First published in Great Britain in 2013 by

PEN & SWORD FAMILY MILITARY

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Copyright © David Buttery 2013

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CONTENTS

Acknowledgements

Key to Map Symbols

Introduction The Most Famous of Battles

Chapter 1    The Return of Napoleon

Chapter 2    The Decisive Moment of the Century

Viewpoints:

The Battlefield of Ligny

St Armand, Sombreffe and Fleurus

The Farmhouses of Gemioncourt, Piraumont and Grand Pierrepoint

The Duke of Brunswick’s Memorial

The Crossroads of Quatre Bras

Chapter 3    The Struggle for Hougoumont

Viewpoints:

Wellington’s Elm Tree Crossroads

The Lion Mound

The Anglo-Allied Right flank

The Anglo-Allied Left flank

Le Caillou

The La Belle Alliance Ridge (French Ridge)

The Inn of La Belle Alliance

Rossomme

The Chateau at Hougoumont and its Environs

Hougoumont – Internal Buildings and Monuments

Chapter 4    D’Erlon’s Attack

Viewpoints:

The Grande Batterie and the Memorial of the 6th Foot Artillery

Napoleon’s Second Observation Point

Allied Centre and Left Flank

Picton’s Memorial

Memorial to Durutte’s Division

La Haye Sainte

Marcognet’s Monument

Wellington’s Extreme Left Flank

Papelotte Farmhouse

La Haye Farm

Smohain Village and Fichermont

Chapter 5    Cavalry Onslaught

Viewpoints:

Views of the Valley

Village of Mont St Jean

Mont St Jean Farmhouse

The Waterloo Panorama

The Allied Centre Right

Mercer and Demulder Monuments

The Polish Lancers Memorial

The 5th Armoured Regiment Memorial

The Bois de Paris (Forest of Paris)

Chapter 6    The Fall of La Haye Sainte

Viewpoints:

La Haye Sainte Farmhouse and its Memorials

Memorial to the 27th (Inniskilling) Regiment

Memorial to the Belgians

The Hanoverian Memorial

Chapter 7    The Battle of Wavre

Viewpoints:

Walhain-St Paul and Evilard Farm

The Town of Wavre

The Church of St John the Baptist

The Field Hospitals

Bierges Mill

Limal Village and La Bourse Farm

The Chateau of La Bawette

The Debève Brothers Monument

Chapter 8    Street Fighting in Plancenoit

Viewpoints:

The Bois de Paris (Forest of Paris)

Colonel von Schwerin’s Monument

Plancenoit Village

The Prussian Memorial

Chapter 9    La Garde Recule!

Viewpoints:

The Allied Centre Right

The Wounded Eagle Monument

The Victor Hugo Monument

The Gordon Memorial

Chapter 10    The Aftermath

Chapter 11    Visiting the Battlefield

Viewpoints:

Brussels

Wellington Connections

The Grand Place (Grote Markt)

Evere Cemetery

The Royal Army and Military History Museum

Braine l’Alleud Village

Waterloo Village

The Wellington Museum

The Royal Chapel and St Joseph’s Church

The Lion Village

Le Musée de Cire (Waxworks Museum)

Waterloo Visitors’ Centre

Restaurants and Souvenir Shops

Annotated Bibliography

Battlefield Chronology

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank a number of people and organizations for their help during the writing of this guidebook. Pauline Buttery, Bert Godley and Stuart Hadaway provided invaluable assistance by proof reading my work, in addition to Pen & Sword’s official readers, who also provided sterling service. I would like to thank Stuart for his companionship during my most recent trip to Waterloo and for his good advice as a fellow historian and Waterloo enthusiast.

David Charlton, of the University of Leicester’s David Wilson Library, provided me with every assistance during research and I thank the National Army Museum and Colindale Newspaper Archive for access to material that proved very useful. Douglas Austin and Alex Sim also deserve a mention for their knowledgeable counsel on several occasions. Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to Rupert Harding for being so patient during this long-term assignment and for asking me to undertake the project in the first place.

KEY TO MAP SYMBOLS

This book is dedicated to the brave men on both sides who fought at Waterloo almost 200 years ago

Introduction

THE MOST FAMOUS OF BATTLES

Visiting battlefields has become an increasingly popular activity over the last few decades and there are many reasons for this trend. Interest in the past has never been greater and many wish to commemorate the achievements and sacrifices made by their ancestors among other considerations. As the politics and events of today are shaped by past conflicts, interpreting why battles were fought, along with who won and them and why, is essential for gaining a thorough understanding of history. Indeed, while some view military history as a narrow and specialized field, it is impossible to comprehend political and social changes in the world without reference to military history.

Waterloo is one of the most famous battles to take place in the last 500 years and so its impact on European and world history is worthy of careful study. It was a decisive battle in that it ended a long series of wars that had plunged Europe into a maelstrom of bloodshed and destruction spanning two decades (1792–1815). The great historian David Chandler wrote that: ‘In the long history of Western civilisation, probably only Zama (202 BC) and Tours (AD 732) have proved of equal importance, and only Gettysburg has been written about as often.’ His point is supported by the fact that Waterloo attracts around 300,000 tourists every year.

The magnetic appeal of the famous personalities concerned also ensures that Waterloo continues to fascinate enthusiasts 200 years on. The mystique surrounding Emperor Napoleon I of France is enough to draw admirers and critics alike to visit the place where he met his final defeat, a loss that did nothing to diminish his growing legend. His principal opponent, Arthur Wellesley, First Duke of Wellington, also occupies a unique place in military history and the fact that these two commanders adopted different approaches to warfare has intrigued historians ever since their confrontation on this battlefield.

This was also a multinational battle, concerning three main armies composed of soldiers from many European nations. The Prussian Army played a valiant role during the 1815 campaign under Marshal Blücher, although historians occasionally downplay his army’s contribution at Waterloo. He was a tactician rather than a strategist and was somewhat overshadowed by the talented commanders of the other two armies involved. Among the lesser ranks who fought at Waterloo (from generals down to private soldiers) were men who had become famous in their own lifetime and it was here that veterans of twenty years of almost uninterrupted warfare converged for the climactic struggle. Great military reputations were made at Waterloo, a battle where many displayed incredible courage during continuous fighting that lasted over 9 hours.

Modern historians who make a study of Waterloo are confronted with a bewildering multitude of accounts from participants, contemporary observers and historians. Many incidents during the battle have gained an almost mythical status and, when these are challenged, provoke howls of outrage from traditionalists. The fame of such incidents in themselves, such as the closing of the gates at Hougoumont, makes a visit to the battlefield even more intriguing for visitors, but this is the case with many locations where such events have taken place.

Although considerable literature exists about the battle, many works are far from objective as it is difficult to set national and political considerations aside when historians hail from countries directly involved in the campaign. Some British historians tend to overemphasize the heroism of British soldiers and gloss over the contribution of their allies. This can be traced back to the immediate reaction after the overwhelming victory at Waterloo, which was welcomed with relief after many years of war. William Makepeace Thackeray, who used Waterloo as a focal point in his novel Vanity Fair, visited the battlefield in the 1840s and his writing typifies the patriotic feeling of the time:

Let an Englishman go and see that field, and he never forgets it. The sight is an event in his life; and, though it has been seen by millions of peaceable gents – grocers from Bond Street, meek attorneys from Chancery Lane, and timid tailors from Piccadilly – I will wager that there is not one of them but feels a glow as he looks at the place, and remembers that he, too, is an Englishman.

Thackeray gives a good impression here of how strongly Victorian society felt about this victory and many of his contemporaries made a pilgrimage to see the battlefield for themselves. However, his prose would have been more accurate had it referred to Britons rather than Englishmen, since Wellington’s Anglo-Allied Army contained many Scots, Irish and Welsh soldiers. Yet even that consideration fails to reflect the international make-up of the Anglo-Allied Army, two-thirds of whom hailed from Hanover, Belgium and Holland, along with other national groups.

In contrast, German historians often claim that the Prussian Army made the main contribution to the victory and allege that Wellington let his allies down by failing to come to their aid at the Battle of Ligny. Peter Hofschröer is one notable historian who believes that Wellington claimed unfair credit for a victory he would not have won but for the Prussian Army. While there is some truth to this and other theories, many historians recognize that the Allied victory was achieved only through an effective combined effort on the part of both armies. Extolling the virtues of one army over another provokes interesting debate between historians but tends to obscure this fact.

The perspective of the French is different again and many of their historians, such as Henry Houssaye, concentrate on the mistakes made by Napoleon’s subordinate commanders and are perhaps a little too generous towards the Emperor himself, who committed grave errors of judgement both at Waterloo and during the campaign. In fact, most French historians concentrate on Napoleon’s previous victories rather than dwelling upon the reasons for his final defeat.

For example, Victor Hugo saw Waterloo as the tragic end of a young republic brought down by a pact between old monarchies (see Chapter 1). Although he wrote very movingly about the tragic effect that the defeat had upon France, his work contains a number of factual errors and can prove misleading. Yet he did visit the field for himself and saw how the site had changed, commenting:

Every one is aware that the variously inclined undulations of the plains, where the engagement between Napoleon and Wellington took place, are no longer what they were on June 18, 1815. By taking from this mournful field the wherewithal to make a monument to it, its real relief has been taken away, and history, disconcerted, no longer finds her bearings there. It has been disfigured for the sake of glorifying it. Wellington, when he beheld Waterloo once more, two years later, exclaimed, ‘They have altered my field of battle!’ Where the great pyramid of earth, surmounted by the lion, rises to-day, there was a hillock which descended in an easy slope towards the Nivelles road, but which was almost an escarpment on the side of the highway to Genappe. The elevation of this escarpment can still be measured by the height of two knolls of the two great sepulchres which enclose the highway from Genappe to Brussels: one, the English tomb, is on the left: the other, the German tomb, is on the right. There is no French tomb. The whole of that plain is a sepulchre for France.

Hugo’s views were very influential on French historians. The way he described the defeat as being a tragedy for liberal ideas, where Napoleon, representing a new form of government, was defeated by mischance, gained widespread acceptance in France. For example, Jules Delhaize and Winard Aerts argued succinctly in their book Waterloo: etudes relatives a la campagne de 1815 en Belgique, published in 1919, that: ‘… there are some defeats which do not tarnish the glory of an army any more than they dimimish a people. Waterloo is one of these.’ In the years immediately following the battle, the majority of its visitors came from countries that had formed the Seventh Coalition against Napoleon. From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, French tourists became increasingly common at the battlefield despite it being the location of one of the worst French defeats.

Yet the Battle of Waterloo can only be properly understood when it is placed within the context of the campaign itself, in which four major battles were fought in as many days between 15–18 June 1815. Therefore, the battles of Quatre Bras and Ligny are described within this book, although not with the same level of detail as events at Waterloo, along with the almost simultaneous conflict fought at Wavre. This battle occurred 15km (9½ miles) from Waterloo and some knowledge of it is necessary to understand how the Prussians were able to reach Wellington’s position in time to intervene and to explain why the French failed to prevent them.

A description of the aftermath of the campaign is also included to explain the massive political impact of the battle and how it altered the balance of power in Europe. Countries like Britain and Prussia gained enormously from the resulting settlement, whereas France was humbled and its military influence drastically reduced. Waterloo also represented the triumph of old reactionary states over the new liberal philosophies emerging in Europe. The old monarchies were relieved after the victory but Napoleon’s defeat only slowed the pace of reform and the respite it gained for them in Europe was only temporary.

The end of the wars also saw the Congress of Vienna, interrupted by Napoleon’s return and reconvened following his final exile, attempt to put an end to warfare as a means of settling disputes between states. Although their efforts were ultimately unsuccessful, this was the first time that an international congress met and tried to resolve issues at the negotiation table rather than by force of arms. This alone makes Waterloo an immensely important event in European history.

Historians entertain many views about exactly what occurred at Waterloo and the responsibility of individuals for specific incidents on the battlefield, reasons why Napoleon lost the battle, reasons why the Allies were victorious and many other theories relating to the battlefield and the campaign. Some are highly controversial and give rise to vigorous debate. While analysing this famous battle is an interesting and engrossing subject, it is not the purpose of this book. This guidebook tries to offer an informed, and hopefully objective, account of the battle rather than attempt to promote new ideas about the campaign or challenge views contained in other works. Its primary intention is to act as a helpful tool for people wishing to visit the location, allowing them to draw their own conclusions from the experience.

A thorough understanding of the difficulties facing the commanders and the armies involved is best achieved by viewing the battlefield itself. Topography has always had a great influence over combat and this was especially true at Waterloo, where Wellington selected a strong defensive position and was determined to hold it until reinforced by the Prussians. The difficulties that Napoleon encountered while attacking this deceptively strong position were immense and only by standing on the actual ground itself can one appreciate why decisions were made, not only due to what commanders could actually see but because some areas were hidden from their view.

Wellington, in his habitually straightforward manner, summarized this neatly, remarking: ‘All the business of war … is to endeavour to find out what you don’t know by what you do; that’s what I called “guessing what was at the other side of the hill.”’ Although this is true of all Napoleonic battlefields, it is particularly so regarding Waterloo where Wellington’s cunning deployment of troops (many being out of the line of sight of French artillery and observers) influenced the choices Napoleon was forced to make.

Waterloo is also unusual in many ways; it covered a far smaller area than many contemporary battlefields and its occasionally subtle geographical contours limited the effect of firepower and contributed to some serious tactical errors on the part of some generals and officers of lesser rank. For those who wish to gain an insight into what occurred on that fateful Sunday afternoon of 18 June 1815, a visit to the battlefield is therefore essential. It is hoped that this work will provide a useful guide for use on the battlefield by including information on how to get there, where to stay, viewing the field itself and how to get the best out of the experience.

Chapter 1

THE RETURN OF NAPOLEON

How had it come to this? Many soldiers must have asked that question as the sun rose over a small area of Belgian countryside on Sunday 18 June 1815. Nearly a year ago, Emperor Napoleon I of France had been forced to accept peace terms and went into exile, events that signalled the end of the wars, or so many had hoped. Nonetheless, two great armies now faced each other near the village of Waterloo only 9½ miles (15 km) from Brussels, preparing for another day’s bitter fighting in the knowledge that many would not live to see another sunrise.

Since 1792, the Continent had been plagued by incessant wars, the influence of which had spread well beyond the confines of Europe. The seemingly invincible French armies had challenged and beaten most of the main European powers but were eventually forced back into France by 1814. Their Emperor had dominated the Continent for over a decade but, after his abdication, a new era of peace and prosperity suddenly seemed possible. Yet within a year, he escaped from exile and deposed King Louis XVIII of France with a speed that barely seemed credible. Although Napoleon was not the revolutionary radical he had once claimed to be, most of Europe saw him as the representative of a dangerous new ideology, bent on overthrowing the old order by force of arms. Shocked by his sudden reappearance on the world’s stage, his enemies formed the Seventh Coalition (a powerful international alliance) against him.

While the Emperor now claimed to be fighting in defence of France, many felt that a French victory in this campaign would plunge Europe back into incessant warfare and destruction as Napoleon had always been an inveterate warmonger. Yet his grip on power was tenuous and he needed a decisive victory and, above all, needed it quickly if his new regime was to survive. In contrast, although the Allied powers knew that winning a major victory here might end Napoleon’s ambitions, they still feared him as a general and knew that a serious defeat could prove catastrophic. Other armies were marching upon France and, even if this campaign failed to stop Napoleon, the French were still massively outnumbered. However, Napoleon’s fame as a general was such that a major defeat might have a ruinous political effect, attracting others to his cause and splitting the alliance ranged against him.

REVOLUTION AND EMPIRE, 1792–1814

To understand what was at stake on the field of Waterloo it is necessary to examine the dramatic events that occurred between the years 1792 and 1814. It all began with the French Revolution in 1789. Revolutionary fanaticism witnessed the overthrow of the French Bourbon monarchy, the dispossession of the aristocracy and eventually led to mass executions and the beginning of a class struggle that would continue to the present day. Although the revolutionaries were split into numerous groups and factions, almost all of them opposed kingship in any form and desired a new and fairer society, to be created by force if necessary.

Most European nations were monarchies at this time and feared that revolutionary ideology would spread from France and lead their own people into rebellion. Therefore, they resolved to destroy the new French Republic before its influence could spread but the revolutionaries proved far more difficult to suppress than anticipated. Far from being the disorganized rabble that initially swept the Bourbons from power, their conscript-based armies were inspired by fiery rhetoric and the promise of a fairer society and proved a match for the professional forces of the old order, not only defending their borders but carrying the war further afield.

Napoleon Bonaparte – the man who had dominated Europe for over a decade. The 1815 campaign would be his last chance to regain power. (Bourgeois)

Napoleon Buonaparte (he would later change the spelling to Bonaparte) was the greatest figure to emerge from the turmoil of the Revolutionary Wars. He came from the island of Corsica, which passed from Genoa to France the year before his birth (1768), and his family was respectable but lacked wealth or influence. He qualified as an artillery officer in the Royal Army but, as the revolutionaries permitted promotion by merit rather than through birth and influence, the new system allowed him to rise swiftly due to his remarkable abilities. Once he became a general, he made a substantial contribution to ensuring that successive revolutionary governments survived. Yet Napoleon’s effectiveness as a soldier was matched only by his almost limitless ambition for himself, his family and friends. During 9–10 November 1799, he seized power in a coup d’état and assumed dictatorial powers over the following years. Victories over Austria and other successes allowed him to retain his grip on power and he was crowned Emperor of France on 2 December 1804.

Warfare continued into the Imperial period, with the French defeating Prussia, Austria and Russia until Britain was the only major power that still stood against him. Up to 1806, it is possible to justify some of Napoleon’s wars on the basis that defending France and republicanism were among his primary aims. Yet after 1807, his wars took on a more sinister tone with the acquisition of territory and power lying at the heart of his ambitions. The Bonaparte family became a new royal dynasty and Napoleon placed his brothers and sisters on the thrones of allied states, and even some of his more successful generals became kings and princes. Hoping to force Britain into a peace settlement, he attempted to close all the ports of Europe against British trade with his Continental System. He intimidated other nations into adopting this policy, which often went against their commercial interests, and ultimately it did little to damage the British economy. Naturally, this commercial embargo was unpopular and its forced imposition helped alienate many nations against Napoleon.

The years 1807–14 saw the French invasion of the Spanish Peninsula and Napoleon’s treatment of Spain, his former ally, left Europe appalled by his treachery. The conflict he began there against Spain, Portugal and Britain was unprecedented in its savagery; mass destruction of property, widespread killing of civilians and incessant guerrilla warfare were commonplace. Thousands of French soldiers died in a ruinous series of campaigns that drained French resources to the extent that Napoleon called this war his ‘Spanish Ulcer’.

The Austrians declared war upon France once again and the Emperor suffered his first serious defeat at Aspern-Essling in 1809. Despite Napoleon’s eventual victory in that campaign, his enemies were increasingly harder for him to defeat as they had become accustomed to his style of waging war. Both sides sustained terrible losses at the Battle of Wagram in the same year which, as well as being his last truly decisive victory, set a new standard for carnage in Europe now that the destruction of armies was the main objective, rather than the acquisition of territory or strategic position.

Allied strategy for June/July 1815.

Napoleon’s invasion of Russia in 1812 was a serious error in his grand strategy as he was compelled to fight on two fronts while the war in the Peninsula still raged. At the head of the largest army ever assembled until that time, estimated at over 500,000 French and allied soldiers, he marched into Russia hoping to force Tsar Alexander I to adopt his Continental System. The Russians fell back before him and, while he defeated their armies and occupied Moscow, the Tsar refused to sue for peace. The battles of this campaign dwarfed the size of the conflicts fought elsewhere in Europe and resulted in crippling losses of men, horses and military equipment. Eventually Napoleon felt compelled to retreat and his army endured a painful withdrawal in terrible weather conditions; he brought fewer than 93,000 men out of Russia. Napoleon’s Grande Armée had finally been humbled and the losses it had suffered were almost impossible to replace.

By 1813, the First French Empire was in serious decline as Napoleon’s allies began to defect in the wake of his disastrous Russian campaign. The Battle of Leipzig in 1813 was a major defeat for Napoleon and French armies had to abandon the bulk of the territory gained during the previous decade. The Peninsular War had also been ruinous for France and her armies retired towards the Pyrenees after suffering a series of defeats at the hands of British, Portuguese and Spanish forces. Although Napoleon’s enemies were massing to destroy him, they still feared his awesome ability as a general and knew that victory would only be possible at a high cost in lives and revenue. Therefore, they offered generous peace settlements that would allow him to keep his crown if he relinquished his territorial gains and restored the balance of power in Europe.

Yet Napoleon’s self-confidence was unshakeable and he believed that it was still possible to split and defeat the coalition of states formed against France. The 1814 campaign was one of his finest; Napoleon used all his skills to win a string of victories against the Allies during a campaign of rapid manoeuvre against fearful odds. Yet the overwhelming number of troops set against him finally proved impossible for the French Army to overcome. Since he had lost a huge number of horses in Russia, Napoleon’s victories ultimately proved futile, as they could not be conclusive unless followed by an effective cavalry pursuit. When Paris surrendered to the Allies, Napoleon’s marshals persuaded him to agree to peace terms and abdicate his throne.

Although permitted to retain the title of Emperor, Napoleon was exiled to the small isle of Elba in the Mediterranean Sea off the western coast of Italy. Political leaders representing all the major powers of Europe met at the Congress of Vienna, where proposals for the redistribution of territory and power were debated. The man whose reputation alone had recently cowed much of Europe was now derided as the ‘New Robinson Crusoe’, and considered safely out of the way. The old reactionary regimes hoped that Europe would now return to the state of affairs that existed before the French Revolution.

Napoleon’s first abdication at Fontainebleau, 6 April, 1814. (Etienne Prosper Berne-Bellecour)

NAPOLEON ESCAPES

Under the circumstances, Napoleon could have suffered a far worse punishment than being exiled to Elba. Although he had not instigated all of the wars that France had become embroiled in, his dynastic ambitions resulted in great loss of life and widespread disruption. On Elba, he ruled over approximately 112,000 subjects and was allowed to retain a bodyguard of several hundred men. Yet he soon became bored and frustrated with his tiny kingdom and the limited opportunities it offered a man with his ambitions.

The Bourbon Government restored by the Allies was proving deeply unpopular in France. Returning royalist émigrés, some of whom had fought against France, behaved arrogantly and received important promotions in the army and government, while old soldiers and administrators were dismissed or pensioned off. The peasantry feared that land they had gained during the Revolution would be confiscated and returned to the Church or aristocracy and the Bourbons seemed bent upon revoking every reform made during their absence. After a brief period of popularity following his restoration, the corpulent and uncharismatic Louis XVIII alienated the majority of his subjects. Compared to the man who had made France the first nation in Europe, he cut a poor figure and many were still loyal to Napoleon. When he learnt about the situation in France, the exile took heart.

To make matters worse, the Allies reneged on several promises made to the Emperor, including the provision of funds necessary to maintain his household. The British Prime Minister, Lord Liverpool, wrote: ‘Buonaparte is reduced to his last shilling. He has spent the little money he brought with him, and his pension has not been paid, although the six months have long since expired. This is abominable.’ He also mentioned the rumour that some influential figures deemed it unsafe to permit this dangerous man to remain close to central Europe. The remote isle of St Helena, lying deep in the south Atlantic, would be a far better home for him they suggested. It is possible that Napoleon heard of these plans.

At the Congress of Vienna, statesmen from all over Europe discussed how they should redistribute territory and power following the defeat of France. Most wished to restore the regimes and borders that had existed prior to 1791 but for many reasons this proved unrealistic. Politically Europe would never be the same again after the French Revolution and the conflicting interests of Prussia, Russia and Britain soon led to disagreements, which were exploited by Talleyrand, a former minister of Napoleon who now represented France’s King Louis XVIII. The Congress’s consideration of such weighty matters was rudely interrupted by the shocking news that Napoleon had escaped.

THE FALL OF LOUIS XVIII

Napoleon left Elba on 26 February 1815 accompanied by only 1,050 soldiers. He landed in France on 1 March where: ‘Amazement, rather than acclaim greeted his arrival.’ Although alarmed at the news, most believed that the government would soon put an end to this threatening venture by arresting and imprisoning him. Nevertheless, he headed determinedly towards Grenoble and despite marching through Provence, which was a staunchly Royalist province, no one made any serious attempt to stop him.

Napoleon reached Grenoble on 7 March where troops of the 5th Ligne Regiment stood to block his progress. Approaching them alone and unarmed, Napoleon dramatically opened his greatcoat and invited them to shoot if they desired to kill their Emperor. Their response was to desert to him en masse and the soldiers flocked around his standard, cheering ecstatically. The 7th Ligne rapidly followed suit and, as news of his progress towards the capital spread, people began to wear revolutionary cockades on their hats and hang the tricolour flag from buildings lining his route. Marshal Ney, at the head of a sizeable force, confronted his former master at Auxerre on 17 March but swiftly renounced the Bourbons and joined Napoleon along with his entire command.

Knowing that his reign had begun badly, Louis XVIII realized that he could expect little or no public support for his government in a fight against the most successful soldier of modern times. He fled Paris in the dead of night on 19 March and headed towards the coast. Reaching Abbeville, he changed direction and crossed the border into Belgium on 22 March. Here he sought refuge in the Kingdom of the Netherlands, a new state founded only the previous year. Napoleon entered the Tuileries Palace less than 24 hours after Louis had fled, receiving a rapturous welcome as he reached the capital with crowds thronging the streets. He had regained his throne in only twenty-three days without firing a shot in anger but it was far from certain that he would be able to keep it.

THE SEVENTH COALITION

Napoleon had been right that the majority of the French people would welcome his return but his illusions that the rest of Europe would accept him at the head of France were soon shattered. His first move was to justify deposing Louis and proclaim his desire for peace. On 4 April, he wrote to all the sovereigns of Europe telling them how the Bourbons had ignored the wishes and rights of the people to the extent that France: ‘was forced to abandon them. The popular voice called for a liberator.’ Furthermore, he declared that Europe was tired of war and: ‘My first and heartfelt anxiety is to repay so much affection by the maintenance of an honourable peace.’

Unfortunately, in the recent past Napoleon had made little secret of his belief that his retention of power rested upon delivering a succession of glorious victories to the French people. Therefore, many viewed him as a warmonger and few considered his desire for peace to be genuine. A week before he returned to Paris, the delegates at Vienna issued a declaration against him stating that: ‘by appearing again in France with projects of confusion and disorder, he has deprived himself of the protection of law, and has manifested to the universe that there can be neither truce nor peace with him’. Representatives of Austria, France, Britain, Portugal, Prussia, Russia, Spain and Sweden signed this declaration. Looking back with hindsight some years later, Napoleon admitted that he had misjudged the political situation by returning too soon. He speculated that had he allowed another six months to elapse, the Allies would not have formed such a strong alliance against him as political rifts had begun to develop between them. Regardless of whether this was true or not, it was now abundantly clear that another war was imminent.

The Seventh Coalition was declared against Napoleon in person, castigating him as a usurper rather than the legitimate ruler of France, and the states involved agreed that there would be no independent settlement with France until he was overthrown. Austria, Prussia and Russia agreed to raise 700,000 men between them, while the Duke of Wellington received command of British, German and Dutch/Belgian troops in Flanders. A Prussian army concentrated in the same region under Field Marshal Gebhard von Blücher, and the two forces hoped to field around 150,000 troops in combination.

Only Murat, King of Naples, voiced his approval of Napoleon’s actions and spontaneously declared war upon Austria. Ironically, he was probably the only head of state whose support Napoleon did not wish to gain. This was due to his disloyalty the year before when he had failed to march his troops to support Napoleon and defected to the Allies in order to keep his throne. Murat was rapidly defeated at the Battle of Torentino on 2 May. He fled to France where Napoleon contemptuously spurned his offer to serve under him, despite his skill as a cavalry general.

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON, 1769–1852

Born in 1769, Arthur Wesley was the fourth son of Garret Wesley, an Anglo-Irish aristocrat. Educated at Eton and later in Angers, he showed little promise until his family bought him a commission in the British Army. Displaying a keen interest in all facets of military life, he even devoted himself to studying practical aspects like logistics and supply, which most officers of the day ignored. As his family’s status improved, they changed their surname to Wellesley, the more aristocratic spelling reflecting their rise in fortunes.

He mastered his profession in India during successful campaigns against Tippoo Sultan and the Mahrattas. During the Peninsular War, he acquired his reputation as a great commander. Landing in Portugal, he soon toppled the weak regime established there by the French under General Junot and fought off two further French invasions. The last of these owed much of its success to the construction of the defensive ‘Lines of Torres Vedras’ made to protect Lisbon. The vast scale of this project was an incredible military undertaking and proved so effective that it immediately halted the progress of a large army under Marshal Massena, who was eventually forced to retreat. With Portugal secure, Wellington crossed the frontier into Spain and fought a series of campaigns to oust the French armies occupying that nation. In the course of this war, he defeated some of Napoleon’s best commanders, eventually crossing the Pyrenees and invading France itself.

Sir Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington. He had fought Napoleon’s Marshals in the Peninsula but in 1815 he would face the Emperor himself. (Sir Thomas Lawrence)

While justly renowned for his defensive skill, he demonstrated his offensive capability by attacking and defeating French armies many times in the Peninsula at battles like Salamanca 1812 and Vitoria 1813. Although some contemporaries resented his family’s political influence, by 1815 he was already Britain’s greatest general through his own hard work and abilities with an unbroken string of victories to his name. Wellington was meticulous in preparation and tried to foresee every possibility on the battlefield, striving to ensure that his troops were well provisioned and supported. While warfare is unpredictable by nature, Wellington’s careful approach usually paid off and he left little to chance. This was in direct contrast to Napoleon, who, while he always calculated the odds, was often prepared to take a gamble in order to win. Wellington did not believe in taking unnecessary chances.

While he had fought the French extensively, he had never faced Napoleon himself and Waterloo would be the first battle where the two greatest commanders of the age would confront each other.

ALLIED WAR PLANS

The Allies planned to assemble vast numbers of troops along France’s eastern frontier, which was about 600 miles (965km) long. They intended to mount two major offensives along this border with a supporting invasion from the south. The first, under the overall command of Field Marshal Prince Karl Schwarzenburg, would cross the Meuse and Rhine rivers and march on Paris. The second offensive was aimed at Lyons to the south and, if successful, would also converge on the French capital. Spanish and Portuguese forces were massing on the Spanish border with the intention of invading over the Pyrenees and attacking in the south. The Allies knew that Napoleon’s armies would be heavily outnumbered in all three sectors and, if he concentrated his forces to stop any one incursion, they could be swiftly outflanked and cut off by the others. They predicted that he would choose to delay their advance and fight a defensive campaign focussed on defending Paris.

The Allies were capable of raising vast forces to crush Napoleon, but time was a pressing factor. Elated at the peace following years of conflict, most nations had rushed to demobilize, the ruinous cost of the wars making rulers keen to cut military expenditure and begin repairing the damage wrought on their economies. Furthermore, thousands of Wellington’s Peninsula veterans were currently in Canada and North America following the recently concluded War of 1812 (actually fought between 1812 and 1815) against America. The Russian Army would also take several months to reach the French border. Many of their soldiers would be inexperienced recruits and the Allies needed time to concentrate sufficient numbers of men to overwhelm and crush Napoleon’s armies.

Ultimately, the Allies were confident about their long-term strategy as long as they managed to deploy in sufficient numbers and maintain their nerve politically. However, they feared that a successful pre-emptive strike by Napoleon might discourage some states from opposing him and persuade others to switch their allegiance. A great deal depended upon how quickly they could manoeuvre their forces into position. By mid-1815, only Wellington and Blücher’s armies were in place and in a state of readiness. The Austrians would not reach the Rhine before July at the earliest and the Russians would not arrive until much later. Many were eager to march on France but, realistically, the Allies would not be able to invade until the autumn.

FIELD MARSHAL BLÜCHER, 1742–1819

Born near Rostock in 1742, Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher was a veteran of the Seven Years War. He remained in the army after hostilities had ended but was eventually compelled to leave due to his penchant for carousing, gambling, womanizing, duelling and occasional insubordination. He became a gentleman farmer for a time but rejoined the army to fight in the Revolutionary Wars and, during the Imperial period, participated in the disastrous 1806 campaign. At Auerstädt, he attacked with his typically impetuous style but managed to fight a tenacious rearguard action to cover the Prussian retreat. Stubborn to the last, he was one of the last to surrender to the French whose rapid defeat of the vaunted Prussian Army shocked all of Europe.

His vitriolic hatred of the French saw him forbidden from holding military office for a time but he returned to fight in 1813 when the Sixth Coalition was formed against France. Although defeated at the battles of Lützen and Bautzen, he went on to play a key role in defeating Napoleon at the decisive Battle of Leipzig, the largest single action of the Napoleonic Wars that saw 365,000 Allied troops sent into the field against 195,000 French and allied soldiers. Promoted Field Marshal by 1814, when the Allies invaded France he pressed for a more aggressive strategy during the drive on Paris. Other Allied commanders only managed to suppress his ruthlessness and lack of caution with difficulty.

A charismatic hussar officer of the old school, Blücher was an inspiring commander who referred to his soldiers as his ‘beloved children’ and saw himself as the father of his army. While an instinctive tactician and a dedicated soldier, he was no strategist. His obsessive hatred of Napoleon and the French after what they had done to Prussia occasionally clouded his judgement. Aged 72, he was about to retire when the news of Napoleon’s escape from Elba brought him back into the field.

NAPOLEON’S GRAND STRATEGY

In all likelihood, despite later protests to the contrary, Napoleon had probably taken it for granted that he would have to fight in order to keep his throne. Yet he was surprised by the strength and unity of the Allied reaction and only resumed the policy of conscription in France that April. This had been one of the most unpopular impositions of his regime and had become known as the ‘blood tax’. During the latter half of the Imperial period, the horrendous losses the army sustained in Russia and the Peninsula justified this gruesome label and French citizens were dismayed by its reintroduction.

Nevertheless, the former Royal Army of 200,000 men had come over to Napoleon almost to a man and around 100,000 old soldiers swiftly returned to their colours when they heard Napoleon was back. Many young volunteers were also eager to serve for the first time but, although his forces looked good on paper, Napoleon was well aware that he had to prove himself anew following his disastrous campaigns between 1812 and 1814. Some of his former marshals refused to serve under him again or renewed their allegiance with considerable reluctance, knowing that France was economically exhausted after years of conflict. Though his army was a well-equipped and cohesive force, it needed a swift victory to inspire it. French historian Henry Houssaye observed that: ‘Never did Napoleon have so formidable or so fragile a weapon in his hand.’

If Napoleon’s backing among the military hierarchy was patchy, he could expect even less from the elite among the French civilian population. Although he was currently more popular than ever with the French people, support would evaporate if too great a strain was placed upon France, especially among those who possessed property or influence. Many were trying to gauge the strength of his new regime before committing themselves so he wished to avoid a destructive campaign on French soil. He knew that if he fought defensively he was doomed, believing that: ‘Against greatly superior forces, it is possible to win a battle, but hardly a war.’ After years of hardship, French resources were low and the country could not hope to sustain a long war of attrition with so many nations united against her.

As France was threatened on all borders, Napoleon faced a serious strategic dilemma. His solution was to distribute small armies throughout France to counter potential invasions but these were spread thinly along long frontiers. Two armies under Clausel and Decaen protected the southern frontier, with a combined force of 14,400 men, facing a potential 80,000 Spanish and Portuguese troops. Lamarque commanded 10,000 men in north-west France to discourage Royalist revolts, while Marshal Davout had 20,000 troops to defend Paris. Along the eastern borders were 5,500 men under Brune, 8,400 men under Lecourbe and 23,500 men under Marshal Suchet. These faced three Austro/Italian armies that would soon field over 100,000 men between them. General Rapp commanded only 23,000 men for his Armée du Rhin, which was likely to face the main Austrian force under Schwarzenburg who hoped to amass a colossal 200,000 men. Combined with Barclay de Tolly’s Russian army of 200,000, the Allies would soon wield massive forces to set against France, which even a commander of Napoleon’s ability would find difficult to match.

Napoleon had committed 128,000 men, over half of his available strength, to the Armée du Nord (Army of the North). With these he intended to invade Belgium and defeat the Anglo-Allied and Prussian armies before the other Coalition forces were ready to invade France. He was gambling on securing an early, decisive victory that would reassure a doubtful France and make his enemies question their resolve to undertake a long, destructive war. Throughout his military career, he had always tried to strike first and Napoleon habitually chose to fight on the offensive whenever possible. Yet he needed a victory more than ever before and the outcome of the entire war would depend upon the success of the opening campaign.

Chapter 2

THE DECISIVE MOMENT OF THE CENTURY

THE FRENCH ARMY

Of the three armies involved in the Waterloo campaign, the French Armeé du Nord was the most homogeneous – both nationally and at a practical level. Although some Poles and other nationalities formed a small portion of this force, it consisted almost entirely of Frenchmen. Many in the army were sickened by the dismal failure of Bourbon rule and confident that Napoleon’s military genius would bring them victory and restore French fortunes. Thousands of veterans who had been captured by the Allies and recently released bolstered the ranks. Many were still devoted to their Emperor and swiftly re-enlisted once they heard he had come back. Most recent conscripts had been sent to the armies guarding the frontiers and the majority of the soldiers in the Armée du Nord were veterans or volunteers. Consequently, morale was high and many were eager to do battle and avenge the recent humiliations suffered by France.

Nevertheless, while the French Army was well led overall, some of Napoleon’s new appointments were questionable. The unexpected death of Marshal Berthier, who died under suspicious circumstances, had deprived him of his best chief-of-staff. Marshal Soult made a poor substitute in this key role and many harboured doubts about his loyalty to Napoleon’s new regime. A better appointment for Soult would have been as commander of the army’s left wing instead of the fiery and intemperate Marshal Ney, whose inconsistent performance later caused problems. The newly promoted Marshal Grouchy received command of the right wing even though he had not held a post of such responsibility before. Although Joachim Murat was renowned for his ability as a cavalry general and would have been a better choice, Napoleon had rejected his services due to his treachery in 1813–14.

Napoleon had also appointed his brother, Prince Jérôme Bonaparte, to an important position instead of employing men like Suchet and Davout to influential posts for this vital campaign, who were great commanders in their own right. Political necessity lay at the root of such decisions. The Emperor needed to make a strong military comeback and was unwilling to share the glory with talented subordinates as they could potentially replace him, a fear shared by most dictators.

At around 128,000 men, the Armée du Nord possessed near parity in numbers when compared with each of the two opposing armies, but it would be outnumbered by them if they fought combined. Considering that Napoleon had been in power for a very short time, it was a remarkably well-equipped and cohesive force. Indeed, with 366 cannon it had more artillery than either of the opposing forces and the French superiority in cavalry, both in terms of quality and numbers, stood in its favour for a campaign of manoeuvre.

THE ANGLO-ALLIED ARMY

In direct contrast, Wellington’s Anglo-Allied Army was a truly international force. It contained a remarkable mixture of Dutch-Belgian, Nassau, Brunswick, Hanoverian and British troops. The Dutch-Belgian troops came from the newly formed Kingdom of the Netherlands, which had been in existence for less than a year. The British and King’s German Legion troops (German nationals within the British Army) were probably the most reliable soldiers. However, many Peninsula veterans, whose presence would have been welcome, were still travelling back over the Atlantic after the recent conflict in America. Many of the regiments that were available lacked experience in the field.

A large proportion of Germans also served in the ranks since, at this time, the monarchy hailed from the royal house of Hanover and this state enjoyed strong links with Britain as a consequence. Hanoverian soldiers had proved very willing to serve under British command in the Peninsula, particularly after their nation had fallen under the influence of a foreign power.

A British cartoon showing the potentially dire consequences of going to the wars for those who served in the ranks. (The Leisure Hour, 1875)

Yet the recently raised Hanoverian forces were largely conscript based and Wellington felt obliged to distribute veterans among them to stiffen their resolve. The Brunswicker and Nassauer soldiers were more experienced but Wellington hestitated to rely on his Dutch-Belgian contingent. Placed under the 23-year-old Prince of Orange, whose appointment owed more to political necessity than his military capability, many of these soldiers had recently fought under French command and their uniforms and tactics relied on French military doctrine. However, Wellington had been able to select some of his own staff and had some senior officers he knew he could rely upon, such as Generals Picton and Hill.

Although Britain’s army was small, it was professional, composed of volunteers and well trained in contrast to the largely conscript-based forces of many Continental armies. British infantry soldiers in particular were renowned for their defensive capability and speed of fire due to constant drilling. Unlike many armies, the British could afford to train their troops in regular live-firing exercises, which naturally led to their greater efficiency in musketry.

The army numbered roughly 106,000 men with 216 cannon but Wellington knew that it lacked national cohesion and, with so many of them having been recent allies or subjects of Napoleon, their loyalty to the Allied cause was suspect. Indeed, the fact that his troops spoke a mixture of at least four different national languages (not to mention local dialects) made internal communication problematic. With a general lack of campaigning experience in the army, Wellington privately referred to his command as: ‘an infamous army, very weak and ill-equipped, and [with] very inexperienced staff’. In the event, it would actually serve him very well.

THE PRUSSIAN ARMY

The Prussian Army had suffered a series of crushing defeats during the wars against France, but Napoleon’s aggressive foreign policy had provoked a resurgence of nationalism in the German states and consequently many were eager to fight against France. Half of this army consisted of twelve old regiments of regular infantry along with twelve reservist regiments, all of which contained experienced men who were reliable soldiers. However, the remaining 50 per cent of the army was mostly Landwehr (militia), and these were often poorly equipped, inexperienced soldiers who lacked discipline.

Some of the German states had been members of Napoleon’s Confederation of the Rhine and therefore many troops had divided loyalties. Even before the campaign actually began, Saxon and Silesian troops mutinied and Westphalian units were regarded with suspicion since Jérôme Bonaparte had recently been their king. Their subsequent lack of enthusiasm for the Allied cause was demonstrated by large-scale desertions after the Battle of Ligny.

The Prussian Army was, however, an effective force with good-quality infantry and efficient artillery. The cavalry arm was enthusiastic and eager to fight but lacked experience when compared with their French counterparts. Nonetheless, they were well mounted and equipped for the most part. The Prussians fielded approximately 128,000 infantry and 312 cannon. Blücher knew that he could rely upon his regular cavalry and infantry but also knew that his Landwehr were an unknown commodity and hoped that they would be able to withstand the rigours of the approaching campaign.

The 1815 campaign.

A Prussian hussar, 1815.

NAPOLEONIC WARFARE: THE THREE ARMS

The infantry was the backbone of most armies during this period. The limited range and inherent inaccuracy of the smoothbore musket, their primary weapon, meant that they were usually deployed in closely packed linear formations in order to ensure a heavy volume of fire was directed at the enemy. This compensated for the weapon’s shortcomings to a degree but, even when fired en masse, musketry was largely ineffective beyond 150yd (137m).

At close quarters, the infantry used bayonets (an edged weapon mounted on the muzzles of muskets or rifles), swords and occasionally the butts of their muskets. Nonetheless, prolonged instances of hand-to-hand fighting were rare in the open field with one side usually fleeing before a serious clash occured. When attacked by cavalry, infantry would form squares (or more accurately rectangles), the kneeling front ranks presenting a row of bayonets, the threat of which usually caused horses to veer away rather than ride into such an intimidating obstacle. The rear ranks (squares were usually three or four men deep) would fire over the heads of the kneeling men at their attackers. While these formations were not invulnerable to cavalry attack, it was rare for infantry squares to be broken by cavalry alone.

While cavalry were considered an elite by most armies, their battlefield role was diminishing due to the increased accuracy and lethality of artillery and firearms. A horse and rider made a large combined target and artillery fire, along with massed musketry at close range, could wreak bloody havoc upon a cavalry squadron. Nonetheless, a well-timed cavalry charge could be very effective under the right circumstances, especially when combined with the effect of other arms. Cavalry also excelled in the roles of reconnaissance, covering an army on the march and was particularly effective in pursuing a beaten enemy.

Artillery had become the biggest killer on the battlefield by 1815. Cannon enjoyed the longest range of any weapon of this period and could fire a variety of projectiles. Roundshot (solid cannon balls) was the main form of ammunition used, capable of striking down numerous targets if the ground was hard enough to allow them to bounce along the ground, cutting down everything in their path until their momentum was spent. Shells of various kinds were also available and were designed to explode on the ground or above targets, showering metal fragments over a wide area. Canister (commonly known by the naval term of ‘grapeshot’) was used at close range against cavalry or infantry. This entailed the firing of a shower of small projectiles, which could strike numerous targets, spreading out rapidly from a gun’s muzzle in a similar fashion to the spread of pellets when fired from a shotgun. Linear infantry formations were vulnerable to artillery, especially when fired upon from the flank, allowing numerous men to be hit as they stood so close to each other. The effects of firing artillery upon dense formations like attack columns or infantry squares could be devastating.

NAPOLEON INVADES BELGIUM

The Allied armies had spread out over this wide area of Belgium due to the necessity to feed and accommodate the troops, which relied upon billeting soldiers in towns and villages as garrisons could not cater for the vast number of men alone. The Allied commanders also wished to cover as much of the Belgian frontier with France as possible, suspecting that Napoleon might attempt a pre-emptive strike against them. Consequently the border was closely monitored as they wished to receive an early warning in the event of incursions.

Wellington’s deployment was partly influenced by a concern he shared with most British commanders who fought on the Continent – the risk of being cut off from the sea. This would sever his supply lines and prevent a withdrawal back to Britain. Consequently, he deployed his troops between Brussels, Mons, Ypres and Ghent with his lines of communication leading back towards Ostend and the Channel ports. The Prussians occupied a large area between Wavre, Charleroi, Dinant and Liège. This would hinder a swift concentration of the two armies and their lines of communication extended back towards the Rhine in the opposite direction to those of the Anglo-Allied Army.

Napoleon was well aware of this and intended to strike at a point between the two armies, hoping to force them apart. If the French were successful in this, he then meant to prevent them combining against him by blocking one army with a portion of his force while inflicting a major defeat on the other with his main army. This was known as the ‘strategy of the central position’, a manoeuvre he had previously used with great success in campaigns like those in Italy in 1796. He outlined this concept in succinct fashion to Marshal Ney:

For this campaign I have adopted the following general principle – to divide my army into two wings and a reserve. The Guard will form the Reserve, and I shall bring it into action on either wing just as the actual circumstances may dictate. Also, according to circumstances, I shall draw troops from one wing to strengthen my reserve.

Marshal Michel Ney who tried to seize the vital crossroads at Quatre Bras from the Allies. (François Gérard)

By thrusting his army into a central position between them, Napoleon predicted that they would instinctively retreat along their own supply lines. This would drive them even further apart and he would then detach a portion of his force to pursue one of the armies while he turned upon the other and defeated it in detail.

The plan relied upon achieving surprise and required careful co-ordination and timing. A less sophisticated army than Napoleon’s could never hope to achieve success in this kind of operation. The French Army was organized so that each corps theoretically formed a miniature army in itself, strong enough to fight an independent action against a superior foe for some time until reinforced. Each had its own staff, cavalry, infantry, artillery and supply train and Napoleon believed a well-led force of 25,000–30,000 men was easily capable of performing such tasks. Nevertheless, he was attempting a bold strategy and, since it relied on adapting to events as they developed, it could go badly wrong if he failed to keep his enemies apart.

CROSSING THE FRONTIER

Since achieving surprise was vital for Napoleon’s strategy, he dispersed the Armée du Nord along a 200-mile (321km) long front, aiming to conceal his intent. He closed the borders to all civilian traffic on 6 June as he began concentrating his forces, to prevent news from reaching the enemy. At 2.30am on 15 June, French troops began to march toward the frontier. He directed the main attack towards the town of Charleroi, which lay at the point where the boundary between the two opposing armies’ positions began, subsequently running northwards from Charleroi to Brussels. He planned to march his army along this line, effectively driving a wedge between the Allies. Napoleon also ordered two simultaneous feints (false attacks) hoping to deceive the enemy into believing he was invading at Mons or Namur.

Prussian outposts were quickly pushed back and the French were fortunate to seize bridges across the River Sambre before the Prussians could destroy them. General Ziethen, commanding the Prussian I Corps, soon realized that this was a serious attack and withdrew in the direction of Ligny. Although warning of the invasion was quickly dispatched, the news took time to reach Blücher. In Brussels, Wellington heard vague rumours of an attack but only received a reliable report late that afternoon. Consequently, the Anglo-Allied Army lost valuable hours, which could have been spent in preparation.

With news of the invasion confirmed, Wellington ordered his army to concentrate in the region between Enghien, Braine and Mons, guessing that the French intended to sever his links to the coastline and acting exactly as Napoleon had predicted. Meanwhile, Blücher, true to his reckless hussar reputation, ignored the supposed threat to Namur and chose to concentrate his army behind Ziethen’s I Corps, an area dangerously close to the point of the French incursion.

Despite some logistical difficulties, the French advanced rapidly into Belgium with the two wings of the army pressing forward in search of the enemy. Napoleon calculated that it would take the Allies at least 12 hours to concentrate their forces and if he could catch one of them in the process of doing so, he might gain a decisive victory. Grouchy with III Corps and the main Cavalry Corps forged ahead on the right and began to encounter resistance. Napoleon had predicted that they would encounter the Anglo-Allied Army first but was delighted to hear of the Prussian’s forward concentration. Accordingly, he began to march his main body to reinforce his right wing.

Picton’s Division on the march. (W B Wollen)

On the French left wing, Marshal Ney advanced along the main Charleroi–Brussels road aiming to seize a strategically important crossroads at Quatre Bras. His main force consisted of I and II Corps along with a cavalry detachment from the Imperial Guard. Possession of Quatre Bras would allow the French to use an important lateral road running through Quatre Bras towards Sombreffe. It would enable them to communicate between their left and right wings more effectively and, potentially, sever Allied communications at this point. If the Anglo-Allied Army continued to retreat, possession of the crossroads also left Blücher’s forward position dangerously exposed to a flank attack.

Yet here Ney encountered resistance. Although he had received orders to the contrary, Prince Bernard of Saxe-Weimar recognized the strategic significance of the crossroads and decided to hold his position there. With two corps, Ney enjoyed massive superiority in numbers but Saxe-Weimar bluffed him into thinking that Quatre Bras was held in greater strength than was actually the case. Ney halted his advance and sent cavalry forward to probe the position but, although there was only a single brigade of Nassauer troops present under Perponcher, he hesitated to attack. Having fought the British before, he was aware of Wellington’s ability to mask troops from sight and feared that the high corn and woodlands in the area concealed further Allied soldiers. He decided to halt, ordering his men to bivouac at 8.00pm that evening, and rode to Charleroi to confer with Napoleon.

NAPOLEONIC WARFARE: THE MUSKET

The smoothbore, single-shot musket was the main infantry weapon used by all the armies of the Waterloo campaign. It was a heavy, muzzle-loading gun fired by means of the flintlock mechanism. To load, an infantryman bit the end off a paper cartridge and took the musket ball it contained into his mouth. He then poured a pinch of gunpowder from the cartridge into the priming pan before pushing the rest of the cartridge down the barrel using an iron ramrod. He then spat the musket ball into the barrel and rammed that down before replacing the ramrod (stored in hoops under the barrel) and pulling the flintlock to the fully cocked position. When the trigger was pulled, the flint (held in the jaws of the cocking lever) struck against a metal plate (called the frizzen) showering sparks into the pan. This ignited the charge and fired the musket.

It was an imprecise weapon as far as accuracy was concerned and unlikely to hit a man at much over 100yd (91m). Colonel George Hanger wrote on the subject in 1804 and claimed:

A soldier’s musket, if not exceedingly ill-bored (as many are), will strike the figure of a man at 80 yards; it may even at a hundred; but a soldier must be very unfortunate indeed who shall be wounded by a common musket at 150 yards, provided his antagonist aims at him; and as to firing at a man at 200 yards with a common musket, you may as well fire at the moon and have the same hope of hitting your object.

The weapon’s inherent inaccuracy dictated the need for closely packed linear infantry formations so that they could be fired simultaneously in volleys, producing a heavy volume of fire. Naturally, this was most effective when fighting a similarly dense formation of men, who made a large target. This increased the chances of hitting someone but muskets were also prone to misfiring, especially in wet conditions.

A man hit by a musket ball could expect a severe wound. Compared with more modern bullets that often penetrate the human body entirely, a musket ball usually stayed within the victim if it struck in the torso, using up its remaining kinetic energy on its unfortunate target. This soft-lead projectile usually deformed upon impact and being of large calibre, was capable of inflicting horrific wounds (British muskets fired a 0.76in ball, while the French fired 0.70in calibre projectile).

Although it was possible to load when lying prone, muskets were best loaded when standing upright due to their length and the fact that the gun was loaded from the muzzle rather than the breech (most modern weapons are loaded from the breech). It was a long, elegant-looking weapon and its length was useful in a melee, where infantrymen thrust this weapon forward in a manner akin to using a spear. Muskets were equipped with detachable bayonets (a stabbing weapon similar to a knife), which were attached over the weapon’s muzzle for use in hand-to-hand combat. Muskets were heavy and this, along with the complex loading process (the description of this given previously has been simplified), dictated the need for regular drilling among the infantry.

Light infantry employed the best marksmen and most agile infantrymen within a regiment and they often fought in more dispersed formations. Skirmishing before a main body of infantry, they would target officers and NCOs once they had overcome their counterparts and were capable of severely damaging the effectiveness of an enemy unit. However, their relatively light volume of fire could not inflict as much damage as a massed unit, the disciplined but less accurate fire of which could be devastating at close range. Rifles were used on Napoleonic battlefields, especially for skirmishing, and these enjoyed far better accuracy up to 200yd (182m) or more as the rifling in their barrels spun the projectile, resulting in greater stability during flight. However, they were slower to load and the large volume of smoke created by the gunpowder of the time limited their effectiveness as battlefields regularly became obscured unless a breeze struck up. In 1815, the use of rifles was largely confined to elite units.

THE ALLIED RESPONSE

By late afternoon, Wellington had received more intelligence about the French invasion but, nonetheless, decided to attend the Duchess of Richmond’s Ball that evening, hoping to reassure observers and calm tensions in the capital. Having quietly given orders for officers to join their commands as soon as was decently possible, Wellington remained at the party and outwardly maintained an air of detached, aristocratic coolness. Yet appearances were deceptive and he anxiously awaited precise intelligence so that he could enter the field with confidence. By 9.00pm he could stand it no longer and retired to a back room to confer with his officers.

At the outset of the campaign, Wellington had anticipated that Napoleon would adopt a defensive strategy similar to that he had fought in 1814, which would have been the safest option for the French. He was aware that the enemy might seize the initiative but had predicted an offensive move by Napoleon beginning in the region of Mons, allowing a more direct march against Brussels. Therefore, he was surprised by this major attack further south at Charleroi and at the speed with which it had been mounted. With grudging respect, he conceded: ‘Napoleon has humbugged me, by God! He has gained twenty-four hours march on me.’ Still convinced that his lines of communication were threatened, he only altered his army’s point of concentration in the early hours of 16 June when he heard that Quatre Bras still remained in Allied hands and that the Prussians meant to stand at Ligny. Picton’s Reserve Division set off at 4.00am and Wellington and his staff left Brussels at approximately 8.00am that day.

Battle of Quatre Bras around 3.00pm.

THE BATTLE OF LIGNY

Blücher managed to assemble approximately 84,000 men and 224 guns from his army and took up positions around the village of Ligny. He stationed his army along a series of ridges to the north of Ligny brook and strongly garrisoned ten villages and hamlets along the 7-mile (11km) front to bolster his defence. He anticipated being attacked before the rest of his army could reach this point of concentration.

Wellington arrived at Quatre Bras at around 10.00am and, discovering that the enemy was remarkably quiet there, rode south-east to confer with the Prussians. He arrived at around 1.00pm and, observing their dispositions, commented that the infantry lay dangerously exposed to French artillery fire on the forward slopes of the ridges they occupied. Conferring with Blücher and his staff, he suggested moving them back to where the rising ground would shield them from sight and offer better protection but General Gniesenau sharply retorted: ‘Our troops like to see the enemy.’ Wellington promised to send reinforcements, as long as his army did not come under serious attack, and returned to Quatre Bras. As he rode away, he commented to an aide that if the Prussians fought in their current positions they would be ‘damnably mauled’.

Napoleon had now brought up the Imperial Guard, his reserve corps and the bulk of the cavalry in support of his right wing. He intended to assault the Prussian position with Gérard’s and Vandamme’s Corps and, while they were thus occupied, d’Erlon’s I Corps would assail the Prussian right flank (although the use of this corps relied upon close co-operation with Ney’s command). If all went well he would then send in the Imperial Guard to inflict a coup de grâce. He anticipated that the Prussians would retreat in the direction of Namur, taking them further away from the Anglo-Allied Army.

Napoleon’s plan envisaged using a sizeable portion of Ney’s forces, but he failed to dispatch new orders to him before 2.00pm, and these did not arrive until around 4.00pm. He also hoped that Ney would attack the Anglo-Allied Army and drive it away from the Prussians towards Brussels. At the very least, he hoped that Wellington would be placed under sufficient pressure to prevent him assisting his ally. Despite this rapid change in strategic emphasis, the Emperor confidently remarked: ‘If Ney carries out his orders thoroughly, not a gun of the Prussian Army will get away.’

The French attack at Ligny began at 2.30pm and the Prussians suffered severely during the preceding cannonade as Wellington had predicted. Fierce fighting ensued in the villages and, though French progress was initially slow, the Prussians sustained heavy losses and were soon obliged to commit their reserves. Napoleon was debating whether to send in the Guard when an unidentified army corps was seen advancing towards the French left from their rear. The attack was postponed while cavalry was dispatched to identify this new force, which turned out to be d’Erlon’s I Corps.

Somehow, d’Erlon had taken the wrong road and subsequently arrived too far to the west. The presence of this corps was welcome but d’Erlon now received new orders from Ney, heavily engaged at Quatre Bras. One of Napoleon’s aides had given instructions directly to d’Erlon without consulting him and Ney was furious. If he was to carry out Napoleon’s initial orders, he needed this corps badly and ordered d’Erlon to return. Receiving a bewildering series of conflicting instructions, d’Erlon marched back and forth, ultimately failing to fight at either location. Due to this confusion, the French were denied the use of 20,000 men, whose presence may well have proved decisive on either battlefield.

Seething at the valuable time squandered by this farcical interlude, Napoleon finally committed the Imperial Guard to the struggle at 7.30pm. The Prussian defence had already weakened and their line crumbled as infantry began to flee to the rear in full retreat. Wishing to avert a catastrophe, Blücher ordered a counterattack and personally led thirty-two squadrons in a cavalry charge. His horse was killed underneath him, pinioning him to the ground, and he was ridden over in the ensuing melee. Nonetheless, this attack allowed the infantry to disengage from the fighting and enabled them to make an orderly retreat. Prussian cavalry only retired from the field at around 9.00pm.

Blücher is unhorsed and ridden over at Ligny. (Scribner’s Magazine, 1888)

The Prussians had suffered a clear defeat. Opinions vary about the number of casualties they suffered but 16,000 is a generally accepted figure, along with the loss of 21 cannon. In contrast, the French lost between 11,000 and 12,000 men. Sergeant Hippolyte de Mauduit of the French 1st Grenadiers walked over the field of battle on 17 June and, although an experienced soldier who had witnessed terrible sights before, was appalled by the scale of the slaughter. Although both sides lost large numbers of men fighting in the villages, Prussian infantry standing exposed to direct artillery fire on the slopes to the north of Ligny brook suffered in particular:

A vast number of corpses, of men and horses, were scattered here and there, horribly mutilated by shells and cannon-balls. This scene was of a different sort to that of the valley where almost all of the dead had at least preserved a human form, for canister, musket-balls and the bayonet were practically the only instruments of destruction used there. Here, in contrast, it was limbs and scattered body parts, detached heads, torn out entrails and disembowelled horses. Further away, on the plateau not far from our regiment, whole ranks were lying on the ground.

The fact that they had been forced to remain there during most of the engagement without being able to fire a shot in return made this carnage even more frightful. Furthermore, had they been ordered to sit or lie down, they would have suffered fewer casualties instead of presenting such a fine target to the French gunners.

Although Napoleon was victorious at Ligny, he did not order an immediate pursuit, allowing the Prussians time to regroup and fall back in good order. Why the usually pro-active Napoleon failed to act at this point is baffling. There are many reasons put forward for the Emperor’s lethargy, some historians claiming that he felt unable to move before receiving definite news about Ney’s battle to the north, while others cite his supposed ill-health as the cause. Regardless of why this was so, the Emperor wasted considerable time walking over and examining the battlefield and denied Grouchy permission to mount a pursuit for a considerable period of time.

THE BATTLE OF QUATRE BRAS

Originally, Ney had expected to be reinforced, believing that the main French attack would be mounted in his sector against the Anglo-Allied Army. Nonetheless, his early inactivity on the morning of 16 June is difficult to account for and the delay would cost the French dearly. He only ordered Reille’s Corps into position at 11.00am and essentially wasted 6 hours of daylight at a point when the crossroads were thinly held by Allied troops. Reille attacked at 2.00pm but still faced only a small defensive force as, even with the addition of Bylandt’s Brigade, Perponcher had only 8,000 men and 16 guns to defend the area against at least 25,000 French infantry, 3,000 cavalry and 60 guns.

Yet Reille agreed with his commander that Wellington meant to fight a ‘Spanish battle’ and proceeded with caution, fearing that far more Allied troops than they could see lay concealed somewhere before them. Nevertheless, the farmhouses of Gemioncourt, Piraumont and Pierrepoint fell to French assault and, when Wellington returned at 3.00pm, fierce fighting raged in Bossu Wood on the right of the Anglo-Allied position. The French committed one and a half divisions to take the wood but the Nassauer troops there defended it tenaciously.

Battle of Ligny at 2.30pm.

Battle of Quatre Bras around 9.00pm.

Gemioncourt Farm, which was defended by battalions of the 27th Jäger and 5th National Militia regiments.

Allied and French cavalry clashed extensively at Quatre Bras and many former friends now fought each other. General Renard later wrote:

At that time several of our brave soldiers underwent a trying ordeal. They were facing comrades with whom they had braved the same dangers a few months before. The latter were calling our soldiers by their names urging them to rejoin their flag. After that fruitless plea they started to fight. Captain Delenne faced Devielle, his brother-in-arms in France. Captain Van Remoortere was stabbed by the sabre of one of his former non-commissioned officers. Staff sergeant Beauce was engaged in a sword fight with the staff sergeant of one of his former companies.

Dutch and Belgian cavalry charged repeatedly at their counterparts, hoping to delay the French advance on the crossroads, and the fighting was intense. One Belgian veteran of the 5th Light Dragoons, fighting against his former emperor, recalled: ‘I have fought [in] all the great wars of France. I have served in the Light Cavalry of the Imperial Guard and have made a lot of charges, but I have never seen any in which we were entangled for so long with the enemy.’ At one point when the Belgian dragoons retired to regroup, they were fired upon by British infantry since their uniforms bore a close similarity to those of the 6th French Chasseurs and they suffered accordingly.

The Prince of Orange had just ordered a counter-attack as his commander-in-chief returned but the cavalry he had committed were swiftly repulsed and six cannon were lost in the action. However, Allied reinforcements were now arriving and the presence of Picton’s Division and further cavalry raised Allied numbers to 17,000. By 4.00pm, the Duke of Brunswick had arrived with a further 4,000 men and Wellington now enjoyed a near parity in numbers to Ney’s command.

At this point, the confusion arose about d’Erlon’s Corps, whose commitment at this time might have overwhelmed Wellington’s defence. As he tried to countermand d’Erlon’s orders, Ney desperately ordered a major cavalry attack on the crossroads at around 5.00pm. General Kellerman, leading a brigade of cuirassiers, now assailed the Allied centre in an unexpected move that initially proved very effective.

Brunswick troops had been heavily engaged for some hours and had taken severe losses. As the Leib Battalion struggled to fall back under heavy fire, they became disordered and the Duke of Brunswick was shot as he tried to rally them. Their 3rd Line Battalion was placed towards the rear of the Brunswick positions and had only suffered light casualties so far, but the overall pressure had had a shattering effect on morale, Ensign Anton Kubel recording:

suddenly the terrible news arrivevd that the Duke was badly wounded and had died shortly thereafter. Moreover, several of our battalions were almost annihilated … at that moment the French cuirassiers advanced on us through a village, and in our numbness and anger we would have been killed to the last man had our artillery not just arrived and thrown the enemy back.

The British 69th Foot were in line when charged by the cavalry and did not have time to form a square to repel them. They suffered terribly, losing one of their colours as they fell back in considerable disorder. The British 42nd was also badly mauled during the attack and the 33rd was thrown into confusion as the French heavy cavalry swept forward, their charge reaching as far as the crossroads itself. Wellington and his aides were forced to take refuge in a square formed by the 92nd Highlanders during this onslaught but French progress was halted by cannon fire from a King’s German Legion (KGL) battery as the French horse began to reform. Well-directed musketry from the 30th and 73rd Regiments, combined with this cannonade, subsequently repulsed Kellerman’s assault.

The battle escalated steadily throughout the afternoon as the Anglo-Allied Army received welcome reinforcements. By 6.30pm, its strength had risen to 36,000 men and 70 guns and Wellington counter-attacked. The French were gradually forced to withdraw, relinquishing most of the territorial gains they had seized that day. The battle ended at around 9.00pm as the light began to fade and d’Erlon’s I Corps returned too late to affect the outcome. The Allies had suffered 4,800 casualties compared to around 4,000 French. Tactically Quatre Bras was a stalemate but, by denying the French use of the crossroads and steadfastly maintaining his position, Wellington had upset Napoleon’s strategic plan.

Ney’s performance at Quatre Bras had been distinctly unimpressive. Historians like Chandler and Roberts believe that he was suffering from combat fatigue after years of campaigning, which might explain his inertia at the outset. He was a veteran of seventy battles during a long period of incessant warfare and the disastrous retreat from Russia in 1812 had taxed his strength and resolve, so this could well be true. Whatever the cause of Ney’s cautious approach, Napoleon was furious at his failure to press Wellington into retreat and feared that the Allies had gained a chance to recover from their initial surprise.

THE ALLIES’ RETREAT

Although Wellington had weathered the French assaults, news of the Prussian retreat compelled him to withdraw or risk being outflanked and possibly enveloped by superior French numbers. Once he received confirmation of the direction of the Prussians’ march, he began to pull his army back, sending the wounded and baggage north. He slowly began to thin out the number of troops on the front line and, when the French failed to attack on the morning of 17 June, Wellington ordered his main body to retreat. He intended to retire to a preselected position along the ridge of Mont St Jean, close to the village of Waterloo. He had ridden over this ground extensively the preceding year and noted its defensive potential. Knowing the direction in which the Prussians were retreating, he also felt that it was close enough to allow them to combine forces. Picton’s Division had already paused at Mont St Jean on their march to Quatre Bras, confirming that Wellington had considered fighting there all along.

Built in 1990, this striking modern memorial records the efforts of the Dutch cavalry regiments who fought to defend the crossroads.

General Augustus von Gneisenau was Blücher’s chief-of-staff and had served under him since 1813. Gneisenau provided competent, professional soldiering to back up his chief’s more instinctive style of command. He distrusted the British and felt that Wellington had let them down at Ligny by failing to send the support he had pledged (not realizing how heavily engaged the Anglo-Allied Army had been at Quatre Bras). During Blücher’s absence when he lay incapacitated after the cavalry charge, he considered falling back on the army’s supply lines towards Namur. However, he knew that his commander was determined to support Wellington and ordered a retreat north towards Wavre, which permitted them the option of taking either route. Blücher agreed when he returned from the battlefield, the 71-year-old having sustained remarkably little injury despite his ordeal.

In truth, the decision to retreat northwards was more Gneisenau’s than Blücher’s. The ageing Field Marshal relied heavily upon his chief-of-staff’s judgement as his grasp of strategic concepts was limited and he was honest enough to admit it. This choice, made hurriedly while under the stress of battle, would have a marked effect on the outcome of the campaign. This important strategic manoeuvre had been debated under very trying circumstances and Wellington later described the decision as ‘the decisive moment of the century’.

Battle of Ligny at 8.30pm.

On the morning of 17 June, Napoleon was finally galvanized into action when he realized that he had an excellent chance to outflank the Anglo-Allied Army. He had expected Ney to resume his attack that morning but knew something must be amiss as he could not hear massed gunfire to the north. Belatedly, he ordered Grouchy to take a mixed force of around 33,000 men (almost a third of his army) and follow the Prussians at around 1.00pm. The Emperor believed that Blücher would retreat on Namur and ordered Grouchy to press his withdrawal and block any Prussian attempts to unite with Wellington. Meanwhile, he hoped Ney would occupy the Anglo-Allied Army while he brought up his Imperial Guard and reserve against their left flank. Riding with his staff to investigate, Napoleon reached Quatre Bras and was astounded to learn that Ney had been inactive all morning. He furiously ordered a full-scale attack but the bulk of the enemy army was already retiring northwards and, although a pursuit was immediately mounted, it was too late.

Captain Mercer of the Royal Artillery recalled that the retreat was carried out as quietly as possible and was surprised at how long it took for the French to realize something was wrong. As part of the rearguard, he manoeuvred his battery in cooperation with the cavalry, trying to support their charges or cover their withdrawal. As they observed the French advance, Mercer was ordered to fire upon them:

‘They are just running up the hill,’ said Lord Uxbridge. ‘Let them get well up before you fire. Do you think you can retire quick enough afterwards?’

‘I am sure of it, my lord.’

‘Very well, then, keep a good look-out, and point your guns well.’

Initially, the opposing sets of cavalry skirmished in a series of running fights, while the artillery of both sides fired in their support. The light rain soon swelled to a downpour, limiting visibility and slowing the progress of both sides along the muddy roads. Dragging heavy guns back through these conditions, Mercer was nearly captured as his troop tried to negotiate the narrow lanes through a village during the retreat. With the fields and roads churned into a sodden morass after the passage of thousands of men, horses, wagons and guns, the pursuit eventually slowed to a crawl. Few casualties were suffered by either side during brief cavalry skirmishes and artillery exchanges during the retreat. Wellington had successfully eluded the French by executing a model withdrawal.

Historian David Chandler later wrote that, because of Ney’s inaction and Napoleon’s vague orders: ‘the Duke was provided with several invaluable hours’ start in what would soon become a critical race for Mont-St. Jean’. The onset of rain and the effective rearguard action mounted by Lord Uxbridge allowed Wellington a crucial breathing space in which to choose his own ground to fight upon. Realizing that he had missed a chance to envelop his enemy, and that Wellington had disengaged without serious loss, Napoleon supposedly muttered: ‘France has been ruined.’

Unbeknown to the French, Grouchy initially set off in the wrong direction, misled by large numbers of Prussian stragglers and deserters fleeing in the direction of Namur. Napoleon’s failure to order a swift follow-up action at Ligny allowed the Prussians a crucial period of respite and their army fell back on Wavre virtually unmolested, regrouping around IV Corps, which had not yet seen serious action.

Although the campaign had begun well for the French, errors made on the 16/17 June enabled the Allies to fall back and choose their own ground. Napoleon had formerly written: ‘Strategy is the art of making use of time and space. I am less concerned about the latter than the former; space we can recover, but time, never . . ’. Unfavourable circumstances, the intransigence of subordinates and the Emperor’s own lethargy had seen the French violate these principles. Napoleon would pay a heavy price for these failures.

Viewpoints

THE BATTLEFIELD OF LIGNY

As the site of Napoleon’s last victory, Ligny has received more attention from the French than the related battlefield of Quatre Bras. Therefore, during the 1960s, the Royal Commission for Monuments and Places of Interest and the Society of the Legion of Honour took steps to preserve important locations and commemorate the battle.

In 1965, the two organizations ensured that the farmhouses of En-Haut and En-Bas were officially protected as both had witnessed intense fighting on 16 June. En-Haut has a particularly Continental look, typical of the period, and is located in the centre of Ligny. It was fiercely defended by the Prussians and seems to be very solidly constructed with an imposing roofed entrance and hardly any external windows, at least upon its outward facing side. A plaque in French records ‘Farm of En-Haut defended by Blücher’s Prussians this farmhouse was captured on 16 June 1815 by the Imperial Guard helping two divisions of General Gérard’s 4th Army Corps – Napoleon entered it on the evening of that glorious day.’

The farm of En Haut – a formidable defensive structure that changed hands several times during the battle.

A memorial erected on the bicentenary of Napoleon’s birth to commemorate his final victory at Ligny.

The farm of En-Bas, also located in Ligny, burnt down on 16 June during the intense street fighting but traces of its original construction remain in its outer shell. A plaque, surmounted by an Imperial eagle, reminds us that the farm withstood repeated French assaults but changed hands numerous times during the struggle. It is now a parish hall.

On the bicentenary of Napoleon’s birth, the Society of the Legion of Honour constructed a memorial on the edge of the old village. This is in the form of a wall surmounted with a plaque and the barrel of a large artillery piece has been placed before them. The plaque proclaims: ‘The Legion of Honour in homage to the civilian and military work of Napoleon 1769–1969’. The brass gun barrel, which is now greened with age, was donated by the Musée de la Porte de Hal and is a heavy calibre weapon. It was cast in Douai on 14 September 1811, weighs 11,904lb (5,400kg) and is 14ft (4.20m) long. Emblazoned with the Imperial ‘N’ for Napoleon, the artillery named this gun, calling it ‘Le Formidable’.

Ligny also boasts a military museum devoted to the battlefield on the Rue Pont-Piraux near the centre of the town. It is called the Centre Général Gérard and is currently open only at weekends. It contains maps, models and artefacts picked up from the battlefield and is well worth a look. A plaque on the museum wall remembers a French officer, killed during the battle. It reads: ‘In memory of General J. Le Capitain, born at Lapentry in 1765, killed in Ligny on 16 June 1815’.

ST ARMAND, SOMBREFFE AND FLEURUS

The Prussian defensive line extended through several villages in addition to Ligny. At the farm of La Haye in St Armand there is a plaque recording the fall of General Jean-Baptiste Girard, who was mortally wounded nearby. The General was taken back to Paris and on 21 June Napoleon made him Duke of Ligny in honour of his exploits there, one of the last dukedoms he created during the final days his regime. However, Girard died on 27 June and enjoyed the title for only a few days.

Nearby at Sombreffe, the Prussians commandeered the village presbytery so that Blücher could use it as his headquarters just before the battle. The village also saw some fighting and one cannon ball remains lodged in the cemetery wall, while another penetrated the presbytery itself and is still embedded in the wall of an internal corridor.

In 1936, the Franco-Belgian Committee constructed an unusual memorial that commemorates three separate battles fought in the area, including Ligny. It stands along the road from Gembloux and its French inscription translates: ‘To the three French victories of Fleurus: Luxemburg 1690 – Jourdan 1794 – Napoleon 1815’. There was little or no fighting within Fleurus itself but behind the monument is an old windmill that Napoleon used as an observation post. It is now a private residence and the mill’s upper section and sails are gone but a plaque on its wall records how Napoleon stood at the summit and watched from here. This was probably only during the early stages of the battle but, considering that it was a high building for the area at that time, he probably enjoyed a good view of the action. In contrast, Blücher watched the initial stages of the battle from a point near Byre along the Namur–Nivelles road, although the exact location is unknown.

The French memorial at Fleurus with the windmill Napoleon used as an observation platform behind it.

Napoleon spent the night of 16/17 June at the Chateau de la Paix, which ironically translates as ‘Castle of Peace’. The chateau now acts as Fleurus town hall and houses some local authority departments. A plaque in its gardens informs the public about its former royal resident. It is rarely possible to gain entry to this structure but it is well worth photographing from outside; it is located on the Chemin de Mons in central Fleurus.

THE FARMHOUSES OF GEMIONCOURT, PIRAUMONT AND GRAND PIERREPOINT

The farm of Gemioncourt stands around 1,093yd (1,000m) south of the main crossroads and its possession was fiercely contested during the battle. It is a large, high-walled and sturdily built farmhouse of red brick with adjoining barns and outhouses. In 1815, it was surrounded by hedged orchards and must have presented a formidable challenge to the French infantry when they tried to assault the structure. The 27th Jäger and 5th National Militia defended Gemioncourt and made their enemies pay a heavy price for its capture. It fell to the Gautier Brigade, of Foy’s Division, at around 3.00pm that day. In 1988, the Association for the Conservation of Napoleonic Memorials placed a plaque on the farm’s gatehouse. Written in French, it translates: ‘In memory of the Soldiers of the Grande Armée who fell before these walls on 16 June 1815’.

Gemioncourt farm was well constructed and a difficult strongpoint for the French to take.

Situated in open ground on the east side of the road from Charleroi, Gemioncourt is easy to find but the farms of Grand-Pierrepoint and Piraumont are situated some way from the main road. Piraumont lies to the west of Gemioncourt and, though it initially fell to the French, it was recaptured in the early evening by a combined force of British, Brunswick and Hanoverian light infantry.

The farm of Grand Pierrepoint is now a clubhouse for a large golf course that is signposted from the main road (Chaussée de Charleroi). It is reached by a narrow country lane, which runs through open fields with no hedgerows. Although the old farm has been massively extended in modern times, parts of the old structure can still be seen, and these probably date back to 1815. Initially defended by a company of the Oranien-Nassau regiment, the farm was utilized as a strong point as it lay to the fore of the Anglo-Allied right flank.

All three farms played a role in delaying the French advance and the tenacious Dutch-Belgian defence bought Wellington valuable time to reinforce Quatre Bras, which greatly affected Allied strategy during the 1815 campaign. Visitors should note that these houses are occupied and due consideration for the owners should be shown if they approach these structures to take photographs.

THE DUKE OF BRUNSWICK’S MEMORIAL

The Duke of Brunswick’s (Duke von Braunschweig-Lüneburg) memorial lies between Gemioncourt and the Quatre Bras crossroads, standing on the eastern side of the main road. It is a fine, imposing monument with a sturdy plinth 29½ft (9m) high surmounted by a 9.8ft (3m) high statue of a Belgian lion. The lion is made of brass and its right paw rests upon a shield displaying Brunswick’s coat of arms.

On the side of the pedestal facing the road is a medallion bearing the Duke’s bust surrounded by a laurel wreath and underneath is an inscription in German, which translates: ‘Frederick-William, Duke of Brunswick and Lüneburg, fell near this place while fighting at the head of his troops, on 16 June 1815’. On the opposite side, a similar inscription records: ‘In memory of the hero and his warriors who fell with him for Germany – The grateful homeland. MDCCCMXXXX’.

A musket ball shattered his right wrist and then lodged deep in the Duke’s abdomen as he struggled to rally his men who were falling back. Officers and men carried him to a nearby farm but he expired before medical help could reach him. His body does not rest here but was taken back to Brussels for embalming and later returned to Brunswick for burial. He was 44 at the time of his death.

THE CROSSROADS OF QUATRE BRAS

The crossroads at Quatre Bras mark the centre of the Allied position. Each side suffered around 5,000 casualties during this terrible struggle and several monuments are located here, commemorating the Allies valiant defence. On the right of the Allied position, the large Bois de Bossu no longer exists so this part of the battlefield has changed considerably since 1815. Nonetheless, the land before the Chaussée de Namur (the road running east from the crossroads) is largely open farmland, dotted with small woods, just as it was during the battle. Looking towards the French position, visitors can gain an insight into the problems facing General Picton as he deployed his Division along the line of the road. There is no reverse slope to shield the infantry from the worst effects of cannon fire and the land is perfect cavalry country. Desperate to lead his men and stay in command, Picton managed to conceal the fact that he had been wounded during this battle and went on to fight at Waterloo.

The monument constructed to commemorate the Duke of Brunswick, who fell at or near this spot, probably shot by a French sharpshooter.

Several modern buildings stand at the crossroads itself, and the name Quatre Bras translates as ‘four arms’ or ‘four ways’. Until recently one of these carried a simple plaque dedicated to the Netherlands forces and their allies but this has disappeared. The building in question will either be demolished or extensively modified, but one day the plaque will hopefully be recovered and restored to its rightful place.

The oldest of the monuments to the west of the crossroads (erected in 1926), dedicated to the Belgian soldiers who fought here.

Three large monuments are placed along the Chaussée de Nivelles (the road running west from Quatre Bras crossroads). The closest of these to the crossroads is a modern monument to the British and Hanoverian forces that fought here. It is a plain but imposing construction and lists all the divisions, brigades and regiments concerned. A striking monument stands across the road with a very modern appearance dedicated to the Dutch cavalry and built in 1990. Constructed in the stylized shape of a sword, it bears inscriptions in Dutch and French and lists the regiments known to have been present during the battle. The oldest of these monuments is tomb shaped and was built in 1926. Dedicated to the Belgian soldiers who fought here, its inscription reads: ‘In memory of the Belgian soldiers killed at the Battle of Quatre Bras for the defence of the flag and the honour of arms’.

Chapter 3

THE STRUGGLE FOR HOUGOUMONT

Wellington took great care over deploying his army, just as he had done during his battles in the Peninsula when time and circumstances had permitted him this luxury. He meant to leave nothing to chance against an opponent as formidable as Napoleon. Previously, he had considered taking up positions along a ridge bisected by the main highway to Brussels. The farm of La Belle Alliance (which also doubled as an inn) lay roughly in the centre of this ridge on the eastern side of the highway. However, Assistant Quarter Master General Sir William De Lancey, Wellington’s chief-of-staff, advised that the army would be spread too thinly if he did so and they agreed to make a stand on the opposing ridge of Mont St Jean, running roughly parallel with this feature.

Although this was a pre-selected position and troops were dispatched to their posts as soon as they arrived, staff officers rode hurriedly around the area to confirm that Wellington’s orders were being carried out. Ever reluctant to delegate a task, Wellington was present on the field himself by 6.00am and took great pains to ensure that all went to plan, from riding constantly along the ridge to questioning subordinates and issuing new commands when necessary. He visited the farmhouses in front of his position and satisfied himself that ammunition and other supplies were being brought up as quickly as possible. At intervals, he paused to observe the opposing ridge with his spyglass, trying to anticipate the preparations his counterpart was making.

The Battle of Waterloo was fought over a remarkably small area, French historian Houssaye commenting: ‘Never in the wars of the Revolution and Empire had so great a number of combatants occupied such a restricted field …’. The area between the two ridges where the opposing armies took up station was barely 1½ miles (2.5km) from north to south. From east to west the battlefield measured just under 3 miles (4.8km). Overall, the main area of conflict covered around 4 square miles (roughly 6.4km square) and 140,000 men would fight within this space at first, before being joined by at least 72,000 Prussian soldiers.

THE ANGLO-ALLIED ARMY DEPLOYMENT

Wellington made the best possible defensive use of both the ground and the man-made features available to him. He had an army of approximately 67,660 men with 156 cannon, deployed along the Mont St Jean ridge, straddling the high road running from Charleroi to Brussels. The Chemin d’Ohain (Ohain Road) followed the crest of the ridge and behind this Wellington deployed the bulk of his 49,600 infantry on the reverse slope to the enemy. Here they would be largely out of sight of French gunners and the ricochet effect of enemy roundshot would be minimized due to the angle. Wellington had always protected his infantry in this fashion when the lie of the land permitted it during the Peninsular War.

He positioned substantial forces on his right flank to the west to protect the area between Merbraine village and the Nivelles road. These included parts of II Corps under Lord Hill and General Chassé’s Division from I Corps. He posted d’Aubremé’s and Ditmer’s brigades to hold Braine l’Alleud and a further four brigades were placed in a second line to support these positions.

Wellington’s I Corps, commanded by the Prince of Orange, occupied a position on the centre right above Hougoumont along with General Cooke’s Guards Division and parts of the general reserve. The bulk of Allied cavalry was stationed behind the Anglo-Allied centre, ready to respond to enemy attacks, and the artillery was dispersed in batteries along the ridgeline. From the opposing ridge, the artillery would be the units most visible to the enemy along with chains of sharpshooters strung out along the forward slope with some cavalry to screen the positions. The forest of Soignies lay behind the Allied centre, a fact that Napoleon later criticized, as it appeared to block their line of retreat. However, Wellington believed that the forest undergrowth was sparse enough to allow the passage of infantry and did not think it would impede his army’s march north significantly if he were forced to withdraw.

To the east of the high road, Wellington placed three brigades from General Picton’s Division along with Best’s and Bylandt’s brigades. Unaccountably, Bylandt’s Dutch-Belgian Brigade was left exposed on the forward slope of the ridge rather than being placed on the reverse. This area was marked with long sections of quickset hedge and the Chemin d’Ohain had an embankment in several places, allowing the artillery to cut makeshift embrasures for their cannon. The cavalry brigades of Vivian and Vandeleur were posted on the extreme left flank.

In front of the Mont St Jean ridge, were six advanced defensive areas that greatly strengthened Wellington’s position. On the east flank was an area containing the farmhouses of Papelotte, La Haye and Fichermont along with a scattering of small houses. Some of the area was wooded and Wellington occupied it with the Nassau Brigade commanded by Prince Saxe-Weimar.

Before the centre left lay a walled farmhouse called La Haye Sainte. This stood in a slight depression alongside the high road towards the foot of the forward slope and Wellington garrisoned it with elements of the King’s German Legion, among his most experienced soldiers. Above this, on the opposite side of the highway, was a gravel pit where men from the elite 95th Foot (later Rifle Brigade) were established.

On the right flank lay the large Chateau of Hougoumont. An extensive brick-built complex containing a chapel and numerous farm buildings in addition to the chateau. It had a high walled garden and orchards with hedges and woods protecting its southern approaches. Wellington posted some of his best troops to defend Hougoumont, including four light companies from the Guards Division and companies of Nassauer, Lüneburger and Hanoverian troops.

Waterloo – positions at approximately 11.50am.

These areas were strongpoints in the Allied line and the defenders of Hougoumont and La Haye Sainte would be able to fire into the flanks of attacking formations if they assaulted the ridge directly. Unless Napoleon was prepared to execute a wide flanking manoeuvre, he would have to capture these farmhouses or expect his men to suffer significant casualties if they bypassed them while assaulting the ridge.

Wellington also placed 17,000 men under Prince Frederick of the Netherlands around the area of Hal and Tubize, 10 miles to the west. This force included Hanoverian cavalry and thirty cannon, to counter any French attempts to turn his right flank, which could cut off his route to the Channel ports. These troops would play very little part in the coming battle.

Wellington’s army lay in a roughly triangular shaped deployment, his main strength on the right flank, anticipating Prussian troops arriving to support his left. Overall, the Anglo-Allied Army held a formidable defensive position, which Houssaye called one ‘vast rampart’. He also considered the open land between the two ridges to be a killing ground for artillery, especially in front of the Allied centre right. Yet the ground, especially to the east of the highway, undulates in places and would occasionally deceive the gunners’ line of sight during the battle. Nonetheless, it was a very strong position.

FRENCH ARMY DEPLOYMENT

Although Wellington’s positions were (to an extent) pre-planned, historian Alessandro Barbero astutely observed that the deployment of both armies at Waterloo was based upon the rival commanders’ anticipation of their enemy’s intent or likely deployment. In Wellington’s case, he could only guess at where his opponent might attack and respond accordingly – the downside of any defensive strategy. Napoleon had different problems as, unable to see the bulk of the Anglo-Allied Army behind the Mont St Jean ridge, he could only surmise where his adversary had concentrated his main strength. Indeed, Napoleon overestimated the number of the enemy force, believing that it slightly outnumbered his own.

Le Caillou farmhouse where Napoleon stayed the night before the battle.

The Emperor wished his army to be at their posts by 9.00am but various factors delayed their deployment. The rain poured down on the troops bivouacked in the fields that night, slowing their responses, and those billeted in surrounding farms and villages took time to stand to arms. Therefore, Reille’s II Corps had only just arrived at Le Caillou by 9.00am.

Napoleon conferred with his generals over breakfast at around 8.00am and was confident of winning the impending struggle. Yet his generals failed to share his optimism and he became irritated as his chief-of-staff expressed reservations about the forthcoming battle. In Soult’s opinion, Napoleon had given Grouchy too many troops to pursue the Prussians, when a single infantry corps and a large number of cavalry would have sufficed. He also suspected that Wellington had prepared an in-depth defence and advised a cautious plan of attack. General Reille, another Peninsula veteran who had personally fought against Wellington, remarked that British infantry were very tenacious when established in a prepared position. Therefore, he proposed that they counter this by using their superior mobility to out outmanoeuvre the Anglo-Allied Army rather than proceed with a frontal assault as Napoleon planned.

Annoyed at what he saw as lack of confidence and pessimism, the Emperor snapped: ‘Because you have been beaten by Wellington you regard him as a great general. I tell you that Wellington is a bad general, that the English are bad troops, and that this will be a very small affair.’ Yet he had fought the British only once at Toulon in 1792, twenty-three years ago. Furthermore, that had been a siege operation and he had never before confronted a British army in the field. Historian David Chandler believed that one of Napoleon’s biggest weaknesses during the 1815 campaign was his tendency to underestimate his enemies, deriding the abilities of his rival commanders and the troops they commanded.

By 9.00am, he was observing the enemy ridge from a mound near the farmhouse of Rossomme, subsequently moving further forward to the area around La Belle Alliance. He would divide his time between these two positions for most of the battle. Two local farmers provided knowledge of the area and Napoleon continued to question them as he watched his army debouche from the highway and deploy on either side of La Belle Alliance. His deployment was simpler than Wellington’s complex dispositions. The two ridges are separated by a shallow valley, divided by the great highway running through the centre of the battlefield. The distance between the centre of Wellington’s ridge and La Belle Alliance was approximately 1,300yd (1,188m) and the depth of the valley did not exceed more than 330ft (100m). In this small area, Napoleon planned the positions of his army with one aim – attack.

Troop positions at Waterloo on the morning of 18 June, looking south from Wellington’s centre towards Napoleon’s army. (D H Parry)

Napoleon intended to weaken the Allied line by a feint attack on their right flank, hoping that this would distract Wellington and persuade him to divert reinforcements from his reserves to reinforce this threatened area. Consequently, he would have fewer troops to defend his centre when the main attack occurred there. He would begin with a general bombardment and most of his artillery was dispersed along the ridge to that effect. Artillery was crucial for his plan as, after a short bombardment, he would concentrate his grand batterie of eighty-four guns to fire upon the Allied centre left. This would prepare the ground for the main infantry attack by d’Erlon’s I Corps. If this successfully penetrated the enemy line, Napoleon would send Lobau’s VI Corps forward to exploit this gain, backed by the Imperial Guard if necessary. He hoped that this would split the Anglo-Allied Army in two, allowing him to isolate and defeat its remaining elements or pursue them northwards.

On the right flank to the east of La Belle Alliance, Napoleon placed d’Erlon’s Corps, which was relatively fresh. This was drawn up in four divisions under Generals Allix, Donzelot, Marcognet and Durutte. Behind them lay Milaud’s IV Cavalry Corps and Jaquinot’s cavalry protected the far right of the army before Papellotte. Although Napoleon predicted that the Prussians would take some time to reform, he took the precaution of sending the 7th Hussars under Colonel Marbot to monitor the area on his extreme right flank, implying that he was not entirely complacent about the possible threat of Prussian intervention.

Reille’s II Corps was drawn up to the south of the chateau at Hougoumont in three brigades. Piré’s cavalry lay on the extreme left flank just before the Nivelle road and behind II Corps were two divisions of cavalry under General Kellerman. Napoleon had massed his main strength behind La Belle Alliance on both sides of the high road. VI Corps lay on the left under Count Lobau along with Guyot’s Guard Cavalry to their right on the other side of the highway. Behind them stood the infantry of the Imperial Guard, the elite striking force of the Armée du Nord. The Old, Middle and Young Guard stood on either side of the great highway, poised to strike the fatal blow if all went well for the French this day. All told, Napoleon’s army at Waterloo totalled 71,947 men; 48,950 infantry, 15,765 cavalry, 7,232 gunners and 246 cannon.

Although the sun now shone, the ground was still very wet and, frustratingly for the French, it would reduce the mobility of troops and lessen the ricochet effect of the artillery’s roundshot unless they waited for it to dry out. Many French soldiers were puzzled by the uncharacteristic slowness on the part of their Emperor, who must have seethed inwardly at the delays.

PRINCE JÉRÔME BONAPARTE

Napoleon kept a watchful eye on Jérôme as the youngest of his brothers but was frequently disappointed by his dissolute behaviour and lacklustre performance. His military career began in the Consular Guard but Napoleon transferred him to the navy where he disgraced himself by jumping ship in America and marrying an American woman called Elizabeth Patterson without consulting his family. The Emperor swiftly annulled this unfortunate union. Jérôme fought against Prussia in 1806 and was promoted General of Division the following year. Proclaimed King of Westphalia in 1807, his overspending accrued large national debts and the subjects of this new kingdom raised few objections when he was deposed in 1813.

Jérôme had fought for Napoleon in 1809 but relinquished command of the VIII Corps during the Invasion of Russia in 1812 after receiving criticism from his brother. He rallied to the Emperor in 1815 and received command of the 6th Infantry Division in Reille’s II Corps. Although officially in command, Napoleon appointed General Armand Guilleminot to provide Jérôme with expert advice and close support. The division included thirteen elite infantry battalions and saw action at Quatre Bras, where Jérôme received a slight wound.

Despite placing his brother in an important command, Napoleon had once complained to Jérôme that: ‘You think and talk of nothing but trifles’, and while he displayed great bravery at Waterloo, some of his decisions during his attempts to seize Hougoumont reflected his unreliable nature.

THE BATTLE BEGINS

The battle started at about 11.30am when French artillery began firing upon the woods before Hougoumont. Napoleon had ordered General Reille to make a demonstration against the chateau; capturing the woods and southern approaches would be sufficient for this purpose. Reille began the cannonade using a divisional battery of II Corps and their fire soon drew a response from three British batteries on the opposing ridge. A large artillery duel soon developed as Prince Jérôme led Bauduin’s Brigade forward into the woods. As he did so, Piré’s lancers advanced along and at the side of the Nivelles road to cover the manoeuvre. Meanwhile, cannon fire broke out along the French ridge in a general bombardment of the Allied positions.

Bauduin’s Brigade descended into the valley and their skirmishers entered the woods, engaging the Hanoverian and Nassauer troops there. The 1st Légèr followed and a fierce fight ensued with the Allies falling back slowly and contesting every thicket. Dense undergrowth assisted the defenders and Bauduin was shot dead at an early stage in the action, while urging his troops forward. Subsequently Jérôme ordered the 3rd Ligne up in their support. The Hanoverian Jägers (Hanoverian riflemen) fought well under the cover of the forest and the Nassauer troops gave ground stubbornly as the French gradually forced them to retire towards the buildings. Pressing forward under the trees the French often came to close quarters and hand-to-hand fighting occurred many times during this fierce struggle. Some of the Guards units emerged from Hougoumont to support their allies but French numbers soon told and the Hanoverians abandoned the woods, falling back to the shelter of the buildings.

Initially the chateau, farm and orchard were garrisoned by four light companies drawn from the elite 1st and 2nd Guards Brigades. Outside in the woods and garden were one battalion of the 1st Nassau Regiment, a company of the 1st Lüneburg Regiment and a company of Jägers. Reinforcements drawn from the 1st King’s German Legion Battalion, 3rd Hanoverian Brigade and Guards Division would eventually play a role but Wellington never increased the defender’s numbers to much over 6,000 men (3,500 defending the complex with around 2,500 in support behind the farm) despite the pressure Hougoumont eventually came under.

Lieutenant Colonel Macdonell was in overall command at Hougoumont with Lieutenant Colonels Lord Saltoun and Henry Wyndam overseeing the defence of the orchard, the farm and chateau. Lieutenant Colonel Dashwood commanded troops defending the garden and the ground around the farm itself. All doors and gates to the complex were barred and heavily barricaded. Although the northern gate was barred, it was kept free of obstruction as the garrison hoped to receive fresh supplies of ammunition and reinforcements via this entrance at the rear.

After an hour’s heavy fighting, the wood fell to the French but they had difficulty crossing the thirty paces between the edge of the trees and Hougoumont, raked as it was by musketry fired from the walls and roofs of the complex, which had been loopholed with men at each firing point. To overcome the slow loading rate of the musket, the Guards posted three or four men at each loophole with one man firing while the others loaded and passed muskets to him in turn. By this method, an almost continuous rate of fire was maintained.

The south gate at Hougoumont after the battle. (The Leisure Hour, 1890)

General Guilleminot urged Jérôme to consolidate his position and simply harass the garrison but his soldiers’ blood was up: ‘instead of being contented with holding the wood according to orders, the French furiously attacked the loopholed and defended wall. They attempted to break in the great door, which was recessed, and therefore protected by a murderous crossfire.’

Men climbed on each other’s shoulders to scale the garden walls, only to be shot down as they did or bayoneted if they managed to jump down behind this barrier. The walls were 6ft high and all the French could see was the smoke of muskets fired through the loopholes as they attacked. The woods largely shielded Hougoumont from the cannon on the ridge so the French were unable to batter gaps in the walls or buildings for their infantry to exploit. They suffered around 1,500 casualties while taking the woods alone and Reille dispatched orders for the Division to retire to the tree line and not waste any more men. Indeed, heaps of casualties now lay before Hougoumont but Jérôme still felt that success was within his grasp.

General Soye’s brigade (around 8,000 men of the 1st and 2nd Ligne Regiments) was ordered up, allowing the 1st Légèr to march around the side of Hougoumont and to attack it from its northern and western sides. Having left the protection of the woods, artillery on the Allied ridge above was able to fire down at them from only 600yd (548m) away. Many were killed but, despite their losses, the French pressed forward and assaulted the northern gate.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL SIR JAMES MACDONELL

James Macdonell was the son of Clan Chief Duncan Macdonell of Glengarry and received an ensign’s commission in 1793. He served in a series of campaigns including Naples, Sicily and Egypt and by 1811 was promoted captain in the 2nd Foot (Coldstream) Guards. He also fought in the Peninsula, seeing considerable action between 1812 and 1814. The Guard regiments benefited from a dual rank system, meaning that Macdonell’s regimental rank of captain was the equivalent to a lieutenant colonelcy in the rest of the army.

A powerfully built man with an impressive soldierly appearance, he supposedly provided Sir Walter Scott with the inspiration for the character of Fergus MacIvor in his novel Waverley (1814). His part in the defence of Hougoumont made Macdonell a national hero in Britain, particularly for his role in defeating the French incursion at one of the main crisis points in the action. Revd John Norcross was among those who offered Waterloo veterans annual pensions in appreciation of their bravery. Norcross left a bequest of £500 (approximately £25,000 today) in his will for Wellington to bestow upon the man that he considered the bravest veteran of the battle. The Duke nomi-nated Macdonell after the courage he displayed in securing the north gate during the battle. However, Macdonell nobly declined and insisted that the bequest was shared with other members of the garrison who had participated in this action.

French attacks on Hougoumont.

Some of the loopholes in the garden wall. Most were cut at shoulder height so that muskets could be fired through them by a defender standing behind the wall. The loopholes were reinforced in Victorian times to preserve them.

A BATTLE WITHIN A BATTLE

At about 12.30pm leading elements of the 1st Légèr assailed the north-west side of Hougoumont and a group of men tried to force the north gate open. Lieutenant Legros (nicknamed l’enfonceur – ‘the smasher’ by his men) seized a pioneer’s axe and hacked his way through a panel, enabling them to enter. With a triumphant roar of ‘Vive l’Empereur!’ his men rushed after him into the courtyard. Some accounts claim that 100 men followed Legros but most estimate that only 40–50 actually gained entry.

A savage close-quarters fight broke out in the courtyard with bayonets, swords and musket butts. Yet the struggle was uneven as the French came under heavy fire from Guardsmen in the upper windows of the chateau, shooting into the struggling melee below them. Colonel Macdonell, hearing that the perimeter had been breached, led a group of officers and men to secure the gate. Fighting their way through the press, Macdonell and Corporal James Graham were among those who set their shoulders to the gates and pushed them closed in the very faces of more French infantry trying to get in. They barred the gate with difficulty and began piling up timber against it as musket butts continued to pound upon it from outside.

Looking from inside Hougoumont in the direction that the French attacked once they had forced the north gate.

The French infantrymen who had charged into the courtyard were all hunted down and shot or bayoneted, as the Guards knew that if the enemy gained a foothold, their defence was doomed. According to most accounts, they only spared one unarmed drummer boy from the slaughter. Macdonell brought up more defenders to fire through the loopholes or over the wall at the French light infantry still massing outside. Observing that the north and west sides of Hougoumont were under great threat, Major General Byng ordered the 2nd Battalion of the Coldstream Guards to descend from the ridge and attack, taking some pressure off the defenders. After sustaining heavy losses, the 1st Légèr then withdrew.

Wellington had observed the progress of the French and, when the 1st Légèr emerged from the woods and Soye’s brigade came up, he ordered Major Bull’s artillery battery to move further along the ridgeline so that they could fire into the woods. Bull’s battery contained howitzers and, knowing possession of the woods was still contested, Wellington realized that their capability of laying down indirect fire was necessary, as cannon already in the area feared hitting their own men or striking the chateau.

Soye had mounted another major attack against the western side of Hougoumont, which was beaten off with difficulty. Elements of the Guards then emerged to mount a counter-attack before retiring inside once more. A third French assault was made against the orchard at around 12.45pm and the area was bitterly contested during more than an hour’s fighting. With great difficulty, the French had dragged a howitzer through the wood and now began to fire shells over the walls into the courtyard and onto the roofs of the buildings. Saltoun led a sortie to silence this gun but was repulsed. At 1.00pm, the Grand Batterie began a heavy bombardment of Wellington’s central positions.

By 1.45pm, on the other side of the battlefield, d’Erlon’s attack on Wellington’s centre was underway. Shortly afterward, elements of General Foy’s Division mounted another desperate assault against Hougoumont’s orchard and further reinforcements from the Guards were sent to relieve Saltoun, whose men had suffered serious losses. Soye mounted another attack from the south-east over the next hour but Bulls’s Battery was now in position and began shelling the woods using spherical case shot (shrapnel shells) to support the garrison’s muskets. Exploding above the woods, these shells rained musket balls and fragments of shell casing down onto the attackers and, even with the protection of the trees, many were struck down. Such projectiles usually inflicted wounds rather than killing outright but their fire was enough to make the attack falter and the French eventually pulled back.

By 3.00pm, fighting still raged around Hougoumont and the garrison had beaten off five major assaults, but the French howitzer in the wood, supported by howitzer fire from the ridge, was causing serious damage and the barns and chateau were set alight by the shells crashing through their roofs. Colonel Woodford of the Coldstream Guards led reinforcements into Hougoumont and recalled the fearful nature of the blaze: ‘The heat and smoke of the conflagration were very difficult to bear. Several men were burnt, as neither Colonel Macdonell nor myself could penetrate to the stables where the wounded had been carried.’

Hougoumont’s chapel – the only part of the manor house to escape the flames during the battle. (The Leisure Hour, 1890)

The fires were burning out of control and some wounded perished horribly but the French attacks were lessening in intensity. Woodford believed that they were poorly executed after the first few assaults and the enemy switched their concentration to harassing the defenders rather than seizing the complex. French tirailleurs (sharpshooters) kept up a heavy fire on the buildings, especially at communicating doors, and many men were killed or injured.

Observing flame and smoke rising above the chateau, Wellington sent a dispatch to Macdonell, offering remarkably sound and well-phrased advice considering that he was in the middle of commanding a battle:

I see that the fire has communicated from the haystack to the roof of the château. You must however still keep your men in those parts to which the fire does not reach. Take care that no men are lost by the falling in of the roof, or floors. After they will have fallen in, occupy the ruined walls inside of the garden, particularly if it should be possible for the enemy to pass through the embers to the inside of the House.

By this time, the first major French attack on the other side of the battlefield had been repulsed and it was becoming clear that Hougoumont must be captured if the French were to dislodge Wellington’s army from western side of the ridge. Between six and seven assaults were made against the complex and, although there were lulls in the action at other points on the battlefield throughout the day, fighting raged around the chateau continuously until 7.30pm that evening.

If Hougoumont had fallen, the Allied right flank would have been dangerously exposed and Napoleon would undoubtedly have exploited such an advantage. Although holding his defensive line ultimately depended upon a number of factors, Wellington gave due credit to the defenders of the chateau after the battle, remarking: ‘The success of the Battle of Waterloo turned on the closing of the gates at Hougoumont.’

At the height of this struggle, Hougoumont virtually became a battle within a battle. Desperate French attempts to take the chateau lured in between 13,000–15,000 men from three divisions – those of Jérôme, Foy and Bachelu. Napoleon badly needed these soldiers elsewhere on the battlefield and what began as a diversionary attack ended up draining his reserves rather than Wellington’s, which was the exact opposite of what he had intended. Events had spiralled out of his control and the Emperor must have cursed the excessive zeal of some officers.

Viewpoints

WELLINGTON’S ELM TREE CROSSROADS (LOCATION MAP REFERENCES 2, 3 AND 4)

Wellington’s crossroads are located at what was once the centre of the Allied position and good views of a large portion of the battlefield can be seen from this area. Allied troops were deployed to the west and east of this position up to 1,640yd (1,500m) away. La Belle Alliance can be discerned quite clearly from the crossroads and the fact that this conflict took place over a small area becomes immediately apparent. Looking south, one can see the ridge where the French deployed and the highway runs north towards Brussels 8 miles (12km) away. Therefore, it is easy to see why Napoleon devoted so much effort to seizing this strategically important crossroads.

There are numerous commemorative monuments placed around the crossroads including those for Lieutenant Colonel Gordon, the Belgian Monument and the Hanoverian Memorial, along with some recent smaller constructions dedicated to General Picton and various regiments. All of these monuments are described in detail in Chapter 6. There were no buildings here in 1815, but a few have been constructed on the north-western angle of the crossroads including the Grill de l’Empereur Café and Le 1815 Hôtel.

Wellington and his staff stood near the crossroads at the beginning of the battle and, although the commander-in-chief was constantly on the move along the ridge throughout the day, he regularly returned to this point. After all, it not only provided a good view of most of the threatened areas as various crises developed but Wellington guessed that its capture lay at the heart of Napoleon’s strategy. A solitary elm tree used to stand at the south angle of the highroad running towards Charleroi and the Route du Lion (leading to the Lion Village) and Wellington frequently stood here to watch events at various points. He was usually mounted as he did this and the late Professor Richard Holmes often commented, from direct personal experience, that battlefields look rather different to an observer from horseback. He often rode over battlefields and valued the experience not only through the increase in height gained by a rider but because most commanders of the period enjoyed a similar perspective.

The monument dedicated to the Belgian soldiers killed or wounded at Waterloo. It is located at the north-east corner of Wellington’s crossroads.

Although this famous tree miraculously survived the conflict that raged about it, including several intense artillery bombardments, it was felled in 1818. This was the year that Mr J B Children of the British Museum visited the battlefield, which had already become a major attraction for tourists in Europe, although most were from the upper or middle classes at that time. Many people came to the site wanting to see Wellington’s famous tree but trampled down surrounding crops in their eagerness to do so, the owner of the land lamenting: ‘so many people came to visit it that the produce of half an acre of land was annually lost in consequence’. In the misguided hope that it would reduce the number of curious sightseers, he decided to have the elm cut down.

Hearing of the landowner’s intent, the enterprising Mr Children purchased the resulting timber and took it back to England. He used the wood to manufacture ‘Souvenirs of Waterloo’, which rapidly became valuable. The Connoisseur Magazine of 1904 recorded that the most prominent of the objects fashioned from the elm were a sideboard and chair, which then resided in the Royal Collection at Windsor Castle. Harold MacFarlane, who wrote the article, also observed that while Napoleon’s romanticized defeat had increased the value of antiques associated with him by at least a hundredfold, objects linked with Wellington like this were worth rather less. It is interesting that even minor objects from Longwood House, where Napoleon stayed during his final exile on St Helena, often command higher prices in comparison. Nevertheless, he also shrewdly observed that relics connected with the victor of Waterloo regularly appeared in private rather than public collections and rarely came up for auction.

The Brabant Tourist Authority planted a plane tree as a replacement for Wellington’s elm in 1958, which stands in the angle of the southern and western branches of the crossroads just as its predecessor did in 1815. The farmhouse of La Haye Sainte can be seen from this point and it becomes clear how it nestles into the foot of the ridge just as the slope rises towards these crossroads. It was of great importance to Wellington’s defensive strategy and how close it was to falling at various stages during the struggle would have been clearly apparent to observers at the crossroads, even without the use of a telescope.

The crossroads were overrun during the huge French cavalry assaults (see Chapter 5) but the closest it came to being captured was at around 6.30pm when La Haye Sainte fell to French assault and the position was fired upon by cannon placed near the farm. Their direct fire inflicted considerable damage on the infantry deployed on both sides of the crossroads until their gunners were targeted and neutralized by riflemen of the 95th Foot. It is worth considering that many thousands of men lost their lives in the immediate vicinity of the crossroads.

As the main highway runs directly between Brussels and Charleroi, it is incredibly busy and, although there are crossing points, pedestrians should take great care here. Being an Englishman, the author committed the cardinal sin of looking left instead of right on a Continental road and almost paid dearly for this inattention. Drivers should also take care about turning around here as all of its roads are well used by traffic. It is preferable to drive further along on the roads running away from the highway before attempting any complicated manoeuvres. During the research for this book, Stuart Hadaway (who was driving) commented: ‘I don’t like these crossroads,’ to which the author responded, ‘Neither did the French!’

THE LION MOUND (LOCATION MAP REFERENCE 8)

The Lion Mound (Montagne du Lion or alternatively the Butte du Lion) is unquestionably the most imposing monument made to commemorate the Battle of Waterloo and the 1815 campaign. It is visible from many miles away and is very useful to visitors since it provides an orienteering point from other locations on the battlefield.

Formed between 1823 and 1826 on the orders of King William I, it was constructed on the approximate spot where his son (the Prince of Orange) was wounded in the shoulder while fighting on the right flank of the Allied line. Although the Kingdom of the Netherlands paid most of the costs, other Allied states contributed funds to pay for its construction. The scale of the project was staggering for the period, some 10 million cubic feet of earth being used to build a giant pyramid, which was surmounted by the colossal statue of a lion.

Several hundred tons of soil were excavated from the centre right of the Allied ridge, the banks of the sunken lane and land around La Haye Sainte. Around 2,000 labourers accomplished these tasks, mainly miners from the Liège area and a large number of these were women. They dug the soil using spades and picks and conveyed it either by cart or in wicker baskets carried upon their backs. Around 600 carts and hundreds of horses were required to complete the mound.

The construction of the Lion Mound was controversial during the early nineteenth century, many Frenchmen seeing it as a triumphal monument that symbolized the crushing defeat of their army, the downfall of republicanism and a blatantly ostentatious reminder of the Allied victory over France. Raising the mound also had the unfortunate side effect of unearthing human remains interred shortly after the battle and, when the Revd Falconer visited the site during its construction in 1825, he observed bones lying by the roadside. He was horrified to record that these were often taken by passers-by as grisly mementoes of Waterloo.

The lion statue was cast in nine bronze pieces at the Cokerill Works in Liège and assembled on the spot. The pedestal was also made in three sections and all of these were carried separately due to their weight via canal. The final leg of their journey continued overland and each required as many as twenty horses to drag them on carts.

The hill is 139ft (42.5m) high with a circumference of about 1,699ft (518m). The lion itself is symbolic of the Netherlands and Britain and faces defiantly towards France with its front right paw placed upon a globe. Thankfully, the passage of time has lessened the political impact of this symbolism and many now see it as a general commemoration of all the lives lost on this battlefield. The statue is 14ft (4.5m) high, 14ft (4.5m) wide and weighs 28 tons (28.4 metric tonnes). It stands upon a vast blue-stone plinth, supported by a column of bricks extending down to the hill’s foundations.

There are 226 stone steps leading to the summit of the mound and, while the views gained from the top are worth the effort of climbing them, elderly or infirm visitors may wish to think carefully before attempting an ascent. The mound is maintained by the Bataille 1815 Association which charges a fee for access to the mound that also includes entry to the adjacent Waterloo Panorama (see Chapter 11). This is a nonprofit making organization and the revenue gained contributes to the upkeep of the mound.

A close-up of the Lion Mound. This incredible monument took three years to construct (1823–6).

The Lion Mound offers splendid views of the battlefield from a perspective that was unavailable to any of the actual participants in 1815. While it is useful to see the field from this vantage point, it can give a false impression by making areas of the battlefield seem a lot flatter than they actually are. Furthermore, its construction has altered the lie of the land on the Allied right, as the ridge was steeper in 1815 and much of the ‘sunken lane’ is now exposed. As the steepness of the ridge and the depth of the lane’s embankment are often debated due to their influence on the fighting, this has had a marked impact on the way the battle is analysed by historians. The most famous critic of the mound was the Duke himself who visited the area again some years after its construction. ‘They have ruined my battlefield’ he remarked frostily, referring to the geographical change its construction had wrought.

THE ANGLO-ALLIED RIGHT FLANK

The appearance of the ground where the right wing of the Anglo-Allied Army was deployed is now somewhat altered. Even from the summit of the Lion Mound, Hougoumont can only be partially seen because of the trees standing behind it. Nevertheless, it is evident from this height that the chateau stood in front of the Allied line and fire from its defenders would have caused heavy casualties in French attack formations marching past it.

Looking from the top of the Lion Mound, and by actually walking along the lane, it can be seen that the Allies were deployed in a roughly triangular shape. Looking at the Allied positions (see Map 7) they appear haphazard in comparison to the near perfect symmetry of the French deployment but this is deceptive as Wellington had planned a concentrated and in-depth defensive pattern. The first line lay just behind the lane and the contours of the ridge here have been softened by the massive removal of soil from the area. The banks that once lined this lane are also gone for the same reason but it is open to debate just how much the ground has changed from its appearance in 1815. Nevertheless, it is still possible to see that artillery batteries placed along the line of this lane would have had a good view down into the valley where the massed cavalry attacks and the advance of the Imperial Guard took place.

THE ANGLO-ALLIED LEFT FLANK

The left flank of the Anglo-Allied Army lay to the east of the crossroads and the bulk of the infantry was deployed behind the road on the reverse slope of the Mont St Jean ridge. Today this road is open and the quickset hedges that ran along it have disappeared. Thomas Creevey, a writer and newspaper correspondent who witnessed the aftermath of the battle, recalled that they were small and ragged hedges and it is unsurprising that farmers in later years removed them to improve access to this land. Their appearance when Creevey saw them was probably altered by damage sustained during the battle itself.

Various points along this road, which traces the same route as in 1815, provide good views of the Allied positions on the left. Many visitors are surprised at how subtle the ridge is, expecting a far more pronounced geographical feature. However, observing these positions from the opposing ridge or down in the valley reveals how well concealed infantry formations would have been, especially when ordered to lie down. Despite Creevey’s observations, the hedges and their contribution to concealment can only be guessed at today.

Artillery batteries were placed along this narrow road and some were dug into hedgerows to give better protection for the gunners. At first sight, the land appears open to the south where d’Erlon’s attack advanced and the well-sited guns enjoyed a clear field of fire. Closer observation reveals several patches of dead ground that would have hampered the gunners’ aim as the land undulates in places. Modern farming techniques have softened the contours of this land and the ridge itself but it is obvious that this was good defensive ground for the Anglo-Allied Army.

LE CAILLOU (LOCATION MAP REFERENCE 17)

Napoleon spent the night at this farmhouse, which stands on the eastern side of the Brussels–Genappe road about 3,280yd (3,000m) to the south of La Belle Alliance. Napoleon conferred many times with his generals and staff here, before making the decision to delay the attack until late morning on 18 June and issuing orders for his army’s deployment. He argued with his generals in Le Caillou and was particularly short-tempered and irritable that evening, probably due to the unavoidable delays that the bad weather conditions imposed, which interfered with his plans.

Major Duuring’s Battalion from the 1st Regiment of Chasseurs in the Old Guard bivouacked in the grounds and orchard to protect their Emperor and the house was full of staff officers seeking shelter from the incessant rain. Therefore, Napoleon only occupied one room in the building. A small monument in the grounds records the presence of Duuring’s battalion.

At about 6.00am on 19 June, Prussian soldiers set Le Caillou alight and a number of French wounded sheltering within perished in the flames. In the chaos of the disordered French retreat, Napoleon left numerous belongings here that fell into the hands of the Allies. These included two of his personal horses, one of which was called ‘Marengo’, the name of a previous battle he had fought in Italy. Taken to England, Marengo soon died but his bones are currently displayed at the National Army Museum, London.

The ossuary in the garden of Le Caillou containing the bones of many slain in the battle. An inscription reads: ‘For the Emperor often, for the Fatherland always’.

The main shells of these buildings survived and Le Caillou was rebuilt in 1818, later being used as a stagecoach inn and a cabaret. With interest in the battle increasing, Le Caillou was completely restored in 1865 by the architect Emile Coulon. By the twentieth century, it had become a museum for the battlefield and measures were taken legally to protect the structure.

An ossuary was constructed in the garden of Le Caillou in 1912 to house the bones of soldiers discovered on the battlefield. Most of these remains are believed to be French, although some are likely to be Anglo-Allied or Prussian, but an inscription in Latin reads: ‘For the Emperor often, for the Fatherland always’.

The unusual new statue of Napoleon donated by Luigi di Quintana Bellini Trinchi that depicts him bareheaded and at the moment when he realized defeat was inevitable.

A magnificent modern statue of Napoleon has recently been erected near the garden gateway (the iron finials of which are wrought in the shape of the socket bayonets used on muskets). Unusually it depicts him bareheaded with a collapsed spyglass in one hand and his left arm outstretched. The statue’s stance conveys an impression of shock and surprise, clearly depicting the instant when the Emperor realized that his defeat was inevitable and that the scale of the disaster would probably result in his downfall.

The statue was donated in 2010 by its sculptor, Luigi di Quintana Bellini Trinchi, who lays claim to the title Prince of Cagnano. He is a member of an Italian-Polish branch of the Knights of the Order of Malta and presented the statue as gesture of reconciliation between this Order and Napoleon (who had dissolved the Order after seizing Malta on his way to Egypt in 1799). It also commemorates the Italian and Polish troops who fought in 1815 on the French side.

Today the museum contains many interesting exhibits including one of Napoleon’s famous travelling camp beds, numerous busts, paintings, prints, models and relics recovered from the battlefield. One of these is the skeleton of a French Hussar (light cavalryman) who seems to have been killed by sabre blows and shot by a musket. As the display of human remains is a sensitive subject, this exhibit is both fascinating and controversial.

THE LA BELLE ALLIANCE RIDGE (FRENCH RIDGE)

This ridge curves around the western side of Hougoumont and runs eastward in a concave line to a point about 492yd (450m) south of Papelotte. It is approximately 4,046yd (3,700m) long and the distance between it and the Allied line varies between 1,531yd (1,400m) at its furthest point between La Belle Alliance and the Elm Tree crossroads and 382yd (350m) at its narrowest point opposite the Chateau of Hougoumont. It is slightly lower than the opposing ridge and at most points along its length, infantry formations placed on the reverse slopes of the Mont St Jean ridge would have been difficult to see.

The view the French had of Hougoumont from their ridge has changed greatly as the extensive woods that once stood before the chateau have been felled over the intervening years. In 1815, the French could see very little of the structure beyond the rooftops and even these might have been obscured from certain points. It is important to consider this when analysing the way in which the French attacked, since the strength of the complex was far from evident from their point of view. However, this still does not explain their refusal to give up the struggle until the closing stages of the battle.

Napoleon had to get his troops in readiness for battle as quickly as possible in order to press his strategic advantage and, although he deployed the bulk of his cavalry out of sight on the reverse slopes, the ridge conveyed few advantages for the purposes of attack.

THE INN OF LA BELLE ALLIANCE (LOCATION MAP REFERENCE 11)

La Belle Alliance itself was a small farm that also served as an inn in 1815, and dates back to circa 1765–70. Napoleon rode to this point on the night of 17 June to observe the positioning of the enemy’s bivouac fires and to judge whether Wellington intended to stand and fight. In common with his usual practice, Wellington had forbidden campfires for this very reason, although not all his soldiers obeyed. However, this might explain Napoleon’s initial uncertainty about whether there would be a battle the following morning or not. He returned the next morning and stood by the inn as his troops marched past him cheering (which he quietly acknowledged) as they took up positions along the ridge. Napoleon later established a second command post nearby to the east of this inn on a hillock (see Chapter 4).

The inn and farm of La Belle Alliance where Napoleon and his staff established his second command post closer to the main action.

The French used the main building as an aid station during the battle and several cannon balls penetrated the roof as the surgeons tended the wounded. A plaque on the house wall records their efforts and bravery in French and translates as: ‘In memory of the French Medical Corps who attended to the wounded with devotion on the 18 June 1815 – Napoleon Foundation’.

At the closing stages of the battle, Wellington and Blücher encountered each other by chance as their troops pressed the French retreat. Speaking in a mixture of German and French (the only language they shared) Blücher embraced him (a difficult feat to achieve as they were both mounted), saying: ‘Mein lieber kamerad’ and then ‘Quelle affaire!’ The Field Marshal indicated how symbolically apt the name of the inn was and consequently Prussian historians referred to the struggle as the Battle of La Belle Alliance for many years afterward. A nearby plaque records the meeting of the two generals in this vicinity.

In recent years, the building has been used as a restaurant and bar but it is closed at the time of writing. Nonetheless, it is still well maintained and plans exist to reopen it for similar purposes once again.

ROSSOMME

The farmhouse of Rossomme no longer exists having burnt down in 1895. However, it played little part in the events of 1815 but of greater interest are the so-called ‘heights of Rossomme’ on the western side of the highway about 1,640yd (1,500m) south of La Belle Alliance. This is a gentle hillock rather than a serious height and Napoleon set up his first command post here. One officer recalled seeing the Emperor here at close quarters:

Seated on a straw chair, in front of a coarse farm table, he was holding his map open on the table. His famous spyglass in his hand was often trained on the various points of the battle. When resting his eye, he used to pick up straws of wheat which he carried in his mouth as a toothpick. Stationed on his left, Marshal Soult alone waited for his orders and ten paces to the rear were grouped all his staff on horseback … Never will one meet a greater or more perfect calm than that of Napoleon on the day of battle … Satisfaction could be seen written on his face and there is no doubt that at this moment he thought his battle was won.

Today the view towards the north-east and directly east are partly obscured by modern houses and trees planted along the highway but Napoleon was able to discern the Prussian vanguard by spyglass at the heights of Chapelle-St Robert, where they were first spotted at around 1.00pm. The village of Plancenoit could also be seen more clearly from here in 1815 and, if he lingered here too long, it was almost certainly due to Napoleon’s concern about the threat they posed to his right flank and rear.

A view towards the Lion Mound from the Rossomme area. This was the point where Napoleon initially set up his command post to watch the battle.

The Emperor returned here after reviewing his troops as they deployed near La Belle Alliance and some historians (such as Mark Adkin) believe that he remained in the vicinity of Rossomme from 9.30am to around 2.00pm before moving forward to a better vantage point near La Belle Alliance. Standing on the hillock today, the Lion Mound can be clearly seen but it is some way in the distance and, in the author’s view, Napoleon would have quickly changed his vantage point, as it lies too far away to observe the progress of the French attacks against the Anglo-Allied Army in detail.

THE CHATEAU AT HOUGOUMONT AND ITS ENVIRONS (LOCATION MAP REFERENCE 10)

The best way to reach Hougoumont is to walk along the formerly sunken lane (that traces the line of the Anglo-Allied Army’s deployment on the right) on foot. This begins from the Lion Village next to the Panorama. The battlefield centre usually provides hourly transport for a fee for those who require this service, as it is a good 15–20 minutes walk proceeding largely through open fields.

Alternatively, since vehicular access to the lane is restricted, drivers can head towards the motorway from the Lion Village and turn left at the crossroads immediately after it. After driving roughly a mile, turn left again and continue over the bridge spanning the motorway. A small signpost points to Goumont (the locals prefer the older name of the chateau) on the right and by driving along the road, which slopes sharply downward from this point, you will reach a car park immediately before Hougoumont. It is advisable to park here rather than drive up to the structure.

There is an information board by the car park describing the events of 1815 in this area and it is easy to appreciate the chateau’s tactical relevance from this point. Indeed, this sunken area was out of sight from the majority of the Allied positions behind this location and therefore it would be difficult to cover by artillery. Some of Napoleon’s generals proposed a flanking manoeuvre to assault Wellington’s position, which was rejected by the Emperor in favour of a frontal assault on the Anglo-Allied line. Had this been attempted Hougoumont’s importance would have doubled, as the fall of the complex would have been even more crucial for winning the battle.

Until relatively recently, Hougoumont was a working farm but, since the death of the last farmer who generously allowed battlefield tourists access to the property, it has been closed and access is restricted. Currently some of the buildings are in a state of disrepair and Project Hougoumont, begun by the late Professor Richard Holmes, has been set up to raise funds to restore it and (hopefully) open it as a museum dedicated to the battle.

Although many of the original buildings still stand, the appearance of Hougoumont has changed since 1815, largely due to destruction wrought upon it during the battle itself. At that time, the buildings stood around two inner courtyards and the chateau itself was an imposing structure with a small tower and attached chapel. More akin to an English manor house than a ‘castle,’ as the French word implies, it was constructed in the 1600s or before. This building was destroyed during the battle along with the original farmer’s house, two large cow houses and the cart sheds. Only its small chapel remains, which suffered some damage.

Hougoumont from the south today. Most of the French attacks were directed against this side of the chateau’s buildings and grounds.

The large orchard at the north of the garden is now gone but the walls that enclosed the then formal gardens are still present, though they have tumbled down in places, notably on the eastern side. The formal gardens used to be set out in elaborate eighteenth-century style and were once the pride of the Chevalier de Louville, who owned the chateau in 1815, retaining a full-time gardener for their upkeep. The Chevalier sold the complex shortly after 1815 and the area was allowed to grass over for use as a grazing paddock.

The walls enclosing the paddock are made of red brick and are 6ft high. Loopholes for muskets still exist, particularly on the southern wall. Some of these have been shored up with stone, probably in Victorian times to preserve them, as it is unlikely that the pioneers who originally cut them would have had time to reinforce them so well.

The most obvious change to the complex’s appearance since 1815 is the absence of the woods that used to stand to the south. Many trees were felled immediately after the battle to assist the cremation of the many thousands of bodies that the army did not have time to bury. Others were so badly damaged by shellfire that they died a few years later and eventually the woods were totally cleared. Only three old, tall and dead trees remain before the southern gateway. Their leafless bare branches give them an eerie aspect and contribute to the formidable atmosphere that seems to surround Hougoumont.

The great barn, outbuildings and stable still stand along with the former gardener’s house, which in recent times became the farmhouse after the destruction of the previous dwelling. In places, the walls of the great barn bulge alarmingly and many internal beams are on the verge of collapse, requiring makeshift support. These signs of deterioration were emphasized by Professor Holmes and put forward as evidence that Hougoumont desperately needs restoration or this historically important building may collapse.

The lane leading to the north gate was once a grand affair lined with elm trees but these were felled long ago. To the left of the gateway the ‘hollow way’ begins, which stretched eastward about 437yd (400m) combining with what was once the sunken lane running along the Allied right flank. The deep embankments still exist in this area and it was along this route that Wellington’s aides brought dispatches to the defenders and ammunition supplies were driven into the besieged chateau.

The walls around the famous north gate are lower than they were during the battle and the gate is said to have had a small roof before. These features were almost certainly altered due to damage sustained in 1815 and it is many years since actual hardwood gates stood here, being long since removed to improve access to the formerly working farm.

HOUGOUMONT – INTERNAL BUILDINGS AND MONUMENTS

The north gate is a good place to enter the complex and is the location of the famous incursion by Sous Lieutenant Legros and his men, who were shot down from the windows in the chateau, which then stood above them, or killed fighting hand-to-hand with the British Guardsmen. It was early evening when the author last visited and, as the farm was utterly still and partly in shadows, it was easy to imagine that many men had met a violent end here. Indeed, Hougoumont has always had a quiet and solemn atmosphere about it.

A plaque has been set on the wall next to the gate that reads: ‘3rd Regiment of Foot Guards – in memory of the officers and men of the 2nd Battalion who died defending this farm June 18th 1815’. Just inside is another memorial recording the heroic efforts made to keep the complex supplied with ammunition, most notably that of Private Brewer who drove his wagon through a hail of enemy musket fire up to the north gate. It reads: ‘In memory of the officers and men of the Royal Wagon Train who took part in the defence of Hougoumont 18th June 1815. This tablet was erected in 1979 by the Royal Corps of Transport the successors of the Royal Wagon Train’. It is worth remembering that, but for their efforts, Hougoumont may well have fallen, as even elite troops like the Guards required sufficient powder and shot to fend off numerous determined assaults.

In the first courtyard is an old draw well that used to have an elaborate roof and dovecote above it. These were destroyed during the battle and today it is covered with a metal grille and has not been used for many years. In the battle, this well played a significant role in sustaining the defenders who suffered from great thirst during the fighting. The heat of the flames and the taste of the black powder cartridges they had to bite into while loading their muskets exacerbated their thirst and water was also drawn from the well in efforts to quench the fires. Indeed, but for this well Hougoumont may have fallen.

A view of the chapel, gardener’s house and barns from where the chateau used to stand (it was destroyed during the battle).

Victor Hugo wrote about it in Les Misérables. He described how after the battle: ‘300 bodies were thrown into the well … the faint cries of those not dead haunting the memory’. In 1985, Derek Saunders excavated the well and no human bones were found, which effectively disproved this ghastly myth.

All that remains of the former chateau are the lines of the foundations with stone and brick showing through the turf in many places. However, the chapel that once served the main house remains and suffered relatively little damage in that terrible conflagration. The flames did reach inside the structure but stopped just as they reached the large wooden crucifix on the wall, burning off the feet of Christ. At the time, this was believed to be a minor religious miracle. Sadly, thieves who carefully removed brickwork and then replaced it to conceal their actions recently stole the crucifix, which once hung on the wall to the left of the doorway. The crucifix may have been stolen on a private collector’s behalf and, hopefully, their conscience may one day persuade them to return this poignant symbol to its rightful place.

The chapel itself is bare with a plain altar and was used to tend the wounded until the Guards were forced to evacuate it due to the fire. Many wounded are said to have perished in the fire (both here and in other buildings) and a passage from the 1907 Foot Guards memorial on the outer wall bears repetition: ‘Visitors are earnestly requested to treat this chapel with respect, for within its walls on the memorable day of 18th June, 1815, many of the brave defenders of Hougoumont passed to their rest’.

The southern gateway of Hougoumont below the former gardener’s house. The French fought fiercely to gain entry at this point.

Another, modern tablet is now placed on the wall and it is more specific about the defenders’ regiments, reading: ‘First Regiment of Foot Guards – in memory of the officers and men of the light companies of the 2nd and 3rd battalions who died defending Hougoumont 18th June 1815. This tablet was erected in 1977 by their successors of the First or Grenadier Guards’.

At the south side of the courtyard is the former gardener’s house, since used by a succession of tenant farmers. It remains in surprisingly good condition compared to the rest of the complex and considering that it lay in the thick of the fighting, though some evidence of bullet damage is visible upon its walls. Many paintings of the battle depict the southern side of this building and its gateway as the French made repeated efforts to break in through this entrance. A plaque is set into the wall of the extension (a later nineteenth-century addition) dedicated to the 2nd Battalion of the Coldstream Guards.

Walking through the gateway underneath the gardener’s house, it is worth continuing along the walls of the former garden. Just after the corner of the wall on the southern side, a modern plaque has been placed commemorating the fall of General Bauduin. He was shot dead near to this spot while leading the first assault on Hougoumont and was the first officer of general rank to be slain at Waterloo.

The walls enclosing the paddock are in a variable state of repair. Most of the loopholes are cut into the southern side, which is in reasonable condition, but the wall on the eastern side has tumbled down in several places. The northern side of the paddock used to be lined by hedges, which would have assisted the defenders, but these have now gone.

A plaque dedicated to the memory of General Bauduin who fell leading an assault against these walls.

There are several monuments within the paddock. The Society of Historic Studies, Friends of Waterloo, erected the French memorial on the eastern side in 1912. It pays homage to the French infantry who tried so desperately to capture Hougoumont, but it is unlikely that any of them reached this point. Topped by a Napoleonic Eagle and laurel wreath around the Cross of the Legion of Honour, the monument is ringed with a small iron fence. It has been restored twice over the intervening years and the Association for the Conservation of Napoleonic Memorials now maintains its upkeep. Its French inscription reads: ‘To the French soldiers killed at Hougoumont June 1815’. Underneath this is a line supposedly dictated by Napoleon himself during his final exile. It translates as: ‘The ground seemed proud to hold so many fine men’.

Indeed, standing within Hougoumont, it is difficult to imagine that so many fought over such a small area with over 20,000 men committed by both sides to the struggle. The French sustained at least 4,000 casualties trying to capture the chateau and, combining the casualty figures of both sides, 5,500–6,500 men fell dead or wounded here. Over an area measuring around 437 x 218yd (400 x 200m), it certainly gives visitors pause for thought.

Two gravestones also stand near the centre of the southern wall. They mark the former graves of Captain John Blackman of the Coldstream Guards, who fell defending this point, and the other used to contain the remains of Sergeant Major Edward Cotton of the 7th Hussars who fought at Waterloo but died some years after the battle. In 1890, both bodies were disinterred and now rest in the Waterloo Crypt at Evere Cemetery in Brussels.

A French monument in the garden of Hougoumont (now used as a paddock). It records their valiant attempts to capture the complex, although it is unlikely that many of them reached this point.

In 1889, a white stone was set into the wall by a relative of Captain Thomas Craufurd 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Guards Regiment who was also killed here. Today, it is partially obscured by trees and is located on the south wall between Blackman’s marker and the corner where Bauduin’s memorial is placed on the opposite side. At one stage, only around 120 men defended the southern side of the garden against repeated attacks. They benefited from the protection of the high walls and improvised fire steps to shoot over them in addition to using the loopholes. Nevertheless, considering the furious assaults made against the area, they must have been very glad when they were reinforced by the rest of their battalion after the first attacks.

Chapter 4

D’ERLON’S ATTACK

To his left, Napoleon saw that Hougoumont and its surrounding woodlands were wreathed in smoke and heavy fighting could be heard from that area. Judging that the attack on Hougoumont was well underway, he ordered a concentrated bombardment of the Anglo-Allied centre left at around 1.00pm. A total of forty-eight 12-pound cannon had been assembled for this purpose, which were the great killing machines of the day and known as the ‘Emperor’s Daughters’. They were combined with forty 8-pound cannon and howitzers and formed Napoleon’s Grande Batterie, which he hoped would help punch a hole through the centre of Wellington’s line.

Little could be seen of the Anglo-Allied infantry formations other than the light infantrymen dispersed in skirmish order on the forward slope of the ridge. Therefore, the French were forced to estimate their likely positions and concentrate their fire accordingly. The French artillery intended that their shot would strike along the crest of the ridge and ricochet over into the formations placed out of their line of sight on the reverse slope. When successfully aimed, roundshot would strike down many men standing in serried ranks every time it bounced off the ground.

The roar of the cannonade drowned out sounds of fighting from around Hougoumont and many believed that Wellington’s centre would sustain massive damage. However, the ground was still soft after the previous day’s rain and absorbed some of the impact, with many roundshot only bouncing three or four times before coming to rest. Wellington had ordered the men to sit or lie down, while still maintaining their formations, so they presented less of a target. This precaution, together with the angle of the slope, meant that many projectiles overshot their targets. Even when rounshot hit their targets, they usually only killed one or two men due to these circumstances. Had the men been standing in line of sight, casualties would have been doubled.

However, Bylandt’s Brigade stood directly in this huge battery’s line of sight. Clad in blue uniforms with orange facings, they suffered terrible losses as the gunners were able observe the results of their fire and adjust their aim accordingly. Even when ordered to sit or lie down, roundshot and shells continued to inflict many casualties. Despite the hard pounding the Dutch-Belgians suffered, the cannonade only inflicted slight losses on the troops behind the ridgeline and Napoleon probably overestimated its effect.

As Napoleon and his staff looked on, they detected movement to the north-east around the heights of Chapelle-St Lambert, which was definitely a substantial body of men. At first, they believed it was Grouchy’s command marching to join them, rather than enemy troops, but cavalry scouts soon reported that it was the vanguard of a Prussian corps, which was confirmed when they brought a captured Prussian cavalry officer before the Emperor. Napoleon was concerned but not unduly alarmed by this development, believing that the Prussians were incapable of sending a large force against him after their recent defeat. Nevertheless, he dispatched new orders to Grouchy, stating:

A letter which has just been intercepted states that General Bülow is about to attack our flank. We believe we can see this corps on the heights of St. Lambert; therefore lose not an instant in drawing near to us and joining us; in order to crush Bülow whom you will take in the very act [of concentrating his corps].

Napoleon reading a dispatch during the battle. (Edouard Détaille)

He believed that Grouchy would be able to meet this oncoming threat and prevent the Prussians from intervening or perhaps place his force between them and the rest of the Prussian Army. Napoleon had intended to support I Corps’ attack by sending VI Corps in behind it but the appearance of this enemy vanguard caused him to reconsider. Consequently, he directed Domont’s and Subervie’s cavalry to the north-east and sent 10,000 men from VI Corps after them. By shoring up his right flank in this manner, Napoleon had now committed over half of his reserves.

Napoleon hoped that only a single Prussian corps was approaching his position but realized that time was rapidly slipping away and ordered d’Erlon to begin his attack at about 1.30pm. As his guns had pounded the Anglo-Allied centre left for half an hour, he hoped their line was sufficiently weakened to allow I Corps to punch through.

D’Erlon’s attack.

Wellington had established his command post beneath a solitary elm tree at the side of the Mont St Jean crossroads. Although he would move along the ridge occasionally, he maintained this position for much of the battle as it afforded a good general view of the French ridge from the centre of his own position. This crossroads was to be the focal point of the coming French attack.

GENERAL JEAN-BAPTISTE DROUET (COUNT D’ERLON)

Enlisting in the former Royal Army at the age of 16, Drouet saw extensive campaigning during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, being promoted to brigadier general by 1799. He fought at Zürich, Hohenlinden, Austerlitz, Friedland and Toulouse in addition to serving in numerous campaigns fought during the Peninsular War. He served briefly under the restored monarchy but as an ardent Bonapartist, soon rallied to the Emperor upon his return.

Despite his long service, Drouet’s command skills were held in poor esteem by many within the French Army, some officers insisting on referring to him as Count d’Erlon but never as ‘ the general’ (except to his face). The reasons behind his misdirected march between Quatre Bras and Ligny have never been fully explained and it has been alleged that incompetence on d’Erlon’s part was to blame rather than poor staff work or conflicting orders. Nevertheless, Napoleon entrusted him with the first great infantry attack at Waterloo, having considerable faith in his abilities.

Historians still debate the kind of attack formations d’Erlon selected for this assault. In 2002, Holmes argued that he placed the columns of Quiot, Donzelot and Marcognet with a frontage of one battalion wide and twelve battalions deep in each column. This allowed a larger number of muskets to be fired compared with some columnar formations while still permitting a dense enough formation for shock tactics with the bayonet to be employed. However, the short intervals between these units meant that as many as twenty-four men could be hit by a single roundshot if it struck the column accurately. Interestingly, Durutte disobeyed d’Erlon by using a wider formation for his division on the right flank of the attack and suffered fewer casualties in consequence.

After the 1815 campaign, d’Erlon was condemned to death in his absence and languished in exile until 1825 while running a cafe in Bayreuth. King Charles X issued him a pardon for his support of Napoleon and he was allowed to return to France, eventually being created a Marshal of France in 1843.

THE ADVANCE

D’Erlon’s I Corps advanced in 4 columns containing around 17,000 men in total. Historians are divided over what kind of attack column d’Erlon used for the assault but many believe he chose one of the older styles of formation when it would have been better to have adopted a newer more adaptable version, employing greater intervals between battalions and allowing it to manoeuvre into firing lines more easily. Assuming that he used the colonnes de battalion par division, these huge rectangular formations had a frontage of between 180 and 200 men and a depth of 8 to 9 battalions in about 27 ranks. Moving slowly in order to maintain their ranks, they advanced in echelon and presented an inviting target to artillery.

The French persisted in advancing in attack columns because they were easy formations to maintain on the move, especially over rough ground. A line formation was far more difficult to maintain during an advance and columns were capable of moving at greater speed. The appearance of such a vast body of men was also very intimidating. While musicians within the formation played a martial air, the men would periodically shout ‘Vive l’Empereur!’ and (on many former battlefields) the enemy had dispersed and run before assault columns even came within range. This form of assault was particularly effective when an attack had been prepared by an artillery bombardment and the enemy formations further disrupted by the fire of skirmishers. Columns sometimes advanced to actual contact with the enemy with the bayonet, but it was more common to halt, deploy into line and decide the contest with firepower.

The Grande Batterie ceased fire as the divisions of I Corps marched forward but recommenced once they reached the dead ground before their own ridge, to inflict as much damage as possible on the Anglo-Allied line before the attack went in. When the columns began to climb the opposing ridge, the guns stopped firing again for fear of hitting their own men.

Anglo-Allied batteries opened fire on the advancing columns as they marched into the valley. Although the softness of the ground limited their effect, they enjoyed a clear view of their enemies, at least at first. Roundshot began to rip into the densely packed ranks striking many soldiers down and sergeants yelled at the men to close up as gaps appeared. Yet where farmland on this side of the battlefield undulated, the formations marched through dead ground and the artillery on the opposing ridge could barely discern them, undoubtedly limiting the effect of their gunnery.

The gunners’ visibility was limited even further by the height of the crops at this point in the battle. Tall rye had been planted, growing as high as 6ft, but the crops also hampered the French advance as it had to be trampled down by men in the front ranks. The clinging mud and tall crops slowed the French infantry and it took at least 15–20 minutes to cover the distance to the Anglo-Allied ridge.

Having missed the action at Quatre Bras and Ligny, the men of I Corps were eager to engage the enemy but Captain Duthilt, who took part in the assault, believed that some officers had inspired their men’s fervour too soon:

This rush and enthusiasm were becoming dangerous in that the soldier still had a long march before meeting the enemy, and was soon tired out by the difficulty of manoeuvring on this heavy churned up soil, which ripped off gaiter straps and even lost shoes … there was soon disorder in the ranks, above all as the head of the column came within range of enemy fire.

Quiot’s Brigade inclined to the left to assault the farmhouse of La Haye Sainte, while the rest of Allix’s Division marched on up the ridge. The skirmishers preceding them soon engaged the KGL companies defending the orchard and rapidly drove them back into the farmhouse itself. This building had not been fortified to the same extent as Hougoumont (where the majority of the pioneers had been sent) but the German soldiers of its garrison laid down a withering fire into the flank of the French attack (over walls and from the windows of the buildings as they climbed the ridge). The French hoped to overwhelm the farmhouse during this attack and sent one battalion around the western side of the farm to capture the garden area, while attacking the farm from the south and east simultaneously. French infantry tried to break down the doors to the houses and barn but could not force their way in (see Chapter 6).

Riflemen of the 95th Foot laid down a heavy fire from the gravel pit, supporting the musketry of Bylandt’s Brigade as the French reached the foot of the ridge. Bourgeois’s Brigade advanced steadily while elements of Donzelot’s Division came up on Bylandt’s right. They had suffered a severe mauling at Quatre Bras and been subjected to a far heavier bombardment than most of the line this day, taking grievous losses. This artillery fire had affected their morale and cohesion and they fired only a few volleys before retreating. The French endured this fire and marched stoically upward. Corporal Canler of the 28th Ligne was among them and recalled that a bullet went straight through his shako as he bent to adjust his gaiter and shoe straps due to the mud. It creased his skull, causing a minor wound but, otherwise, it would have killed him. The 95th also abandoned the gravel pit as the French came up and withdrew to defend the hedges along the Chemin d’Ohain. Bylandt’s troops rushed back in a near rout, causing some disorder to the 28th Foot as they went. Their flight proved unstoppable until well beyond the crossroads where their officers eventually managed to rally them.

Donzelot’s Division had now reached the crest and halted within thirty paces of the Chemin d’Ohain to redeploy. The sunken road and the hedges that lined it broke up their formation and the men bunched instinctively as their officers struggled to get them past these obstacles to reform on the other side. Here they intended to form firing lines and they had practised this vital manoeuvre many times during incessant drilling. Columns were usually divided into three formations, two companies wide, that were three files (or men) deep. The three lines had intervals between them that permitted space to perform such manoeuvres. To form a firing line the two rear ranks would swing outwards at an oblique angle on either side. This would eventually conform to the former front ranks of the column, and the whole formation would make one continuous line. Once in line, all the soldiers would be able to present and fire their muskets, without being obstructed by men who had formerly stood in front of them.

In the meantime, Durutte’s Division advanced on the right of the attack and assaulted the farm of Papelotte, ejecting the light companies of Nassauer troops holding that position.

As La Haye Sainte was under attack from at least three sides, the Prince of Orange ordered the Lüneburg Battalion, from the Hanoverian Brigade, to counter-attack and support its defenders. Approaching from the north-west, these troops halted to fire volleys at the French infantry attacking in the garden area, forcing them to pull back. However, the cavalry squadrons protecting d’Erlon’s flank now came up and fell upon the hapless battalion. Caught in the open with no time to form square as the cuirassiers hurtled into them, the battalion was scattered and cut down almost to a man.

Looking across the land where d’Erlon’s I Corps attacked towards the Lion Mound and La Haye Sainte.

PICTON’S STAND

General Picton now brought up elements of Kempt’s Brigade to fill the gap left by the retreat of Bylandt. The brigades of Generals Pack and Best had been lying prone to avoid the artillery bombardment. Now they were ordered to stand and engage the enemy. Donzelot’s officers did not see them until they stood, and the French tried frantically to complete the difficult manoeuvre of redeploying into line as they emerged from the hedgerows. Attempting this in the face of the enemy was folly as their overconfident advance had brought them too close. The French struggled to form ranks and the British infantry standing in double ranks before them calmly raised their muskets.

The redcoats now delivered a shattering volley at about forty paces, cutting down many of the French in the foremost ranks. Confusion set in among the French and, observing this, Picton ordered a bayonet charge crying: ‘Charge! Charge! Hurrah!’ These were his last words as he was then struck on the forehead by a musket ball and killed instantly. The men rushed forward and, though the French faltered, a savage melee took place. Lieutenant Belcher of the 32nd Regiment was carrying the regimental colours (standards with flags) and came face to face with a French officer:

He suddenly fronted me and seized the staff, I still retaining a grasp of the silk (the colours were nearly new). At the same moment he attempted to draw his sabre, but had not accomplished it when the Covering Colour-Sergeant, named Switzer, thrust his pike into his breast, and the right rank and file of the division, named Lacy, fired into him. He fell dead at my feet. Bevet-Major Toole … called out ‘Save the brave fellow;’ but it was too late.

General Picton who fell leading his division forward at Waterloo. (R A Muller)

Marcognet marched his division past Donzelot’s right considering it unwise to redeploy at this moment. He had begun to pass the hedges and was advancing against a Hanoverian battery when he was confronted by the 92nd Highlanders, who opened fire. In their dense formation, the French could respond only with the muskets of a far narrower frontage than the British line, which was only two ranks in depth and far longer. Realizing they were at a disadvantage, the French began to advance after firing a volley, hoping to decide the issue with the bayonet but now the cavalry intervened. One French officer of the 45th Ligne was trying to inspire his men forward when: ‘I pushed a soldier in front of me, I saw him fall at my feet from a sabre blow. I raised my head. It was the English cavalry who were riding through our ranks and cutting us to pieces.’

MAJOR EDWARD CHENEY

Born in England in 1778, Cheney joined the 2nd Royal North British Dragoons (or Scots Greys) at the most junior officer rank of cornet. He fought in Holland during the Duke of York’s unfortunate 1794 campaign and was severely wounded. Although a captain at Waterloo, he held the brevet (unconfirmed) rank of major and took part in the cavalry charge, which became renowned as his regiment’s most famous exploit and is immortalized by Lady Butler’s dramatic painting ‘Scotland Forever’.

In the furious fighting that ensued, an officer shouted to him: ‘How many minutes have we yet to live, Cheney?’ Seeing the odds stacked against them at that point, Cheney responded grimly: ‘Two or three at the very utmost, most probably not one.’ Although the Scots Greys helped defeat a massive body of infantry (part of d’Erlon’s I Corps) and went on to assault the guns of the Grande Batterie, they suffered greatly in the counter-attack that followed. Cheney had four horses shot from under him and a fifth wounded during the battle. Losses among the officers were so severe that he assumed command of the regiment and was its acting colonel by the end of the day’s fighting.

Colonel Cheney’s statue in Gaddesby village church showing him dismounting from a wounded horse at Waterloo (he had several horses shot from under him during the battle).

One of the friezes at the base of Cheney’s statue showing Sergeant Ewart (of the same regiment) capturing the Eagle of the 45th Ligne at Waterloo.

After the Colonel Cheney’s death in 1845, sculptor Joseph Gott accepted a commission to make a statue of him during the battle. It depicts him at Waterloo dismounting from one of his stricken horses, which has foundered beneath him. It now stands in St Luke’s Church next to his final home of Gaddesby Hall in the village of Gaddesby, Leicestershire. The base of the statue includes a frieze depicting the charge of the Scots Greys and Sergeant Ewart of the regiment in the act of seizing the Eagle standard of the 45th Ligne from a French officer.

THE CHARGE

Although the French were falling back in places, it was a crucial moment as the brigades of Kempt and Pack had only 3,000 men between them opposing roughly 10,000 French at this point. Lord Uxbridge had already been preparing cavalry for a counter-attack and now ordered the Household Brigade to attack cuirassiers, who were beginning to advance on the left flank of d’Erlon’s infantry. The French cavalry were in a poor position, having just fought against infantry sent to reinforce the farm. They had only just reformed and, as they were advancing uphill, were vulnerable. He also ordered the Union Brigade to move forward, directly into the advancing infantry columns. Both brigades were nine squadrons strong.

The Household Brigade, led by Uxbridge in person, charged to the west of the highway straight into the squadrons of cuirassiers around La Haye Sainte. Galloping downhill gave the advantage of speed and impetus and the French cuirassiers were swiftly overthrown. Lieutenant Waymouth of the 2nd Life Guards recalled: ‘A short struggle enabled us to break through them, notwithstanding the great disadvantage arising from our swords, which were [a] full six inches shorter than those of the cuirassiers.’ As the cavalry covering them dispersed and fled, the French infantry attacking the farm were forced to make a rapid withdrawal as the British cavalry turned upon them. Some were cut down but most managed to reach the orchard, where they reformed, protected from the cavalry by hedges and trees.

British Life Guards fighting with French cuirassiers as the Household Brigade advance to repulse d’Erlon’s attack.

The Union Brigade advanced simultaneously, pouring through the gaps between Kempt’s and Pack’s infantry formations. This brigade consisted of three regiments drawn from the nations forming the United Kingdom – 1st (Royal) Dragoons (English), 2nd Royal North British Dragoons (Scottish) and 6th (Inniskilling) Dragoons (Irish). The Inniskillings fell upon Donzelot’s Division. Already heavily engaged with the infantry, the French were completely surprised and quickly broke and fled back down the slope. The heavy cavalry rode in among the fugitives cutting down viciously at the running men and many infantrymen threw themselves flat on the ground to escape their swords. Lieutenant Graeme was defending La Haye Sainte and recalled the advance and retreat of the French columns: ‘When close upon us we entered the farm, and closed the gates, and poured a constant fire on their Columns as they passed us … when they were repulsed and broken by the British line, and repassed [sic] us like a flock of sheep, followed by the Life Guards …’.

Bourgeouis’s Brigade was still engaged in a firefight with the 95th but was forced into a precipitous retreat by this unexpected assault. They withdrew along the highway in good order, having rallied by the gravel pit, but the cavalry harried them and, by the time they regained the French ridge, they were in considerable disorder.

An officer and trooper in the 1st Royal Dragoons. (Richard Simkin)

Marcognet’s column was also attacked and, at the sight of their fellow countrymen in the Scots Greys, the men of the 92nd Regiment took up the cry of ‘Scotland Forever!’ and charged into the melee to support them. There was no time to form square to repel the enemy horsemen and Marcognet’s men broke and ran, covering the slope with a mass of fugitives. Captain Duthilt was caught up in the chaos of the rout: ‘The brigade started retreating, dissolving, ridden through everywhere by this cavalry, and the ground was clogged with dead and wounded.’

The infantry followed the cavalry taking hundreds of prisoners but halted before they reached the foot of the slope. Many of the British cavalry later complained that men who had asked for quarter, and received it, subsequently took up their arms again to fire treacherously into their backs as the dragoons advanced. This provoked some harsh reprisals and many Frenchmen were compelled to seek the protection of the British infantry, as the cavalry were so enraged, cutting men down mercilessly. The Eagles of the 45th and 105th Ligne regiments were captured towards the end of the action. The bearers of these standards and their guards had sworn to protect them with their lives and their capture testifies to the savagery of the action and the decimation of the French units.

Sergeant Ewart of the Scots Greys captured the Eagle of the 45th Ligne, while Captain Clark and Corporal Styles of the Royals seized the Eagle of the 105th Ligne. As the infantry fled down the slope, Clark saw the standard being born off in the crowd surrounded by a determined group of officers and men. Gathering a number of dragoons about him he ordered: ‘Right shoulders forward, attack the Colour’, and personally led them in a frenzied assault on its defenders. Clark thrust his sword through the officer holding the standard but failed to grasp it as it fell, crying out: ‘Secure the Colour, secure the Colour, it belongs to me.’ Corporal Styles managed to retrieve it and carried it to the rear.

On the far left of the Allied position, Vandeleur’s cavalry charged Durutte’s Division and inflicted losses. As infantry were also advancing, Durutte soon felt compelled to abandon Papelotte and fell back in some disorder as cavalry harried their withdrawal. A counter charge by French lancers under Colonel Brô allowed Durutte time to reform his brigades. Vandeleur brought up four regiments of British and Dutch dragoons along with Belgian Hussars of Ghigny and, despite the intervention of the lancers, managed to inflict considerable havoc. Nonetheless, Durutte’s command suffered the fewest casualties out of the divisions committed in d’Erlon’s attack. He later attributed this to the manner in which he had advanced and the support he received from the cavalry. Durutte observed that the enemy hussars seemed to fight at a considerable disadvantage against their assailants’ longer weapons, recalling: ‘Never had I seen so well the superiority of the lance over the sabre.’

The Allied counter-attack was extremely successful but substantial numbers of the heavy cavalry became wildly excited and overreached themselves, charging in scattered parties towards the French ridge. On their right flank, musket fire from Bachelu’s Brigade caused many of the cavalry to rein in and retire with Lord Somerset rallying most of his men near La Haye Sainte. Yet a considerable portion of the Union Brigade rushed forward and overran two horse batteries that the French had brought forward to support their attack. Uxbridge commented: ‘After the overthrow of the Cuirassiers I had in vain attempted to stop my people by sounding the Rally, but neither voice nor trumpet availed …’. Uxbridge’s decision to lead the attack in person had been brave but the realization that his main responsibility was to exercise control over the reserves occurred to him too late. During his absence, his subordinates had failed to organize cover for the cavalry’s withdrawal and his hurried attempts to make up for this were only partially successful.

Well satisfied with the results of their charge, the Royals and Inniskillings began to regroup and withdrew back up the ridge. However, Colonel Hamilton of the Scots Greys led his men onwards. Most had not served abroad during the wars until now and officers and men were inexperienced and eager to prove themselves. Having attacked the two horse artillery batteries near the highway, they climbed the opposing ridge to attack the Grande Batterie. They overturned some guns and cut down gunners and drivers. Corporal Dickson recalled the ferocious nature of the struggle as his regiment set upon the gunners: ‘Such slaughtering! We sabred the gunners, lamed the horses, and cut their traces and harness. I can hear the Frenchmen yet crying “Diable” when I struck at them, and the long-drawn hiss through their teeth as my sword went home.’ He added that some of the drivers were only teenagers and, petrified by this onslaught, sat weeping in their saddles too shocked to flee or defend themselves.

The Union Brigade attack French gun batteries at the climax of their charge.

Just how much permanent damage the cavalry inflicted upon the artillery is debatable. Although Uxbridge recorded that many guns were overrun, few were likely to have been spiked or permanently disabled, and were simply put back into action when the gunners they had driven off returned. General Desales, who commanded fifty guns in this part of the field, claimed that the British cavalry did far more damage to morale than anything else, saying that they had great difficulty in recalling some gun teams who fled to the rear. It is unlikely that more than thirty or forty cannon were put out of action and the Grande Batterie was so large that even this loss did not reduce its effectiveness for long, most guns having resumed firing within an hour.

Colonel Martique’s Lancers now assailed the Scots Greys (and other scattered elements of the Union Brigade) in the flank and inflicted great losses. Mounted on tired horses, many of them were easily overmatched in the melee and had difficulty outrunning pursuers on fresh mounts. This devastating assault was then followed by the cuirassiers of General Farine’s Brigade, who pursued the survivors back through the valley as far as the foot of the Allied ridge. General Sir William Ponsonby was among those slain and of the 2,500 men in both brigades, about 1,000 were killed, wounded or captured. Lieutenant Wyndam of the Scots Greys wrote how his regiment had suffered:

Brevet-Major Cheney … brought out of action four or five Officers, and under thirty men. It is a curious circumstance that we lost as many killed (nearly) as wounded … The Lancers did us as much mischief almost as the round shot and shell as they got in our rear. We found men with ten and fifteen wounds, and one man had eighteen …

Uxbridge’s attack.

Indeed, Lieutenant Colonel Sir Frederick Ponsonby of the 12th Light Dragoons was wounded twice before being cut across the head by a sabre, this wound knocking him senseless. When a lancer saw him moving as he recovered consciousness, he stuck his lance into the helpless officer’s back snarling: ‘Tu n’es pas mort, conquin’ (‘You are not dead, you rascal!’), piercing a lung. Although Ponsonby eventually recovered, it is believed that lancers killed many British wounded after the charge, their 9ft (2.7m) long lances enabling them to do this easily from the saddle.

Although sounds of fierce fighting still issued from Hougoumont, a lull descended on the eastern side of the battlefield as the Grande Batterie had ceased firing. The valley and ridge crest were carpeted with dead and wounded, one English officer recalling: ‘The dead were in many spots as thick as the overturned pawns on a chessboard.’ The French attack had been firmly repulsed with d’Erlon’s corps losing at least 5,000 men (around 3,000 of whom were taken prisoner).

Commenting on d’Erlon’s attack (and on his attacks in general at Waterloo), Wellington later remarked dismissively: ‘Napoleon did not manoeuvre at all. He just moved forward in the old style, in columns, and was driven off in the old style.’ This was a crucial point. During the Peninsular War, the British had learned that line formations were superior to assault columns in terms of firepower and columns lacked the psychological power to intimidate steady troops. The staying power of British infantry had become renowned during that war, proving that the British policy of employing a small, yet highly professional army could outmatch a larger force composed largely of conscripts, who often faltered in the face of such assaults.

At 3.00pm, as he surveyed the carnage below him, Wellington had good cause to feel relieved. Although his heavy cavalry had suffered serious losses due to over extending their charge, this sacrifice had helped beat off a serious attack by the French I Corps, which would take considerable time to recover and re-enter the fray. More importantly, the repulse of this major attack had bought Wellington valuable time. His Anglo-Allied Army was still badly outnumbered and he knew that he could not defeat them alone.

Viewpoints

THE GRANDE BATTERIE AND MEMORIAL OF THE 6TH FOOT ARTILLERY

Napoleon had selected a good location for his Grande Batterie on the high ground before and to the east of La Belle Alliance. The appearance of the ridge hereabouts has changed little over the years and the area is still open and given over to farmland. Except for the high crops, the French artillery had an unimpeded view of the opposing ridge crest, though the hedges lining much of the Chemin d’Ohain would have obscured their view in places. However, Napoleon must have wished that his adversary had placed his infantry on the forward slopes as the Prussians had done at Ligny as, with the exception of Bylandt’s Brigade, most lay out of the line of sight for his artillery.

A memorial stone for the 6th Foot Artillery Regiment, which comprised roughly half of the Grande Batterie, has been set about 109yd (100m) to the north of La Belle Alliance on the eastern side of the Brussels highway. Commanded by Colonel Hulot, its forty cannon and howitzers pounded the Allied centre hoping to soften it up for d’Erlon’s attack. They also provided fire at various points during the assault and attempted to cover the retreat. The French language inscription translates: ‘From La Belle Alliance to Papelotte on 18 June 1815 the units of Colonel Hulot’s 6th Foot Artillery Regiment effectively fired in support of the attacks of the French 1st Army Corps’.

NAPOLEON’S SECOND OBSERVATION POINT

(LOCATION MAP REFERENCE 12)

After leaving his initial command post at Rossomme, Napoleon rode forward to La Belle Alliance and established himself and his staff somewhere to the right of the inn. The exact location is open to debate but it is generally agreed that the Trimotiau hillock is likely since it permits a good view of the battlefield from this area. This is signposted along the road leading from La Belle Alliance towards the village of Plancenoit and the Brabant Tourist Authority set up a hedged area and bench with steps leading up to it for easier access on the western side of the road.

The area where Napoleon concentrated his Grande Batterie to enfilade the centre of the Allied line. The Lion Mound is on the left and La Haye Sainte and Wellington’s crossroads can be seen in the centre largely obscured by trees.

It is possible that Napoleon moved along the ridge to view events from various points as the battle raged, although he was nowhere near as mobile as Wellington was in this regard. Indeed, just how long he spent here is also debatable, with historians such as Andrew Uffindell believing that one reason he lost the battle was that he spent too long at his former position at Rossomme (see Chapter 3), being distracted by the threat of Prussian intervention, which was more evident from that vantage point. Yet the Emperor could certainly see the Anglo-Allied front line far better from this forward position.

The Grande Batterie was deployed before and to the right of this position and, having begun his career as an artillery officer, Napoleon must have taken a keen interest in the effect of its fire, hoping it would wreak massive destruction upon the Anglo-Allied centre. Regardless of whether the observation point is in the exact location that Napoleon took up, walking along the ridge in this area reveals just how strong a defensive position Wellington had adopted as his deployment greatly hindered French attempts to observe his positions and reduced their capability to dislodge him.

The Belgian authorities have ensured that good footpaths line the sides of the highway and battlefield tourists can trace its length to view the ground over which I Corps advanced. The land is open but still extensively farmed so be aware that you may be challenged if you walk over it without due consideration for the crops. Walking along the foot of the Allied ridge, one can see that the French faced a long but not overly steep slope to march up before reaching the crest. However, the high crops impeded their march with tall rye being grown for its use in animal fodder, which was far more important in 1815 than today.

ALLIED CENTRE AND LEFT FLANK

Wellington would have seen d’Erlon’s attack developing from the crossroads. When he rode down the Chemin d’Ohain towards the east, it was impossible to miss the massive formations of men as they marched over their own ridge and into the valley. These views are remarkably similar today. However, due to hollows in the land in some places, the view of the Anglo-Allied gunners was probably obscured in some places. Photographs usually fail to represent the nature of this dead ground sufficiently and it is a good reason for walking the area on foot.

The black powder (gunpowder) used at this time generated large amounts of smoke and the gunners’ aim would have been further hampered by their own discharges after repeated firing. Likewise, the smoke generated by the Grande Batterie would have foiled the view of the Allied gunners during the initial stages of the attack as the French infantry began to march over the crest of their own ridge. With these factors in mind, it is interesting to speculate just how effective the artillery of both sides would have been when smoke and geographical features conspired to confuse their aim.

Riflemen of the 95th Foot occupied the gravel pit and a small rise just below Wellington’s crossroads for much of the battle. Although they were forced to abandon the area at least once, they caused the French considerable annoyance from this position. The gravel/sand pit used to lie on the eastern side of the highway between the crossroads and the farm of La Haye Sainte but it was filled in many years ago.

A view of the slope towards the crest of the Allied ridge from a point near the crossroads. The building in the centre is the Fichermont Convent, lying adjacent to the Chemin d’Ohain. It dates from after the battle but marks a point roughly halfway along the Allied deployment on this flank.

PICTON’S MEMORIAL

Today a rest area has been established with picnic tables and benches next to the Monument to the Belgians (see Chapter 6) at the south-east angle of Wellington’s crossroads. General Picton’s memorial is located nearby. It is a stone erected by the Waterloo Committee in 1980 at a point close to where the general is believed to have been killed.

Picton was renowned for his eccentricity and wore civilian dress at the battles of Quatre Bras and Waterloo, including a top hat along with a scruffy old overcoat and an umbrella. At the Battle of Busaco in 1810, he supposedly wore a nightcap while commanding his troops. Ever a stickler for correct uniform, at least among his officers if not the rank-and-file, it is a measure of Wellington’s respect for Picton that he tolerated this. His monument bears the words:

To the gallant memory of Lt General Sir Thomas Picton Commander of the 5th Division and the left wing of the Army at the Battle of Waterloo. Born 1758. Died near this spot in the early afternoon 18th June 1815 leading his men against Count Drouet D’Erlon’s advance. General Picton was said to have suffered two broken ribs at the battle of Quatre-Bras, to have continued fighting with his company, and to have fought and died wearing civilian clothes, because he had not time enough to fetch his uniform upon dashing to rejoin his division.

Picton had been immensely popular as colonel of the 88th Foot and for many years this regiment and its successors commemorated his death by a black stripe within the gold trimmings of their officers’ uniforms.

MEMORIAL TO DURUTTE’S DIVISION

A few metres to the right of the Hanoverian Monument at Wellington’s crossroads (see Chapter 6) stands a small stone dedicated to the memory of Durutte’s Division. The French inscription translates as: ‘At this place on 18 June 1815 the 8th Line infantry regiment of the Durutte Division successfully attacked the 2nd German Legion of Colonel Von Ompteda’. The Napoleon Foundation erected this monument. Of all the divisions committed by d’Erlon during his great attack, this one came closest to success and, although briefly forced into precipitous flight, retired with fewer casualties than its counterparts. Durutte was badly wounded during the latter stages of the battle, being cut about the head and upper body and losing a hand when set upon by Prussian cavalry. His saddle, still stained with his blood, is on display at the Musée de l’Armée in Brussels.

LA HAYE SAINTE (LOCATION MAP REFERENCE 5)

In comparison to Hougoumont, this farmhouse suffered relatively little damage during the battle and its appearance today is similar to that which it presented in 1815. Although the main barn was set alight and damaged, the walls of all the buildings in this complex are strongly constructed of brick or stone and did not require extensive repairs. Today the hedged orchard that stood to the south of the farm is gone but its presence in 1815 probably saved the structure from being fired upon by French artillery. Had the French been able to train guns on its walls, the farm would probably not have weathered so many assaults. Considering how much fighting and bloodshed took place in and around this farmhouse, it is remarkable that La Haye Sainte remains in such good condition.

A considerable portion of Quiot’s Division was employed to assault the farm during d’Erlon’s attack. Although this would have drawn the majority of the defender’s fire, they still recorded firing upon the columns marching up the ridge, at least during the initial stages of the action. The fact that they could fire into the flank of such an assault was one of the main reasons that Wellington chose to occupy the farm in considerable strength. Standing just before the farm at its front gate and further along the garden wall, it is evident that they would have enjoyed a good view of Donzelot’s column as it marched up the slope. Even at a range of 200–300ft (60–91m), the German riflemen would have inflicted considerable losses on this vast formation.

Today La Haye Sainte is an active, working farm. Until recently the walls to the left of the main gate had been knocked down to allow farm vehicles access to the courtyard but these have been reconstructed, probably to prevent the intrusion of battlefield tourists who sometimes attempt to gain entry with almost as much fervour as the French 200 years ago. Although the farmer tolerates photography from the front of the property, it is wise to gain the owner’s permission before proceeding further as offence may be taken. La Haye Sainte is described in greater detail in Chapter 6.

MARCOGNET’S MONUMENT

Walking or driving along the Chemin d’Ohain eastward from the crossroads, one comes across another French monument commemorating Marcognet’s Division which fought so hard to take the ridge around this point and suffered heavy casualties. The French dedication translates: ‘At this place on 18 June 1815 the 21st Line infantry regiment of the Marcognet Division heroically attacked the Anglo-Scottish units forming Major General Pack’s Brigade’. The Napoleon Foundation placed it here.

A monument along the Chemin d’Ohain near Fichermont Convent, commemorating the attack of Marcognet’s Division upon the Allied left flank.

WELLINGTON’S EXTREME LEFT FLANK

The area on the extreme left of the Anglo-Allied Army was held by soldiers of the 2nd Netherlands Brigade under Prince Bernard of Saxe-Weimar. The main defensive points were the village of Smohain (now renamed La Marache), the Chateau of Fichermont and the two farmhouses of Papelotte and La Haye (also spelt as La Haie). The area presents a confusing pattern of minor lanes that are often lined with embankments and/or hedges in places. Victor Hugo referred to this lane as being ‘sunken’ in addition to that on the Allied right flank. The whole area provided ideal defensive ground for infantry, presenting the French under Durutte who tried to take the area with serious problems.

PAPELOTTE FARMHOUSE (LOCATION MAP REFERENCE 6)

The farm of Papelotte lies about 1.2 miles (2km) from the Lion Mound along the narrow Chemin d’Ohain, to the east of Wellington’s crossroads. Six companies of the 3/2 Nassau Battalion defended it under the command of Major Hegmann, who also occupied the nearby farm of La Haye. Durutte’s Division captured the farm during d’Erlon’s attack but only occupied it briefly before falling back. It fell to Durutte once again towards the end of the battle but he was forced out again when attacked by Ziethen’s I Corps arriving from the east. It was around this area that the Prussians first made contact with the left flank of the Anglo-Allied Army.

Papelotte farm, which lay on the extreme left of the Allied position. It was badly damaged during the battle and has seen extensive modification and rebuilding since.

Papelotte was set alight and seriously damaged by fire during the battle, although the shell of most of the main buildings survived. It remained a ruin until 1860 when it was rebuilt along similar lines as before with farmhouse and outbuildings surrounding a courtyard. An impressive tower (known as a belvedere) has been placed over the main entrance but this feature did not exist in 1815. Today the farm is highly active and is used as an equestrian centre and riding school. It is well signposted as private property and visitors should proceed with caution and consideration for its occupants if they wish to view the farm closely.

LA HAYE FARM

The farmstead of La Haye was located about 165yd (150m) east of Papelotte on the edge of the village of Smohain. Constructed 200 years ago, the farm was built from a material called cob (a compact mixture of gravel, clay and straw) and had a thatched roof. Musket balls easily penetrated the walls and the single-storey structure did not provide much protection for the company of Nassau troops who defended it. It burnt down in 1910 and the current buildings bear little resemblance to the farm that stood here in 1815.

SMOHAIN VILLAGE AND FICHERMONT

In La Marache, formerly known as Smohain, none of the village buildings date back to 1815. Proceeding through it will bring you to the site of the Chateau of Frichermont (modern spelling Fichermont). This was a large complex of buildings typical of major farms and manor houses of the area and the owner at the time was the Duke of Beaulieu. It possessed a number of buildings set around a courtyard with a square tower in its centre and smaller round towers at each corner. Woods surrounded Fichermont on three sides and it had a formal garden similar to that of Hougoumont. These strong buildings were ideal to defend and were occupied by four companies of the 1/28th Orange-Nassau Battalion. This marked the furthest point of the Allied left flank making an effective anchor for Wellington’s line. Jacquinot’s cavalry (on the French right wing) was placed just over 328yd (300m) away from Fichermont and reconnoitred its strength at around 10.00am on 18 June. However, they considered the structure too difficult to assault without a substantial force of infantry and, although shots were exchanged, no serious attempts were made to take Fichermont.

Fichermont burned to the ground in 1857 after an accidental fire. Although it was rebuilt later in the century, the subsequent building was demolished in 1960 and the surrounding woods have now reclaimed the site. Today there is little visible evidence of the once extensive chateau. Only a few broken walls can be discerned among the trees and tangled bushes that cover the site and these are not very photogenic. In light of the limited part that Fichermont played at Waterloo, visitors may wish to bypass this location in favour of more relevant sites.

Chapter 5

CAVALRY ONSLAUGHT

Both commanders were concerned about the way the battle had developed up to this point. Wellington, while not contemplating retreat, felt obliged to reinforce his front line with units from his second line of defence. He was also beginning to draw upon his reserves. Some of his staff worried that the army might not withstand another infantry attack on a similar scale to d’Erlon’s assault, especially if one of the farmhouses fell to the French. Wellington believed his army would stand for some time but was frustrated that, although the Prussians had arrived in some numbers by 2.00pm, Blücher appeared to be proceeding cautiously while the Duke desperately needed him to take some pressure off his army.

Napoleon was now more troubled about what might be happening in the east and dispatches from Grouchy alarmed him even further. At 11.30am, Grouchy’s first message revealed that his march towards Wavre was progressing slowly and it seemed very unlikely that he would be able to impose his force between the Prussian main body or attack them while they were on the march. It was now clear that there was no chance of Grouchy joining with the Emperor’s army and, even if this had been possible, the French were still likely to be outnumbered by two to one if the Prussians contributed two or more corps.

The failure of d’Erlon’s assault convinced Napoleon that the Anglo-Allied line was stronger than he had suspected, so he ordered Ney to seize the farmhouse of La Haye Sainte at all costs. Once this was achieved, French forces could concentrate closer to the enemy and subsequent assaults had more chance of carrying the ridge and penetrating Wellington’s defences. He also hoped that the fall of Hougoumont was imminent with significant numbers of his troops committed to its capture. I Corps was regrouping to the east of La Belle Alliance and Ney selected the two brigades who had suffered the fewest losses to renew the attack on the farmstead.

The Grande Batterie, now reinforced by guns from Reille’s Corps and the Imperial Guard, began to pound the Allied centre once again. Their concentrated firepower laid down a fearsome bombardment and General Alten later commented: ‘Never had the oldest soldiers heard such a cannonade.’ The strength of this fire persuaded Wellington to bring his front line further back around 100 paces. Ney was observing the Anglo-Allied position closely with his staff and, seeing signs of a substantial movement to their rear, guessed that Wellington was on the verge of retreating. In fairness, following the Duke’s well-executed withdrawal after Quatre Bras, he had grounds to suspect that Wellington would try to conceal attempts to fall back until the last moment.

However, the manoeuvres Ney had seen dimly through the smoke were actually large numbers of walking wounded, columns of prisoners and empty supply wagons retiring from the battlefield. He may also have seen the remnants of the Household and Union brigades regrouping before Mont St Jean. Combining this with the rearward movement of the entire first line (or what he could see of that manoeuvre), it was easy to see how he might have misinterpreted what he saw unfolding before him.

Hoping to take swift advantage of the enemy’s withdrawal, Ney ordered a brigade of Milhaud’s cuirassiers to move forward and press the enemy’s retreat. General Delort, one of Milhaud’s divisional commanders, questioned the order with General Farine and then with Ney himself:

He not only insisted on his original order being carried out, but demanded both divisions [of Milhaud’s corps] in the Emperor’s name. I hesitated to obey, saying that heavy cavalry ought not to attack heights held by infantry, infantry which had never yet been shaken and which was well placed to defend itself. The Marshal cried ‘Forward, for the sake of France!’ I reluctantly obeyed.

To cover their advance, Ney ordered Piré’s lancers to make a feint against the Anglo-Allied right flank, where they skirmished with Grant’s cavalry. Up to this point, many of the cavalry divisions had merely watched and listened to the fighting without taking an active part in the battle and were eager to come to grips with the enemy. Without waiting for orders, Lefebvre-Desnouëtte’s cavalry advanced once they saw Milaud’s squadrons moving forward and joined the attack. At around 4.00pm over 5,000 cavalry were moving against the centre right of the Anglo-Allied position.

GENERAL EDOUARD JEAN-BAPTISTE COUNT MILHAUD

Edouard Milhaud was born in 1766 and was the son of a farmer. He became a staunch Republican and is said to have taken part in the famous storming of the Bastille prison in Paris, which marked a turning point in the French Revolution, on 14 July 1789. He was elected as a deputy in the National Convention Government, where he voted to execute King Louis XVI, who duly went to the guillotine in front a vast Parisian crowd on 21 January 1793.

He left the world of politics for the army in 1795 and rose swiftly through the ranks. His support of Bonaparte when he seized power in 1799 greatly boosted his career as the future Emperor never forgot those who had championed his cause during this tense period. Milhaud was a superb cavalry commander and was promoted général de brigade in 1800.

Considered a fanatical Bonapartist, he fought in most of the main campaigns on the Continent and was obliged to retire in 1814 during the Bourbon restoration. It came as no surprise when he rallied enthusiastically to Napoleon’s standard upon his return and the Emperor rewarded this display of loyalty with the command of the IV Reserve Cavalry Corps in the Armée du Nord. This force included two of the famous curirassier divisions of the heavy cavalry. These horsemen were renowned throughout the French Army, their name deriving from the metal cuirass they wore, which protected a cavalryman’s front and back. They also wore tall Greek-style helmets, decorated with bearskin and having a horsehair plume flowing down the cavalryman’s back. Armed with long straight swords, their appearance was fearsome and they were renowned for the ability to deliver a decisive blow as an elite branch of Napoleon’s heavy cavalry.

When Ney called upon Milhaud’s Corps to assault the Anglo-Allied ridge, he did not question the command as others did, and immediately complied. He committed at least 3,000 cuirassiers to the initial assault and, being an officer who led from the front, received a wound at Waterloo leading his men against the infantry squares.

Surprisingly, Milhaud did his best to ingratiate himself with Louis XVIII’s regime when Napoleon was overthrown. As a known regicide, he was likely to be imprisoned, exiled or executed but his efforts succeeded to the extent that he was allowed to remain in France. Yet he was forced to resign his commission and only received a meagre pension to live on, despite his valiant service for France.

VIVE L’EMPEREUR! – THE FIRST CHARGES

The French cavalry advanced between the farmhouses of Hougoumont and La Haye Sainte. In order to bypass these positions without receiving heavy fire from their defenders, they were obliged to pass through a narrow area about 800yd wide (731m) – a constricted area for 1,000 let alone 5,000 riders. As no serious attacks had taken place on Wellington’s centre right, the tall crops planted here had not been trampled down to any serious degree. Some of the land was still sodden in places and, combined with the need to ride uphill, this meant that the cavalry progressed at walking speed and their pace did not exceed a trot until they reached the crest of the ridge.

In his eagerness to press the retreat, Ney had failed to co-ordinate this attack with a combination of different arms. Although the infantry attack on La Haye Sainte continued, the cavalry advanced without infantry support to exploit any success and only a few batteries of horse artillery followed in their wake to add supporting fire for their charges. One British officer observed: ‘We were astonished that one should attack with cavalry an infantry as yet unshaken and which, thanks to the undulations of the ground behind which it was lying, had suffered little from the cannonade.’ Ney rode at the forefront and this display of courage, while undoubtedly boosting the men’s morale, limited his ability to make command decisions. Just as Uxbridge had done earlier that day, the ‘bravest of the brave’ allowed his soldier’s instinct to overcome his judgement as a general.

Observing the French preparations from the ridge, Wellington sent orders for the artillery to move their horses to the rear, fearing they could be driven off when the cavalry attacked. He also ordered the infantry in the front line to return to their former position just behind the brow of the ridge and form squares there to repel cavalry. He instructed the artillery to fire right up to the last minute at the oncoming cavalry before running to take shelter in the squares behind them. The infantry were formed in twenty squares (though most were more rectangular in shape) placed in chequerboard fashion so they would avoid firing into each other. Most were at least sixty men wide and three or four ranks deep.

Ney’s cavalry attacks – approximately 4.00pm.

As the French rode forward, Allied artillery fired into the huge formations of men and horses. They moved slowly, offering large targets as roundshot tore into their ranks cutting down horses and emptying saddles. Colonel Ordner, commanding the 1st Cuirassiers, recalled proudly: ‘Our four superb lines were practically fresh; they moved simultaneously to cries of Vive l’Empereur! … Marshal Ney was at our head’.

When they neared the foot of the ridge, the artillerymen began to double-shot their cannon, firing both roundshot and canister and inflicting horrific losses at close range. It was a glorious but horrific sight as the magnificent squadrons rode forward into a lethal storm of fire. As the gunners fled to seek protection in the squares, the cavalry hurled themselves against the infantry. The Anglo-Allied batteries were swiftly overrun but few French cavalrymen had thought to bring gun spikes to disable cannon with. In any case, most hurtled forward regardless, eager to ride down the enemy. At first, the tall crops were a considerable obstacle. Major Llewellyn of the 28th Regiment wrote how they not only restricted the view of the infantry but also compelled the French to take drastic reconnaissance measures:

The rye in the field was so high, that to see anything beyond our own ranks was almost impossible. The Enemy, even, in attacking our Squares, were obliged to make a daring person desperately ride forward to plant a flag, as a mark, at the very point of our bayonets. On this they charged, but were invariably repulsed.

While infantrymen in the front ranks of these squares knelt, grounded their muskets and presented a wall of bayonets towards the enemy, men behind them fired at their assailants over their heads. Waiting until they saw the ‘whites of their eyes’, the infantry allowed the enemy to within close range before discharging their muskets. With many new recruits in the ranks, this was not easy, as the sight of the oncoming cavalry was frightful and intimidating. Inexperienced men tended to fire too high and it took great courage for them to hold their fire until cavalry approached within close range, when a volley would be more effective.

Their officers knew that, if the infantrymen kept their nerve and remained in square, they were relatively safe from the cavalry. Although they were not invulnerable, it was very difficult for cavalry to break their ranks without supporting fire from infantry or artillery. On the French side, the cavalry mounted furious attacks hoping either to penetrate the squares or break the morale of their defenders. If the infantry quailed at the sight of the massed cavalry bearing down upon them and ran, they could be cut down with impunity once dispersed. Losses were steadily being inflicted on both sides but it had also become a battle of wills, with those who kept their nerve the longest being the ones who would prevail.

The intense, disciplined fire of the infantry repulsed and broke up the cavalry formations and riders who approached close enough to hack down at the infantry with their sabres and inflicted only small losses in return. Those who rode close enough to do this were often shot or bayoneted as most horses baulked at the sight of the levelled bayonets and refused to charge into the men kneeling and standing before them. The cavalry swirled around the squares and the ridge became wreathed in gunpowder smoke from the massed volleys of musketry. Every time they were repulsed, the cavalry fell back to reform, stubbornly mounting charge after charge.

In places accompanying horse artillery had unlimbered close enough to see the squares and fired directly into the infantry, striking many men down in their tightly packed formations. However, the French had not brought up enough guns and, although the infantry took losses from this fire, it was not enough to make wide enough gaps in any squares for the cavalry to ride into and exploit. At least four major cavalry assaults took place before the French could even begin to check their cavalry’s over enthusiasm.

An infantry attack was also in progress against La Haye Sainte, which began just before 4.00pm. Donzelot deployed a heavy skirmish line, advancing it before the farmhouse to engage the riflemen who had returned to the gravel pit. This force covered the main attack by elements of Quiot’s Division who entered the orchard to the south of the farm and renewed their assault. The defenders were beginning to run low on ammunition, despite urgent requests to be re-supplied, but Wellington only sent two further companies of infantry to support them.

Baring’s men continued to resist the assaults on their walls and laid down a heavy fire, which drove Quiot’s men back into the orchard inflicting serious losses. Skirmishers from Kempt’s Brigade also advanced to the east of the farm and added their fire to that of the 95th, swiftly repulsing the French skirmishers covering the attack. The farmhouse was under heavy pressure but its garrison seemed likely to withstand these assaults for the present.

THE PRUSSIANS ARRIVE

Fearing that the Anglo-Allied Army might be overwhelmed at Mont St Jean, Blücher had urged his men onward throughout their difficult march from Wavre. Prussian artillery encountered severe problems in dragging their guns over hilly and rough country near Chapelle-St Lambert and it took all of the Field Marshal’s legendary willpower and enthusiasm to inspire his weary soldiers. Observing one gun team struggling to free their cannon from the mud, he leaned down from his saddle saying: ‘Come, comrades, you would not have me miss [break] my word!’ He knew that, even if Wellington managed to hold out against Napoleon, his troops were urgently needed if the Allies were to regain the initiative and turn the tide against the French.

By 1.00pm, Blücher had arrived on the edge of the battlefield at Fichermont Wood. He and his staff observed the battle closely under the cover of the trees with their spyglasses. Prince August of Thurn and Taxis (who served on the Prussian staff) recorded: ‘Hard to believe as it may be, we could see into the rear of the enemy (a distance of about 1½ hours’ march), and could even make out with our telescopes how the wounded were being carried back.’

They sent out a reconnaissance patrol of Uhlans under Major von Falkenhausen, who scouted almost as far as La Belle Alliance. He returned with prisoners who were taken completely unawares, never dreaming that the Prussians were so close. Their scouts reported that the French seemed entirely unaware of their presence.

Conferring with his officers, Blücher agreed that Napoleon would soon recognize the threat they posed and was likely to concentrate his efforts on breaking the Anglo-Allied line before they could intervene. Yet Blücher refused to mount an attack until he had concentrated sufficient forces and made them ready for battle. Committing troops in piecemeal fashion would simply result in unnecessary losses. Until then, Wellington would just have to hold out, but he began to plan an assault against the village of Plancenoit. Once IV Corps was ready, he meant to seize this village on the French right flank. If IV Corps could do this, he would then attack the French centre or rear from this position.

SERGEANT WILLIAM WHEELER OF THE 51ST REGIMENT

Wheeler served throughout the Peninsular War and participated in the invasion of France in 1814. He fought at Quatre Bras and at Waterloo and later took part in the Allied drive into France, fighting at Cambrai, until the wars ended with Napoleon’s second and final abdication.

Throughout his service, Wheeler wrote letters recounting his experiences to his family in Somerset and they read them avidly as a Sunday treat around the fireplace. They were published in 1949 and provide an interesting record of a straightforward, plain-spoken working man caught up in great events. Unlike some diarists, Wheeler rarely grumbled about poor accommodation, irregular food and low pay. Although he occasionally complained about some officers, he seemed generally content with life in King George’s Army. He saw considerable action and was among those hardy men who stood fast in square under shot and shell while surrounded and charged by some of the finest cavalrymen in Europe.

His patriotism never failed him during these adventures and he maintained an enduring faith in the Duke of Wellington, writing:

If England should require the service of her army again and I should be with it, let me have ‘Old Nosey’ to command … There are two things we should be certain of. First, we should always be as well supplied with rations as the nature of the service would admit. The second is we should be sure to give the enemy a damned good thrashing. What can a soldier desire more?

STANDING FIRM

Back on the Anglo-Allied ridge, the cavalry continued to pit lance and sabre against musket and bayonet. Every time the cavalry withdrew to reform, gunners emerged from the squares, ran to their guns and fired at them while they struggled to reform at the foot of the ridge. The crops had now been trampled beneath their hooves but the cavalry made little progress against the infantry, which remained steadfast in their serried ranks. Watching grimly from his vantage point, Napoleon voiced his disapproval of Ney’s actions to Marshal Soult: ‘This is a premature movement, the results of which may prove disastrous.’ Soult responded: ‘He is endangering us as at Jena!’ The Emperor looked long at the field of battle, reflected a moment, then said: ‘It is too soon by an hour; but it is necessary to follow up what has already been done.’

Consequently, the cavalry of Kellerman and Guyot were committed to the attack. For another hour, wave after wave of cavalry pressed relentlessly against Wellington’s centre and as many as 10,000 cavalry were sent against the ridge in total. Conditions within the infantry squares were appalling as, amidst the cloying smoke, officers struggled to keep order and shout commands above the deafening sound of musketry, the thunder of hooves and clash of steel. In the centre of the squares lay many wounded and dead, dragged back there by their comrades.

This part of the struggle became the most famous event during the battle and many drawings and paintings of Waterloo later showed Allied infantrymen standing stoically in square with their colours stirring in the breeze behind them in the centre of their squares. Their grim, determined resistance was in direct contrast to the wild courage of the French cavalry, furiously attacking the squares with great bravery. Images like this became symbolic of the titanic struggle at Waterloo.

It seemed that the situation for Wellington was desperate, with his infantry in the centre surrounded by a tide of cavalry, swirling furiously about them. Ordener, who rode against the squares himself, exaggerated slightly by claiming: ‘We were almost masters of the plateau, and the English were three parts destroyed. But they seemed rooted in the earth; we should have had to kill them to a man.’ Even Napoleon believed that victory was close and later commented that if Murat had been there enough squares might have been destroyed to enable him to break through: ‘perhaps, he would have given us the victory. For what was it that we needed to do at certain points in the battle? Smash three or four British squares.’

While only a few horse artillery batteries had advanced with the cavalry, the squares were harassed by numerous tiraillers, particulary near La Haye Sainte, and morale in the squares wavered as casualties mounted. The skirmishers sometimes denied Allied artillerymen the chance to return to their guns during the intervals between charges and Wellington knew that the situation would become perilous if the French advanced in force with infantry. Adam’s Brigade was in the second line and, in contrast, his men were agitated by occasional skirmisher fire, and were eager to adopt a more active role. The Duke now ordered them to move closer to the front line (moving slowly in square) and instructed other battalions to drive the skirmishers back if possible, declaring: ‘I’ll be damned if we shan’t lose this ground if we don’t take care.’

Although the Allied infantry suffered, far more cavalrymen and horses were cut down by their firepower during this battle of attrition. At one stage Marshal Ney, who had had three horses shot from under him, was seen standing alone in a captured battery and beating his sword against a gun barrel in rage and frustration. The Anglo-Allied infantry had not been weakened by the previous cannonades as much as the French had thought and, without infantry support, it was clear that cavalry alone could not break them. Two years before, General Thiébault had written that infantry formed in two lines of squares with sufficient intervals between them to allow them free fire, had little to fear from cavalry, especially when supported by artillery. This was certainly the case at Waterloo and he had remarked that in theory: ‘I cannot imagine what cavalry would be able to accomplish against them’ in such a scenario.

When cavalrymen rode near enough to use lance or sword, they often faced two or three defenders at a time lunging upward with their bayonets, or were shot at from point-blank range. Some discharged pistols or carbines from the saddle but they could not hope to compete with the concentrated fire of so many muskets. The chequerboard positioning of the squares allowed each battalion to offer mutual fire support to neighbouring squares and therefore the French often received fire in their flanks as well as in front as they rode past. Renowned for their efficient drill, British battalions occasionally redeployed into a line four men deep when their assailants withdrew, firing a more devastating volley after them. Observing this, the French sometimes wheeled about and charged again, only to be thwarted as jeering redcoats smoothly reformed square (a relatively easy manoeuvre to carry out from a line four-men deep).

Cavalry clashes at Waterloo. (H Chartier)

One of the infantrymen standing in the beleaguered squares was Sergeant William Wheeler of the 51st Regiment, who wrote only days afterward:

I am at a loss which to admire most, the cool intrepid courage of our squares, exposed as they often were to a destructive fire from the French Artillery and at the same time or in less than a minute surrounded on all sides by the enemy’s Heavy Cavalry, who would ride up to the very muzzles of our men’s firelocks and cut at them in the squares. But this was of no use, not a single square could they break, but was always put to the rout, by the steady fire of our troops.

Wheeler also recorded how, on one occasion, a large number of cuirassiers overreached themselves and, not wishing to retire under the fire of his square, took a circuitous route down the road lying to their left. Finding this barricaded by felled trees, the cavalry milled around in confusion and most were killed when infantry approached and fired down upon them from the embankment above.

Every time the French withdrew, Lord Uxbridge launched counter-attacks with his cavalry hoping to inflict losses and disrupt their attempts to reform. Nonetheless, mindful of the casualties his own cavalry had suffered that day, he took care to keep his men in hand and managed to prevent them from pursuing the enemy beyond the foot of the ridge before withdrawing behind the squares once again as renewed French charges began.

By around 5.00pm, Ney had realized that Wellington was not retreating and his cavalry could not capture the ridge without more support. Therefore, he ordered 8,000 infantry from Reille’s II Corps, which were not committed to the fight for Hougoumont, to advance in the wake of the cavalry attack. Yet the move was badly mistimed and they did not move forward until 5.30pm when the cavalry had fallen back to the foot of the ridge.

Reille’s infantry pressed forward into a heavy cannonade and then received devastating musketry fire as they traded volleys with the infantry on the ridge who had redeployed into line to meet them. Fearing further cavalry attacks, most Anglo-Allied battalions adopted lines four-men deep. While this was more restrictive in terms of firepower than the usual firing line, only two-men deep, it did permit them to reform a square more quickly. Even so, it was effective and General Foy recalled:

When we were about to meet the English, we received a very lively fire of canister and musketry. It was a hail of death … The columns of Bachelu’s division fled first and their flight precipitated the flight of my columns. At this moment I was wounded. A ball passed through the top of my right arm; the bone was not touched … I rallied the debris of my division [brigade] in the valley adjacent to the wood of Hougoumont.

Bachelu was also wounded during this abortive attack, receiving a shell splinter in the head. According to some accounts, the French lost as many as 1,500 men in only 10 minutes and by around 6.00pm the attack had been completely repulsed.

Historians continue to debate who was ultimately responsible for the disastrous charges at Waterloo, which devastated the French cavalry arm. Some blame Ney, while others suggest Napoleon was guilty of committing his men to unnecessary slaughter. Some suggest that the cavalry’s fanaticism and over eagerness lay at the root of the disaster but, whatever the cause, 10,000 virtually unsupported cavalrymen exhausted themselves against a heavily defended position for very little gain. Furthermore, in the face of heavy losses and lack of progress, the attack was permitted to continue for far too long. Reinforcing failure went against everything Napoleon had written about the art of war and the fact that he allowed the assaults to continue unchecked is far more difficult to comprehend than the reasons for the initial attack.

However, recent studies on the battle by Alessandro Barbero, suggest that the French gained from the multiple cavalry charges. He believes that Napoleon was well aware of how the assaults were proceeding but decided to continue with them as they occupied the Anglo-Allied infantry on the ridge and prevented Wellington bringing up reserves. This allowed the French to continue with their efforts to seize Hougoumont (without significant interference) and prepared the way for a move against La Haye Sainte, which was isolated while the cavalry attack continued. Furthermore, while the massed charges were costly, they inflicted some damage upon Wellington’s line and maintained pressure upon it until Napoleon was ready to deliver a final, crushing blow.

Viewpoints

VIEWS OF THE VALLEY

Despite the height advantage from being on horseback, the French cavalry could see very little of the Anglo-Allied line during their advance through the valley and when climbing the slope of the ridge before them. The smoke generated from the cannon firing down at them told them where to expect enemy artillery batteries to be, but even after they crested the ridge, many of the infantry squares would have been difficult to make out due to the high crops. This would have remained the case until repeated assaults crushed the rye lying in their path and Major Llewellyn’s recollections of the French having to place direction markers, as a prelude to their charges, are probably accurate for the first few attacks.

Today the reverse slopes of the ridge are open farmland just as they were in 1815. The crest is probably lower in places and the embankments on either side of the lane are long gone due to the construction of the Lion Mound. Nevertheless, visitors tracing the line of the ridge or looking up at the crest while walking through the fields below can still gain a good impression of how things stood in 1815. One thing that becomes immediately apparent from the ridge, highway or valley floor is the narrowness of the area between the two farmhouses. This was a very restrictive area to attack through for such a large force and this must have challenged the ability of officers and NCOs to direct the cavalry formations and maintain their ranks.

VILLAGE OF MONT ST JEAN

In 1815, the village of Mont St Jean was a small settlement inhabited by about 300 people. Its buildings stood around a crossroads where the roads from Nivelle and Genappe joined and the highway ran directly on towards Waterloo and Charleroi. The ridge of Mont St Jean, where Wellington established his army, is about 1,093yd (1,000m) from the centre of the old village.

After the battle, many wounded were brought through Mont St Jean on the way to Brussels or were treated in the village itself. Years afterwards, Sergeant Major Cotton returned to live in Mont St Jean and wrote his famous A Voice from Waterloo guidebook here. Victor Hugo also stayed at the Hôtel des Colonnes and wrote the Waterloo chapter of Les Misérables during his visit to the area. This hotel was demolished in 1962 but Hugo’s reputation was such that the balcony from room he stayed in was saved from the wreckage and can now be seen in the garden of the museum at Le Caillou.

Today few old buildings remain from the time of the battle and the village has been virtually swallowed by the suburbs of Waterloo and Braine l’Alleud. Nevertheless, due to its close proximity to the battle and the fact that much of the fighting took place upon Mont St Jean ridge, the French used to refer to the battle as Mont St Jean in preference to Waterloo.

MONT ST JEAN FARMHOUSE (LOCATION MAP REFERENCE 1)

The farm of Mont St Jean is located around 656yd (600m) north of Wellington’s crossroads on the eastern side of the highway to Brussels. Just before the battle, Dr John Gunning, who was the Principal Medical Officer of I Corps in the Anglo-Allied Army, requisitioned it. He used the buildings as an aid station to treat casualties in and, even though the farm was large, it soon became filled with wounded men.

Hundreds of wounded were brought here for treatment either within the buildings or within the central courtyard, where they lay exposed to the elements. Amputation was the main form of treatment for serious wounds and operations were carried out on rough farm tables or improvised platforms constructed from farm doors or anything else that came to hand. With few anaesthetics available, patients had to be firmly held down by orderlies during their agony and the courtyard must have resembled a charnel house as bloodied surgeons tended screaming men with severed limbs stacked in piles around them.

Ney spotted the movement of troops around the farm from the French ridge (some distance away) and misinterpreted it as evidence of an enemy retreat. Many of the men and wagons he saw were wounded walking or being carried into the farm. The cavalry of the Household and Union Brigades were also reforming in the fields to the south of Mont St Jean farm, which helped persuade Ney to mount the massed attacks that would simultaneously bring glory and ruin upon the French cavalry.

Mont St Jean dates back to 1150 and belonged to the Order of the Knights Templar at one stage. At the time of the battle, a square tower was located over the main gate to the complex but this fell during earth tremors in 1992. At the time of writing, this gateway is blocked by the ruins of the former tower and it is out of use. This has the effect of defacing the front of the building for photographic purposes and the rest of the structure is in a poor state of repair on the side facing the highway. Today the farmer gains access by means of a gateway on the north side of the farm. A small lane runs from this gate along the north side of the complex before turning right into the inner courtyard.

The courtyard of Mont St Jean farm where many wounded were treated either within the surrounding buildings or out in the open.

Although the buildings appear to be unoccupied ruins from the front, it is a busy farm and family residence and visitors should be cautious if they wish to gain access beyond taking photographs of the farm from the roadside. Although most locals are friendly, it is best to ask permission if in doubt about rights of access and visitors should treat the area with the respect it deserves.

The Waterloo Committee contributed towards a plaque commemorating the noble efforts of the senior staff surgeons, which is next to the ruined main gate. It reads:

In memory of Deputy Inspector Gunning Principal Medical Officer of the 1st Corps the Surgeons and other members of the field hospital which was established in this farm to care for the wounded of the battlefield 18th June 1815. This tablet was erected in 1981 by the Royal Army Medical Corps.

THE WATERLOO PANORAMA (LOCATION MAP REFERENCE 8)

In the Lion Village, a panorama/rotunda stands next to the Lion Mound displaying an incredible depiction of the French cavalry charges during the battle. This large white building is unmistakeable and it is one of the few rotundas in the world displaying a military painting, its main rivals being those in Sevastopol (Ukraine) and Gettysburg (United States of America), which also commemorate great battles of the nineteenth century.

In 1910, the artist Louis Demoulin leased this plot of land from the Belgian Government for a period of eighteen years and building began. He secured funding from numerous Belgian and foreign donors and engaged the services of four other French and Belgian artists. These included Robiquet, Malespina, Desavreaux and Vinck, whose varied experience included painting wildlife and military subjects.

A section of the Waterloo Panorama showing Marshal Ney charging at the head of his cavalry at the height of the cavalry attacks made against the Allied centre right.

The Panorama is 114ft (35m) in diameter and the painting is 360ft (110m) long and 39ft (12m) high. It was constructed from fourteen lengths of canvas and the painting and surrounding building were finished by 1912. In 1989, two exhibition rooms were added in order to display exhibits relating to the battle and the panorama.

The painting itself depicts what many consider the dramatic highlight of the Battle of Waterloo, showing the massed French cavalry attacks that continued for at least 2 hours. In the foreground stand life-size mannequins, bushes and weapons, which are designed to give the impression of blending into the painting itself. The painting is remarkable both as a dramatic depiction and for the accurate representation of uniforms and equipment. Its painters took great pains to represent as many regiments as possible and, although cuirassiers, hussars and red lancers predominate, plenty of more obscure cavalry types (such as carabiniers) are also shown in what amounts to a breathtaking display of colour and variety.

The painting also reveals that Wellington’s army was very much an allied force. In addition to the redcoated British infantrymen so beloved by most artists of the period, Brunswicker, Nassau and Belgian troops are also much in evidence. Several famous personalities can be picked out with closer scrutiny and Napoleon can be seen on horseback, surrounded by his staff, having ridden forward to watch the progress of the attacks. Likewise, his adversary is shown with his own staff sheltering within one of the infantry squares, and Wellington sits calmly on his horse as enemy cavalry stream about him.

Yet the most prominent figure is that of Marshal Ney, who has valiantly placed himself at the head of another charge to lead his men by example. Having lost previous horses during incessant and determined attacks, his hat is long gone and his famous red hair therefore marks him out as he encourages his cavalrymen onward, sword in hand.

Although the painting is worth viewing for its artistic merit alone, the centre has added loud sound effects, which add to the atmosphere. Standing on the central viewing platform, visitors hear the thunder of hooves, gunfire, war cries and the screams of the wounded, the combination of which makes a powerful impression on most observers. The painting portrays an incredible scene, simultaneously revealing the splendour, glory and horror of war (as scenes of the dead and suffering wounded are also apparent). Even pacifists of the author’s acquaintance have found this display to be impressive. No visitor should leave the Lion Village without viewing this exhibit and it is well worth the small entry fee charged, which also includes entry to the Lion Mound.

THE ALLIED CENTRE RIGHT

Anglo-Allied artillery was deployed along the line of the lane running between the Lion Mound and Hougoumont and the infantry were placed behind it during the cavalry attacks. Although the reverse slope appears very shallow along this line, the excavations carried out in the 1820s have probably altered the sharpness of this ridge significantly.

There has been considerable debate about the depth of the sunken lane at this part of the battlefield. Victor Hugo emphasized its effect as an obstacle to the cavalry when he wrote about the battle, claiming it played a crucial role in disrupting the French cavalry charges. Unfortunately, first-hand accounts that mention the lane are contradictory and its true depth will never be known. However, it certainly did not present an insurmountable obstacle to horses and, significantly, British cavalry did not encounter much difficulty when counter-attacking at various points during the battle. Admittedly, they were more familiar with this ground than their enemy but, since this feature has now disappeared, historians can only guess at how much effect it had on the tactics used on this part of the battlefield.

MERCER AND DEMULDER MONUMENTS (LOCATION MAP REFERENCE 9)

Walking the line of the lane between the Lion Mound and Hougoumont, visitors will encounter two small monuments. The first is a memorial stone dedicated to the memory of Lieutenant Augustin Demulder of the 5th Cuirassiers who died near this point while charging the infantry on this ridge. It lies about 273yd (250m) from the base of the mound and the inscription is in French. It reveals that Demulder was a Belgian, aged 31 at the time of his death and had served extensively at battles such as Eylau (1807), Aspern-Essling (1809) and Hanau (1813). Wounded three times during a notable military career, he travelled far in the service of France and it is ironic that he was killed only a few miles from his birthplace at Nivelles. His monument lies at a point where the ridge levels out and it is quite possible that he was killed very close to its location. The Anglo-Allied squares lay in two curving lines parallel with the modern lane on the reverse slope here.

The monument is dedicated to Lieutenant Demulder who died during the cavalry assaults on the Allied right. It stands very close to Mercer’s Monument and it is quite possible that Demulder was slain by cannon fire from that very battery.

The second marks the point where Captain Alexander Cavalié Mercer’s G Troop of the Royal Horse Artillery took up its last position during the battle. This comprised five 9-pounder guns and one 5.5in howitzer and its straightforward description in English records their presence here. During the cavalry charges, G Troop was attacked several times but its fire proved so devastatingly effective that the gunners did not need to retire into the infantry squares for protection. They were the only battery who continued to fire throughout the massed French cavalry attacks that took place in this part of the battlefield.

A monument on the lane between Hougoumont and the Lion Mound marking the approximate spot where Mercer’s Battery of G Troop Royal Horse Artillery stood and fired upon the massed cavalry charges against the Allied centre right.

THE POLISH LANCERS MEMORIAL

A small stone to the Polish Lancers is located close to the Wounded Eagle Monument (Location Map Reference 14 – see Chapter 9) by the Association for the Conservation of Napoleonic Memorials. It records the contribution of the 1st Squadron of the 1st (Polish) Lancer Regiment which fought under Major Balinski. These cavalrymen were clad in blue uniforms and fought alongside the equally famous red lancers, commanded by Colonel Sourd, as part of the Light Cavalry of the Imperial Guard.

There were Polish soldiers who fought with great enthusiasm for France in all three arms of the French Army. The Polish were horrified when their country was divided between three other nations in 1795 and Napoleon won their undying gratitude by championing Polish demands for independence. When he went to war with Russia in 1812, many Polish soldiers fought with his Grande Armée and participated in the invasion of Russia, hoping to ensure that Poland became a sovereign nation. Although he ultimately failed to deliver on his promises, they remained loyal to Napoleon until the end. The French inscription refers to the ‘Battle of Mont St Jean’ and translates thus: ‘To the officers, NCOs and soldiers of the Polish Squadron who fell at Mont St Jean, 18 June 1815’.

THE 5TH ARMOURED REGIMENT MEMORIAL

Located further along the road towards Placenoit, running from Napoleon’s observation point (Location Map Reference 12), and situated on a traffic island at a fork in the road lies a small memorial to the 5th Cuirassiers. Commanded by Colonel Baron Gobert, it comprised approximately 500 men of one of the best-equipped regiments in Milhaud’s IV Cavalry Corps. Emblazoned with a Napoleonic Eagle, the stone’s inscription records how this heavy cavalry regiment was deployed in this area and joined the massed cavalry attacks against the Allied infantry in Wellington’s centre.

THE BOIS DE PARIS (FOREST OF PARIS)

The Bois de Paris lay about 1,640yd (1,500m) away from the French right flank but the woods were considerably larger in 1815 than they are today. The Prussians encountered great difficulty marching here due to the muddy roads, defiles, congestion and hills in the area. Four main tracks ran through the woods and all were narrow and unpaved. This would have restricted the passage of men marching in column and historians, such as Mark Adkin, believe that the French could have stopped Prussian progress quite easily had they intercepted them here.

However, only the 7th Hussars were present to skirmish with Colonel Schwerin’s 6th Hussars when the Prussians first began to arrive in this region. While the cavalry of Domon and Subervie were dispatched to delay the Prussians, they were not capable of holding back a large force of combined arms and when Lobau brought his infantry up, he either declined to enter the woods or arrived just as the Prussians began to emerge from them. Whatever happened, when Bülow’s infantry left the forest and began to deploy at about 4.30pm, they took up good positions for an assault on Lobau’s force and to advance on Plancenoit.

Today the lie of the land here is similar and most roads in the area are still narrow just as they were at the time of the battle. The land is dotted with many small areas of woodland and, despite the criticism the French have received, it is easy to imagine that these features could have masked the Prussian approach for even longer as the forest was more extensive. Only efficient scouting by the 7th Hussars and alert observation by Napoleon and his staff saved the French from losing even more time before they could meet the Prussian threat.

Chapter 6

THE FALL OF LA HAYE SAINTE

On the night of 17 June, the 2nd Kings German Legion Brigade, commanded by Colonel Ompteda, was ordered to garrison the farmstead of La Haye Sainte. Accordingly, Major George Baring occupied the farm and its environs using the 2nd Light Battalion of the Kings German Legion (KGL). This force consisted of between 380 and 400 men of all ranks, divided into 6 companies. Assessing the buildings for defensive purposes, the Major described La Haye Sainte in the following fashion:

The dwelling-house, barn, and stables were surrounded by a rectangular wall, forming a court in the interior. Towards the enemy’s side was an orchard, surrounded by a hedge, and in rear was a kitchen-garden, bounded by a small wall towards the road, but on the other sides by a hedge. Two doors and three large gates led from the court to the exterior; but of these, that of the barn had been unfortunately broken and burned by the troops.

He assigned two companies to hold the buildings and enclosures of the farm itself, one to defend the kitchen garden on the northern side of the complex and the remaining three companies to defend the orchard.

The rain hampered Baring’s efforts to prepare for an attack and the fact that his pioneers had been sent to help fortify Hougoumont meant he would have to improvise when it came to strengthening the farm’s defences. The mule carrying the battalion’s entrenching tools had been lost on the march and he lamented ‘that I had not even a hatchet’ to carry out work on the farm. Therefore, he had to rely upon tools found within the farmstead or borrowed from other units. The officers’ failure to prevent soldiers from destroying the great barn’s gate, for use as firewood during in the night, also rendered the western corner of the farm even more vulnerable.

The legionaries did, however, manage to break three large loopholes in the courtyard walls in addition to holes in the roof for sharpshooters, who took up position in the attics. They did not have timber or suitable objects to manufacture platforms in the courtyard that would enable them to fire over the walls. Only the piggery adjacent to the courtyard gate allowed them to do this and its height meant that men would have to lie or kneel upon the roof or risk exposing themselves to heavy fire during assaults. The garrison also managed to block the entrance of the great barn with farm implements and furniture but this makeshift barricade made a poor substitute for the stout double gate that had recently stood there. In any case, Baring hestitated to block this entrance completely as the companies defending the orchard might need a quick escape route back into the complex if forced to withdraw. Baring later complained: ‘Important as the possession of this farm apparently was, the means of defending it were very insufficient.’

La Haye Sainte farmhouse.

THE FIRST ASSAULT – 1.30PM–2.30PM

During the attack of d’Erlon’s I Corps, La Haye Sainte came under direct assault by Colonel Charlet’s Brigade of Quiot’s I Infantry Division. While French infantry advancing along the highway could be seen approaching, this was not the case directly to the south of the orchard where Baring directed operations, who noticed: ‘the farm lies in a hollow, so that a small elevation of the ground immediately in front of the orchard concealed the approach of the enemy’.

Riflemen lined the southern hedgerow and directed a telling fire as a large number of French voltigeurs pressed forward to trade shots with them. Yet in their eagerness to take the farm, the French did not skirmish for long and rapidly: ‘advanced over the height, with two close columns, one of which attacked the buildings, and the other threw itself in mass into the orchard, showing the greatest contempt for our fire’. Intending to deliver a heavy, concentrated fire into the orchard, the French marched forward swiftly and endured the losses the riflemen inflicted. Rifleman Friedrich Lindau was one of those firing at them and later wrote: ‘At first, as the enemy were packed in front of our hedge we opened such a murderous fire on the dense crowd that the ground was immediately covered with a mass of wounded and dead. For a moment the French halted, then they fired, causing major destruction on us.’

At close quarters, the superior range and accuracy of the Baker Rifle conferred little advantage as it was also slower to reload than the musket. The French were able to fire repeated volleys into the orchard and the hedges only offered limited protection. With a second column advancing on their right, aiming to assault the western side of the farm, they were also in danger of being outflanked. Seeing this, Baring ordered them to retire and Lindau recalled: ‘but when the columns on the right advanced as far back as the barn door and threatened to cut off our withdrawal … we marched slowly back, shooting’. Rifleman Harz, a close friend of Lindau’s, was shot down right next to him. Captain Schaumann and Major Bosewiel also fell in the orchard, along with many of their men as they retreated. Entering the great barn, the defenders laid down a heavy fire through the gateway, preventing the French tirailleurs from entering.

Baring rode his horse along the western side of the farm trying to direct the men outside to retire under the protection of its buildings. General Alten, seeing that the farm was virtually surrounded by French infantry, ordered Colonel von Klencke to lead his Lüneburg Battalion down the slope and relieve some of the pressure on the kitchen-garden position. The Lüneburg Battalion deployed into a firing line and engaged the French attacking the garden and advancing along the western side of the farm. However, Baring saw that cuirassiers were approaching and feared these reinforcements would be caught out in the open as they had not yet seen the cavalry’s approach. He rode towards them and shouted at their officers to retire into the farm along with his men.

Busily engaged in exchanging fire with the French infantry, the Lüneburg battalion was horrified to see French cavalry bearing down upon them from only a short distance away. This force comprised Dubois’s 1st and 4th Cuirassiers whom Ney had placed under the command of Colonel Crabbé with orders to support the infantry assault. Crabbé had deployed his four (possibly five) squadrons in column and now sent a large portion of his force directly at the Lüneburg infantry. While officers and sergeants shouted vainly to form square, disorder rapidly set in and the infantry scattered as the cavalry closed upon them, most fleeing for the ridge hoping to gain the safety of their own lines.

Baring also tried to prevent their flight and deal with the withdrawal of his own men simultaneously. He recalled: ‘My voice, unknown to them, and also not sufficiently penetrating, was, notwithstanding all my exertions, unequal to halt and collect my men together …’. The armoured cavalrymen charged into the infantry, cutting many of them down with their long heavy swords. Von Klencke was killed and his battalion was completely dispersed. It took such heavy losses that it played no further role in the battle. Baring’s riflemen also lost a number of men as they fled back within the farm and the action became so confused that many mingled with the attacking French infantry as they desperately sought cover within the buildings.

Fighting at the gate before La Haye Sainte. (W B Wollen)

It proved unnecessary for Crabbé to use all his cavalry (about 500 sabres) to destroy the Lüneburgers and at least 2 squadrons crested the ridge to the consternation of the battalions formed on the reverse slope, who immediately formed square. However, with British cavalry coming up, the French swiftly withdrew. One squadron rode back through Ross’s Battery and, although the gunners ran for the shelter of nearby infantry squares, many artillerymen were cut down as the cuirassiers retired back into the valley.

At the front of the farmhouse, Lieutenant Graeme’s men fired on the advancing infantry from the abatis (barrier) thrown across the highway but retired as the assault columns engaged in d’Erlon’s attack on the ridge began to draw level with their position. ‘When close upon us we entered the farm, and closed the gates, and poured a constant fire on their Columns as they passed us, and even until they were up on the crest of the British position …’. The long range of the Baker Rifle used by the KGL allowed them to inflict some loss and disruption on the men of Donzelot’s column. Indeed, the formation was so large that even muskets would have had some effect at this range. The garrison received some supporting fire from the three companies of riflemen manning the gravel pit over the highway. The range of their weapons meant they were capable of hitting French infantry advancing along the road next to the orchard.

Having defended the barn for some time, Lindau now joined the defenders of the courtyard and fired through a loophole at the French infantry on the highway. They were trying to break down the main gate and he recorded that they: ‘stood so closely packed here that several times I saw three or four enemy fall by one bullet’. Baring recalled similar incidences and would afterwards claim proudly that the garrison made almost every shot count.

When d’Erlon’s attack on the ridge was repulsed and pursued by the Household and Union brigades, Graeme opened one side of the main gate and mounted a bayonet charge against the infantry falling back along the road. In the wake of this assault, he remembered: ‘The ground was literally covered with French killed and wounded …’. Lindau joined this sally with Graeme and saw cavalry of the Household Brigade escorting hundreds of French prisoners to the rear as they returned. The defenders now benefited from an hour’s respite as a lull in the fighting ensued on their part of the battlefield. Nevertheless, the orchard remained in French hands and skirmishers there still subjected the garrison to intermittent sniping.

RIFLEMAN FRIEDRICH LINDAU KGL

Georg Friedrich Lindau was born in Hamelin in 1788. After Prussia’s defeat in 1806, his native state of Hanover became part of the Kingdom of Westphalia (a French satellite state). Lindau was a wild lad and, against the wishes of his parents who wanted him to pursue a trade, fled from Germany hoping to fight in British service. Subsequently he enlisted in the King’s German Legion in 1809. He fought in the Peninsula and during the invasion of France, fighting at Albuera, Badajoz, Salamanca, Vitoria, San Sebastien, Nivelle and Nive.

Lindau was a hard man who relished combat and enjoyed skirmishing, with his memoirs conveying an open and occasionally disturbing candour about life in the ranks. While on leave, he killed a man in a pub brawl and was placed under arrest for murder. As he was escorted under guard, an officer threatened him saying: ‘that I would see that six men had loaded, if I looked about to run away, the six bullets would be sent after me. I replied that I did not think much of six bullets, many had already whistled past my ears.’ As he was a popular and experienced soldier and very useful to the regiment, his officers ensured that the case never came to trial.

He was highly commended for his role in the defence of La Haye Sainte and Major Baring recalled Lindau’s words when he suggested he should retire and seek treatment for a severe wound: ‘He would be a scoundrel that deserted you, so long as his head is upon his shoulders.’ In addition to the Waterloo Medal, Lindau was awarded the Guelphic Medal having displayed great bravery at the siege of San Sebastien and at La Haye Sainte.

HOLDING OUT – THE SECOND ASSAULT – 3.00–5.00PM

The garrison watched a multitude of cavalry sweep past to their west during Ney’s attack. Most were too far away for them to fire upon effectively and Baring did not wish to waste powder or bullets admitting: ‘my greatest anxiety was respecting the ammunition, which, I found, in consequence of the continued fire, had been reduced more than one half’. The French infantry now renewed their assault and, despite receiving a withering fire from the farm as they issued from the orchard, advanced close to its walls. Laying down a heavy fire against any defenders who showed themselves above the walls or at the loopholes, they concentrated on trying to break down doorways and gates.

Baring was also concerned about the huge numbers of cavalry who, although largely concentrated to the north and west of the farm, also rode round the eastern side to reform as charges were repulsed on the ridge. He realized that his line of retreat was cut off and, if the stronghold fell, the entire garrison was likely to be killed or captured, as very few men would make it back up the ridge behind them. Occasionally, the riflemen fired upon the cavalry as they rode past but Baring wrote that this sporadic fire failed to discourage them during their fanatical assaults upon the ridge.

Posted in the courtyard to defend the main gate, Lindau stated that: ‘We soon ran short of cartridges, so that as soon as one of our men fell we immediately went through his pockets.’ Baring sent repeated requests for more ammunition back to his brigade but none was forthcoming. However, reinforcements were sent, Captain Christian von Wurmb leading a light company from the 5th Line Battalion KGL down to their assistance, who were armed with muskets rather than rifles. Coming under heavy fire as they did so, Wurmb was killed by a roundshot but most of his men made it into La Haye Sainte.

The courtyard of La Haye Sainte where a vicious close-quarter fight took place once the French gained entry.

Graeme’s men in the courtyard were under heavy pressure and he later wrote: ‘They never tried to escalade, and we kept them off the great gate by firing from the piggery (where I was placed most of the day), although the abatis served them for cover unfortunately.’ The French were crawling up to the wall in places to fire through the garrison’s own loopholes and any man who showed himself above the wall to fire down at them drew a hail of shots from outside. Lindau was one of about twelve men on the piggery roof firing over the wall and received a musket ball through the back of the head while he did so. It was a serious wound but his comrades doused his scalp with brandy and bandaged it. At least two officers told him to go back for proper treatment but he responded: ‘No … so long as I can stand I stay at my post’.

The French were so close to the farm that several men had their rifles grabbed as they fired through the loopholes or over the walls by attackers who tried to wrest their weapons from them. A hail of musketry was fired through these apertures and the defenders were forced back from them several times and had to wait for this fire to slacken before trying to regain their positions. During this assault, the French set fire to the great barn and Graeme reflected it was lucky for the garrison that the straw it recently contained had been plundered by the garrison for bedding during the night.

Although no ammunition had arrived, about 150 men from the light company of the 1/2nd Nassau Regiment were dispatched from the ridge to reinforce them. These men carried muskets rather than rifles so redistributing their ammunition would do the riflemen no good (the Baker Rifle having a smaller calibre than the India pattern musket). Nonetheless, additional defenders were welcome and Baring was particularly pleased that many of the men carried camp kettles. Using these, he swiftly organized efforts to draw water from the farm’s pond to douse the fires on the barn’s roof.

As the French cavalry assaults on the ridge began to slacken from 4.30pm onwards, the intensity of the infantry assaults against La Haye Sainte also lessened. Taking stock, Baring was horrified to learn that his men were down to three or four cartridges per man (having started the engagement with around sixty cartridges in their cartouches). He had appealed for cartridges at least five times, virtually begging to be re-supplied, and resorted to plain language in his last dispatch stating that the farmhouse would fall if he did not receive further rifle ammunition.

SEIZE AT ALL COSTS!

La Haye Sainte lies about 250yd (228m) from the ridge crest in the centre of the Anglo-Allied positions. Since Napoleon had decided to assault this position with a series of frontal assaults, holding it was crucial for Wellington’s defence. From his point of view, the French were obliged to give the stronghold a wide berth or endure the garrison’s fire on their flanks, which also effectively funnelled their attacks towards either side of his centre. As far as the French were concerned, if they seized the farmstead, they would not only weaken the Anglo-Allied line but would be able to concentrate for new attacks in positions far closer to Wellington’s centre. Possession of such a base would greatly improve their chances of carrying the ridge.

Napoleon was exasperated over losing two valuable hours during the futile and costly cavalry attack. Nonetheless, he judged that the Anglo-Allied Army must be significantly weaker after suffering a series of attacks and bombardments that day. With the Prussians arriving in increasing strength, he needed either to break through swiftly or order a general retreat. He decided that it was all or nothing and ordered Ney to seize the farmhouse at all costs. It was the key to the Allied line and, once taken, would allow him to commit his reserves and destroy Wellington’s centre.

This time there would be no mistake and Ney committed Colonel Gourgeon with three battalions of the elite 13th Légère from Donzelot’s 2nd Infantry Division, Pégot’s relatively fresh brigade from Durutte’s 4th Infantry Division and a company of the 2/1st Engineers to assault La Haye Sainte. Artillery now opened fire upon the ridge above the farm to cover the assault and cavalry moved forward to protect the infantry against potential counter-attack.

COLONEL BARON VON OMPTEDA

Ompteda was born in Hanover in 1765 and previously served in the Hanoverian Guards before transferring to the British Army and taking a commission with the King’s German Legion in 1807. He suffered a mental breakdown in 1811 and briefly convalesced in Germany before recovering and returning to fight under Wellington’s command in the Peninsula the following year.

Ordered to recapture La Haye Sainte, he objected vociferously but was denied the option of advancing in square or in a line four-men deep to protect his men against the counter-attack by French cavalry that he believed was inevitable. Realizing that he stood little chance of success and fearing the worst, Ompteda asked Lieutenant Colonel Baron von Linsingen of the 5th Line to look after his two young nephews (who served under him as junior officers). Linsingen had his horse shot from under him and struggled to extricate himself during the melee but survived and managed to keep his word. However, the 5th Battalion lost around a third of their strength.

Ompteda led his men forward on horseback and when the cuirassiers rode into his battalions plainly saw that all was lost. He rode forward alone, jumping the garden hedge and charging into the midst of the French infantry there. Captain Berger reported seeing French officers shouting at their men to spare him and striking up the barrels of muskets levelled at him: ‘the nearest French officer looked on in admiration without attempting to check the attack’. Yet, this gallant officer refused to surrender, striking down at the men ringing him in with his sword, and eventually received a shot through the throat that killed him instantly.

LA HAYE SAINTE FALLS – 5.00PM–6.30PM

The infantry assault recommenced with renewed fury as Durutte’s men tried to force their way into the buildings. Hearing the Germans within crying out desperately for more cartridges to each other and realizing that their volume of fire had diminished, they pressed forward with increasing boldness right up to the walls. The barn was set alight once more and Graeme recalled that: ‘Lieutenant Carey, in spite of the enemy’s fire, went out, and with his men, poured water on the flames.’

Tirailleurs clambered onto the walls and the roofs of the barn and stables to fire down on the men below, most of whom were unable to shoot back (having run out of ammunition) and were shot or forced under cover. The French now stormed all the gates and doors simultaneously trying to smash their way in and, surrounded on three sides, the farm seemed about to be swamped by a great wave of attackers. Lieutenant Vieux of the engineers: ‘struck with heavy blows of the axe upon the gate. He received one ball in the wrist and another in the shoulder. The axe was passed from hand to hand, the gate finally yielded, and the wave inundated the court.’

During this combined assault, the west yard door was broken down and French infantry charged into the courtyard. They also mounted a bayonet charge and rushed through the open gateway of the great barn, overwhelming the men defending it. As the French entered the courtyard from two directions, French voltigeurs also struggled over the courtyard walls and a vicious fight developed as the two sides crossed bayonets. Standing on the piggery as men below him scaled the wall, Lindau ran a soldier through with his sword bayonet, bending it during his struggle to withdraw it as it became trapped in the unfortunate man’s chest. Forced back as more men clambered over the wall, he witnessed:

At the entry to the farmhouse I saw my captain fighting hand to hand with the French. One of them was about to shoot Ensign Frank but Captain Graeme stabbed him with a sword through his body, another he struck in the face. I wanted to rush to help, but then I found myself suddenly surrounded by the French. Now I used the butt of my rifle and hit out in all directions around me …

A photograph of La Haye Sainte today from its south-east corner.

With his defences breached in several places, Baring felt compelled to abandon La Haye Sainte and later lamented that: ‘Inexpressibly painful as the decision was of giving up the place, my feeling of duty as a man overcame that of honour, and I gave the order to retire through the house into the garden.’

Having mounted three costly assaults, the French infantry were enraged after losing so many comrades. The passageways in the farm were very narrow and many German soldiers were overtaken by their pursuers as they fled through them: ‘who vented their fury upon them in the lowest abuse, and the most brutal treatment’. The cry went up to give no quarter to ‘les coquins verde!’ (‘the rascals in green’) and many were mercilessly shot at point-blank range, bayoneted or clubbed to death with musket butts as the French hunted them down.

Towards the end of the furious melee in the courtyard, Lindau was among a group of riflemen taken prisoner and recalled that they received rough treatment from their captors. As they were marched back towards the French ridge, most were searched and had their valuables stripped from them. Those who failed to move quickly enough for their guards were beaten or even killed.

Since farm buildings now in French hands closely overlooked it, Baring swiftly realized that defending the garden was untenable. He ordered his men to retire one at a time back towards the ridge and was amazed that the enemy declined to fire upon them as they did so. The major told the men from other regiments to seek out their own brigades and formed the remnant of his 2nd Battalion upon two companies of Lieutenant Colonel Lewis von dem Bussche’s Battalion. Only 42 men out of the nearly 400-strong garrison remained with him. After hours of desperate fighting, the farmhouse had fallen to the French at around 6.30pm.

DISASTROUS COUNTER-ATTACK

The fall of La Haye Sainte was a blow to the Allies and, being in French hands, it posed a grave threat to Wellington’s central positions. General von Alten (who commanded the 3rd Division) ordered Colonel Ompteda to counter-attack and attempt to retake the farm. Ompteda objected to this, pointing out that the buildings were held in considerable strength and at least two regiments of enemy cavalry covered the infantry assault and remained to the south-west of the farm. Alten repeated the order but the Prince of Orange then rode up and entered the discussion. Accounts vary but many believe that the Prince mistook the cavalry for Dutch troops and promptly endorsed Alten’s instructions, insisting: ‘I will hear no further arguments.’ Ompteda considered this foolhardy but felt obliged to obey, declaring angrily: ‘Then I will!’ and rode away to organize the attack, which took place at around 6.45pm.

Ompteda led the 5th KGL Line Battalion down from the ridge, driving in the enemy skirmishers before them who had advanced up the slope to snipe at the infantry formations on the ridge. French infantry were deployed in and before the garden and began to fire upon them as they approached. The Germans charged but two regiments of French cuirassiers, having observed their advance, immediately counter-attacked just as Ompteda had predicted.

Lieutenant Kincaid of the 95th Foot watched the slaughter from the crest and bluntly recorded that: ‘the cuirassiers broke in among them, and so complete was the surprise that they were annihilated almost without firing a shot’. Assailed from the flank and rear while they were charging, the 5th Battalion suffered horrific casualties as the cavalry wrought a terrible revenge for the losses they had endured that day. One of their colours was captured and Ompteda fell in the desperate melee that ensued. The effective loss of a battalion left a gap in the Anglo-Allied line that Wellington struggled to fill as repeated attacks had thinned their numbers considerably.

As the farm complex and its garden were firmly occupied by the French, they were able to make a determined attack across the road on the gravel pit. This forced the 95th to fall back from their position for a while. The French also sent skirmishers directly to the north of the farm, who advanced up the ridge. Although the battalions there sent out their own skirmishers to oppose them, the French dispatched voltigeurs in considerable numbers and soon forced them back, allowing them to fire upon the main battalions deployed on the reverse slope. Ney also ordered guns forward and a battery of horse artillery unlimbered three cannon very close to the farm. Beginning to fire upon the crossroads and Wellington’s centre from a distance of around 218yd (200m) these guns soon inflicted grievous losses.

A PYRRHIC VICTORY

Captain James Shaw-Kennedy (who served as Alten’s Assistant Quarter Master General) believed that Wellington’s greatest mistake at Waterloo: ‘was his overlooking the vast importance of retaining possession, at any cost, of the farm and enclosures of La Haye Sainte’. He added that the Duke admitted as much to Lord Ellesmere some time afterwards and its loss was certainly a considerable blow to him. Shaw-Kennedy also believed that Napoleon recognized the farm’s importance from the outset having: ‘from the first seen the vast importance of his possessing himself of this part of Wellington’s field of battle, as is proved by his massing so very large a force immediately opposite to it, and by his establishing a battery of 74 guns to bear upon it’.

While there is much truth to this, it has never been satisfactorily explained why the Grande Batterie failed to train guns against the farm walls and buildings. The slight rise and orchard before the farm obstructed their view and prevented direct fire but, since the orchard has been felled, it is now impossible to assess its effect with any accuracy. Notwithstanding, guns could have been brought closer on either side to support the assaults or batter down walls or gates. Although the French may have wished to seize the structure intact, Napoleon knew that he was running out of time and artillery fire would certainly have hastened its fall. Perhaps these failures go some way to explaining that, while there are many British and German accounts of the defence, there are no memoirs from any French participants of the assaults on La Haye Sainte. Considering the fame of the action and the fact that it prepared the ground for the even more famous attack of the Imperial Guard, this omission is mystifying.

La Haye Sainte after the battle.

There are many theories about the Allied failure to resupply La Haye Sainte’s garrison with ammunition. Historian Christopher Summerville makes the point that Baring should have ensured that he had a surplus before the battle began. As he had occupied the farm on the night of 17 June and had most of the morning to prepare, he certainly had time to do so. Some believe that the wrong kind of ammunition was sent, being the 0.760in calibre intended for use in muskets rather than the 0.615in ball used by the Baker Rifle. Yet, William Siborne came up with the most plausible explanation that the cart containing the bulk of the 2nd Light Battalion’s ammunition overturned in a ditch during the retreat from Quatre Bras and that rifle ammunition was consequently in very short supply.

The physical difficulties of resupplying the farm, while under heavy fire, also bear consideration. Its main entrances lie towards the southern end of La Haye Sainte and gaining access during the repeated harassment of the garrison was difficult if not impossible. Dragging a cart over a planted field and through the hedged kitchen garden presented difficulties and the door on the northern side was narrow. Wellington later recalled discussing the possibility of making large holes in this side of the farm, enabling ammunition to be passed through to its defenders by hand but left the execution of this task to subordinates. Admittedly, with his entire line under great strain at this time he had other concerns, adding: ‘it was impossible for me to think of everything’.

The garrison, however, did manage to hold out for many hours against fearsome odds. Their numbers never exceeded much more than 800 men, including the reinforcements dispatched to them. In contrast, the French committed some 7,000 men, drawn from 13 battalions, during their attempts to seize the farmhouse. With a 765yd (700m) perimeter, it is likely that only about 2,000 men were able to storm the complex at any one time during the 3 main assaults but Baring’s men still faced odds of at least 4 : 1. The accepted military formula for an attacker to stand a good chance of taking a well-defended position is 3 : 1. These figures provide ample testimony to the heroic endurance and tenacity of the German troops.

After the battle, when men returned to their colours and casualty figures were drawn up, the 2nd Light Battalion of the King’s German Legion recorded the loss of 202 men. While perhaps not as drastic as the forty-two men left under Baring’s command after the loss of the farm implies, this still represented over 50 per cent losses. Around 400 reinforcements also entered the farm itself and only 200 to 250 of them returned to their regiments. Nevertheless, according to Mark Adkin’s figures, the farm absorbed the attention of around 7,000 French soldiers at various stages in the battle. As French casualty figures for the 1815 campaign are incomplete, their losses can only be estimated. However, considering the defensive advantages that this well-built farm enjoyed, the French probably lost at least double the number of the casualties sustained by its garrison during a series of attacks over a 5-hour period.

Historian David Chandler cited 6.00pm as the moment when Wellington’s line came under the greatest strain during the battle. Ney now made up for his previous mistakes by mounting a determined assault with combined arms that had brought results. With the farm in French hands, d’Erlon’s I Corps advanced again and began to engage the Anglo-Allied line on their left, though it was not the force it had been before. Yet the troops on Wellington’s left flank had suffered too with their numbers thinned considerably by incessant cannonades during the day. However, Ney knew he lacked sufficent troops to break through and sent a dispatch to Napoleon, suggesting that he attack immediately to exploit his gains.

The Emperor watched from the ridge and witnesses reported him pacing up and down, hands clasped behind his back with his head inclined downwards. Severe fighting had broken out in Placenoit as the Prussians contested possession of the village with his Young Guard and he needed to relieve some of this pressure on his right flank before he could move against Wellington. When Colonel Heymes rode up with Ney’s desperate plea for reinforcement, Napoleon glowered at him, retorting sarcastically: ‘Troops? Where do you expect me to get them from? Do you expect me to make some?’

Napoleon has received great criticism for failing to attack at this point and, in truth, the weakened Anglo-Allied centre may well have shattered if he had done so with sufficient force. Yet any forward manoeuvre he made would be compromised as an attacking force would have its right flank exposed to a potential Prussian attack. Napoleon knew that he must secure his right flank before committing more troops to taking Wellington’s centre and was correct to delay until he was sure it would hold. While he waited for his Imperial Guard to do this, another opportunity for the French gradually slipped away.

Viewpoints

LA HAYE SAINTE FARMHOUSE AND ITS MEMORIALS (LOCATION MAP REFERENCE 5)

The name of La Haye Sainte (also spelt La Haie Sainte) translates as ‘The Sacred Hedge’ in English and it is grimly ironic that such carnage occurred at a place with such an innocuous sounding name. The farm rests in a hollow just at the foot of the ridge and this feature, along with the hedged orchard that used to lie before it, probably spared the farm from a ruinous cannonade that could have rendered further defence untenable. The farm suffered relatively little structural damage during the battle. The great barn’s roof was set alight but its walls did not suffer irreparable harm and, although a similar calamity followed in 1936 due to an accidental fire, its walls remain much as they appeared in 1815.

This orchard to the south was felled years ago but some new trees have been planted next to the farm where it once stood. In 1815, a pond lay to the left of the main gate inside the courtyard but subsequent farmers thought it obstructed access to the courtyard and filled it in. Most accounts suggest that it was a fairly deep pool and its position could not have been better when the barn was set alight and the garrison drew water from it to quench the flames. Without this water, La Haye Sainte may have fallen to the French assault far sooner.

The kitchen garden is walled on its eastern side with hedges to the north and west that follow similar boundaries to those that existed during the nineteenth century. During the intervening years, one farmer broke down the south-east corner of the courtyard wall (next to the main gate) to allow greater vehicular access to the courtyard. This has since been rebuilt, probably due to the inconvenient numbers of battlefield tourists crossing the highway and entering the courtyard, but this also had the effect of restoring the farm’s frontage to its former appearance. Outbuildings such as the piggery still exist and La Haye Sainte still looks very similar to how it appeared in 1815.

The gravel pit where three companies of the 95th were stationed used to lie about 54yd (50m) north of the farm on the other side of the highway. The pit has been filled in and the area is lined with trees, providing visitors with a quiet space where they can view the monuments around Wellington’s crossroads. The riflemen posted in this area would have had a good view of the French columns as they began to climb the ridge and it was a natural defensive position. Furthermore, they had a clear view down the highway and the main gate where so much fighting took place was well within range of their Baker Rifles. In addition to the garrison’s fire, riflemen here were able to inflict considerable losses on French infantry advancing along the road and probably levelled a lethal fire against those trying to break in through the gate.

The famous gate of La Haye Sainte, which was the scene of vicious fighting as the French fought to gain entry to the courtyard.

The main gateway has not changed much since 1815, and enthusiasts will probably recognize it and the general frontage of the farmstead from the many famous battlefield paintings that usually show La Haye Sainte from this angle. It still has a roofed dovecote above the gateway and high double doors, which are now seldom used. This is because the current farmer has created a more convenient access route to his property by constructing a dirt lane running down the ridge behind the farm from the Route du Lion. The farmer also knows that many tourists are incapable of resisting the temptation to enter the courtyard if he leaves this gate open. Although it is acceptable to cross the road and view the plaques set into the walls, it is unwise to trespass over the land at the side of the farm and the buildings are all private and closed to the public.

The main farmhouse has mullioned windows and dates back to the late eighteenth century. It is easy to see why Wellington decided to protect this area by giving the farm a strong garrison. In Cotton’s original guidebook of the battlefield, he referred to how strong the buildings were, being constructed of both brick and stone, which is still the case today. Yet he also recalled the limitations placed upon the garrison for strengthening its defences, writing: ‘A dozen loop-holes in the west or Lion side of the buildings would have added considerably to the strength of the post. Loop-holes were made in the south and east walls as well as in the roofs …’.

Today La Haye Sainte is whitewashed, just as it was two centuries ago but its frontage is often marred by the mud and exhaust fumes from the busy Brussels–Genappe highway that runs immediately in front of it. Nevertheless, a good number of Waterloo enthusiasts will wish to take numerous photographs of this acclaimed farmhouse, which has been depicted many times in paintings, wargaming models and film. Great care must be taken when crossing this thoroughfare but the local authorities have ensured that there is a pedestrian crossing point nearby and the pavements are relatively wide. It is inadvisable to park nearby, though, and visitors with cars will find it preferable to park in the Lion Village or near the crossroads and walk down to the farm.

Crossing the road, visitors will see a number of monuments set onto the eastern walls of La Haye Sainte. Originally, Prince George of Hanover, along with a group of Anglo-Hanoverian veterans, set a marble plaque here in 1822 to commemorate their compatriots’ valiant defence. This was replaced by a diamond-shaped, iron plaque in 1847, although the text remains the same. It is placed on the wall of the farmhouse itself and is written in German, which translates as:

The Officers of the 2nd Light Battalion King’s German Legion to their comrades-in-arms who fell in the defence of this farmhouse on the 18 June 1815: Major H. Boswiel/Captain W. Schaumann/Ensign F von Robertson and 46 NCOs and Riflemen of the 2nd Light Battalion/Raised again by his Royal Highness Crown Prince George of Hanover on 18th June 1847 dedicated at the same time to those who also fell: Captain H von Marschalk from the 1st Light Battalion/Captain von Wurme from the 5th Line Battalion/In recognition of the Hanoverian heroism they showed.

In 1998, a further memorial was dedicated to the King’s German Legion, which includes a tribute to Colonel Ompteda’s valiant but doomed counter-attack. This was placed on the kitchen-garden wall next to the road and reads: ‘To Major Baring and the 2nd Light Btn KGL’s heroic defence of La Haie Sainte 18 June 1815/Also to Col. von Ompteda who fell leading a brave counter-attack after the fall of the farm. Dedicated by Bexhill-on-Sea England/A King’s German Legion Garrison 1804–14’. The English inscription is repeated underneath in German.

The English village, then known simply as Bexhill, was home to the KGL between 1804 and 1814. The regiment was well behaved and popular among the locals who benefited from the trade they brought them. The Legion was disbanded in Osnabrück in 1816, whereupon its association with England ended but the Bexhill Hanoverian Study Group (formed in 1989) were instrumental in dedicating this monument to their former guests, who have never been forgotten.

Two French monuments are set into the wall on the right of the gate and dovecote. The left-hand plaque reads:

18 June 1815. Towards 6.30pm the farm of La Haie Sainte was captured by Marshal Ney after heroic assaults by engineers of the 2nd Company, 2nd Battalion of the 1st Engineer Regiment under Colonel Lamore, and the 2/13 Light Infantry Regiment of Donzelot’s division.

One of the French memorials placed upon La Haye Sainte commemorating the French infantry and engineers who assaulted the farm on Ney’s orders.

To the right of this is another, smaller plaque, which simply states: ‘To the memory of the French soldiers who gave their lives heroically before these walls of La Haie Sainte, 18 June 1815’. All of the plaques on the farm walls can be safely viewed and photographed from the pavement and it is humbling to think how many men gave their lives trying to take or defend this farm that, by an accident of history, became a focal point of Europe’s most famous battle.

Another memorial stands in the modern picnic area across the road from La Haye Sainte’s garden commemorating the action fought by the 8th Ligne Regiment who, along with the 29th Ligne, were deployed by Ney during his attempts to follow up and exploit his gains after the fall of La Haye Sainte. They clashed with Ompteda’s Brigade and the French-language plaque reads: ‘Near this place on 18 June 1815 the 8th Infantry Regiment from Durutte’s divison successfully attacked the German Legion under Colonel von Ompteda’.

MEMORIAL TO THE 27TH (INNISKILLING) REGIMENT

The memorial to the 27th Regiment of Foot is situated on the Rue de la Croix near the junction between the Chemin d’Ohain and the Brussels–Charleroi highway (N5). The 27th was held in reserve until about 3.00pm and saw serious action when La Haye Sainte fell to the enemy. They deployed in square very near the crossroads, not to repel cavalry, but to enable them to fire both forward and to their left onto the highway as infantry from both directions closely assailed them. Unfortunately, this made them a prime target for both skirmishers and artillery and they suffered great losses accordingly, as this plaque recalls:

In memory of the heroic stand by the 27th (Inniskilling) Regiment of Foot at the Battle of Waterloo on 18th June 1815 when, of the 747 officers and men of the Regiment who joined the battle 493 were killed or wounded. A noble record of stubborn endurance. Of them the Duke of Wellington said, ‘Ah, they saved the centre of my line’ erected by their successors the Royal Irish Rangers (27th (Inniskillings) 83rd, 87th) 18 June 1990.

The stone recording the stand of the British 27th (Inninskilling) Regiment of Foot who endured terrible losses defending this area.

It is rare for a military unit to sustain such casualties (66 per cent losses) without breaking. The 27th was also the only battalion entering combat here under the command of a captain (John Hare) who held a brevet rank of major. Sixteen of its nineteen officers became casualties and some companies fell under the command of sergeants by the end of that terrible day.

MEMORIAL TO THE BELGIANS (LOCATION MAP REFERENCE 2)

This monument is located at the north-east angle of the crossroads and commemorates the sacrifices made by Belgian troops on 18 June 1815. An estimated 4,200 Belgian troops were present at Waterloo under 4 generals. They suffered 1,200 casualties with General van Merlen slain that day and General Collaert subsequently dying of his wounds.

Planning for this monument began in 1911 and the Centenary Committee, which commissioned the architect Callewaerts to create it, intended to present the memorial to the public on 18 June 1915. The outbreak of the First World War disrupted this plan and the opening was brought forward to 13 September 1914, with many dignitaries attending the ceremony. The monument takes the form of a bluestone obelisk that carries a bronze image of a battle-torn standard with a Belgian coat of arms surrounded by laurels. The inscription is in French and Dutch and translates: ‘To the Belgians who died on XVIII June MDCCCXV while fighting for the defence of the flag and the honour of arms.’ Railings surround the memorial, some headed with representations of various weapons such as sabres, javelins, arrows, axes and maces.

THE HANOVERIAN MEMORIAL (LOCATION MAP REFERENCE 3)

The Hanoverian Memorial stands roughly opposite the Gordon Memorial in the crossroads area above La Haye Sainte. It is a large stone obelisk and is one of the earliest monuments raised to commemorate the Battle of Waterloo, being built in 1818. Officers who survived the battle, along with contributions from their regiments, paid for this memorial. Many soldiers from the German states served in the British Army, which was partly due to King George III reigning as the monarch of Hanover until Napoleon annexed that state in 1803. Hanover came under the dominion of the British Crown once again in 1814 and remained as such until Queen Victoria’s time.

The obelisk commemorating the Hanoverian soldiers who fell at Waterloo. It stands to the south of the crossroads opposite the Gordon Memorial.

The memorial has inscriptions on all four of its sides and forty-two Anglo-German officers are buried in the immediate vicinity. It is said to be placed over or near the site of an enormous mass grave containing as many as 4,000 men from both sides killed in this area along with several hundred horses slain in the battle. The names of officers killed who belonged to the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 5th and 8th Line Battalions in the King’s German Legion are listed on two sides of the monument but pride of place is allotted to Colonel Christian Baron Ompteda of the 5th Line Battalion and Colonel Charles du Plat of the 4th Line Battalion. The majority of these men fell during the attempts to support or retake La Haye Sainte, although many were undoubtedly killed defending the main line on the Allied centre right. It is a sobering thought that so many men are buried here having died in such a confined area.

Chapter 7

THE BATTLE OF WAVRE

Napoleon’s selection of Marshal Emmanuel Grouchy to command the right wing of his army was one of his more controversial decisions. As a hereditary aristocrat, Grouchy was used to wielding authority and had proved himself an able general. However, he had only recently received his promotion to Marshal of France and had never before commanded a whole army of combined arms. After spurning Murat’s services, Napoleon could still have appointed more experienced men like Davout or Suchet and his choice of Grouchy was probably dictated by political rather than military considerations. It is also interesting to speculate how events would have turned out if the fiery, impatient Ney had been dispatched after the Prussians rather than the methodical Grouchy, still new to this command and unsure of himself. Overall, considering how important it was for Napoleon to prevail in this campaign, his selection of this commander was a curious decision.

Denied permission to mount a pursuit until midday on 17 June, Grouchy began at a disadvantage as French cavalry scouts had lost contact with the enemy, permitting them a considerable head start. The French were further misled by the number of scattered units and deserters fleeing from Ligny, and their efforts to determine where the main body was headed cost valuable time with Grouchy heading northeast initially. Progress was slow because of muddy and saturated roads but by nightfall, his main force was approaching Gembloux. Yet his scouts had overlooked the presence of a Prussian cavalry outpost at Mont St Gilbert due to the heavy rains and it was not until 10.00pm that night that he learned that the Prussian Army was at Wavre.

Grouchy changed his plans according to this new intelligence. He wrote to inform the Emperor that he guessed the Prussians would remain at Wavre to regroup and would probably march towards Brussels the following morning. He deemed it unlikely that they would conduct a forced march over difficult terrain to re-establish their link with the Anglo-Allied Army after suffering a major defeat (a view shared by Napoleon). Nonetheless, his army was tired after conducting a long and difficult march, many of them having also fought at Ligny. Therefore, Vandamme’s III Corps did not set out until 6.00am on 18 June with Gérard’s IV Corps following 2 hours later.

By around 11.25am, Grouchy was at the village of Walhain-St Paul, just north of Gembloux, in conference with his generals and famously eating strawberries as a late breakfast. This minor detail has often been used to imply that Grouchy was in no hurry and was not taking his duties seriously, which is perhaps unfair. During this conference, the sound of massed cannon fire was heard from the west and they correctly surmised that Napoleon was fighting a serious engagement.

The Battle of Wavre – afternoon.

Marshal Grouchy who faced considerable difficulties in pursuing the Prussians after the Battle of Ligny.

General Valazé also presented a local man he had been using as a guide to the Marshal who told Grouchy that the fight was at Mont St Jean. ‘We should march to the sound of the cannon,’ Gérard suggested, a view supported by Valazé. Annoyed at this blunt statement in front of junior officers on his staff, Grouchy disagreed and reminded them of the Emperor’s orders. He added that Napoleon would hardly have given him this command if he anticipated needing these troops and that the lateness of the day, along with the poor state of the roads, meant that they would be unlikely to reach the conflict in time to intervene.

General Baltus agreed with his chief but others argued that Mont St Jean was only 16 miles (25.5km) away and Valazé’s command included sappers who could make the route more practicable. Once more, Gérard gratingly insisted: ‘Monsieur le Maréchal, it is your duty to march to the sound of the cannon.’ Irritated by Gérard’s tone, which verged upon insubordination, Grouchy replied coldly: ‘My duty is to execute the orders of the Emperor, which direct me to follow the Prussians; to follow your advice would be an infringement of his instructions.’ He then gave orders to continue the march on Wavre.

REARGUARD ACTION

Although Napoleon believed the Prussians to be a spent force after their defeat, the French failure to press their retreat allowed the Prussian Army to regain its cohesion. Blücher reformed his battered army on von Bülow’s IV Corps, which had arrived too late to take part in the fighting at Ligny and was relatively fresh.

He was determined to honour his promise to Wellington and bring at least two corps to his assistance. He ordered von Bülow, whose Corps lay around Dion le Mont 2 miles (3.2km) south-east of Wavre, to march at 4.00am. Bülow complied but had to march through the town itself, which was congested with troops from II Corps. A mill had also caught fire near the main bridge in the centre and this large conflagration delayed the march even further. Yet, once he had moved north of the town, IV Corps began to make steady progress. Bülow had around 9½miles (14km) to cover and eventually reached St Lambert at around 10.00am. He reached the Bois de Paris by 4.00pm and was poised to attack from there half an hour later but nearly turned around upon hearing heavy firing from Wavre’s direction.

The Prussians were aware that they were being pursued by a strong force and General Thielmann was ordered to defend Wavre and protect their rear for as long as possible with a force of 15,000 men. Prussian cavalry scouts believed Grouchy’s army was cavalry based and estimated their number at 20,000. In fact, Grouchy had 33,000 men (including 2 infantry corps) and possessed 96 guns in comparison to Thielmann’s 35 cannon. Thielmann established his headquarters in the Chateau of La Bawette and deployed his main force in and around Wavre. He placed the bulk of his reserves and cavalry, under Major General von Hobe, to the north of the town.

As Blücher began his march westward, confusion set in and the bulk of Thielmann’s 9th Brigade left with him, unaware that they were supposed to be part of the rearguard. In contrast, elements of Ziethen’s I Corps were left behind in the rush and the 19th infantry battalion along with three cavalry squadrons under von Stengel remained to guard the bridge at Limal village.

General Pirch’s II Corps set out at around midday with Ziethen’s I Corps following shortly thereafter. The march towards Mont St Jean proved very heavy going as their route lay over hills and through woods, which obstructed the passage of the artillery, particularly since much of the ground was still wet. Furthermore, the narrow roads were slow to travel over as the march of the preceding corps had churned their rutted and muddy surfaces even further. Yet Blücher’s indomitable spirit inspired the men who had been disheartened by their recent reverse, as one Landwehr officer recalled:

The firm bearing of the army owed not a little to the cheerful spirit and freshness of our seventy-four-year-old Field Marshal. He had had his bruised limbs bathed in brandy, and had helped himself to a large schnapps: and now, although riding must have been very painful, he rode alongside the troops, exchanging jokes and banter with many of them and his humour spread like wildfire down the columns.

Yet the Prussian command knew that their army was vulnerable on the march and feared it might be intercepted if the French pursuit bypassed Wavre. Their attempt to restore the link with the Anglo-Allied Army was therefore a brave but highly risky manoeuvre. Prince August of Thurn and Taxis (a Bavarian officer on the headquarters staff) wrote that their journey became harder as they approached their destination:

The terrain now began to get surprisingly difficult. There was a steep drop into the Lasne valley, and immediately after that, an equally steep rise on the other side. The path was very narrow and in a poor state. The defile delayed us for a very long time, and we had particular difficulty in bringing the artillery up the far height. A very small enemy detachment could have disputed its passage with us the whole day.

The encouragement Blücher gave to his troops raised morale, making the difficult march towards Wellington easier to endure.

GENERAL DOMINIQUE JOSEPHE RENE VANDAMME, 1770–1830

Lieutenant General Count Dominique Vandamme had an extensive career and reputedly joined the Royal Army in 1788 only to desert shortly afterwards. After the Revolution, he enlisted in the infantry in 1791 and served in the West Indies. He raised his own company of chasseurs in 1792 and was promoted général de brigade by 1793. However, he was suspended for looting in 1795 and similar accusations dogged him throughout his career. Bluntly spoken and aggressive, he was renowned for his fighting ability but was notoriously insubordinate. Only Bonaparte’s intense personality cowed him and gained his respect. He once admitted: ‘So it is that I who fear neither God nor the Devil, tremble like a child when I approach him.’

Vandamme saw extensive campaigning in Germany, the Netherlands and Spain. He was one of the two divisional commanders who led the decisive attack at Austerlitz in 1805 and was wounded at Wagram 1809. He commanded II and later VIII Corps during Napoleon’s invasion of Russia but was dismissed for brigandage, which was quite a feat in an army that permitted its soldiers to live off the land and often condoned looting.

Several administrative appointments followed, such as the governorships of Boulogne and Lille but Vandamme was accused of embezzlement during his tenure in these offices. He served under Davout during the 1813 campaign and many officers said that only this severe disciplinarian was capable of controlling him, albeit with some difficulty. Captured at Kulm 1813, he was questioned by the Tsar himself who accused him of looting only to receive the taunt: ‘At least I have never been accused of killing my father.’

Released in 1814, he was exiled from France by the Bourbons and hastened to rejoin Napoleon in 1815. Had it not been for his unsavoury reputation, Vandamme would have been raised into the marshalate but the Emperor recognized his value as a fighting soldier nonetheless. He had little respect for Grouchy and the decision to place him under his command was unwise and caused problems. His value as a soldier needed to be weighed against his frequent insubordination and lack of self-control. Napoleon’s verdict was revealing: ‘If I had two Vandammes, I would have one shot. But I have only one and I keep him for myself because I need him and I am unable to replace him.’

VANDAMME’S FOLLY

Wavre was a sizeable town with a large suburb stretching out to its south over the River Dyle that ran through it. There were partially wooded heights to the north and south and there were two stone bridges over the Dyle in Wavre, the largest of which was the Bridge of Christ. The Prussians barricaded both spans but encountered difficulty in finding the means of doing so at first as most townsfolk had fled, locking their doors as they did so. Nevertheless, they manhandled three wagons and a dozen large barrels onto the bridge to block it and the houses on the north bank of the Dyle were loopholed and garrisoned with at least a thousand light infantry and sharpshooters. Thielmann had artillery batteries placed on the northern bank between houses or on the heights north of of the town, well positioned to enfilade the approaches of the two bridges.

French skirmishers arrived on heights south of Wavre at around 3.00pm that afternoon. Although his cavalry had only carried out a brief reconnaissance, General Vandamme chose to attack immediately with his III Corps, without waiting for orders or mounting a preliminary bombardment. Vandamme resented Grouchy’s recent promotion, having coveted a marshal’s baton for years, and believed the appointment should have been his. Aware that talented rivals like Gérard might outstrip him, he hoped to impress the Emperor with a display of bravery and initiative. Historian Hyde Kelly believed that he may also have been motivated by the desire to move swiftly before the Prussians could elude them.

A French staff officer observing enemy positions. (Messonier)

By 3.30pm, the attack was under way and Generalmajor von Borcke’s 9th Brigade was swiftly driven back through the southern half of the town. Vandamme attacked using General Habert’s entire 10th Division consisting of battalions of the 22nd, 34th, 70th and 88th Ligne. They attacked in column and, after their skirmishers had cleared most of the enemy infantry out of the houses to the south, pressed on rapidly towards the bridges. Two horse artillery batteries of 12-pound cannon were brought up and, although eventually their fire proved effective, they drew fire from the Prussian guns and provided little support during the first attack until they were firmly established.

While approaching the bridges, French infantry were subjected to cannon fire and a devastating hail of musketry fired from the houses or behind hedges on the northern bank. During the attempt to storm the Bridge of Christ, the Prussians were able to sweep the approaches with musketry and fire into their attackers’ flanks as they charged on to it. Lieutenant General Berthezène cursed Vandamme’s recklessness by attacking prematurely, writing contemptuously:

He simply ordered Habert’s division to enter it [the town] in column. In spite of the murderous fire of the enemy, this column reached the bridge but when Habert was wounded, it retired in disorder … This stupid attack cost us five or six hundred men … Besides, the occupation of Wavre could have no influence on the outcome of the campaign.

The River Dyle at a point to the northeast of Wavre. The river was wider and less constrained by modern efforts to contain it in 1815. It was also swollen by heavy rainfall when Grouchy’s troops attempted to cross it.

They had rushed headlong into a well-prepared defence and suffered accordingly. Colonel Fantin des Odoards recalled that the bridge was heavily barricaded and that returning fire against men ensconced within houses had little effect. The French regrouped and tried to rush the bridges several times. The 70th Ligne suffered horrendous losses and Colonel Maury (already embarrassed by his regiment’s poor performance at Ligny) rallied them when they withdrew, brandishing the regiment’s Eagle standard and shouting: ‘What, rabble, you dishonoured me the day before yesterday and you offend me again today! Forward! Follow me!’ The gallant Colonel reached the barricade on the bridge but was shot down as he did so. Odoard claimed that Prussian infantry were reaching over the barricade to grasp the treasured standard and would have taken it if he had not led another bayonet charge with the 22nd and recovered it.

Thielmann had placed his reserves so that buildings running parallel with the river protected them. Every time his defensive front line suffered losses, he drew upon these forces for reinforcements. Grouchy arrived after the first attacks had been repulsed and soon realized that, without massive artillery support, frontal assaults were unlikely to succeed. He later described the French position here as being: ‘engulfed in a kind of cul-de-sac,’ adding that: ‘They crowned all the heights behind Wavre and extended towards Limal. Numerous artillery pieces defended this strong position at the foot of which runs the Dyle. The nature of the country hardly allowed me precisely to estimate the enemy numbers …’ Grouchy issued orders for the infantry to break into the houses along their side of the Dyle and cut loopholes in their northern sides. Firing from the cover of the houses, they were to exchange fire with Prussian light infantry occupying the buildings on the opposite bank.

The French knew that there were small wooden bridges at Bas-Wavre to the north-east and the villages of Limelette, Limal and Bierges. Fords existed but the river had risen so high during the recent weather that they were unusable. Therefore, Lieutenant General Exelmans was dispatched with eight regiments of dragoons to Bas-Wavre. Major von Bornstedt had two companies of the 1st Kurmark Landwehr here but was unable to blow this bridge up before the dragoons arrived. His men severely damaged the structure with picks and axes but the French attacked before they could destroy it. Nonetheless, the French deemed it incapable of bearing the weight of artillery in its current state and only made one serious attempt to seize it with Exelmans subsequently deploying men along the riverbank to skirmish with the Landwehr across the Dyle.

Grouchy decided that his best option was to engage the Prussians in and around Wavre by holding the line of the Dyle. He would then move further upriver and try to force a crossing in sufficient numbers to outflank the town’s defences.

WHAT A SOLDIER MUST KNOW

The village of Bierge lay further upriver where there was a small wooden bridge next to the mill of Bierge. The Prussians had placed a company of the 31st Infantry in the mill with the rest of their battalion along the riverbank and the surrounding area. This position was supported by further infantry along the riverbanks and artillery batteries to the south of the village. Lieutenant Baron Etienne Lefol’s Division attacked at this point but their first attempts to take the mill were driven off.

The Battle of Wavre – evening.

Gérard brought up more troops from IV Corps to support him but soon discovered why the position was so hard to approach. The meadows on the flood-plain were saturated after the rains and the river was swollen and had broken its banks in places. Staff officer Captain Thouvenin recalled that:

I was sent to reconnoitre the river above the mill occupied by the enemy … its width was about nine metres. Its parallel, low banks gave it the appearance of a miry canal. I pushed my horse in and I had water up to my waist. Captain Pellissier and his voltigeurs helped me to retrieve my horse.

It proved difficult to support the attack due to the flooded fields and ditches on either side of the bridge and when Hulot ordered men to throw themselves into the ditches and use them as cover if they could not leap them, they found they contained 4 or 5ft feet of water. As soldiers struggled through this marshy terrain, the Prussians unleashed a storm of musketry against them and Gérard, trying to organize the attack, was shot in the chest and carried from the field.

As Grouchy rode up to see how matters stood, he was astounded when General Baltus declined to mount another assault against the mill. Disgusted by this blunt refusal to obey orders, he dismounted and roared: ‘if a soldier can not make his subordinates obey him, he must know how to get himself killed!’. Drawing his sword, he led another bayonet charge against the mill under heavy fire, yet this attack eventually stalled and failed as before.

At around 5.00pm Grouchy received a dispatch written by Marshal Soult at Napoleon’s dictation. Sent at 1.00pm, it was a rambling and confusing message. Napoleon appeared to want Grouchy to both intercept Bülow’s Corps, which he now knew was approaching him, and simultaneously continue with his previous mission. Written in pencil, it was smudged and barely legible in places and its content was ambiguous at best. Only Soult’s postscript, reading: ‘the centre of the English army is at Mont St Jean, therefore manoeuvre to join our right flank’, was clear but failed to convey any sense of urgency.

Grouchy would later claim that he misread the line ‘la battaile est engage’ (‘battle is engaged’) as ‘la battaile est gagnée’ (‘the battle is gained’). Whether this was true or not, at 5.00pm Grouchy now had no chance of disengaging and reaching the field of Waterloo in time even if he had chosen to do so. He did not seem unduly alarmed by this message and probably thought that dealing with the matter in hand was his first priority. He may have been guilty of complacency or failing to read between the lines but, in fairness, he was in the middle of commanding a battle.

It was clear that crossing this well-defended bridge across waterlogged ground was going to be difficult if not impossible. Therefore, Grouchy marched most of IV Corps towards Limal, leaving some troops to maintain pressure in the area and occupy the Prussians. Houssaye speculates that, while Grouchy plainly intended to force the river at Limal and assail Wavre from that direction, he also meant to dispatch some of his force to assist the Emperor.

GENERAL JOHANN ADOLF FREIHERR VON THIELMANN, 1765–1824

Born in Dresden (Saxony) in 1765, Thielmann (also spelt Thielemann) enlisted with the French after his country became part of their Empire. During Napoleon’s invasion of Russia 1812, he commanded the 1st Brigade of the 7th Cuirassiers Division (part of IV Cavalry Corps) in the Grande Armée. At the Battle of Borodino, he led a charge of mostly Saxon and Polish cavalry against the Raevsky Redoubt, winning some renown, though some said that Napoleon denied him his just deserts in favour of French soldiers who took part in this action.

He commanded the garrison at Torgau in 1813 but defected to the Allies on 12 May that year when the tide began to turn against France. Commanding a force largely composed of Cossacks, he attacked and defeated General Lefebvre-Desnouëttes at Altenburg on 28 September while attempting to sever French communications between Leipzig and Erfurt.

He joined the Prussian Army in early 1815 and commanded the Prussian III Corps, which fought at Ligny on 16 June. Stationed on Blücher’s left wing, Thielmann’s corps was heavily engaged, suffering serious losses, but was selected as the army’s rearguard nevertheless. His successful action at Wavre was a considerable achievement as he held off a force double the size of his own for 20 hours, enabling Blücher to march to Wellington’s aid. Although Grouchy was eventually victorious, III Corps remained intact and Thielmann only carried out a temporary strategic withdrawal, permitting the French only 30 minutes of glory before they retreated themselves.

FORCING THE DYLE

Lieutenant General Count Claude Pajol was ordered to lead his command to the village of Limal and seize the bridge there if possible. He led the 4th and 5th cavalry and the 21st Infantry Battalion into attack almost as soon as he reached the area at around 7.00pm. Although a battalion of Prussian infantry was posted to defend the bridge, they were caught off guard when Pajol sent a cavalry charge straight over the span. Although the wooden bridge was only wide enough for four riders marching abreast to cross, General Vallin’s hussars rode right into the defenders and the speed and shock of their attack sent them reeling back into the village, where they attempted to regroup.

Although Stengel had occupied houses on the northern bank and laid down a heavy fire, Teste’s infantry swiftly followed up on the cavalry’s successful attack. They charged over and a fierce street fight ensued. After resisting for at least an hour, Stengel withdrew to heights north of Limal. Grouchy now had his breakthrough but as Houssaye commented: ‘The road to Mont Saint-Jean was open: but for a long time the cannon of the Emperor had been silent.’

Throughout the day, Thielmann feared that he would be overwhelmed or forced to retreat. Knowing that his task was vital to protect the whole army, he sent several dispatches to Blücher requesting reinforcements. By the time he received the first of these messages, the Field Marshal was poised to intervene on the field of Waterloo and remarked dismissively: ‘Not a horse’s tail shall he get.’ He knew that the outcome of the campaign depended on him reinforcing Wellington and he could not afford to support Thielmann, seeing the rearguard’s sole purpose as an action to buy him time. Gneisenau was starkly pragmatic, murmuring softly: ‘It doesn’t matter if he’s crushed as long as we gain the victory here.’

By 9.00pm, Grouchy had arrived at Limal and rapidly sent more men across the river. Fighting continued in Wavre until 11.00pm that night, although an artillery exchange designed to weaken the houses along the riverbanks, continued for some time afterward. The French had briefly seized the Bridge of Christ but were unable to force their way across and gain a foothold on the northern bank. During the artillery duel, a number of houses caught fire and many wounded perished inside them, being unable to escape the flames.

Marshal Blücher whose plan to re-establish the link with Wellington would only work if Thielmann managed to hold Grouchy’s forces at Wavre.

Thielmann hoped to contain the French bridgehead at Limal and Colonel von Stülpnagel was sent with most of the 12th Brigade and some of the reserves to try and restore the situation where: ‘I found Limal and the heights in front of it already occupied by the enemy and Stengel’s detachment retiring to these heights. The darkness prevented a judgement of the enemy’s strength. As Limal was an important position, I was of the firm belief that I should do everything to recapture it.’ Accordingly, he chose to attack under cover of darkness, hoping to surprise the French and drive them back across the river. He attacked with five battalions formed in two lines (two in front and three behind them). A large number of skirmishers preceded this attack and cavalry was placed at the rear to exploit any breakthrough.

However, the ground they fought over was uneven and seamed with ditches in many places. Second Lieutenant Mannkopff of the 31st Regiment later recalled that they soon encountered the enemy: ‘We advanced with our skirmishers out in front and a long and determined battle broke out with the enemy voltigeurs in the darkness and amid the man high corn that covered the fields.’ The two sides kept running into each other unexpectedly in the dark and close-range fire or brief and vicious bayonet fights ensued.

When the Prussians encountered a hollow lane, it was hotly contested by French skirmishers and proved such an obstacle that the second line of battalions was forced off course. Consequently, they were unable to support the first line and confusion set in. When the French sent cavalry forward, their attacks caused further disruption, and while Stengel’s cavalry charged on the Prussian right, the resulting clash was inconclusive. Realizing that the attack had hopelessly stalled, Stülpnagel called off the attempt against Limal and fell back.

The night attack had failed but the Prussians were determined to hang on to the territory they still held and the two forces bivouacked remarkably close to one another around Bierges and the Rixensart Forest. Lieutenant Wehmeyer of the 31st Infantry remembered that: ‘The outposts were standing so near to the enemy that every word could be heard. Many wounded men lay just in front of the line of outposts, or even among them, and their groaning could be heard all night. Enemy patrols clashed with us constantly.’

That night Grouchy heard an unconfirmed report that the Emperor was marching on Brussels, whereas Thielmann received rumours that the French had suffered a major defeat. In any case, both sides had no intention of withdrawing and meant to resume their offensives the next day.

RENEWED HOSTILITIES

During the night, Grouchy communicated with Vandamme in Wavre, asking him to recommence his attacks with III Corps on 19 June and occupy the Prussians there. This would prevent them making any manoeuvre against his right flank when he mounted a major attack that morning.

Although the report of Napoleon’s defeat was unconfirmed, it was enough to convince Thielmann to renew his assault on Limal on 19 June and he informed his troops, hoping the news would inspire them. This information also persuaded Stengel to march to rejoin I Corps but preparations for a counter-attack were put in motion. If this intelligence was correct, he believed that the enemy were about to withdraw and an attack would speed them on their way or even rout them. Viewing their lines through his spyglass, he believed that it was possible that the troops he could see might even be a rearguard and that they had already begun pulling out.

Accordingly, the Prussians commenced a heavy bombardment at 4.00am. This inflicted some damage and a roundshot actually cut down one of the sentries guarding Grouchy’s command tent. A cavalry attack was also sent forward, Colonel Marwitz leading the 8th Uhlans and two squadrons of the 6th Kurmark Landwehr Cavalry against French positions near Lamal, with the 5th and 7th Uhlans advancing on his left in support. However, the French had been preparing to attack themselves and their batteries immediately returned fire. A fearsome artillery exchange ensued and, having more guns, the French soon gained the upper hand, dismounting six Prussian cannon.

With its artillery outgunned, the Prussian cavalry was subjected to heavy cannon fire and rapidly withdrew. The Prussians now held a line stretching from Bierges to the woods of Rixensart with the village of Point du Jour in their centre. The French now began their offensive. Colonel Carl von Clausewitz (who later became famous as a military theorist) was the chief of staff for the Prussian III Corps. He observed: ‘At first light, the first cannon shots fell, fired from a range of just 500 paces. A determined battle developed, in which the French moved their four divisions methodically forward, covered by a strong line of skirmishers.’

Grouchy was attacking with infantry drawn mostly from IV Corps and advanced all along the Prussian line from Bierges to the woods. Mannkopff was now in command of a skirmish line on the edge of the Rixensart Forest; he sheltered under the cover of the trees and observed:

At daybreak the edge of the wood facing the enemy filled with our entire force of skirmishers, while the battalion columns formed up in support to our rear in the forest. We had hardly deployed in this fashion when some French voltigeurs, who had very skilfully crawled up to us unseen in the tall corn, opened a superior fire on us.

The Prussian skirmishers fell back as the French battalions came up and these soon entered the woods and began to exchange volleys with the Prussian infantry. Captain Charles François of the 30th Ligne was disconcerted by the kind of insults the enemy taunted them with during this firefight. ‘Come with us, brave Frenchmen! You no longer have an army. Napoleon is dead!’ they yelled.

Vandamme, perhaps smarting at the criticism he had received for his unauthorized and fruitless assault the previous day, renewed hostilities slowly and with little enthusiasm. Yet it made little difference as the French enjoyed a numerical advantage and IV Corp’s attack swiftly carried all before it. The enemy was forced out of the Rixensart Forest and General Teste’s attack succeeded in capturing Bierge. As the key to the Prussian line, the fall of Bierge left a yawning gap, meaning that Thielmann’s line of retreat was in danger of being cut off.

Accounts vary over when Thielmann received confirmation of Napoleon’s defeat. Some say that it arrived as early as 6.00am but he had certainly heard by 9.00am that morning. He now knew that Pirch was leading II Corps to reinforce him but also that they were some distance away. Consequently, he decided to pull back to a third position at around 10.00am: ‘I decided to quit Wavre and fall back on the road to Louvain. The Reserve Cavalry covered this manoeuvre and the corps fell back … towards St-Agatha-Rode, two hours from Wavre … Here, we took up positions on the left bank of the Dyle with our outposts in Ottenburg.’ St-Agatha-Rode lies about 5 miles (8km) north of Wavre and Thielmann added that, once they began to withdraw, they suffered few losses as the French failed to press their advantage. Moving slowly across the abandoned bridges into the north half of Wavre, Vandamme encountered little resistance. Marching beyond the town, he encountered two battalions of the 4th Kurmark Landwehr, supported by cavalry, who stood their ground to exchange fire with his infantry. The French began to bring up reinforcements to attack this small rearguard but halted their preparations when they received news of Napoleon’s defeat.

NEWS FROM WATERLOO

Grouchy finally received confirmation that Napoleon had suffered a terrible defeat at around 10.30am, just as he was about to exploit his victory at Wavre. The officer who brought the news was so exhausted that Grouchy thought him drunk or mad at first. Yet this intelligence was soon confirmed and he immediately called off the pursuit he had sent after Thielmann. His cavalry also brought news that the Prussian II Corps was approaching, which would outnumber his army once it combined with Thielmann’s III Corps. Accordingly, he ordered a general retreat and moved his army back over the Dyle.

Fighting was intense at Wavre with the Prussians recording 2,467 killed, wounded or missing. French figures are harder to ascertain but are estimated in the region of 2,500 casualties. Thielmann held out for a long time against odds of 2 : 1. He made excellent use of the defensive features available to him and his men had fought courageously, resisting a series of ferocious attacks. Thielmann achieved all of his strategic aims, preventing his opponent from intercepting the march of the main army, which was invaluable for the Allies as a complete victory at Waterloo would have been unlikely without Prussian intervention. Had Thielmann’s defence crumbled, it was probable that Blücher would have been compelled to turn and face the threat to his rear and been unable to help Wellington. In the event, Thielmann’s impressive rearguard action permitted him to strike a devastating blow against Napoleon’s army. Despite being forced into retreat, III Corps remained intact and inflicted a similar number of casualties on a superior force as it had suffered in return.

From the French point of view, Grouchy had won a hollow victory rendered strategically irrelevant by Napoleon’s defeat. It is interesting to speculate over what would have happened if he had acted differently. Historians have often raised this question and the unfortunate Marshal is regularly blamed for the ultimate French defeat in 1815.

Had Grouchy turned west from Gembloux that morning it is possible that he may have intercepted Bülow’s Corps on the march and prevented the Prussians from reaching their destination. Even so, he would have had to cover around 16 miles (25.5km) to Chapelle-St Lambert over difficult terrain. This could have been acheived if he had crossed the Dyle at Mousty or Ottignies before he reached Wavre. Yet the dispatches he had received up to this point did not appear to be urgent and by the time he had proceeded past these bridges, it was certainly too late for him to overtake Bülow. Furthermore, he was torn between the desire to carry out Napoleon’s original orders or, by seizing the initiative, risk provoking one of the Corsican’s infamous rages. Ney had already felt the Emperor’s wrath during the campaign to his cost and Grouchy had no wish to make the same mistake.

As to the message that Grouchy received as late as 5.00pm, Soult was certainly at fault for sending a poorly phrased and ambiguous dispatch, which was the last thing an officer busily engaged in commanding a battle wants to see. Grouchy later apologized to his generals and staff for not acting differently but perhaps he judged himself too harshly. The undiplomatic conduct of his generals at the famous Gembloux conference was unhelpful and it is not surprising that they drew an adverse reaction from a commander already under some strain. Vandamme’s performance at Wavre also added to Grouchy’s difficulties and did little to help him.

By the time Soult’s message reached him, Thielmann’s III Corps lay between Grouchy and the main body of the Prussians. By displaying more aggression, he may have pushed Thielmann aside and assailed the Prussian rear forcing their army to turn and deal with him. Yet, considering the strength of the Prussian position, this is unlikely and Napoleon himself deserves the lion’s share of the blame for issuing Grouchy with vague instructions and trying to recall him once it was too late. Grouchy had been handicapped from the start when Napoleon delayed permission for a pursuit and it was the Emperor who had miscalculated when assessing the Prussian intent and capability. Consequently, Napoleon’s bitter remarks about Grouchy contributing to his defeat as he languished in exile on St Helena seem grossly unfair.

Viewpoints

Wavre rarely receives as much coverage as the other battles of the campaign and a visit there is often omitted from the itineraries of organized battlefield tours due to time constraints and the relatively small number of sites in its region compared to other 1815 battlefields. Notwithstanding this, the clash between Grouchy and Thielmann is an intriguing battle that is seldom written about and its outcome had a serious effect on events at Waterloo. Looking at the terrain in this area gives a good impression of the logistical difficulties that Grouchy and the Prussians faced in reaching their destinations and there are enough sites and monuments here to interest dedicated enthusiasts.

WALHAIN-ST PAUL AND EVILARD FARM

Marshal Grouchy reached the village of Walhain-St Paul at around 10.00pm on the night of 17 June and established his headquarters in the house of the local notary, Monsieur Hollert. This village is found by driving along the N4 that runs between Wavre and Gembloux. Take the first major turning north of Gembloux, which is clearly signposted towards the village.

In Walhain-St Paul, few houses date back to the battle but Hollert’s former residence is well worth visiting. As soon as Grouchy arrived he wrote to the Emperor, informing him of his progress: ‘This evening I will be massed at Wavre and thus find myself between Wellington, who I suppose is beating a retreat to run away from Your Majesty, and the Prussian army …’. Unfortunately for the French, his confidence was misplaced.

Evilard farm, as Hollert’s former residence is now known, is famous in France as the site of Grouchy’s notorious conference with his commanders. After Valazé brought his local guide to see Grouchy, Monsieur Hollert confirmed the information that a battle was likely to take place on the edge of the Forest of Soignes near Mont St Jean. This intelligence influenced many of Grouchy’s commanders and those who study the 1815 campaign often speculate over what would have happened had he followed their advice and marched in that direction.

The house itself lies on the edge of the village and was formerly known as Château-ferme Marette (Marette castle and farm). It is located towards the end of the Rue Sauvenière and is part of a large and imposing set of buildings. A tree-lined avenue leads up to Evilard farm and the complex possesses a large archway topped by a dovecote. Hollert’s former home lies on the right-hand side of this. Although part of the building was demolished some time ago, its appearance is similar to that it presented in 1815.

The chapel, stables and outhouses still exist and further buildings have been constructed to form a square around the courtyard. The garden where Grouchy’s famous strawberries were grown is still maintained and a plaque on the farm wall translates: ‘18 June 1815 Marshal Grouchy [was] stationed here while Waterloo was rising up in arms.’ The Commune of Walhain placed the plaque here and its wording leaves the reader in little doubt that its writer thought the Marshal would have been better employed elsewhere. Indeed, the choices he made here continue to arouse controversy among historians and enthusiasts.

Evilard farm is also notable as the place where General Gérard was brought for treatment after being severely wounded during the fighting at Bierges.

THE TOWN OF WAVRE

The town of Wavre has expanded greatly since 1815 and modern industry, housing and the motorway now obscure large parts of what was once a battlefield. Two world wars have also left their mark, as the Germans burnt much of Wavre in 1914 and heavy bombing took place throughout the whole region during 1940–45. Naturally, these factors have ensured that few relics of 1815 currently remain within the town.

Wavre lies south-east of Brussels and to the east of Waterloo. When travelling from the capital, use either the N4 or the motorway (E411/A4). Alternatively, if visitors wish to see the ground between Mont St Jean and Wavre traversed by the Prussians, proceeding along the narrow Chemin d’Ohain, you will eventually join the N271. Follow this towards Rixensart and you will eventually reach the motorway or proceed towards Wavre via the N238 or N239. This is a difficult and tortuous route and it is very easy to get lost. Nonetheless, it does give the visitor an impression of the difficulties experienced by the Prussians, when most roads were little more than unpaved tracks. The route is hilly in places with areas of forestry, numerous villages and narrow roads.

To get an impression of what Vandamme could see as he approached Wavre from the south, it is best to drive to the junction of the N4 and N43. From here, the slope leading down into Wavre from the heights is apparent, although the town’s appearance is considerably different today. By the time Vandamme reached this point (at around 3.00pm in the afternoon) several cavalry skirmishes had taken place in this area. It is preferable to drive into Wavre and park in its centre to reach the following locations on foot. The town is usually busy and high buildings mask even the tall spire of the Church of St John the Baptist, which is of some relevance to the battle.

Although the Dyle still flows along a similar route to that of 1815, it is much narrower than it was during the battle. Great efforts have also been made to contain the Dyle in cement channels and it was swollen after the June thunderstorms prior to Grouchy and Thielmann’s clash here. Therefore, its appearance contrasts with most eyewitness descriptions of the battle for most of its length within and in the immediate vicinity of Wavre. Although walking along its route is pleasant, Wavre has lost the majority of its old buildings following a succession of modern wars. Indeed, even on 18 June, at least thirty buildings were burnt to the ground near the Bridge of Christ with many more damaged or destroyed throughout the town.

Little exists to suggest that such intense fighting took place in the centre over the two stone bridges. Both spans have disappeared and the area where the larger Bridge of Christ once stood is now completely different, having been heavily built over, and the Dyle flows through a tunnel underneath. The crucifix that stood on the bridge has gone and the area is now a civilian precinct. Until recently, a plaque was placed on one of the buildings near the site where the bridge once was that read: ‘On 18 June 1815 this bridge was the focal point of a battle between the troops of Grouchy and Blücher’ – the valiant Thielmann fails to get a mention.

Indeed, most local people are entirely unaware of the battle that took place here during the Napoleonic Wars, although knowledge of local events during the world wars is far more widespread. Of the four battlefields for the 1815 campaign, Wavre is the only major clash that does not have a museum, battlefield centre or signposts directing visitors to related sites. With the bicentenary approaching, this situation may change in the near future.

THE CHURCH OF ST JOHN THE BAPTIST

This is by far the easiest location to find in Wavre. Building work on this church began during the fifteenth century but its vast spire was not completed until the 1600s, with a series of major structural additions taking place after that. The church is regularly closed to visitors, except for Sundays, and even then it is difficult to gain access unless one wishes to attend as part of the congregation. It is a large church and its walls display signs of musket-ball damage in places. Indeed, it is so large that attempting to get a side view photograph of the church is difficult due to the narrow roads on either side (even when photographers press right up against adjacent buildings).

There is a plaque outside the main door indicating bullet damage on the wall but it is well worth proceeding inside if it is possible to gain entry. Towards the top of one of the pillars, a cannon ball is set into the stonework. This penetrated the church during the battle but it is unclear whether it actually lodged here or was set into the stone afterwards. On the assumption that it has not been moved for display purposes, it was likely to have been fired by the French judging by the angle of entry.

A plaque is set around this projectile depicting a winged warrior (possibly an angel) striking down a naked man with the date 1815 emblazoned upon his shield. The Latin inscription translates as: ‘What force have you against this stone, violent cannon-ball? Certainly you will go no further! So passes the inconsiderate glory of the world.’ This dedication was placed here during the 1970s by one of the priests.

THE FIELD HOSPITALS

At least two large aid stations were established in Wavre to cater for the vast number of wounded. The first of these was placed within the former Hôtel de l’Escaille, which is now the Public d’Aide Sociale (Social Security Offices). This building’s address is 20 Rue de Bruxelles and it was here that the famed French Surgeon Major Seutin organized treatment for the wounded, assisted by medical officer Simonart and local Wavre surgeon Rayée.

The Church of St John the Baptist in central Wavre, an area that was bitterly fought over as the French tried to establish a bridgehead over the Dyle and take the town.

A small calibre roundshot penetrated the church and is now mounted at the top of one of its pillars within. A priest set the cannon ball into this plaque with an inscription commenting on the futility of war.

The other aid station used to be a Carmelite convent but now serves as Wavre’s town hall. It was badly bombed during the Second World War but benefited from an extensive restoration project. It dominates the Place de l’Hôtel being the largest building within the square.

BIERGES MILL

A small bridge lay very close to Bierges Mill (Le Moulin de Bierges) and this area was the scene of heavy fighting on the first day of the battle as the French fought desperately to cross the Dyle. The mill lies just outside Wavre on the left of the road to Ottignies about 218yd (200m) from the flyover of the Brussels–Namur motorway. The nearby presence of the motorway obscures the turning and this location can be difficult to find.

The mill itself dates back to 1687. Today it is more of a farm than a mill, though its workings are still operable, and numerous modern buildings have been built on the site. It is open to the public during the day except on Thursdays and Sundays. As well as being a working farm, it offers a range of services including animal foodstuffs, homemade food, handicrafts, gardening equipment and provides a nature area for birdwatching. The owners are very amenable and visitors should have no problem taking photographs or inquiring about the history of site with the proprietors.

There is a memorial on the edge of the grounds dedicated to the memory of General Gérard, who was badly wounded nearby. Its dedication reads: ‘It was here that General Gérard, Hero of the Empire and Defender of our National Independence, was wounded on 18 June 1815’. It is a stone memorial with an inset portrait of Gérard and was established here in 1958. The mention of national independence refers to his participation in the Belgian Revolution (1830–2) when the Belgians fought against Dutch influence in their national affairs.

This monument is partially obscured by hedges and bushes and can be difficult to find. Proceeding from the modern bridge across the Dyle here, visitors should walk northwards along the riverbank and turn right onto the N168. Walking along the pavement about 164yd (150m) down here, it should become visible as you proceed along this road.

LIMAL VILLAGE AND LA BOURSE FARM

Although Wavre itself is easy to find, driving to the related villages and finding locations can be complicated. The fact that two major highways run through and around the city (the N4 and E411 motorway) potentially adds to visitors’ confusion. It is easy to become sidetracked onto these and the smaller roads concerned are often obscured due to their dominance of the area.

The village of Limal fell to the French at around 9.00pm on 18 June. Grouchy established his headquarters here late in the evening, though he may have actually spent the night under canvas. The Ferme de la Bourse stands about 1,202yd (1,100m) north-west of the village centre. Its large archway with the date 1702 set into the brickwork above identifies it clearly. This also has the unusual feature of a large pedestrian doorway directly to its right, although gates and door are currently missing. The farm itself comprises several buildings and outhouses set around a courtyard. Limal witnessed serious fighting and some walls and buildings showed bullet scars and contained at least two large roundshot that had almost penetrated them, revealing how strong and thick these walls are. Unfortunately, these relics of 1815 were removed or plastered over some years ago.

Looking around the villages of Limal and Bierges today, there are few buildings dating back to the time of the battle. However, it is worth exploring the nature of the surrounding countryside. It is easy to see that the heights beyond the villages would have permitted the Prussian artillery a good view of the Dyle, allowing them to interfere in French operations considerably until they brought up batteries to silence them. Furthermore, the land between the two villages is still uneven, largely uncultivated and seamed by agricultural features such as drainage ditches. This reveals how the Prussian night attack was doomed to failure, as troops marching over this ground in the dark would have encountered great difficulties.

THE CHATEAU OF LA BAWETTE

About 1,531yd (1,400m) north-west of Wavre stands the Chateau of La Bawette along the N4 towards Brussels. Thielmann chose the building as his headquarters, using it at various stages during the battle. It saw some action during the latter stages as two cannon balls remain embedded in its walls where they struck in 1815.

The French captured the chateau on 19 June but only occupied it briefly as they were soon compelled to withdraw. It was here that Grouchy called his officers to him and announced the news that their Emperor had suffered a major defeat and was returning to France. He explained that they were compelled to withdraw as Prussian reinforcements were heading their way and expressed his deep regret that they had been unable to prevent this disaster for French arms.

Today La Bawette is part of Viscount le Hardy de Beaulieu’s estate and a golf course lies within its grounds. The house was badly damaged during the Second World War so its appearance is rather different to that of 1815 despite extensive restoration.

THE DEBÈVE BROTHERS MONUMENT

In a cemetery on the edge of Wavre is a monument dedicated to the three Debève brothers who fell during the battle. This lies along the road to Louvain. It is a tall stone monument in the form of a large, fluted pillar, surmounted by a veiled funeral urn with a wreath around the pillar about halfway down its length. The base of the monument is inscribed on all four sides in French detailing the heroic deeds of the three men. The main dedication reads as follows:

In memory of the brothers Ph. Debève, Cavalry Captain, Knight of the Legion of Honour and of Ferdinand of Spain, – J.-B. Debève, Cavalry Captain, Knight of the Legion of Honour, – B.-J Debève, Chasseur of the Imperial Guard, decorated with the Saint Helen military medal. May they rest in peace.

On the other three sides are lists of the battles that they fought at including: ‘Austerlitz, Iena [Jena], Pultusk, Eylau, Heilsberg, Friedland, Ratisbon, Essling, Wagram, Vittoria, Saragossa, Cadiz, Lutzen, Bautzen, Dresden, Montmirail, Waterloo’. It is an impressive tribute and it is sad to think that this military family lost three of its members in the service of France here.

Chapter 8

STREET FIGHTING IN PLANCENOIT

Plancenoit was the largest village in the region with a parish church, walled churchyard and cobbled streets. It was bigger than Smohain or Mont St Jean, the buildings of which were grouped around road junctions, rather than spread out in a network of streets. Plancenoit’s narrow streets and well-built houses made it easy to defend. The majority of the villagers had fled when the armies approached and the French had broken into many houses, smashing up doors, window shutters and furniture to fuel their fires during the night.

Although Wellington was soon aware of the Prussians’ arrival, Blücher refused to be rushed, despite increasingly urgent pleas for assistance. As Bülow’s IV Corps began to arrive, he placed them in formation but allowed the soldiers some respite after their long march once they reached Chapelle-St Lambert. Immediately committing these tired and footsore men into combat would have been foolish but, even though they were permitted some rest, many had still not received any provisions that day.

Once the French detected the Prussian advance, Napoleon sent infantry under Lobau to meet the threat but until they arrived, only cavalry stood in their way. Count von Schwerin’s Cavalry Brigade was in the vanguard and soon clashed with the French cavalry protecting the extreme right flank of the French army on the edge of the Bois de Paris. Schwerin was among the first Prussians killed as they pressed forward to test their metal in a series of charges and melees.

Colonel Marbot’s 7th Hussars were among the first to skirmish with the Prussian cavalry vanguard and tried to delay them as long as possible. He recalled: ‘The head of the Prussian column approached, though very slowly. Two times I threw back into the valley the hussars and lancers which preceded it. I strove to win time by holding the enemy at bay as much as possible. The enemy could only debouch with great difficulty from the muddy, sunken tracks in which he was engaged.’

Although it took time for the Prussians to deploy, Blücher commented that at first they ‘did not appear to be paying any attention to our existence’. Initially troops were sent in two separate directions and they tried to advance upon a very wide front. The main assault was directed against Plancenoit.

Prussian columns began to emerge from the Bois de Paris, roughly 3,500yd (3,200m) from Plancenoit, at around 4.30pm. They began to establish themselves in the open fields before the woods in preparation for an assault but, with only two brigades available, Blücher wanted the other half of Bülow’s Corps in place before ordering an attack. When messengers arrived from Wellington imploring the Prussians to intervene, Blücher finally relented and ordered his artillery to begin firing upon Domon’s cavalry, sending the attack forward between 4.40 and 5.00pm while the rest of IV Corps was still on the march.

Two regiments of cavalry now advanced on the flanks of the Prussian attack with three artillery batteries following in support. The infantry of Losthin marched forward on the right of the road to Plancenoit, while Hiller’s brigade advanced on the left. Yet the French refused to adopt a passive defence and Domon immediately sent his cavalry forward to engage the Prussian hussars. In the fight that followed, the Prussians were forced to retire after a vicious melee and the French then charged against the artillery batteries behind them. They were only repulsed after the infantry halted their march and levelled a heavy fire against them. Bülow recorded that the attack began well:

Our artillery fire and that of our skirmishers chased the enemy from one undulation to another. Where our skirmishers had obtained a solid foothold, the artillery advanced with the rapidity the situation demanded and passed them to direct its fire at short range against the enemy. The line of massed battalions followed and behind came the supporting cavalry, watching the advancing line of skirmishers ceaselessly.

General Friedrich Wilhelm von Bülow whose IV Corps bore the brunt of the fighting in Plancenoit. (T Johnson)

The French cavalry mounted several charges but these lessened with intensity as the Prussians pressed forward and they confined themselves to trying to menace and delay their progress, particularly after the 8th Hussars under Major von Colomb inflicted losses upon them in an effective counter-attack. Colonel August Pétiet wrote that the Prussian artillery fire was becoming increasingly effective and recalled one incident when General Jacquinot:

saw a cannonball smash into the flank of the neighbouring cavalry division, of Lieutenant General Subervie. The ball beheaded one squadron commander, took two legs off the horse of another and killed the mount of … Jacquinot, commander of the 1st Lancers and brother of the divisional general. At a stroke, the three senior officers of the 1st Lancers were down …

Lobau blocked their progress briefly with his VI Corps as the brigades of Losthin and Hiller approached Plancenoit. Although they slowed the Prussian advance, they were outnumbered and forced to retire into the village at around 5.30pm. Plancenoit was occupied by a full brigade but the Prussians did not pause and immediately assaulted the village.

Almost two-thirds of IV Corps were Landwehr and as Müffling had confided to Wellington earlier: ‘Our infantry doesn’t possess the same physical force and capacity to resist as yours. Most of our troops are young and inexperienced.’ However, Napoleon’s imperialism had stirred up great national feeling in the German states and many were inspired by a fierce hatred of the French. Yet because of their enthusiasm, many units expended their ammunition too quickly and the inexperience of their officers meant that the attack was not as well co-ordinated as it should have been.

FRIENDLY FIRE

Wellington had been delighted when Prussian troops began to appear on his left but was alarmed when they were withdrawn. Although he could see smoke rising above Plancenoit, the sound of the battle around him made it difficult to determine how serious the action being fought there actually was. He repeatedly sent messages to Blücher advising him to hurry as his line was hard pressed.

As Ziethen’s I Corps approached the village of Ohain, Major von Gillhausen of the 1st Westphalian Landwehr wrote how they marched in column on either side of the road in an attempt to avoid cannon fire that was now being directed against them. In spite of this:

we hoped to keep the battalions out of the heavy artillery fire whose direction was constantly changing, but without deviating significantly from our objective. However, I could not prevent one cannonball striking the left of the III Battalion, killing two men and wounding three, and another from killing one Jäger and wounding four from the 2 Jäger Detachment.

By around 6.00pm the vanguard of General Ziethen’s leading brigade had reached Ohain. Ziethen’s I Corps had been the last to leave Wavre but had marched along the River Smohain on a more northerly route than the rest of the army. Lieutenant Colonel von Reiche (Ziethen’s chief-of-staff) was busily engaged in planning their deployment when he was greeted by General Baron Philipp von Müffling, who was the Prussian liaison officer attached to Wellington’s staff.

Müffling informed him that Wellington’s line was under severe strain and: ‘The Duke was most desirous of our arrival and had repeatedly declared that this was the last moment, and if we did not arrive soon he would be compelled to retreat.’ Yet when Ziethen arrived, he had no wish to rush forward blindly until his Corps had assembled. He had already turned down a request for immediate support from Colonel Freemantle, at Wellington’s behest. After all, if things were as bad as Müffling said, they might march into the path of an oncoming French assault and suffer accordingly. He sent staff officers ahead to assess the situation and was worried when they returned with an exaggerated report that implied the Anglo-Allied left flank was on the verge of breaking.

When La Haye Sainte fell at around 6.45pm, Wellington’s situation was becoming increasingly desperate. Much depended on the Prussians intervening effectively and he later wrote: ‘The time they occupied in approaching seemed interminable … Both they and my watch seemed to have stuck fast.’ The loss of the farmhouse was a major blow and the French were now pressing forward to exploit their advantage.

Although the cavalry attacks had stopped, the Allies still feared that more might follow. Therefore, battalions were kept in square or adopted a line four-men deep. The downside of this was that they suffered more losses from cannon fire and, since cavalry still menaced them, were usually obliged to stand rather than lie prone to reduce casualties. The Anglo-Allied artillery batteries also had difficulty in recalling all their gun teams as some artillerymen had fled to the rear rather than retire into the infantry squares during the massed cavalry attacks. Therefore, their fire would be significantly weaker if another assault began before they were replaced.

Wellington’s centre now came under a fearful artillery bombardment and it was uncertain whether it could withstand another major assault if the French attacked before he brought up more reserves. They were losing the battle of attrition with the infantry suffering under the cannonade and gaps had started to appear in the line. Observing this the Duke murmured grimly: ‘Give me Blücher … or give me night’.

Major von Scharnhorst now rode up to Ziethen, telling him that IV Corps was struggling to take Placenoit and needed support. He conveyed Blücher’s orders for him to march south-west and assail the village. As Ziethen began to make preparations, French skirmishers were pressing forward beyond the Chemin d’Ohain and d’Erlon’s corps was advancing once again. Aghast at what was happening, Müffling cried out that: ‘The battle is lost if the 1st Corps does not support the Duke!’ Supported by Reiche’s counsel, they managed to persuade Ziethen that the Anglo-Allied command was virtually unaware of events at Plancenoit and diverting his march there would have a ruinous effect on their army’s morale. Although persuaded with great difficulty, Ziethen then took the dangerous step of ignoring orders and continued his advance towards Papelotte.

The Prussian I Corps now began to enter the area around the villages that was traversed by sunken lanes shaded by trees and lined with hedgerows. Their progress was slow and, although 2 hours of daylight remained, their vision was poor in the twilight. As von Reiche later conceded, this led to mistakes as heavy skirmishing was in progress in the area:

The Nassauers who were leaving the village fell back in open order on our advancing troops. As the Nassauers were dressed in the French style of that time, our men took them to be the enemy and fired at them. Their commander Prinz Bernhard of [Saxe] Weimar rushed up to General Ziethen to clarify the misunderstanding, which he did in no uncertain terms. The General, not knowing the Prince, made no excuses and calmly replied, ‘My friend, it is not my fault that your men look like French!’

As the Prussians deployed, there were similar incidents when men of Pack’s Brigade fired upon them, mistaking the Prussian infantry for French soldiers. Fortunately, officers on both sides rapidly stopped these exchanges and I Corps sent out skirmishers and deployed three artillery batteries. As the main battalions advanced, this proved more than enough to halt the French advance in this sector of the battlefield.

Durutte, on the extreme right of the French flank, had only four battalions (roughly 1,500 men) to oppose the Saxe-Weimar’s command, now reinforced by just under 4,000 Prussians. Although heavily outnumbered, the hedgerows and undulating ground enabled them to stave off the Allied/Prussian advance. Durutte held out stubbornly but knew that it was only a matter of time before he would have to withdraw, unless he received support.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL COUNT HANS ERNST ZIETHEN, 1770–1848

Hans Ziethen began his military career in 1806 serving with the Prussian Queen’s Dragoons. He campaigned against France (1813–14), commanding a brigade under General Kleist and fighting at the gigantic Battle of the Nations at Leipzig 1813. Promoted to lieutenant general in 1815, he was one of Prussia’s most experienced commanders and consequently received command of Blücher’s I Corps.

Heavily engaged during the Battle of Ligny, I Corps suffered serious casualties but Ziethen managed to withdraw in good order and morale and cohesion had improved by the time it reached Wavre. It was the second Prussian corps to reach Waterloo, arriving 3 miles (4.8km) from Wellington’s position at the village of Ohain at 6.00pm after a gruelling forced march.

When approached by Lieutenant Colonel Freemantle (and later other members of Wellington’s staff) at Ohain, he refused to commit his troops until I Corps had fully assembled and later received considerable criticism from some historians in consequence. Despite the urgency of Freeemantle’s request, his reasoning that the men needed rest after their long march and time to form for battle seems sound enough.

Although ordered to redirect his march to Plancenoit by Blücher, Ziethen took the courageous decision to conform to Wellington’s right flank instead when Müffling convinced him that the Anglo-Allied Army would break without his support. This proved to be a crucial decision as it allowed Wellington some respite and permitted him time to prepare for Napoleon’s final assault. Historians sometimes overlook this point but the effect of Ziethen’s decision on the outcome of the battle should not be underrated.

After the 1815 campaign, Ziethen became Commander-in-Chief of the Prussian Army occupying France in Blücher’s absence. He went on to rise within the military and ended his career as a field marshal.

The final assaults on Plancenoit.

COUNTER-ATTACK

By 6.00pm, Blücher had the rest of IV Corps at his disposal and now had thirty-four battalions to draw upon for his attack against Plancenoit. The 16th Brigade (under Hiller) and the 15th Brigade (under Losthin) therefore renewed their assaults on the village. The new arrivals included more regular battalions and the assault was spearheaded by the 11th Infantry under Colonel von Reichenbach. The Landwehr regiments in Ryssel’s Brigade were also of superior quality and these fresh troops formed the backbone of the attack.

Lobau’s men had been fighting for hours and were massively outnumbered. The French brigades flanking the village were forced to retreat and Lobau started to pull out of the Plancenoit itself, fearing the brigade there would be outflanked. Long-range Prussian artillery fire was already beginning to fall around the highway where the Imperial Guard stood and even near the point where the Emperor and his staff were postioned directing the battle.

Houssaye believed that when the first attacks began against Plancenoit Napoleon could hear the cannonade in Wavre and assumed that Grouchy had fallen on the rear of the Prussian Army. Consequently, he thought that the Prussians would be unlikely to commit more than a single corps to the struggle. Yet, as more Prussian troops were seen advancing in the distance, the village was clearly under great threat. The Emperor knew that if they captured Plancenoit, his entire right wing would crumble, enabling the enemy to roll up the French line and fall upon his centre. Reluctantly, he commanded General Philibert Duhesme to lead his eight battalions of the Young Guard, accompanied by three artillery batteries with a combined twenty-four guns, into Plancenoit to shore up its defence.

On the edge of Plancenoit near the Prussian Memorial. The Prussians approached from this direction and the land is still wooded and traversed mainly by farm tracks, just as it was in 1815.

The Young Guard Division was composed of two brigades of light infantry. These troops were either tirailleurs, whose meaning translates as ‘skirmishers’ or ‘sharpshooters’, or voltigeurs, whose name means ‘vaulter’ or ‘leaper’. All of the Young Guard were experienced soldiers taught to think for themselves and fight in small groups in a skirmishing role. They were the ideal troops to commit to the confused street fighting in Plancenoit.

The Prussian attack had faltered in the centre where they still encountered major resistance but some light infantry had advanced around it and had taken up position in the houses and behind walls on the western side of the village. As Duhesme led his battalions forward, they came under sporadic musket fire but he forbade his men to waste time by returning it and pressed forward into the streets. They charged into Plancenoit and broke into the houses to roust out the defenders in savage hand-to-hand fighting. Soon the Young Guard reached the centre where the fighting still raged.

With Lobau’s crumbling defence reinforced by the Young Guard, the fighting intensified and the French gained the upper hand. Regiments like the staunchly Bonapartist 15th Ligne still held out and the Prussians were swiftly forced back and then routed. Skirmishers from the Young Guard actually pursued them beyond the village but were checked by the fire of Prussian battalions reforming at the edge of the woods. The 2nd Silesian’s regimental history then records that: ‘a squadron of the 2nd Silesian Hussar Regiment charged them, cutting down some of them and chasing them back’.

The village of Plancenoit. With the arrival of the Prussians, possession of this village became crucial for one side to win the battle.

Blücher was furious at the reverse and personally rode to help rally the 16th Brigade. Haranguing the largely Westphalian and Silesian troops, he told them that gaining possession of the village was vital if they were to win this battle. He knew that Thielmann was heavily engaged to their rear and the only way was forward. One of his staff heard him snarl: ‘if only we had the damned village!’. Once Plancenoit fell to the Prussians, Napoleon’s position would become untenable.

Bülow’s entire Corps was now deployed and the next attack was massively reinforced. Although the Young Guard fought hard, the Prussians entered the village once again and soon fought their way back into the centre. Colonel Hiller recorded how his men of the 15th Infantry Regiment and the 1st Silesian Landwehr sustained heavy losses from canister and musketry on their approach but fought their way through the streets and:

penetrated to the high wall around the churchyard held by the French Young Guard. These two columns succeeded in capturing a howitzer, two cannon, several ammunition wagons and two staff officers along with several hundred men. The open square around the churchyard was surrounded by houses, from which the enemy could not be dislodged in spite of our brave attempt. A firefight continued at fifteen to thirty paces range which ultimately decimated the Prussian battalions. Had I, at this moment, the support of only one fresh battalion at hand, this attack would indeed have been successful.

The Young Guard were hard pressed and numbers of them surrendered but the Prussians were disinclined to take prisoners after the slaughter in the village and many were abruptly shot or bayoneted.

GENERAL COUNT PHILIBERT GUILLAUME DUHESME, 1766–1815

Rising from obscure origins, Duhesme was a labourer’s son and began his military career in the National Guard in 1789. The French Revolution assisted his career and he joined the Army of the North in 1792 becoming a general of brigade by 1794. He distinguished himself at the Battle of Fleurus and fought in Italy in 1798–9. Thereafter he received a series of Italian commands until 1807.

Sent to Spain in 1808, he played a major role in reducing the citadel of Barcelona but was recalled to France to face charges of corruption in 1810. He was dismissed from his post as Governor of Barcelona due to these allegations but was also implicated in charges of banditry, torture and murder. Although these charges were never proved, the stigma they attached to his name meant that he languished on half pay in a state of semi-retirement for some years.

By 1813, Napoleon desperately needed good officers and the seedier side of Duhesme’s past was overlooked, resulting in his recall to active service. Given a divisional command under Marshal Victor, he fought at Brienne and La Rothière and was created a Count of Empire in recognition of his services. As a staunch Republican, Duhesme felt Napoleon had betrayed the ideals of the Revolution and was initially reluctant to support him when he returned from Elba. Yet he eventually relented and was rewarded with the command of the Young Guard.

He led his division well at Plancenoit and held back the Prussian advance for some time until overwhelmed by superior numbers. Shot in the head somewhere near the edge of the village, he almost lost consciousness and was carried from the field. Supporting the stricken general in the saddle, his officers managed to lead him away but were forced to leave him at the Roi d’Espagne Inn at Genappe during the rout of the Armée du Nord. Officers on Blücher’s staff discovered him there the next morning but he died of his wounds the following day. Duhesme was buried in the nearby village of Ways in the Church of St Martin’s graveyard, where his tomb can be seen to this day.

NO QUARTER

Aware that it was vital to secure his right before mounting another attack, Napoleon had formed up the Imperial Guard (Old and Middle Guard) in a long line facing eastward in case the Prussians broke through. Yet he still hoped to win the battle and now committed two of their finest battalions to reinforce Duhesme. It would weaken his final assault but the Emperor had no choice. He selected the first battalions of the 2nd Grenadiers and the Chasseurs à Pied of the Old Guard. Between them, they only fielded about 1,000 bayonets but these famous elite troops were fanatically loyal to the Emperor and were reliable. Captain Mauduit described their pedigree in 1815: ‘the average age of the grenadiers was 35 years old … average service … was 15 years and as many campaigns … Long-tested by marches, fatigues, deprivations, bivouacs … the grenadier of the Guard was lean and thin’.

Indeed, contrary to some depictions of the Guard, most soldiers were old in experience rather than actual years. British artist Benjamin Haydon saw infantry of the Old Guard at close quarters at Fontainbleu in 1814 and left a graphic description of their fearsome appearance: ‘More dreadful looking fellows than Napoleon’s Guard I had never seen. They had the look of thoroughbred, veteran, disciplined banditi. Depravity, recklessness, and bloodthirstiness were burned into their faces … Black moustache, gigantic bearskins, and a ferocious expression were their characteristics.’ Unusually they were also permitted to wear earrings and, despite the impeccable turnout of their uniforms, this added to Haydon’s impression that they resembled brigands rather than soldiers. The Guard enjoyed many privileges denied to the rest of the army and, although this occasionally provoked resentment in the line regiments, most soldiers acknowledged that Napoleon’s ‘immortals’ had gained their elite status through battle and many wished to earn a place in their ranks. Even the privates enjoyed an exalted status (classed as corporals in the rest of the army) and they received better pay, rations and accommodation. Yet this had to be weighed against the fact that all of them were experienced soldiers who had endured the rigours of campaigning many times before. Furthermore, although held in reserve for a potential decisive stroke, they always earned their pay when called upon.

It was maddening as Napoleon only had around thirteen battalions of the Middle and Old Guard left for his last attempt against the Anglo-Allied line. Was it enough to break through? The guns of the Grande Batterie thundered on, pounding the Allied centre and his Guard were now almost in position but he could not ignore the threat to his right. He chose Generals Pelet and Morand to lead the attack, telling Pelet to: ‘go with your 1st battalion to Plancenoit where the Young Guard is entirely overthrown. Support it. Keep your troops closed up and under control. If you clash with the enemy let it be with the bayonet.’

The battalions advanced in separate columns against the village and received fire from light infantry ensconced behind walls and houses as they neared Plancenoit. Pelet turned to look behind him and roared at his men not to load their muskets and put their faith in cold steel. Elements of the Young Guard falling back from the village took heart at the sight of their advance and officers shouted at them to reform behind their columns and join their attack, which many did. Much of Plancenoit was now in flames and the prospect of advancing into this inferno, with screams and sounds of combat issuing from within, was a grim one, yet the Guard marched on determinedly.

The Prussians were only beginning to take possession of the houses on the edge of the village when the Old Guard stormed Plancenoit. The narrow village streets were already choked with rubble, dead and wounded but the Guardsmen struggled over the debris to engage in a brutal, close-quarters fight with the Prussians. The ferocity of their assault drove their enemy back into the houses or through the village and they pressed on towards the centre where elements of the Young Guard still held out.

Pelet later recalled the bitter struggle from street to street and inside the houses. It was a closely confined area and: ‘At each interval between the gardens, I saw muskets aiming at me forty paces away. I can not imagine how they did not shoot me twenty times.’ Although opposed by as many as fourteen enemy battalions, the Guards drove inexorably through the village and pushed the Prussians out after 20 minutes of hard fighting.

Because the Prussians had hanged some of their prisoners in the village, Pelet saw many men refusing to give quarter to surrendering Prussians being consumed by a blind fury, which often accompanied hand-to-hand fighting. He was horrified to witness the murder of some prisoners and had to wrestle with soldiers or beat them with the flat of his sword to prevent further reprisals. One group had begun to cut the throats of men they had captured en masse before Pelet stopped them. Most of the Young Guard had now rallied and resumed their positions alongside their reinforcements and by 7.00pm Plancenoit was back in French hands.

ONE LAST GAMBLE

Ziethen’s deployment on the Anglo-Allied Army’s left came at a crucial point in the battle. Between 6.45 and 7.30pm as the Old Guard retook Plancenoit, the Duke was reinforcing his battered central positions. He drew Wincke’s Brigade and four battalions of Brunswicker troops closer towards his centre, reinforcing the brigades of Pack, Best and Kempt on the left who had suffered severe losses. The divisions of Donzelot, Allix and Marcognet had all advanced almost to the ridge crest and their skirmishers lined the hedges along the Chemin d’Ohain and sniped at the battalions on the reverse slope. Now the welcome arrival of the Prussian I Corps enabled them to move forward and drive the French back beyond the road. When riflemen re-entered the gravel pit, their accurate fire killed many of the artillerymen around the guns brought up close to La Haye Sainte. Although this silenced them, their fire had already wrought considerable damage on the infantry around the centre from close range.

Chassé’s Dutch-Belgian Division also arrived from Braine d’Alleud to help fill the gaps in Wellington’s line, thinned by successive attacks. The cavalry of Vivian and Vandeleur were also recalled from their position on the extreme left. The Duke added these six regiments to his cavalry reserve, massed behind his centre. Wellington’s stubborn defiance had paid off and Prussian efforts had already had a marked effect on the fighting. If Wellington could weather one last attack, victory for the Allies was in sight.

Viewpoints

THE BOIS DE PARIS (FOREST OF PARIS)

Today the forest is smaller than it was in 1815 but large parts of this area remain covered with woodland. The Bois de Paris lay to the east and north-east of Plancenoit. It covered two steep ridges, with a valley in between, and these were eminently defensible by infantry who would have benefited from the cover of the trees if fired upon by artillery. Four country tracks ran through these woods and the bulk of the Prussian army heading towards Mont St Jean were obliged to use them, so the woods were of considerable strategic importance. Had the French occupied them with even a moderate sized force of combined arms, they would probably have delayed the Prussians significantly or even prevented them from intervening at Waterloo. In the event, Lobau was only able to deploy before the woods some 5,468yd (5,000m) from Plancenoit in a line running south-east from Frichermont to block the Prussians as they emerged from the treeline.

COLONEL VON SCHWERIN’S MONUMENT

Colonel Count Wilhelm von Schwerin commanded the 1st Prussian Cavalry Brigade and his 6th Hussars were the first to skirmish with Marbot’s 7th Hussars sent to monitor the area east of the Bois de Paris. Schwerin soon brought up the 1st West Prussian Uhlans to support his hussars but encountered little serious resistance at first. Yet as Domon and Subervie’s cavalry came up, the Prussians received increasing fire from cavalry under the tree line as they approached the woods. Firing their notoriously inaccurate short carbines either dismounted or from the saddle, this initially had little effect except to delay their advance. However, the French also brought up a horse artillery battery whose fire brought down many riders as Schwerin began to deploy for an attack. Colonel Schwerin was killed in the early stages of this engagement and is said to be the first Prussian soldier to die that day on the battlefield of Waterloo.

Initially, Schwerin was buried near to where he fell. As he had probably been killed by roundshot, it is likely that his body would have been badly mutilated, so conveying his remains as far as one of the local churchyards would have been difficult despite the special treatment often afforded to high-ranking officers. Two years afterwards, Countess Sophie Daenhoff (his widow), came to the area and found his shallow grave with the assistance of a local farm girl. She had him disinterred and formally reburied. This monument now stands over his grave and the Countess was so impressed by the locals’ helpfulness that she gave the parish priest an annual subscription of 100 florins for the poor and donated two bells to the church at Lasne.

Schwerin’s monument stands to the west of Lasne village on the road towards Plancenoit. To reach it, drive 109yd (100m) south-west from Lasne church to the crossroads. Taking the branch towards Plancenoit, proceed another 54yd (50m) before turning left. Travelling along this route, you will find a small track that leads to the monument, which should be visible before this turning due to its height.

A well-kept hawthorn hedge surrounds the monument, which is a thick, round stone column 16ft (5m) high set upon a square pedestal. A bronze plaque is set upon the monument and its German inscription translates as: ‘William, Count von Schwerin, Knight and Superior Officer of the King, fallen in a foreign country for the Fatherland, during the victory of 18 June 1815’.

PLANCENOIT VILLAGE

The village of Plancenoit witnessed some of the most intense fighting of the battle, particularly during its later stages. In 1815, it was home to around 500 souls, who mostly fled when it became clear that battle was imminent. Its houses were well built with garden walls bordering many properties and the streets were cobbled. The sturdy nature of its buildings made Plancenoit easy to defend and it is surprising that the French had failed to garrison the village before the Prussian approach, particularly as it lies only 1,312yd (1,200m) from the main highway to Brussels. This implies that Napoleon was supremely confident of the outcome of the approaching battle and meant to devote all his resources to breaking the Anglo-Allied Army. Even when the Prussian threat became very serious, he only committed more troops to its defence with marked reluctance.

Today the majority of the houses in the village are modern as, unaccountably, Plancenoit was exempted from the 1914 law protecting Belgian battlefields. Yet layout of the streets remains essentially the same and the Church of St Cathérine (Location Map Reference 16) still dominates the central square. This area is more open than it was in 1815 and is now used as the village green. In common with many similar sites, the village has a pleasant aspect and it is difficult to stand here and imagine that a horrific slaughter took place on this spot, marred by atrocities committed against prisoners by both sides.

The Church of St Cathérine in the centre of Plancenoit. Fighting raged around the church and it was badly damaged during the battle.

One of the plaques on the wall of St Cathérine’s commemorating Lieutenant M Louis and the tirailleurs of the Guard who defended the village almost to the last.

St Cathérine’s was badly damaged in the fighting, which was particularly ferocious around the village centre. Parts of the cemetery wall date back to the time of the battle but the church was virtually demolished during the mid-nineteenth century, later being rebuilt along similar lines. The tower and spire were modified in 1856 but the church still resembles its 1815 appearance.

There are four French-language plaques dedicated to the French soldiers who fought here in and around the church. Two are set on either side of the main church door. The one on the right reads: ‘In this village of Plancenoit that became famous on 18 June 1815, the Young Guard of the Emperor Napoleon distinguished itself. It was commanded by General Count Duhesme, who was fatally wounded’. The memorial plaque to the left of the church door is devoted to a single officer and records: ‘To Lieutenant M. Louis, 3rd Tirailleurs of the Guard, born at Jodoigne 3.4.1787, fell at Plancenoit 18.6.1815’.

Although it is not always possible to enter the church, a marble plaque hangs upon the wall to the left of the main entrance inside next to the Virgin’s Altar. This reads: ‘To the memory of Jaques Cles Adre Tattet, Lieutenant of the Old Guard Artillery, member of the Legion of Honour killed at the start of the battle of 18 June 1815, aged 22 years’.

French artillery played an important part in holding the Prussian onslaught at bay, particularly as they approached the village. Walking into the churchyard itself, another plaque is devoted to them. It is set upon the outer wall of the church and reads: ‘Near this place on 18 June 1815 the 1st and 2nd Companies of the 8th Foot Artillery Regiment under Colonel Caron fought their guns effectively, the French VI Army Corps’.

Driving or walking through the village to its south-eastern edge, another monument is located at a crossroads on the edge of the village. It is a rectangular stone with a French Eagle above the inscription, in common with many of the French monuments in the region. Its French inscription translates as: ‘Near this place on 18 June 1815 the 5th Infantry Regiment under Colonel Roussille of Simmer’s Division, fought heroically against the Prussian Corps of General Bülow’.

Killed while defending Plancenoit, Colonel Roussille’s death is particularly tragic as he opposed Napoleon’s restoration but fought for him in spite of his political beliefs. Defying his entreaties, his men went over to the Emperor to a man so Roussille petitioned Napoleon asking to remain in command, arguing ‘my regiment has abandoned me, but I will not abandon it’. Napoleon graciously agreed to his request and the 5th Ligne fought well here under Roussille, who fell for France and his regiment if not for his Emperor.

Walking north from the centre along the road leading towards La Belle Alliance, visitors will find another monument to the Imperial Guard. Placed on a small grass island a few metres before the Prussian Memorial, its inscription records: ‘Near this place on 18 June 1815 at 5:00pm the Emperor’s Young Guard, under the orders of General Count Duhesme fought gloriously against the Prussians of General Bülow’. Just over 4,500 men, drawn from 8 battalions of the Young Guard, confronted the Prussians to strengthen Napoleon’s right flank in and around this village.

Plancenoit contains many plaques and monuments commemorating the fallen of the French Army. This is significant as the fight for this village is especially relevant to the French, not only for the huge number of casualties they suffered here, but because its possession was crucial for winning the battle. Right up until the final rout of Napoleon’s army, soldiers continued to fight on the village outskirts as they knew that if Plancenoit fell, the entire army could be surrounded and defeated in detail. Although Waterloo was a crushing defeat for France, it could have been even worse if the defenders of Plancenoit had not endured long hours of fighting here.

THE PRUSSIAN MEMORIAL (LOCATION MAP REFERENCE 15)

In direct contrast to the provision for the French, there is only one Prussian memorial in Plancenoit. During their relentless assaults against Plancenoit, around 30,000 Prussian infantrymen alone fought for possession of the village, at least 7,000 of whom became casualties. Therefore, to build only one commemorative reminder of this sacrifice, which contributed so much toward the final victory, seems strange. Fortunately, it is a fine monument and a fitting tribute to the bravery of those who gave their lives to seize this stronghold on that great yet terrible day.

The memorial commemorating the Prussian soldiers who took serious losses in repeated assaults against the village of Plancenoit.

Erected in 1819 upon a mound where an artillery battery stood during the battle, accounts differ as to whether this was a Prussian or French position. It is possible that the Prussians, having driven French artillery from here, used the same location to position their guns. Observing the views from the immediate vicinity, a battery here would have been well located for firing on the woods, into the centre of the village and the highway to Brussels. Therefore, it is more than possible that both sides placed guns here at various stages of the battle.

The monument stands on the northern edge of Plancenoit at the beginning of the lane leading to Lasne village. Approaching it from the centre of Plancenoit, take the road leading to La Belle Alliance past the Young Guard Memorial. The road runs directly north and then turns west in a sweeping curve. There are two exits on the right just as the road curves round and taking either of them will allow you to find the monument, which lies close by.

The Prussian Memorial is in the form of a four-faced Gothic iron spire set upon a bluestone base. The spire is jet black and the lettering in a Gothic typeface upon it is highlighted in gold, with a gilt Maltese cross set at its peak. Although trees stand around it, due to its high elevation, it is visible from some distance away and the sun regularly sparkles on its golden cross. Karl Friedrich Schinkel, the architect who designed it, deliberately placed it facing east, so that it looks towards Germany. A stairway runs up from the pavement to the monument, which is surrounded by iron railings.

In 1832, the monument was vandalized by French soldiers as they marched to besiege Antwerp and assist Belgian rebels, fighting against Dutch rule. They pulled down the cross and were in the process of toppling the spire itself when Marshal Gérard intervened and shamed them into halting this act of desecration. Having fought at Wavre, Gérard respected his former enemies and contributed funds to its restoration the same year. The present iron railings were cast by the Royal factory in Berlin and now protect the spire from further depredations.

The simple inscription on the spire is in German and translates as: ‘The King and the Country honour with gratitude the fallen heroes. Let them rest in peace. – La Belle Alliance 18 June 1815’. The monument required further restoration in 1944 and 1965 but is now extremely well maintained and during the author’s last visit it looked almost new due to this standard of care.

Chapter 9

LA GARDE RECULE!

Napoleon faced a serious dilemma. Previously he had assembled thirty-seven battalions (including those of the Imperial Guard) to deliver what he hoped would be a decisive blow against Wellington’s line. Yet the fight for Plancenoit was steadily absorbing these troops he held in reserve, forcing him to commit twenty-three of these battalions to roust the Prussians out of the village. Even with these reinforcements, the fight there still swayed back and forth. He had to wait until he was sure that his right flank was secure before he could risk sending another attack forward.

The centre of the Anglo-Allied Army now lay under intense fire and, forced to remain in closely packed formations, the infantry suffered terribly. Even though their targets were out of sight, the French artillery had far greater chance of hitting men standing in square or in a line four files deep. Yet Napoleon knew that resources were finite and his guns could not maintain a cannonade on this scale for long. Artillery was also necessary to support the planned attack and exploit a breakthrough if it was successful. Therefore, the French needed to stop firing and conserve their ammunition very soon.

On the other side of the battlefield, Wellington knew that the French could not sustain this massive bombardment much longer. Nevertheless, he asked himself whether his men could withstand another sustained attack having fought all day under heavy fire. Dead and wounded lay piled in heaps on the plateau and behind the Mont St Jean ridge or lay scattered on the slope before it. Morale remained high in the battered infantry squares but they could see the carnage around them and walking wounded staggering back to the aid stations behind. He knew that when the attack came, everything would depend upon whether his infantry remained steadfast.

LA GARDE AU FEU!

The threat of further cavalry attacks was still real and most of the Allied infantry remained in formations four-men deep. While they could still present a good number of muskets when firing, this formation made them almost as vulnerable as the square to artillery fire. As cavalry remained in the area, most battalion commanders felt unable to let the men sit or lie down and they had to stand and endure the fire, watching many of their comrades being cut down beside them.

Tirailleurs were also pressing over the ridge to snipe at the line battalions, which also made it difficult to lie prone if they were to fight them off. The French deployed far more skirmishers than ever before at Waterloo and their Allied counterparts were forced back by sheer weight of numbers. Consequently, the line was coming under aimed musket fire and often had to stand to fight the tirailleurs off while a hail of roundshot continued to plummet down upon them. French skirmishers were becoming increasingly bold and, as the Prince of Orange gave orders to Kruse’s Brigade of Nassauer troops, he and his staff came under fire from aimed muskets at close range. Several men and horses were hit and the Prince was struck in the shoulder and forced to quit the field.

Although Wellington’s redeployment had been effective, his line was stretched dangerously thin in places. Halkett’s Brigade had suffered badly at Quatre Bras and sustained even greater losses at Waterloo. The brigades of Kielmansegge and Ompteda had been decimated, leaving a gap in the line that Wellington had struggled to fill, and Lambert’s 10th Brigade had suffered enormous casualties.

In his haste to redeploy, Wellington had personally ridden to ensure that Chassé’s Dutch Belgian Division marched down from the right to bolster his weakened centre. He also ordered Uxbridge to place his cavalry behind the line to prevent it breaking. There had already been nervousness within the ranks and some rearward movement as the men suffered under the heavy bombardment but the sight of the cavalry drawn up behind them discouraged this.

As the Duke regained the area of the crossroads once more, a message from Colonel Fraser of the 52nd Foot reached him. A French cavalry officer had approached this regiment after deserting from Napoleon’s army. He rode up the ridge with one arm raised, signalling surrender. ‘Long live the King!’ he declared when brought before the colonel. ‘That rascal Napoleon will be on you with the Guard before a half-hour.’ Although Wellington already anticipated another major attack, this intelligence confirmed that it was imminent.

As Napoleon swept the Allied line with his spyglass, everything he saw confirmed that he needed to attack. To his left, a huge pillar of smoke boiled into the sky above Hougoumont and the din of the ferocious engagement raging there could be heard clearly from where he stood. Durutte’s Division was contesting the land before Papelotte and La Haye while the ill-advised cavalry attacks must have weakened the Allied centre to some extent. The divisions of Donzelot, Allix and Marcognet were edging forward against the Allied ridge on the right and Wellington must have committed all his reserves by now.

Napoleon’s main worry was the threat posed by the Prussians but, if he attacked swiftly, they might not be able to intervene in time to save their allies. After an exhausting forced march from Wavre, the Prussian infantry must be tired and would take time to concentrate and form for battle. The right flank of this attack would be vulnerable if Plancenoit fell but he felt obliged to take this risk. The appearance of Ziethen’s I Corps was even more worrying but only served to harden the Emperor’s resolve, as he felt he must act before they were fully deployed. Hearing Grouchy’s cannon to the east, he took heart, hoping that this action would occupy a substantial portion of the Prussian Army or even force them to disengage from the fighting at Waterloo.

The Imperial Guard battalions he had held back were fresh and eager to enter the fray. For more than 6 hours, his army had mounted incessant attacks against Wellington’s centre, which had suffered a dreadful pounding from his artillery. Crucially, now that La Haye Sainte was in French hands, the Anglo-Allied centre lay exposed to a direct assault. There was a strong chance that the Imperial Guard could break through. They had never let him down before and one last determined effort might bring success. Yet he had never needed a decisive victory more than he needed one now. If Napoleon was defeated here, Grouchy could also be cut off and his army destroyed in detail, leaving the French frontier open behind them.

Infantry of the Imperial Guard advance into battle. (A Bligny)

Napoleon estimated that there were only 2 hours of daylight left and, during this time, he would have to strike a crushing blow against Wellington’s army. Turning to General Drouot, Napoleon commanded: ‘La Garde au Feu!’ (‘Send up the Guard!’).

VOILA GROUCHY!

As the final preparations for the attack went into motion, Napoleon adopted the dangerous strategy of deceiving his own army, hoping to convince his soldiers that victory lay within their grasp. Ziethen’s I Corps was now clearly visible on their right flank and beginning to engage. He ordered several officers, including Colonel Octave Levavasseur, to spread word that these were actually French troops and Grouchy had finally arrived. Levavasseur recalled that he: ‘set off at a gallop, with my hat raised on the point of my sabre, and rode down the line shouting: ‘Vive l’Empereur! Soldats, voila Grouchy!’ The shout was taken up by a thousand voices. The exaltation of the troops reached fever pitch and they all shouted: ‘En avant! En avant! Vive l’Empereur!’ Looking up on the ridge, they could see firing and smoke from some of the unfortunate clashes between Allied and Prussian troops. This, along with signs of the action being fought by the remnants of d’Erlon’s Corps along the ridge, added credence to the lie. Marshal Ney was not the only senior officer to be appalled by this subterfuge, guessing that it would lead to trouble.

Generals Drouot and Friant led the Guard forward at around 7.00pm. Napoleon and his staff rode before them to a point 600yd (548m) south of La Haye Sainte. Just as it seemed that the Emperor might lead his men into combat personally, he turned aside, his officers begging him to turn back, believing he would be killed. He allowed Ney to take command and lead the Guard forward, which now debouched from the road and formed into attack columns. Ney’s primary objective was to seize the crossroads and the village of Mont St Jean after he had broken through the enemy line.

Although their Emperor appeared magnificently indifferent to the Guard as they marched past him, inwardly he must have been in a state of turmoil as he watched their advance. Everything he had gained so far depended upon the outcome of this engagement. He was committed and there was no turning back. The gravity of this situation was increased by his knowledge that, if the Guard failed, Napoleon’s army was so closely committed that he might not be able to extricate it from the fighting intact.

Now the fighting along the ridgeline intensified, as the Anglo-Allied Army received welcome reinforcements from Ziethen’s Corps and d’Erlon’s hard-pressed divisions began to waver. Yet the sight of the Guard advancing and Napoleon’s presence stiffened their resolve. One veteran, who had fought at Marengo, sat wounded by the highway with both of his legs shattered by a cannon ball. As the Guard marched forward he yelled at them: ‘It is nothing, comrades; forward! And long live the Emperor!’

EN AVANT!

The Imperial Guard attacked at between 7. 30 and 7.45pm. The attack would be in 2 lines with 8 battalions (averaging 600 men each) of the Middle Guard making the main assault. Three battalions of the Old Guard would form the second line and would remain in support unless the Middle Guard broke through. They would then advance and exploit any gains that the first line had made. The fact that the Emperor was committing his finest infantry, always reserved for a shattering coup de grâce, revealed that decisive action of the battle was about to take place.

Napoleon had sent dispatches to d’Erlon and Reille urging them to redouble their efforts and keep the enemy occupied on either side of the attack, giving it a greater chance of success. Essentially this would be a combined attack in three main sections of the battlefield and not confined to the assault of the Imperial Guard alone. Historian Mark Adkin called it: ‘as near a general advance, spearheaded by the Guard, that the French achieved at Waterloo’.

One battalion of the Old Guard remained at Le Caillou to protect the Emperor’s baggage and act as Napoleon’s bodyguard in the event of a reverse. The 2/3rd Grenadiers were posted at Rossomme as a reserve and a further two battalions of the Old Guard stopped to the east of Hougoumont to protect the left flank of the attack. The five Middle Guard battalions now marched up the declivity between Hougoumont and La Haye Sainte. This was open farmland and the previously high crops here had been trampled down after repeated cavalry assaults on the ridge.

The attack of the Imperial Guard.

Although this became one of the most famous assaults in military history, French accounts of this attack are inconsistent and the formations they adopted to assault the Allied ridge are still hotly debated. Some historians suggest that they advanced in square, while others believe that they formed in massive attack columns. Chandler claimed that they pressed forward in: ‘close column of grand divisions (on a two company frontage) to the beat of their drums interspersed by occasional concerted cries of ‘Vive l’Empereur!’.

Houssaye believed that Ney directed the attack poorly from the outset and, rather than inclining diagonally to the left of La Haye Sainte, should have advanced directly along the highway in one huge column. This was also the area subjected to the heaviest bombardment by the Grande Batterie and the high embankments here would afford some protection from enemy artillery. However, Chandler argued that this would have been difficult as the Guard would have been compelled to divide into different formations to circumnavigate the farmhouse and ran the risk of becoming disordered and intermingled with Quiot’s and Donzelot’s brigades, still heavily engaged on and around the highway. Furthermore, the whole area was strewn with dead horses, broken cannon and the general wreckage of former attacks, which would have impeded their advance.

The Middle Guard actually advanced to the west of La Haye Sainte towards the ridge where brigades under Adam, Maitland and Halkett stood. The Brunswick battalions to the east of the crossroads and directly above La Haye Sainte were under attack by elements of Donzelot’s Brigade by this time. Advancing in echelon in two large columns (according to the most accepted theories about their formations) they would strike the ridge successively. From the crossroads to Hougoumont, the ridge on the Anglo-Allied right sweeps round in a gigantic curve and thus their artillery was deployed in a wide semi-circle with the Imperial Guard marching towards its centre.

Although many Allied cannon on the ridge had been dismounted by French cannon fire, there were still plenty of guns left to be trained against the Guard as they toiled up the slopes. At 200yd (182m), the gunners loaded with double shot (roundshot and canister) and opened fire. The guns deployed at the edge of this semi-circle could fire into the flanks of the attack and terrible gaps were torn in the lines as they fired downwards into the advancing men. Yet the Guard continued to press on with a measured step, calmly closing up the gaps in their line and stepping around those struck down by the cannon fire. Drummers towards the head of the column beat out the pas de charge, helping the Guard keep in step and inspiring them onward. Periodically the marching men gave a deep-throated shout of ‘Vive l’Empereur!’, which carried across the hillside, a war cry that had unsettled French enemies on many former battlefields.

About 3,500 men of the Middle Guard now climbed the ridge. A horse artillery battery under Lieutenant Colonel Duchand of the Old Guard accompanied them. He had divided his guns into four sections and these advanced in the intervals between the battalions. The ridge was steep and the flattened corn was still damp so they must have experienced considerable difficulty doing so but they unlimbered their cannon about 110yd (100m) from the ridge and began to lay down a heavy fire. Captain Mercer’s battery had already suffered casualties that day and his gunners were almost exhausted following hours of serving their guns. This entailed loading heavy roundshot, ramming down charges, sponging out the barrels after each discharge and manhandling the guns back into place after the recoil of each shot propelled the cannon backwards. He recorded how French guns unlimbered about 400yd (365m) from them and began to target his troops:

The rapidity and precision of this fire were quite appalling. Every shot almost took effect and I certainly expected that we should all be annihilated. Our horses and limbers, being a little retired down the [reverse] slope, had hitherto been somewhat under cover from the direct fire in front; but this plunged right amongst them, knocking them down by pairs, and creating horrible confusion …

The crest of the ridge where the Allied troops deployed to meet the attack of the Imperial Guard. The land slopes down sharply to the right of this picture.

No skirmishers had been sent out to prepare the attack as the Guard relied on speed of attack, hoping the shock of their assault would break their enemy’s line and see them carry the ridge. As the majority of Allied skirmishers had been withdrawn to reinforce the main battalions at this point, the Guard did not suffer much from skirmisher fire as they came on. A line of British infantry brigades awaited the Imperial Guard just behind the crest of the ridge with Nassauer and Hanoverian troops deployed to the right of the French attack.

MAJOR GENERAL SIR FREDERICK ADAM

Adam was 34 when he fought at Waterloo as the commander of the 3rd British Brigade in Clinton’s 2nd British Infantry Division. Known for his straightforward approach to soldiering, he was also considered a strict disciplinarian. After serving in Egypt, Sicily and Spain he was trusted with the command of the 52nd, 71st and 2/95th at Waterloo, whose recent experiences during the Peninsular War served him well that day.

It was his brigade, along with Maitland’s, that absorbed the brunt of the final attack of the Imperial Guard – often considered as the climax of the battle. The stoic resistance of his brigade arrested the progress of the second French column and, when the 52nd swung outwards from the main line, giving their fire almost at a right angle into the French flank, it proved decisive.

In the wake of the Imperial Guard’s repulse, Wellington ordered Adam to advance on one of the French batteries still firing at the Anglo-Allied Army as it advanced on all fronts. ‘Adam, you must dislodge those fellows’, the Duke declared. Adam obeyed and was successful in capturing the battery but sustained a severe wound in the last ½ hour of the battle.

Taken to Brussels, Adam received medical treatment and eventually recovered. For his service at Waterloo, Wellington recommended him for a KCB (Knight Commander of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath), one of the most prestigious awards that the Prince Regent could bestow.

NOW IS YOUR TIME!

Things began well on the right of the attack with the 1/3rd Grenadiers pushing back some Nassauer battalions who fell back in considerable disorder at their approach. However, Sir Colin Halkett’s Hanoverian troops offered stouter resistance and though Halkett himself fell badly injured in the resulting firefight, General Chassé brought up elements of Ditmer’s Dutch-Belgian Brigade to support them on their left. Indeed, Krahmer’s Belgian Battery did great execution against the advancing infantry and Halkett credited them with turning the enemy back as much as the fire of his own infantry. It was at this point that Ney’s fifth horse sank under him as he tried to rally the grenadiers.

Chassé’s Netherlands Division had seen little action for most of the day, being positioned near Braine d’Alleud, and comprised 12 battalions of around 7,000 men. However, most were untested militia and, as they began to advance, many quailed under the fire that Duchand’s Battery laid down against them. Seeing confusion setting in, Chassé pulled his men back behind the hedgerows lining the road in order to reform them under relative shelter from the guns. Both Halkett’s and Chassé’s infantry suffered greatly from Duchand’s cannon and the bombardment only slackened a little when counter fire from Krahmer’s guns was levelled at the French artillery.

The 4th Grenadiers and the 1/3rd Chasseurs crested the ridge at the centre of the French attack. Despite the pounding they had received as they marched up the slopes, Ensign-Lieutenant J P Dirom of the 1st Foot Guards believed they had suffered relatively few losses from artillery fire, emphasizing his belief that the matter was ultimately decided with musketry and bayonet. He saw that: ‘The Imperial Guard advanced in close column with ported arms, the Officers of the leading Divisions in front waving their swords. The French Columns showed no appearance of having suffered on their advance, but seemed regularly formed as if at a field day.’

The batteries of Kuhlmann and Cleeves on this part of the ridge were running low on ammunition, which may explain why the Imperial Guard had suffered so little according to Dirom. Gronow recalled seeing the tall bearskins worn by many of the Guard, appearing above the crest as they advanced, with some trepidation. This would be a clash between the elite troops of both armies and the outcome was far from certain.

Maitland’s Guards Brigade (about 1,400 men) was placed to confront the first column, but as the French advanced they initially saw only a group of mounted officers as the Guards were lying prone in ranks about 60yd (18m) behind the Chemin d’Ohain. Wellington was here with his staff and could not resist giving the order for them to stand as the enemy appeared, crying: ‘Now Maitland, now’s your time!’ Posterity has often credited him with the phrase of ‘Up, Guards, and at them!’ but this is unsupported by contemporary accounts. Lieutenant Captain H W Powell of the 1st Foot Guards recorded what happened next:

They continued to advance till within fifty or sixty paces of our front, when the Brigade were ordered to stand up. Whether it was from the sudden and unexpected appearance of a Corps so near them, which must have seemed as starting out of the ground, or the tremendously heavy fire we threw into them, La Garde, who had never before failed in an attack suddenly stopped.

Most of the Allied brigades on the ridge had remained deployed in four ranks and the Imperial Guard faced a narrower frontage than the usual two-rank firing lines, which had wrought such havoc upon French columns in the past. Nonetheless, while fewer muskets could be fired, the firepower now set against them was concentrated and deadly at such close range. The Guards brigades contained some of the best soldiers under Wellington’s command and they now laid down steady and disciplined volley fire into their attackers. Dirom later wrote that:

When they got within a short distance we were ordered to make ready, present, and fire. The effect of our volley was evidently most deadly. The French Columns appeared staggered, and, if I may use the expression, convulsed. Part seemed inclined to advance, part halted and fired, and others, more particularly towards the centre and rear of the Columns, seemed to be turning round.

The Foot Guards fired several volleys into the Imperial Guard, felling dozens of men. According to some sources, this initial volley shot down 20 per cent of the Guards in this formation. Although this may well be an exaggeration, the redcoats’s fire certainly had a devastating effect at this range. The fact that their enemies were far closer than they had imagined and the determination of their resistance would also have had a ruinous effect on French morale.

Despite this, the Grenadiers and Chasseurs stubbornly returned fire and officers tried to change the formation from column into line to do this more effectively. Accounts vary but they probably completed this manoeuvre, quite a feat in the face of such withering fire. Large numbers of men fell on both sides during this close-range firefight but the British gradually began to gain an edge in the struggle.

With their enemies reeling from the effect of their musketry, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 1st Foot Guards mounted a bayonet charge. Gronow charged with the 3rd Battalion and took part in the fierce engagement that followed:

It appeared that our men, deliberately and with calculation, singled out their victims, for as they came upon the Imperial Guard our line broke and the fighting became irregular. The impetuosity of our men seemed almost to paralyse their enemies; I witnessed several … who were run through the body apparently without any resistance on their parts. I observed a big Welshman by the name of Hughes, who was six feet seven inches in height, run through with his bayonet and knock down with the butt-end of his firelock, I should think a dozen, at least of his opponents.

The Imperial Guard gave ground reluctantly at first but the shock of this savage attack was irresistible and they fled back the way they had come in some disorder. Gronow recorded that they resisted for nearly 10 minutes. This was rare as most infantrymen hesitated to fight at close quarters, knowing what horrific wounds edged weapons inflicted in such a melee. Usually the side who had suffered the worst during the preparatory musketry duel swiftly gave way but the Imperial Guard were stubborn and did not fall back easily.

The British Guardsmen pursued the remnants of the first column cautiously after this hand-to-hand clash. This was fortunate, as Powell remarked: ‘We charged down the hill till we had passed the end of the orchard of Hougoumont, when our right flank became exposed to another heavy Column …’. This was the second column, which was advancing in support of the first. The Guardsmen hurriedly turned and retired back up the slope in the face of this new threat.

The second column advanced closer to Hougoumont and comprised the 4th Chasseurs and 2/3rd Chasseurs. Although surprised by the swift repulse of the first column, these veterans were not easily demoralized and officers shouted at the men retreating down the slope to rally and reform upon their rear. The French had brought up squadrons of cuirassiers and Guard cavalry to cover the assault columns in case cavalry was deployed against them and the sight of these units caused the retreating Guardsmen to halt. Many reformed in ranks and followed in the wake of the second column.

As the second column crested the ridge, they were opposed by Adam’s 3rd Brigade who swiftly laid down a heavy fire against them. Although they had advanced with more caution than the first column, this fire broke the momentum of their advance and the second assault column rapidly halted and attempted to redeploy into a firing line.

As they did so, Colonel Colborne marched the 52nd Foot out, pivoting their line so that it inclined towards the left flank of the column. This enabled the 52nd to fire into the side of the attacking column so that the French received musketry from two angles. Having performed this manoeuvre under fire many times in the Peninsula, the 52nd executed this manoeuvre swiftly so the intensity of their fire denied the French any chance of redeploying on their left. As men marched out from the rear sections of the column, the British shot them down in droves and Guardsmen instinctively shrank back from the fusillade. Blocked by the ranks of the files in front of them, their return fire was sporadic and could not compete with the volume of musketry laid down by the 52nd.

Lieutenant General Baron Delort sat in front of his squadrons of cuirassiers, brought up to support the attack, and recalled seeing the Middle Guard wilting under a hail of musketry and canister as they struggled to maintain their footing on the plateau. Placed to protect the flank against cavalry, and possibly cover a withdrawal, he was frustrated that they could do nothing but watch at this stage.

In the face of this concentrated firepower, the attack stalled and the French began to waver. This time the British did not contest the fight with musketry for so long, swiftly charging their muskets and marching forward with bayonets levelled. Advancing in a menacing silence at first, the redcoats suddenly gave a great cheer just before they charged. Many troops had quailed at such a sight in the past and fled before a clash occurred but these were veterans to a man and confidence and pride made them stubborn. They stood to meet the counter-attack; a violent struggle ensued with bayonets, swords and musket butts but the result was a foregone conclusion after the losses the French had sustained.

The column’s formation broke slowly at first but gathered momentum as more and more men ran from the rear ranks to flee down the slopes. Men at the front went down under the bayonets of the Foot Guards and, as the 52nd charged into their flank, their formations broke up into small knots of men grimly thrusting their muskets back at their attackers. These last groups were soon overwhelmed and the British chased the retreating French down the ridge once more as the Imperial Guard finally fled in disorder.

At first Allied artillery fired canister into the fugitives as they retreated, cutting many down, but the redcoats pursued them so closely that they risked hitting their own men. An artillery officer of Bolton’s Battery conceded: ‘The combatants were so mingled, that we were compelled to cease firing.’ Some of the Guard still had fight left in them and tried to reform at the foot of the ridge but were set upon by the British infantry rushing down the slope and swiftly shot or cut down. The pursuit continued until it was roughly level with Hougoumont again. Knowing that French cavalry remained in the area, Guards officers recalled their men, ordering them to fall back up the slope to reform.

THE RETREAT

The arrival of the Prussian II Corps under General Pirch finally tipped the balance in the fight for Plancenoit. Men from the 5th Infantry Brigade under Tippelskirch spearheaded a final assault that saw its defenders overwhelmed and finally forced Lobau to abandon the village. By 8.30pm, they were in headlong retreat, though some sources claim that small pockets of French defenders held out until around 9.00pm. Durutte’s Division still contested the area around Papelotte and La Haye but a strong attack by Ziethen’s Corps saw them rapidly give ground and finally forced into retreat. Set upon by Prussian hussars, Durutte received several vicious sword cuts to the head and had his right hand cut off by a sabre blow as he tried to defend himself against numerous assailants. Only the speed of his horse spared him from worse and he was carried away by the retreat. The French right flank had totally collapsed and the Prussians now advanced in strength.

The brigades of Donzelot, Allix and Marcognet had continued to attack and hold the Allied troops in the centre and along the ridge to the east of La Haye Sainte throughout the assault by the Imperial Guard. News rapidly spread that the Guard had been defeated and the despairing cry of ‘La Garde Recule!’ (‘The Guard Recoils’) now went up. At first this was met with disbelief as many had an unshakeable faith in the Guard’s invincibility but the sight of Guardsmen running en masse down the ridge dispelled this illusion, provoking an immediate withdrawal to the foot of the ridge. Already distrustful of their high command, soldiers began to shout ‘Sauve qui peut!’ (‘Save yourself if you can!’). They could see that the right flank had collapsed and Napoleon’s subterfuge was now laid bare. It was clear to the rank-and-file that it was the Prussians who had arrived in force, with Grouchy’s command nowhere to be seen.

Observing that the enemy was in disarray below him, Wellington stood in his stirrups and, waving his bicorne hat above his head, ordered a general advance along the entire line of the Anglo-Allied Army. Lord Uxbridge wondered if the enemy was truly broken at this point and suggested that they only advance as far as the French ridge, but Wellington responded: ‘Oh, damn it! In for a penny, in for a pound is my maxim; and if the troops advance they shall go as far as they can.’

Attacks on Hougoumont ceased abruptly and Reille’s infantry fell back towards the French ridge. The garrison there had been under intense pressure since late morning and were relieved to see their own infantry marching down from the ridge behind them. Macdonnell realized that his men were too exhausted to join in the pursuit and let them enjoy a well-earned respite. Reille’s Corps was close enough to see the retreat of the Imperial Guard in detail and the sight proved too much for them. While officers vainly tried to maintain order, a hasty withdrawal ensued. Panic had set in throughout the army and many dispersed and ran towards the French ridge, some throwing down their arms as they did so. Within 15 minutes of the Guard’s repulse, the Armée du Nord was in full retreat.

Some cavalry squadrons attempted to cover the withdrawal but the total collapse of the army’s front and right flank rendered this a hopeless task. In any case, the French cavalry had suffered terrible losses during the massed charges earlier that day and many felt disinclined to risk their lives for what was clearly a lost cause. As the overwhelming numbers set against them became clear, most cavalry officers turned their squadrons about and retired. Others simply lost control of their squadrons, which dispersed and joined the frantic rush to quit the stricken field.

Anglo-Allied cavalry pressed forward and the infantry advanced steadily down the slopes, as Napoleon’s army disintegrated before them. For a short while, the bulk of the artillery maintained their positions and fired upon the retreating French but some of the horse artillery began to limber up in order to join in the pursuit. The 40th Foot advanced on La Haye Sainte, firmly driving the tirailleurs before them. Their grenadier company, along with that of the 27th Foot, forced their way back into the farmhouse but the French were already in the process of abandoning the farm and they encountered little resistance, easily retaking the position.

French artillery on the La Belle Alliance Ridge still pounded the Anglo-Allied ridge in an effort to cover the retreat and permit an orderly withdrawal. Yet most French units, especially on the right, were totally broken and the retreat soon turned into a rout. The guns continued to fire, sometimes cutting down friend and foe alike as Allied cavalry rode down scattered French infantry in the valley. Captain Stretton of the 40th Foot recorded that their aim was still deadly even as their army broke and fled about them: ‘whilst the Regiment was in open column, a round shot from the Enemy took off the head of a Captain (Fisher) near me, and striking his Company on the left flank, put hors de combat more than twenty-five men. This was the most destructive shot I ever witnessed during a long period of service.’

Although their attack had been repulsed, the three remaining battalions of the Old Guard did not waver. The 1/2nd Grenadiers, 2/1st and 2/2nd Chasseurs formed squares in a line and slowly withdrew as hordes of fugitives sped past them. Two battalions marched across country towards La Belle Alliance while the other retired directly along the highway. Some of the Guards from the shattered assault rallied on the squares and were allowed to enter the ranks but most fleeing infantrymen were abruptly forced out of their path and even fired upon as the officers feared they would disrupt their ranks, leaving them exposed to cavalry.

Enemy cavalry bore down into the retreat and set upon the squares. Yet the Guard presented an unwavering hedge of bayonets to their attackers with the rear ranks calmly shooting over their kneeling comrades to down horses and empty saddles. At this stage in the pursuit, while they continued to harass the Guard, their pursuers concentrated upon easier targets. There were plenty of scattered infantrymen running desperately for the French ridge to the south, who could offer little resistance, many having thrown down their arms.

Wellington moved forward with his staff to observe the troops’ progress and this small group of horsemen was fired upon when they entered the low ground to the south of La Haye Sainte as they watched Vivian’s Cavalry Brigade mounting charges against the French ridge. Uxbridge was struck by a piece of canister, which shattered his right knee, and was ironically one of the final French artillery shots during the battle. ‘Looking down at his maimed leg, he gasped: “By God, sir, I’ve lost my leg!” Wellington momentarily removes the telescope from his eye, considers the mangled limb, and says, “By God, sir, so you have!” and resumes his scrutiny of the victorious field.’

One of Uxbridge’s aides, Captain Thomas Wildman of the 7th Hussars, observed the moment that Vivian’s hussars charged the ridge:

taking two squares of Infantry and a column of Cavalry in their way. Our infantry rushed down also; the Prussians closed in our left. Genl. Vandeleur’s Brigade cut up those who were dispersed, and the rout became general. A panic seized the enemy in every direction, and they fled on all sides deserting their artillery throwing down their arms and each man thinking of his own preservation. Our Cavalry & the Prussians joined in the pursuit, the latter continued it the whole night, giving no quarter.

Count d’Erlon came across a ragged figure as he crossed the Brussels highway in the midst of the fugitives. Bareheaded with his face stained by powder smoke, Marshal Ney had been in the thick of the fighting throughout the day and an epaulette on one shoulder on his uniform had been cut in half by a sabre blow. He shouted and pleaded with the fugitives to stand and fight, brandishing his broken sword, in an attempt to rally them. Recognizing the general as he was carried past by a torrent of panicked men, he shouted: ‘D’Erlon, if we escape this, we shall be hanged!’

With his efforts by the roadside ignored, Ney moved on and tried to stop two battalions from Durutte’s Division who were retiring in relatively good order. Hoping to get them to stop and cover the retreat, he roared: ‘Come and see how a Marshal of France can die!’ Yet even these men could clearly see that the day was lost and marched stoically past, casting their eyes downward rather than meet his accusing gaze.

THE LAST OF THE OLD GUARD

When he realized that all was lost, Napoleon briefly took refuge in one of the infantry squares of his Old Guard. The frantic efforts of senior French officers to slow the retreat had failed and even the sight of the Emperor failed to rally fleeing men as they ran, terror stricken by the threat of being sabred by enemy cavalry, who were already beginning a pursuit. Knowing that the situation was irretrievable, Napoleon rode back to Rossomme, accompanied by a few officers and some Guard cavalry.

Some believed that Napoleon, when he realized that all was lost, should have chosen to die on the battlefield. Certainly, Prince Jérôme thought this would have been the most honourable course for his brother to choose, as it seemed that a second military comeback was unlikely. It is possible that, when he led the Imperial Guard forward during the final attack, it had been his intention to die at the head of his men. Some have even speculated that this was the case, as he must have known that this assault was doomed to defeat before he had ordered it. Yet this would reveal a remarkable callousness in the Emperor to sacrifice so many in an empty gesture. However, considering that Napoleon valued the army above all things and had proven his willingness on many battlefields to stake all on a final gamble, this seems highly unlikely.

By the time they had regained their own ridge near La Belle Alliance, the ranks of the Imperial Guard had thinned considerably. Thousands of fugitives blocked the main road slowing their withdrawal and British and Dutch-Belgian cavalry were mounting increasingly determined attacks against them, knowing that once these pockets of resistance were crushed they could fall upon the fleeing army and harry it with impunity. Yet they now faced a greater threat as their slow withdrawal had allowed Anglo-Allied infantry to catch up with them. Packed in dense ranks three or four men deep, they made an easy target as British and Prussian infantry levelled their firelocks and fired into them, cutting down dozens of men with each volley. Once they had inflicted enough damage, the cavalry would be able to charge into the disintergrating squares and cut them to pieces.

It soon became clear that the Guard were on the brink of annihilation and a British officer approached the tattered square of the 2/1st Chasseurs under a flag of truce, calling upon them to surrender. From within the square General Cambronne (who was in command) roared a single word in reply: ‘Merde!’ (‘Excrement!’). Immediately after this defiant retort, the firing recommenced. The Guard marched painfully toward the rear, leaving a bloody trail of casualties in their wake.

GENERAL CAMBRONNE

Pierre Jacque Cambronne came from a poor, working class background and volunteered for military service in 1792 as a private soldier. He rose swiftly through the ranks after fighting in some of the hardest campaigns of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. Renowned as a true fighting man, he was ill-educated, hard drinking and led from the front. Such attributes enabled him to gain the respect of his men and the army in general. Although wounded at Ligny, he insisted on retaining command of the 1st Chasseurs à Pied of the Guard at Waterloo, comprising 2 battalions totalling around 1,200 men.

Despite an illustrious military career, he is mostly remembered for his refusal to surrender at Waterloo during the fighting retreat of the Old Guard. This became celebrated in France as ‘le mot de Cambronne’ (‘the word of Cambronne’) but its exact wording has always been disputed. The reply: ‘La Garde meurt et ne se rend pas!’ (‘The Guard dies but never surrenders!’) was considered by many contemporaries to be the fabrication of a French journalist who sought to glorify his cruder assertion of ‘Merde!’ Certainly, Wellington, who met Cambronne and knew something of his character, ridiculed the idea that he had made such a grand statement during the chaos of battle.

Initially Cambronne endorsed his single-word retort but when he married into polite and (ironically) English society, he claimed to have used the more poetically fitting phrase. He could in fact have used a combination of both versions but whatever the truth may be, Cambronne did surrender eventually. Yet his gesture of defiance made him a French national hero. Victor Hugo, while admitting that dying with his men would have been a more romantic end, justly acknowledged that: ‘For being willing to die is the same as to die; and it was not the man’s fault if he survived after he was shot.’

In truth, the valiant last stand of Cambronne and the Guard requires no embellishment but the longer version of his shouted defiance was carved on his tombstone when he died in 1842. Nevertheless, it is ironic that history remembers this old campaigner for a phrase he may never have used.

Napoleon flees the battlefield when he realizes that all is lost.

‘No surrender!’ The Old Guard refuse quarter as they fall back, covering their army’s retreat. (Illustrated London News, 1852)

After this incident, the Chasseurs continued to withdraw but Cambronne was hit in the forehead by a spent musket ball, which knocked him unconscious. Left for dead, when he regained his senses, he staggered after the square, which had moved on. Seeing the general, Lieutenant Colonel William Halkett (in Hanoverian service) rode up to him and was about to cut him down with his sword when Cambronne surrendered. Following his captor, Cambronne then tried to escape when Halkett’s horse was shot from under him. Jumping up after his fall, Halkett pursued his prisoner and relayed how: ‘I instantly overtook him, laid hold of him by the aiguillette, and brought him in safely and gave him in charge to a sergeant of the Osnabrückers to deliver to the Duke …’.

The three battalions continued to fall back in good order, pausing only to fire volleys to keep their attackers at bay. Hundreds fell during this short retreat but their sacrifice was covering the army’s retreat and allowing their Emperor to reach safety. Soon they had to adopt smaller triangular formations since they had lost so many men. Finally, these were reduced to shapeless huddles as the proud Guardsmen determindly reloaded and aimed their muskets while their comrades fell about them, defiant to the last. Eventually the battalions broke up entirely but, though some joined the rout, few men were taken prisoner.

When Napoleon reached Rossomme, he found two fresh battalions of the 1st Grenadiers awaiting him there under General Petit. These also formed squares, retired along the main road where they occasionally paused to fend off pursuing cavalry, and gave short shrift to any fugitives who blocked their line of retreat. Now in headlong retreat, the army had degenerated into a mob and Petit later wrote of the horrors he witnessed: ‘The enemy was close at our heels, and, fearing that he might penetrate the squares, we were obliged to fire at the men who were being pursued and who threw themselves wildly at the squares. This was one evil we had to incur in order to avoid a greater one.’

When they reached Le Caillou, other senior officers including Soult, Drouot and Lobau who had ridden there with their staff joined Napoleon. They now combined with the 1/1st Chasseurs and the Emperor abandoned most of his imperial baggage and fell back on Genappe 2 miles (3.2km) to the south, where he hoped to rally the army.

Napoleon quickly realized that the situation at Genappe was hopeless once he arrived on the outskirts of the town. Its streets were in chaos and the highway was blocked with retreating soldiers. With Prussian cavalry falling upon their rear and sabring them unmercifully, the soldiers were disordered and panic-stricken. Although the Dyle was only 10ft wide (3m) at this point, a desperate struggle took place as men fought with each other trying to cross by the narrow bridge spanning the river.

The Guard battalions marched around the eastern side of Genappe, fording the shallow river and circumventing the town to regain the highroad from the south. It took Napoleon’s escort an hour to clear a path for his carriage through the mob. Ultimately, they had to abandon the carriage and Napoleon was given a horse and then rode with his escort back towards the French frontier.

At around 10.00pm that evening, Wellington had a fortuitous meeting with Blücher near La Belle Alliance. According to Wellington, the Prussian commander embraced and kissed him exclaiming: ‘Mein lieber Kamerad!’ and then ‘Quelle affaire!’, which the Duke laconically observed in later years ‘was pretty much all he knew of French’. Aides had already carried messages between them and the Prussians agreed to take up the pursuit as the Anglo-Allied Army was almost spent after such a long fight.

Despite Blücher’s assertion that his men were fresher than Wellington’s, a large portion of his army had fought at Waterloo and all of them had endured a long march from Wavre over difficult terrain. Yet he was determined to pursue the French almost to extinction and dreamed of capturing Napoleon, against whom the Marshal nursed a considerable grudge. Using an interpreter, he indicated the name of the nearby tavern and suggested that ‘La Belle Alliance’ would be a fitting name for the titanic struggle that had just taken place.

Viewpoints

THE ALLIED CENTRE RIGHT

When standing in the open fields between Hougoumont and La Haye Sainte, it is still possible to gain an impression of the obstacles faced by the Imperial Guard during their final attack. The steepness of the slope is now somewhat reduced due to the construction of the Lion Mound and modern farming techniques but, looking up at the skyline from the floor of the valley today, it is clear that it would have been a difficult march. Certainly, the teams of Duchand’s Battery would have encountered problems dragging guns and caissons behind them due to the steep declivity along with the impediments left from previous attacks.

At various points from the foot of the ridge or the lane running along its crest, it becomes apparent that Wellington’s troops were deployed in a sweeping curve and the cannon on the ridge could fire into oncoming formations from several angles. Viewing the area from the Lion Mound, this becomes even more evident. Most sources agree that the Middle Guard sustained heavy casualties from artillery fire before they even crested the ridge to match their muskets against the British, Dutch and German battalions awaiting them on the reverse slope.

It is important to remember that artillery was the biggest single killer on Napoleonic battlefields and that, although the Guard was finally halted and repulsed by musket fire and bayonet charges, cannon fire would have played a major role in their defeat.

THE WOUNDED EAGLE MONUMENT (LOCATION MAP REFERENCE 14)

As long ago as 1815, the French had requested a monument to commemorate the sacrifices made by the French Army at Waterloo. Predictably, the restored Bourbon monarchy refused to honour the army of their greatest enemy who had planned to supplant them. Even after the Revolution of 1848, there was little official enthusiasm for such projects and successive French Governments also proved disinterested. As Waterloo had been a great defeat for France, public subscriptions raised insufficient funds for a suitable monument and it seemed that French plans would come to nothing. Yet the efforts of writers and historians went a long way to changing popular opinion in France and in 1900 Houssaye wrote:

The Comte de Maroy, Gustave Laronnet and myself, have had the idea of erecting a modest memorial to the French soldiers killed on 18 June 1815. We bought a plot of land at the junction between Grande route de Bruxelles and the Chemin de Plancenoit. We presented it to the military society of Sabretache. Jerome produced the model of the wounded eagle that will be cast in bronze and will crown the memorial …

Count Albert de Maroy had chosen the location after walking the battlefield, talking extensively with locals, and conferring closely with legal experts. Officially, they planned to pay tribute to the whole Armée de Nord but it was no accident that the site chosen was where the last square of the Imperial Guard was thought to have been wiped out. This is believed to have been the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Grenadiers of the Guard and the Wounded Eagle Memorial is closely associated with the noble self-sacrifice of the Old Guard, the actions of which are felt to have saved the honour of France during the disastrous retreat.

The Wounded Eagle Monument, which serves as a poignant reminder of the terrible losses that the French army sustained at Waterloo.

Some journalists objected to the location suggesting that Ligny, as the site of Napoleon’s last victory, would be more appropriate. Houssaye responded to this criticism thus: ‘We do not want to commemorate the Battle of Waterloo, which was a defeat, we simply want to honour the French soldiers who died for their country in this battle of giants.’

The Wounded Eagle was unveiled on 28 June 1904 amidst much ceremony. The sun shone, which brought out the crowds, but many had travelled a long way in their eagerness to witness the event. The day began with a Requiem Mass in St Cathérine’s Church, Plancenoit at 9.00am. At 2.00pm, dignitaries began to arrive at the railway station to attend the main opening ceremony. These included General Bruylant, who represented the King of Belgium, and Monsieur Gérard, the French Minister at Brussels.

Hundreds of French and Belgian soldiers came to see the new statue and a detachment of Belgian gendarmes formed a guard of honour around the monument, in full dress uniform, which included bearskin helmets similar to those of the Imperial Guard. Many national and society flags were on open display and 400–500 schoolchildren were brought by their teachers to witness the scene.

Houssaye was immensely pleased to greet so many descendants of men who had fought at Waterloo. These included the grandson of General Durutte and two relatives of Lieutenant General Duhesme of the Young Guard. Baron de Grandmaison, the grandson of Lieutenant General Mouton (Count Lobau) who commanded VI Corps, performed a special honour during the proceedings by respectfully laying his ancestor’s sword at the base of the new monument. Lobau had carried this weapon during the battle.

As many as 50,000 people gathered to see the unveiling and many more watched the ceremony from the Lion Mound and other vantage points, coming down to see the eagle later. An estimated 100,000 people assembled here that day, probably the first time since that battle that so many had visited this spot together. The great French military artist, Edouard Détaille, gave a speech before the unveiling:

It is with deep emotion and a feeling of patriotic piety that we tread upon this soil, this impassive witness of so much heroism, where the combatants of Waterloo rest for eternity … we salute as we pass the remains of all the brave men who rest side by side united in death. But we go straight to our dead, our soldiers, our grenadiers whose whitened bones, still in formation, indicate the location of the last square of the Old Guard and bring them the tender remembrance of the country of France.

As soon as he finished, the tricolour draped over the statue was lowered and the crowd applauded as they saw the statue. Houssaye also spoke in praise of the sculptor (Jean-Léon Gérôme) who had died only months before, shortly after completing this magnificent work. Openly weeping after the ceremony, the historian often commented during his later years that this had been the finest day of his life.

The Wounded Eagle’s stance is certainly dramatic and, visually, it is among the most impressive of all the Waterloo monuments. The bronze eagle clutches a French standard in one talon while the other is poised to fend off attack. The bird’s left wing is raised, revealing it to be rent with sword cuts and shot through by musket balls. It is a splendid depiction of one of most famous symbols of the First Empire. The plinth below the eagle bears a simple but poignant line in French, which translates: ‘To the last Combatants of the Grande Armée on 18 June 1815. The Sabretache. 18 June 1904’. The area taken up by the monument is 10.9yd (10m) square and fenced in with iron railings, decorated with the grenade symbol of the Imperial Guard’s grenadiers and the ‘N’ symbol for Napoleon.

Although the ceremony had been largely a French and Belgian affair, the Society of English Pilgrims of Waterloo laid a wreath of English roses and French violets (their colour being associated with Bonapartism) before the new monument. Their offering symbolized the new friendship that had grown up between the two nations and an accompanying card read: ‘To the immortal memory of the French heroes who died on the battlefield of Waterloo on 18 June 1815’.

The Sabretache Society bore the main cost of the construction but since 1986, the Association pour la Conservation des Monuments Napoléoniens has undertaken its maintenance and repair.

THE VICTOR HUGO MONUMENT (LOCATION MAP REFERENCE 13)

A column dedicated to the memory of Victor Hugo stands around 164yd (150m) south of La Belle Alliance on the eastern side of the main road. This monument must be unique in the history of commemorative structures raised on battlefields throughout the world in that it marks the efforts of an author recording events rather than a participant in the actual battle. Nevertheless, his countrymen were so impressed at what he wrote about Waterloo in works such as Les Misérables, Les Chatiments (The Punishments) and his poetry, that his work has become synonymous with the battle in the hearts of the French.

Victor Hugo wrote about Waterloo and his efforts impressed his countrymen so much that they erected this column to his memory, connecting him forever with the battlefield.

Hugo visited the area in 1861, famously writing much of the Waterloo chapter in Les Misérables at the Hôtel des Colonnes in Mont St Jean. While a literary masterpiece, his work contains many errors and most historians consider it as fiction loosely based on fact as far as the battle itself is concerned. Hugo stirred French passions with his emotive prose and there is no doubt that he considered Napoleon’s downfall as a national tragedy. He also lamented the manner in which the famous soldier was defeated and thought that he had been brought down by lesser men who owed more to chance than skill, writing scathingly: ‘It is not the victory of Europe over France, it is the complete, absolute, shattering, incontestable, final, supreme triumph of mediocrity over genius.’

Hector Fleischman (an historian) and Maurice Dubois (a military painter) raised subscriptions for a Victor Hugo monument in 1911. A huge crowd gathered on 22 September 1912 to see the foundation stone laid and work began but the death of Fleischman and the outbreak of the First World War meant that work halted on the site. Lack of funds and the Second World War further delayed progress and it was not until 1954 that work resumed.

The column is of very strong construction and a bronze medallion depicts the author’s countenance at its base. Extracts from his poems are also carved there, such as: ‘And this plain, alas! Where one dreams today, Fled those, before whom the world had fled!’ The Committee also added the following inscription:

This monument completed by the Victor Hugo Committee, non-profit making association in Brussels, was inaugurated on 24 June 1956. Original promoter Hector Fleischman, Manuel Ley, Jean Verhoeven, architects.

One day will come when there will be

no other battlefield than

markets opening to trade

and minds opening to ideas.

Yet the monument remains unfinished, as the architects had always intended to place a statuette of a bronze French cockerel at the summit of the column. Hopefully, this impressive monument will eventually receive that crowning glory.

THE GORDON MEMORIAL (LOCATION MAP REFERENCE 4)

The monument raised in remembrance of Lieutenant Colonel Sir Alexander Gordon of the 3rd Foot Guards stands at the south-west corner of Wellington’s crossroads. Gordon was one of Wellington’s eight aides-de-camp during the battle and a close friend of the Duke. ADCs were invaluable to a commander, acting as his eyes and ears while conveying orders across the battlefield, in a period when a fast horseman was the only reliable means of communication available. Officially, Wellington was only provided with four aides but, knowing their inestimable value and high mortality rate, he paid for a further four out of his own pocket.

Gordon received a mortal wound almost at the end of the battle while trying to stiffen the resolve of Brunswicker and British troops who were falling back before the Middle Guard’s assault. These troops were at the west of the crossroads and Wellington ordered him to complete this task when he saw the troops here were wavering. As he was trying to steady the square of the 2/30 Foot, his hip was shattered by a roundshot, probably fired from a gun in Duchand’s Battery, felling him from his horse.

The monument to Lieutenant Colonel Gordon of the 3rd Foot Guards who served as one of Wellington’s aides-de-camp at Waterloo. He was struck by a cannon ball and later died at the Duke’s headquarters aged only 29.

Sergeant Major Wood of the 30th Foot saw to it that he was carried back to Wellington’s headquarters in Waterloo where he was treated in the Duke’s own bed, a relic that can be still be seen in the Wellington Museum today. He survived the traumatic amputation of his leg but died suddenly in the night. Only one in three men survived similar operations during this period.

Dr John Hume, who had operated on Gordon, brought news of his death to the Duke the following morning and saw tears spring into the great man’s eyes upon hearing the news. After giving him a further update on the casualty figures for his army, Wellington famously remarked: ‘Well, thank God, I don’t know what it is to lose a battle; but certainly nothing can be more painful than to gain one with the loss of so many of one’s friends.’

Gordon’s memorial is in the form of a fluted column, surrounded by railings at its base and is reached by a stairway built into the cutting. The main road is always busy at this point and it can be dangerous to approach the stairs from across the road. If visitors need to cross, it is better to do so at the crossroads itself and walk down to the monument, although it is more photogenic from this side. The Hanoverian Monument directly opposite is a good place to take photographs as the column stands out starkly against the sky from here, with the Lion Mound in the background.

Gordon came from an old and distinguished Scottish family and his siblings paid for and raised his memorial in 1817. Due to the date of its construction, it is therefore possible to estimate the depth of the road cutting two years before, providing useful information for historians. With embankments this steep, it is easy to understand Houssaye’s point that it would have afforded considerable protection from cannon fire during the Middle Guard’s advance had they marched straight up the road instead of turning to advance obliquely towards the north-west. Yet it is also evident that the width of the highway would have restricted the formation’s width if the Middle Guard had formed a single column as suggested.

The monument is inscribed in English and French, giving details of Gordon’s extensive military career and describing the esteem the Duke held him in at some length. Underneath is a more concise description, which reads: ‘To the memory of the Hon. Sir Alexander Gordon KCB Lt-Col Scots Guards and Aide de Camp to the Duke of Wellington. After serving his country with distinction he was killed at the Battle of Waterloo 18th June 1815’.

Gordon was very unlucky, dying just before the decisive moment of the battle, especially as he had survived hard-fought campaigns in Portugal, Spain and France in recent years. Originally, he was buried in St Gilles Cemetery but was eventually disinterred and transferred to Evere Cemetery in Brussels, where he rests to this day.

Chapter 10

THE AFTERMATH

Although it did not become fully apparent until a few weeks afterwards, the Allies had just won one of the most decisive battles in world history. While the campaign continued over the rest of June, the impact of Waterloo was soon felt in France and French morale and resistance crumbled once they recognized the scale of the defeat.

The period now known as the ‘Hundred Days’ had been remarkable. Napoleon had returned from exile, established a new government and set out to fight a major war with a speed that seems barely credible. At the outset, fortune had smiled upon his endeavours. His grand strategy to divide Wellington and Blücher before the armies of the Seventh Coalition could converge on France was inspired and well executed but his enemies had become accustomed to his manner of waging war. Once they realized that Napoleon intended to divide them using the strategy of the central position, they made every effort to combine and thwart him. The campaign that began so well ended in disaster. Some time later, Napoleon remarked dourly: ‘Everything failed me just when everything had succeeded.’

THE VICTORY

During the early hours of 19 June, Wellington arose from an exhausted sleep and sat at his desk to write his famous Waterloo Dispatch, informing the British Government about recent events. Gordon lay dying in a nearby room and the Duke was physically and mentally weary after his exertions the previous day but he persevered with this task and wrote in his habitual straightforward, concise style.

Addressing his remarks to Lord Bathurst, Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, this would actually be the first of several dispatches as Wellington became acquainted with further intelligence about the battle as it came in. He acknowledged and paid tribute to the Prussian contribution but referred to only a few specific individuals and units from his own army to single them out for praise. In fact, the majority of the dispatch referred to the Anglo-Allied Army in general with remarks such as: ‘It gives me the greatest satisfaction to assure your Lordship that the army never, upon any occasion, conducted itself better.’ He later received criticism for a perceived lack of generosity, subsequently admitting that he ‘should have given more praise’ and did expand on his remarks in later communications. In fairness, he was in command of an army poised to embark on the invasion of France and had concerns that were more pressing.

Wellington gave the dispatch, along with the French Eagle standards captured at Waterloo, to Major Henry Percy (one of his ADCs) who rode in great haste for the coast and took ship to England. He sailed from Ostend on 20 June but weather conditions prevented the ship from putting in at Dover harbour as planned. Sailing up the coastline, high winds also prevented a landing at Ramsgate but Percy had himself rowed ashore in the small bay before Broadstairs village in Kent.

The Duke of Wellington writing his famed ‘Waterloo Dispatch’ after the battle.

Most authorities (such as Wellington himself in his first dispatch) state that Percy carried only two Eagles, those of the 45th and 105th Ligne. However, it is possible that a third was taken at Waterloo but this has never been confirmed. The sight of these standards jutting from the coach window attracted great attention in London, many guessing their appearance heralded a wonderful victory as they were rarely captured. Recent news of Quatre Bras had been ambiguous, so Percy’s arrival was greeted with jubilation.

Finding Lord Bathurst absent from Horse Guards (then Headquarters of the British Army), he sought to deliver the dispatch to Prime Minister Lord Liverpool, who was also not at his official residence of 10 Downing Street. Charles Arbuthnot, Secretary to the Treasury, then accompanied him to see the Prime Minister, who they found dining with his Cabinet. Initially sceptical, Lord Liverpool became ecstatic when Percy read Wellington’s dispatch aloud to the Cabinet and insisted that he convey the news to the Prince Regent.

FRENCH EAGLES

These standards were personally bestowed by the Emperor to each regiment (originally to each battalion but they were allotted to each regiment by 1815) and were among the most highly venerated symbols of the First Empire. Their design was based upon standards carried by the Imperial Legions of Ancient Rome, the martial achievements of which Napoleon admired. All battalions carried flags of some kind but Eagles (as well as symbolizing regimental pride and honour) were a visible indication to the men of the direction their main formation was heading in, where officers could be found and provided a rallying point for them to form upon.

The Eagle itself was 12.2in high (31cm) with a wingspan of 10in (25.5cm) and cast of bronze with a gold alloy finish. Its wings were spread with its head turned to the left and the eagle clutched a thunderbolt in one claw. It rested upon a 2in (5cm) high plinth bearing the number of the regiment to which the standard belonged. It weighed slightly less than 4lb (1.85kg) and regiments considered them more important than the accompanying flag. It surmounted a sturdy black pole 6.7ft (2m) long and the regimental flag was suspended below with their battle honours emblazoned upon it.

A reconstruction of a French Eagle on the roof of Eagle House at Broadstairs in Kent. In the background is the beach where the captured Eagles of the 45th and 105th regiments were brought ashore by Major Percy along with Wellington’s ‘Waterloo Dispatch’.

By 1815, a porte-aigle (‘eagle bearer’) was appointed to carry the treasured standard, usually a junior officer of proven courage and long service armed with a sword and two pistols. Both he and the colour guard of sergeants, who were also veterans, were charged with defending their regimental standard with their lives. Standards attracted fire and their capture was highly prized so a place in the colour guard, while a great honour, carrried considerable risk. Capturing a colour was a demonstration of personal bravery and the victorious side always displayed them.

At Broadstairs, where two captured Eagles were brought ashore, a replica Eagle complete with flag and standard is now on display at the Neptune’s Hall Public House, 1–5 Harbour Street, Broadstairs, along with prints of the Napoleonic Wars and photographs of re-enactors. The house on the beach where Percy called at immediately after landing still exists and has recently had a replica Eagle placed on its roof to commemorate the event. A plaque on its railings reads:

Admiral House used to be the headquarters of the Coast Blockade. On the 21st June, 1815 Major Percy, part of the homecoming fleet, landed at Broadstairs with the captured French Eagle Standard taken at the Battle of Waterloo. In recognition, Admiral House was re-named Eagle House. As part of the Bicentenary celebrations of this historic victory, this replica Eagle Standard was crafted and donated by John Couzens Roofing during the refurbishment works to Eagle House in 2010.

It should be borne in mind that only two Eagles were taken at Waterloo despite the magnitude of the victory, a full thirty-seven being carried by Guard and line regiments. This testifies to the ferocity with which they were defended even during the rout. Most of the 1815 Eagles were destroyed by regimental officers at the end of the war rather than see them fall into Royalist or enemy hands. It is only fair to record that between two and six colours were captured by the French at Waterloo, although only two were confirmed as lost by their regiments.

The Prince was at a soirée and was greatly surprised at Percy’s appearance as attend ants ushered him in. He still wore travel-stained boots and a uniform marked with the dried blood of another aide killed at Waterloo, having had no time to change. Percy later recorded in his journal that he:

Went … to the Prince Regent (before he came home) at Mrs. Boehm’s in St. James’s Square. Prince much affected. All London thrown into agitation – people quitting balls and assemblies as the news was conveyed of wounds or deaths of relatives. Many ladies fainted. There was a rumour, before the news came, of a great battle and retreat and even defeat. People were much depressed; therefore the reaction was immense.

Kneeling before the Prince Regent, he laid the Eagles at his feet and loudly proclaimed: ‘Victory, Sir! Victory.’ The Prince was greatly affected by the news and became emotional, while other guests, though elated by these glad tidings, made excuses and rushed to check the casualty lists, many having relatives serving under Wellington. The Prince instantly promoted Percy to the rank of lieutenant colonel, as was customary for the bearer of a victory dispatch.

Once news of the victory spread throughout London, great public rejoicing ensued. On 22 June, The Times declared: ‘Glory to WELLINGTON, to our gallant Soldiers, and our brave Allies! BUONOPARTE’S reputation has been wrecked, and his last grand stake has been lost in this tremendous conflict.’

The reverse was true in Paris. On 18 June, a salute was fired at Les Invalides to celebrate Napoleon’s triumph at Ligny and many expected to hear of further successes. However, by 21 June Napoleon was back in the capital, which appeared to confirm the wild rumours already spreading throughout Paris that a great military disaster had occurred. Marshal Davout was astounded when Colonel Michel brought news of the Emperor’s defeat, commenting: ‘I would have you shot for bringing me such news, if I did not know you’, he responded angrily. The chastened Colonel then murmured: ‘Please God, you might have me shot, if that would alter the case.’

Alarmed at talk on the streets and in the Parisian salons, Colonel Labretonnière went to the Elysée Palace seeking firmer intelligence, where he observed: ‘Several cavalry soldiers of the Imperial Guard were sitting gloomily on a bench by the gate, while the tethered horses waited in the yard. One of the horsemen had his face bandaged with a black scarf. The whole scene betokened shame and grief.’ Rumours that the entire Armée du Nord had been destroyed were dismissed as exaggerations but it soon became clear that the French Army had suffered a major defeat, which would have dire repercussions for Napoleon’s cause.

The Prussians were elated after Waterloo, the two Allied armies having not only halted Napoleon’s drive into Belgium but also forced it into ignominious retreat. The Prussian Army was composed of troops whose quality varied immensely, yet they had prevailed, conclusively defeating a fine French Army under the command of a general feared throughout Europe. After the battle, Blücher praised his ‘children’, proclaiming: ‘Never will Prussia cease to exist while your sons and your grandsons resemble you.’ Once Napoleon had been dealt with, Prussia could recover from the humiliations forced upon her by France and stood to gain enormously in the political settlement that would follow.

CASUALTIES

Despite the knowledge that the Allies had won a great victory, the Prince Regent’s tears were appropriate, as he knew the battle was gained at great cost. The casualty lists that appeared in the newspapers over the next few weeks made stern reading, as there had been appalling carnage at Waterloo, in addition to those lost at Quatre Bras, Ligny and Wavre. The Anglo-Allied Army suffered approximately 15,000 casualties at Waterloo alone with the Prussians losing a further 7,000 there and almost 2,500 at Wavre. During the chaos that followed Napoleon’s defeat, many French regiments failed to return accurate figures recording their losses. However, it is estimated that the Armée du Nord lost 25,000 killed or wounded at Waterloo and that around 8,000 prisoners fell into Allied hands. Grouchy’s command sustained around 2,500 casualties at Wavre. Wellington was horrified by the number of men killed and knew that a large proportion of the wounded would die over the next few weeks. He had also suffered many personal losses and when people approached him, offering their felicitations over the following weeks, he responded: ‘Oh! Do not congratulate me. I have lost all my friends.’

French Prisoners being marched into captivity. Huge numbers of French soldiers fell into Allied hands during the 1815 campaign. (Navy & Army Illustrated, 1897)

In addition to this, many men were missing and large numbers of the Armée du Nord never returned to their regiments, most historians placing the number of deserters at between 8,000 and 10,000 men. The Allies also sustained widespread desertions, particularly in the immediate wake of Ligny and Quatre Bras but the majority of these returned to their colours once it became clear which way the campaign was going. At this point, the overall losses were more even when the former battles are taken into account with the French suffering approximately 60,000 killed, wounded or missing compared to around 55,000 Allied casualties. Yet from a national point of view, the Allies could afford to lose larger numbers as they expected massive reinforcements to arrive from Austria and Russia, while the French could not replace men so easily.

To put a more human face on these dry statistics, almost every unit within the Anglo-Allied Army that fought at Waterloo sustained horrendous casualties. Those in the thick of the action experienced the most drastic reductions in their ranks. For example, Major Baring (whose 2nd KGL Battalion defended the farmhouse of La Haye Sainte) mourned the loss of 63 per cent of his fellow officers killed, wounded or captured. Although some men initially reported as missing returned, 50 per cent of the battalion were listed as casualties. The sorrowful Baring admitted: ‘Whoever I asked after the answer was “Killed”, or “Wounded!” I freely confess that tears came involuntarily into my eyes at this sad intelligence, and the many bitter feelings that seized upon me.’ His division had also suffered terribly and, when they camped that night on the field of battle amidst the slain, there was little merriment around the campfires.

THE PURSUIT

In the immediate aftermath of Waterloo, Anglo-Allied cavalry had not pursued the broken Armée du Nord much further than the French ridge before Vandeleur handed over command of the pursuit to Gneisenau. Since both men and horses were tired after fighting for hours, he was keen to do this. The exhaustion of the horses also meant that his cavalry would be less effective as it took away their greatest asset – their mobility.

Gneisenau was able to commit almost 4,000 relatively fresh cavalry to pursue the French, although it has to be borne in mind that they had marched from Wavre and must have been jaded to some extent. An effective pursuit was vital to reap the benefits of a victory during this era. Most offensive military operations were designed to force an opponent into withdrawal as the greatest losses were inflicted upon an enemy during the pursuit. The majority of prisoners and the bulk of military material was usually taken during this time and cavalry excelled in this role due to their speed and manoeuvrability.

French gunners continued to fire on the enemy advance as their infantry fled past them but joined the rout when their batteries were seriously threatened. Although some artillerymen kept their nerve, harnessing their guns to their teams and trying to withdraw, they did not get far as the highway to Charleroi was blocked with fleeing soldiers and they had little chance of outrunning cavalry across country. Virtually all the French artillery fell into Allied hands, with 200 cannon of various calibres taken. The number of guns captured by an army was used to illustrate the scale of a victory and, as it was rare to capture as many as fifty cannon, this figure demonstrates the overwhelming Allied success at Waterloo. In addition, around 1,000 artillery caissons and wagons of various kinds were captured during the pursuit. The loss of this expensive ordnance would be extremely hard for the French to replace swiftly.

The Armée du Nord had been so conclusively defeated that the rout continued as the fugitives reached Charleroi. Baron Peyrusse (Napoleon’s paymaster) bravely tried to save Napoleon’s war chest, which was being carried in the treasury wagon. When he and his escort reached the town, he quickly realized that they would never get over the bridge with a heavy vehicle. The river was at least 43yd (40m) wide at this point and some men, jostling with their fellows in their haste to cross, fell in and drowned.

Peyrusse was distributing bags of gold among his escorts, relying upon their honesty to return it, and hoping that this ploy would save a portion of the treasury, when Prussian cavalry fell upon the soldiers milling in Charleroi’s streets. Cries of: ‘Save yourselves!’ and ‘The Prussians are upon us!’ went up and, in the resulting uproar, the wagon was overturned and abandoned. Men from both sides then looted the wagon and thousands of francs disappeared into the pockets of common soldiers.

The Inn of La Belle Alliance suffered considerable damage during and after the battle as the vengeful Prussians pursued the French. (Denis Dighton)

The Prussians wreaked a cruel vengeance on the fleeing French, taking few prisoners, and cutting down many men during the early stages of the pursuit. By 9.00pm that evening the pursuit was fully underway but Gneisenau halted operations just after midnight due to increasing losses and the gathering darkness causing confusion, the leading elements having reached Frasnes by the time they stopped. The Prussians resumed their pursuit in the early hours but, while many stragglers were overtaken, the French had recovered sufficiently to cover their retreat as they approached the Belgian border with cavalry (largely drawn from regiments of the Imperial Guard).

THE INVASION OF FRANCE

Napoleon travelled toward Paris by way of Charleroi and subsequently through Philippeville. The panicked rush subsided once the fugitives reached the frontier and he ordered Soult to rally and regroup the army in the region of Laon while he headed for the capital to organize the defence of France. During the journey, he wrote: ‘All is not lost … There is still time to retrieve the situation.’ He correctly surmised that Wellington and Blücher would not pause at the frontier in order to mount an immediate invasion rather than await the other Coalition armies. Napoleon now intended to fight a defensive campaign along similar lines to the one he had fought in 1814.

Although France had suffered a catastrophic reverse at Waterloo, Napoleon still had great resources at his disposal and, for a time, his plan was possible. Furthermore, the vast Russian Army still lay a considerable distance from France and the Austrians had suffered setbacks already. General Rapp, despite having a small army by the standards of the day, had won a minor victory at Germesheim, thereby delaying Schwarzenburg’s advance considerably. Marshal Suchet had also mounted an offensive in the south by invading Savoy upon his own initiative.

Combining the remnants of the Armée du Nord with Davout’s forces defending Paris, Napoleon could field around 117,000 men. If French morale had recovered sufficiently, he was confident that Wellington and Blücher would be unable to take the city until reinforced. The Emperor also knew that 150,000 conscripts were undergoing training and would soon become available to him. In combination with his armies on the frontiers, he might be able to defeat the invasion before the other Coalition powers reached France.

However, this was not to be, once the scale of the defeat at Waterloo became known. Both the Senate and Chamber of Deputies united in opposing the Emperor’s proposals, declaring themselves as being in permanent session, fearing that he might dissolve them. Some members went further, demanding that Napoleon abdicate or be deposed. Outraged by this defeatism, the Emperor exploded: ‘What! And if they take no action, the enemy will be at our gates within a week. Alas, I have made them used to such great victories that they cannot bear a single day of misfortune!’

The 2nd Foot Guards (Coldstream) at camp in the Bois de Boulogne as the French are pursued into France.

Many believed their generals had betrayed the French Army and Napoleon still enjoyed considerable support among the common people and the military. Parisians in particular seemed willing to fight but the elite in society rapidly turned upon him, considering his regime doomed. Indeed, ministers such as Fouché had entered into secret negotiations with the Allies shortly after hearing about the reverse, if not before.

Napoleon briefly contemplated using the army to dissolve the government in order for him to rule alone. However, the situation was very different to 1799 when he had mounted a coup d’état. Marshal Davout declared that he would oppose such action as the nation was too war weary to stand for further bloodshed, especially where their fellow countrymen were concerned. Becoming despondent in the face of unified opposition, Napoleon abdicated his crown for a second time on 23 June.

The Allies swiftly crossed the frontier, Wellington advancing through Nivelles and Maubeuge, while the Prussians marched through Charleroi towards Avesnes. The Anglo-Allied Army paused to take the fortresses at Cambrai and Péronne, which put up brief resistance, and Blücher secured the Prussian advance in a similar manner during his march, intending to converge with Wellington before Paris.

A Provisional Government was formed and it ordered Marshal Grouchy to take command of the army from Soult when he reached Laon. Grouchy had conducted a skilful withdrawal from Wavre, encountering little interference from the Allies so far. His army was still intact and, after combining with Soult’s forces, he headed towards Paris with at least 50,000 men. Grouchy then encountered the Prussian vanguard and fought small rearguard actions at Compiègne and Villers-Cotterêts on 27 June. A further clash took place at Senlis but none of these actions seriously delayed the Prussian advance and Grouchy reached the capital on 29 June.

The Prussians exacted some harsh reprisals in the countryside during their advance, in revenge for French excesses in 1806, and this stiffened the resolve of Parisians to resist. Furthermore, Davout now had a large number of troops at his disposal and Napoleon, brooding at Malmaison, realized that there was a good opportunity for a successful counter stroke against the Allies as they tried to perform the difficult task of advancing on a concerted front. He offered his services as a mere general to the Provisional Government, arguing that their national honour demanded revenge for Waterloo. However, French politicians harboured no illusions about the kind of political advantage Napoleon would reap if he succeeded and he was denied the chance to fight the ‘Battle of Paris’ that he craved.

This political situation had developed just as Napoleon had predicted upon his resumption of power. France would not support him in a protracted and destructive war, even if it became one of national defence. The invasion of Belgium had been his final chance and, although it came close to success, its ultimate failure resulted in his complete downfall.

On 29 June, skirmishes were fought to the north of Paris and Blücher, finding the defences strongest there, began to manoeuvre his forces to approach the city from the west. His animosity towards Napoleon was such that he also sent a large cavalry detachment into the city tasked with seizing the former Emperor or killing him if he resisted. Marshal Davout had the bridge across the Seine nearest to Malmaison destroyed as the Prussians approached but only narrowly thwarted their mission.

Nonetheless, skirmishes fought on the outskirts of Paris demonstrated that the French were still willing to fight on as the Allied probes encountered strong resistance. A Prussian cavalry squadron was cut off during one clash, being killed or captured to a man. Witnessing the fighting from her home, Countess Hocquart supposedly shouted: ‘Bravo! Bravo! Kill all those people for me!’ and applauded as Prussian hussars were shot down.

Therefore, although the Allies were confident of taking Paris, they welcomed French emissaries sent to negotiate a peace settlement. The Provisional Government was also keen to avoid the further bloodshed and suffering that a prolonged siege of Paris would bring. They reached an accord on 3 July with the government recognizing Louis XVIII as their sovereign and agreeing that the French Army would evacuate Paris and retire south of the River Loire, allowing the Allies to enter the capital. Accordingly, the Prussians marched into Paris on 7 July and Louis XVIII soon returned to the Tuileries Palace.

SURRENDER AND EXILE

Napoleon had fled Paris on 29 June and intended to seek asylum in America, a nation that had previously been a French ally. He approached Fouché to gain passage on a frigate to take him there but this duplicitous politician prevaricated over making the necessary arrangements. Undeterred, he actually put out from Rochefort, sailing as far as Aix, but it soon became clear that Royal Navy squadrons blockading the coast were present in such strength that they were unlikely to cross the Atlantic without being stopped.

Returning to Rochefort, he heard that the Provisional Government intended to arrest him. General Flahaut approached Marshal Davout seeking travel permits for Napoleon, who was disgusted when he heard that his former master feared arrest and contemplated surrender. ‘Your Bonaparte is taking his time’, he scornfully remarked. ‘Tell him from me that he had better make haste. If he does not start at once, I shall have to have him arrested. I will go myself, in fact, and arrest him.’ In former times, Napoleon had flown into one of his infamous rages when former friends turned upon him. Now he merely shrugged despondently when told of Davout’s reaction, turning to Flauhaut and murmuring: ‘Let him come. I am ready to offer him my neck.’

With his options swiftly running out, Napoleon wrote to the British Prince Regent offering to surrender and throw himself at his mercy: ‘Your Royal Highness … I have ended my political career and come, like Themistocles, to seat myself at the hearth of the British people. I put myself under the protection of her laws and address this entreaty to Your Highness as the most steadfast and the most generous of my foes.’

On 15 July, Napoleon boarded HMS Bellerophon in Rochefort harbour and surrendered to Captain Frederick Maitland RN. He was conveyed to England but the Coalition powers still considered him a potential threat to the peace of Europe. Even in defeat, he exerted a strong appeal to those who sought political change. When HMS Bellerophon reached the English coast, it was not allowed to dock and was directed to a series of anchorages off the coast, while the Cabinet debated their options.

Sailing into exile. Napoleon may have fallen for the last time but his influence on Europe was immense and would long outlast the man himself. (W Q Orchardson)

Fears about the influence Napoleon could exert were more than mere paranoia or vindictiveness on the part of the authorities. When HMS Bellerophon lay anchored in Torbay, many curious citizens rowed out to the ship just to catch a glimpse of him during the few days it remained there and the Royal Navy had difficulty discouraging sightseers. It is likely that hundreds, if not thousands, would have come to see the ‘notorious tyrant’ if he been allowed ashore.

The British press had already commented extensively upon Napoleon’s defeat and much was made of his unwillingness to fight to the bitter end. A few days after Waterloo, The Times commented: ‘It is clear that he retreated; nor are we prepared to hear that he fled with haste or cowardice; but we greatly suspect that he did not court an honourable death. We think his valour is of the calculating kind … ’ Yet it was impossible to contest that he had humbled some of the greatest nations on the Continent and challenged all Europe for the past fifteen years, coming alarmingly close to success. Even some of his worst enemies grudgingly admitted to a certain admiration for his talents, if not his methods or ambitions. He was still a very dangerous man and the establishment decided to deny him his liberty and send him far from France.

Napoleon dictates his memoirs in exile on St Helena. (Myrbach)

Napoleon never received a reply from the Prince Regent and sailed into exile on the remote isle of St Helena in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean. Here escape was virtually impossible and he was well beyond the reach of his supporters or those he could still influence. He stepped ashore on 17 October 1815 and was held under house arrest on St Helena until his death in 1821.

REDRAWING THE MAP

Although rudely interrupted by the return of Napoleon, the delegates for the Congress of Vienna swiftly reconvened after his defeat and exile. Once again, they attempted to redraw the map of Europe and restore the balance of power on the Continent. The actual end of hostilities was formalized by the Treaty of Paris on 20 November 1815. France was compelled to return all the art treasures looted during Napoleon’s previous campaigns and obliged to pay an indemnity of £28 million (although it is uncertain whether the French ever paid this in full). France also had to endure an occupation by an army of 150,000 men for 5 years (actually withdrawn after only 3 years) and renounce all claims to territory seized since 1792.

France’s economy had been damaged by years of incessant warfare and recovering from war damage and paying the indemnity presented great difficulties at first, particularly with the added burden of a poor harvest in 1816. Furthermore, Royalist mobs killed hundreds of Bonapartists in what became known as the ‘white terror’, murders that cast a shadow over the new regime just as it began. The restored monarchy was eager for revenge and executed a number of men who had defected to Napoleon on his return including Marshal Ney and Maréchal de Camp Charles de la Bédoyère, despite pleas for leniency. Even though Wellington argued that Ney’s life should be spared, the Bourbons insisted on executing this gallant soldier by firing squad due to his perceived treachery. A general amnesty was declared but many of those who had served Napoleon were outlawed or exiled. The phrase ‘If you have not lived through 1815, you do not know what hatred is’ became a popular French saying after these reprisals.

Marshal Ney was executed by firing squad in the aftermath of Waterloo as the Bourbon monarchy took steps to avenge perceived disloyalty. (The Leisure Hour, 1870)

It is true that Napoleon was bitterly unhappy in exile and was sent to St Helena in a hurried and slightly deceitful manner. Yet many hardliners called for his death and it is to the credit of the peacemakers that they resisted these demands for vengeance. Although Napoleon was a far better man than many dictators who he is often compared with, his dynastic ambitions had caused widespread destruction and massive loss of life. Many autocrats toppled from power over the past 200 years have suffered far worse fates than that which befell Napoleon Bonaparte.

The settlement was surprisingly generous considering what the victorious Allies could have imposed upon France, with enormous damage sustained across the Continent between Moscow and Lisbon. Indeed, considering that the wars fought between 1792 and 1815 reached Egypt, South America and the Indian subcontinent, many historians class them as ‘world wars’ due to the extent of their influence. Certainly, the detrimental effects of the wars spread well beyond Europe itself. It is therefore unsurprising that the decisive battle, which brought this destructive period to an end, was greeted with considerable, almost universal relief.

The two main motives of the Congress of Vienna were to restore territory and power to royal houses dispossessed during the wars and reward the victors of 1815. Although Talleyrand continued to exert a powerful influence, succeeding in preventing the break up of France, the fear generated by Napoleon’s final attempt to regain power led to reactionary feeling at the negotiation table. This assisted Tallyrand’s opponents, such as Castlereagh and Metternich, and subsequently Austria, Russia, Prussia and Britain all reaped substantial benefits while France’s influence over Europe was much reduced.

It can be claimed that delegates largely ignored the social and nationalistic issues raised by the wars, thereby storing up problems for future generations. Certainly, the revolutions that took place in 1830 and 1848 might have been avoided if these problems had been properly addressed. Yet their deliberations resulted in a general peace throughout Europe for almost four decades. Even the conflicts that followed subsequently (such as the Crimean and Franco-Prussian Wars) did not match those of 1792–1815 for destruction and social upheaval. Although there is much to criticize about the Congress of Vienna, its delegates did ensure that Europe did not suffer similar destruction until the First World War of 1914–18. The Battle of Waterloo had permitted them the chance to achieve this and in that sense alone, it was a truly decisive battle.

WATERLOO’S LEGACY

Since the fall of Napoleon, the name Waterloo has entered the English language as a metaphor for final defeat. It is common, when someone has failed in something or suffered a catastrophe from which it is impossible to recover, for people to say that they have ‘met their Waterloo’.

However, the battle was not always known by this name as the French referred to the clash as the ‘Battle of Mont St Jean’ for many years afterward. Since the possession of this tiny village and its crossroads dominated the actions of the participants, this was quite fitting. Marshal Blücher believed differently, writing to the governor of Berlin that: ‘The battle was fought in the neighbourhood of some isolated buildings on the road from here to Brussels, bearing the name “La Belle Alliance”, and a better name can hardly be given to this important day. The French Army is in complete dissolution, and an extraordinary number of guns have been captured.’

The Prussian contribution to the victory had been immense, being present in sufficient numbers to influence Napoleon’s command decisions from at least 1.30pm onwards. Indeed, one of Napoleon’s ADCs later commented: ‘the eyes of the entire army turned towards the right’ as they arrived in increasing numbers. Yet the battle would not have been fought and won if the Anglo-Allied Army had not stood and fought, despite the fact that Wellington could not be certain of receiving Prussian support. Ultimately, the victory that ended Napoleon’s career had been a combined Allied effort, so Blücher’s suggestion made a lot of sense and seemed highly appropriate.

Wellington always believed in naming his battles after significant features or the place where he had established his headquarters. Considering that he had never lost a major battle, this was not entirely inappropriate. He also wrote his famous ‘Waterloo Dispatch’ from his headquarters during the early hours of 19 June and, since this was widely published in the newspapers, the name swiftly became well known to the public in Britain. Although Waterloo was a full 3 miles (4.8km) behind the Anglo-Allied front line, the name stuck and became forever associated with the battle. The name did not win universal approval, as Robert Southey wrote in The Poet’s Pilgrimage to Waterloo after visiting the battlefield: ‘Why call it the Battle of Waterloo? … call it Mont St Jean, call it La Belle Alliance, call it Hougoumont, call it La Haye Sainte, call it Papelotte – anything but Waterloo’. Yet these arguments have now become academic as the word has entered the English language and the battle will always be known by this name.

BRITISH ARMY AWARDS

While the Prussians and the Kingdom of the Netherlands rewarded their soldiers for service during the 1815 campaign, the British were particular generous regarding Waterloo, with the number of honours and awards bestowed for service there exceeding any given before this date. Most of the regiments who had been present received a battle honour for ‘Waterloo’ to be emblazoned on their colours. The scale of the victory and the fact that it was the last major battle of the Napoleonic Wars meant it became a proud distinction for a man to be able to claim that he had fought there. The 1st Foot Guards famously gained the title of ‘Grenadier Guards’ in the false belief that they had defeated the French Imperial Guard Grenadiers during the final attack, though in fact they had defeated the Guard Chasseurs.

Prize money was awarded to many survivors, a privilege usually afforded to the Royal Navy after the capture of enemy ships. In the case of Waterloo, a private soldier who had fought that day should receive £2 11s 4d. Officers received higher amounts. For example, captains were entitled to £90 7s 4d and generals as much as £1,275 10s 11d (a considerable amount for the time). The commander-in-chief received a full £61,000 and the British Government paid out huge sums to Waterloo veterans in total, demonstrating how much the country appreciated the army’s efforts and that national magnitude of the victory. This was even reflected in the pension rights for the rank-and-file, both for disability and when they retired. These were meagre enough by modern standards but a man who could prove he had fought that day was entitled to an additional two years towards his pension and extra pay while he remained in the service.

The Waterloo Banquet at Apsley House, where Wellington hosted senior officers who had been present at the battle every year. (Illustrated London News, 1847)

Large numbers of officers and men received promotions and decorations after fighting at Waterloo. All of the general officers received decorations of some kind and the Prince Regent decided to extend the Honourable Order of the Bath, as so many officers were deemed worthy of entering this elite. Consequently divided into three classes, recipients were awarded a Knights Grand Cross (GCB), Knights Commander (KCB) or Companion of Military Order of the Bath (CB). No less that 121 lieutenant colonels gained a CB and the Order was extended to 2,258 members, infuriating some existing members who believed that these elite awards had been handed out to commoners in such numbers that it lessened the meaning of the distinction. Yet these voices were ignored in the acclamation that the victory received.

A Waterloo Medal was also struck to commemorate the victory and this was awarded to all who took part in the battle. This was the first time that a medal was awarded without distinction of rank to every soldier and was introduced at Wellington’s personal request. Indeed, before the Napoleonic Wars, common soldiers had been looked down upon in Britain, often derided as poorly paid and being inclined to drunkenness. Britain valued the service they had displayed in defeating Napoleon and Waterloo was instrumental in changing the public’s attitude towards the army.

Although already famous, Wellington had a vast number of honours bestowed upon him and was forever associated with the victory. Both the Commons and the Lords voted their thanks to the victor and the officers and men who had served under him. His achievement also provided a major boost to his political career and Wellington eventually became Prime Minister and retained a vast (though often unofficial) influence over military affairs long after his active service had ended. Such was the reputation he gained from defeating the greatest general of the age that he became renowned as the ‘father of the country’ in Victorian England, being seen as a role model for success and moral standards. Upon his death in 1852, he was given the rare privilege of an official state funeral (usually reserved for royalty) and was entombed in the Crypt of St Paul’s Cathedral. Memorials to Sir Thomas Picton and Sir William Ponsonby were also placed there, which they probably would not have received but for the roles they played on that fateful day of Sunday 18 June 1815.

BURIED AT WATERLOO

While Waterloo is famed for many things (such as the display of courage on both sides and its effect upon Europe) it was also a horrendous struggle in which thousands of men lost their lives. Others were permanently maimed as a result of wounds they received there and a huge number of horses were slain, injured or put down after the battle. Assistant Commissary General Tupper Carey rode over the battlefield on 19 June and recorded the harrowing sights he saw there:

It was dreadful to see the numbers of the killed, both men and horses on each side of the road. Many bodies were stripped of their clothes. As we descended towards La Haye Sainte, the scene of carnage was still more developed … the dead were innumerable, French and English intermixed. Those who had fallen in the road had been trampled upon by horses and wheels of artillery, into a mass of blood, flesh and clothes, hardly to be distinguished from one another … With the exception of a few parties wandering in the quest of wounded men, as well as plunder, all was quiet as a churchyard.

It took days to pick up all the wounded from the field and even longer to attend to the burial of the dead. Although friends or relations retrieved some bodies, many corpses were so badly disfigured that they were unrecognizable and looters had often removed identifying uniforms and valuables. Blackwoods Edinburgh Magazine printed an even more graphic and unhappy account of the grisly aftermath of Waterloo in 1847:

It is only four days since the burying of the dead bodies which the field of the battle of Mont St Jean was strewed. Several thousand carts had been put in requisition for this operation … After the lapse of ten, twelve, and even fifteen days, there were found among the dead carcasses great numbers of wounded, who, impelled by madness or hunger, had eaten of the bodies of the men and horses that surrounded them. I say madness, because there were some of them who even then cried, in the dying agonies, ‘Vive l’Empereur.’

Only hours after the battle ended, a macabre trade in battlefield relics had begun. Soldiers and civilians prowled the field looking for valuables and souvenirs such as helmets, breastplates and weapons. Opportunists often robbed, or even murdered, wounded men still lying on the field if they refused to hand over valuables. With the bulk of the army now embarked on the invasion of France, it was difficult for the authorities to prevent these depredations. Relics such as epaulettes (signifying a soldier’s rank), musket balls, shako badges and helmets were traded in Brussels markets in the weeks following the battle and, as the relevance of Waterloo became clear, began to command high prices. Even the teeth of the slain were sought after, as dentists were eager to buy them to create false teeth for the rich.

Although many bodies were eventually interred in vast communal graves, notably alongside the main highway and around the area of Wellington’s crossroads, the burial parties were simply overwhelmed by the scale of the task. Corpses had begun to putrefy and there was a strong risk that disease would spread in consequence. Therefore, huge pyres were constructed and thousands of bodies were cremated en masse. Pillars of smoke boiling into the sky from this sad necessity were seen from many miles away.

WELLINGTON’S GREAT STATUE

Although many statues of the Duke of Wellington have been erected throughout Britain, the most famous is probably the ‘Great Statue’ that once stood upon the Wellington Arch (also known as the Constitutional Arch) at Hyde Park Corner in central London. Constructed between 1826 and 1830 by Decimus Burton, the arch itself is of massive construction. It was commissioned by George IV to commemorate Britain’s victories during the Napoleonic Wars and stands opposite Apsley House, Wellington’s main residence in the capital. The arch is hollow, has rooms on three floors, viewing platforms and once housed the capital’s smallest police station.

In 1836, it was decided to place an equestrian statue of Wellington on top of the arch to honour his military and political achievements – the most famous of which being his victory at Waterloo. Accordingly, Mr Matthew Cotes Wyatt (along with his son James) designed and constructed the largest equestrian statue ever made in Britain. It depicts the Duke mounted on Copenhagen (his favourite horse) and dressed in the cape and cocked hat he wore at Waterloo. Wellington personally sat for the sculptor who showed him indicating with a telescope in a commanding fashion.

This colossal work was made of bronze in six pieces with the bulk of the metal used supposedly recast from captured French cannon taken at Waterloo. It stands 30ft (8.5m) high and weighs over 40 tons. Unlike most statues, the horse’s legs are solid in order to bear its great weight. The huge wooden cart, designed to convey the monument to Hyde Park from Wyatt’s foundry, was 20ft (6m) wide and needed twenty-nine horses to drag it through the streets to its unveiling in 1846 before an enormous crowd.

Yet according to the Illustrated London News of that year, the size of the statue provoked considerable ridicule as it looked out of proportion even when placed upon the massive triumphal arch, which stands over three storeys high. Burton also objected, saying that he had never intended the arch to withstand so much weight and feared that it might eventually collapse. Letters appeared in the newspapers and many called for its removal. Nevertheless, Queen Victoria ordered that it must remain (at least during the Duke’s lifetime) as relocating it might offend a great British hero.

Although regarded as an eyesore by many Londoners, the statue stayed until Prince Edward (later King Edward VII) suggested its relocation to Aldershot Military Town, ‘where it will be highly regarded by the Army’. Parliament agreed and the British Army dismantled it and conveyed it there in 1885. Wellington’s great statue now stands upon Round Hill near the Royal Garrison Church in Aldershot. Eventually the site became overgrown but the army and local volunteers cleared it in 2004 and the statue was re-bronzed. It is now the responsibility of the Friends of the Aldershot Military Museum.

This colossal statue of Wellington was considered too large even for the vast triumphal Wellington Arch and eventually relocated. (Illustrated London News, 1846)

A bronze Triumphal Quadriga (the Angel of Peace driving a chariot) replaced Wellington’s statue in 1912 and the arch is a popular tourist attraction. Magnificent views of London, particularly towards Buckingham Palace, can be seen from its viewing platforms. A more modest, although still larger than life size, replica of Wellington’s statue stands before the arch and directly opposite Wellington’s former house. Four statues of British soldiers, whose regiments fought at Waterloo, stand around the statue’s base. Apsley House is still owned by the Wellesley family and is often known as No. 1 London. It contains a museum with a large collection of unique ‘Wellingtonia’ and is a joy to visit for anyone with an interest in the Duke and nineteenth-century history.

Burial of the dead after the Battle of Waterloo. (Denis Dighton)

IN REMEMBRANCE

While monuments would be raised at Waterloo itself (these are covered in detail elsewhere in this guidebook), related statues and monuments were erected far beyond the battlefield itself. In the aftermath of his famous victory, statues of Wellington were erected in London, Glasgow, Aldershot and even further afield. Indeed, some cities were named after him, including New Zealand’s capital city. Many more street names, railway stations, towns and cities were named in honour of the battle and Waterloos can be found in North America, Australia, Canada, Guyana, New Zealand, Sierra Leone, Suriname and Trinidad. Some famous examples in England are Waterlooville in Hampshire and Waterloo railway station in London.

The name has even caused controversy in more recent times when London’s Waterloo railway station was initially considered as the main terminus for the Eurostar train service in the capital. As this service runs between London and Paris, travelling through the Channel Tunnel, gaining French approval at the planning stages was of paramount importance. Although there were many reasons for the eventual selection of St Pancras railway station, it is thought that Waterloo’s name was held against it. The authorities believed that choosing a station named after a great French defeat might offend French visitors and, since most Londoners were likely to oppose a name change, St Pancras was chosen instead.

Officers who had died at Waterloo had monuments and tombs erected in their hometowns or elsewhere. Even many years afterwards the battle’s fame ensured that a man who had fought there was likely to have the fact recorded on his headstone by his relatives. These range from small gravestones to large monuments such as that erected for General Picton in his hometown of Carmarthen. However, it should be remembered that most of the rank-and-file who fought at Waterloo were eventually buried without any kind of grave marker due to poverty so the vast majority of those commemorated were officers.

Thackeray wrote Little Travels and Road-side Sketches that included passages about touring the battlefield and commented upon the lack of specific monuments to common soldiers when looking at graves in Waterloo village. He wrote:

But I confess fairly, that in looking at these tablets, I felt very much disappointed at not seeing the names of the men as well as the officers. Are they to be counted for nought? A few more inches of marble to each monument would have given space for all the names of the men; and the men of that day were the winners of the battle. We have a right to be as grateful individually to any given private as to any given officer …

While there was some justice to this sentiment, he was perhaps unaware of just how many men died at Waterloo, which in itself would render recording so many on small gravestones out of the question. Nonetheless, this situation was unjust and similar calls eventually led to the construction of communal monuments on many battlefields. Yet even these did not include a complete list of names, which in fairness was very hard to compile from often incomplete or inaccurate records. Such problems are clearly illustrated by the massive size of monuments for more modern conflicts, which also demonstrate the horrific scale of losses incurred in the twentieth century.

One spectacular example commemorating a Waterloo veteran is the tower raised for Lord Uxbridge on the Isle of Anglesey. Uxbridge was made Marquess of Anglesey, largely due to his exploits during the battle and the column is 100ft (30.4m) tall and surmounted by a statue of the general in the uniform of the 7th Hussars. Visitors can climb to the foot of the statue and the location affords splendid views out over the Menai Strait. Plas Newydd, the most impressive of this nobleman’s former residences, stands less than 2 miles (3.2km) away from the column. A small Waterloo museum is located here, displaying numerous relics associated with Lord Uxbridge and the battle.

The Anglican clergy gave thanks for the victory over Napoleon, which signified the end of so much bloodshed, and asked the British Government to pay for churches as a national offering for the salvation of Europe. Despite the slaughter that had taken place at Waterloo, Christians were so relieved that thanksgiving services were held in churches all over Europe for the victory. The Literary Panorama and National Register of 1815 printed the words of a thanksgiving prayer that began:

O God the Disposer of all human events, without whose aid the strength of man is weakness, and the counsels of the wisest are as nothing, accept our praise and thanksgiving for the signal victory which thou hast recently vouchsafed to the Allied Armies in Flanders. – Grant O merciful God, that the result of this mighty battle, terrible in conflict, but glorious beyond example in success, may put an end to the miseries of Europe, and staunch the blood of Nations …

Feeling in the British Government was so euphoric after the army’s success that they granted a huge amount of money for the Church Building Commission, set up under Joshua Watson. Initially they donated £1 million (roughly £50 million in today’s money) and proposed the construction of eighty-five churches, costing an average of £20,000 each.

The renowned architect Sir John Soane received commissions to build some of the Waterloo churches in London and constructed Holy Trinity (Marylebone Road), St Peter’s (Walworth Road) and St John’s (Bethnal Green). In the financial slump that followed the Napoleonic Wars, this project understandably became controversial but Parliament voted to give additional funds when the scheme went over budget, demonstrating the strength of feeling regarding Waterloo.

The Prussians were equally proud of their participation and statues were erected to Marshal Blücher, notably in Berlin, although the monument commemorating the victory at Leipzig 1813 dwarfs almost any other structure. The Prussians had been heavily involved in that titanic struggle and many argue that it was that battle that broke Napoleon’s power and that his return was never likely to succeed after his defeat there.

Unsurprisingly, the French have not been as keen to commemorate the battle that led to the downfall of their First Empire and the restoration of an unpopular monarchy. However, General Cambronne’s tomb in Nantes proudly records the fact that he fought at Waterloo and of course the famous ‘mot de Cambronne’ (see Chapter 9) that he allegedly roared in defiance when called upon to surrender. Most of the French Marshals of Empire, along with other senior officers, lie buried at Père Lachaise Cemetery in Paris. The tombs here are spectacular and ornate but their inscriptions emphasize the French victories they were involved in rather than their final defeat at Waterloo.

This column was raised to commemorate the military achievements of Lord Uxbridge (later Marquess of Anglesey) on the Isle of Anglesey.

Napoleon’s captors deliberately downplayed his funeral when he was buried on St Helena in 1821. Nonetheless, after a more liberal regime took power in France under King Louis-Philippe in 1830, the French successfully petitioned for his remains to be returned in 1840. Napoleon’s statue was restored to the top of the column at the Place Vendôme in Paris and the former Emperor was honoured with an elaborate state funeral in Paris. While still a controversial figure, this sombre occasion was welcomed in the capital as the French recognized that he had done a great deal for France, despite the high price the country paid for his military ventures.

Statues of Napoleon have been erected throughout France with several in Paris (notably at the Champs-Elysées) along with a host of French towns and cities such as Lyons, Boulogne-sur-Mer, Laffray (near Grenoble) and Cherbourg. However, they rarely relate directly to Waterloo. Nevertheless, a new statue has recently been unveiled at Le Caillou (see Chapter 3) which unusually portrays him at the moment of defeat rather than other depictions, which usually show him on horseback or in a more sedate pose.

Napoleon now rests in a spectacular red-porphyry sarcophagus (designed and made by Visconti and Pradier) in the historic military Hôpital des Invalides. Here the light shines down upon the tomb from the massive dome above and it is a popular destination for tourists and military enthusiasts. Interestingly, the tomb of the man who finally ended the career of this military colossus is far more sombre, while still of gargantuan construction, in the catacombs of St Paul’s Cathedral. Far fewer people make a pilgrimage here in comparison to the Invalides and the location is surprisingly obscure, most visitors seeing only the main cathedral above where another monument is dedicated to Wellington. Notwithstanding, this seems fitting as Wellington disdained extravagance unlike the preference of his former adversary.

WATERLOO IN STORY, POETRY AND SONG

Large amounts of fictional and non-fictional works have been published about the Battle of Waterloo and the 1815 campaign. In Britain, the Victorians were immensely proud of the victory at Waterloo and, all over Europe, widespread fascination over Napoleon’s career endured and grew in strength even after his death. In addition to serious histories, novels and poems about Waterloo were published soon after the battle and their number grew over time. Lord Byron visited the field and was inspired to write the Eve of Waterloo, which spoke of events in Brussels before the battle, along with lengthy verses in his epic Childe Harold related to the battle itself.

Sir Walter Scott wrote poetry and prose about Waterloo and the subject inspired many lesser poets, who often wrote in extremely patriotic style. A good example of this was penned in the same month as the battle by an Englishman living in Brussels. Printed in the New Monthly Magazine of 1816, a typical extract reads:

Thrice did Napoleon head the fierce attack,

And thrice the British squadrons drove him back;

Till maul’d and feather’d in the glorious fight,

Th’ Imperial eagle wing’d his rapid flight …

The modern Titan, flying o’er the field,

Saw Gallic pride to British valour yield;

His legions, struck with terror and dismay,

Fled from the field, and England won the day …

Historical fiction also abounds and many authors chose to write about Napoleonic subjects with Waterloo receiving great attention as the battle that had ended the era. Famous authors such as William Makepeace Thackeray, Honoré de Balzac, Marie-Henri Beyle (better known as Stendhal) and Victor Hugo all wrote about the period or Waterloo. Today interest in the period is undiminished and modern authors like C S Forester, R F Delderfield and Bernard Cornwell all wrote extensively about the wars, attracting a wide readership.

While it is true that the accuracy of historically based fiction varies enormously and is often prone to romanticism, these works have certainly kept interest in the period alive far more than more academic works. Naturally, academics have reservations about historical fiction but it is a rare historian who has failed to be inspired by such writers at some stage in his career.

The appeal of Waterloo is such that songs have been composed about heroic moments during the battle or the great men who were present there. During the nineteenth century, folk songs were very important for keeping such events alive in collective memory, especially as illiteracy was far more common at that time. Interestingly, the name of Waterloo still emerges in modern music occasionally. The British rock band The Kinks recorded a single called ‘Waterloo Sunset’ in 1967 which, although it referred to Waterloo railway station specifically, is of course related to the battle. Even more famously, the Swedish group ABBA released a song entitled ‘Waterloo’, which won the Eurovision Song Contest in 1974, both of which ensured that the name endured even in modern popular youth culture for a time.

Chapter 11

VISITING THE BATTLEFIELD

The first time the author visited Waterloo was in 1995 on a superb tour organized by the now defunct Midas Tours. This was the first of many visits to Belgium during which the battlefields of the 1815 campaign were studied with an increasing level of interest. Anyone wishing to gain a greater understanding of how topography shaped events at Waterloo should visit the field itself. Although the construction of the Lion Mound undoubtedly altered the appearance of the ridge where Wellington’s right wing stood, it is still possible to appreciate the strength of the Anglo-Allied Army’s defensive position and the difficulty that Napoleon experienced in attacking it.

One thing that immediately strikes observers, even when looking at maps alone, is the relatively small area that the main battlefield covers. This is true not only in comparison with later battlefields but in relation to other Napoleonic battlefields. For example, the Battle of Fuentes de Oñoro (1811) was fought across the Spanish–Portuguese frontier and extends over an area three or four times as large as Waterloo. It is possible to walk from Napoleon’s command point to Wellington’s in 20–5 minutes, revealing how small this area is. It is staggering to think that the battle that influenced the fate of Europe for almost 100 years took place in an area totalling little more than 3 square miles (4.8km^2).

The undulating nature of the ground also played a great part in deciding the outcome of this battle tactically. Despite the closeness of the Anglo-Allied and French armies, there are still large patches of dead ground in between them that restricted the effectiveness of artillery or allowed troops to be concealed. Photography can only give a vague impression of its subtle appearance and the field needs to be seen in person by enthusiasts who truly want to understand how and why events developed as they did. For example, when one sees the lie of the land around La Haye Sainte, the alleged mistake that the Prince of Orange made by sending infantry forward in line (while unaware that concealed cavalry lay in the vicinity) seems far more understandable.

TRAVELLING TO WATERLOO

Belgium is bordered by Germany, the Netherlands and France. It is not landlocked and has a coastline with three major ports on the North Sea. Brussels (the capital) is the largest city, after which Antwerp, Brugge and Luxembourg cities are its largest municipalities. This nation’s central position means that it has been involved in numerous wars over the centuries, particularly between Austria, France and Germany. The regions of Flanders and Wallonia have suffered repeated invasions but one of the few benefits of incessant warfare has been the construction of extensive road, rail and canal networks enabling armies to traverse the area more swiftly.

Finding Waterloo.

Although it has always been a centre of trade, commerce and politics, Brussels has become increasingly important in Europe. As one of the founding states of the European Union, Brussels has effectively become Europe’s capital city as the main meeting place of the European Parliament, although there are three homes to the elected body of the European Union, the others being in Luxembourg and Strasbourg. Other related organizations are located within the capital or in other Belgian cities. The resulting increase in the city’s international importance means that travel links to Belgium have become even easier to use over the last few decades and Waterloo lies only 12 miles (19km) from Brussels.

Large airports are located in Brussels, Antwerp, Charleroi, Liège and Luxembourg City. The two closest to the battlefield are at Brussels and Charleroi but the former possesses far more advantages for most tourists both in terms of position and facilities. The main Brussels airport for international flights is at Zaventem, lying 9 miles (14km) to the north-east of the city centre. Most Belgians refer to it as Zaventem rather than Brussels airport and taxi drivers will instantly recognize it by this name.

There are regular flights to Brussels from all European capital cities and beyond. British Airways, Air Canada, American Airlines, Delta and Lufthansa (among others) all offer several direct flights every day but travellers from North America may find it easier to land at other European capitals and take a connecting flight from there.

Brussels lies at the heart of the European rail network and travellers should experience little difficulty reaching the city by train. The high-speed Eurostar service now runs directly to the Belgian capital from London through the Channel Tunnel and can be boarded at a number of stations in England and France before it reaches Belgium. Direct services are offered from Paris, Amsterdam and Cologne, using the Thalys rail network, but the locations of other capital cities (such as Berlin) require passengers to change trains along most routes.

When arriving in Brussels by train, it is possible to change connections and continue by rail to the town of Waterloo or very near the battlefield itself. A regular local service operates from the capital with stations at Waterloo and the town of Braine l’Alleud. Waterloo station lies about ½ mile (1km) from the town centre and visitors can either proceed on foot along the Rue de la Station towards it or call a taxi. A regular bus route runs from the centre of Waterloo to the battlefield and there are plenty of taxi operators based in the town. If visitors alight at Braine l’Alleud station, a regular bus service runs directly to the Lion Village from the centre and, once again, taxis are easily available for this short trip.

Travelling to Brussels by road is also easier than it has ever been in the past. Daily (or occasionally more frequent) coach services run from most European capitals and Brussels contains a number of major bus stations. Travelling to Waterloo from the capital by bus is straightforward with regular services operating along the main highway (N5), which transects Waterloo and the battlefield itself. Since Brussels is so close to the battlefield, the cost of a taxi there is not prohibitive. Visitors who are in a hurry or who wish to avoid public transport may find it advisable to use the taxis, especially if they have booked accommodation close to the battlefield and have large amounts of luggage.

Those wishing to reach Brussels by car will find that Belgium benefits from an extensive, well-maintained road network, which includes numerous motorways. Drivers from the Netherlands, Germany and France will have no difficulty in reaching Brussels using major routes but visitors from the British Isles will have to use the ferry crossings to the Channel ports. The Belgian ferry ports are at Antwerp, Ostend, Zebrugge and Ghent. However, the French ports of Calais and Dunkirk are close to the frontier and usually allow drivers to join motorways faster, permitting a swifter journey to Brussels.

Since Belgium signed the Schengen Agreement, there are no border controls to delay travellers and routes from all the Channel ports are well signposted and quick to travel on. Journeys beginning from Ostend or Zebrugge usually take 2 hours and can be as short as 1¼ hours from Calais. Brussels lies in the centre of a large motorway hub with at least ten motorways joining this directly and other major routes converging with them shortly beforehand. The Petite Ceinture (small belt) lies within this hub, providing easy road access to the city centre itself.

The N5 is the best route to take when driving to Waterloo and the battlefield from Brussels itself as it neatly transects both destinations. Alternatively, the R0 motorway runs there indirectly and travellers using it should leave at sortie (exit) No. 28 or 27 if heading for Waterloo or at sortie No. 25 for the actual battlefield. It can be interesting to travel by way of Charleroi, joining the N5 just above that city to trace part of Napoleon’s invasion route, which approaches the battlefield from the south.

ACCOMMODATION

Brussels makes an excellent base for tourists and has too many hotels and other forms of accommodation to list in addition to numerous restaurants, art galleries, museums and facilities of almost every other kind. Yet some visitors may wish to stay closer to the battlefield hoping to gain obvious advantages from close proximity and more economical rates than those charged in the capital.

Waterloo boasts a number of hotels, those nearest its centre being Martin’s Grand Hôtel/Martin’s Lodge, the Ibis Hôtel and the Hôtel Le Côte Vert. Moving further out of town, the Hôtel Dolce La Hulpe lies in its north-eastern suburbs, while the closest to the battlefield is Le Joli Bois to the south, just north of Mont St Jean.

The former Hôtel du Musée, established in the Lion Village by Sergeant Major Cotton, is now a museum and no longer receives guests, but Le 1815 Hôtel provides the closest accommodation currently possible, being located on the battlefield itself. It stands on the Route du Lion within easy walking distance of Wellington’s Elm Tree crossroads and the Lion Village. Le 1815 Hôtel offers very reasonable rates and a big bonus for Waterloo enthusiasts is the fact that many rooms enjoy excellent views of the battlefield. The hotel lies near the centre of Wellington’s position and the rooms at the front face towards the farm of La Haye Sainte and the Lion Mound is close by. La Belle Alliance is visible from here along with other notable features.

One pleasing aspect is the fact that the rooms have been named after Allied and French generals including Wellington, Napoleon, Blücher, the Prince of Orange, Picton, Hill, Uxbridge, Ney, Grouchy, Soult, Lobau, Reille, Cambronne, d’Erlon, Gniesenau and Thielmann. This is a nice touch and the hotel is a pleasant and highly convenient place to stay in, providing excellent access to the battlefield. Nonetheless, visitors should be aware that the Route du Lion is often extremely busy and should take care when entering or leaving the hotel car park.

AN EARLY BATTLEFIELD GUIDE

One of the very first battlefield guides was Sergeant Major Edward Cotton (1792–1849). Cotton fought at Waterloo with the 7th Hussars, which was part of Colquhoun Grant’s 5th British Cavalry Brigade. At that time, Cotton was a private soldier and displayed great bravery when he dragged Private Edward Gilmore from under his fallen horse and got him to safety as French cavalry bore down upon them. He left the army in 1835 and returned to the area, buying land on the battlefield. He married a local woman and lived in Mont St Jean village.

Now that the British could travel freely to the Continent again, Waterloo became a popular stop during the traditional European Grand Tour beloved by the nobility. The increasingly prosperous middle classes were also beginning to travel for pleasure and Cotton recognized a business opportunity, establishing Le Grand Hôtel du Musée in a small hamlet that became known as the Lion Village. The building eventually contained an ‘English bar, four rooms for restaurant, one of which is capable of seating 100 people, 24 sitting and bedrooms, stabling for 40 horses and vast coach-houses and outhouses’.

As a veteran, Cotton’s services as a ‘Guide and Describer of the Battle’ were much in demand and he eventually wrote a guidebook entitled A Voice from Waterloo in 1846. This became enormously popular and thirteen editions were published between that time and 1913 (it is still available today). As an honourable man, Cotton was generous towards his former foes, writing of them:

Their bearing throughout the day was of gallant soldiers; their attacks were conducted with a chivalric impetuousity and admirably sustained vigour which left no shadow of doubt upon our minds of their entire devotedness to the cause of Napoleon, of their expectation of victory, and the determination of many of them not to suvive defeat. The best and the bravest of them fell: but not til they had inflicted almost equal loss upon their conquerors.

Cotton amassed a considerable array of Waterloo artefacts and trivia that he displayed within the hotel, which reputedly catered for over 1 million guests during the 14 years that Cotton ran the establishment. The Naval and Military Gazette described him as: ‘an intelligent, active, good-looking man of fifty-three years of age, and the very cut of a hussar’. When he died on 24 June 1849, he was buried in the orchard of Hougoumont next to Captain Robert Blackwood’s grave at his own request. His remains were eventually transferred and now rest in Evere Cemetery in the company of other Waterloo heroes. Cotton’s descendants ran the hotel until 1909, when they finally sold the business. His collection of around 3,000 artefacts was divided and auctioned in Brussels.

The building no longer serves as hotel but houses the current Waxworks Museum. Cotton was hugely influential in helping to establish the Lion Village and would probably be proud of the service it provides to visitors today. His guidebook is still highly regarded, despite its age, and was useful during research for this work nearly 200 years later.

BATTLEFIELD TOURS

Professionally organized tours of Waterloo have visited the battlefield since the 1850s and possibly before. As popular peace movements have emerged worldwide during the past 200 years, some people have questioned the ‘macabre appeal’ of visiting battlefields, alleging that it appears voyeuristic in some sense. However, the serious study of military history demonstrates that examining the ground itself is of great help to those who wish to understand how events transpired and there are many educational benefits, especially to sites well equipped with battlefield centres and museums. Furthermore, even though Waterloo is nearing its bicentenary, there is still a commemotive purpose for visits, especially for those whose ancestors or regiments fought there.

There are numerous advantages to going on a properly organized tour and many companies offer trips to Waterloo, usually lasting between three days and a week in length. They provide an excellent introduction for those wishing to learn about military history or who are visiting a battlefield for the first time, with the benefits of expert guides and lecturers being obvious. There are also advantages to travelling with like-minded guests and most groups rapidly establish a lively camaraderie, which make tours a pleasant experience in themselves. Other guests, who often include former service personnel and re-enactors, may possess specialized knowledge and the author has learned a great deal from associating with fellow enthusiasts in this manner.

From a practical viewpoint, a tour operator usually provides almost everything during these excursions, which can be a relief for older tourists reluctant to go through the stress of driving in a foreign country among other considerations. Essentially the tour operator undertakes to get their guests to their destination (handling driving and map reading), books accommodation, takes them to individual sites on the battlefield, recommends how to get the best out of the experience, provides foreign-language speakers and generally deals with any unforeseen eventualities that may arise. In the case of sickness or injury, this can be a major advantage for people travelling in another country.

In Britain, there are a host of tour operators including Holts Battlefield Tours, The Cultural Experience, Ian Fletcher Battlefield Tours, Leger Holidays and Cooper’s Waterloo Tours. However, this list is not comprehensive and many other guided tours operate on the Continent and from even further afield. Using the Internet, those wishing to visit Waterloo as part of a tour will find themselves spoilt for choice.

While organized tours are an excellent facility for most visitors, the author recommends the option of attempting to organize your own tour from personal experience. While not suitable for everyone, people who have an advanced knowledge of the subject matter can gain great benefits from arranging a ‘Do It Yourself’ tour of their own. Unsurprisingly, tour companies find themselves obliged to cater for a broad level of knowledge among their guests, ranging from total novices to experts. Unless travelling on a specialized tour, aimed at those who are already well informed, serious enthusiasts may find that guides and lecturers do not go into the level of detail they may require. Furthermore, such tours are often more expensive than attempting the trip alone due to the need to stay at hotels with three-star ratings or above, which many older guests enjoy.

The final disadvantage is that tour guides are obliged to adhere to a strict itinerary, due to time restrictions, and obscure locations can be omitted and the time spent at others restricted. History enthusiasts who plan and execute their own travel plans enjoy total control in this regard. However, the DIY approach also has drawbacks and it is certainly more stressful as individuals or small groups have to be self reliant and confident in their own abilities. Essentially, it is vital to book ahead for accommodation, ferry crossings, flights and deal with all other travel considerations personally. While this requires some effort, the introduction of the Internet has made booking your own holiday far easier and it is possible to shop around and find far cheaper rates than a tour company may be able to secure.

Admittedly, the experience can be more stressful than utilizing a company’s services. For example, long periods of driving are tiring and language barriers need to be overcome, a particular problem for many British visitors. Map reading, during travel and on the battlefield itself, is also a challenge and extra time should be allowed for potential difficulties in finding locations. For example, during the author’s last trip, negotiating the road system and finding obscure locations at the site of the Battle of Wavre was a significant problem, only overcome with great persistence on the part of the navigator and driver. While modern ‘sat navs’ can be invaluable in large cities with complex road systems, they are not 100 per cent reliable and they can sometimes give misleading information. Always carry maps to back up electronic devices, regardless of what their manufacturers may claim about their merits. It is also very easy to be tempted when sighting unexpected but attractive locations and divert from your planned itinerary.

Advance planning is vital for organizing your own tour and it is advisable to stick to a set itinerary or be prepared to sacrifice a visit to some sites if you deviate from it. The remarkable thing about touring historical sites is just how many relevant locations there are and time is always at a premium on such trips with difficult choices occasionally being necessary. Furthermore, a personal tour requires accepting responsibility for the safety of the vehicle, refuelling and gaining a prior knowledge of local driving laws and conditions. The simple fact that Continental countries drive on the right-hand side of the road is enough to deter many British tourists from attempting this kind of project. Securing proper medical insurance for all those involved is also advisable, especially when isolated areas feature on the itinerary.

Indeed, prior to arranging personal tours, the author did not carry a mobile phone. After the experience of crossing isolated rivers to gain photographs of bridges in the Peninsula, a cell phone became a vital accessory, and it is advisable to learn the local emergency numbers when travelling abroad. Naturally making your own choices is a major advantage for going it alone but the experience certainly gives you a greater appreciation of the organizational difficulties that face professional tour guides.

Overall, visiting battlefields is an excellent pastime and greatly recommended whether you travel with a tour operator or attempt the trip yourself.

VISITING THE SITES

Once visitors actually reach Waterloo, there are a number of ways to travel around the main locations. Driving by car or coach are the easiest in terms of mobility but the merits of cycling or walking should not be dismissed, especially as this is a relatively small battlefield compared to others of the era. Furthermore, sufficient parking is not always available at some locations and visitors should be prepared to walk a short distance from the nearest parking point to areas of interest.

While Belgian drivers are usually considerate road users, bear in mind that the main Charleroi–Brussels highway (N5) is always busy and that vehicles usually travel at some speed upon it. While searching for roadsigns and sites of interest, it is easy to become distracted so be aware that traffic may be bearing down upon you and that manoeuvres such as three-point turns on some roads are therefore inadvisable if you have missed a location and have to retrace your route.

While walking the battlefield is not recommended for everyone, particulary older or infirm visitors, a slow perusal from the perspective of an infantryman can add to the experience. Indeed, some companies offer specialized walking tours specifically aimed at experts who have already been to Waterloo and wish to revisit the area to view the sights in a slower, more meticulous fashion. Bicycles can also be hired in Waterloo and elsewhere and more is often seen when travelling at a slower pace. The late Professor Richard Holmes even recommended viewing battlefields from horseback as one gains the perspective that a commander would have enjoyed. For those wishing to try the experience, the area contains many equestrian centres, notably at Papelotte.

Walking or cycling around the battlefield is definitely recommended during the summer months but visitors should be aware that the area is quite exposed and suitable clothing and suncream are necessary. Furthermore, the bane of many battlefield trips (regardless of the form of travel) is dehydration, particularly in the warmer months. Visitors should therefore take a plentiful supply of water and, as the author can testify from personal experience, its excess weight and bulk is often worth the effort of carrying rather than falling victim to dehydration.

Finally, visitors should take particular care to treat monuments, private residences and property with sufficient respect. In the case of war memorials, inconsiderate behaviour around them can cause genuine offence so be particularly sensitive when viewing and photographing them. Although residents living in the area are used to the sight of tourists, they are easily irritated if they overstep common courtesy. It is therefore important to avoid approaching relevant farmhouses, which are often family residences, without due care and attention.

Tales of aggravated farmers reaching for shotguns and peppering adventurous visitors with rock salt or birdshot are legion in military history circles. Thankfully, this is rare but the author once witnessed an entire group being thrown out of Hougoumont by the former farmer after a glass object was accidently smashed in the courtyard. He subsequently declared his property off limits for the rest of the day.

With hundreds of visitors arriving daily, even outside the usual tourist season, it is understandable that tempers can become frayed. Taking account of this, approach occupied buildings very carefully and ask permission if you wish to take close-ups or try unusual angles when taking photographs. For example, people have occasionally been tempted to scale the wall of La Haye Sainte and take photographs over it into the courtyard below, as the gate is usually closed and impassible. After years of being pestered, the current owner restored the wall largely to prevent such incursions and he may respond badly to ill-advised attempts to gain entry, hopefully not resorting to the extremes that the farm’s former occupants adopted when they observed voltigeurs clambering over the walls.

Although instances of the above are rare, remember that the people inhabiting this region are friendly and helpful but please treat them kindly in order that they remain so and continue to welcome visitors to Waterloo.

WATERLOO RELICS AND ANTIQUES

Collectors have always sought after relics connected with great battles. In the case of Waterloo, people realized its significance so swiftly that a thriving trade in mementos picked up from the battlefield began in Brussels in the very week in which the battle took place. Indeed, some participants even took items from their foes while the fighting was still in progress such as Captain Kelly of the 1st Life Guards who, after cutting down Colonel Michel Ordener of the 1st Cuirassiers during a cavalry skirmish, dismounted to take the epaulettes from his enemy’s uniform as trophies. In fact, the unfortunate Ordener was merely wounded and survived the battle. Large numbers of civilians and camp followers also prowled the battlefield that night and over the following days, looting anything of significance or value.

In recent years, the use of metal detectors has become increasingly popular with those who hope to find interesting or valuable objects on battlefields. Collectors who engage in this hobby seek formerly commonplace items such as belt buckles, uniform buttons, shako plates and musket balls. Some pass these on to museums but many either collect objects for themselves or sell them. The use of metal detectors can be beneficial when museum professionals or archaeologists conduct surveys but amateur enthusiasts should be aware that searching battlefields without permission is legally and morally dubious.

Main locations for Waterloo battlefield.

In fairness, the trade in such objects is an interesting one and it is easy to see why many are drawn to the hobby. However, few things irritate a landowner more than the sight of a stranger wandering through his fields equipped with metal detector and shovel. However, the field of Waterloo’s fame has ensured that it has been thoroughly searched in this fashion over the years and there cannot be much left to find of great significance. In any case, the proper place for battlefield finds is in museum collections where they can be displayed to the public.

Objects directly associated with Waterloo, and those that fought there, often fetch high prices at antique auctions. This is especially true of artefacts associated with Napoleon or Wellington. Gilles Betrand and Gérard Lachaux, in their book Waterloo Relics, wrote that even mundane objects that the Emperor handled briefly are valued. For example, a cup and saucer he used at a farm in Charleroi is now a treasured possession in the Musée de l’Armée’s collection in Paris. Likewise, when a local woman gave Napoleon a drink from a ceramic vessel in Fleurus, it became her most treasured possession and was passed down as a family heirloom. This object is now held in the Musée Napoléon de Ligny.

Personal objects, such as Napoleon’s distinctive hats and long grey frock coats, command astronomical sums at auction on the rare occasions when they are sold. This was true even during the early twentieth century and the Connoisseur Magazine of 1904 recorded that serious collectors paid various amounts for them and for ‘that essentially personal relic – the Napoleonic hair. For some considerable time past a lock of Wellington’s hair has fetched a sovereign or thereabouts.’ Locks of hair were regularly exchanged during the nineteenth century as marks of affection between friends and relations.

Major Heinrich Eugen Baron von Keller captured two of Napoleon’s carriages during the rout of the French army. They were abandoned when the roads became impassible due to the numbers of fugitives fleeing Waterloo and Keller was fortunate that he maintained possession of them. Although they contained some valuables, even items such as the side lanterns and candles were cut from them and later sold. Keller also received large sums of money for the carriages themselves, the Berlin seized at Genappe fetching £2,500 from Madame Tussaud’s gallery in London (a considerable sum at the time).

Objects like the Waterloo Chairs constructed out of wood from the elm tree at Wellington’s crossroads are highly treasured items today (see Chapter 3), as are items of furniture that Napoleon used at Longwood House during his exile on St Helena. Any weapon used at Waterloo, with a legitimate provenance, can also command high sums at auction and it is a demonstration of how significant the battle was that almost any item associated with this battle instantly attracts the attention of serious collectors.

Viewpoints

BRUSSELS

Belgium’s capital city lies 12 miles (19km) from the battlefield, which makes it an excellent base for most visitors. It is also easy to travel to and battlefield tourists will have no difficulty in finding accommodation, shops, restaurants and almost anything that they require in a city that has become the heart of Europe. Indeed, as Brussels is the main home of the European Parliament, it is tempting to suggest that Napoleon’s ideal of a united Europe is almost upon us, although in truth his vision entailed an empire dominated by France with a ruling Bonaparte dynasty at its head.

After the peace of 1814, hundreds of British expatriates (many of them from among the nobility) came to stay in Brussels. They did this partly through curiosity, as travelling there had been almost impossible during the wars, but also to escape their creditors and enjoy a high but economic standard of living in Belgium. At the time of Napoleon’s return, Brussels was thriving with regular balls and soirées. The famous Waterloo Ball, held at the Duke and Duchess of Richmond’s residence, was one such entertainment. Lord Byron described the occasion in his poems Childe Harold and the Eve of Waterloo. One verse reads:

There was a sound of revelry by night,

And Belgium’s capital had gather’d then

Her Beauty and her Chivalry, and bright

The lamps shone o’er fair women and brave men;

The ballroom no longer exists, having been demolished during the nineteenth century when the Rue des Cendres was constructed. The house it stood behind still stands in the Rue de la Blanchisserie in central Brussels.

WELLINGTON CONNECTIONS

Wellington set out from Vienna on 29 March and arrived at the Belgian capital on 4 April. He chose to stay at the private residence of Monsieur van de Cruyce, renting the entire ground floor of this large house on the Rue Royale. The building is currently divided between civic and private company offices and is numbered 54–6 on the Rue Royale near the Parc de Bruxelles in the city centre. It was here that Wellington planned the invasion of France and, although caught off guard by Napoleon’s preemptive strike, his preparatory work served him well when the Allies marched into France after Waterloo.

The Duke also spent significant time at the Hôtel de Belle Vue. This is now the Belvue Museum, which displays a large collection of fine paintings, photographs, sculptures and other exhibits related to the Belgian royal family. It stands on the Place de Palais, opposite the Palais Royale, and this palace is the official residence of the Belgian Monarchy. The former hotel has an elegant neoclassical facade and it is easy to see why Wellington enjoyed holding lectures and meetings here for military purposes and civic functions. It was here that he received an alarming message from General Constant de Rebequè at 3.00pm on 15 June, which informed him that Napoleon had crossed the frontier.

THE GRANDE PLACE (GROTE MARKT)

Many buildings and private residences were used as makeshift hospitals within the city as carts carrying hundreds of wounded soldiers trundled into the capital from 15 June onwards. Every jolt the wagons took as they traversed the roughly cobbled streets drew gasps and groans of pain from the men they carried, arousing great sympathy from the citizens of Brussels who did their best to cater for their needs.

Among the buildings used as aid stations were the Civil List Building (at the corner of the Place de Palais and Rue Ducale) and the Abbaye de la Cambre (at the end of the Etangs d’Ixelles). The most famous place where wounded were tended to is the Grande Place which lies right in the heart of the old quarter of the city.

Today the Grande Place is a popular tourist destination as a site of spectacular architectural beauty where cultural events are regularly held. Some of the oldest civic buildings in Europe stand on the edges of this large cobbled square and all are well maintained and of magnificent appearance. These include the spectacular Hôtel de Ville, Le Maison des Ducs de Brabant and the Maison de Roi, parts of the latter dating back to 1536. Victor Hugo stayed at ‘Le Pigeon’, which is currently a restaurant, during his exile in 1852. Most of the buildings are stone faced and some have their construction dates, statuettes and features on their facades picked out in golden alloy or brass. The area is steeped in history, providing the ideal venue for enthusiasts to sit at one of the many pavement cafes there and comfortably enjoy Belgian wine, beer and food in a very pleasant setting.

With this in mind, it is hard to imagine the markedly different scene that must have greeted passersby in 1815 for at least a week after Waterloo. Medical orderlies scattered a layer of straw over the cobbles and laid wounded men in rows throughout the square. While it is likely that many were moved indoors when accommodation became available, others were tended in the open air for hours or days and received only minimal treatment. It is likely that many remained here for several days and the mortality rate must have been high due to the long wait for operations, with so many men to treat, and amputation being the main method of dealing with serious wounds. Although visiting the Grande Place is a wonderful experience, this is a location where horrific events occurred and its current appearance gives no hint of what took place there 200 years ago.

EVERE CEMETERY

On Tuesday 26 August 1890 a monument was unveiled at Evere Cemetery by the Duke of Cambridge as commander-in-chief of the British Army. It was dedicated to the soldiers of the British Army killed during the 1815 campaign or who died of wounds received in battle shortly thereafter. Huge numbers of British expatriates living in Belgium attended along with scores of extra visitors from Britain. So many people wished to attend, particularly from among the military that a special steamer was laid on to convey them from Dover to Ostend.

Among the large crowd present was General Baron de Rennette (representing the Belgian King Leopold II), the Lord Mayor of London and the Burgomaster of Brussels. Many relatives of men who had fought during the campaign attended and among them was Lord Vivian, the grandson of Major General Sir Hussey Vivian who commanded the 6th British Cavalry Brigade at Waterloo. After a solemn but magnificent religious service, Lord Vivian gave a speech to the gathering, explaining the purpose of the monument and thanking the Municipality of Brussels for generously bestowing the site for commemorative purposes.

The Belgians had given the British a plot 32yd^2 (30m^2) in Evere Cemetery where they placed a burial vault with a large statue above it. Initially this contained the remains of fifteen officers and one non-commissioned officer, although other remains were subsequently added. These had been disinterred from various sites, placed in zinc coffins and laid to rest inside the vault. They included Lieutenant Colonel Sir William de Lancey (Wellington’s Deputy Quartermaster General), Lieutenant Colonel the Honourable Sir Alexander Gordon (whose monument stands by Wellington’s crossroads) and Sergeant Major Edward Cotton of the 7th Hussars.

The British royal family, British Army and the City of London contributed to the cost of the monument. Subscriptions were also raised from British communities in Brussels and private individuals in Britain and Belgium. The Illustrated London News gave a good description of its appearance:

the work of the Comte de Lalaing, a Belgian sculptor, represents, on a pedestal, a kneeling figure of Britannia, with her head bent down as if in mourning for her children, and still watching over them in their death-sleep. At the base of the monument are three lions couchant in varied attitudes. The effect of the whole is seriously impressive …

Beneath the statue is a Latin inscription reading ‘mortuorum patria memor’ (‘the country mindful of its dead’). The vault itself lies below and is reached by two flights of stairs, which descend into the ground ending at the vault entrance. Shield-shaped plaques record the names of the regiments that fought at Waterloo on either side and above the entrance is the following inscription in English:

IN MEMORY of the British officers non-commissioned officers & men who fell during the WATERLOO CAMPAIGN in 1815 & whose remains were transferred to this cemetery in 1889. This Monument is erected by Her Britannic Majesty Queen Victoria, Empress of India, & by their Countrymen on a site generously presented by the City of Brussels.

The cemetery lies to the north-east of Brussels centre and is easily reached by car, taxi or bus. It is usually open from early morning to late afternoon but is often closed on Mondays. It is located at the end of the Rue de la Cimetière. To find the monument, walk through the main gateway of the cemetery, proceed directly on to the central island and then turn right. Alternatively, turn right immediately after entering, walking along the wall of the cemetery. Using either route, the monument soon becomes visible due to its height.

THE ROYAL ARMY AND MILITARY HISTORY MUSEUM

The Musée Royal de l’Armée et d’Histoire Militaire (Royal Army and Military History Museum) is one of the largest museums of its kind in the world. It is located in a large complex of buildings around the vast triumphal arches at the end of the Parc du Cinquantenaire in central Brussels, which includes Autoworld and the Musées Royaux d’Art et d’Histoire. It contains a vast array of military artefacts from the medieval period to the present day along with a section devoted to aircraft.

Of particular interest are examples of medieval artillery and exhibitions dedicated to the history of the Belgian Army from the late 1700s, Belgian Revolution of 1830, Emperor Maximilian’s involvement in Mexico and the First and Second World Wars. As a Royal institution, the museum has benefited from generous funding and the fact that so many wars have been fought in central Europe has allowed it to assemble a huge amount of weaponry, paintings, uniforms and decorations.

Military history enthusiasts will be spoilt for choice in this incredible museum but the Napoleonic Gallery is obviously the most relevant for this book’s subject matter. In addition to the material contained within it, the gallery is located within the triumphal archway itself, which stands several storeys high and is reached by stairway or elevator. Visitors can step out onto viewing platforms on either side of the quadriga surmounting the structure. This sculpture portrays the figure of Brabant, brandishing the national flag and riding a four-horsed chariot. A gigantic Belgian flag usually hangs within the central archway and is visible from a great distance. From this height, visitors gain spectacular views of Cinquantenaire Park below and the city.

Ironically more re-enactors choose to portray soldiers of the French Army rather than the ultimately victorious Allies today. The romanticism of a lost cause is one of the attractions.

The Napoleonic gallery contains an impressive number of exhibits, many of which are rarely seen elsewhere. Examples include the largest range of Napoleonic shakos and helmets that the author has ever seen on display during a lifetime of visiting military museums. Along with numerous weapons, decorations and paintings (some relating directly to Waterloo) are two exhibits worth seeking out specifically. These are a complete set of musical instruments from a regimental band and a striking portrait in pastel of a Belgian officer in the French Imperial Guard.

Another object of interest is an imposing French 12-pound cannon, which currently stands near the main museum entrance, behind the triumphal archway. Cannon of this calibre were considered the most effective field weapon of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The sheer size of this monstrous gun (the wheels exceed the height of most men) gives some insight into why these cannon were both feared and respected on the battlefield. Napoleon valued them greatly and believed that successfully concentrating the fire of artillery batteries had been a decisive factor in many of his victories.

BRAINE L’ALLEUD VILLAGE

Braine l’Alleud lies to the north-west of Waterloo battlefield and, while no actual fighting took place here, Wellington posted large numbers of troops within and around Braine l’Alleud. The bulk of these forces were from the 3rd Netherlands Division (around 7,000 men) and, as the course of the fighting became clearer, General Chassé brought most of his division forward to reinforce Wellington’s centre. A portion of Chassé’s command played an important role in repelling the final French attack by the Imperial Guard.

Today there are few buildings within Braine l’Alleud dating back to 1815 or before but the locals brought many wounded here and gave them shelter. One building that was here in 1815 is the Church of St Etienne, which was used for the treatment of the injured. It has an unusual spire, similar to the onion-shaped minarets of Russian Orthodox Church spires. A plaque is set on the outer wall of the tower and its French inscription translates as: ‘This church served as a hospital on the day following the battle when the good people of Braine l’Alleud came to tend the wounded, June 1815’. These words are also inscribed upon a bass relief inside St Etienne’s, depicting Simon Cyrene helping Jesus carry his terrible burden to the crucifixion.

The church tower is 147.6ft (45m) tall and Victor Hugo compared its distinctive spire to a ‘graceful chalice’. It was visible some distance from the village, which is now a small town, and according to local legend, Prussian soldiers asked their officers how they would know when victory was near, who responded: ‘When you see a church tower surmounted by a helmet.’ The spire does resemble a German pickel-haube helmet, although the use of this spiked military headgear postdates the Battle of Waterloo.

WATERLOO VILLAGE

Today Waterloo is a large town with a population of around 28,000 inhabitants. In 1815, there were approximately 7,000 people living here and the village lies 3 miles (5km) from the battlefield, and no fighting took place here. As the name of their town is world famous due to its associations with the conflict, its citizens are naturally proud but occasionally perplexed by having to explain its exact involvement to the thousands of tourists who visit every year. During one of the author’s recent visits, a woman serving in the Maison de Tourisme (tourist information office) smiled after pointing out the Waterloo-related leaflets and literature available and gestured to the floor above, where there was a local history exhibition. ‘Waterloo is known for more than just that time when Napoleon visited us, you know?’ she added. The tourist information centre is located in the centre of the town, just across the road from the Wellington Museum.

Early Medieval accounts initially refer to the village as ‘Waterlots’, which means ‘wet meadows by a stream in a forest’. It lies 9½ miles (15km) from the capital and its position, being along one of the first main highways to be paved in the country (originally named the Chemin des Wallons), meant that it prospered as a staging post for travellers. Inns and taverns sprang up to cater for travellers eager for food and lodgings during journeys between Brussels and Paris. The close proximity of the Forest of Soignes also meant that the village was involved with the forestry industry. A minor engagement was fought here in 1705 during the War of Spanish Succession when Jacque Pastur (who was born in the village and commanded a militia-based force) briefly challenged the progress of the Duke of Marlborough’s army. Since it straddles an important national communications route, Waterloo has seen many armies pass through over the centuries.

THE WELLINGTON MUSEUM

The Musée Wellington lies on the Chaussée de Bruxelles in the centre of Waterloo. An old coaching inn (built circa 1705), Wellington selected it as his headquarters since it was large enough to house most of his staff and was situated adjacent to the highway that Napoleon probably intended to use on his drive towards Brussels. The building had narrow corridors and fourteen separate rooms along with stabling in 1815. It was here that Wellington conferred with his generals and wrote his famous first dispatch conveying news of his victory to the British Government.

Over the years the house has changed hands many times and been used for several different purposes. During the 1950s, a wealthy American offered to buy the structure, intending to transfer it back brick-by-brick for reconstruction in the USA. However, Count Jacques-Henri Pirenne (the historian who founded Les Amis du Musée Wellington – The Friends of the Wellington Museum) managed to prevent this in 1955 and it became a museum. By 1958, the Belgian Government had taken possession, and it was declared a protected building in 1981.

The museum’s collection includes many relics associated with the battlefield, Wellington, Napoleon and the Wars of Revolution and Empire. Of particular interest is Wellington’s former bedchamber on the first floor, which he relinquished to his friend Gordon as he suffered the agonies of amputation. Nearby is the study where the Duke wrote his first dispatch outlining the emerging details of the victory. A mannequin representing Wellington sits at the very desk he supposedly used for the purpose. He wrote this knowing that his friend Gordon lay mortally wounded only a short distance away, where he eventually died in the early hours of 19 June.

The Wellington Museum, which resides in the building that the Duke chose as his headquarters. It stands opposite St Joseph’s in the centre of Waterloo.

In addition to numerous busts, paintings, weapons and decorations, the Wellington Museum regularly hosts special exhibitions. Many of these relate to the Napoleonic Wars in general but the Duke’s Peninsula campaigns are also a favourite topic. A recent exhibition examines the effect that Waterloo had on history and records how far its name spread throughout Europe and the world by listing the incredible number of towns, cities and institutions named in honour of the battle. There are also large-scale maps on display, some of which are illuminated, which visitors may find useful to peruse before visiting the actual battlefield.

In addition to the usual Waterloo postcards and souvenirs, the museum contains an excellent bookshop containing more Napoleonic titles than most related museums in the area. The old coach entrance on the front of the museum is now filled with a black gate about 6ft (1.8m) high with the numerals 1815 picked out in gold upon it. A pleasing addition to the frontage are modern national flags of participating nations in the 1815 campaign, the appearance of which side by side represents the hope that old quarrels are now forgotten.

The gardens are also open to the public and plaques can be viewed both here and mounted on the walls of the ground floor of the house. Many plaques have been relocated from elsewhere and the officers thus commemorated are Lieutenant Colonel Stables (of the Guards), Major Arthur Rowley Heyland (40th Foot), Colonel Ellis (25th Foot) and Lieutenant Colonel Richard Fitz-Gerald whose tomb still stands in the garden.

One of the more unusual tales about Waterloo relates to Lord Uxbridge’s amputated leg. This awful operation was carried out in Château Tremblant, which then stood on the Chausée de Bruxelles. According to some sources, Uxbridge suffered the agony of amputation in silence only speaking once to remark that the surgeon’s saw could have been a little sharper. Jean-Baptiste Pâris, who lived there, actually put up a grave marker for the severed limb after burying it in the garden.

There are three versions of how its inscription read, which are grimly humourous, the first supposedly reading: ‘Here lies the Marquis of Anglesey’s leg; Pray for the rest of his body, I beg’. The second alternative continues in similar vein with: ‘Here lies the Marquis of Anglesey’s limb; The devil will have the remainder of him’. The final version is a more respectful, if rather eccentric, record for the interment of a solitary body part:

Here is buried the leg

Of the illustrious and valiant Count Uxbridge,

Lieutenant-General of his Britannic Majesty,

Commander in Chief of the British, Belgian and Dutch

Cavalry, wounded 18th June

1815, at the memorable battle of Waterloo;

Which by his heroism, contributed towards the

Triumph of the human cause;

Gloriously decided by the brilliant victory of the said day.

Lieutenant General Henry Paget, Earl of Uxbridge, one of Britain’s finest cavalry commanders and second in command to Wellington at Waterloo. (Lawrence)

The leg was disinterred during the nineteenth century and, according to some sources, actually displayed in a glass cabinet at one stage. When the Marquis’s son visited the area during 1877–8, he was stunned to see the bone and the boot that housed it utilized as an exhibit and appealed to the Belgian ambassador in London for its removal when he returned to England. Consequently, it was removed from display and was transferred to the grounds of the Wellington Museum in 1991. Once again, the remains were reburied but their precise whereabouts are now disputed. Nevertheless, one of the Marquis’s wooden prosthetic limbs is currently on display in Gordon’s bedchamber in the Wellington Museum.

THE ROYAL CHAPEL AND ST JOSEPH’S CHURCH

On the other side of the Chaussée de Bruxelles, opposite the Wellington Museum, are the Royal Chapel and Church of St Joseph, which predate the battle. The chapel was consecrated in 1690 by the Marquis of Castanaga (the Spanish Governor General of the Low Countries) who intended it to be used as a place of rest for his sovereign’s line. However, when Charles II of Spain died without issue, it was put to other uses. The chapel has a solemnly impressive appearance with a classical frontage. The adjoining St Joseph’s Church has been extended since 1815, reaching its current size in the 1850s, and the combined structure towers over the pavement and visually dominates the centre of Waterloo.

Following the battle, twenty-seven plaques commemorating Allied officers slain during the campaign were placed within the Royal Chapel. Subsequently, most of these were transferred into St Joseph’s Church and today they adorn the walls and floor of its interior. Only two large bas-reliefs relating to the battle and a large bust of Wellington remain in the Royal Chapel now.

St Joseph’s Church in the centre of Waterloo Village (now a town). Inside the church are numerous monuments commemorating the slain on all sides at Waterloo.

The church and chapel are made of dark-brown brick, faced with stonework and the dome is contained in a leaden roof, greened with age and topped by a dark tower. Considering the relatively dark exterior, it therefore comes as a pleasant surprise to visitors that the interior of the dome contrasts sharply with this appearance. Light cascades down from the windows above and the whole structure is spacious, bright and cool – lending a serious and calm aspect suitable for a place of worship housing memorials to the fallen.

The stones lining the walls predominantly record the sacrifices of British, Belgian and Dutch soldiers but a French monument was added in recent years. The sheer number of officers listed, along with their regiments who lost even more men in the ranks, has a sobering effect on most observers. Naturally their words are too many to repeat here but a white marble plaque to the left of the entrance gives a more general description: ‘In honoured memory of all British officers, non commissioned officers and soldiers who fell in battle upon the 16th, 17th and 18th June 1815. This tablet was erected by a few brothers in arms and countrymen AD MDCCCLVIII’.

THE LION VILLAGE

The impact of the Napoleonic Wars was so great that people immediately wished to see the place where Wellington triumphed over the ‘Corsican Tyrant’ and finally defeated him. Indeed, as soon as word of the great victory reached Brussels, many travelled to the scene and some civilians had even been present during the battle itself, as was often the case during the period, simply out of curiosity.

Looking down on the Waterloo panorama and the village from the summit of the Lion Mound, which contains a spectacular painting of the battle.

An early pioneer of travelling for pleasure was Thomas Cook, often considered the father of modern tourism. Having organized excursions in Britain during the 1840s, he became a full-time ‘excursion and tourist operator’ in 1854 and arranged his first ‘Grand Circular Tour of Europe’ the following year. This included a trip to Waterloo, and visits to the site of Napoleon’s defeat were frequently requested throughout his career, the battlefield never losing its popularity as a destination.

While the majority of early tourists hailed from the participant nations allied against France in 1815, French visitors increasingly began to travel here as the political climate and assessment of history changed their nation’s outlook. The undiminished and almost mythic status afforded to Napoleon was also influential in drawing curious visitors to the site of his last battle. By 1912, an anonymous French writer claimed: ‘the battlefield has beome an almost obligatory pilgrimage for the French visiting Belgium’.

Yet even before the organization of large tours, visitors flocked to the battlefield and a small group of buildings was constructed to cater for tourists. Built nearby and to the north-east of the Lion Mound, the village lies in the centre of the ridge where Wellington’s right flank had once been. This collection of buildings soon gained the unofficial name of the Lion Village. The gigantic Lion Mound (see Chapter 3) and the large rotunda at its foot, containing the panorama (see Chapter 5), dominate the village. It also contains an impressive range of shops, restaurants, museums and a battlefield centre.

LE MUSÉE DE CIRE (WAXWORKS MUSEUM) (LOCATION MAP REFERENCE 7)

One of the first buildings constructed here was the Hôtel du Musée (Museum Hotel) begun by Sergeant Major Cotton. This was purpose built for battlefield visitors and, as a Waterloo veteran, Cotton’s services as a guide were sought after. Today the building is a museum, housing a collection of life-size waxwork figures. These include portrayals of Wellington, Napoleon and Blücher along with most of the French marshals present during the battle. The famous scene of Napoleon breakfasting at Le Caillou and in conference with his generals is one of the events depicted. While the faces and poses of the figures vary in terms of realism, the uniforms are quite accurate and give a good impression of the visual military splendour of Napoleonic times.

WATERLOO VISITORS’ CENTRE

A trip to Waterloo is incomplete without going to the Visitors’ Centre. This lies at the foot of the Lion Mound and there is a fee charged for those wishing to climb to its summit. An estimated 300,000 visitors do this every year and they are offered an audio-visual display in addition. This comprises a film depicting modern re-enactments of Napleonic battles and excerpts from Sergei Bondarchuk’s film Waterloo. Maps and display panels, along with a large model of the battlefield, help onlookers gain an understanding of the terrain and the course of the battle before they climb the Lion Mound. Tickets are also available for the Waterloo Panorama, which is well worth a visit and the centre contains a large bookshop with many related titles.

Staff at the battlefield centre are extremely helpful and, despite being frequently busy catering for large numbers of tourists, will happily answer queries from enthusiasts. Yet the future of the battlefield was once in doubt and, had it not been for the efforts of Belgian and British committees to preserve the field, the view from the Lion Mound might not be so impressive.

The conservation of a battlefield that had determined the fate of Europe was occasionally uncertain. Although changes have occurred since 1815, extensive building developments were once planned in the area and would have transformed the battle-field’s appearance unfavourably. Consequently, committees formed during the early twentieth century had to fight determinedly to fend off attempts to encroach on the site. While they benefited from the support of the fourth Duke of Wellington and Field Marshal Roberts among other dignitaries, they could not afford to buy the area outright as some groups have done with American battlefields. Instead, attempts were made to buy the building rights in the region with a view to restricting them. However, the Belgian Government was eventually persuaded to pass legislation forbidding new developments over an area of 1,347 acres in 1914.

RESTAURANTS AND SOUVENIR SHOPS

Over the years, there have been many restaurants in the Lion Village, which have changed names and ownership numerous times. Currently some are unoccupied but the three main restaurants are Le Bivouac de l’Empereur, Le Cambronne Taverne and Le Wellington Café. These are all excellent establishments serving fine food and alcoholic beverages for every taste. While the first two have a pleasingly traditional atmosphere inside, displaying numerous Waterloo prints and artefacts on their walls, the Wellington Café presents a more modern appearance.

This impressive reproduction of a French Eagle stands guard outside Le Bivouac de l’Empereur Restaurant in the Lion Village.

The Cambronne Tavern is worthy of note, partly for its excellent beer and the fondues it is justly renowned for, but mainly because of an unusual modern ‘shrine’ placed on one internal wall. This is in the form of a large bust of Napoleon upon a sturdy shelf. Behind this hangs a flag from a French Eagle standard and the bust is flanked by two candlesticks. Apparently, the candles are lit on the 18 June each year and this, along with the fact that the tavern is named after the famously defiant General Cambronne (see Chapter 9) strongly imply that the owner’s sympathies do not lie with the Allied Coalition ranged against Napoleon.

The restaurants all have seating outside where it is very pleasant to enjoy a glass of cool beer particularly after tramping over the dusty battlefield during the summer months. Indeed, the Lion Village is extremely welcoming to tourists but be aware if driving through the village that it becomes extremely crowded, particularly around the June anniversary, and that ‘jaywalking’ visitors abound despite the sharp bend in the Route de Lion as it runs through the village.

The village is provided with large car parks but even these are stretched to capacity in June, often due to large numbers of coaches conveying organized tours to the battlefield. Re-enactors often wander within the village and, even when not acting in character, are usually prepared to pose for photographs to the delight of many visitors. Most groups take great care about the authenticity of their uniforms, arms and equipment so visitors can often learn a great deal about the Napoleonic Wars by engaging these enthusiasts in conversation. A large-scale re-enactment of the battle is currently planned to take place every five years. The first of these in 1995 was initially controversial since it took place on the battlefield itself. The concept of commemorating the battle in this fashion has now become more acceptable but the location of the event varies, depending upon landowners’ consent and other considerations.

Re-enactors depicting British light infantry (the famed ‘redcoats’), whose tenacious defence played a major part in winning the battle for the Allies.

A statue of Napoleon in the Lion Village, where statues of the victorious generals (Wellington and Blücher) are notable by their absence.

Both the visitors’ centre and the souvenir shops contain a vast range of mementos for sale connected with Waterloo and related personalities. While an impressive range of books are on offer, it is also possible to buy an enormous number of items relating to the battle or displaying its name. These include military prints, toy soldiers, toy cannon, t-shirts, sweatshirts, postcards, pens, busts and statuettes of all kinds. Interestingly, the vast majority of gifts are linked to Napoleon in some fashion, causing some visitors to comment wryly that people who are unaware of the battle’s history might reasonably conclude that he had actually won a victory here judging by their visit alone.

Indeed, items relating to the Allied armies and personalities such as Wellington and Blücher are notable by their absence. Considering the cult that has grown up around Napoleon, this is to be expected, especially when one considers that he had an entire era named after him. Those who had known him personally recognized that he was approaching legendary status even before his death on St Helena. François-Rene Chateaubriand (a renowned French writer, politican, soldier and historian) knew the former Emperor well and suggested: ‘Bonaparte is no longer the real Bonaparte; he is a figure of legend composed of a poet’s mad musings, soldiers’ accounts, and folk tales. What we see today is the Charlemagne and the Alexander of medieval epic. This fantastic hero shall remain the real person; the other portraits will vanish.’

Even though he had been conclusively defeated, the magnetism of the Emperor’s personality and virtually unmatched achievements made him an attractive and romantic figure. Chateaubriand argued fiercely with Napoleon and had no reason to like him. Indeed, when Napoleon became enraged after reading what Chateaubriand had written about him, he threatened to have him sabred on the steps of the Tuileries. Yet this former enemy was honest enough to concede that: ‘In his life he failed to capture the world. When he was dead, it was his.’ The truth of this phrase is evident in the Lion Village and many of the museums related to Waterloo or other Napoleonic subjects. The fact that a statue of Napoleon stands in the Lion Village, actually located on the former Allied ridge, while likenesses of his enemies are nowhere to be seen, speaks volumes about this theory.

ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Waterloo is one of the most famous battles ever fought. Therefore, it is unsurprising that it has attracted the attention of hundreds of authors to the extent that it would be possible to write a good book about books concerning Waterloo. With such a host of literature available, it should also be borne in mind that the following list represents only a tiny portion of the vast number of titles available. For reasons of brevity, the entire list of works used by the author while compiling this guidebook, along with primary source material, is not included here. The following is intended to provide a general guide to what is available on the subject and is primarily aimed at those setting out on a study of the battle for the first time.

Adkin, Mark, The Waterloo Companion, London, Aurum Press Ltd, 2001

This large tome contains a huge amount of useful information concerning Waterloo and the 1815 campaign. While it is a specialized book aimed at enthusiasts, it is highly recommended for those who want in-depth detail about Waterloo.

Barbero, Allesandro, The Battle: A History of the Battle of Waterloo, London, Atlantic Books, 2006

This is one of the best modern works on the battle and Barbero’s Italian heritage allows him to be more impartial than historians hailing from any of the participant nations in the 1815 campaign.

Black, Jeremy, Waterloo – The Battle that Brought Down Napoleon, London, Icon Books Ltd, 2010

A good modern study aimed more at those already familiar with Waterloo rather than those just setting out on the subject.

Chandler, David, Waterloo: The Hundred Days, London, George Philip, 1987

The late, great David Chandler wrote some of the best books on the Napoleonic period and this is no exception. It gives a lucid and readable account of the campaign and its climax at Waterloo.

Hofschröer, Peter, 1815: The Waterloo Campaign (2 vols), London, Greenhill Books, 1999

While these books are written from the standpoint that the Prussians made the major contribution to the campaign, rendering them controversial in some quarters, they are readable and well-researched nonetheless.

Houssaye, Henry, 1815, Waterloo – An account of Napoleon’s last campaign, York, Leonaur, 2009

A welcome reprint of Houssaye’s classic 1906 description of Waterloo from a largely French perspective, which has been translated into English.

Howarth, David, Waterloo – A Near Run Thing, Glasgow, William Collins Sons & Co. Ltd, 1968

A traditional but reliable account of Waterloo.

Liddell Hart, B H (ed.), The Letters of Private Wheeler 1809–1828, Moreton-in-Marsh, Gloucestershire, 1999 (first edn 1951)

The words of an honest and plainspoken infantryman, providing fascinating eyewitness testimony of events on 18 June 1815.

Lindau, Friedrich (trans. and ed. Bogle, James and Uffindell, Andrew), A Waterloo Hero, London, Frontline Books, 2009

Lindau served in the King’s German Legion as a private soldier and played a valiant role defending the farmhouse of La Haye Sainte, where he was captured.

Mercer, Alexander Cavalié, Journal of the Campaign of 1815 – The Experiences of an Officer of the Royal Horse Artillery during the Waterloo Campaign, London, Leonaur Ltd, 2008

Recently reprinted, this is a famous eyewitness account of Waterloo and one of the best.

Pericoli, Ugo and Glover, Michael, 1815 The Armies at Waterloo, London, The Military Book Society, 1973

A detailed and well-illustrated book depicting the armies that fought during the 1815 campaign.

Roberts, Andrew, Waterloo: Napoleon’s Last Gamble, London, Harper Perennial, 2006

This is an incredibly concise account of the battle at less than 150 pages, but it nevertheless examines Waterloo objectively. This is an excellent introduction for beginners but should also please enthusiasts looking for a small, handy volume that covers a lot of ground.

Summerville, Christopher, Who was Who at Waterloo – A Biography of the Battle, Harlow, Pearson Education Limited, 2007

A source of some fascinating information about those who fought at Waterloo, providing an invaluable aid for enthusiasts.

Weller, Jac, Wellington at Waterloo, London, Greenhill Books, 1992 edn A well-researched and readable description of Waterloo, if slightly biased in favour of the Duke of Wellington’s contribution to the victory.

BATTLEFIELD CHRONOLOGY

The Battle of Waterloo was a vast event involving hundreds of thousands of men and is therefore difficult to break down into a precise time chart. The exact times when some events occurred are disputed by conflicting eyewitness testimonies or are challenged by historians’ research. Therefore, all of the following times are estimated. To complicate matters further, the simultaneous manoeuvres of three large armies must be included. These are differentiated in the following way:

FA – French Army

PA – Prussian Army

AA – Anglo-Allied Army

THE BATTLES OF WATERLOO AND WAVRE, SUNDAY 18 JUNE 1815

03.30

AA:

Wellington receives the confirmation that the Prussians will march to his aid and decides to make a stand at Mont St Jean

03.48

PA:

Prussian IV Corps breaks camp at Wavre

06.00

AA:

Wellington leaves Waterloo village for the battlefield

FA:

Many French units are still marching from Genappe while others remain in bivouac around La Belle Alliance and Plancenoit

Vandamme’s III Corps begins its march towards Wavre

PA:

Bülow’s IV Corps encounters difficulties while marching through the congested centre of Wavre

07.00–08.00

AA:

Wellington inspects his troop dispositions, orders reinforcements to Hougoumont and meets Lord Saltoun to discuss its defence

FA:

Napoleon confers with his generals at Le Caillou

Gérard’s IV Corps begins its march on Wavre

PA:

Bülow’s IV Corps begins the march west from Wavre

09.00–09.30

FA:

Napoleon orders a further reconnaissance of the Anglo-Allied position and directs General Haxo (Guard Engineer Commander) to assess the defences of La Haye Sainte and Hougoumont

PA:

Most of the Prussian Army have broken camp and is marching west

09.30–10.00

AA:

1/2nd Nassau Battalion arrives at Hougoumont

FA:

Napoleon rides forward to observe from Rossomme

PA:

Blücher sends a dispatch to Wellington confirming that his army is marching westward

Prussian IV Corps is halfway to Chapelle-St Robert Ziethen’s I Corps and Pirch’s II Corps have now left Wavre

10.00–10.45

AA:

Wellington receives a report from the 10th Hussars that they have made contact with Prussian cavalry

FA:

Napoleon issues orders for his army to take up positions

Dispatches are sent to Grouchy and the 7th Hussars are posted to monitor the extreme French right flank

Napoleon orders Soult to organize the first attack by the d’Erlon’s I Corps with Reille’s II Corps in support

11.00–12.00

AA:

The Anglo-Allied Army is now fully deployed with the exception of Lambert’s Brigade

FA:

Napoleon reviews his troops at La Belle Alliance as they debouch from the highway to take up positions. Afterwards he either returns to Rossomme or takes up position to the east of La Belle Alliance

At around 11.00am, Napoleon makes the final adjustments for the first attack by d’Erlon’s I Corps

Battle begins with a preliminary French bombardment between 11.20 and 11.30am

French first attack on Hougoumont wood from the south begins at 11.30–11.45am

Grouchy hears the sound of the cannon during a conference with his generals but decides to continue towards Wavre as ordered rather than march to the west

A Prussian cavalryman is captured near St Lambert at around 12.00

PA:

Losthin’s Brigade approaches Chapelle-St Robert

Blücher leaves Wavre in the hands of the rearguard

12.00–12.20

AA:

Hanoverian and Nassau troops are driven from the Hougoumont woods and orchard

Howitzers from Bull’s Battery begin firing on Hougoumont wood

Lord Saltoun counter-attacks with two companies of Guards attempting to retake Hougoumont orchard at around 12.00

FA:

Bauduin’s Brigade (of Prince Jérôme’s 6th Division) take possession of Hougoumont woods and orchard between 11.50 and 12.00

Second French attack on Hougoumont begins at around 12.00

Napoleon concentrates more artillery in the Grande Batterie

The Middle and Old Guard approach Rossomme

Durutte’s 4th Division is still marching into position

12.30–13.15

AA:

Bijlandt’s Netherlands Brigade withdraws from the forward slope where it has suffered greatly under the bombardment

Macdonell’s companies retire inside the buildings at Hougoumont

At around 13.15 Hougoumont’s garrison receives further reinforcements

FA:

Third French attack on Hougoumont

Colonel Cubieres attacks the western side of the chateau

A small number of French (around thirty men) enter Hougoumont via the north gate but the assault group is trapped inside and the attack is repulsed

The French deployment is completed

PA:

The vanguard of IV Corps reach Chapelle-St Lambert

Blücher joins the vanguard, ordering the column to halt for the entire Corps to catch up

Prussian reconnaissance is sent out on Blücher’s orders

13.00–13.15

FA:

The Grande Batterie opens fire at approximately 13.00 on the Anglo-Allied centre

Napoleon and his staff sight Prussian troops in the distance

A Prussian prisoner is brought before Napoleon at around 13.15

Domon and Subervie’s cavalry are ordered to delay the Prussian advance

Napoleon orders Lobau’s VI Corps to reinforce his right flank

13.15–14.15

AA:

Two more companies reinforce Hougoumont, bringing the garrison to around 2,600 men

The Lüneburg Battalion is sent to reinforce La Haye Sainte and is decimated in a counter-attack by French cavalry

Bijlandt’s Netherlands Brigade is attacked and eventually retreats in disorder

Three companies of the 95th Foot abandon the sandpit area

Garrison in La Haye Sainte farmhouse is isolated and attacked

The brigades of Kempt, Pack and Best are all heavily engaged and the commander of the 5th British Infantry Division, General Picton, is killed

The farmhouses of Papelotte and La Haye on the Anglo-Allied left flank are attacked

Uxbridge orders a counter-attack on the Anglo-Allied left with cavalry from the Household and Union brigades

FA:

Elements of Grouchy’s army reach Baraque, roughly 2 miles (3km) from Wavre at around 14.00

D’Erlon’s attack begins at approximately 13.30 and the Grande Batterie ceases fire as it advances on the Anglo-Allied right flank

The fourth French attack on Hougoumont begins at around 14.00 (approximately 12,700 men from 24 battalions are committed by 14.15)

Elements of the French IV Corps are sent to reinforce the right flank against Prussian attack

Colonel Charlet’s Brigade (of Quiot’s 1st Division) attacks La Haye Sainte

Dubois’s Cuirassiers charge the Lüneburg battalion to the west of La Haye Sainte

D’Erlon’s divisions assault the ridge and Bijlandt’s Brigade is driven back. They are heavily engaged on the ridge by 14.00 Durutte’s Division is engaged on the right flank, contesting possession of Papelotte and La Haye

Domon and Subervie’s cavalry arrives on the French right flank at around 14.00

Napoleon moves to a closer position in the region of La Belle Alliance

PA:

Prussian cavalry scouts the Bois de Paris (woods) and the Lasne Valley and begins skirmishing with French counterparts

Bülow’s IV Corps is still concentrating

Ziethen’s I Corps is now heading towards Wellington’s left flank from Rixensart toward Ohain

14.15–15.00

AA:

The Guards retake the great orchard at Hougoumont

The Household Brigade disperses Dubois’s cavalry to the north and west of La Haye Sainte and turns on the French infantry

The Union Brigade drives d’Erlon’s divisions back from the Allied ridge in great disorder, taking two Eagles and around 2,000 prisoners

Elements of the Union and Household brigades overreach themselves by attacking part of the Grande Batterie. The Union Brigade suffers serious losses when counter charged by French cavalry and its commander, General Ponsonby, is killed

The garrison of La Haye Sainte gains a brief respite but is soon attacked once more

FA:

The fifth major attack on Hougoumont begins

D’Erlon’s I Corps is firmly repulsed suffering serious casualties, only Durutte’s Division withdrawing in good order

Part of the Grande Batterie is temporarily put out of action

Napoleon orders a successful counter-attack by eleven squadrons of cuirassiers and lancers (under Travers, Farine and Jacquinot) against the Union Brigade

Bachelu’s 5th Division (of Reille’s Corps) attempts to join the attack on Hougoumont but is forced back by artillery fire from the Allied ridge

PA:

IV Corps is now advancing and the leading brigades under Hiller and Losthin enter the Lasne defile heading towards Plancenoit

15.00–16.00

AA:

Buildings in Hougoumont are set alight by French artillery fire

Much-needed ammunition is carried into Hougoumont

Companies of the 95th Foot reoccupy the sandpit

La Haye Sainte is reinforced by two more companies but the garrison is running low on ammunition and comes under heavy attack

Wellington orders Chassé’s Netherlands Division forward from the area around Braine l’Alleud to bolster his weakened centre

FA:

Grouchy’s scouts arrive before Wavre at around 15.00 and Vandamme attacks with his III Corps at 15.30

The divisions of Quiot, Donzelot and Marcognet (of d’Erlon’s I Corps) regroup

The Grande Batterie resumes its bombardment of the Anglo-Allied centre

Elements of Quiot’s Division resume the attack on La Haye Sainte

Ney observes major troop movement behind the Anglo-Allied centre and assumes that it signifies a general retreat at around 16.00. A cavalry assault is consequently ordered

Count Schwerin’s 1st Cavalry Brigade clashes with French cavalry in a serious engagement on the eastern side of the Bois de Paris at around 15.30

Infantry from Bülow’s vanguard begin to enter the Bois de Paris

PA:

Thielmann beats off a determined attack by Vandamme’s III Corps aimed at seizing the two main bridges over the River Dyle in Wavre between 15.30 and 16.30

16.00–17.00

AA:

All Anglo-Allied infantry battalions in the first and second lines of Wellington’s defence form square to repel massed cavalry attacks by the French

Wellington orders the artillery to fire on the advancing cavalry for as long as possible before the gunners retire to the protection of infantry squares

La Haye Sainte remains under pressure with continuous assaults and the garrison has almost exhausted its ammunition supply

FA:

A sixth French assault begins at Hougoumont at around 16.00 Grouchy arrives before Wavre at approximately 16.00 and receives the dispatch Napoleon sent at 10.00 that morning

Grouchy receives a dispatch dictated by Napoleon at 13.00 at around 17.00, which fails to convey that his support is urgently needed at Mont St Jean. It is too late for him to reach Napoleon on 18 June so this order is now redundant

Ney attacks with at least ten regiments of cavalry following a preliminary artillery bombardment. Despite repeated charges, no infantry squares are broken

Attacks on La Haye Sainte continue

Lobau’s VI Corps engages with the leading units of Bülow’s IV Corps as it debouches from the Bois de Paris

PA:

Hiller’s and Losthin’s brigades emerge from the Bois de Paris to advance on Plancenoit and begin fighting with Lobau’s VI Corps at around 16.30

17.00–18.00

AA:

Anglo-Allied infantry remain under attack by massed French cavalry and suffer heavy artillery bombardment between assaults

Uxbridge pursues enemy cavalry after each assault but struggles to prevent his cavalry overreaching themselves by charging down the ridge

Wellington sends Nassau troops (around 150 men) to reinforce the garrison of La Haye Sainte but dispatches no ammunition to the farmhouse

FA:

Gérard’s IV Corps attacks upriver from Wavre trying to cross the Dyle at Bierge between 17.00 and 17.30

Ney increases the number of cavalry assaulting the ridge, committing the brigades of Kellerman and Guyot (Imperial Guard) but fails to break the Anglo-Allied line and calls off the attack between 17.30 and 18.00

Elements of Reille’s Corps, advancing in support of the cavalry, arrive belatedly before the ridge at around 17.30 and are firmly repulsed

Lobau’s VI Corps retires into Plancenoit after a fighting a fierce engagement

The 13th Légère mounts a serious assault on La Haye Sainte just before 18.00

PA:

Elements of Pirch’s II Corps begin to arrive from 17.00 onwards on the left of IV Corps

Bülow’s IV Corps is fully engaged by 17.30 and, outnumbering Lobau’s forces, pushes the French back towards Plancenoit

The first brigade of Ziethen’s I Corps under Steinmetz reaches Ohain at around 18.00

18.00–18.30

AA:

Hougoumont is still under heavy attack, the orchard having changed hands several times but the woods are firmly in possession of the French

La Haye Sainte finally falls to French assault at around 18.30 and elements of the KGL garrison manage to escape to the Allied ridge. Most become casualties or are captured

FA:

Ney tries to organize a combined arms assault on Wellington’s centre at between 18.00 and 18.30 but is denied infantry by Napoleon, who is concerned about Prussian moves against the army’s right flank

Plancenoit falls to Prussian assault and Napoleon is forced to commit eight battalions of the Young Guard to retake the village

The seventh major attack against Hougoumont begins at around 18.30

PA:

Losthin’s 15th Brigade and Hiller’s 16th Brigade mount a serious attack on Placenoit, beginning with an assault on its northern edge. Intense street fighting takes place, particularly around the church in the centre of the village. The French abandon the village

18.30–19.30

AA:

A counter-attack intended to retake La Haye Sainte is beaten off with serious losses among two KGL battalions and the brigade commander, Colonel Ompteda, is killed

Most Anglo-Allied infantry battalions are forced to remain in square or formations four ranks deep due to fear of further cavalry assaults. Despite being ordered to lie down, they take serious losses from French artillery fire

Wellington orders all his reserves to march and reinforce his centre, bringing up Brunswick troops personally at around 19.00

FA:

Due to the fall of La Haye Sainte, guns are deployed near the farm and elements of the Grande Batterie are brought forward to unleash a heavy cannonade against the Allied centre

The Young Guard retake Plancenoit, driving the Prussians out at around 18.45

Renewed Prussian assaults see the Young Guard placed under heavy pressure and partially forced out of the village Lieutenant General Pajol seizes the bridge at Limal upriver from Wavre

Napoleon sends two battalions of the Old Guard into Plancenoit and by 19.30 it is still occupied by the French

PA:

Forced out of Plancenoit, Bülow is reinforced and continues to attack the village. Heavy losses are inflicted on the Young Guard in bitter street fighting but the French continue to hold out in the centre until reinforced by the Old Guard. IV Corps is repulsed but reforms for further attacks

Ziethen’s I Corps arrives on the Chemin d’Ohain but is almost diverted to join the Prussian attack on Plancenoit. The leading brigades link with the right flank of the Anglo-Allied Army

19.30–20.30

AA:

Chassé’s Netherlands Infantry Division is deployed, reinforcing Wellington’s centre

The arrival of Ziethen’s I Corps also allows Wellington to move the cavalry brigades of Vivian and Vandeleur from his left flank to the centre

Halkett’s and Maitland’s brigades absorb the brunt of the attack by Napoleon’s Imperial Guard to the right of Wellington’s centre. They receive the attack in formations four ranks deep and halt it in the ensuing firefight. The French are repulsed by well-timed bayonet charges mounted by the infantry

FA:

Napoleon sends in his final assault at around 19.30 using infantry from his Imperial Guard. Five battalions of the Middle Guard assault the Allied ridge assisted by three battalions of the Old Guard. It is supported by simultaneous attacks elsewhere on the battlefield. Despite fiercely contesting the ridge, the Imperial Guard is repulsed

Disheartened by the failure of the Imperial Guard’s assault and fearing betrayal, French units begin to waver and fall back. Pressed by a general Allied advance, the majority of the French Army is soon in a state of full retreat

PA:

Ziethen’s I Corps helps the Anglo-Allied left flank withstand renewed attacks by d’Erlon’s I Corps

The 5th Infantry Brigade under Tippelskirch (of II Corps) spearheads a ferocious assault on Plancenoit at around 20.00. The bulk of French forces are ejected from the village after ½ an hour’s fighting but isolated fighting continues until around 21.00

20.30–22.00

AA:

Wellington gives the order for a general advance by the whole army. The French fall back before them and their retreat soon becomes a rout. Anglo-Allied cavalry pursues the enemy but does not advance very far beyond the opposing ridge once the guns there are captured

Wellington meets Blücher by chance near La Belle Alliance at around 22.00

FA:

Grouchy attacks across the River Dyle at Limal at around 21.00

Attempts by French officers to stem the retreat at Waterloo prove futile. By 20.30, the retreat becomes a fully fledged rout with units abandoning their arms and dispersing

Three battalions of the Old Guard withdraw slowly in square formation, attempting to cover the retreat. Impeded by the press of fugitives, they are repeatedly attacked and eventually destroyed

Napoleon flees the battlefield heading for the French frontier

PA:

Ziethen’s I Corps advances alongside Wellington’s general advance, driving all French units before them into retreat and ultimately rout

Prussian troops take over the pursuit from the exhausted Anglo-Allied Army. Prussian cavalry reaches Rossomme by 21.30

Blücher meets Wellington by chance near La Belle Alliance at around 22.00

23.00–00.45

FA:

Fighting temporarily ceases around Wavre at 23.00 with Grouchy determined to continue his attack the following day The French beat off a Prussian night attack mounted between 23.45 and 00.45

PA:

Colonel von Stülpnagel’s 12th Brigade attacks towards Limal (near Wavre) shortly before midnight. Fierce fighting ensues but the Prussians eventually withdraw as confusion caused by the darkness disrupts their attack

After the crushing defeat at Waterloo, Prussian cavalry continues to chase French fugitives until darkness halts their progress just after midnight.

Table of Contents

Title Page

Copyright

Contents

Acknowledgements

Key to Map Symbols

Dedication

Introduction The Most Famous of Battles

Chapter 1: The Return of Napoleon

Chapter 2: The Decisive Moment of the Century

Viewpoints:

The Battlefield of Ligny

St Armand, Sombreffe and Fleurus

The Farmhouses of Gemioncourt, Piraumont and Grand Pierrepoint

The Duke of Brunswick’s Memorial

The Crossroads of Quatre Bras

Chapter 3: The Struggle for Hougoumont

Viewpoints:

Wellington’s Elm Tree Crossroads

The Lion Mound

The Anglo-Allied Right flank

The Anglo-Allied Left flank

Le Caillou

The La Belle Alliance Ridge (French Ridge)

The Inn of La Belle Alliance

Rossomme

The Chateau at Hougoumont and its Environs

Hougoumont – Internal Buildings and Monuments

Chapter 4: D’Erlon’s Attack

Viewpoints:

The Grande Batterie and the Memorial of the 6th Foot Artillery

Napoleon’s Second Observation Point

Allied Centre and Left Flank

Picton’s Memorial

Memorial to Durutte’s Division

La Haye Sainte

Marcognet’s Monument

Wellington’s Extreme Left Flank

Papelotte Farmhouse

La Haye Farm

Smohain Village and Fichermont

Chapter 5: Cavalry Onslaught

Viewpoints:

Views of the Valley

Village of Mont St Jean

Mont St Jean Farmhouse

The Waterloo Panorama

The Allied Centre Right

Mercer and Demulder Monuments

The Polish Lancers Memorial

The 5th Armoured Regiment Memorial

The Bois de Paris (Forest of Paris)

Chapter 6: The Fall of La Haye Sainte

Viewpoints:

La Haye Sainte Farmhouse and its Memorials

Memorial to the 27th (Inniskilling) Regiment

Memorial to the Belgians

The Hanoverian Memorial

Chapter 7: The Battle of Wavre

Viewpoints:

Walhain-St Paul and Evilard Farm

The Town of Wavre

The Church of St John the Baptist

The Field Hospitals

Bierges Mill

Limal Village and La Bourse Farm

The Chateau of La Bawette

The Debève Brothers Monument

Chapter 8: Street Fighting in Plancenoit

Viewpoints:

The Bois de Paris (Forest of Paris)

Colonel von Schwerin’s Monument

Plancenoit Village

The Prussian Memorial

Chapter 9: La Garde Recule!

Viewpoints:

The Allied Centre Right

The Wounded Eagle Monument

The Victor Hugo Monument

The Gordon Memorial

Chapter 10: The Aftermath

Chapter 11: Visiting the Battlefield

Viewpoints:

Brussels

Wellington Connections

The Grand Place (Grote Markt)

Evere Cemetery

The Royal Army and Military History Museum

Braine l’Alleud Village

Waterloo Village

The Wellington Museum

The Royal Chapel and St Joseph’s Church

The Lion Village

Le Musée de Cire (Waxworks Museum)

Waterloo Visitors’ Centre

Restaurants and Souvenir Shops

Annotated Bibliography

Battlefield Chronology