old lady stalking Wanibuchi leads the reader of the novel to infer that the destruction of the house was a direct consequence of the *urami* generated by the business of moneylending. The aestheticization of the act, however, leaves the agent responsible for the act somewhat unclear.[51] We are left to suppose that perhaps the dissonance between Masayuki's family morality and his fate—a filial child is convicted by the Japanese legal system—is ultimately supposed to be more of a reflection on the injustice of Meiji law and the Meiji state, rather than on the son.

Readers familiar with rural affairs in the Tokugawa period will have noted a strong resonance between Edo-period notions of moral economy regarding moneylending that used intimidation, house-smashing, and

arson to punish those who violate the moral economy and the incineration of Wanibuchi's house, as he is a moneylender causing so much suffering to so many. Chapter 1 noted that Meiji law flatly defied the popular wisdom of *honsen kaeshi* (the popular belief that interest on borrowed money should never exceed the value of what was borrowed, so the profit on a loan would never exceed 100 percent). With its modern police force, the Meiji state actively suppressed the traditional moral economic right to enforce economic justice, and even used the law and the police to actively press the claims of parties such as loan sharks who were illegitimate from the popular perspective of moral economy.

It is difficult not to see the arson of Wanibuchi's house as an aestheticized echo of the rights of the people within traditional Japanese moral economy, a moral economy that Meiji-period governmentality sharply violated. In other words, perhaps we can read this scene of the novel as the displacement of an effectively outlawed ritual of *uchikowashi* (house smashing) into an uncanny, gothicized mode of melodramatic resistance. This analysis strongly suggests that a challenge to the legitimacy of Japanese property law in conflict with perceived moral economy is another important element of the grammar of the *shimpa higeki* mode.

There is a related scene just prior to the attack on Kan'ichi where he makes a call regarding a loan payment and walks into a house full of former classmates from his old school. The resident of the flat is Yusa Ryûkitsu, the guarantor of a loan taken out by a relative. Kan'ichi's former higher middle school[52] friends are all there. The discussion initially turns on whether Kan'ichi can make an exception for an old friend. Arao mentions at several points in the story that he considered Kan'ichi to be like a brother and was very hurt that Kan'ichi broke off contact. There is a strong sense that his classmates constitute a familial community of sorts. If there is a community in the novel that Kan'ichi is a part of in the first half of the novel, these classmates would have to be it. But Kan'ichi adamantly refuses to make an exception. "Friendship is friendship, and loaned money is loaned money. Naturally, they are different matters," he coldly states.[53] Kan'ichi's character, as the personified spirit of capital accumulation, insists on imposing the economic logic of the market onto a member of a community figured in quasi-familial terms. His former classmates constitute a community that in turn resists his refusal to recognize the justice of moral economy.

The behavior of the students is described in a manner that deliberately evokes the *sôshi* of the 1880s Freedom and Popular Rights Movement. The *sôshi* were "tough guys," often student drop-outs from private universities like Waseda, with intentionally ripped clothing in self-conscious

opposition to what they saw as the dandified, Western style of the gentlemen who ran the Meiji government and whom they mocked as effeminate. The *sôshi* generally opposed the Meiji government as authoritarian, but they also opposed the state's perceived appeasement of the treaty powers demonstrated by repeated state capitulation during negotiations over treaty revision. In an effort to reinforce their *machismo*, the *sôshi* studied the martial arts, *jûdô* in particular.[54] Perhaps it is not too far-fetched to interpret the violence of Kan'ichi's treatment of Miya as a sort of channeling of *soshi* primitivism and hard masculinity into the territory of newly idealized male-female relations, thus heightening the legitimacy of masculinity invested in male-female relationships by aligning it with the violence of the *sôshi* previously associated with hard, "traditional" forms of Japanese masculinity.

The students at first attempt to negotiate with Kan'ichi, but when he continues to be completely intransigent, they turn to brute force. They strong-arm Kan'ichi, trying to force him into compromising. While he continues to refuse and they finally let him go, one of them steals the promissory note for the loan out of Kan'ichi's satchel. They draw a parallel between the economic oppression of domestic Japanese subjects by unjust laws domestically enforced by the Meiji state under capitalist governmentality and the Western treaty powers' abuse of weaker nations such as Japan by military power while paying lip service to the "rule of international law."

> With his throat being immediately suffocated, he [Kan-ichi] couldn't say a word. Kamada was choking him fairly hard.
>
> "Go on! Now try saying it! If you say a word, you won't be able to breathe, you son of a bitch [kisama] . . ."
>
> As Kan'ichi couldn't endure the pain, he struggled and tried to pull free, but couldn't match the strength of Kamada, who had studied Kano school judo [Kanô Jigorô founded *jûdô* in the 1880s—Ed.] . . . Kan'ichi let him have his way as this was all he could do, and it created some sense of relief.
>
> Yusa was surprised and Kazahaya was also concerned, "Hey, Kamada! Is he alright? He won't die?"
>
> "Don't get too rough."
>
> Kamada burst out laughing.
>
> [He said] When it comes down to it, rather than money power, it's brute force [*wanryoku*] [that wins out] isn't it? Hey, there's no helping that this is an illustration in the *Water Margin*. In defending national interest, in preserving national rights, such things as international law are only surface matters. What is essential is the force of arms! . . . If there is no sovereign to enforce laws in the international arena (*bankoku*), who could fairly and satisfactorily settle matters between one country and another?

Here, there's only one institution that may referee such matters—in a word, combat [*tatakai*]!

[Kazahaya] "Let [him] go! He looks bad."

[Kamada] "I have never heard of strong nations being humiliated. Therefore, my art of foreign policy is also Kano-school!" . . .[55]

They gather around the lamp like carp drawn to a baited lure in a pond . . .

"This is the 300Y promissory note, isn't it?" . . .

Kamata began dancing like a spring.

"I've got it! This is it!" . . .

"Is this technique included in the Kano-school, too?" . . .

"It's not a joking matter. But this is a special teaching beyond orthodox Kano school doctrine." . . . [Kamada] "Let's say a *banzai* for Yusa kun!"[56]

The community of Kan'ichi's former school friends effectively claims that international law is a mask for war and exploitation of the weak by the world powers, an example of the suspension of international law theorized by Anghie and discussed in Chapter 1. The implication is that just as international law misguidedly attempts to legitimize the coercion of capitalist governmentality in an international context, domestic Meiji law misguidedly attempts to wrongly enforce and legitimate the tender mercies of such governmentality upon the Japanese people domestically, perhaps implicitly for the sake of appeasing Western treaty power interests, but ultimately as the means by which they are both implicated in the Meiji state's enforcement of the strong's exploitation of the weak at home as well as abroad. Here, as in the case of the *karuta* party, "*banzai*" invokes the melodramatic mode as developed for imperial ceremony; its exclamation creates a sense of community among the former classmates.

Konjiki yasha and Gothic Abjection

The third aspect of the text I would like to deal with more closely is Kan'ichi's trip to Shiobara. Anne Williams has noted that gothic landscape typically situates the character who experiences it in a pre-Oedipal position. She finds Kristeva's notion of the semiotic in *Powers of Horror* as a useful tool for identifying such scenes.[57] I employ her categories of gothic literary structure as a way of identifying when a character's boundaries are threatened and the manner in which the self (one's identity) is reintegrated into the social formation as a clean and proper body. Williams finds that the patterns of the "family romance" tend to be projected onto the gothic landscape. In this framework, the aspects of nature characteristically associated with gothic—night, the moon, the moors, storms, and

all sorts of violence and disorder—signify an unruly female principle. The entire configuration of gothic conventions thereby signifies a receding of the patriarchal symbolic. Gothic nature demonstrates the point at which representation breaks down. To read a landscape (real or imagined) is to take a step back toward what Lacan calls "the imaginary." This aesthetic experience constitutes a kind of "waking dream." The characteristic emotions associated with the gothic are horror, terror, and melancholy. The subject experiencing sublimity is feminized and infantilized. The gothic landscape evokes the feelings that according to psychoanalysis derive from early separation from the mother. According to Kristeva, melancholy is an "unsymbolized" sadness on the border of the semiotic and the symbolic, an inadequate or imperfect separation from the mother (and, by extension, the sign of a conflicted and incompletely formed identity).

The section of the text in which Kan'ichi moves from his dream to a reality that he can no longer distinguish from his dream embodies nearly all of the aspects of the decoding process of gothic landscape delineated by Williams. Representational perception breaks down. As Kan'ichi sets off on the road to Shiobara, he is, "wrapped in melancholy (*yûutsu*)." The road passes through an "ancient wilderness."[58] He encounters a raging river, which calls to mind thunder and lightning and strikes him as *susamajî*, meaning horrible, terrible, weird, or uncanny. As he leaves behind the last houses on the way and crosses a bridge into the thickest part of the forest, the sun darkens, the air suddenly grows cold, the mountains rise up as sheer cliffs, and the valley plunges further below him. He is startled as he reaches Fukuwata. The spot, which he has never visited before, is the very scene of his dream the night before in which Miya had jumped off a cliff in remorse for having abandoned him during their engagement. Her dead body had then floated to the surface of a shallow pool. This pool of water was unmistakably where her body had been floating. He wonders if it is possible to dream of something never seen before. Every detail was precisely as in the dream. The more he examined the area, the closer and more exact the resemblance became. The man carrying his bags informs him that this valley is called *Fudô*, the God of Wrath.

He next encounters a sheer cliff topped by pines that Kan'ichi recalls as where he himself had jumped into the river in an effort to save Miya. He wonders if he has ever been here before, but then thinks if he had really jumped from this cliff he would have been dashed to pieces. As he rounds the next bend he is filled with terror at the sight of a twenty-foot high rock in the swirling rapids below. He had scrambled up onto this very rock in his effort to retrieve Miya's dead body. There was the pool where Miya had jumped. There was the branch that had caught her hair.

> Although it was a dream, it had been relentlessly painful, unavoidably also terrifying, wretched, mournful, and heart-rending, but if things did not remain as a simple dream, how could it be? The actual scenery of Shiobara, little by little appeared exactly as it was in the dream. So this scenery is not a dream! I myself who came here by chance must also not be a dream! All that was missing from the dream was Miya. She alone did not come! Kan'ichi tried to resist the idea that he had started to dream again. If it isn't a dream, I've come to an awful place. Let it be that this, fortunately, does not resemble a dream. . . . [59]

Kan'ichi reaches Shiobara before the sun sets. Within an hour of his arrival his heart had calmed down, his fears had died, and he felt strangely softened. He thinks to himself that nature has the power to cure the disease of his soul. He had previously held nature in disdain, but now recognized his mistake.

> Look! Look! The green of the trees, the floating clouds, the towering peaks, the flowing valleys, the towering rocks, the breeze from afar, the sunlight, the sound of the chickens, the color of the sky, if these look like the things of this mutable [uncertain] world, then here we can forget our melancholy (*urei*), we can forget sadness, and we can forget fatigue. My body is as light as that cloud, my heart is as fresh as the water. I wish I could end my life in this manner.
>
> Here there is no love, there is no hate; there is no money, there is no worldly power; no honor, no intrigue, no reputation, no corruption, no competition, here there is no attachment, there is no glory, and there is no disappointment. This is a place with the purity of nature [*tennen*]. It is a place where the landscape is simply peaceful. Perhaps it is a place to bury my thoughts? Perhaps it is a place to bury my self?
>
> Kan'ichi—who, by birth, was not intimately acquainted with the great natural beauty of landscape loved it and was pleased as he had to no idea where his mind was going. He was shown to the second floor room of the inn, but he didn't go inside. From the start he leaned on the railing facing the waterfall. *Inside he felt like a child who, having accidentally lost his way among strangers, meets his mother and, for a moment, is unable to leave her side.*[60]

There is no peace in nature or Kan'ichi until Miya's virtual sacrifice of herself to patriarchy. Through Miya's sacrifice, the dead Miya and the living Kan'ichi regain a clean and proper body that has a place in the social formation. Within this scene, Miya is thus situated as a dead but virtuous woman along the lines of the male gothic mode. Kan'ichi is resituated as a vital, living subject reduced to the status of a child, but reintegrated with the community through new knowledge that allows an adjustment in his relation to reality as with the female gothic mode. Kan'ichi's epiphany

effectively inscribes the mother of the nuclear family within a pastoral Japanese landscape, articulating yet another alignment of familial and national structures. Where Williams' privileges the feminine gothic for its challenge to the symbolic underpinnings of patriarchal subject positions, *The Gold Demon* conversely but consistently claims the female gothic for the cause of sustaining patriarchy, ultimately punishing or eliminating female subject positions in tension with it. The confusion of fantasy and reality in the scene defies the representational clarity of a stable subject position. Certain sections of the passage construct a focalization of perception limited by the position of the character in the scene. But this field of perception itself breaks down as Kan'ichi loses touch with a sense of the boundary between fantasy and reality.

Decoding in the guise of gothic literary convention clearly plays an important role in the function of this text. Compared to Kôyô's immediately previous novel, *Tajô takon (Much Passion, Much Grief)*, which was written in *genbunitchi*, *The Gold Demon* indicates a continued discomfort and failure to identify with the *genbunitchi* mode of writing that Kôyô was among the first to master. Further, the anomalous, eclectic series of discursive modes it employs suggest a larger crisis involving the range of discursive possibilities of the time.

In conclusion, both the content and the contemporary reception of *The Gold Demon* situate it squarely within the problematic discussed in previous chapters: that of the life of a society becoming defined by the accumulation of capital as an aspect of the mode of governmentality imposed and enforced by the Meiji state and tied to the global system instituted in Japan under the Ansei treaties. These transformations were enabled and promulgated by new discourses of family, morality and the state emerging from and in response to capitalist governmentality.

The novel lays out a vitalist ontology that places love, family, and nation on the side of life. It situates commodification and the state on the side of death, thus implicitly hewing closely to the political perspective of thinkers such as Miyake Setsurei and Kuga Katsunan for whom foreign capital is an impurity to be expunged from the body politic. Japanese capital redirected toward the purposes of Japanese family and nation, however, may be understood as effectively sublated by life and integrated into the social formation. *The Gold Demon* develops this ontology in discourses of melodrama and the gothic. Julia Thomas has argued that middle Meiji nationalists moved to replace social Darwinism with nature as social Darwinism contributed to social disturbance and its universalism tended to undermine claims for national particularity. It seems that *The Gold Demon* actively participates in the displacement of social Darwinism

identified by Thomas (albeit ten years later)—and arguably for similarly nationalist reasons.[61]

It strongly and repeatedly evidences a *shimpa higeki* discourse of melodramatic resistance to official state-sponsored governmentality, a discourse characterized by abjection. Numerous attempts are made to draw a boundary between the domestic and the foreign. Several characters, and the narrator, all register the commodification of social relations and personal identity. The novel exhibits a breakdown in the stability of narrative reality characteristic of challenges to patriarchal authority in the genre of gothic fiction. Detailed analysis and interpretation of both the contextual and textual evidence surrounding and within *The Gold Demon* thus supports the thesis that it participated in a process of sociocultural reterritorialization in response to the socio-economic deterritorialization precipitated by the capitalist governmentality characteristic of the Ansei treaty era.

Chapter 6

Haga Yaichi's Institution of Classical Japanese Literature

Civilizing Japan, Governmentality, and Imperial Domesticity

This chapter examines the Meiji-period construction of classical Japanese literature as an object of academic study in three respects: (1) the role of the discipline in the institution of Japanese national community and in resisting the treaty powers' claims of superiority over the Japanese, (2) the usefulness of the discipline as a resource for capitalist governmentality seeking to discipline Japanese subjects in support of the logic of the market in Japanese society, and (3) its role in the development of a concept of imperial domesticity that lent legitimacy to Japanese claims to a paternalist obligation to occupy and develop Korea.

As Japan turned from cultural defense to offense around the turn of the nineteenth century, discourses of Japanese civilization and domesticity were increasingly deployed as a moralizing aspect of capitalist governmentality at home and for the purpose of legitimizing Japanese expansion on the continent. Thus in addition to Haga's late nineteenth-century work, this chapter also examines Haga Yaichi's writing after the Russo-Japanese War (1894–1895) in which he transforms his literary research into cultural commentary on the *Imperial Rescript on Education* that serves as a means of legitimating Japanese modes of capitalist governmentality and Japan's annexation of Korea. For Haga, it seems, Japan's superior devotion to the patriarchal authority of the father and the emperor—Japan's superior form of domesticity—demonstrated that Japan ranked higher on the hierarchy of civilization than did Korea and that Japan thus had a paternal responsibility to oversee Korean development for the foreseeable future.

Haga's rhetoric incorporates a moralizing critique of secular modernity that anticipates many aspects of contemporary East Asian and North American neoconservatism. It functions as mode of governmentality that identifies capitalism and indigenous tradition. It seeks to legitimize Japanese economic expansion and unequal treaty privileges in Korea. His position constitutes an early Japanese claim to an alternative modernity, to have in effect overcome modernity by way of political theology. Haga proffered a Japanese moral superiority grounded in the claim to have avoided the moral decadence he associates with secularizing Enlightenment paradigms of modernity. The first section of the chapter examines the ramifications of his work for national community and governmentality. The second section of the chapter addresses the intersection of discourses of domesticity and Japan's efforts to legitimize its colonial administration of Korea in his writing after 1905.

Instituting National Community and the Discourse of Civilization

My research suggests that in Haga's hands the discipline of classical Japanese literature contributed toward a counter-history disproving the treaty powers' claim that the Ansei treaty regime was justified on cultural grounds—that Japan was a less civilized, non-Western nation. Japanese scholars of literature such as Haga Yaichi conducted research designed to demonstrate that Japan had always been a civilized nation in Euro-American terms and that it comprised a civilization of cosmopolitan value in its own right. In other words, the articulation of the discipline of classical Japanese literary study figured importantly in gathering Japanese cultural capital—initially as a form of cultural resistance to the legal exceptionalism upon which the imposition of the Ansei treaties was premised.

The role of classical literary study in articulating and institutionalizing Japanese national community was a significant concern of Japanese literary criticism in the 1990s. Mark Anderson, in 1997, was the first author to frame the issue this way in his article, "National Literature as Cultural Monument: Instituting Japanese National Community."[1] Highly regarded work by Tom Lamarre,[2] Haruo Shirane,[3] and Tomiko Yoda[4] has subsequently further developed this problematic. While refining my take on this issue, this chapter articulates two additional problematics that have yet to be significantly addressed in previous scholarship: (1) the role of classical literary study in establishing claims that Japan is a civilized nation in response to claims by the treaty powers that Japan was uncivilized and therefore unqualified for international recognition and legal, political, or economic sovereignty, and (2) the argument that Haga Yaichi's conception of classical

literary study served as a resource for a discourse of Japanese domesticity that was instrumentalized at home as a moralizing mode of capitalist governmentality designed to contain political activism and abroad to legitimize paternalist Japanese intervention in and occupation of Korea.

This chapter argues that the Meiji-period saw a reinterpretation of premodern literature as part of a newly national tradition, and a corollary shift in the status of the Japanese language. This section of the chapter focuses on the institutionalization of *kokubungaku*, the study of Japanese national literature. It pays particular attention to how reinterpretations of the Japanese past have been involved in the process of constructing national community and domesticity. At the same time, the chapter draws attention to the manner in which the reading of literary texts is mediated by the institution of literary study. It argues that only the suppression of caste, regional, and historical differences enables pre-Meiji Japanese literature to be read as the expression of a single, homogeneous, and historically continuous national subject. The first section of the chapter explores the ways in which, in the name of timeless tradition, the study of Japanese literature participated in the suppression of cultural difference that was and remains masked by the formation of modern Japanese national community in its literary form.

If the institution of *kokubungaku* mediates the ways in which literary texts are read, this means that the significance attributed to a literary text will vary, as does the social function of the institution which selects it as an object worthy of academic study. In the words of Samuel Weber, this "would work from the 'inside' of the [discipline] in order to demonstrate concretely, in each case, how the exclusion of limits from the field organizes the practice it makes possible, but in a way that diverges from the self-consciousness of the practitioner . . . to reveal the strategic nature of apparently constative academic discourse."[5] *Kokubungaku* (national literature) was and remains a part of the construction of Japanese national identity. National identity in its turn is integral to the articulation of modes of capitalist governmentality and in the imperialist discourse of the "civilizing process"; that is, an accumulation of cultural capital which positions Japan above its immediate neighbors and moves it out of Asia toward the Western and the modern. These are among the issues at stake in examining the disciplinary formation of *kokubungaku* from a critical perspective. Above all, the chapter argues that the articulation of Japanese claims to national identity and civilized status on the international stage was ultimately deployed as a distinctively Japanese mode of governmentality invoked for the sake of morally legitimating a capitalist Japanese social order at home and the expansion of that social order abroad.

This chapter does not purport to be representative or exhaustive. It rather focuses on the work of Haga Yaichi, an early and influential Meiji-period founder of the discipline of *kokubungaku* in Japan. Haga's case is important because of his formative influence on the discipline of classical Japanese literary study. Haga's career began in the late 1890s, but includes the period after the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 and Japanese annexation of Korea (referred to throughout the Japanese colonial period as *Chôsen*) in 1910. His place in time and his intellectual position vis-à-vis Euro-American thought situate him as a bridge between a Japan overwhelmed by its semi-colonial relation to the treaty powers and an economically and territorially expanding Imperial Japan on behalf of which Haga was a highly successful culture warrior. Haga's career spanned the period during which Japan successfully emerged out from under the Ansei treaty regime. This was an event that roughly coincided with formal Japanese claims to sovereignty over Korea in addition to its previous claims to rule over Taiwan, Okinawa, and Hokkaido. From that point on, what we now think of as the four main islands (Honshû, Shikoku, Hokkaidô, and Kyûshu) were typically referred to as "domestic territory" or the "homeland" (*naichi*) while Taiwan, Korea, and the Manchurian territory were referred to as the "outer territories" (*gaichi*).

The following questions are explored in the first part of this chapter: What was the method of study Haga employed? With what totality did he identify literary expression? What was the larger intellectual discourse within which he situated it? What was the institutional setting within which his project was instituted? What role did literature play in his discussions of Japaneseness? What role did literature play in the discipline of prose composition as he conceived it? Finally, what role did literature play in conceptions of Japaneseness in the context of multi-ethnic empire?

The chapter takes its methodological point of departure in the work of Deleuze and Guattari as regards language and Foucault as regards governmentality. It does not assume that Haga Yaichi is a unitary subject who expresses himself consistently over the course of his career. It takes him to be a split subject as articulated within his writing and action capable of occupying a variety of positions traversing distinct moments of historical development. It takes his work to be responsive to historical events without presuming that it faithfully represents history as it happened outside of his work. It does not presuppose an identity between Haga's texts and the historical context in which they are written. It is rather concerned with the manner in which Haga's texts take part in articulating the very notion of Japanese national community that common sense now dictates would be their natural context.

Foucault argues that capitalist governmentality disrupts, subverts, and revises traditional social codes. I take Haga's work to be an important moment in the articulation of a distinctively Japanese mode of capitalist governmentality, the revision of discourses stripped of their original meaning with a new significance that enforces the logic of the market. The sign and the referent are related to one another metonymically and cannot be made identical. The Japanese symbolic order as articulated in the discourse of Haga Yaichi is a presumption of order and structure that imagines the emperor and the national essence as guaranteeing a coincidence between code and context. It serves to ground the metaphoric axis that supports identity. Haga's discourse contributes toward constructing the metaphoricity necessary to identity.

I argue that Haga's hermeneutic project seeks to re-anchor the socially decoded metaphoric axis in a newly national and personal imaginary register. Just as is the case with bureaucracy and economy, culture is also a site of decoding and recoding. Once traditional social codes have fallen away, personal codes become possible and necessary. I contend that Haga's hermeneutics of a Japanese national essence participates in installing a new socio-symbolic order.

For Deleuze and Guattari, the social formation is a function of resonance between collective modes of enunciation and their corresponding bodies. The unity of language is fundamentally political. Regimes of subjectification involve a point of subjectification which gives rise to a subject of enunciation and then a subject of the enunciated in relation to the first subject. Subjectification as a regime of signs or a form of expression is tied to an assemblage, an organization of power.[6] If we wish to move to a real definition of the collective modes of enunciation, we must ask of what acts order-words are constituted and comprised. The order-words, or assemblages of enunciation, in a given society (in short, the illocutionary) designate this relation between the enunciated and the bodily attributes they express. These acts are defined as the set of all transformations current in a given society and attributed to the bodies of that society.[7]

The fundamental point is that the particularity of bodies may be channeled and constrained by the totalizing efforts of a given collective mode of enunciation, but they may never be completely captured by it. Both the totalized social formation and the individual are the effects of particular operations upon bodies. Bringing out the latent multiplicity of social and individual totalities is one of the primary purposes of critical analysis.

The status of *kokubungaku* in Meiji Japan cannot be separated from the institution of the modern university. The restoration government appointed a committee of *kokugaku* scholars to draft a higher-education

proposal. Located in Edo, which had just been renamed Tokyo, the initial structure was in place through 1869 until the summer of 1870. Confucianists, Shintoists, and scholars of Western learning were integrated into a single institution with the Confucianists and Shintoists located in the Main School (*daigaku honkô*) and the Western scholars divided up into an eastern and southern school. Antagonism between the Shintoists and Confucianists and the rise of the Westernizing clique to hegemony within the ruling oligarchy led to the closing of the *daigaku honkô* in August 1870.[8] From this point on, the Imperial University was an institution organized entirely within the cosmological confines of Western learning. For over a decade, the faculty of the Imperial University was largely foreign and instruction was carried out in the native language of the instructor. A majority of the instructors in medicine and agriculture were from Imperial Germany, basic science and engineering was dominated by British and American instructors, while law and letters was relatively evenly divided among the three. All told, forty-six instructors (38 percent) came from Germany, comprising the largest group. The program for Japanization of university faculties in the 1880s was designed to minimize Japan's intellectual colonization while maximizing the ability and productivity of the Japanese population.

German institutions were much more concerned with the humanities and had a much more firmly held commitment to the expansion of scientific knowledge through research. As opposed to the "general culture" ideal espoused by Fichte, Humboldt, and Hegel, Japanese education ministers were united in their commitment to the study of basic principles and to an increase in the store of knowledge relative to the immediate, pragmatic needs of the state. Engineering was a large component of the curriculum beginning in 1886 and was taught at all Imperial universities, with the exception of Hokkaidô. Engineering was excluded from German universities because its practical orientation was not considered compatible with the "general culture" ideal. In 1914, 13 percent of German university students were enrolled in basic science and 21.2 percent studied the humanities. The corresponding figures for Japan were, 4.4 percent in basic science and 8.5 percent in the humanities.[9]

Beginning in 1877, Tokyo Imperial University included a Chinese/Japanese literature department (*Wakan bungaku-ka*) within the *Bungaku-bu*. In 1882, a separate Classics department (*Koten koshoku-ka*) was created.[10] The Chinese and Japanese literature department was divided in 1885. Haga Yaichi, Ueda Kazutoshi, and Mikami Sanji were all graduates of this curriculum. Their instructors were largely nativist scholars *(kokugakusha)* who remained opposed to the ascendance of Western

learning. Haga's tenure at Tokyo Imperial University, his later ties to Kokugakuin University, his importance as a founder of the discourse of *nihonjinron* (writings on the essence of Japaneseness), his ties to the first Japanese governor-general of Korea, and the long-standing influence of the philologically oriented research method he introduced to the field all make Haga Yaichi an important case to study.

Haga's initial published writing on literary history was his introduction to a reader of national literature published in 1890, *Kokubungaku dokuhon [National Literature Reader]*. I find his presentation in that work to be in essential agreement with his lengthier and more detailed work, *Kokubungakushi jikko* [*Ten Lectures on National Literary History*], first published in 1899. This chapter's initial topic—Haga's approach to literary history—will focus on a reading of the latter text. In *Ten Lectures*, he writes,"Our ancestors have represented their thought and sentiment in the national language [*kokugo*] and this has made fine works of art. These are called *kokubungaku*. Please know that the history of *kokubungaku* is the history of this kind of writing."[11]

This is Haga's most concise definition of his object of study. National literature is a kind of writing that can be described in aesthetic discourse as art that is written in the national language and that expresses the national essence. He contrasts this new definition of literature with previous definitions of it as "learning in general or rhetoric."[12] Haga thus differentiates his new concept of literature from its Tokugawa-period antecedents by framing literature in terms of aesthetic discourse. While literature is the initial object of study for *kokubungaku*, for Haga it ultimately serves as a means toward developing an intellectual and cultural history of the nation.

He writes, "What is interesting about literary history is that within literature, the spirit, thought, and sentiment of the [national] people are naturally represented of themselves. It is important that the thought, mentality, and sentiment of the [national] people are reflected in *national literature*. It is on this basis that we research it historically. Taking up something that represents and expresses the thought and sentiment of our [national] people—and researching it—means observing changes in the thought and sentiment of our [national] people. In this way we know the spiritual life (*shinsei seikatsu*) of the [national] people."[13]

From this perspective, the person most qualified by his academic discipline to make authoritative statements about Japanese literature and spirit would be a professor of *kokubungaku* such as himself. Haga worked in the fields of national literature (*kokubungaku)*, national language (*kokugo*), and national studies (*kokugaku*). The institutional site of national literary study was initially the university, but eventually came to include

elementary and middle schools, partly in connection with classes in composition. *Kokubungaku* as Haga conceived it formulated a very specific subject position for the researcher and reader of national literary history. This is important, as Kokugakuin University, Waseda, and Keiô, among others, modeled their departments of Japanese Literature along the lines of the department at Tokyo Imperial University.

Haga's model of literary history was organismic. He was concerned to establish that Japanese literature had ancient roots, but also evidenced continued life and development to the present.[14] He thus installs a vitalist ontology at the heart of Japanese classical literary study. He writes, "In literary history, the primary concern is to show the path of development and transformation such that the circumstances in this area are made clear."[15] Further, literary history was to be distinguished from other forms of history in that it involved the internal, or spiritual, life of the nation. "Regular politics and history . . . only look at the external form (*gaikei*). For the purpose of observing the true interior—what kind of life the Japanese people led and in what kind of circumstances—knowing the history of literature is the best way."[16]

For Haga, to read a work of literature is to recover the character of both the author and the nation expressed within it.[17] As his concern with the organismic model of development and the framing of literature as the spiritual interior of the nation indicates, Haga purports to uncover the very continuous and unbroken historical record of the Japanese national subject that his work actively contributes toward instituting and establishing. While Haga's reference to Japan's never having been invaded by a foreign country and its single unbroken line of emperors since time immemorial reiterates elements of Tokugawa-period *kokugaku* accounts of Japanese literature, within his discourse these elements also appear designed to establish the presence of a continuous Japanese national subject throughout history in terms commensurable with modern Western discourses of the national.

Haga's literary history incorporates a very specific conception of translation. For Haga, "a great translation is great national literature."[18] Haga's conception of translation posits language as a totality bounded along national lines. For Haga, a translation is implicitly a work of art because language is tied to a national cultural totality and a translation would therefore be an expression of an individual and communal Japanese subject. It would be recognizable as an original cultural product, because it would be original within the confines of the national totality Haga himself is actively articulating. Further, while the Japanese language may have changed over time, "Japanese is always Japanese," meaning it has remained immutable for thousands of years.[19]

How do Haga's discourse of a continuous national history, aesthetics, and translation situate the researcher and reader of Japanese literary history? The following passage from Michel Foucault addresses this point:

> Continuous history is the indispensable correlative of the founding function of the subject . . . Making historical analysis the discourse of the continuous and making human consciousness the original subject of all historical development and all action are two sides of the same system of thought. In this system, time is conceived in terms of totalization and revolutions are never more than moments of consciousness. In various forms, this theme has played a constant role since the nineteenth century: to preserve, against all decenterings, the sovereignty of the subject, and the twin figures of anthropology and humanism.[20]

While the Ansei treaties had situated Japan as an uncivilized nation, Haga's claim to uncover a continuous Japanese history implicitly claims the sovereignty and agency of the humanist subject for Japan at both the level of the individual and the nation. Further, only civilized nations produce works of art and only great civilizations produce enough important works to enable an art history. By chronicling the history of Japanese literature as art, Haga lays a foundation for the claim that Japan is a great civilization in terms commensurable with late nineteenth-century Europe. Haga is not only concerned to establish that Japan is civilized, but he clearly asserts that Japan is civilized on a level comparable to Europe. As early as 1899, Haga is challenging Eurocentric delusions of grandeur in reigning histories of world civilization. He writes, "When we look back (on what we have covered), indeed our Japan is an ancient country of the Orient. The light of literature has shone (upon us) since the countries of Europe were still in a barbaric state."[21]

Haga's conception of translation clearly ties his project to hermeneutics. For Haga, anything written in the national language is to be read as expressive of an individual author who is a national subject. As previously discussed at the head of the chapter, the unity of a language can only be a politically imposed unity that suppresses the multiplicity and difference of the individual and various subgroups of which it is comprised. Haga's theory of translation functions as an order-word that collapses the singularity of the individual resident of Japan and the multiplicity of language communities of late 1800s Japan within a single, collective assemblage of enunciation inside of which the individual can only express himself or herself in national terms. By anachronistically projecting the continuity of a single Japanese language back through history, Haga revises the cultural production of previous social formations such that they are taken to

be expressive of a single, continuous national subject. Thus, Haga is able to make a prenational past serve as evidence to legitimate a new model of national language and community that had yet to be effectively instituted even in 1899 at the time he was writing.

Haga's hermeneutic project situates literature such that the transference of the reader from the perspective of literary history enables the contemporary Meiji Japanese reader to identify him or herself with the cultural production of previous social formations on the Japanese islands. In other words, to the degree that the study of premodern literature since Haga Yaichi has been taken to be expressive of the nation, all Japanese literature is modern literature. Haga's articulation of Japanese literary study is designed to suppress linguistic, cultural, and historical difference. To the degree that it continues to operate within the frame articulated by Haga, responsible scholarship attentive to difference must displace the institution of *kokubungaku*. Regarding an analogous German case, Kittler writes, "Over the free space of hermeneutics there stands, as above every language game, an 'order-word.' . . . A new law decrees hermeneutics . . . The nebulous legitimation of literature is that texts appear to be hermeneutically intelligible and not, rather, a matter of what has been programmed and programs in turn."[22]

In other words, Haga's project of hermeneutics participated in producing unprecedented discursive unities. While Haga purports to legitimate literary study on the ground that it teaches about the nation, in fact his project serves as an important disciplinary means of instituting this novel conception of national community. This is the most immediate respect in which Haga's exclusion of limits from the field of *kokubungaku* "organizes the practice it makes possible, but in a way that diverges from the self-consciousness of the practitioner." There is thus a strategic aspect of Haga's seemingly constative discourse.[23]

Haga certainly recognizes that historical change occurs. He allows that the grammatical structure of Japanese has changed over time. He even elaborates a framework within which agency for the production of national literature successively passes from one class of Japanese subjects to another. Yet for him, variations in grammatical structure pertain to a language he understands to have always been unified and national. He anachronistically ties it to a conception of national community that did not exist prior to his own time. Its immediate precursors only developed in the late 1700s.[24]

The notion of literary agency Haga purports to find being passed from one class to another still insists that the literature written by each hegemonic class is expressive of a continuous national essence, anachronistically

projecting Meiji conceptions of national community back through several distinct social formations. Further, Haga's writings were written and published just a few years before Kôtoku Shûsui was convicted of conspiring to assassinate the emperor and martyred by the Japanese police as an anarchist and socialist enemy of the emperor and the state. Haga's attention to class served to incorporate socialist terms of analysis within a nationalist humanism. As the previous citation from Foucault (on p.161) concerning continuous national history subsequently goes on to suggest, Haga's articulation of literary history totalizes temporality as necessarily an expression of the national and individual subject, thereby defending against challenges to capitalism, anthropocentrism, and humanism.

> In this system, time is conceived in terms of totalization and revolutions are never more than moments of consciousness. In various forms, this theme has played a constant role since the nineteenth century: to preserve, against all decentrings, the sovereignty of the subject, and the twin figures of anthropology and humanism. Against the decentring operated by Marx—by the historical analysis of the relations of production, economic determinations, and the class struggle—it gave place, towards the end of the nineteenth century, to the search for a total history, in which all the differences of a society might be reduced to a single form, to the organization of a world-view, to the establishment of a system of values, to a coherent type of civilization.[25]

Haga implicitly ties his project to the work of such people as Miyake Setsurei (discussed in Chapter 3) by virtue of his claim for a unique Meiji Japanese position between East and West. This position leads to a sense of humanist cultural mission. Haga writes, "This is so not only in the case of literature. This is an age that seeks the harmony of Oriental and Occidental civilization in music, painting, architecture, and art as well. [Realizing] the harmony of the Oriental and Occidental civilizations is a task that Japanese ought to undertake. Westerners will not be able to assimilate Oriental culture very rapidly."[26]

Aside from Haga's numerous previously discussed claims to civilized status for Japan, there are two passages in which Haga's interpretations of Japanese language, literature, and culture connect the discourse of gender to concessions of Japanese cultural inferiority. Haga claims that due in large part to the role of women in developing Heian-period prose style, the percentage of vowels in the vocabulary is extremely high. The consequence of this is that, while the prose style is very delicate and beautiful, it lacks strength and may be seen as effeminate. As a consequence of the importance of Heian-period prose as a model for much of later

Japanese literary production, Haga asserts that these are qualities of the Japanese language and culture generally.[27] Further, Haga finds that Japanese generally identify with nature, often producing things of beauty on a small scale, but that Japanese literature does not evidence thought on the sublime scale of Indian tradition. For Haga, Japanese tradition is unphilosophical and reveals a general effeminacy.[28] Finally, he asserts that knowledge of national literature is essential for language education and prose composition.

Haga explicitly conceived *kokugaku* (national studies) as a discipline distinct from *kokubungaku*. The object of the former was Japan conceived as a civilization, while the object of the latter was national literary expression. Haga's teacher, Konakamura, was a student of Motoori Ohira, so Haga was affiliated with a specific Tokugawa-period school of *kokugaku*.[29] In 1897, Haga was associated with the launching of Takayama Chogyû's magazine *Nipponshugi* (*Japanism*). Haga lobbied for the title *Nipponshugi* rather than *Shinshinto* (*New Shinto*).[30]

Haga's two most important writings on *kokugaku*, were his "Outline History of Kokugaku" (1900) and "What is Kokugaku?" (1904). Taking national language and literature as its base, he defines *kokugaku* as studying the character (*seishitsu*) of the Japanese nation. He writes, "The object is to know the totality of society through the study of ancient language and written records, to know ancient culture, to know the totality of a nation's social way of life."[31]

Both essays were concerned to situate *kokugaku* vis-à-vis German conceptions of philology. In fact, they were in large part devoted to establishing the legitimacy of *kokugaku* as a modern scientific discipline. Haga takes the modern university and the scientific structure of modern knowledge as the locus of authority and sets out to establish the legitimacy of *kokugaku* in relation to them. To give a sense of the institutional status of *kokugaku*, the Kokugakuin is the only Japanese university that institutionalized and retained the discipline of *kokugaku* as such. He also relates the research agenda of *kokugaku* to work in linguistics, literature, and philology, however, so the practice of these disciplines at other universities could also contribute toward the development of *kokugaku* as he envisioned it.

The subject position of the *kokugaku* researcher is developed in Haga's discussion of the relation between *kokugaku* and Prussian philology. Haga notes that the point of philology is to study ancient civilizations, but that civilizations without written records will not function as a proper object for philological research.[32] He writes, "The discipline of philology was developed in countries with great ancient civilizations."[33] Thus the degree

to which he can link the indigenous discipline of *kokugaku* to philology is the degree to which he can establish that Japan is a great civilization in terms commensurate with late nineteenth-century Prussian academia. Tomoko Masuzawa has established that nineteenth-century philology was centrally focused on articulating flattering Euro-friendly ancestral traditions, but that around the turn of the century schemas of overt religious and racial hierarchy were gradually replaced by a new discourse of the plurality and diversity of religions that concealed an ongoing hegemony of Christianity as the default definition of religiosity per se.[34] In this regard, it seems that Haga's project invokes elements of both nineteenth century philology and the subsequent paradigm of comparative religious studies.

Haga notes that there are two models of philology, an older one that focuses on the ancient civilizations of the West—Greece and Rome—and a newer one that takes the colloquial tradition of a single nation or race as its basis of study. Auguste Boeckhe and Hermann Paul represent the first model. He associates the latter with Wilhelm von Humboldt.[35] Strikingly, Haga appropriates *both* models for Japanese *kokugaku*. In effect, while Japan is taken as a contemporary nation with a colloquial tradition meriting research on its own terms, at the same time Haga situates Japan as its own classical civilization. The former undertakes to establish the particularity of Japan as a nation vis-à-vis other nations. The latter insists that Japan is a great civilization unto itself. In other words, through philology Haga poses Japan as both analogous to Western civilization (taken to include Enlightenment humanism) and as a great power with a world class national culture. In the "Outline History of Kokugaku" (1900), Haga explicitly argues that in an Asian context, Japan is now the only non-Western nation on a level comparable to the Western powers.[36]

Partha Chatterjee has noted that in colonial contexts the translation of disciplines often produces a discursive formation that opens itself to preexisting linguistic or intellectual practices. He writes, "Even as the metropolitan authorities and institutions of science come to be recognized as authoritative, there are attempts at setting up parallel authorities, parallel institutions, and parallel subject-positions, all claiming a privileged status by virtue of the 'authenticity' of their affiliation to the indigenous tradition and yet displaying, at the same time, as many authorized tokens of 'science' as possible."[37]

Haga's *kokugaku* evidences all the complexities of this sort of transference. Even as German philological method is taken up to fundamentally reorient *kokugaku* in such a way that it will function as a science in the context of the university based on "Western learning," it is claimed that *kokugaku* scholars had already been conducting philology for one

hundred and fifty years before they encountered its Western counterpart. This assertion incorporates German philology for the purposes of academic legitimacy, modernity, and civility, yet disavows it by implicitly presenting Tokugawa period scholarship as already modern, civilized, and legitimate in Western terms. That is to say, it is a statement of Japanese cultural autonomy vis-à-vis Europe, in European terms, that denies any connection to Europe. Yet in so far as it is assumed that the form of community conceived of by *kokugaku* is indistinguishable from middle Meiji notions of national community, any potential historical difference from or perspective on the Meiji-period colonial scene is consequently erased. Haga's paradigm of *kokugaku* thus allows a projection of post-Meiji forms of political community back into the pre-Meiji era and underlines the fundamental respect in which the discipline often erases cultural and historical difference.[38]

Where Norinaga endeavored to retrieve a lost purity of the past for the purpose of contemporary change, Haga seeks to locate the *kokutai* of present-day Meiji Japanese Empire in the past as a precursor that legitimizes the contemporary Japanese political order. He relates such study to a contemporary ethical context and specifically argues against socialism and women's rights as forms of decadence brought about by Western learning and Western ways. He asserts they must be resisted through the preservation of tradition. "*The Outline History of Kokugaku*," in which these claims are presented, thus erases the historicity of national community and the process of its construction.

It is revealing that while Norinaga located voice and bodily comportment in a past, communal way of life with which they were seen as intrinsically involved, Haga bases linguistic study on physiology. The simultaneous location of voice as both a locus of national community and a question of physiology biologizes the notion of national community and moves the foundation of *kokugaku* to a discipline that would have been considered a heretical form of Western learning in Norinaga's day. This reinterpretation is accompanied by a shift in which narrative replaces poetry as the most privileged genre.

The narration of national literary history, i.e., the ascription of post-Meiji national community to any and all eras of Japanese history in terms of temporal progress, is precisely a revision of the Japanese past such that it can only be conceived as national and modern, and consequently, civilized. *Kokugaku*, according to Haga Yaichi, would then be a translation, and consequently, civilization, of the Japanese past into Western intellectual terms. Its program can be described as, not the study, but rather the erasure, of difference.

Haga's schema thus reduces the subject of enunciation to a totalized positivity defined as linguistically and culturally homogeneous. At the level of recognition, it resists Western hegemony. As a new mode of governmentality identified with Japanese capital, however, we will see that the Japanese social formation outlined by Haga can hardly be construed as resistant.

Concerned with legitimating *kokugaku* as a scientific discipline, Haga insists that *kokugaku* has progressed remarkably over the last 100 years, surpassing the accomplishments of Chinese studies (*kangaku*). He would remind us that *kokugaku* played an essential role in enabling the Imperial restoration. He insists that *kokugaku*'s contribution should not be forgotten.[39]

He differs from Edo-period *kokugaku* scholars with regard to method of study. Their research methods were not scientific, though he does not consider this a bad reflection on them. For him, this merely indicates that from the perspective of advances made in the meantime, their work was lacking. He acknowledges that they did have a form of phonetic study, but finds that they lacked a discipline of phonetics based on physiology. They also did not have the support of psychology for the purposes of literary research. For Haga, the duty of future *kokugaku* studies must be the progressive advance of knowledge based upon the foundation laid by previous *kokugaku* scholars, rather than the close-minded defense of previous doctrine.

He acknowledges that Japan has been influenced by premodern Chinese culture and literature and that previous *kokugaku* scholars have not studied it at all. He insists that this issue must be taken up. He notes that previous *kokugaku* scholars were interested only in the Nara (*jôko*) and Heian (*chûko*) periods and ignored the question of historical progress. Haga writes, "we certainly do not hold up Antiquity (*kodai*) as an ideal," which directly contrasts his position with that of Motoori Norinaga and Tokugawa *kokugaku* more generally.[40] He finds that there were advances in ancient literature and linguistics, but holds that they are certainly not to be seen as a standard for the future. He observes that such scholars have not left behind studies of each of the respective historical periods and suggests that a method of historical research that covers all the subdivisions of literature, linguistics, and institutions is necessary.

> It would be cruel to criticize our predecessors for this. Scholars of the restoration made advances based on the impetus toward restoration. From that time they advanced a step toward us and influenced posterity. Western scholars research their countries with a discipline based on documents called philology. In Japan we study this country on the basis of native

> language and literature (*kokugo kokubun*). What kokugaku scholars have done for the last two hundred years, in other words, is Japanese philology. We must build upon the works of the learned scholars of the past two hundred years and conduct new research that builds upon this base rationally, comparatively, and historically.[41]

While Haga and, for example, Motoori Norinaga, both share a concern for the status of the national essence in its relation to what they understand as literature, there are clearly fundamental differences in their respective projects. Norinaga held up the ancient world as a locus of pure Japaneseness which could perhaps be recuperated and reiterated through the phonetically based study of ancient Japanese texts. Norinaga can be seen as articulating a notion of linguistically based community which he saw as ethically indispensable for the rectification of Tokugawa period Japan even as he argued that this community was based on sensibility rather than the sort of ethical rationality he ascribed to China. While he did not oppose the *bakufu*, Norinaga's project was critically opposed to the contemporary status quo as he understood it at the time. It was articulated over against an ancient Chinese cultural totality which he opposed to Japan, and Japanese characteristics were elicited as a function of a posited communal difference *vis-à-vis* China. Norinaga's phoneticist hermeneutic translated written texts into an economy of voice in its relation to the scene of enunciation. Textual study served as a means of gaining access to this archaic community and reiterating it in the present for the purpose of reforming the present.

Whereas Norinaga conceived Japan in terms of its difference from ancient China, Haga appropriates the properties and differences generated in relation to China for the purposes of a new structure within which Japan is opposed to, yet simultaneously equated with, Europe. This is the reason it is now possible for Haga to bring *kangaku*, or Chinese studies, within the field of *kokugaku* research. Opposing Japan to Europe thus brings China and Asia closer as supplementary aspects of a modern and civilized Japanese difference from Europe. Haga's notion of temporality curiously evokes Fukuzawa Yukichi. He emphasizes the claim that *kokugaku* is not backward-looking, but evidences development and progress that testify to their ongoing contemporary relevance. The temporality of the civilized world is a temporality of progress, and Haga's project is determined to locate development, not just in *kokugaku*, but in Japanese tradition generally. By identifying *kokugaku* with development, he situates it as modern and consistent with the vitalist ontology of the contemporary nation-state.

In sum, Haga appropriates the disciplines of national literary study and classical philology for Japan in all of their imperial glory. Yet he is also concerned to establish parallel authorities and modes of enunciation such that the academic legitimacy conferred upon Japanese philology by way of reform along Prussian lines serves to articulate Japanese tradition prior to the encounter with Europe as already having been civilized in European terms. Haga thus inscribes literary study and national learning within the discourse of civilization required by Japan's semicolonial and then imperial situation.

He further claims that this formation should be understood retroactively. Michel Foucault writes that, "history is that which transforms documents into monuments."[42] I suggest that Haga transforms Japanese literary study and national studies into a monument to Japanese civilization in Western terms prior to contact with the West. Thus he expressly aligns Japan with the imperialist aspects of the European discourse of the civilizing process. His later work went on to explicitly elaborate this logic in the context of the Japanese colonial empire.

Haga's next important work on Japaneseness, *Kokuminsei jyûron* [Ten Essays on the National Essence] (1907), published just two years after the Russo-Japanese War, was a runaway bestseller. While the work is conventionally identified with the postwar genre of writings on Japaneseness known as *Nihonjinron*, it also meets Haga's definition of *kokugaku*. The object of Haga's concern in *Kokuminsei jyûron* is national character (*kokumin no seishitsu*). His project is to examine the national particularity (*kokumin no tokusei*) of the Japanese people and its relation to the influence of other civilizations. He writes, "While there are differences between people in different parts of Japan, when Japanese are looked upon as a unified whole and compared to Europeans, we may ourselves recognize traits particular to the Japanese people."[43] He is at pains to make clear that each variety of folk (*minzoku*) is not defined by differences in hair and skin color alone, but also by physical constitution and mentality (*taikaku* and *shinsei*).[44] There exists a character of each folk (*minzokuteki seishitsu*). Haga, like Fukuzawa, understands cultural progress to emerge from the interaction of cultures.[45] He more specifically suggests that Japan has now emerged on the world stage. Japanese must now reflect upon what must be preserved from the past and what must be changed for the future. It is necessary to know the character of Japan. The Japanese folk are possessed of beautiful morals, but strengths are also always weaknesses from another perspective.[46] The work is divided up into chapters based on traits that Haga takes to be particularly characteristic of Japan as a totality. These topics include loyalty and patriotism, the ancestors,

pragmatism, optimism, love of nature, simple elegance, purity and integrity, and mercy. Haga does not explicitly present the work as the product of a particular academic discipline, but clearly his position as a scholar of literature and language serves to legitimize his various statements about the character of Japanese tradition. He repeatedly emphasizes that he writes as a Japanese subject.

In this work, Haga once again emphasizes that Japan alone among Asian countries has "entered the ranks of the strong nations of the world."[47] While Japanese military success has led to Western hysteria in the form of the yellow peril, Haga is determined to portray Japan as civilized, adaptive, spiritually autonomous, militarily prepared (but only in self-defense), racially tolerant, and charitable—as a morally superior nation of natural poets.[48] Haga is careful to attempt to reassure the West that Japan is not an aggressor, while at the same time rattling the sword toward Asia. He gruffly declaims that Asian states should not mistake Japan's peaceful intentions for a submissive attitude toward other Asian states. Incredibly, he suggests that the 1880s decision to postpone invading Korea until a later date when the Japanese nation was more prepared to favorably prosecute a war establishes Japan's peaceful intentions.[49]

We have seen that Japanese governmentality often invokes the family as a site of recoding in response to the decoding of capitalist rationalization. Haga's project, like that of Inoue Tetsujirô, is to articulate a mode of governmentality grounded in the *ie*, or the *extended family household*, understood as an extension of the Imperial family. In this way, he promulgates a novel conception of national community in the guise of passive and faithful adherence to tradition and family values. Haga implicitly rejects the notion of a civil society distinct from and beyond the family, thus articulating a self-consciously and polemically anti-liberal conception of the Japanese social formation. This becomes explicit when he insists that filial piety and patriotism are one and the same virtue.[50]

This may be seen as in part a reaction to the semicolonial position of Japan at the end of the nineteenth century. The national community as a whole is to be most properly governed by moral suasion rather than political power. The moral superiority of Japan as a nation, in fact, is purportedly proven by Haga's assertion that social revolution in Japan has never involved a challenge to patriarchal or imperial authority.[51] He also claims that Japan is a country of families rather than individuals. Ultimately his argument is tautological—Japanese nationals are characterized by selflessness and deference to authority because he takes these to be the primary Japanese virtues. In essence he asserts that Japanese nationals are virtuous by definition.[52]

Lastly, a nearness to and affinity with nature is defined as a characteristic of the Japanese. Poetry is defined as the expression of natural sentiment. The Japanese people are then defined as a nation of poets.[53] Haga thus defines Japanese national community as a literary ventriloquism of nature. The communal sensibility Haga ascribes to the cultural totality he is helping to articulate is ascribed to the landscape. The emperor, the language, the family, and the land all become figures of nature that express themselves in the form of Haga's variety of national community. Construction of a second, anthropocentric "nature" thus lies at the heart of Haga's conception of governmentality.

The circular quality of Haga's discourse is of a piece with how he instantiates each aspect of the institutions he purports to be describing. He grounds a new concept of the nation in a new concept of the emperor system. He grounds a novel conception of the emperor system in a new understanding of the family defined in relation to the nation rather than to caste. Command of the Japanese language situates one within a new cultural totality, but this language itself was in the course of being massively reformed. Every tradition to which Haga appeals in order to legitimize other practices turns out to be a novel discursive unity that was itself undergoing radical and dramatic change at the time Haga was writing. In effect, Haga produces an endless chain of newly "nationalized" traditions, all purportedly legitimating one another in the name of a past that had never previously been conceived in any of these terms.

For Haga, these national characteristics establish that Japan is morally superior to Europe by virtue of greater racial tolerance. This is based on the claim that in remote antiquity, Koreans and Chinese were once supposedly allowed to relocate to Japan (in fact, at this time many Japanese were native to the Korean peninsula or immediate relatives of people in various Korean kingdoms). He finds the yellow peril to be a sign of Aryan supremacy and race hatred.[54] Russian generals are guilty of atrocities in the Sino-Japanese War, but for Haga Japanese soldiers would be incapable of such things by definition—in any historical period.[55] From his perspective, even as Japan began to assert colonial control over the Korean peninsula, its attitude toward Korea was defined by tolerance above all else.[56] On similar grounds, Haga claims Japanese superiority to China by asserting that while Japanese are among the cleanest peoples on earth, the Chinese are dirty and have historically been cannibals.[57] At this point Haga's writing becomes a free-floating fantasm designed to establish Japanese superiority. Ultimately, Haga's definition of Japaneseness comes to define socially acceptable enunciative positionality. Within his schema, social contradiction is excluded from the social formation by definition.

According to Haga, those who would contradict his orthodoxy are un-Japanese and therefore not legitimate or loyal opponents. What Haga enacts here is the oppression of a totalizing identity that suppresses the singularity of the individual and the multiplicity of the community. The eternal continuity of imperial Japanese orthodoxy is aligned with life. Forces that challenge that orthodoxy from within or without are agents of degeneracy and ultimately, opposed to the life of the empire.

IMPERIAL DOMESTICITY AND COLONIAL KOREA

The second part of this chapter focuses on Haga's major work of 1911, *Nihonjin* (*Japanese*), another text on Japaneseness. It was a revision of lectures he gave in Seoul, Korea at the invitation of the Japanese Governor-General of Korea in 1911, the year after Japan asserted sovereign control over the Korean peninsula and formally annexed Korea as the colony of Chôsen. The work took the form of a commentary on the *Imperial Rescript on Education* from the perspective of nationality (*kokuminsei*).[58] He includes a set of one hundred *waka* from all periods of Japanese history that he feels represent the beauty of the national essence (*kokutai*). The work thus carries over from his previous writing the assumption that literature is an important avenue for understanding the thought and sentiment of the nation.[59]

Haga's enunciative position as regards Korea was very much a function of legal, economic, and cultural aspects of governmentality instituted by the Japanese state, at first informally, and then by way of explicit annexation and the establishment of the office of the governor-general as the preeminent political, legal, and economic authority. The Japanese instituted the legal aspects of capitalist governmentality in Chôsen in several ways. The Treaty of Kangwha (1876) declared Korea an independent nation, only to define the relationship in unequal terms that were self-consciously drawn from the Ansei treaties imposed on Japan in the 1850s; Japan was granted two treaty ports and territory in Pusan where Japanese subjects enjoyed extraterritoriality.[60] After the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, the Treaty of Shimonoseki again declared Korea's independence, but annexation in 1910 overturned this and asserted Japan's unqualified sovereignty over Korea.[61] This was reinforced by the Japanese abolition of extraterritorial privileges in Korea and a new situation under which Japanese were no longer defined as foreigners. The Japanese constitution was held to legally "apply," but was not observed in practice. The Korean legal code was technically distinct from domestic Japanese law.[62] The legal framework imposed on Korea by the Japanese was effectively a policy of discrimination in the name of assimilation.[63] A governor-general was granted administrative authority to unilaterally promulgate regulations

with the force of law,[64] so Korea was effectively subject to a military state of emergency from 1910–1945. Police were granted legal authority to pass summary judgments on misdemeanor cases,[65] and the legal code introduced by the Japanese subjected Koreans to a special "premodern" code of discipline including torture and flogging, a practice long outlawed in Japan as barbaric and inappropriate. The colonial legal code, as compared to previous Korean legal codes, actually expanded the use of flogging as punishment for various illegal acts.[66] Koreans were excluded from enlightened, liberal forms of governance.[67]

The paramount concern of legally imposed governmentality in Korea, however, was to use state authority to better organize and administer Korean society for economic development.[68] A core purpose of legal innovation was to accelerate the commodification of land. This was widely associated with evolutionary progress.[69] The household register and the land register were important institutions in this process;[70] these registers were central to the Japanese implementation of a new, private legal code.

The cultural aspects of governmentality under the governor-general in Korea were manifold. According to Japanese authorities, Korean people possessed a lower level of civilization and ethnic development (*mindo*) in spite of an ultimate racial community with the Japanese. Koreans were therefore not competent to be recognized by the Japanese as legal subjects under the law.[71] They were as children, requiring the paternalist supervision of Japanese adults.[72] As Komagome Takeshi has shown, assimilation was a very ambivalent idea for Japanese colonial authorities. Japan effectively tried to achieve economic and social assimilation without conceding political assimilation and participation. In effect, it was a policy of class stratification in the guise of a policy of integration.[73] For Komagome, the policy of assimilation was designed to allow Japanese to disavow the contradictions between nationalism and imperialism.[74] Campaigns against traditional lifeways were tied to Japanese efforts to enhance productivity and install economic discipline.[75] Koreans were not thought capable of deferred gratification, one of the cardinal measures of social development under contemporary evolutionary theory.[76] The promotion of flogging was tied to a perception among Japanese officials that Koreans lacked the time discipline necessary to a society to be effectively subject to the imperatives of wage labor. Incarceration appeared to be ineffective absent a population that clearly resented or suffered from a loss of control over their time.[77] Japanese efforts at Korean development were consistently aimed at improving the efficiency and productivity with which Korean society could produce Japanese profits. The lack of national community or unity, especially of a sense of identity between the royal house and the

state in Korea as compared to the "unbroken imperial line" of Japan, were taken to be decisive indications of Korean inferiority.[78] The ideology of imperial domesticity, commonly referred to as the *kokutai* ideology, was invoked in support of a Japanese obligation to take up the altruistic cause of cultivating Korea and Koreans due to the superior maturity of Japanese moral and religious conceptions. Japanese authorities such as Yamagata Aritomo privileged morality and religion above secular legal codes in a proto-neoconservative manner. The *Imperial Rescript on Education* was at the heart of this privileging of morality and custom in both Japanese and Korean education.[79] The Rescript was introduced into Korean education in 1909.[80] Assimilation and annexation were justified and legitimized in terms of family or kinship,[81] even as differences in *mindo* were presented as reasons why legal and cultural equality between Japanese and Koreans was not realistic. As Peter Duus has noted, the family metaphor, what I refer to as the "discourse of domesticity," envisioned Korean-Japanese relations in a hierarchical manner that extended intra-familial notions of hierarchy to the international sphere.[82] That is to say, the Japanese nation conceived as a family state implicitly expanded under the rubric of a family empire.

To return to Haga Yaichi, the first observation to be made about *Nihonjin*'s mode of enunciation is that he appeals to Japaneseness as a source of rhetorical authority in an increasingly multiethnic context. The Japanese colonial empire had grown to include a significant number of other Asian countries. Consequently, the Taiwanese, Ainu, and Korean subjects of the empire are only admitted to public discourse insofar as they are willing to speak from an avowedly Japanese subject position. I will return to this issue shortly.

The institutional site of the lectures is also important. Haga lectured on Japaneseness, in relation to a rescript of the Japanese emperor, at the heart of Japanese military headquarters for the colonial control of Korea. Discourses of Japaneseness increasingly came to bear quite immediately upon the lives and futures of many ethnically non-Japanese groups throughout Asia at this time and Haga's speech is a very concrete instance of this. Haga's writings frequently revolve around issues of what Anghie has defined as a colonial dynamic of difference in two respects.

First, from the Japanese perspective, Haga is concerned to distinguish Japanese culture from Western civilization as he defines it. This serves to modernize and nationalize Japan, while insisting on a sense of Japanese cultural sovereignty. Until 1910, this was undertaken in the context of the semicolonial discipline of the Ansei treaties. Second, from the perspective of Korea in 1910, Haga's writings set up the study of classical Japanese literature as the ground of a discourse that endeavors to legitimate

Japanese control of Korea. Haga derives a Japanese paternalist duty to govern Korea from a dynamic of cultural difference between Japan and Korea according to which he seeks to establish Japanese moral and cultural superiority, especially as regards the domestic sphere.

In this sense, Haga's writings elaborate a Japanese dynamic of difference prejudicial to Korea in which Japanese sentiment and purported Korean backwardness present Japanese control of Korea as a paternal duty and as the most highly ethical Japanese course of action. A Japanese regime of truth and knowledge regarding Japanese and Korean morality and culture is invoked in order to justify colonial domination. Haga transforms the Japanese distinction he elaborated in order to sustain Japanese cultural autonomy vis-à-vis Euro-America into a rationalization for Japanese imperial expansion.

Komagome Takeshi has outlined a range of Japanese colonial discourses ranging from equality and assimilation to discrimination grounded in a recognition of difference.[83] Haga's conception of the proper Japanese relation to Korea was centered on the concept of *dôka*, or assimilation, a notion that was explicitly promoted by the initial Japanese governor-general of Chôsen. A popular discourse of Japanese nationalism domestically, when enunciated in Korea *dôka* became a doctrine that rehearsed national virtue in order to legitimize colonial occupation and administration.

Haga's talk in Seoul both reiterated and amplified the themes he had previously expounded upon. He repeated his claim that Japan was both a civilization of great antiquity and a modern nation of great power. He remarked that Japanese civilization was older than European civilization and that only Japan had continuously existed from the ancient to the modern period, while other civilizations in Europe or Asia had not.[84] From Haga's perspective, these qualities implied Japan's moral and spiritual superiority over all other civilizations and nations in the world.

Haga consistently demeans and abjects Chinese and Koreans. He finds that Chinese are uncivilized by virtue of practices such as foot-binding. They are dirty. They are incapable of imagining a social ritual as beautiful as the Japanese doll festival (*hinamatsuri*).[85] Both Chinese and Koreans are cowards when confronted with armed Japanese might. Haga even develops an orientalist discourse within which only Japanese now truly understand ancient Korea or China. For Haga, the truly moral aspects of doctrines originally developed in China are now lost to them. Even originally Chinese moral principles now live on only in Japan.[86]

Haga effectively inverts the treaty era version of the dynamic of difference, now describing Japanese difference from Europe as a European lack rather than a Japanese shortcoming. For example, he remarks that

a Japanese shrine indicates Japanese moral virtue, but that the charm of a German forest is lessened by the absence of the Shinto shrines, one would expect to see in Japan.[87] Haga capriciously conflates and then distinguishes religion and morality depending on what is most flattering to Japan. From the perspective of Japanese education, religion does not figure importantly. From the perspective of morality, the Japanese emperor is superior because he is a moral leader rather than simply a political power broker. *The Imperial Rescript on Education* is precious as the word of the gods. Yet the educational system based on the word of these gods does not involve religion. For Haga, Japan is superior to Europe by virtue of not having divided morality and politics.[88] Haga expressly asserts that no boundary exists in Japan between the private and the public sphere, between the state and civil society, and insists that this indicates Japanese superiority. He writes, "When the light of learning shines, while religion remains the root of education in such circumstances, the shadow it casts grows weaker. It loses authority. Isn't it the present European countries of civilization that come to a dead end over the separation of religion and education? Our ability to possess a teaching [canonic text] that keeps its distance from each type of religion and whose authority transcends religion is a prerogative not to be found in other countries of the world."[89]

Haga essentially claims that Japan has avoided the contradictions of European modernity. The purported absence of a Japanese civil society opposed to the state is to stand as evidence for this. What might have previously been seen as a premodern Japanese lack he now presents as a dynamic of difference indicating Japanese superiority and European lack. Further, the state is figured as a private realm subject to the moral leadership of the emperor. Within Haga's mode of governmentality, the entire social formation is conceived in the terms of the household or family—this family is, however, always already national by virtue of the purported tie between the ancestors of the immediate family and the Imperial family. To worship one is to worship the other.[90] Further, contrary to the West, where the family exists for the sake of the individual, the Japanese individual is supposed to exist for the sake of the family. Civil society is coded as Western and Haga's attempt to articulate an indigenous Japanese thought consequently repeats themes common to several varieties of Euro-American nationalism grounded in religious orthodoxies (varieties of Christianity and Judaism) that seek to marginalize secular modernity. Haga thus presents an argument that significantly anticipates significant aspects of Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss's critiques of secular Enlightenment modernity.[91]

A second strategy of totalization is the identification of the emperor and the people with the soil. The Imperial court is posited as the source

of beautiful things in morality and literature. To be poetic was originally to be courtly, *miyabi*. Court ritual gave rise to both poetic art and national morality.[92] In effect, the Imperial court assumes the position held by Mother Nature within European romanticism.[93] For Haga, the Imperial court is the value in itself for the sake of which Japanese art and society undertake their work. It is often suggested that European aesthetics substitutes the spirit of the nation for the spirit of Christ. It seems that with his aesthetics of the Imperial household Haga comes very close to claiming expression of both a national spirit in aesthetics and a quasireligious, transcendental spiritual presence.

In defense of his vision of national community, Haga collapses the regime of knowledge and membership in the cultural totality so completely that disagreement is essentially immoral and un-Japanese. The singularity of the subject of enunciation is entirely collapsed into coincidence with the cultural totality Haga envisions. Haga claims that neither Chinese nor Westerners can understand Japanese affairs by virtue of their having internalized the national essence of foreign countries. Basil Chamberlain is his primary exhibit in this regard.

Haga acknowledges that Chamberlain had mastered Japanese language and history. Chamberlain's claim that the emperor was not revered during the Tokugawa period and was then revived at the end of the period is even supported by textual evidence, but Haga dogmatically insists that it cannot possibly be true by definition. He writes, "*Even though there may be periods during which the [national] people might appear to have forgotten the imperial court, they absolutely did not forget. The feeling of respect from the bottom of our heart never changed. This national land, in other words, coexists with the Imperial Household*."[94]

By Haga's own admission, the evidence supports Chamberlain's position, but he refuses to concede the point because it conflicts with his preconceived orthodoxy regarding the emperor. Chamberlain's disagreement must be ascribed to his position of speaking from outside the totality of the Japanese national essence. Haga writes, "*There is no way Japanese reverence for the emperor may be explained with ideas such as the democratic monarchism of an Englishman*."[95] Haga insists that, "*Once you know that the prosperity of the imperial household is nothing other than the prosperity of the state, then at the same time you must deeply appreciate that absent the imperial household, neither the country of Japan nor the Japanse people could exist*."[96]

As tautologically defined by Haga, the Japanese people could not exist without the emperor. Within Haga's schema, disagreement or challenge to authority is un-Japanese by definition. Disagreement that leads to class conflict or disrespect for authority is not legitimate because it is defined

as an un-Japanese mode of comportment. To disagree is to remove oneself from any legitimate speaking position as defined by Haga. For Haga, native-born Japanese subjects who depart from his orthodoxy are by definition no longer true Japanese.

In a domestic context, Haga's position functions as a mode of capitalist governmentality—as a means to contain feminist, anarcho-socialist, and communist demands in the face of market logic being enforced by the police powers of the state.[97] Haga directly makes the connection himself by remarking that in Western countries there is a need for rational social policy, but that Japanese need do no more than think of the example of the court. There, mechanization has led to labor strife and pride in personal productivity has been lost. For Haga, this is a Western ailment reflected by a lack of joy on the part of Western artists. Haga's mode of capitalist governmentality demands that socio-economic conflict be translated into a discourse of traditional Japanese values that stand in for the interests of Japanese capital and patriarchy.[98]

Haga declares that Japanese martial spirit is what enabled the Japanese annexation of Korea.[99] In the close of *Nihonjin*, Haga asserts that the primary purpose of *The Imperial Rescript on Education* is to make the spirit of the ancestors understood and to encourage imperial subjects to make it their own. The traces of the ancestors that remain are not simply matters of the past: He writes, "The blood of our ancestors runs in our veins.[100]"

For Haga, whether in ancient times or in the present, nothing truly changes. Families have always sympathized and suffered in the same way; therefore, the nation has always existed and always will.[101] Once again, the nation is conflated with the sphere of family morality. Because there have always been families in Japan, there have always been Japanese ancestors, and by implication a Japanese nation. In domestic Japan, a transference relation is supposed to take place where one sympathizes with one's immediate relatives and ancestors. These ancestors are tied to the fate of the Imperial family, and to worry about one's own family is thus to have concern for the nation. Within Haga's scheme, the extended family is thus colonized by the Japanese nation-state in the guise of the Imperial ancestors. It is the purportedly eternal verity of family that is used to naturalize both nation and political economy.

But how does this rhetoric of incomprehensibility to foreigners operate in the context of an expanding Japanese empire? How does this assemblage of enunciation operate in a multi-ethnic colonial context? Haga explicitly advocates the assimilation, or *dôka*, of "our newly attached countrymen."[102] They are to be taught the "same spirit as loyal subjects of today. Teach them the beauty of our national essence and assimilate them to us. There

is no other way."[103] Haga is certain that Koreans must be beside themselves with gratitude at Japan's having introduced modern medicine to Korea.[104] He writes, "for this one thing alone, Korea's subordination to our country is something for them to rejoice over."[105] For Haga, Japanese charity and benevolence are manifest in Japanese control over Korea.

How must such a regime look from a Korean perspective? Does the blood of Japanese ancestors run in the veins of contemporary Koreans? Many Japanese intellectuals insisted it did. This was obviously a controversial claim among Koreans. If the Japanese national essence is as incomprehensible to Englishmen and Chinese as Haga claims it is, what could conceivably bring about the assimilation of Korean subjects? If the Japanese language is identified with a national totality of sentimental immediacy, where would a Korean language student fit in to that totality? What might bring them closer to an assemblage of enunciation that so emphasizes Japanese particularity? *Nihonjin* leaves us with this fundamental aporia.

In conclusion, this chapter has made four claims regarding the Meiji period disciplinary formation of classical Japanese literary study. First, literary study served to accumulate cultural capital for the purpose of establishing that Japan was a civilized nation and thus in this sense contributed toward challenging the social-Darwinist discourse of the civilizing process that accompanied the imposition of the Ansei treaties and indirectly helped set the stage for their renegotiation. Second, the discipline of literary history operated as a subjective technology that grounded a new notion of the Japanese nation and individual in the humanist subject and established a claim for its historical continuity from time immemorial strongly identified with nature. It reframed the archive of traditional writing as newly expressive of a national subject and established new philological protocols for reading it as such. Third, Haga's nationalist discourse of Japaneseness played an important part in the turn-of-the-century mode of capitalist governmentality grounded in a uniquely Japanese domestic sphere and according to which feminism, labor organization, anarchism, and communism—indeed any challenge to capital and patriarchal authority—was deemed a transgression of traditional Japanese values. Fourth, Haga invoked this same discourse of the moral superiority of a uniquely Japanese domestic sphere abroad for the purpose of rationalizing and legitimizing Japanese annexation and administration of Korea. For Haga, Japanese exploitation of Korea was transparent evidence of Japanese benevolence and racial tolerance. Foreigners were defined as incapable of understanding Japanese things even as Japan administered a multi-ethnic empire that professed to seek to integrate non-Japanese within a common imperial Japanese culture.

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Epilogue

Japan and the Specter of Imperialism has argued that Japanese responses to the Ansei treaty regime were characterized by vitalist ontologies of the nation and a consistent concern with the mutual implication of discourses of the foreign and the domestic. Such conceptions of national "life" consistently functioned as alternative understandings of a capitalist "second nature" that served to safely domesticate the market for Japanese purposes. The book establishes that late nineteenth-century Japan suffered under competing sovereignties that inflected various attempts to establish a proper place for Japan within a liberal capitalist world characterized by colonial hierarchy and evolutionary notions of zero-sum competition and survival. It demonstrates that competing Japanese modes of governmentality were haunted by the breakdown of their vitalist assumptions, particularly by the unintended consequences of the Ansei treaties and the hierarchies of coercion and exploitation that accompanied the capitalism they brought with them.

Aside from the anarchism of Kôtoku Shûsui, all competing conceptions of nineteenth-century Japanese national identity discussed in this book sought to come to terms with the demands of the global market on the Japanese social body. Most of these conceptions were efforts to constitute a Japanese domestic sphere, in the sense of both the nation and the family. Threats to Japanese national identity were frequently interpreted in familial terms and the family was consistently defined as a locus for the production and improvement of national citizens. Imperialism was just one of several specters haunting Japanese ontologies of the nation and the individual.

Contrary to much previous work on Japan, this study establishes that an organismic paradigm of the social body was as central for Japanese intellectuals drawing on British liberalism as it was for those who developed their positions in dialogue with German idealism. While incorporating insights from previous postcolonial approaches to Japan-related material and insisting on the level of economic and military coercion associated with the spread of capitalism into East Asia, this book has sought to account for the economic agency and hegemony of non-Western forces as well. It takes as its point of deparature that the international legal regime of the late nineteenth century and the associated cultural discourses of civilization were instrumental in denying legal and economic agency to

Japan during the unequal treaty period and explores the manner in which Japan in turn exploited these same institutions in its annexation and colonial administration of Korea.

Chapter 1 situates the Ansei treaties as instituting a regime of differentiated sovereignty. The treaty powers invoked a dynamic of cultural difference to legitimize economic, legal, and political discrimination under international law. In a manner similar to the disarticulation of citizenship under twenty-first century status-of-forces agreements and special economic development zones, under the Ansei treaties Japanese citizens were deprived of their right to the criminal jurisdiction of the Japanese state in the case of crimes committed by foreigners residing in the treaty ports. Foreign workers also received special privileges and above-market salaries. Thus, it seems we may interpret the Ansei treaty system as a translational system designed to substitute the space of the global market for that of Japanese state sovereignty. In this respect, the unequal treaties with Japan appear to anticipate the economic development zones promoted by neoliberalism since the 1980s.

The chapter finds that the treaties effectively replaced a feudal rule of status with a regime of coercive contracts. Treaty power claims that introduction of the rule of international law served a liberating, civilizing function, came to be seen by Japan's most ardent and influential liberals (Fukuzawa Yukichi and Tokutomi Sohô, for example) as obviously false. Such great power abuse of international law came to be widely considered illegitimate, at least when applied to Japan. The chapter endeavors to read *Madame Butterfly* as a narrative set in the Ansei treaty context and critical of inequities in the unequal treaty regime from a position in deep sympathy with the Christian-inspired promotion of a paternalist domestic sphere. It also suggests that the novella's emphasis on the gravity of love-marriage and divorce deeply resonated with contemporary Japanese debates and state policies actively promoting the seriousness of marriage as a significant concern related to treaty revision through its potential reflection on Japan's relative level of civilization. The chapter notes the incorporation of melodramatic tactics into Imperial state ceremony and factory law debates. It argues that Kôtoku Shûsui's anarchism, by contrast, called into question the easy association of the Japanese domestic sphere and the national economic interest by arguing that claims to a common domestic sphere were false claims of community advanced on behalf of very narrow financial and political interests.

Chapter 2 explores the manner in which Mori Arinori implemented those aspects of Spencerian evolutionary theory he considered helpful in instituting industrial era market rationality, labor discipline, and national competiveness in Japan. It finds that the educational reforms of Mori

and his successors contributed toward institutionalizing competition and related elements of calculative market rationality that came to be signficantly formative of Meiji Japanese society. According to the Spencerian logic implicit in Mori's ethics text, citizens should be valued in terms of their contribution to the accumulation of capital, a mode of governmentality strikingly reminiscent of the economization of citizenship under neoliberal modes of governmentality as theorized by Aihwa Ong. Nevertheless, the chapter finds that Mori also adjusts Spencerian evolutionism in a manner that accounts for Japanese challenges. His stated views and policies as education minister directly challenged Spencer's opposition of the militant and industrial modes by insisting that both were necessary for late nineteenth-century Japan.

Chapter 3 reveals the role of aesthetic discourse drawn from German idealism in new conceptions of Japanese national identity developed during the 1880s and 1890s. It shows how Japanese claims of traditional national unity required the prosthetic supplement of aesthetic discourse, cultural preservation, and the associated academic disciplines developed in the West. Shiga Jûkô and Kuga Katsunan explicitly drew upon the thought of Johann Fichte to articulate an alternative, non-Western Japanese modernity tied to a uniquely moral and spiritual Japanese domestic sphere. Shiga and Kuga's positions interestingly imply that occupied Germany of Fichte's era was already a site of non-Western, alternative modernity in some sense.

Chapter 4 maps the extension of aesthetic discourse into the theorization of imperial domesticity. Inoue Tetsujirô and Kuga Katsunan articulated alternative modes of Japanese governmentality. Inoue conjured an organismic utilitarianism that claimed moral superiority over the West on communal grounds. Kuga's approach was also organismic, but challenged Western reason, even as it identified with the logic of Japanese capital. Both positions constituted claims for an alternative Japanese modernity and both directly sought to challenge Eurocentrism.

Chapter 5 establishes that Ozaki Kôyô's *The Gold Demon* is not only haunted by the hierarchies of exploitation that characterized domestic class stratification and international imperialism. It also stages the increasing commodification of domestic social and personal relations in a capitalist market economy, albeit in combination with a particularly male-centered politics of gender. It finds that the novel ultimately aligns itself with Miyake and Kuga's articulation of a Japanese social body according to which freedom and life are identified with organismic national community, whereas foreign capital and state authority are seen as agents of uncanny alien powers that sabotage the realization of both personal autonomy and national sovereignty. Japanese capital, on the other hand,

may be sublated within the body of the nation as contributing toward a national common good. Kan'ichi's redemption at the end appears to suggestion a sort transubstantiation of his ill-gotten gains once they are redirected toward selfless and familial or communal purposes.

Chapter 6 finds that Haga Yaichi articulates and institutes a new vision of Japaneseness by way of philology that contributes toward promoting Japan within the civilizational hierarchy of nations. His work produced a counter-discourse as relates to the treaty powers. He later redeploys it in an effort to legitimize Japanese control of Korea by invoking the superiority of Japan's imperial domesticity. His writing and research contributed toward a mode of capitalist governmentality both domestically and abroad, in both cases calling on purportedly traditional values to legitimize the institution and enforcement of industrial era market logic.

What broader conclusions might be drawn regarding the Meiji period based on the research and analysis that this book brings together? *Japan and the Specter of Imperialism* reveals the extraordinarily dynamic relationship between nations across the Pacific and across the northeast Asian region. It argues for the centrality of gender history to cultural studies and historical inquiry more broadly. Clearly, the antagonisms discussed in this book were profoundly important in establishing the social landscape that enabled the later policies more conventionally associated with mid-twentieth century Japanese expansion. It is no doubt necessary to account for the Meiji installation of profoundly new modes of capitalist governmentality in order to think later Japanese policies in a responsible way that avoids the false presumption of atavism or failed modernity. The changes in Meiji Japan documented in this book and related research were just too profound for these sorts of immediate post-Second World War interpretations to be taken very seriously at this stage of our knowledge. This book's perspective requires thinking Japanese expansion alongside Euro-American policy, recognizing agency in the West as well as in Japan. It requires including Japanese empire within the larger history of imperial practice as Alexis Dudden has called for. It also requires acknowledging the uncomfortable truth that many of the mid-twentieth century policies for which the West has often condemned Japan had roots deep in the Meiji period, but were not of particular concern at that point as the West was playing "the Great Game" right alongside them and at that point Anglo-American interests were largely in harmony with those of Japan.

As regards future research, it is remarkable that every significant Meiji period thinker examined in this study was deeply involved in conjuring an extraordinary series of "second natures." For Japanese Christians, the new domestic sphere was a bridge toward the spiritual life of Christianity that transcended biological finitude. Reform of the Japanese domestic sphere

posed as a practical step that might potentially prefigure the religious salvation of the nation as a whole. For Mori, capital accumulation was effectively the "life" of Japanese society. For Fenollosa, Okakura, Kuga, Shiga, Miyake, and Onishi, national spirit expressed in aesthetics effectively performed the function of religious spirit in offering a higher form of life through the nation. For Inoue, the family was continuous with nation and race, and morality and aesthetics were significantly integrated. Kôyô's depiction and then exorcism of spectrality in *The Gold Demon* in large part followed Miyake and Kuga's ontology of communal national life, staging a melodramatic resistance to the market grounded in a quite reactionary politics of gender. Haga's celebration of imperial domesticity included claims similar to those of Kuga that Japan was a nation of poets, essentially ventriloquizing nature through the immediacy of their relationship with nature by way of the Emperor. For Kôtoku Shûsui, the lives and livelihoods of the international community of workers were haunted by the illegitimate specter of the Japanese state doing the bidding of capitalists and financiers.

As Cheah's discussion of nationalism makes clear, from a global perspective vitalist constructions of the nation (and revolution) are probably more typical than exceptional. Yet the relentless insistence of so many of these Meiji period thinkers on Japan's unique proximity to nature, however, does distinguish their nationalist discourses from those of many of their competitors. This issue raises at least two significant questions. Why would so many Japanese intellectuals make such claims? And what are we to make of them now?

On the first point, concerning what would motivate Japanese nationalists to make such claims, it seems essential to consider the unintended consequences of the treaty powers' deployment of the dynamic of difference in rationalizing exploitation of Japan in the late nineteenth-century. A very large percentage of the Japanese claims for uniqueness may be traced to cultural defense that takes the form of self-orientalization. Japanese differences that had at one point been used to signify Japan's status as less civilized were frequently turned on their heads to later function as distinguishing signs of Japanese superiority. For example, Inoue reclaims aesthetics for the moral discourse of Japanese patriarchy. Haga, the reader will recall, celebrates Japan's avoidance of secularization and even that its core values transcend mere religion. Julia Thomas has argued persuasively that in the 1890s Shiga Jûkô turned to nature as an alternative to discourses of social Darwinism that posed consistent problems for Japanese nationalism. The research and analysis presented in this book strongly supports extending that claim to the work of Miyake Setsurei, Kuga Katsunan, and Ozaki Kôyô as well.

A second required response will be to work through the materiality of such claims of Japanese proximity to nature and the centrality of the species line in drawing the biopolitical boundaries that defined Meiji

Japanese modes of capitalist governmentality. Even as Kan'ichi was metaphorically becoming a beast in response to the inroads of capitalism, Japanese intellectuals such as Haga were elaborating a discourse of Korean and Chinese inferiority that repeatedly associated them with the filth of animals and non-human animal species. Meiji Japanese intellectuals' relentless semiotic construction of a capitalist second nature also raises the question of the materiality of Japanese treatment of nature in the Meiji period. Among the countless issues that will neet to be addressed in future research, the following are surely of great importance.[1]

Japanese practices of land reclamation repeatedly transformed the landscape over the course of centuries. While agricultural productivity tied to land reclamation quadrupled during the Tokugawa period, the Meiji period saw such efforts skyrocket, as means to increase Japanese food supplies and as a means to create coastal territory ideally suited for new industrial facilities.[2] Chapter 1's account of Meiji legal reform underlines the commodification and alienation of land required by the new laws. These legal codes redefined Japanese and then Korean land as itself a form of capital. Japanese fishing practices were a consistent concern of the Japanese state. They were rationalized during Meiji, becoming an international enterprise in the wake of the territorial expansion of the empire that raised the catch to levels many times that of the late Tokugawa period. Indeed, for a time in the twentieth-century Japan was the world's leading exporter of fish.[3] It was in the Meiji period that cattle first became a significant source of food as well as leather in Japan. This entailed expanded cattle production and slaughter. Indeed, Mori Arinori considered beef consumption critical to the ability of Japanese males to compete with their foreign counterparts in the international war for survival. Silk-worm cards met cultures of female tutelage and cultures of tuberculosis in textile factory dormitories.

Between the 1870s and 1905, track was laid outlining the heart of the Japanese railroad network as we know it today.[4] Urban spaces gradually shifted from nodes organized around bridges and water transportation to a focus on railways and streetcars. The massive level of Meiji period railroad construction transformed habitat for nonhuman animals as well. Flooding of the Ashio copper mine poisoned vast tracts of land in Tochigi prefecture, threatening the lives and livelihood of many thousands beginning in the late 1870s. This incident was among the first warnings of the extraordinary danger and potential ecological devastation that accompany the mineral resource demands of industrialization. Air pollution became a significant concern with the expanded use of coal for industrial energy and electricity generation. The textile, paper, and pulp industries began to significantly pollute water sources in the Japanese islands.[5]

What might the book have to offer concerning repetition and difference between nineteenth-century Japan and the present? As the foregoing rehearsal of Chapter 1 notes, it appears that the Ansei treaties and the market logic promoted by Mori Arinori's variety of evolutionism eerily prefigure the displacement of sovereignty and disarticulation of citizenship that defines contemporary neoliberal globalization. Their common promotion of differentiated citizenship based on one's contribution to the accumulation of capital is particularly striking. But there are also significant differences between them of which we must not lose sight.

The two twenty-first century institutions that most closely recapitulate the logic of the Ansei treaties are special economic development zones and U.S. status-of-forces agreements. With the various zones of differentiated sovereignty characteristic of neoliberalism, general populations are dependent on the legal exceptions characteristic of economic development zones whether they happen to live in them or not.[6] Contemporary citizenship has consequently become partially embedded in the territoriality of global capitalism. Sovereignty has become routinely fragmented and pluralized, divided, and spatially extended.[7] The contemporary situation creates differentiated classes of citizenship, a hierarchy of those who are subjected to, and those who are excepted from, the tender mercies of the market.[8] In other words, hierarchies of relative human worth grounded in contribution toward the operation of market logic are not simply survivals of nineteenth-century social Darwinism—they define the ruling logic of contemporary capitalism in Japan and around the globe. While Aihwa Ong has described the promotion of Asian values in support of capitalism as a "new Asian hegemony," one that de-centers Western hegemony only in the postwar period,[9] this study establishes that the roots of such East Asian neoconservatism reach back at least as far as early twentieth-century Japan.

What contrasts should be drawn between the nineteenth century practices of the treaty ports and contemporary economic development zones? One salient issue is surely a shift regarding anxiety over the mutual implication of the domestic and the foreign in the context of the special economic development zones. There are two distinctions that may be clearly observed in a contemporary context: (1) where nineteenth century nationalists considered the Ansei treaties obviously illegitimate and demanded revision as soon as possible for over forty years, the neoliberal project attempts to normalize treaty–port-style exceptions to national sovereignty and citizenship as permanent, defining aspects of capitalist modernity to which good nationalists should not object because they ought to consider the interests of capital indistinguishable from the national interest; (2) the neoliberal project consistently attempts to redefine market logic as democratic logic. In effect, it seeks to substitute economic competition

for political democracy. When they conflict, the latter is to yield to the former. In this way, it may be argued that contemporary neoliberalism takes up the Spencerian logic of Wanibuchi Tadayuki, the social Darwinist moneylender in *The Gold Demon*. From this perspective, Japanese citizens really do have value to Japan only insofar as they are entrepreneurial and contribute toward the accumulation of Japanese capital; the creation of wealth is the true political deed. *The Gold Demon* as a work of art clearly questions that worldview, but it may also be argued that Kan'ichi's reintegration into society effectively comes down on the side of Miyake and Kuga, that ultimately the accumulation of Japanese capital for communal purposes is socially acceptable and compatible with human decency.

Pheng Cheah has suggested that the vitalist ontologies of nineteenth-century nationalism begin to break down in the face of the neoliberal nationalist concession that foreign capital must be a constitutive aspect of postcolonial or third world nationalisms going forward. As a consequence, he proposes the concept of spectral nationality as a new concept of the nation grounded in radical finitude. One consequence he derives from this is that the nation must not be too quickly dismissed as a critical site for challenging the hegemony of contemporary neoliberalism. On this view, "the state is an uncontrollable specter that the nation-people must welcome within itself, and direct, at once *for itself and against itself*, because this specter can possess the nation-people and bend it toward global capitalist interests."[10] That is to say, for Cheah the contemporary state is constitutively haunted or contaminated. While the neoliberal turn has increased capital and technology flows, it has not significantly challenged the generally static quality of labor or the international divisions of labor that result in uneven globalization. He argues that popular nationalisms in the postcolonial South should thus be reconsidered as instances of spectrality that may constitute significant sites of resistance to economic transnationalism.[11]

On one hand, this book's research demonstrates that intellectuals such as Mori Arinori were already promoting the necessity of capital accumulation for the development of Meiji era Japan. It is true that Japan was quite exceptional in requiring most foreign investment to come in the form of loans to the state, and generally proscribed direct foreign investment. It also would not do to ignore the epochal impact of Soviet and Chinese communism in inducing the development of welfare states among their competitors that ameliorated some of the worst excesses of laissez-faire capitalism through the better part of the twentieth century. Whether or not the current situation regarding nationalist opposition to neoliberal restructuring and economic development zones is qualitatively different from the vehement nationalist demands

to revise the unequal treaties will turn on how we interpret longterm Asian responses to the Asian financial crisis and the Japanese response to the increasing economic stratification that the move toward neoliberalism is increasingly beginning to produce within Japan. To date, popular opposition to neoliberalsm has not approached the levels of anti-treaty opposition. On the other hand, in the wake of the Asian financial crisis and continued Japanese economic stagnation, comparisons between the two situations are increasingly drawn. Finally, attention to the materiality of capitalist discourses of nature and the related abuse of animals and the environment points to a significant lacuna in Ong and Cheah's analysis that will have to be supplemented in future work. Indeed, it seems that the logic of refusing to recognize ecological and nonhuman animal agency is the very logic that informs the exclusion of certain categories of human agency intrinsic to regimes of extraterritoriality such as treaty ports, economic development zones, and status of forces agreements. Discriminatory exclusion of both human and nonhuman agency has proven integral to the projects of primitive accumulation and exploitation historically associated with such regimes of extraterritoriality.

Chalmers Johnson has noted that the status of U.S. military personnel in Japan, as in any situation governed by status-of-forces agreements negotiated with the United States, is a matter of extraterritoriality.[12] As discussed in Chapter 1, under nineteenth-century unequal treaties, criminal jurisdiction was retained by foreign consular officials in the case of crimes committed by foreign nationals. Article 17 of the status-of-forces agreement between Japan and the United States modifies this, ceding nominal jurisdiction and sovereignty to the host county, but giving U.S. authorities the right to refuse requests to hand over suspects.[13] Status-of-forces agreements in Germany, Japan, and Korea reflect the right of conquest and did not initially involve consent of the host countries. Seungsook Moon notes that three exceptions recognized within the SOFAs virtually override the theoretical sovereignty of host countries in the case of NATO countries: (1) the U.S. military maintains jurisdiction regarding offenses against other U.S. citizens; (2) the U.S. military maintains jurisdiction over offenses emanating from the performance of official military duties as defined by U.S. officers; and (3) host countries agree to give sympathetic consideration to requests for a waiver of SOFA terms, a practice that is automatic.[14]

The situation is even more blatantly unequal in the case of non-Western host countries. Because of military exceptions for passport and immigration regulations, the right of the United States to detain suspects until charges are filed in Japan and Korea has routinely been used to fly accused rapists and murderers with military ties and United States' citizenship out of those

countries, thus typically preempting indictment and prosecution by host authorities.[15] The result is a legal system that pays lip service to Wilsonian conceptions of national sovereignty, but that in practice amounts to a de facto continuation of the system of extraterritoriality characteristic of the liberal imperialism of the nineteenth-century unequal treaties. Since the 1990s, this system has been extended to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kyrgystan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kuwait, Qatar, Turkey, Bulgaria, and Iraq.[16] In other words, contemporary U.S. neoliberal imperialism shares with the nineteenth century an insistence on the suspension of international law, though its legal face has been adjusted to account for the formal recognition of legal sovereignty required by subsequent regimes of international law. Lastly, there is a depressingly familiar resonance between the missionary claims taken up in John Luther Long's *Madame Butterfly* that U.S. access to Japan and the Philippines was a matter of liberating Japanese and Filipino women and more recent efforts to legitimize the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq as again crusades motivated by a concern to liberate foreign, non-white women. *Japan and the Specter of Imperialism* aspires to underline the startling continuity of such moralistic U.S. crusades between the nineteenth and twenty-first century—both the foregrounding of gender politics for nationalist purposes and the (shifting) economic and strategic stakes that have consistently followed in their wake.

Lastly, this book has demonstrated that a vitalist ontology of economic growth and capital accumulation characterized not only Japanese varieties of social Darwinism but the nationalist discourses of nature with which the Japanese countered them in the 1890s as well. Related conceptions of economic vitalism (that national economic growth is a human right and that this entails access to the natural resources industrial capitalism requires) were central to later conflict between the Axis and the Allies. We see a resurgence of a very similar dynamic in the present-day competition between the United States, China, Japan, and India for access to and control over natural resources vital to economic growth.

The work of Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen and Herman Daly calls into question the basic premises of the reigning belief in the unqualified virtues of economic growth demanded by the economic vitalism analyzed in these pages.[17] Georgescu-Roegen and Daly establish that the neoclassical and Keynesian economics by way of which policymakers in Japan and the United States attempt to grapple with social and economic difficulties systematically excludes consideration of the biosphere and the second law of thermodynamics. Such views willfully ignore the manner in which increased economic production (GDP) depletes resources and increases waste—ignore the entropy of the ecosystem as a whole, the ecosystem upon which all species rely for their very survival.

Daly has characterized such approaches as a variety of "economic imperialism" that insists on treating the human economic subsystem of the global ecosystem as if it were the global ecosystem itself. This is perhaps the specter of imperialism that both Japan and the larger world face most immediately today. As Valerie Fournier has said, "If there is to be any hope of a sustainable future, it is precisely economic growth that needs to be called into question."[18] This book has established that economic vitalism is a discourse that has been at play in Japanese history for over a century. In the contemporary context, the process of challenging economic imperialism in Daly's sense will have to be negotiated between the Japanese, other nations, and the larger ecosystem upon which we all depend for our very survival. The success or failure of this challenge will directly affect global prospects for the outbreak of further resource wars going forward.

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Notes

Introduction

1. Ozaki Kôyô, *Konjiki yasha*, 115, translation mine.
2. Kôtoku, "Wasen wo kessuru mono" ["Those Who Decide on Peace and War"], 20. The editorial was originally published on February 2, 1904. My translation.
3. Kôtoku, *Nijyûseiki no kaibutsu: Teikokushugi* [*The Twentieth-Century Monster: Imperialism*].
4. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, 3–16; 327–45.
5. Cheah, "Spectral Nationality," 1–5.
6. Ishida Takeshi's *Meiji shisôshi kenkyû* is a landmark work that helped establish this position. Maruyama Masao discusses Kuga Katsunana and "healthy" Meiji nationalism in Senchû to sengo no aida [Between Wartime and the Postwar], 281.
7. While this argument was developed prior to contact with her work, in pursuing competing Japanese concepts of nature in the plural rather than the singular, I follow Julia Thomas's *Reconfiguring Modernity*. Pages 158 to 178 of that work cover material particularly relevant to the argument presented here.
8. Foucault, "Governmentality," 201–22.
9. Anghie, *Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law*, 6–7.
10. Classics from the debate on Japanese capitalism include Hattori Shisô's *Jôyaku kaisei oyobi gaikôshi* [*Treaty Reform and the History of Foreign Relations*] and Hani Gorô's *Meiji isshinshi kenkyû* [*Research on Meiji Restoration History*]. More recent research specifically regarding the unequal treaty system includes Inoue Kiyoshi's *Jôyaku kaisei* [Treaty Revision] and Ishii Takashi's *Meiji isshin no kokusaiteki kankyô* [The International Environment of the Meiji Restoration]. E. H. Norman's *Origins of the Modern Japanese State* was written within this tradition. Harry Harootunian's *Toward Restoration* also takes issues raised in the course of these debates as its point of departure. These Marxist studies had the merit of recognizing the violence of capitalist inroads into East Asia and collecting data on the issue, but often went astray in attempting to categorize Japan-related developments within theories of social development that required it to be laid out in a single unilineal series of discrete stages. The insights of these approaches were often obfuscated by the stage theory approach.
11. F. C. Jones' *Extraterritoriality in Japan* and Payson Treat's *Diplomatic Relations* are the classics in this genre. Pat Barr's *The Deer Cry Pavilion*, Hugh Cortazzi's *Victorians in Japan*, Robert Rosenstone's *Mirror in the Shrine*, F. G. Notehelfer's *Japan Through American Eyes*, J. E. Hoare's *Japan's Treaty Ports*,

and Louis Perez's *Japan Comes of Age* all share the tendency toward biographical focus. Accounts of missionaries in Japan include Sandra Taylor's *Advocate of Understanding* and F. Calvin Parker's *The Southern Baptist Mission in Japan*.

12. Foremost in this category may be Lothrop Stoddard's *The Rising Tide of Color. Stoddard writes*, "The smug satisfaction expressed in the West at what is called the "modernization" of the East shows lack of wisdom or an ineffective grasp of the meaning of comparatively recent events in Japan, China, eastern Siberia, and even in the Philippines . . . there is rapidly coming about a solidarity of political and material interests which in time will reduce Western participation in Far Eastern affairs to that of a comparatively unimportant factor.' . . . Every succeeding month of hostilities had seen the white world grow weaker and had conversely increased Japanese power . . . Japanese foreign policy has one minimum objective: Japan as hegemon of a Far East in which white influence shall have been reduced to a vanishing quantity. That is the bald truth of the matter—and no white man has any reason for getting indignant about it . . . That is no reason for striking a moral attitude and inveighing against Japanese 'wickedness,' as many people are today doing. These mighty racial tides flow from the most elemental of vital urges: self-expression and self-preservation. Both outward thrust of expanding life and counter-thrust of threatened life are equally normal phenomena. To condemn the former as 'criminal' and the latter as 'selfish' is either silly or hypothetical and tends to envenom with unnecessary rancor what objective fairness might keep a candid struggle, inevitable yet alleviated by mutual comprehension and respect . . . There are critical times ahead; times in which intense race-pressures will engender high tensions and perhaps wars." Stoddard, 34; 41–42.

In Stoddard's *Rising Tide* he also writes, "The man who, on a quiet spring evening of the year 1914, opened his atlas to a political map of the world and pored over its many-tinted patterns probably got one fundamental impression: the overwhelming preponderance of the white race in the ordering of the world's affairs . . . At this point the reader is perhaps asking himself why this book was ever undertaken. The answer is: the dangerous delusion created by viewing world affairs solely from the angle of politics . . . a better reading of history must bring home the truth that the basic factor in human affairs is not politics, but race . . . The force of this query is exemplified when we turn from the political to the racial map of the globe. What a transformation! Instead of a world politically nine-tenths white, we see a world of which only four-tenths at the most can be considered predominantly white in blood, the rest of the world being inhabited mainly by the other primary races of mankind—yellows, browns, blacks, and reds . . . The respective areas of these two racially contrasted worlds are 22,000,000 square miles for the whites and 31,000,000 square miles for the colored races . . . The statistical disproportion between the white and colored worlds becomes still more marked when we turn from surveys of area to tables of population . . . The colored races thus outnumber the whites more than two to one . . . some four-fifths of the entire white race is concentrated on less than one-fifth of the white world's territorial area (Europe), while the remaining one-fifth of the race (some 110,000,000 souls), scattered to the ends of the earth, must protect four-fifths of the white territorial heritage against the pressure of colored

races eleven times its numerical strength . . . Thus the colored world, long restive under white political domination, is being welded by the most fundamental of instincts, the instinct of self-preservation, into a common solidarity of feeling against the dominant white man . . . The upshot was the Russo-Japanese War of 1904, an event the momentous character of which is even now not fully appreciated . . . both Asia and Africa thrilled with joy and hope. Above all, the legend of white invincibility lay, a fallen idol, in the dust." Ibid., 3–12.

Beyond Stoddard's work being a defining 1920s work of American eugenics and the yellow peril, Samuel Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations* frequently reads as a less historically informed echo of Stoddard's avowed race history: "The survival of the West depends on Americans reaffirming their Western identity and Westerners accepting their civilization as unique not universal and uniting to renew and preserve it against challenges from non-Western societies." Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*, 20–21.

Huntington writes, "In coping with an identity crisis, what counts for people are blood and belief, faith and family. People rally to those with similar ancestry, religion, language, values, and institutions and distance themselves from those with different ones." Ibid., 126.

Huntington continues, "The West's share of most, but not all, of the most important power resources peaked early in the twentieth century and then began to decline relative to those of other civilizations . . . At the peak of its territorial expansion in 1920, the West directly ruled about 25.5 million square miles or close to half the earth's earth. By 1993 this territorial control had been cut in half to about 12.7 million square miles. The West was back to its original European core plus its settler-populated lands in North America, Australia, and New Zealand. The territory of independent Islamic societies, in contrast, rose from 1.8 million square miles in 1920 to over 11 million square miles in 1993. Similar changes occurred in the control of population." Ibid., 84.

13. Princeton's *Studies in the Modernization of Japan* series is the other canonic series of texts in this category. Maruyama Masao's *Nihon seiji shisôshi kenkyû* (Research on the Intellectual History of Japanese Politics) and Ishida Takeshi's *Meiji shisôshi kenkyû* (Research on Meiji Intellectual History) are two of the Japanese classics of this type. Kenneth Pyle's *The New Generation in Meiji Japan* also fits comfortably here. Robert Reischauer and Donald Keene were perhaps the highest profile figures in postwar America's effort to rehabilitate Japan from its demonization by Second World War-era U.S. propaganda. The primary point promoted by Reischauer and Keene was that Japan had successfully become both modern and Western. As "one of us" it no longer posed a danger. The work of the school as a whole often contributed toward rehabilitating Japan as safely in the Western capitalist camp for cold war purposes and typically expended some energy toward actively delegitimizing, refuting, and discounting communist charges that Western capitalism was particularly tied to exploitation in Asia, even as they typically grounded their own approaches in stage theories of evolutionary analysis drawn from reworked evolutionist and Marxist interpretations and research.
14. Ramon Myers and Mark Peattie's *The Japanese Colonial Empire* and *The Japanese Informal Empire in China*, W. G. Beasley's *Japanese Imperialism*, and Michael

Montgomery's *Imperialist Japan* fall in this category. Beasley and Montgomery's accounts follow evolutionary and modernization theory (and implicitly Spencer and Schumpeter) in attributing Japanese imperialism to cultural atavism rather than to the contradictions of capitalism, though Beasley acknowledges the latter as also a factor.

15. Auslin, *Negotiating with Imperialism*.
16. Tanaka, *Japan's Orient;* Oguma, *Tanitsu minzoku shinwa no kigen* [*The Origin of the Myth of a Single Nationality]; Oguma*, *"Nihonjin" no kyôkai* [*The Boundaries of "The Japanese*"]; Dudden, *Japan's Colonization of Korea*.
17. "A far deeper problem exists. Historical theories of international relations sustain the Euro-American Powers and their former colonies as the standards by which historical pasts and presents are defined. By neglecting Japan in these formulations, the civilizational project endures. Only the nations first described as civilized manifest a normal history of imperialism." Dudden, *Japan's Colonization*, 24.
18. "Several essays refer to hegemonic constructions of regional and cultural foundations that, while in some ways in opposition to Eurocentrism, nevertheless represent ideological formations that legitimize the operations of a globalized capitalism; it is my contention throughout these essays . . . that the critique of Eurocentrism is no longer (if it ever was) sufficient as a critique of hegemony." Dirlik, *The Postcolonial Aura*, 13. "Globalization in Asia, then, has induced both national and transnational forms of nationalism that not only reject Western hegemony but seek, in panreligious civilizational discourses, to promote the ascendancy of the East." Ong, *Flexible Citizenship*, 18. "In this work, I try to show how our cultural insights and our attention to everyday practice and the relations of power can illuminate how the operations of globalization are translated into cultural logics that inform behavior, identities, and relationships. We have perhaps also been restrained by our tendency to self-critique and by the postcolonial critique that attributes all modes of domination to the West . . . without paying close attention also to emergent forms of power and oppression that variously ally with and contest Western forces." Ibid., 22.
19. Tanaka's new book, *New Times in Modern Japan*, begins to remedy the situation by taking up issues of capitalist development and exploitation, although it does still remain within a largely postcolonial framework that avoids the thorny postcolonial identity politics of East Asian neoconservatism and its reliance on traditional Asian values in the service of alternative Asian modernities that ultimately promote Asian capitalisms.
20. Lydia Liu's *The Clash of Empires* is a pathbreaking work that applies a translational model to thinking through the unequal treaties in the Chinese context.
21. Howland, *Translating the West*, 186.
22. John K. Fairbank's *Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast*—an exemplary cold war modernization theory approach to the unequal treaty regime in East Asia—is dedicated to a former customs official under the unequal treaties who was a U.S. citizen and a personal mentor. He argues that the shining integrity and virtue of impeccable "Anglo-Saxon" administration in the customs office outweighed the fact that its implementation was only brought about by forcing a

subordinate status upon the Qing dynasty under international law. In response to Chinese suggestions that the customs house and the unequal treaties amounted to imperialist exploitation of China, Fairbank prefers to describe the customs house as an institution of both China and the foreign community. Thus, rather than seeing the unequal treaty regime in China as imperialism, he prefers to view the unequal treaties in terms of Chinese tradition as an instance where foreigners were incorporated into a pre-existing Chinese system (Fairbank, *Trade*, 468). This has the effect of erasing treaty power imperialism under the Open Door by implying that such oppression of Chinese was an expression of Chinese agency, the responsibility for which therefore cannot fall to foreigners if it is jointly an expression of British and Chinese will. Fairbank thus deliberately conflates the interests of the Qing dynasty with those of the Chinese people. He invokes the agency of a non-Western people to erase treaty power exploitation. Ultimately, Fairbank wants to avoid accounting for treaty power exploitation by claiming that concern for the power and agency of indigenous culture and tradition makes ascription of imperialism to the British Empire a variety of intellectual imperialism.

Michael Auslin's *Negotiating with Imperialism* is the most broadly drawn, detailed and significant English language study of Japan's unequal treaty diplomacy in recent years. Auslin is concerned to starkly distinguish the treaties imposed on Japan from the treaties imposed on China, so as to claim that the Japanese treaties were less onerous (Auslin, *Negotiating*, 21). He repeatedly implies that anything short of territorial colonialism cannot be significantly coercive or exploitative. Thus economic coercion and the threat of military force simply fall into the category of "non-colonial" policy—the treaties don't even qualify as producing semi-colonial relations. In effect, Auslin defends the unequal treaties imposed upon Japan as globalization *avant la lettre*: "The treaty powers had not come to Japan to colonize . . . Since Japan was not to be colonized, the Westerners treated Japan from the beginning more "equally" than they did colonized states, such as India, or semi-colonized nations, such as China. They took no territory in Japan, and did not carve out spheres of influence for themselves, in which only one nation was the primary power and prevented other states from engaging in trade or military actions . . . As a result, all the Western powers ultimately were bound by the same set of agreements with Japan, and found no room for typically imperialist competition with any other treaty power. The Ansei treaties thus played the key role in regulating not only Japanese-Western relations, but, uniquely, also intra-Western relations in Japan." Auslin, *Negotiating*, 7

Auslin asserts that Japanese unequal treaties were negotiated rather than imposed after military defeat, a distinction that would seem largely specious given that the treaty powers' military defeat of rebel powers at Shimonoseki led to punitive changes to the treaty framework that gave the bakufu state a choice between two ultimatums favorable to the treaty powers—open more treaty ports or pay $3 million in reparations and agree to a lower tariff schedule. Auslin is nevertheless persuaded that treaty-power restrictions on tariffs were not a

punitive response to a colonial legal rhetoric of injury as conventionally understood for over a century, but were rather simply a local application of a universal British push for open markets. Auslin in effect argues that the tariff conditions imposed on Japan by way of the treaties after 1866 were something on the order of a nineteenth-century free-trade agreement. The epilogue will take up Auslin's intriguing suggestion that the Ansei treaties resemble present day free-trade agreements, but in order to blame rather than to praise them.

In effect, Auslin repeats the contention of nineteenth century positivists like Wheaton and modernization theorists like Fairbank—if Japan did not want to enter into such contracts they shouldn't and wouldn't have, a sentiment that fairly erases the military and economic coercion that undeniably set the scene. Such tactics have traditionally been referred to as gunboat diplomacy for concrete historical reasons. Remarkably, Auslin is intent on expanding the range and impact of Japanese agency to the fullest extent possible. By purporting to respect Japanese negotiators for their savvy and ingenuity, like Fairbank, he implicitly lays the groundwork for the position that any Japanese claims of dissatisfaction are necessarily ex-post facto special pleading. Otherwise, why would they have signed the treaties? Fairbank's position is very suggestive for why application of "foreign theory" was considered such a shibboleth in East Asian area studies for the duration of the cold war. In this context it becomes clear that "foreign" or "Western" theory was often a code word for anticapitalist theories of Marxism and imperialism, especially when Fairbank goes out of his way to explicitly call out theories of imperialism as the latest Western import into China. The ban on applying foreign theories to China and Japan strangely never applied to the equally foreign works of Max Weber and Walter Rostow. Auslin appears to be developing an identity politics variant of Fairbanks' position designed to legitimate neoliberal globalization. His book simply assumes that if a historical practice resembles neoliberalism, then obviously nothing could be further from exploitation or colonialism. Auslin's book is ultimately an attempt to locate diplomatic heroism and an expression of agency in "agreement" to coercive contracts.

23. "My argument, by contrast, is that sovereignty was improvised out of the colonial encounter, and adopted unique forms which differed from and destabilized given notions of European sovereignty. As a consequence, Third World sovereignty is distinctive, and rendered uniquely vulnerable and dependent by international law. Thirdly, I adopt a historical approach to sovereignty doctrine, seeking to show how the colonial encounter shaped the underlying structures of the doctrine. My broad argument, then, is that doctrinal and institutional developments in international law cannot be understood simply and always as logical elaborations of a stable, philosophically conceived sovereignty doctrine, as an outcome of the continuing attempt to create order among sovereign states. Rather, we might see these doctrines and institutions as being generated by problems relating to colonial order." Anghie, *Imperialism*, 6–7.
24. There is an extensive literature concerning this question of whether unequal treaty era Japan was effectively a British colony or was rather in a semicolonial

situation, for example, Ishii Takashi's *Meiji Isshin to Gaiatsu* [*The Meiji Restoration and Foreign Pressure*].The Japanese Marxist debate on the development of Japanese capitalism also addressed these issues. Hani Gorô held that Japan was in a *hanshokuminchitekina* situation (semi-colonial), or literally half-colonial situation because of its relation to his stage theory analysis of world history. For Hani of the *Kôza* (lecture) school, the fundamental contradiction was between international capitalism and the Japanese people. Hattori, conversely, argued that Japan was in fact incorporated within the British Empire by way of the unequal treaty regime.

25. "It appears that unitary models of the postcolonial and of modernity are ascendant at a time when many Asian countries are not interested in colonialism or in postcolonialism—having in their leaders' views successfully negotiated formal decolonization—and are in the process of constructing alternative modernities based on new relations with their populations, with capital, and with the West. In other words, the 'alternative' in alternative modernities does not necessarily suggest a critique of, or opposition to, capital. Rather, it suggests the kinds of modernity that are (1) constituted by different sets of relations between the developmental or postdevelopmental state, its population, and global capital; and (2) constructed by political and social elites who appropriate 'Western' knowledges and re-present them as truth claims about their own countries." Ong, *Flexible Citizenship*, 35.
26. Fukuyama's *The End of History and the Last Man* and Friedman's *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* are two best-selling presentations of the view I challenge here, a view that continues to dominate news media perspectives in the developed world. Franks' *One Market Under God* also presents a useful survey of this literature. Naomi Klein makes an impressive case for the position I take here. Klein, *The Shock Doctrine*, 3–25.
27. For example, Ehito Kimura, a Japanese academic teaching in Thailand wrote in 1998: "Oddly, today's 'Unequal Agreements' are imposed not directly by the British or Yankees but by the International Monetary Fund and other international institutions in the form of reform pacts, packages and letters of intent. These 'agreements' require sweeping economic liberalization and heavily curtailed government spending. There are two interrelated concerns here. First, the IMF is prescribing the wrong medicine, blaming and punishing governments for crimes perpetrated by the private sector. Second, many feel that the IMF policies are designed (intentionally or not) to benefit Western powers who have been frustrated traditionally by tariff and non-tariff barriers in the region. But it's more than just about trade. The new 'Unequal Agreements' are also about U.S. dominance in the Pacific. If the old treaties fulfilled U.S. aspirations to be a trans-Pacific power, the new ones firmly maintain that embedded power structure." Kimura, "The New Unequal Treaties." http://www.geocities.com/RainForest/7813/0206_imf.htm. Accessed March 1, 2008.

CHAPTER 1

1. "The art of government, as becomes apparent in this literature, is essentially concerned with answering the question of how to introduce economy—that is to say, the correct way of managing individuals, goods, and wealth within the family (which a good father is expected to do in relation to his wife, children, and servants) and of making the family fortunes prosper—how to introduce this meticulous attention of the father toward his family into the management of the state . . . This I believe, is the essential issue in the establishment of the art of government—introduction of economy into political practice . . . To govern a state will mean, therefore, to apply economy, to set up an economy at the level of the entire state, which means exercising toward its inhabitants, and the wealth and behavior of each and all, a form of surveillance and control as attentive as that of the head of a family over his household and his goods." Foucault, "Governmentality," 207.

   Jonathan Xavier Inda provides an excellent overview of research developing Foucault's conception of governmentality in "Analytics of the Modern: An Introduction," 1–20. Another chapter in the same volume addresses Partha Chatterjee's concern over the proper relation between the colonial and the modern. "Chatterjee marks a distinction between colonial and modern power in such a way as to bring into focus the specificity of the former. In Chatterjee's view, unless we produce this conceptual distinction we shall be left with no recourse but to see the colonial as little more than an episode in modern—Europe's—history. . . . On my view, however, this formulation is not a conceptually adequate one. This is not because I think the question—What is the specificity of colonial power?—is irrelevant, but because, as I shall suggest, I think that unless the formulation of that question is made to depend upon a prior reconstruction of the historically differentiated structures and projects of colonial rule (the discontinuities within the colonial, in other words), we run the risk of a too-hasty homogenization of colonialism as a whole. In other words, my worry is that in formulating the question as he does (in a simple counterposition of colonial and modern), Chatterjee preempts an inquiry that would allow us to sort out those political rationalities that constituted colonialism in its historically varied configurations, and therefore enable us to mark the modernity of a turn in the career of colonial power." Scott, "Colonial Governmentality," 26–27.
2. "I use the term 'dynamic of difference' to denote, broadly, the endless process of creating a gap between two cultures, demarcating one as 'universal' and civilized and the other as 'particular' and uncivilized, and seeking to bridge the gap by developing techniques to normalize the aberrant society. My argument is that this dynamic animated the development of many of the central doctrines of international law—most particularly, sovereignty doctrine." Anghie, *Imperialism*, 4. Gong's *Standard of 'Civilization'* probably reflects hegemonic English language thought on the discourse of civilization as it specifically relates to the unequal treaty system in East Asia.

3. For example, see Gallagher and Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade," 1–15. Inoue Kiyoshi takes up the point in an essay from 1952: "To me there is a contradiction between Tôyama's claim that the powers' only aim was free trade and Tôyama's acknowledgement that these treaties were signed under the threat of artillery." Inoue Kiyoshi, *Meiji isshin* [Meiji Restoration], 159. Bernard Semmell's work brings some clarity to the issue: "Imperialism is, indeed, a term of which students of empire have become understandably, cautious . . . The attack on the neo-Marxist theory began in 1919, with Schumpeter's essay on imperialism, whose argument, stressing the essential irrationality of modern imperialism, was based, in good part, on the predominance of an anti-imperialism in the mid-Victorian heyday of British capitalism. There is no question but that such an anti-imperialist ideology, one which helped to precipitate 'the fall of the old colonial system,' existed. But what is not so well understood is that, with one or two exceptions, the same men whom Schuyler, Schumpeter, and Hobson, as well as others, have regarded as the spokesmen of this anti-imperialism, because they were the leaders of those groups who wished to dismantle the old colonial mercantilism, were also the spokesmen and, in some cases, the theorists of a new free trade imperialism which, they held, would prove more effective and popular, given England's altered economic position. Basing their views upon the doctrines of classical economics, they constructed theories of capitalist imperialism which held that empire-building was a necessity if the new industrialism were to survive, and advocated policies, both in and out of parliament, which later theorists of imperialism, in its 'classic' period, would recognize as almost classically imperialist. . . . From the standpoint of ideology, then, from the perspective of theory and policy no less than activities, it is possible to see continuity, rather than an interlude of anti-imperialism. Indeed, the period of the fall of the old colonial system may be viewed as one of the rise of a 'free trade imperialism. . . . To speak of theories or policies of a 'free trade imperialism' is, apparently, to go in the face of almost all previous theory." Semmell, *Rise of Free Trade Imperialism*, 3–4.
4. Beasley, *Japanese Imperialism*, 3–4. The first report of the Opium War entered Japan in June 1840. Inoue Katsuo, *Kaikoku to bakumatsu henkaku* [*The Opening of the Country and Late Bakufu Period Change*], 145.
5. Hoare, *Notes on Japan's Treaty Ports*, 134.
6. Beasley, *Japanese Imperialism*, 15.
7. Murphy, *Hemispheric Imaginings*, 69–70.
8. "Mahanism was a program for an emergent U.S. hegemony and a geopolitical analysis of the achievement of British hegemony. It was, of course, a mercantilist vision: A nation becomes wealthy and powerful through trade, and this trade was, of necessity, oceanic. The power that controlled the ocean would thus be the dominant world power. This control was not dependent on overseas colonies. Coaling stations were more important than colonies for the maintenance of the world navy . . . The trade was more important than carriage, and naval power was exercised by the navy, not by the merchant fleet. Naval policy, then, should be predicated to project force . . . into what Mahan often referred to as the new Great Common." Connery, "Ideologies of Land and Sea," 186.

9. "Compounding the intrinsic defects of international law, as there was no superior political authority endowed with a monopoly of force that would give it the ability to execute judgment against an offending party it fell to the civilized powers . . . to supply the executive function . . . To stave off a resurgence of barbarism . . . the great powers must maintain armed forces adequate to perform the duties that—in a more enlightened age—would fall to international police." Holmes, *Theodore Roosevelt and World Order*, 105.
10. Treat, *Diplomatic Relations*, 15.
11. Ibid., 51, 71–72.
12. Ishii, *Meiji Isshin to Gaiatsu* [*The Meiji Restoration and Foreign Pressure*], 261.
13. Jones, *Extraterritoriality in Japan*, 18–21.
14. Henning, *Outposts of Civilization*, 18–19.
15. Hoare, *Notes on Japan's Treaty Ports*, 58–59.
16. Inoue Katsuo, *Kaikoku to bakumatsu henkaku* [*The Opening of Japan and Changes in the Late Bakufu Period*], 192–93. "There is then, according to these writers, no universal, immutable law of nations binding upon the whole human race . . . The obligation of the ordinary *jus gentium* depends upon the persuasion, that other nations will observe the same rules in their intercourse with us, which we observe toward them, or if they fail to observe these rules, that they will incur the general hostility of nations. But this persuasion cannot exist as to those races of men who do not recognize our law of nations. International law is only a particular law, applicable to a distinct set or family of nations, varying at different times with the change in religion, manners, government, and other institutions, among every class of nations . . . the immediate visible basis on which the public law of Europe, and of the American nations which have sprung from the European stock, has been erected, are the customs, usages, and conventions observed by that portion of the human race in their mutual intercourse." Wheaton, *Elements of International Law*, 40–41. Douglas Howland has an important discussion of the challenge of translating international law into terms intelligible to mid-nineteenth century Tokugawa intellectuals. Howland emphasizes the degree to which the Japanese term for rights, "ken," more easily lent itself to usage in a national rather than a personal context. Howland, *Translating the West*, 124–27. Lydia Liu insightfully traces the career of Wheaton's text in a Chinese unequal treaty context. Liu notes that Wheaton imbues his notion of positive law with a vague notion of natural law. She also emphasizes how successive editions of Wheaton both influenced and reflected imperial developments in East Asia in near tautological fashion. Liu, *Clash of Empires*, 120–39.
17. The powers who signed the Ansei treaties with Japan.
18. Treaty power threats were presented as unavoidable police actions wholly distinct from a conventional declaration of war. Treat, *Diplomatic Relations*, 160.
19. Ibid., 263–65.
20. "The notion of a government of population renders all the more acute the problem of the foundation of sovereignty . . . and all the more acute equally the necessity for the development of discipline . . . in reality one has a triangle, sovereignty-discipline-government, which has as its primary target the population

and as its essential mechanism the apparatuses of security." Foucault, "Governmentality," 219. Lydia Liu makes much of a curious assumption that Foucault situates juridical sovereignty as unqualifiedly archaic and therefore unrelated to modern technologies of subjection. On my reading of Foucault's position in *Society Must Be Defended*, he clearly argues for juridical sovereignty and modern disciplinary technologies as working in tandem so I would be inclined to qualify Liu's suggestion that Foucault neglects the continued centrality of sovereignty in Asia Pacific contexts. Perhaps this difference arises from an inconsistency on Foucault's part across a range of texts. Liu, *Clash of Empires*, 19. On this point, Liu's position somewhat parallels a similar argument in Giorgio Agamben's *Homo Sacer*: "One of the most persistent features of Foucault's work is its decisive abandonment of the traditional approach to the problem of power, which is based on juridico-institutional models . . . in favor of an unprejudiced analysis of the concrete ways in which power penetrates subjects' very bodies and forms of life." As regards *Society Must Be Defended*, it is hard to describe Agamben's position here as anything but a misreading. Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, 5.

21. "Our trade will be provided with what it requires as a life or death necessity. Though it be accompanied by danger and expense, we seek trade wherever it may be. For the sake of responding to our endlessly expanding requirements and industrial power we seek endlessly expanding new markets. It seems that these markets primarily lie in the Far East. Though it may not be inevitable, we naturally take that course. Our first step is to gain access to the markets they offer by treaty. As the native powers don't have much intention of opening negotiations, our first and most effective means is to apply pressure that secures a document conveying all the rights and conveniences requisite to the required trade." Rutherford Alcock, *The Capital of the Tycoon*, vol.2, 320, cited in Ishii, *Nihon kaikokushi* [*History of the Opening of Japan*], 1.
22. Hoare, *Notes on Japan's Treaty Ports*, 84.
23. Anghie, *Imperialism*, 43, 53–54, 57, 63, 72, 76, 77.
24. "Unlike Comte . . . Spencer was a militant of laissez-faire, in this closely associating himself with the search for legitimation of a bourgeoisie then rising to the position of command in the industrializing process of his country. Spencer, in a context dominated by the evolutionary theses of Charles Darwin, displayed in its full force the tendency to organicize or 'biologize' the social. Under the auspices of positivistic tradition in sociology, there began to emerge, starting at the end of the nineteenth century, the idea of communication as the regulatory principle counteracting the disequilibria of the social order. This conceptual matrix would later reach its high point in the functionalist sociology of mass communications; the 'religion of progress,' so dear to the first positivists, would in the following century metamorphose, by various stages, into the 'religion of communications.'" Mattelart, *Mapping World Communication*, 36.
25. "However, at the same time, Koreans and Taiwanese with Japanese papers were not treated equally as 'Japanese.' . . . They were systematically and generally discriminated against. They existed as 'Japanese' who were not 'Japanese.' This corresponds to the people on the border of 'Japanese.' . . . This establishes the

topic of this book. In other words, to pursue the discourse of policy debates over the Okinawa, Ainu, Taiwan, and Korea of modern Japan, and investigate where the boundary of the 'Japanese' is established." Oguma, *Nihonjin no kyôkai* [*The Boundaries of the Japanese*], 4. "Why have both students of European and colonial histories treated bourgeois "civilizing missions" in metropole and colony as though they were independent projects for so long?" Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire*, 12. "These concerns over racial and cultural hybridity fueled the administrative and practical fears of a heterogeneous European community that its boundaries needed policing in ever more intimate ways. Who was 'dangerous' was as much those legally defined as European—that noxious 'middle-race' inside the borders of this amorphous European community—as those clearly external to it. These discourses provided liberal reformers with a constant reminder that colonialism was about not only incorporation, but also distinctions between the *echte* Dutch and those assimilated natives of 'fabricated' European status, between citizens and subjects, between colonized and colonizer, and not least between different classes of Europeans." Ibid., 46–47.

26. Hoare, *Japan's Treaty Ports*, 23–24, 30, 35, 48–49. Based on the autobiographical writing of the American Francis Hall, F. G. Notehelfer has strongly disputed Hoare's description of the treaty ports as Anglocentric and unrepresentative. He specifically points to Hall's near daily and mutually affectionate interaction with a broad swathe of contemporary Japanese of diverse social standing as evidence to the contrary.
27. Ibid., 22, 26, 28, 34.
28. Ibid., 36–37.
29. Henning, *Outposts of Civilization*, 39.
30. This account is largely based on Oguma, *Tanitsu minzoku shinwa no kigen*, 33–48 and Berlinguez-Kono "Debates on *Naichi Zakkyo* in Japan," 6–22.
31. Taki, *Tenno no shôzô* [*Portrait of the Emperor*], i–iii.
32. Hasegawa, *Mori Arinori ni okeru kokuminteki shutai no sôshutsu* [*The Production of the National Subject in Mori Arinori*], 410.
33. Fujitani, *Splendid Monarchy*, 165–66.
34. Hadley, *Melodramatic Tactics*, 3–12.
35. Readers familiar with scholarship in Japanese folklore studies (*minzokugaku*) or people's history (*minshûshi*) will have experienced a sense of recognition on reading this definition. Indeed, both *minzokugaku* and *minshûshi* as disciplines appear to deploy ethnography and history in a decidedly melodramatic mode. The advantages of Hadley's approach for my project include broadening the horizon of melodrama beyond the field of literary genre theory, her attention to the profound role of melodrama in resisting market forces and bureaucratic discipline, and her intriguing claim that the "angel in the home" is actually not a middle class value, but rather a countervailing melodramatic mode of patriarchal deference that mediates the cut-throat liberal and legalistic social Darwinism of middle-class male culture. For Hadley, then, the "angel in the home" is a mythologized holdover from the imagination of patriarchal deference rather than a countervailing or liberal middle class norm. In other words, it is one of

a long list of wrenching contradictions at the heart of Victorian liberalism. The "angel in the home" figure is, after all, militantly moralistic and anti-contractual. In Japan studies, the analogous shift has frequently been read as a variety of middle-class women's liberation from the feudal concept of the *ie* [family defined as male lineage]. Hadley's work suggests that both the *ie* and the *katei* paradigms are grounded in patriarchal deference hierarchies.

This last point intersects with Ueno Chizuko's conclusion that the modern Japanese family system is an oppressive institutional adjunct of capitalism, but differs with her in seeing the domestic sphere as a mediating form of patriarchal anti-market deference rather than as simply a product of capitalist market forces per se. In other words, it assumes that capitalist ideology is somewhat more riven with contradiction than does Ueno. Ueno, *Kindai kazoku no seiritsu to shûen* [*The Formation and End of the Modern Family*], Chapter 1.

36. Hadley, *Melodramatic Tactics*, 176–83.
37. Fujitani, *Splendid Monarchy*, 107–11.
38. Ibid., 164.
39. Fuess, *Divorce in Japan*, 2. Nolte and Hastings add that this was nevertheless in the service of a Japanese "cult of productivity" rather than a "cult of domesticity" in the Western middle-class sense. Nolte and Hastings, "The Meiji State's Policy Toward Women," 154.
40. Ueno, *Kindai kazoku no seiritsu to shûen*, 74.
41. Karlin, "The Gender of Nationalism," 54.
42. This account is based on Nishikawa, "The Changing Form of Dwellings," 3–36 and Toshitani, "The Reform of Japanese Family Law," 66–82. Useful research on Meiji period Japanese family structure includes Arichi, *Kindai nihon no kazokukan* [*View of the Modern Japanese Family*]; Ueno, *Kindai kazoku no seiritsu to shûen*; Kiyonaga, *Ryôsai kenbo no tanjô* [*The Birth of Good Wife, Wise Mother*]; Kawashima, *Fujin-kateiron no kotohajime* [*The Beginning of the Woman's Home*]; Nolte and Hastings, "The Meiji State's Policy Toward Women," 151–74; Muta, "Images of the Family in Meiji Periodicals," 53–71.
43. Uno, "Womanhood, War, and Empire," 493.
44. Inoue Tetsujirô, "Chokugo engi," 94. Katayama's *Shiryô-Kyôiku chokugo* is an essential compilation of materials related to the controversy surrounding the *Imperial Rescript on Education*.
45. Inoue Tetsujirô, "Chokugo engi," 100.
46. Fuess, *Divorce in Japan*, 120.
47. Muta, "Images of the Family in Meiji Periodicals," 58.
48. "From the late nineteenth century onward, American and European visitors and residents, especially missionaries, reprimanded Japanese for their casual attitude toward divorce. They believed that Japanese behavior was based on a disregard for the seriousness of marriage and on the low position of women in Japan. Not surprisingly, they proposed Christianity as a means to sanctify marriage and make wives and mothers secure. Japanese intellectuals, politicians, scholars, lawyers, teachers, and women of the emerging professional class started to criticize divorce as a national disgrace, often with reference to Western marriage ideals

in the early twentieth century. They interpreted the decline in divorce as a sign of increased happiness in marriage and of the strengthened position of wives, as well as a proof of modernity . . . As has been noted, divorce rates came to be perceived as a national disgrace precisely when they were on the decline." Fuess, *Divorce in Japan*, 141–42.

"The Christian wedding inspired Japanese reformers of the Japanese marriage ceremony. . . . Japanese commentators later took up the issue of wedding reform, but dropping references to foreign models. An 1898 editorial in the *Tokyo asahi shinbun* criticized Japanese weddings for being much too simple, lacking in solemnity, and, most important, failing to stress the importance of marriage and the disgrace of divorce . . . in subsequent years, newspapers reported repeatedly on the spread of weddings in a religious style . . . Even without the religious trappings, weddings came to carry more symbolic, economic, and social weight in the countryside." Ibid., 138–39.

49. Fujitani, *Splendid Monarchy*, 113, 117.
50. Ibid., 120, 123, 139; Fujitani, *Splendid Monarchy*, 117.
51. Fujitani, *Splendid Monarchy*, 163.
52. Ibid., 189.
53. Barbara Brooks's recent work interestingly pursues a directly related aspect of this problematic. See Brooks, "Reading the Japanese Colonial Archive," 295–317 and Uno, "Womanhood, War, and Empire," 493–513.
54. Burke-Gaffney's *Starcrossed: A Biography of Madame Butterfly* (2004) begins the process of trying to think through the narrative in the context of its setting in Nagasaki. He particularly emphasizes that Long incoherently conflates prostitution and marriage in a matter that erases the brutality and exploitation of the contemporary Japanese system of prostitution in which Cho-Cho-San would necessarily have been involved. This is an important point. I think my own emphasis on the centrality of missionary concerns in the narrative makes a similar point regarding wishful thinking and idealization. Burke-Gaffney, *Starcrossed*, 9–39.
55. Arthur Groos's series of articles on *Madame Butterfly* and its adaptations are indispensable. Groos, "Lieutenant F. B. Pinkerton," 654–75; "Return of the native," 167–94; "Madame Butterfly," 125–58. Another worthwhile reference is Bailey-Harris, "Madame Butterfly and the Conflict of Laws," 157–77. Bailey-Harris's reading is careful, but is unfortunately based on the 1898 civil code that was not yet in force at the time the novella was conceived and written. It also, somewhat surprisingly, does not evidence much interest in extraterritoriality or the Ansei treaties.
56. Yoshihara, *Embracing the East*, 3–4. See also, Burke-Jones, *Starcrossed: The Biography of Madame Butterfly*.
57. "Such a strategy figures the United States as chaste and pure, and explicitly challenges British moral and sexual virtue through a criticism of British literature . . . These passages strikingly reveal that Adams conceived of the Monroe Doctrine partly in response to a debate about national literature, and in terms of popular narratives about female sexual restraint, seduction, and domestic virtue that were a major focus of British and American literature of the late eighteenth and

early nineteenth century . . . Inspired by calls for a national literature, American historical romances of the 1820s typically culminated in a struggle for a 'democratic' marriage, pitting the interests of two virtuous young lovers in freely chosen marriage against the interests of their parents in more traditional, hierarchical values of aristocratic family ties or inherited wealth. The national household is refounded in the companionate marriage, with the cycle of patriarchal authority broken by domestic consent and affective individualism." Murphy, *Hemispheric Imaginings*, 48.

58. "U.S. policy in Asia now rested on a naval base at Manila and an informal alliance with Japan and Great Britain, the only other two powers interested in the open door. Or as Mahan portrayed the developing global power struggle, the seapowers of Great Britain, Japan, and the United States were pitted against the land powers of Russia, Germany, and France. For Americans, it was a contest of good traders versus evil colonizers . . . Komura . . . attempted to protect his nation's trading rights in Hawaii. But U.S. officials had decided that the open door no longer applied to the newly annexed islands." LaFeber, *The Clash*, 61–62.
59. Yoshihara, *Embracing the East*, 3–4.
60. Ibid., 5.
61. Ibid., 4.
62. Burke-Gaffney, *Starcrossed*, 9–39.
63. Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire*, 170–71.
64. Ibid., 173.
65. "Although Long's text is often denigrated as an imitation of *Madame Chrysantheme*, its origin is different: *Madame Butterfly* is based on a real-life incident reported to Long by his sister, Sarah Jane (Jennie), a teacher and the wife of Irvin Correll, a Methodist Episcopal missionary in Japan. . . . In March and April 1931, two years before her death, Jennie Correll gave a series of talks and interviews in Japan and China; in September of that year she published a written version of these talks intended to reveal the 'long secret' of *Madame Butterfly* . . . It is not difficult to date the affair of the tea-house girl Cho-san that Jennie Correll witnessed. It occurred after March 1892, when she joined her husband in Nagasaki, and before mid-July 1897, when Irvin Correll departed with his family for Philadelphia on a leave ordered by doctors." Groos, "*Madame Butterfly*," 135.

    Burke-Gaffney suggests that there is reason to question Jennie Correll's veracity when she claims that the novella was based on a true story. He suggests that her later anecdote regarding *Madame Butterfly*'s origins itself appears to have been influenced by the operatic version of the story subsequent to its publication. My reading assumes only that contemporary missionary views and the laws in force in Nagasaki at the time when the book was conceived and written should serve as important intertexts for a reading of the work. The argument concerning whether or not the narrative is based on a true story is not particularly germane to my interpretation. Burke-Gaffney, *Starcrossed*, 63–92.
66. Long, *Madame Butterfly*, 3.
67. Ibid., 62–63.
68. Ibid., 78.

69. Chisolm, *Fenollosa: The Far East and American Culture*, 118.
70. Ibid., 6.
71. Ibid., 5–6.
72. Ibid., 12.
73. Ibid., 31–32.
74. Ibid., 84–85.
75. I would like to thank Arthur Groos for encouraging me to develop this point.
76. Burke-Gaffney, *Starcrossed*, 82.
77. Feuss, *Divorce in Japan*, 120.
78. John Luther Long, *Madame Butterfly*, 11.
79. "In each of my chapters I explore how the representations of U.S. imperialism were mapped not through a West/East axis of frontier symbols and politics, but instead through a North/South axis around the issues of slavery, Reconstruction, and Jim Crow segregation." Kaplan, *Anarchy of Empire*, 18.
80. Morison, *"Old Bruin," Titlepage*.
81. Fukushima, *Nihon shihonshugi no hattatsu to shihô* [*The Development of Japanese Capitalism and Private Law*], 71.
82. Ibid., 21–25.
83. Nakamura, *Economic Growth in Prewar Japan*, 54–61.
84. Ibid., 61.
85. "Rent had become institutionalized in various forms of loan contracts . . . Many peasants . . . pawned their land for a fixed period of time in return for a cash loan with which to pay their taxes . . . Usually, in such cases, however, tenants claimed a right to have their pawned land returned to them whenever the principal and the interest on their original loan was repaid. . . . But during the 1860s landlords who accumulated the pawned land of poor peasants were often unwilling to honor such traditional rights. The best evidence we have of this is the frequency with which peasants, during uprisings, demanded that landlords return to them their pawned land . . . Moreover, debt bondage in the form of tenancy was on its way to becoming a new and crucially important mechanism of social control. Because of the two-tiered chain of landlord and fief oppression, public opinion in villages endorsed the destruction of the property of middle-level officials, who had been overzealous in enforcing the fief's reform measures. Village opinion also supported attacks on speculative rice merchants, moneylenders, and landlords." Bix, *Peasant Protest in Japan*, 191.
86. Ibid., xxx–xxxv. Bix largely follows the Kôza school of Japanese Marxism in positing the nineteenth century as a transition toward a capitalist social formation that remained incomplete, especially in rural areas.
87. Mizukami, *Kane kashi no nihonshi* [Japanese History of Moneylending], 177–87, 192–93; Yasumaru, "*Kômin to no ishiki katei*," 85–90.
88. Marshall, *Capitalism and Nationalism in Prewar Japan*, 57–58.
89. Ibid., 59–60; Gordon, *The Evolution of Labor Relations in Japan*, 55.
90. Gordon, *The Evolution of Labor Relations in Japan*, 57.
91. Ibid., 65.
92. Ibid., 67.

93. Earl Kinmonth has suggested that such claims are overstated and that Japanese businessmen were generally just as proud of turning a profit as businessmen anywhere else.
94. Kôtoku, *Nijyûseiki no kaibutsu: Teikokushugi* [*The Twentieth-Century Monster: Imperialism*], 91–92, 105.
95. Ibid., 109.
96. Ibid., 349.
97. Ibid., 116.
98. Ibid., 122.
99. Ibid., 140.
100. Ibid., 138.
101. Ibid., 260–63.
102. Ibid., 417.
103. Kôtoku, "Wasen wo kessuru mono" ["Those Who Decide on Peace and War"], 20; translation mine. The editorial was originally published on February 2, 1904. This passage is also cited in Notehelfer, *Kôtoku Shûsui*, 96.
104. "But if the Hobson-Lenin theory that modern imperialism is driven by surplus capital seeking foreign outlets may tell us something about the character of British or French imperialism in the decades before World War I, it can have no relevance to the case of Japan's imperialism. As we have seen, newly industrializing Japan suffered from a persistent capital shortage and went into debt to European and American capitalists in order to build its European-style empire. Nevertheless, the Japanese government made early efforts to establish itself as a creditor power in China. Japan's position in this regard was parallel to that of imperial Russia, which also went deeply into debt to France, Britain, and other Western European countries at the same time that it aggressively pushed its own loans on China. This debt-leveraged lending is a case of what has been called Japan's 'dependent imperialism' of the early twentieth century." Metzler, *The Lever of Empire*, 50–51.

CHAPTER 2

1. Mori Arinori, "Kyôikuron: Shintai no nôryoku" ["On Education: The Aptitudes of the Body"], 325–26.
2. Mori Arinori, *Rinrisho* [*Ethics Text*], 419–20.
3. Mori Arinori was born into a samurai family in Satsuma in 1847. He was sent to Great Britain under an alias by the Satsuma domain in 1865 without the Shogunal government's knowledge, just three years before its demise. In 1867 he moved to a religious colony in New York called the Brotherhood of the New Life. He returned to Japan in 1868. Satsuma, along with Chôshû, dominated the ruling coalition brought to power by the *coup d'etat* that toppled the shogunal government in 1868. Mori's ties to Satsuma led to a series of administrative positions in the new government which came to be known as the Meiji Restoration government and which purported to rule in the name of the Emperor.

In 1869 Mori proposed the abolition of sword-wearing, an event that led to the forced resignation of his domestic government position. He worked for the Foreign Office continuously from 1870–1884. He was successively envoy to Washington (1871–73), ambassador to Beijing (1876–1877), and ambassador to London (1880–1884). Mori was a founding member of the *Meirokusha* and the *Meiroku zasshi*, widely regarded as the first modern Japanese intellectual society and magazine respectively. In the first half of the 1870s Mori advocated religious freedom, secular education, abandoning the Japanese language in favor of English, and the social, as opposed to political, emancipation of women. In 1875 he founded a college designed to promote business education that developed into the present day Hitotsubashi University. "Mori Arinori nenpyô" [Mori Arinori Chronology], in *Mori Arinori zenshû* [*Collected Works of Mori Arinori*], vol.1, 201–35. In English, see Ivan Hall, "Mori Arinori," *Kôdansha Encyclopedia of Japan*, vol.5, 247–48.

4. Kôsaka, *Japanese Thought*, 180.
5. Yamashita, *Supensa to nihon kindai* [Spencer and Japanese Modernity], 123–42. A point of interest in Fenollosa's interpretation of Spencer is that he followed John Fiske and W. T. Harris in considering an explicitly idealist interpretation of Spencer as the starting point for a modernized idealism with contemporary relevance. A Hegelian interpretation of Spencer was to provide an idealism that accounted for scientific advances subsequent to Hegel that was nevertheless philosophically more sophisticated than Spencer himself.

   This point had important consequences for the future development of U.S. idealism and pragmatism in general. It also relates to the articulation of a new pride of place for the United States in world history that was a part of Fenollosa's project of resituating Japan and China as neglected in the Eurocentric world history hegemonic at that time.
6. This account is based on Nagai, "Herbert Spencer"; Shimizu, *Nihon bunka keitairon* [*On the Form of Japanese Culture*]; Yamashita, "Herbert Spencer."
7. Wada, *Tokutomi Sohô shû*, [*Tokutomi Soho Collection*], 407–530.
8. For Spencer, military conflict invariably caused even advanced European states to regress toward the militant, feudal stage as a consequence of the predictable increase in central state authority and increased respect for hierarchy and status that typically accompanied it.

   It is also important to recognize that the logical structure of the debate between radical reformist and gradualist interpretations of Spencer anticipated important aspects of the later debate among Japanese communists over the development of Japanese capitalism. The 1927 Comintern position, adopted by the *Kôza* faction of Japanese communist community, was that contemporary Japan was too backward for an immediate socialist revolution. It was insisted that the Japanese communist party must work on behalf of a bourgeois-democratic revolution so as to eliminate feudal remnants in Japanese society. This was to be followed by a subsequent socialist revolution. The opposing *Rônô* school broke from the Comintern and called for an immediate, one-stage socialist revolution. They held that the Meiji Restoration had produced a bourgeois

constitutional monarchy and that rural Japanese property law was no obstacle to socialist revolution.

9. Spencer, *The Man Versus the State*, 10. I would like to point out the significant parallels between Spencer's opposition to the welfare state on principle as the return of repressed, centralized, feudal state authority and contemporary neoliberalism that refers itself to F. A. Hayek, yet resolutely avoids all reference to its roots in Spencer's evolutionary account of industrial society and the larger, related discourse of social Darwinism. Hayek's *The Road to Serfdom* deeply resonates with many defining Spencerian positions.
10. This appointment was made over the objections of the emperor's Confucian tutor, Motoda Nagazane, who suspected him to be a Christian, and the further objections of the head of the Monbushô, Iki Takato, at the urging of his deputy vice minister, Kuki Ryûichi.
11. Okubo, *Mori Arinori zenshû* [*Collected Works of Mori Arinori*], 102–98; In English, see Hall, *Mori Arinori*, 418.
12. *Japan Weekly Mail*. April 3, 1886. The Japanese practice of inviting the *oyatoi* foreigners as privileged governmental advisers significantly resonates with the neoliberal exceptionalism of contemporary doctrines of flexible sovereignty such as we find in contemporary Singapore and Southeast Asia. Where it differs, however, is that Mori considered it essential that these special privileges and exceptions must be only temporary tactical measures whereas contemporary regimes of capitalist flexibility make no such discrimination, the overriding criterion being economic competitiveness. For more on this issue, see Ong's *Flexible Citizenship* and *Neoliberalism as Exception*.
13. Yamashita, *Supensa to nihon kindai*, 182–95; In English, see Yamashita, "Herbert Spencer," 77–95.
14. Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, 568–667. For Spencer, each distinct assemblage involves a specific articulation of language and the object world as well as interpersonal relations.
15. Mori Arinori, "The Japanese Ambassador of Public Affairs, An Interview on his Departure from England," in *Mori Arinori zenshû* [*Collected Works of Mori Arinori*], 220; italics added. This interview was originally conducted and published in English.
16. "I would like to try to see the extent to which the binary schema of war and struggle, of the clash between forces, can really be identified as the basis of civil society . . . Is power quite simply a continuation of war by means other than weapons and battles? . . . I will begin by eliminating the very people who are said to be the theorists of the war in civil society, and who are in my view no such thing, namely Machiavelli and Hobbes. Then I will try to look again at the theory that war is the historical principle behind the workings of power, in the context of the race problem, as it was racial binarism that led the West to see for the first time that it was possible to analyze political power as war." Foucault, *Society*, 16. It is notable that Mori's characterization also significantly anticipates theories of total war typically associated with the aftermath of the First World War.

17. Darwin refers to the struggle for existence in *The Origin of Species*. The title of Chapter IV in the first edition was "Natural Selection." In later editions, this became "Natural Selection; or the Survival of the Fittest." Spencer coined the phrase as an alternative to Darwin's "natural selection" which he saw as implying a suggestion of teleology that Darwin's theory did not intend or require. He set out his understanding of competitive selection in an article that anticipated Darwin by seven years. In it, Spencer says, "all mankind, in turn subject themselves more or less to the discipline described . . . the competition . . . entail[ed] by increase of numbers . . . either may or may not advance under it; but . . . only those who do advance under it eventually survive . . . as those prematurely carried off must, in the average of cases, be those in whom the power of self-preservation is least, it unavoidably follows, that those left behind to continue the race are those in whom the power of self-preservation is the greatest—are the select of their generation." Spencer, "A Theory of Population," *The Westminster Review* (April 1852): 468–501.

    In "Survival of the Fittest," Spencer notes that his initial theory did not extend the observation to the extent of finding in it an origin of new types as did Darwin. In *The Principles of Biology*, Spencer defines life as a correspondence to environment or the "continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations." Spencer, *Principles of Biology*, 80. Adaptation is then the process by which an organism attempts to reestablish equilibrium in relation to a changing environment. While he acknowledged Darwin's theory of natural selection, which he renamed survival of the fittest, as important in accounting for adaptation, he argued that as life forms become increasingly complex, the importance of inheriting acquired characters becomes proportionately greater. Additional bibliographical information on this issue appears in Perrin, *A Primary and Secondary Bibliography*, 173. This account is largely based on Perrin's indispensable work. Spencer's "A Theory of Population" later appeared as a separate book in 1852.

    Darwin himself acknowledged the significance of both Spencer and Lamarck. He referred to the survival of the fittest in later editions of his work, though he interpreted the phrase in his own way. He wrote, "I have called this principle, by which each slight variation, if useful, is preserved, by the term Natural Selection, in order to mark its relation to man's power of selection. But the expression often used by Mr. Herbert Spencer of the Survival of the Fittest is more accurate, and is sometimes equally convenient." Darwin, *The Origin of Species*, 46. Darwin's appropriation of the phrase as a chapter heading in later editions of his own book surely accounts for much of the confusion as to the origin of the phrase.

18. Gregory Golley's otherwise brilliant, *When Our Eyes No Longer See* (perhaps one of the most important books in Japan studies in twenty years), unfortunately falls prey to the tendency among contemporary Darwinists to project the unpleasant aspects of Darwinian theory on to Spencer and the even more anachronistic gesture of presenting Darwinian evolution as an original of which Spencerian evolution can only be an inaccurate copy.

    There is no question that Spencer offered his own quite distinct, much more broad theory of evolution, and did so earlier than Darwin. There is thus no

historical support for teleologically describing a different, competing theory of evolution as a failed attempt to arrive at Darwinian theory or, worse yet, as a misrepresentation of a Darwinian original. "Popular enthusiasm in Japan for Spencer's *misrepresentation* of Darwin's actual biological paradigm may even suggest that Meiji progressives intuitively recognized something in Darwin's original theory running deeply counter to the modernization program." Golley, *When Our Eyes No Longer See*, 219.

For more on the hegemony of dubious, anti-Spencerian defenses of Darwin, see Mark Francis, *Herbert Spencer and the Invention of Modern Life*. "My reasons for distinguishing between Spencer's theories and Darwinism are: (i) Spencer's evolutionary theory did not focus on species change; (ii) Spencer's faith in progressive evolution did not draw on natural selection or competition; and (iii) Spencer did not accept that modern individuals and societies would continue to make progress through struggle for survival . . . The propositions I have asserted are merely blunt instruments designed to dispose of facile interpretations by Darwinian enthusiasts who use Spencer as a whipping boy who can be credited with unattractive or simplistic comments on natural selection. I have had to be plain-spoken on this point because disinformation of this kind is so entrenched that it could almost be called tradition. Although fake, it has dominated popular discourse on Spencer during the twentieth century." Francis, *Herbert Spencer*, 2–3. Another central part of the picture is that popularizers of both Darwin and Spencer were quite willing to loudly promote versions of Darwin and Spencer that did simply cheer on many of the things that the thought and politics of Darwin and Spencer on their own significantly contest. On this point, see Barry Werth, *Banquet at Delmonico's*, ix-xxxi.

19. Mori, "Saitama-ken jinjô shihan gakkô ni okeru enzetsu" ["Speech at Saitama Prefecture Teacher's Normal School"], 485–86; italics added. The speech was originally delivered on December 19, 1885.
20. Mori, *Mori Arinori zenshû* [*Collected Works of Mori Arinori*], 325–29.
21. Stallybrass and White, *The Politics and Poetics of Transgression*, 9–10.
22. Howell, *Geographies of Identity in Nineteenth-Century Japan*, 1–10.
23. Mori, *Mori Arinori zenshû*, [*Collected Works of Mori Arinori*], v.1, 325–29.
24. Mori, *Mori Arinori zenshû*, 347–49.
25. Karasawa, *Kyôshi no rekishi* [*History of Teachers*], 45–77.
26. Mori, *Mori Arinori zenshû*, 325–29.
27. Yoshimi, "Undôkai no shisô" ["*The Thought of the Exercise Fair*"], 141.
28. Ibid., 142. Yoshimi's rhetoric of contrast and extraction appears to presume that Emperor-centered notions of community predated Mori's policies and that such notions were premodern as opposed to the modernity of the political technology used by Mori. In other words, it suggests that Mori's methods dialectically sublated some traditional conception of community.
29. Ibid., 146–47.
30. Yamamoto, *Kindai kyôiku no tennôsei ideorogii* [*The Emperor System Ideology of Modern Education*], 362–82; Yoshimi, "Undôkai" ["Exercise Fairs"], 138–39.
31. Duke, *The History of Modern Japanese Education*, 332–33.

32. Hasegawa, *Mori Arinori ni okeru kokumin no sôshitsu* [*The Production of a National Subject in Mori Arinori*], 68.
33. Ibid., 73.
34. This is an issue upon which his position agreed with that of Theodore Roosevelt.
35. Spencer, *Facts and Comments*, 158–61.
36. Satô, "Shotô kyôiku" ["Elementary Education"], 182.
37. Inoue Kiyoshi, cited in Satô, "Shotô kyoiku, 182; translation mine.
38. Spencer, *The Man Versus the State*, 413–14.
39. Ibid., 391.
40. Ibid., 384–85.
41. Ibid., 385.
42. To be fair, Spencer vehemently opposed expenditures of state funds in defense of colonial adventurism and was also an outspoken opponent of slavery. His insight into the exploitative aspects of liberal, free-trade imperialism, unfortunately, was another matter.
43. Mori, *Mori Arinori zenshû*, 420–24.
44. This review is noted in Hall, *Mori Arinori*, 441.
45. *Japan Weekly Mail*, June 29, 1889.
46. Spencer, *Data of Ethics*, iii.
47. "Complete comprehension of conduct is not to be obtained by contemplating the conduct of human beings only; we have to regard this as a part of universal conduct, conduct as exhibited by all living creatures . . . The conduct of the higher animals as compared with that of man . . . mainly differ in this, that the adjustment of acts to ends are relatively simple and relatively incomplete." Ibid., 4–5.
48. Spencer, *Data of Ethics*, 13.
49. Mori, *Mori Arinori zenshû*, 442–45.
50. Francis, *Herbert Spencer and the Invention of Modern Life*, 46–7.
51. "Another of our ordinary conceptions has to be much widened before we can rightly interpret political evolution. The words 'civilized' and 'savage' must have given to them meanings differing greatly from those which are current. That broad contrast usually drawn wholly to the advantage of the men who form large nations, and to the disadvantage of the men who form simple groups, a better knowledge obliges us profoundly to qualify. Characters are to be found among rude peoples which compare well with those of the best among cultivated peoples. With little knowledge and but rudimentary arts, there in some cases go virtues which might shame those among ourselves whose education and polish are of the highest." Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, v.2, 233–34.
52. Mori Arinori, *Mori Arinori zenshû*, 445–46.
53. Ibid., 447–48; translation mine.
54. The ultimate end of life lies in . . . reaching the point at whch one both acquires self-realization in thought and is satisfied in the senses. As the trend of the times does not yet permit this, however, there are circumstances in which we cannot avoid adhering to propriety to the greatest degree possible, without reflecting upon the consequences of such an action for happiness . . . The ultimate end of man is to enter into the realm of complete good . . . Society established upon

the assembling of humanity corresponds to the organic assemblage. Within it, it has various parts . . . each shares their own power cooperatively in the division of labor. With interdependence and mutual aid, each part is able to survive, and the whole is able to survive as well . . . It is not simply that they are unable to benefit themselves, it is that the cooperation of self and other must be established in order to maintain equilibrium." Ibid., 449–50.

55. Marx, *Capital*, v.1, 481–82.
56. Ibid., 486.
57. Mori, *Mori Arinori zenshû*, 325–29; translation mine.
58. An institutionalized mode of marking Classical Chinese that involved reordering words and introducing particles necessary for translation into a variety of Japanese grammar.
59. The connection between Japanese masculinity, educational reform, and national strengthening is broached more explicitly in Mori's address to educational officials in Saitama prefecture cited above.
60. Stefan Tanaka makes a similar observation in *New Times in Modern Japan*. These passages were written in the late 1990s long before his work on this topic was available, so I interpret this as independent confirmation of a similar problematic in the same historical period.
61. Karatani, *Nihon kindai bungaku no kigen* [*The Origins of Modern Japanese Literature*], 141–69.

CHAPTER 3

1. Kuga, Katsunan, "Shidôron," 749–50.
2. Eagleton, *The Ideology of the Aesthetic*, 3.
3. Ibid., 3–117.
4. Bernstein, *The Fate of Art*, 1–9.
5. Satô, "Kindaishigaku toshite no bijutsushigaku no seiritsu to tenkai" ["The Establishment and Development of Art History as Modern History"], 150.
6. Ibid., 150.
7. Satô Dôshin has argued convincingly that these three terms in particular were actually generated for the purposes of the economic export policy. It was only later that they took on the associations of aesthetic discourse developed around the concept of *geijutsu*. Satô, "Kaiga to gengo 1, 'e' to kanji" ["Painting and Language 1, 'graphic art' and Chinese characters"], 53–6.
8. Western realist painting was itself instrumental in displacing previously reigning conceptions of the proper relation between verbal and visual texts. These techniques were known to many Japanese artists several decades prior to the Meiji period. They were marginalized, however, by the major schools of painting such as *bunjinga* and the Kanô school, for lacking what they referred to as *kiin*. Western or Dutch painting was held to be superficial or surface oriented and thus lacking in the valorized attribute of *kiin*. Fenollosa at times translates his own distinct conception by using this term taken from Edo period painting discourse.

9. Fenollosa, "Truth in Art," 9. This is the primary surviving English language manuscript. It differs somewhat from the Japanese translation of the speech published at the time.
10. Naoki Sakai makes a related argument concerning Tokugawa period intertextuality in relation to readings of *Kogigaku* school Confucian scholars, jôruri, and gesaku texts. Sakai, *The Voices of the Past*, 88; 115.
11. Fenollosa, "Truth in Art," 3.
12. This account is based on the "Truth in Art" manuscripts.
13. Takeuchi, "Okakura Tenshin—Ajiakan ni tatsu bunmei hihan" ["Okakura Tenshin—A Critique of Civilization Grounded in Asian Perspective"], 374.
14. Fenollosa, "East and West," 221.
15. Yamaguchi, *Fenorôsa* [Fenollosa], Chapter 3.
16. Satô, *Kindaishishigaku toshite*, 160.
17. He presents his views on this issue most completely in "Review of the Chapter on Painting, in *L'Art Japonais*, by L. Gonse."
18. Foster, *The Anti-Aesthetic, 1–15*.
19. Fenollosa, "Review of the Chapter on Painting."
20. "There is no trace here of the influence of the Greeks . . . a deeper and better-informed study of the works of Gandhara itself will reveal a greater prominence of Chinese than of the so-called Greek characteristics . . . The Alexandrian invasion means rather the extension of Persian influence than of Hellenic culture . . . Hinduism . . . is now recognized once more as the inclusive form of the nation's life." Okakura, *Ideals of the East*, 75–76; 78; 80.
21. In a March 4, 1899 letter to George Sanger, Fenollosa refers approvingly to an argument along these lines in an article by Benjamin Ide Wheeler, "The Old World in the New," 145–53. Fenollosa suggests that Wheeler's work identifies the center of a new era in world history. Fenollosa writes, "Asia, he proclaimed, will become the pivot for the twentieth century, and 'the history of European races will have to be rewritten . . . Hang Chow shall be to them a second Athens, and Shanghai their London of the future.'" This letter is cited in Chisholm, *Fenollosa: The Far East and American Culture*, 139.
22. Takagi, *Kindai tennôsei kokka no shakai tôgô* [*The Social Unification of the Modern Emperor Ideology's State*], 97–120.
23. Satô, "Kindaishigaku toshite no bijutsushi," 161.
24. Takagi, *Kindai tennôsei kokka no shakai tôgô*, 115.
25. Shiga, "The Spiritual Energy of the Yamato People," 303–6.
26. Miyake, "*Shinzenbi nihonjin*" ["*True, Good, Beautiful Japanese*"], in *Nihon no meicho: Kuga Katsunan, Miyake Setsurei*, 37, 286–93, especially p. 288. This account is informed by Motoyama, "Meiji nijûnendai no seiron ni arawareta nashonarizumu" ["Nationalism as it Appears in Political Polemic of the Second Decade of Meiji"].
27. Miyake, "Tomi wo motte senka toku wo motte senka" ["With wealth? Or with morality?"], in *Nihonjin*, November 3, 1889.
28. Miyake, "Ajia keiron saku" ["Asian Economic Policy"], in *Nihonjin*, March 6, 1889.
29. Kuga, *Kinji seironkô* [On Recent Politics], 67–68. This account of Kuga's thought is informed by the following articles in particular: Motoyama, "Meiji nijûnendai no seiron ni arawareta nashonarizumu" ["Nationalism as it Appears in Political Polemic

of the Second Decade of Meiji"] and Matsumoto, "Meiji zenki hôzonshugi shisô no itchidanmen" ["The First Phase of Preservationist Thought in the First Half of Meiji"]. Also, Matsumoto, "Society and State in the Thought of Kuga Katsunan."
30. Kuga, *Kinji Seironkô*, 67–68.
31. Ibid., 67–8.
32. Ibid., 68.
33. Matsumoto Sannosuke argues that it was the concept of society along the lines of Kuga Katsunan that enabled the "social problem" after the Sino-Japanese war to be identified as such. He also suggests that this utopian notion of society was a direct antecedent of turn of the century socialism. Matsumoto, "Society and State in the Thought of Kuga Katsunan, 156.
34. Kuga, "Kazokuteki seikatsu oyobi seijiteki seikatsu" ["Family Life and Political Life"], 537–39.
35. The recent publication of Stefan Tanaka's *New Times in Modern Japan* significantly improved this situation.
36. Maruyama Masao, for example has made this claim regarding members of the Seikyôsha such as Kuga. Maruyama, *Senchû to sengo no aida* [*Between Wartime and the Postwar*], 281.

CHAPTER 4

1. Conversation with Stefan Tanaka was instrumental in drawing my attention to the significance of aesthetic discourse in Inoue Tetsujirô's *Chokugo engi*. I greatly appreciate his generosity in sharing his thoughts on Inoue and related matters.
2. Bogue, *Deleuze and Guattari*, 136–38.
3. Kaigo, *Kyôiku chokugo seiritsushi no kenkyû* [*Research on the History of the Formation of the Education Rescript*], 380. See also, Katayama, *Shiryô: Kyôiku chokugo* [*Materials: Education Rescript*]; Shively, "Motoda Eifu: Confucian Lecturer to the Meiji Emperor," 302–33; Takeda, Tennôsei shisô to kyôiku [*Education and the Thought of Imperial Ideology*]; Nolte, "National Morality and Universal Ethics: Ônishi Hajime and the Imperial Rescript on Education," 283–94; and Gavin, *Shiga Shigetaka 1863—1927*, 103–16.
4. Kaigo, *Kyoiku chokugo*, 381.
5. Ibid., 394–95.
6. Ibid., 376.
7. Ibid., 387.
8. Ibid., 330.
9. Ibid., 364.
10. Tsunoda, *Sources of Japanese Tradition*, 139–40.
11. Miwa, "Crossroads of Patriotism in Imperial Japan," 195–96; Ozawa, *Uchimura Kanzô fukei jiken* [*Uchimura Kanzô Disrespect Incident*], 28.
12. As Fenollosa and Inoue both share an appropriation of Spencer (albeit differing ones), it seems important to note that the panopticon is drawn from the writings of Bentham. While in many ways Spencer can be said to have carried forward the project of a utilitarian ethics, viz. *Data of Ethics*, his libertarian leanings put him in fierce opposition to Bentham and Mill in so far as they would extend the hand

of government into civil society for the purposes of reform. Spencer opposed public schools, public welfare, and forced vaccination as extending the power and authority of professional groups with vested interests and assuming a social consensus on methods of solution and social direction that did not exist. Thus he concluded that these matters should be left to individual conscience, each person knowing his or her mind best. It is interesting to consider that in many ways Foucault reduces modern subjectivity to a Benthamite model of liberal state interventionism that obviously was not the only one available. Given the overwhelming resonance between Spencer and contemporary neoliberalism it would seem important to clarify the degree to which Spencer did have a critical relationship to Bentham and the respects in which this would require qualifying Foucault's account, which at times appears to take Bentham as something approaching the exclusive paradigm of modern subjectivity.

One additional point must be made concerning social Darwinism. The roles it played in Japan and China were quite distinct. Social Darwinism became popular in China at the end of the 1890s when Yen Fu and others introduced the concept. Its popularity lasted much longer than in Japan, and in 1907 Lu Hsün translated into Chinese a study by Ernst H. Haeckel, who also had been instrumental in converting Katô from natural law to social Darwinism. While Japan's Social Darwinists considered Japan to be a country rapidly joining the ranks of the powerful in the international arena, the Chinese intellectuals who espoused the concept of social Darwinism could not, considering the weakness of the Chinese position in the world, help but argue that open competition for survival was a process that denied the existence of the weak. Therefore, in place of social Darwinism with its emphasis on the importance of competition for survival, many Chinese intellectuals came to favor either Kropotkin's anarchism with its advocacy of a system of mutual aid or the Marxist theory of the class struggle. Ishida, *Japanese Political Culture*, 7.

13. Inoue Tetsujirô, "Chokugo engi," 94
14. "The biologic relation of the cells to the tissues and organs of lower organisms is the same as that which exists among the higher animals between the individuals and community of which they are component parts. Each cell, though autonomous, is subordinated to the body as a whole, in the same way the societies of bees, ants and termites, in the vertebrates herds and the human state, each individual is subordinate to the social body of which he is a member." Haeckel, cited in Gasman, *The Scientific Origins of National Socialism*, 83.
15. Inoue, "Chokugo engi," 96.
16. Ibid., 94.
17. Ibid., 91; translation mine.
18. Ibid., 91–92.
19. Ibid., 92; 95.
20. Ishikawa, *Onna daigaku shû*, 280.
21. Inoue, "Chokugo engi," 91.
22. Ibid., 91.
23. Ibid., 87.

24. Ibid., 109.
25. Ibid., 104; translation mine.
26. Ibid., 103.
27. Ibid., 114.
28. Shiga, *Nihon fûkeiron* [*On Japanese Landscape*].
29. Ibid., 105; translation mine.
30. Ibid., 106; translation mine.
31. Ibid., 106.
32. Ibid., 99.
33. Kuga, "Shidôron," 750.
34. Given that these research findings were largely realized in the mid-1990s, this serves as independent confirmation of Kevin Doak's later discussion of the opposition between ethnic and state nationalism in the Meiji Japanese context. My recollection is that we initially shared our views on the subject in about 1998. For further detail on Doak's reading of this point, see Doak, "Culture, Ethnicity and the State in Early Twentieth-Century Japan," 181–205.
35. Kuga, "Naikanshôron" ["On Internal Intervention"], 218–20.
36. Miyake, "Chokugo engi wo yomu" ["Reading the Education Rescript Commentary"], 1010.
37. Ibid., 1012.
38. Ibid., 1013–14.
39. Ibid., 1014.
40. Ibid., 1016.
41. Ibid., 1016.
42. Ibid., 1013.
43. Ibid., 1014.
44. Ibid., 1018.
45. Ônishi, "Kyôiku chokugo to rinrisetsu" ["The Education Rescript and Ethical Theory"], 58.
46. Ibid., 59.
47. Ônishi, "Nihonjin wa bijutsu kokoro ni tomeruka" ["Can the Japanese be Enriched in Artistic Spirit?"], 426.
48. Ibid., 415–27; Ônishi, "Wa ga bijutsu no mondai" ["Our Art Problem"], 29–37. The former essay was initially published in *Jogaku zasshi*, no.140, December 1886.
49. Ônishi, "Nihonjin wa bijutsu kokoro ni tomeruka," 427.

CHAPTER 5

1. Takagi, *Shinbun shôsetsu shi*, 281.
2. Shima, "*Konjiki yasha* satsuei yowa" ["Thoughts on Filming *Konjiki yasha*"], 1.
3. Nakamura, *Nihon no kindai shôsetsu* [*Japan's Modern Novel*], 58.
4. Kôyô, *Ozaki Kôyô zenshû* [*Collected Works of Ozaki Kôyô*]. The 1904 publication of his fiction by *Hakubunkan* in the first collected works edition of a modern Japanese novelist considered representative of the nation also arguably

contributed toward this end. This is excepting Higuchi Ichiyô, who was widely respected but not at the time considered a writer representative of the nation due to her gender. On this point, see Copeland, *Lost Leaves*.

5. Takagi, *Shinbun shôsetsushi* [*History of the Newspaper Novel*], 284.
6. Sugitani, *Sakubun kôwa oyobi bunpan* [*Lectures on Composition and Writing*], 72–73.
7. Yamamoto, *Kindai buntai hassei no shiteki kenkyû* [*Historical Research on the Emergence of Modern Style*]; Kornicki, *The Novels of Ozaki Kôyô*, 154.
8. Seki Hajime, "*Konjiki yasha* no jyuyô to mejia mikkusu" ["The Reception of *Konjiki yasha* and the Media Mix"], 158–94.
9. Kôyô, *Ozaki Kôyô zenshû*, 478.
10. Takayama, "Hikokuminteki bungaku wo ronzu" ["On UnJapanese Literature"], 33; translation mine.
11. Ibid., 33.
12. This sort of claim has resurfaced with fairly predictable regularity whenever conservative Japanese intellectuals have been interested in claiming a colonization of Japanese intellectual discourse. Kobayashi Hideo makes a similar claim in his "Watakushi shôsetsuron." An analogous claim also arises in the overcoming modernity debate of the early 1940s.
13. Kôyô, in Yasuda, "*Konjiki yasha* jôchûgehen gappyô," 137–38.
14. Yasuda, "*Konjiki yasha* jôchûgehen gappyô," 86–138.
15. In fact, Kan'ichi's breakdown strikingly parallels Tokutomi Sohô's traumatized repudiation of Spencerian liberalism in response to what he saw as the sheer thuggery of the Triple Intervention and the racial animus it communicated even after Japan had finally received formal legal recognition as an East Asian power.
16. Since this chapter was written, recent scholarship has established that William Rolph's philosophy of insatiability was actually a significant influence on Nietzsche's concept of the will to power but also confirms my reading that their respective conclusions regarding morality diverged quite sharply. For more on this point, see Moore, "Nietzsche and Evolutionary Theory," in Ansell-Pearson's *A Companion to Nietzsche*. Also, Dirk Johnson, "Nietzsche, Biology, Metaphor (review)," in *Journal of Nietzsche Studies*.
17. Mori, in Yasuda, "*Konjiki yasha* jôchûgehen gappyô," 130–34.
18. The informed reader may recall that Nietzsche develops his concept of slave morality most explicitly in *The Genealogy of Morals*, *Beyond Good and Evil*, and *The Anti-Christ*. He offers a speculative, evolutionary genealogy of human morality in which the morality of a superior, noble type of man defined the good, and the morality of an inferior, commoner type of man defined the bad. Such a morality was to have emerged from the enunciative position of the actor, rather than from a separate, abstracted code or law. Nietzsche speculates that with the passage of time and the development of Paulinian Christianity, what served the best interest of the weaker, inferior commoner was redefined as the Good and what served the interests of the stronger, superior nobility was redefined as Evil, thus confining the superior individual within a morality of the commoner and the "herd" that ought not be properly applicable to him or her, and which was

explicitly opposed to his or her own best interest by design. From a Nietzschean perspective, Kant's categorical imperative would be a rationalization—an attempt to justify and legitimate "slave morality" in the name of Reason.

19. Ôgai presents a superb account of Rolph, but tends to conflate Rolph and Nietzsche to a greater degree than their texts warrant. While likely the hegemonic reading of Nietzsche at the time, it does not demonstrate a particularly close familiarity with Nietzsche's text. First, Nietzsche's conception of "the last man"—a central object of critique in much of his later work—fundamentally emerged as a critique of Herbert Spencer's *Data of Ethics*. Nietzsche saw that work as effectively theorizing the death of God as having no lasting consequences and thus conveying a smug self-satisfaction with the moral status quo. It seems to have been Spencer's implicit suggestion that the loss of God doesn't change anything that Nietzsche associated with nihilism. Given this context, for Nietzsche the accumulation of capital would hardly designate one as a superior or noble individual.
20. Metzler, *The Lever of Empire*, 29–32.
21. The figures for performance on the *shimpa* stage are calculated based on a chronology in Marui, *Shimpa nenpyô* [*Shimpa Chronology*]. *The Gold Demon* was produced as a film sixteen times, *Hototogisu* was produced twenty-three times, *Ono ga tsumi* twenty-one times, and *Biwa uta* fifteen times. The calculations for film production are based on data from the prewar volume of *Nihon eiga sakuhin jiten* [*Dictionary of Japanese Film*]. I excluded *jidaigeki* films from this survey. The one case in a borderline contemporary setting I chose to exclude was the seemingly infinite series of films concerning the life of General Nogi.
22. I did not limit my survey of *shimpa* and film production to literary works alone. It just happens that these four serialized novels were the prewar narratives most frequently presented on both the *shimpa* stage and the silver screen. See McDonald, *From Book to Screen*, for an excellent overview of the canonic Japanese language film history account of *shimpa* in early Japanese silent film. McDonald calculates sixteen film productions of *Chikyôdai*, but that was not my count based on the *Dictionary of Japanese Film*.
23. Yanagi, *Eban zuke—shimpa gekidan* [*Illustrated Programs—Shimpa Theater Groups*], 1–51.
24. A number of works published in the twenties identify themselves as "*shimpa higeki*." I hope to pursue a more finely grained account of the evolution of later *shimpa* discourse in future.
25. What is perhaps most striking about the results of the aforementioned survey is that some recent scholarship has tended to metonymically reduce the *shimpa* stage and film tradition to the work of Izumi Kyôka. The data makes it clear that while his work was certainly important at the turn of the century, it did not have nearly the currency of the four warhorses I discuss at the head of this chapter. Working from the production history, the prevailing association of *shimpa* with Kyôka is likely due to two factors—first, Kyôka's undoubtedly higher reputation among literary critics since then; second and perhaps more surprising, Kyôka's place in film adaptation does not really peak until the revival of his work undertaken by Mizoguchi Kenji in 1929, ten years after the last previous adaptation of

his work to film and long after the initial wave of *shimpa higeki* based on Meiji writers had ceased to dominate stage and screen. The association of Kyôka and *shimpa* film production perhaps tells us more about Mizoguchi Kenji's status in the pantheon of film *auteurs* than it does about the history of *shimpa* drama, *shimpa higeki* in film, or the historical place of Izumi Kyôka in that institutional context. For an example of a Kyôka-centered look at *shimpa* and Japanese silent film see Yomota, "*Kyôka, shimpa, nihon eiga*" ["Kyôka, Melodrama, Japanese Film"], 400–409.

Yomota writes, "It would not be too much even to say that it was precisely Kyôka who, by way of *shimpa* (theater), set the precedent for the Japanese melodramatic imagination." Ibid., 403.

Yomota proceeds to cite the figure of twenty-five film adaptations based on Kyôka's writing as evidence for the dominance of Kyôka's work on the silent screen. The figures do seem overwhelming until you compare them to the contemporary competition. Kyôka only comes in a distant number five in the category of authors whose works were adapted to the screen as *shimpa higeki*. The most frequently adapted author in this category is Kikuchi Yûhô, and by a very wide margin. Yomota does note in passing that one of Kyôka's most frequently staged and filmed pieces was extensively edited and rewritten by his mentor, Ozaki Kôyô. Ibid., 404.

26. A reader familiar with scholarship in Japanese folklore studies (*minzokugaku*) or people's history (*minshûshi*) may have experienced a sense of recognition on reading this definition. Indeed, I would suggest that both *minzokugaku* and *minshûshi* themselves deploy the disciplines of ethnography and history in a melodramatic mode.

Hadley's take on melodrama contrasts sharply with the well-known work of Peter Brooks employed in recent English language studies of turn-of-the-century Japanese melodrama:

"Brooks's definition of melodrama seems to me not so much erroneous as anachronistic. He takes a basically accurate depiction of melodrama's later manifestations in the novels of high realism and psychological realism and uses it as a timeless literary convention, ultimately reading it backward into early French stage melodrama. He thereby affirms both his formalist starting point and his romantic assumptions about subjectivity, especially the presumption that subjectivity is without a history." Hadley, *Melodramatic Tactics*, 231.

Brooks' account of melodrama figures importantly in Ito, "Class and Gender in a Meiji Family Romance: Kikuchi Yûhô's Chikyôdai," 339–78 and Zwicker, *Practices of the Sentimental Imagination*. A critical reading of Ito and Zwicker's otherwise innovative and important work will require exploring the degree to which they successfully compensate for Brooks' unquestioned assumption of romantic subjectivity and of literature as an always already constituted discursive field. While an important experiment, Zwicker's account of melodrama as a trans-historical schema across the Tokugawa and Meiji periods would appear to fall into the trap of formalism for which Hadley faults Brooks. A further concern with Zwicker's Franco Moretti-inspired methodological framework is that it

appears to share with Moretti an identification of space with cultural homogeneity and a presumption of historical continuity in categorical frameworks such as the nation. On this point, see Winthrop-Young, "How the Mule Got Its Tale; and Prendergast, "Evolution and Literary History."

27. The characters for Tomiyama's surname literally mean "mountain of wealth."
28. The Japanese character for Miya as a nonproper noun may signify a Shinto shrine, a palace, or the imperial household.
29. "Miisan, you're an adultress! It's the same as if you cheated on me! . . . If you've already lost your virginity, you're an adultress, aren't you?" Kôyô, *Ozaki Kôyô shû*, 107.
30. Sedgewick, *Between Men*, 1–3.
31. Hori, "*Konjiki yasha* no ranpon—Bertha M. Clay wo megutte" ["The Source of *The Gold Demon*—on Bertha M. Clay"], 188–201. Brame wrote this work under the pen name, Bertha Clay, for business reasons.
32. Karlin, "The Gender of Nationalism," 42.
33. "But if the Hobson-Lenin theory that modern imperialism is driven by surplus capital seeking foreign outlets may tell us something about the character of British or French imperialism in the decades before World War I, it can have no relevance to the case of Japan's imperialism. As we have seen, newly industrializing Japan suffered from a persistent capital shortage and went into debt to European and American capitalists in order to build its European-style empire . . . This debt-leveraged lending is a case of what has been called Japan's 'dependent imperialism' of the early twentieth century." Metzler, *The Lever of Empire*, 50–51.
34. Kôyô, *Ozaki Kôyô shû*, 62.
35. Ibid., 62; translation mine.
36. Kimura, *'Seinen' no tanjô* [*The Birth of 'Youth'*], 42–130.
37. It is difficult not to read the violet scent of Tomiyama's cologne as a reference (whether subconscious or otherwise) to Violet, the main female character of the novel Kôyô in part adapted in this work, Charlotte Brame's *Weaker Than a Woman*.
38. Kôyô, *Ozaki Kôyô shu*, 111.
39. On Meiji discourses of the family as they relate to the Meiji novel more broadly, see Ito, "The Family and Nation in Tokutomi Roka's *Hototogisu*," 489–536.
40. Research on the debates over family structure in this period disagrees somewhat over whether the state largely promoted the *ie* model of the family around the turn of the century and the *katei* model was promoted by private actors, or whether the state rapidly made room for the *katei* as well shortly after the turn of the century. Nishikawa Yûko argues for a dual structure that includes both. Nishikawa, "The Changing Form of Dwellings and the Establishment of the *Katei* (Home) in Modern Japan," 3–36. Toshitani Nobuyoshi similarly argues for the Meiji Civil Code of 1898 as a compromise form of sorts. Toshitani, "The Reform of Japanese Family Law and Changes in the Family System," 66–82. Muta Kazue finds that the 1890s saw an incorporation of Confucian mores revitalized under the cover of the progressive notion of *katei* drawn from the west, partly in self-conscious reaction against previous Westernization, but that all of

the competing Meiji models of Japanese family structure were basically novel, not premodern, as so often suggested in previous research. Muta, "Images of the Family in Meiji Periodicals," 53–71.

41. This also highlights the intriguing way in which popular Meiji conceptions of Buddhist enlightenment appear to have been speciesist. They systematically devalued non-human life forms as farther distanced from enlightenment.
42. Kôyô, *Ozaki Kôyô shû*, 447.
43. Kôtoku, *Nijûseiki no kaibutsu: Teikokushugi* [*The Twentieth Century Monster: Imperialism*], 92; 127; 140.
44. "I experience abjection only if an Other has settled in place and stead of what will be "me." Not at all an other with whom I identify and incorporate, but an Other who precedes and possesses me, and through such possession causes me to be." Kristeva, *Powers of Horror*, 10.

    "In this struggle, which fashions the human being, the mimesis, by means of which he becomes homologous to another in order to become himself, is in short logically and chronologically secondary." Ibid., 13.

    "Abjection . . . is always brought about by that which attempts to get along with trampled-down law." Ibid., 19.

    "Dostoyevsky has X-rayed sexual, moral, and religious abjection, displaying it as collapse of paternal laws. Is not the world of *The Possessed* a world of fathers, who are either repudiated, bogus, or dead, where matriarchs lusting for power, hold sway—ferocious fetishes but nonetheless phantomlike?" Ibid., 20.
45. Kôyô, *Ozaki Kôyô shû*, 225.
46. Ibid., 226–7
47. Ibid., 227–28; italics added.
48. For a neoliberal critique of economic relations in *The Gold Demon*, see Ito, *An Age of Melodrama*, 114; 116; 119. Ito's interpretation demonstrates that the competing positions staged in *The Gold Demon* remain deeply and actively contested to this day.
49. Ibid., 228–30.
50. Ibid., 277
51. Ibid., 273.
52. They all attended Tokyo Higher Middle School together. This is literally a middle school in English, but this part of the Meiji era Japanese system actually corresponds quite closely to the German *gymnasium*, a college preparatory school for students in their late teens and early twenties. In a national context, the higher middle school in Tokyo was the elite school in the elite college prep track with most graduates going to Tokyo Imperial University and then into government service, typically at very high levels.
53. Ibid., 195
54. Kimura, *'Seinen' no tanjô*, 42–130.
55. Kôyô, *Ozaki Kôyô shô*, 195.
56. Ibid., 202–4.
57. Williams, *Art of Darkness*. 1–26; 66–98.
58. Kôyô, *Ozaki Kôyô shû*, 397–98.

59. Kôyô, *Ozaki Kôyô shû*, 400.
60. Ibid., 402; translation mine, italics added.
61. Thomas, *Reconfiguring Modernity*, 176.

CHAPTER 6

1. Anderson, "National Literature as Cultural Monument," 45–59.
2. Lamarre, *Uncovering Heian Japan*.
3. Shirane, *Inventing the Classics*.
4. Yoda, *Gender and National Literature*.
5. Weber, *Institution and Interpretation*, 32.
6. Deleuze, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, 129–30.
7. Ibid., 79–80.
8. Rubinger, "Education: From One Room to One System," 204.
9. Bartholomew argues that, contrary to received academic opinion, the tendency of U.S. scholars to associate German and Japanese universities as similarly sources of authoritarian, legally trained officials for the government bureaucracy is unsupportable by the statistical evidence. The Imperial University's commitment to applied science and records of the government hiring practices of the Japanese government belie this claim. He attributes its tenacity to U.S. academic investment in modernization theory. He finds that such scholars "exaggerate the importance of political values and the role of the public sector in the process of change. It may even be that a majority of scholars in Japanese studies believe structural and value changes in the political realm determine—or at least analytically preclude—changes in the economy, culture, or social structure . . . Given the dominance in Japanese studies of the view represented here, we can readily agree with Robert Ward's observation that an interest in and concern for political modernization 'may well have been . . . pressed further in the case of Japan than in that of any other modern society.'" Bartholomew, "Japanese Modernization and the Imperial Universities," 266. It is hard not to suspect a connection between the anomalous extreme of Japan studies and the policy demands of U.S. occupation.
10. Haga, *Meiji bungaku zenshû* [*Complete Works of Meiji Literature*], 224.
11. Haga, *Kokubungakushi jikko* [*Ten Lectures on National Literary History*], 6.
12. Ibid., 6.
13. Ibid., 6.
14. Ibid., 7.
15. Ibid., 8.
16. Ibid., 7.
17. Ibid., 9.
18. Ibid., 266.
19. Ibid., 7.
20. Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, 12.
21. Haga, *Kokubungakushi jikko*, 263.
22. Kittler, *Discourse Networks*, 21–22.
23. Weber, *Institution and Interpretation*, 32.

24. On this point, see Naoki Sakai, *The Voices of the Past*; LaMarre, *Uncovering Heian Japan*; Shirane, *Inventing the Classics*; and Yoda, *Gender and National Literature*.
25. Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, 12–13. Kazamaki Keijirô makes a related argument in "Haga Yaichi to Fujioka Sakutarô," ["Haga Yaichi and Fujioka Sakutaro"], 610–11.
26. Haga. *Kokubungakushi jikko*, 265; translation mine.
27. Ibid., 14–16. See also, Yoda, *Gender and National Literature*, 42–58.
28. Haga, *Kokubungakushi jikko*, 16–18.
29. Hisamatsu, *Kokugaku sono seiritsu to kokubungaku to no kankei* [National Studies—Its Establishment and Relation to National Literature], 428.
30. Haga, *Nihonjin* [*Japanese*], 2.
31. Haga, "Kokugaku to wa nanizoya" ["What is Kokugaku?"], 231.
32. Ibid., 229.
33. Ibid., 229.
34. Ibid., 229. See also, Masuzawa, *The Invention of World Religions*, xiv.
35. Haga, "Kokugaku to wa nanizoya" ["What is National Studies?"], 230; 232; 233.
36. Haga, "Kokugakushi gairon" ["Outline History of National Studies"], 206.
37. Chatterjee, "The Disciplines in Colonial Bengal," 25–26.
38. Previous published work on this problematic includes Anderson, "National Literature as Cultural Monument," 45–59; LaMarre, *Uncovering Heian Japan*; Shirane, *Inventing the Classics*; and Yoda, *Gender and National Literature*.
39. Haga, "Kokugakushi gairon" ["An Outline of the History of National Studies"], 224.
40. Ibid., 225.
41. Ibid., 225.
42. Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, 12.
43. Haga, "Kokuminsei jyûron" ["Ten Essays on Nationality"], 235.
44. Ibid., 235.
45. Ibid., 235–36.
46. Ibid., 281.
47. Ibid., 236.
48. Ibid., 251; 276; 277.
49. Ibid., 280.
50. Ibid., 244.
51. Ibid., 236.
52. Ibid., 244.
53. Ibid., 254–55.
54. Ibid., 277.
55. Ibid., 277.
56. Ibid., 276.
57. Ibid., 267; 276.
58. Haga, *Nihonjin*, unpaginated introduction.
59. Ibid., 38; 128.
60. Dudden, *Japan's Colonization of Korea*, 55.
61. Ibid., 55; 61; 119–20.
62. Lee, "Modernity, Legality, and Power," 27; 30.

63. Ibid., 50.
64. Ibid., 26.
65. Ibid., 31–32.
66. Dudden, *Japan's Colonization of Korea*, 129; Lee, "Modernity, Legality, and Power," 32.
67. Lee, 50.
68. Ibid., 37–38.
69. Ibid., 25.
70. Ibid., 37–38.
71. Ibid., 28.
72. Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword*, 406.
73. Komagome, *Shokuminchi teikoku nihon no bunka tôgô* [*The Cultural Unification of the Colonial Japanese Empire*], 16; 20.
74. Ibid., 21.
75. Lee, "Modernity, Legality, and Power," 39.
76. Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword*, 405.
77. Lee, "Modernity, Legality, and Power," 32–34.
78. Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword*, 408; 410.
79. Lee, "Modernity, Legality, and Power," 42; 44.
80. Soeda, *Kyoiku chokugo no shakaishi* [*The Social History of the Education Rescript*], 235.
81. Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword*, 421–22.
82. Ibid., 433.
83. Komagome, *Shokuminchi teikoku nihon no bunka tôgô*, 2–27.
84. Haga, *Nihonjin*, 2–3.
85. This is a festival associated with young girls that takes place in March and is strongly colored by aspects of emperor worship and Shinto tradition.
86. Ibid., 58; 67; 73; 76; 82. Aspects of this Japanese orientalism also appear in contemporary work by Okakura Tenshin. See Stefan Tanaka's *Japan's Orient*, for a superb account of an alternative articulation of this same discursive formation. Tanaka, *Japan's Orient*, 47.
87. Haga, *Nihonjin*, 8.
88. Ibid., 21–23.
89. Ibid., 28.
90. Ibid., 22; 24; 46; 47.
91. "It is not usually remarked that Leo Strauss's oeuvre, and in particular his famous works of the 1950s such as *On Tyranny* and *Natural Right and History*, offers a precedent of the kind of discursive strategy advanced by Agamben . . . The main polemical object of *Natural Right and History*, for instance, is Max Weber: revered in Germany and in the United States for his liberal temper, Strauss tries to unmask him as a moral nihilist . . . If liberalism understands the mutual recognition of the autonomy of individuals, in and through the rule of law, as the ground of moral value, Strauss, on the contrary, claims that the anterior passage from nature to culture already contains in itself the roots of a moral relativism and nihilism which inevitably propel modernity towards totalitarianism—not

despite modern liberalism, but because of it. As in Agamben, Schmitt's discourse on Hobbes and the foundations of modern rule of law is central to Strauss's understanding of the dialectical inversion of liberal ideals . . . whereas for Strauss these developments are symptomatic of the absence of the divine in politics, for Schmitt they are an index of its kerygmatic presence." Vatter, "Strauss and Schmitt as Readers of Hobbes and Spinoza," 163–64.

92. Haga, *Nihonjin*, 17; 20; 21.
93. "Nature, in the discourse network of 1800, is The Woman. Her function consists in getting people—that is, men—to speak . . . Nature therefore accomplishes a Production of Discourses." Kittler, *Discourse Networks*, 25.
94. Haga, *Nihonjin*, 189; italics in original.
95. Ibid., 185; italics in original.
96. Ibid., 196; italics in original.
97. Ibid., 154.
98. Ibid., 154–57.
99. Ibid., 77.
100. Ibid., 205.
101. Ibid., 205–6.
102. Ibid., 207.
103. Ibid., 207.
104. Ibid., 152. This was also a standard strategy of Christian missionaries from the United States.
105. Ibid., 153.

EPILOGUE

1. Nicole Shukin's *Animal Capital* was very suggestive for the position outlined here. Shukin, *Animal Capital*, 1–48. Julia Thomas has begun to sketch the vast outlines of this problematic. See Thomas, *Reconfiguring Modernity*, 195–98.
2. Watanabe, "Land Reclamation," in *Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan*, v.4, 364.
3. Ted Bestor's *Tsukiji* documents Japan's central role in the global fishing economy during the postwar period. Bestor, *Tsukiji*, 32; 118–25. I would like to thank Christine Marran for bringing the transformation of Japanese fishing methods in the modern period to my attention. While avoiding Japan's "green nationalism" and taking the ecological challenge of Japanese industrialism seriously, it is also important to do so on a careful, case-by-case basis, being wary of falling into a green Orientalism under which it is often falsely assumed by Westerners (particularly Western industry and their state representatives) that Western capitalists are by and large responsible, while Asian capitalists pose a unique and indiscriminate threat to environmental sustainability. In other words, the discourse of ecology itself is already being actively instrumentalized on many sides toward many ends. On this point see Barclay, "Fishing, Western, Japanese and Islander Perceptions of Ecology and Modernization in the Pacific," in *Japan Focus*, posted August 29, 2007.

4. This account is informed by Thomas Cleaver, "Railways," in *Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan*, v.6, 277–80.
5. This account is significantly based on Victor Lippitt, "Environmental Quality," in *Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan*, v.2, 225–30.
6. Ong, *Neoliberalism as Exception*, 4.
7. Ibid., 7.
8. Ibid., 16.
9. Ong, *Flexible Citizenship*, 73; 76–77; 82.
10. Cheah, "Spectral Nationality," 15.
11. Ibid., 15–8.
12. Johnson, *Blowback*, 43.
13. Ibid., 43.
14. Moon, *Theorizing the U.S. Military Empire*, 7.
15. Johnson, *Blowback*, 43; Moon, *Theorizing the U.S. Military Empire*, 8.
16. Moon, *Theorizing the U.S. Military Empire*, 5.

17. See Daly, Beyond Growth, 1–44; and Georgescu-Roegen, The Entropy Law and the Economic Process.
18. Felton, "Beyond the Growth Paradigm," in Adbusters, August 7, 2009.

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