creases and the differences between experimental results grow relatively smaller.

One area in which statistical design of experiments is important is in the design of experiments for reliability. For instance, in a complex manufacturing process, such as that used in the production of very large scale integration (VLSI) components, we wish to know how measurable characteristics of the manufacturing process affect the reliability of the product. We can determine these effects by taking periodic samples of the product and experimentally determining their expected lifetimes. Because of the high precision required in measuring a complicated manufacturing process as well as determining the success or failure of a complex item, such as a VLSI circuit, it is important to design the experiment so as to properly take into account all factors affecting an item's reliability as well as to accurately and precisely measure the effects of the factors.

RELIABILITY THEORY OVERVIEW

Reliability is the probability that a system will operate without failure for a specified period of time (the design life) in a specified environment (e.g., ambient temperature, power supply voltage, energetic particle flux). This is simply the cumulative probability distribution (CDF) of success. We may consider reliability to be a measure of the system's success in performing its intended function. For example, suppose that 1000 identical electronic parts are tested in the environment in which they are expected to operate. During an interval of time $(t - \Delta t, t)$, we observe that 97 of the original 1000 components have failed. Since reliability is the CDF of success, the reliability at time t , $R(t)$, is

$$
R(t) = \frac{\text{number of components surviving at time } t}{\text{total number of components under test}} = \frac{903}{1000} = 0.903
$$
 (1)

If **t** is a random variable denoting the time to failure, a system's reliability function at time *t* is given by

$$
R(t) = P(\mathbf{t} > t) \tag{2}
$$

The CDF of failure, $F(t)$, is the complement of $R(t)$

$$
R(t) = 1 - F(t) \tag{3}
$$

If the probability density function (pdf) associated with the **RELIABILITY VIA DESIGNED EXPERIMENTS** random variable **t** is given by $f(t)$, we can then rewrite $R(t)$, given by Eq. (3), as follows:

$$
R(t) = 1 - \int_0^t f(x) \, dx \tag{4}
$$

$$
\frac{dR(t)}{dt} = -f(t) \tag{5}
$$

The theory of experimental design was developed in response to the fact that experimental results are inherently variable. R In fields such as physics and chemistry, this variability is often quite small, and, for experiments conducted in a class-
rie take the time derivative of Eq. 4, we obtain the following
room environment, it is not unusual to think of the "correct" relationship between and $R(t)$ and result for an experiment. Even in the classroom, however, experience indicates that the results are variable, with the variability arising from complexities of the measurement procedure as well as from the inherent variability of the experimental material. The precision of an experiment, and For example, suppose that $f(t)$ is exponential with parameter therefore the statistical design of the experiment, becomes in- λ . The pdf for a model of accelerated life testing, the exponencreasingly important as the complexity of the experiment in- tial distribution model, has this form. In this case, $f(t)$ =

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 $\lambda e^{-\lambda t}$, and the reliability function $R(t)$ is $\cdot \hat{f}$

$$
R(t) = 1 - \int_0^t \lambda e^{-\lambda x} dx = e^{-\lambda t}
$$
 (6)

We are now in a position to express the probability of a system's failing in a time interval $[t_1, t_2]$ in terms of its reliability where $n_f(t)$ is the number of light bulbs that have failed
function: by time t, Δt is the length of the interval (1000 h for this

$$
P(t_1 \le \mathbf{t} \le t_2) = \int_{t_1}^{t_2} f(x) \, dx = R(t_1) - R(t_2) \tag{7}
$$

The failure rate in the interval $[t_1, t_2]$ is defined as the proba-
is computed as: bility that a failure per unit time occurs in this interval, given that no failure has occurred prior to t_1 . The failure rate is given by

$$
\frac{R(t_1) - R(t_2)}{(t_2 - t_1)R(t_1)}\tag{8}
$$

If we now replace t_1 by t and t_2 by $t + \Delta t$, we can rewrite the failure rate as

$$
\frac{R(t) - R(t + \Delta t)}{\Delta t R(t)}\tag{9}
$$

fined as the limit of the failure rate given in Eq. (9) as Δt function, we can write approaches zero,

$$
h(t) = \lim_{\Delta t \to 0} \frac{R(t) - R(t + \Delta t)}{\Delta t R(t)} = \frac{1}{R(t)} \left[-\frac{d}{dt} R(t) \right] = \frac{f(t)}{R(t)} \tag{15}
$$

From Eqs. (5) and (10), we obtain the following relationship Table 2. between the reliability function $R(t)$ and the hazard function *^h*(*t*): **FACTORS AFFECTING RELIABILITY**

$$
R(t) = e^{-\int_0^t h(x) dx}
$$
 (11)

can be used to estimate the hazard rate and reliability. Sup-
pose a light bulb manufacturer is interested in estimating the factors—the current density through the circuit and the cirpose a light bulb manufacturer is interested in estimating the mean life of the bulbs. Five hundred bulbs are tested under cuit's temperature. The rate at which corrosion that can detethe same conditions under which they are expected to be used riorate the leads outside of a packaged integrated circuit and by the firm's customers. The bulbs are observed during the thereby cause its failure is determined by the relative humidtest; the number of failures observed in nonoverlapping 1000 ity of the circuit's operating environment. For thin-film inteh intervals is shown in Table 1. We now wish to plot the fol- grated circuit resistors, the rate at which their resistance lowing quantities: changes over time is affected by the temperature of their op-

Table 1. Number of Failed Light Bulbs per Time Interval

Hours in the Time Interval	Failures Observed
$0 - 1000$	237
1001-2000	73
$2001 - 3000$	53
$3001 - 4000$	34
$4001 - 5000$	32
5001-6000	27
6001-7000	24
7001-8000	20
Total failures	500

˜(*t*), *the Failure Density Function Estimated from the Data.* We compute this as:

$$
\tilde{f}(t) = \frac{n_f(t)}{n_0 \Delta t} \tag{12}
$$

example), and n_o is the total number of light bulbs being *tested* (500 for this example).

 \cdot $\tilde{h}(t)$, the Hazard Function Estimated from the Data. This

$$
\tilde{h}(t) = \frac{n_f(t)}{n_s(t)\Delta t} \tag{13}
$$

where $n_s(t)$ is the number of light bulbs surviving at time *t*.

• $\tilde{R}(t)$, the Reliability Function Estimated from the Data. From Eq. (10), we can write

$$
\tilde{R}(t) = \frac{\tilde{f}(t)}{\tilde{h}(t)} \tag{14}
$$

The hazard function $h(t)$, or instantaneous failure rate, is de-
final as the limit of the failure and given in $\mathbb{F}_{\alpha}(0)$ as Λt the CDF of failure is the complement of the reliability

$$
\tilde{F}(t) = 1 - \tilde{R}(t) \tag{15}
$$

The computations for each of these quantities are shown in

For many physical systems, the physics of the failure mecha-The key equations relating $R(t)$, $h(t)$, $F(t)$, and $f(t)$ are Eqs. nisms for those systems can be used to estimate their reliabil- (5) , (10) , and (11) .
We now give a simple example to show how failure data and electronic devices. For instance, the time to failure of in-We now give a simple example to show how failure data and electronic devices. For instance, the time to failure of in-
h be used to estimate the hazard rate and reliability. Sup-
tegrated circuits due to electromigration i erating environment. The interested reader may refer to Elsayed (1) for more details.

In each of these cases, factors affecting a system's reliability are either physical properties of the system itself, characteristics of the process by which it was manufactured, or characteristics of its operating environment that can be measured. Experiments can be designed to determine the effects of these factors on the system's reliability. Such experiments must be designed with the following issues in mind:

- How to take into account similarities and differences between individual experimental units in the design.
- How to estimate the effects of individual factors that are believed to determine a unit's reliability.
- How to identify and model interactions between factors.

Time	Estimated	Estimated	Estimated	Estimated
Interval	Failure	Hazard	Failure	Reliability
(Hours)	Density	Function	CDF	Function
$0 - 1000$	$\frac{237}{500 \times 10^3}$ = 4.74E - 04	$\frac{237}{500 \times 10^3} = 4.74E - 04$	$0.00E + 00$	$1.00E + 00$
$1001 - 2000$	$\frac{73}{500 \times 10^3} = 1.46E - 04$	$\frac{73}{263 \times 10^3} = 2.78E - 04$	$4.74E - 01$	$5.26E - 01$
2001-3000	$\frac{53}{500 \times 10^3} = 1.06E - 04$	$\frac{53}{190 \times 10^3}$ = 2.79E - 04	$6.20E - 01$	$3.80E - 01$
3001-4000	$\frac{34}{500 \times 10^3} = 6.80E - 05$	$\frac{34}{137 \times 10^3} = 2.48E - 04$	$7.26E - 01$	$2.74E - 01$
$4001 - 5000$	$\frac{32}{500 \times 10^3} = 6.40E - 05$	$\frac{32}{103 \times 10^3} = 3.11E - 04$	$7.94E - 01$	$2.06E - 01$
5001-6000	$\frac{27}{500 \times 10^3} = 5.40E - 05$	$\frac{27}{71 \times 10^3}$ = 3.80E - 04	$8.58E - 01$	$1.42E - 01$
6001-7000	$\frac{24}{500 \times 10^3} = 4.80E - 05$	$\frac{24}{44 \times 10^3}$ = 5.45E - 04	$9.12E - 01$	$8.80E - 02$
7001-8000	$\frac{20}{500 \times 10^3} = 4.00E - 05$	$\frac{20}{20 \times 10^3} = 1.00E - 03$	$9.60E - 01$	$4.00E - 02$

Table 2. Computing $\tilde{f}(t)$, $\tilde{h}(t)$, $\tilde{F}(t)$, and $\tilde{R}(t)$

Randomized Block Designs

When setting up an experiment to compare different treat-
ments, each treatment must be applied to several units—if we were to apply a treatment to only one unit, we would not
be able to determine whether differences in the responses from two units were caused by differences in the treatments
from two units were caused by differences i difference between the units in this type of experiment is the
treatment that is applied. This design is called a completely
randomized block experiment, we need to take into
account the differences between blocks. This i

randomized design, the ambiguity that occurs if only a single unit is treated in a particular manner is not eliminated. It may be the case that a treatment might be applied to all of The average yield, μ , is the same as for the randomized exper-
the units which respond in a particular fashion. However, if iment. The vield, however, is now the units which respond in a particular fashion. However, if iment. The yield, however, is now the yield of treatment *j* in the experimenter has any ideas of which units are most likely the *i*th block *y*. The additional the experimenter has any ideas of which units are most likely the *i*th block, y_{ij} . The additional term b_i represents the aver-
to behave similarly, they can be used to control the allocation age deviation from *u* o to behave similarly, they can be used to control the allocation age deviation from μ of the units in the *i*th block. Finally, ϵ_{ij} of treatments to units. The idea is that the experimental units represents the devi of treatments to units. The idea is that the experimental units represents the deviation of the units in the *i*th block that have will then include roughly equal numbers of units for each units in the *i*th block, $\mu + b_i$.
treatment. This control is referred to as blocking, and the re-
Most experimental data is of changing one step in the manufacturing process for inte- two functions: grated circuits. The measured change to the fabrication process would be the treatment in this case. The wafers being 1. It divides the total variation between the experimental sampled from the production line might be divided into units into components that represent the different blocks; the blocks are characterized by their distance from the sources of variation. This provides a way of assessing center of the wafer. the relative importance of those sources.

In the randomized and randomized block designs, we as- 2. It provides estimates of the underlying variation besume that each experimental unit has an inherent yield that tween the units themselves, which can be used in reais modified by the effect of the treatment to which it is sub- soning about the effects of the treatments.

TYPES OF EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN in the randomized design, we can express this by

$$
y_{jk} = \mu + t_j + \epsilon_{jk} \tag{16}
$$

-
-

$$
y_{ij} = \mu + b_i + t_j + \epsilon_{ij} \tag{17}
$$

undergone treatment *j* from the average yield of all of the

Most experimental data is examined using the *analysis of* sulting design is the randomized block design. This type of *variance* technique. Detailed treatments of this analysis techexperiment might be appropriate for determining the effects nique may be found in Refs. (2) and (3). This analysis has

-
-

-
-

The analysis of variance relationship is given by

$$
\sum_{ij} (y_{ij} - y_{\bullet \bullet})^2 = \sum_{ij} (y_{i \bullet} - y_{\bullet \bullet})^2
$$

Total Sum of Squares \equiv Block SS

+
$$
\sum_{ij} (y_{\bullet j} - y_{\bullet \bullet})^2
$$
 + $\sum_{ij} (y_{ij} - y_{i \bullet} - y_{\bullet j} + y_{\bullet \bullet})^2$
+ Treatment SS + Error SS (18)

indicates the mean value of *y* over all possible values of the section. The expected lifetime of the bulbs under each experisuffix *j*. The relative magnitudes of between-block variance, mental treatment is computed from $\tilde{R}(t)$ for that treatment as between-treatment variance, and variation between the units are obtained by comparing the block, treatment, and error mean squares. If the number of blocks is *b*, and the number val at the conclusion of which no bulbs were functioning, and

Block mean square =
$$
\sum_{ij} (y_{i\bullet} - y_{\bullet\bullet})^2 / (b - 1)
$$

\nTreatment mean square = $\sum_{ij} (y_{\bullet j} - y_{\bullet\bullet})^2 / (t - 1)$
\nError mean square = $\sum_{ij} (y_{ij} - y_{i\bullet} - y_{\bullet j} + y_{\bullet\bullet})^2 / (b - 1)(t - 1)$ (19)

lows a normal distribution. S_4 .

Factorial designs are employed when we wish to examine the the four shapes. These are 17.1 h for shape S_1 , 20.8 h interactions among various factors affecting the results of an for S_2 , 22.8 h for S_3 , and 29.2 h for S_4 . From this viewexperiment. A *factor* is a set of treatments that can be applied point, we see that the experimental material has an adto experimental units. For instance, in an experiment on vantage for each of the four shapes, and has the biggest metal fractures, one factor might be the thickness of the ma- advantage for shape *S*4. terial. A factor's *level* is a specific treatment from the set of treatments that make up the factor. For example, there might be three different thicknesses of the material being investigated in an experiment on metal fractures. Each thickness would constitute a different level of the thickness factor. An *experimental treatment* is the description of the way in which a particular unit is treated; the treatment comprises one level from each factor.

Consider a simple example in which a manufacturer of light bulbs is considering changing the filament material and the shape of the filament with the goal of increasing the lifetime of the bulbs. In addition to the current shape of the fil-

The analysis of variance for the randomized block experiment ament S_1 , there are three possible new shapes $(S_2, S_3,$ and takes into account the following sources of variation: $S₄$, and the manufacturer wishes to determine the effects of the new material and the new shapes on the expected lifetime Variations between blocks of the bulbs. For this experiment, there would be two factors: Variations between different treatments filament material *F* and shape *S*. There are two levels of the
Veristions due to inconsistency of treatment differences filament material factor (current material *C*, new material Variations due to inconsistency of treatment differences and four levels of the shape factor (current shape S_1 , S_2) and four levels of the shape factor (current shape S_1 , S_2) S_3 , and S_4). The set of experimental treatments is given by *F* \times *S*, that is:

$$
\{(C, S_1), (C, S_2), (C, S_3), (C, S_4), (N, S_1), (N, S_2), (N, S_3), (N, S_4)\}
$$

A total of 800 bulbs are included in the experiment; 400 are constructed using filaments made of the proposed new material, and 400 are constructed using the material currently used by the firm in the bulbs it distributes commercially. The failure density, hazard function, reliability function, and CDF The use of a dot instead of a suffix in Eq. (18), such as $y_{\bullet j}$ of failure are obtained as shown in the example in the first $\sum_{i=1}^{N} \Delta t_i \tilde{R}(t_i)$, where *i* denotes successive test intervals, Δt_i denotes the length of interval *i*, *N* denotes the interof treatments is *t*, the block, treatment, and error mean $\tilde{R}(t_i)$ denotes the estimated reliability function at the end of squares are as follows:
the *i*th test interval. The results of the experiment are given the *i*th test interval. The results of the experiment are given in Table 3. Each entry in the table gives the observed expected lifetime (measured in hours) of the bulbs under that particular experimental treatment. There are several ways in which we can interpret these results:

- 1. We could consider the effects of changing the shape of the filament for each type of filament material. For the bulbs using the current filament material, the effect of changing the shapes from S_1 to S_2 , S_2 to S_3 , or S_3 to S_4 increases the expected lifetime at each change in shape, (1) with the change from S_3 to S_4 having the largest effect. Each of the divisors in the above definitions of mean squares
are referred to as *degrees of freedom* for that source of vari-
ance. The mean squares may also be compared using F tests
if we assume that the variation of
- 2. We could consider the expected lifetime differences be- **Factorial Designs** tween experimental and current filaments for each of

Table 3. Observed Expected Lifetimes of Experimental versus Current Bulbs

	Filament Shape			
Filament Type	Current (S_1)	S_{2}	S_{3}	$S_{\scriptscriptstyle{4}}$
$\rm Current$ material	1895.20	1908.70	1922.30	1939.40
Experimental material	1912.30	1929.50	1945.10	1968.60

3. We can consider first the average difference between given below: the two types of filaments, which for our example is 22.48 h. Secondly, we can consider the average response to shaping the filaments in different ways; in this case 1903.75, 1919.19, 1938.70, and 1954.00, and then the way in which the overall pattern differs from a combination of these two effects. We can express the way in which the overall pattern differs from a combination of two effects by saying either that the difference in expected lifetime between the current and experimental filaments is largest for shape $S₄$ or that the increase in expected lifetime in response to changing the filament shape from S_1 to S_4 is larger for the experimental filament material than for the material currently in use.

We can express this third approach in the following model:

$$
t_{jk} = f_j + s_k + (fs)_{jk} \tag{20}
$$

where t_{ik} is the treatment effect for material *j* and shape k , f_i is the average treatment effect for material j , s_k is the average treatment effect for shape *k*, and $(fs)_{ik}$ is the difference be-

$$
\sum_{j} l_{j} t_{j} \tag{21}
$$

$$
\sum_{k} m_{k} \sum_{j} l_{j} t_{jk} \tag{22}
$$

$$
f_j = t_{j\bullet} - t_{\bullet \bullet}
$$

\n
$$
s_k = t_{\bullet k} - t_{\bullet \bullet}
$$

\n
$$
(fs)_{jk} = (t_{jk} - t_{j\bullet}) - (t_{\bullet k} - t_{\bullet \bullet})
$$

\n
$$
= (t_{jk} - t_{\bullet k}) - (t_{j\bullet} - t_{\bullet \bullet})
$$

Table 4. Deviations of Treatment Yields from Overall Average

		Filament Shape			
Filament Type	Current (S_1)	S_{2}	S_{3}	S_4	
Current material	-32.44	-18.94	-5.34	11.76	
Experimental material	-15.34	1.86	17.46	40.96	

$$
f_1 = (-32.44 - 18.94 - 5.34 + 11.76)/4 = -11.24
$$

\n
$$
f_2 = (-15.34 + 1.86 + 17.46 + 40.96)/4 = 11.24
$$

\n
$$
s_1 = (-32.44 - 15.34)/2 = -23.89
$$

\n
$$
s_2 = (-18.94 + 1.86)/2 = -8.54
$$

\n
$$
s_3 = (-5.34 + 17.46)/2 = 6.06
$$

\n
$$
s_4 = (11.76 + 40.96)/2 = 26.36
$$

\n
$$
(f s_{11}) = (-32.44) - (-11.24) - (-23.89) = 2.69
$$

\n
$$
(f s_{12}) = (-18.94) - (-11.24) - (-8.54) = 0.84
$$

\n
$$
(f s_{13}) = (-5.34) - (-11.24) - (6.06) = -0.16
$$

\n
$$
(f s_{14}) = (11.76) - (-11.24) - (26.36) = -3.36
$$

\n
$$
(f s_{21}) = (-15.34) - (11.24) - (-23.89) = -2.69
$$

\n
$$
(f s_{22}) = (1.86) - (11.24) - (-8.54) = -0.84
$$

\n
$$
(f s_{23}) = (17.46) - (11.24) - (6.06) = 0.16
$$

\n
$$
(f s_{24}) = (40.96) - (11.24) - (26.36) = 3.36
$$

tween t_{jk} and $f_j + s_k$. Effects involving comparisons between
levels of only one factor are called *main effects* of that factor,
while those effects involving comparisons for more than a sin-
gle factor are called *int* changing from S_1 to S_2 and from S_3 to S_4 . Using the new material and changing from S_1 to S_2 produces a additional positive difference of $fs_{22} - fs_{21} = 1.85$ h to add to the main effect where $\Sigma_j l_j$ is 0 and $t_{j\bullet}$ represents the average value of t_{jk} over
all possible levels of factor k. We may write $t_{j\bullet} = \Sigma_k t_{jk}/n_j$. The
interaction between two factors is written as
interaction between two facto material and changing from S_3 to S_4 produces an additional positive difference of $f_{s_{24}} - f_{s_{23}} = 3.20$ h to add to the main where Σ_k m_k is 0.
Returning to Eq. (20), we can recognize f_j , s_k , and $(fs)_{jk}$ as
main effects and interactions if we define them as follows:
main effects and interactions if we define them as follows:
main effec

One of the advantages of using a factorial structure in experimental design is that we are able to examine interactions between factors, as illustrated above. There are two additional advantages. First, conclusions about the effects of a factor have a broader validity because of the range of conditions For the numerical values used in the example above, the
treatment effects t_{jk} are estimated by the deviations of treat-
ment yields from the overall average of 1927.64. These devia-
tions are shown in Table 4. The esti Suppose that we want to investigate the effects of three factors, each at two levels, and that we only have enough resources for 24 observations. The factors are *X*, *Y*, and *Z* with levels x_0 and x_1 , y_0 and y_1 , z_0 and z_1 . There are three designs that we consider:

- 1. We can have three separate experiments, one for each factor, with 8 observations per experiment:
	- $(x_0y_0z_0, x_1y_0z_0)$, four observations each
	- $(x_0y_0z_0, x_0y_1z_0)$, four observations each
	- $(x_0y_0z_0, x_0y_0z_1)$, four observations each

In this set of three experiments, we isolate the effect of each factor in turn by controlling all other factors. This is considered to be the classical scientific experiment.

2. We can reduce the resources wasted in the first experiment by using $(x_0y_0z_0)$ in each of the three individual experiments. Instead, the four distinct treatments may be replicated equally as follows:

$$
(x_0y_0z_0), (x_1y_0z_0), (x_0y_1z_0), (x_0y_0z_1)
$$

with six observations each.

3. We can design a factorial experiment with the following eight treatments: of design shown in Fig. 1; this particular design evaluates

 $(x_0y_0z_0)$, $(x_0y_0z_1)$, $(x_0y_1z_0)$, $(x_0y_1z_1)$, $(x_1y_0z_0)$, $(x_1y_0z_1)$,

To compare the three designs, we can look at the variance
of the comparison of mean yields for x_0 and x_1 (the compari-
sons of the mean yields for y_0 and y_1 and z_0 and z_1 will be
equivalent). The three e

- 1. $2\sigma^2/4$ for the classical scientific experiment
- 2. $2\sigma^2/6$ for the equal replication of distinct treatments
-

results of the first two types of experiment may not be reproducible if the levels of the other two factors are changed.

For some experiments, there may be more than one appro-
priate blocking scheme that we would like to accommodate in it is extremely restrictive. The number of replicates of each the experiment. One simple and well-known example is the treatment must be equal to the number of treatments. Furproblem of assessing the wear performance of automobile thermore, the number of degrees of freedom for error in the tires. Different brands of tire will perform differently. In addi-analysis of variance for an experiment w tires. Different brands of tire will perform differently. In addi-
tion, tires may be fitted to any one of four positions; there $(t-1)(t-2)$ —this provides only two degrees of freedom for tion, tires may be fitted to any one of four positions; there $(t-1)(t-2)$ —this provides only two degrees of freedom for
may be differences in performance between the four positions. an experiment with three treatments and may be differences in performance between the four positions. an experiment with three treatments, and six degrees of free-
Finally, there will also be overall differences in performances dom when there are four treatments Finally, there will also be overall differences in performances dom when there are four treatments. We would not expect to between different cars. In this situation, we would like to de-
obtain an adequate estimate of σ sign a single experiment in which we allocate tires to each When using a Latin square design for an experiment with position for each car so that each brand of tire is tested in three or four treatments, it is usually necessary to have more each position of each car. This is accomplished with the type than one square.

	Car			
Tire Position				
			Ш	IV
Left, Front	А	B	C	I)
Right, Front	в	D		C
Left, Rear	C	А	I)	B
Right, Rear				

Figure 1. A Latin square design for an experiment to assess the wear of four brands of car tire. A row represents possible positions of
a tire on a car, and a column represents one of four varieties of automobile.

four brands of tire in four positions for four different cars.

The type of experimental design shown in Fig. 1 is referred to as a Latin square design. Latin square designs have the $(x_1y_1z_0)$, $(x_1y_1z_1)$ was a Latin square design. Latin square designs have the experimental units arranged in a double-blocking classification system. There are *x* blocks in each system, with each of Each treatment in this experiment would have three ob- *x* treatments occurring once in each block of each block sysservations. **tem.** The total number of units in the experiment is x^2 . For the example shown in Fig. 1, the two blocking systems are

yield of this type of experiment is

$$
y_{jk} = \mu + r_j + c_k + t_{l(j, k)} + \epsilon_{jk}
$$

3. $2\sigma^2/12$ for the factorial experiment where *r_i* represents treatment effects within row *j*, c_k represents treatment effects within column *k*, and ϵ_{ik} is an error The factorial experiment gives the smallest variance for $x_1 = k$ form specifying the deviation of the unit in the row j, column x_0 , and is therefore the most efficient of the three experiments—in the absence of interac

$$
\sum_j r_j = 0, \quad \sum_k c_k = 0, \quad \text{and} \quad \sum_l t_l = 0
$$

Latin Square Designs
For some experiments, there may be more than one appro-
In two blocking factors within a single experiment. However it is extremely restrictive. The number of replicates of each obtain an adequate estimate of σ^2 under these circumstances.

- expect that differences between position should be consistent over the two groups. An experimental design for this situation is shown in Fig. 2. **EXPERIMENTAL ASSESSMENT OF SOFTWARE RELIABILITY**
-

APPLICABILITY OF EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN SOFTWARE RELIABILITY: AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM TO SOFTWARE TESTING

there are no common row or column effects. These modules will execute when the software performs its

One particular method of using experimental design techniques (8) uses combinatorial designs to generate tests that efficiently cover *n*-way combinations of a system's test parameters (the parameters that determine the system's test scenarios). Cohen et al. show (8) that the number of test cases grows logarithmically in the number of test parameters. This makes it fairly inexpensive to add detail to the test cases in Figure 2. Variation on a Latin square design to assess the wear of
car tires. This design uses multiple Latin squares with common row
effects. In this case, the effects of tire position are consistent across
both groups o to select the $(r + 1)^{st}$. This is done by generating *M* different Experiments in which multiple Latin squares are used fall candidate test cases and then choosing the one that covers into one of two categories: the most new *n*-tuples (e.g., pairs, triples) of parameters. Cohen et al. report (8) that when *M* was set to 50 (50 candidate 1. *Experiments in Which One of the Blocking Systems is* test cases were generated for each new test case), the number Consistent Over Different Squares. For instance, if two of generated test cases grew logarithmically i

2. Experiments in Which the Rows or Columns Have No
Relationship to Each Other. This type of design is $\frac{1}{2}$ To determine a software system's reliability we must conduct
three distinct experiments. First, we must know An index of designs for a given number of treatments and for
a set of experimental units with two blocking systems may be
found in Ref. 4; detailed treatments of experimental design
may be found in Refs. 5 and 6.
These iss

Design of experiments can be used in testing software to gen-

computer programs do not break. They do not fail monolithi-

erate a set of test cases that will produce maximum coverage

cally. Programs are designed to per

The literature in reliability is rife with efforts to port hardware reliability notions to software. It just won't work. Software is very different from hardware. Software systems are composed of individual and largely independent sections called modules. At any instant in the life of a program, only one of these modules is capable of demanding the resources of the computer central processing unit (CPU). It would be very difficult to conceive of an analogous hardware system. Imagine, if you will, an automobile capable of moving one piston at a time in its engine, turning but one wheel as it goes down the road, or switching its operation from the distributor to the rear differential to the left tail light, and so on. Soft-**Figure 3.** Example of a multiple Latin square experiment in which ware systems are constructed of many modules. Only some of nominal functionality. A module may be hopelessly flawed, troduced into a system by people making errors in their tasks. but if it never enters the set of operating modules, these flaws Ultimately, if we wish to improve the quality of our software will never be seen nor expressed. Systems we must come to grips with the fact that faults are

ness, we can only have at most one software system. For ex- the specification, design, or coding a piece of software. ample, if we build a million cars all with the same program A significant amount of work remains to be done in the manufacture of software. Whatever we do, we will only build is repeatable, consistent, and identifies faults at the same one system. There may be zillions of copies, but they are all level of granularity as other structural measurements. This turing process. Several.

FOUNDATIONS

software profession is the notion of a bug. There is exactly no however, with the detection of the failure event. Not all such information in the statement that a program has n bugs in it failures will cause the system to information in the statement that a program has *n* bugs in it. failures will cause the system to stop executing. The system No one have event may not have No one have ever defined just what a bug is. A recent check may well continue executing. The failure event may not have
of the National Institute of Standards and Technology re-
mportant consequences. It may go undetected. of the National Institute of Standards and Technology re-

yealed no temperature controlled rubidium standard bug The quasisoftware failure is one that initiates a chain of events that vealed no temperature-controlled rubidium standard bug. The ous software failure is one that initiates a chain of events that
whole of software reliability engineering must center around will bring the system to its knees whole of software reliability engineering must center around will bring the system to its knees at some future time. When
a precise understanding of software flaws and their etiology the failure is finally made manifest, a a precise understanding of software flaws and their etiology. Some terminology will be in order. elapsed between when the actual failure event occurred and

may write an incorrect specification. The act of introducing then the notion of the time between observable failures will
the defective specification is the error. A software designer, have a very large (and undetermined) may fail to implement a specification correctly. The act of is really no way to measure the elapsed time between events
omission is the error. There are two principal categories of that we cannot observe. The failure event omission is the error. There are two principal categories of that we cannot observe. The failure event, and the circum-
these errors. There are sins of commission. A person actively stances that surround the failure have p introduced a problem. There is also the sin of omission. A sive concepts.
person failed to perform some activity that was prescribed. Finally no

People make errors. The physical and tangible result of these we are not interested in these faults. They will never lead to
errors is a fault. Unfortunately there is no particular defini-
tion of precisely what a software to talk about rates of fault introduction and removal, we mea- **Some Thoughts on Time** sure in units describing how the system changes over time. Changes to the system are visible at the module level, and Computer software exists only in a three-dimensional world. we attempt to measure at that level of granularity. Since the There is no real concept of time as far as software is conmeasurements of system structure are collected at the module cerned. Software is not like wine. It will never improve with level (by module we mean procedures and functions), we age. Software is not like gears in a transmission. It will never would like information about faults at the same granularity. wear out. Nor will continual use sand its surface smooth. Any We would also like to know if there are quantities that are faults in a software system at its birth will still be present at related to fault counts that can be used to make our calibra- its demise. Furthermore, a software system's exposure to time

tem that may lead to the system's eventually failing. In other measurement standards, we could achieve really reliable softthe type and extent may be measured using the same ideas time between failure has no particular relevance in software.
used to measure the properties of more traditional physical It is most inappropriate, then, to think ab used to measure the properties of more traditional physical

Yet another problem we have in the software quality busi- introduced by people due to the psychological complexity of

running the ignition controls, each of these cars will have ex- actual measurement of software faults. To count faults, we actly the same program. There is exactly no variation in the needed to develop a method of identification, a standard, that the same program. This is good and this is bad. If there is one type of fault is simple to count, since it occurs only in one design defect, then each of the zillion copies has this flaw. It module. In identifying and counting faults, we must deal with is good in that there is exactly zero variation in the manufac- faults that span only one module as well as those that span

Failure Events

A failure occurs when the software system encounters a soft-One of the most offensive and misleading terms used in the ware fault during the course of execution. There is a problem, software profession is the notion of a bug There is exactly no however, with the detection of the fa when it had visible consequences.

Thus, a significant problem in the determination of the re- **Errors** liability of a software system is the precise determination of An error is an act of a person. A software requirement analyst the failure event. If the failure event is largely unobservable, may write an incorrect specification. The act of introducing then the notion of the time betwe have a very large (and undetermined) noise component. There stances that surround the failure have proven to be most elu-

Finally, not all faults will lead to failures. Some faults will be located on execution paths that will never be expressed **Faults Faults Fault**

tion task easier. is a highly variable commodity. Some CPU's are very fast, Simply put, a fault is a *structural defect* in a software sys- others are very slow in relation to the fast ones. By hardware words, it is a physical characteristic of the system of which ware by running it on the slowest possible CPU. The notion of

systems. More details are given by Nikora (9). Faults are in- system breaking at some future time based on our observa-

around the failure event itself. Our current view of software failure free, whereas other functions will collapse with cerreliability is colored by a philosophical approach that began tainty whenever they are executed. It is possible to measure with efforts to model hardware reliability (see Ref. 10 for the activities of a system as it executes its various functions more details). Inherent in this approach is the notion that it and characterize the reliability of the system in terms of these is possible to identify with some precision this failure event functionalities. and measure the elapsed time to the failure event. For hard- Each program functionality may be thought of as having ware systems this has real meaning. Take, for example, the an associated reliability estimate. We may chose to think of failure of a light bulb as discussed earlier. A set of light bulbs the reliability of a system in these functional terms. Users of can be switched on and a very precise timer started for the the software system, however, have a very different view of time that they were turned on. One by one the light bulbs the system. What is important to the user is not that a particwill burn out and we can note the exact time to failure of each ular function is fragile or reliable, but rather whether the sysof the bulbs. From these failure data, we can then develop a tem will operate to perform those actions that the user will precise estimate for both the mean time to failure for these want the system to perform correctly. From a user's perspeclight bulbs and a good estimate of the variance of the time to tive, it matters not, then, that certain functions are very unrefailure. The case for software systems is not at all the same. liable. It only matters that the functions associated with the Failure events are sometimes quite visible in terms of cata- user's actions or operations are reliable. The classical examstrophic collapses of a system. More often than not, the actual ple of this idea was expressed by the authors of the early failure event will have occurred a considerable time before its UNIX utility programs. In the last paragraph of the documeneffect is noted. In most cases it is simply not possible to deter- tation for each of these utilities was a list of known bugs for mine with any certainty just when the actual failure occurred that program. In general, these bugs were not a problem. on a real time clock. The most simple example of this improb- Most involved aspects of functionality that the typical user ability of measuring the time between failures of a program would never exploit. may be found in a program that hangs in an infinite loop. From a functional viewpoint, a program may be viewed as Technically the failure event happened on entry to the loop. a set of program modules that are executing a set of mutually The program, however, continues to execute until it is killed. exclusive functions. If the program executes a functionality This may take seconds, minutes, or hours depending on the consisting of a subset of these modules that are fault free, it patience and/or attentiveness of the operator. As a result, the will never fail no matter how long it executes this functionalaccuracy of the actual measurement of time intervals is a sub- ity. If, on the other hand, the program is executing a functionject never mentioned in most software validation studies [de- ality that contains fault laden modules, there is a very good tails given by Chan, Littlewood, Brocklehurst, and Snell (11)]. likelihood that it will fail whenever that functionality is ex-The bottom line for the measurement of time between failures pressed [details given by Munson (12)]. Furthermore, it will in software systems is that we cannot measure with any rea- fail with certainty when the right aspects of functionality sonable degree of accuracy these time intervals. This being are expressed. the case, we then must look to new metaphors for software The main problem in the understanding of software reliasystems that will permit us to model the reliability of these bility from this new perspective is getting the granularity of systems based on things that we *can* measure with some ac- the observation right. Software systems are designed to im-

to software reliability modeling is that the failure of a com- a particular program module and a particular functionality. puter software system is simply not time dependent. A system That is, if the program is expressing that functionality, it will can operate without failure for years and then suddenly be- execute exclusively in the module in question. In most cases, come very unreliable based on the changing functions that however, there will not be this distinct traceability of functhe system must execute. Many university computer centers tionality to modules. The functionality will be expressed in experienced this phenomenon in the late 1960s and early many different code modules. It is the individual code module 1970s when there was a sudden shift in computer science cur- that fails. A code module will, of course, be executing a particricula from programming languages such as FORTRAN that ular functionality when it fails. We must come to understand had static run time environments to ALGOL derivatives such that it is the functionality that fails. as Pascal and Modula that had dynamic run time environ- As a program is exercising any one of its many functionalments. From an operating system perspective, there was a ities in the normal course of operation of the program, it will major shift in the functionality of the operating system exer- apportion its time across this set of functionalities (see Ref. cised by these two different environments. As the shift was 12 for more detail). The proportion of time that a program

tions of its past performance. As we discuss in the next sec- made to the ALGOL-like languages, latent code in the option, software breaks because of what we chose to do with it erating system, specifically those routines that dealt with in the future, not because of some intrinsic characteristic memory management, that had not been executed overly aging in the system. The future reliability of a system, then, much in the past now became central to the new operating depends entirely on the user and how he or she chooses to use environment. This code was both fragile and untested. The the system. operating systems that had been so reliable began to fail like cheap light bulbs.

A new metaphor for software systems would focus on the **GETTING THE METAPHOR RIGHT** functionality that the code is executing and not the software as a monolithic system. In computer software systems, it is A main concern in software reliability investigations revolves the functionality that fails. Some functions may be virtually

curacy. plement each of their functionalities in one or more code mod-Yet another problem with the hardware adaptive approach ules. In some cases there is a direct correspondence between

spends in each of its functionalities is the *functional profile* of the program. Furthermore, within the functionality, it will apportion its activities across one to many program modules. pressed functionalities are those with the property This distribution of processing activity is represented by the $\text{concept of the execution profile.}$ In other words, if we have a $F^{(o)} = \{f : F | \forall \text{IMPLEMENTS}(o, f)\}$

understanding program failure events is the direct associa-
tion of these failures to execution events with a given func-
tion o. An example of the IMPLEMENTS relation for
tionality. A Markovian stochastic process will be scribe the transition of program modules from one to another shown in Table 5. In this table, we can see the space of the function θ_1 . as a program expresses a functionality. From these observa-
tions, it will become fairly obvious just what data will be
needed to describe accurately the reliability of the system. In
mumbers represent the proportion of t

ity, it will be useful to make this description somewhat more F , there is a relation *p* over $F \times M$ such that $p(f, m)$ is the precise by introducing some notation conveniences. Assume proportion of execution events of m precise by introducing some notation conveniences. Assume proportion of execution events of module *m* when the system
that the software system S was designed to implement a spe-
is executing function f. Table 7 shows an e that the software system *S* was designed to implement a spe-
cific set of mutually exclusive functionalities *F*. Thus, if the SIGNS relation for the four functions presented in Table 5 cific set of mutually exclusive functionalities *F*. Thus, if the SIGNS relation for the four functions presented in Table 5.
system is executing a function $f \in F$, then it cannot be ex-
In this example we can see the fun system is executing a function $f \in F$, then it cannot be ex-
pressing elements of any other functionality in F. Each of mented in the program modules m, m_2 and m_1 . One of these pressing elements of any other functionality in *F*. Each of mented in the program modules m_1 , m_2 and m_4 . One of these these functions in *F* was designed to implement a set of soft-modules m_1 , will be invoked these functions in *F* was designed to implement a set of soft- modules, m_1 , will be invoked regardless of the functionality.
ware specifications based on a user's requirements. From a \overline{B} is common to all functio ware specifications based on a user's requirements. From a It is common to all functions. Other program modules, such user's perspective, this software system will implement a spe-
as $m₁$ are distinctly associated user's perspective, this software system will implement a spe-
cific set of operations, O. This mapping from the set of user
 $\frac{1}{2}$ the state is an example of the relation of These numbers cific set of operations, *O*. This mapping from the set of user ble 8, there is an example of the relation *p*. These numbers perceived operations, *O*, to a set of specific program function-
represent the proportion of ti perceived operations, O , to a set of specific program function-
alities. F , is one of the major tasks in the software specifica-
equita in each of the program modules. The row marginal valalities, *F*, is one of the major tasks in the software specifica-
tion process.

be thought of as having been implemented in a set of func-
tional specifications. There may be a one-to-one mapping be-
Table 8 represent the proportion of time distributed across tween the user's notion of an operation and a program function. In most cases, however, there may be several discrete tion. In most cases, however, there may be several discrete There is a relationship between program functionalities functions that must be executed to express the user's concept and the software modules that they will caus functions that must be executed to express the user's concept and the software modules that they will cause to be executed.
These program modules will be assigned to one of three disof an operation. For each operation, *o*, that the system may These program modules will be assigned to one of three dis-
perform, the range of functionalities, *f*, must be well known. tinct sets of modules that in turn, Within each operation one or more of the system's functionalities will be expressed. For a given operation, *o*, these ex-

Table 6. Example of the p' Relation

p'(o, f)				
O ₁	0.2	0.8		
O ₂		0.4	$0.4\,$	$0.2\,$

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$F\times M$	m ₁	m_2	m_{3}	m_4	m_5	$m_{\mathfrak 6}$
f_1		m				
f_2						
f_3			m			
14			m			

Table 7. Example of the ASSIGNS Relation

program structured into *n* distinct modules, the *execution pro*-
file for a given functionality will be the proportion of program
activity for each program module while the function was be-
ing expressed.
As the discuss As the discussion herein unfolds, we see that the key to ation $o \in O$, there is a relation p' over $O \times F$ such that $p'(o,$
derstanding program failure events is the direct associa. f is the proportion of activity assi

Operations ASSIGNS(*f, m*) is true if functionality *f* is expressed in module *m*. For a given software system, *S*, let *M* denote the set of To assist in the subsequent discussion of program functional-
ity, it will be useful to make this description somewhat more F there is a relation n over $F \times M$ such that $p(f, m)$ is the n process.
Each operation that a system may perform for a user may the functions. These are the same values as the column marthe functions. These are the same values as the column mar-Table 8 represent the proportion of time distributed across each of the six program modules.

tinct sets of modules that, in turn, are subsets of M . Some

Table 8. Example of the *p* **Relation**

p(f, m)	m ₁	m ₂	m ₃	m ₄	m ₅	m_{6}
12					$0.1\,$	
13			0.5			0.3
					0.4	$0.1\,$

modules may execute under all of the functionalities of *S*. This will be the set of common modules. The main program dex *t* runs through a set of nonnegative integers, $t = 0, 1, 2$, is an example of such a module that is common to all opera- . . . representing the epochs of the process. At any particular tions of the software system. Essentially, program modules epoch the software is found to be executing exactly one of its will be members of one of two mutually exclusive sets. There *M* modules. The fact of the execution occurring in a particular is the set of program modules *Mc* of common modules and the module is a *state* of the system. For this software system, the set of modules M_F that are invoked only in response to the system is found in exactly one of a finite number of mutually execution of a particular function. The set of common mod- exclusive and exhaustive states that may be labeled 0, 1, 2, ules, $M_c \subset M$ is defined as those modules that have the prop- . . ., M. In this representation of the system, there is a sto-

$$
M_c = \{m : M \mid \forall f \in F \bullet \text{ASSIGNS}(f, m)\}
$$

All of these modules will execute regardless of the specific functionality being executed by the software system. Yet an- property that other set of software modules may or may not execute when the system is running a particular function. These modules are said to be potentially involved modules. The set of potentially involved modules is

$$
M_p^{(f)} = \{ \quad m : M_F | \exists f \in F \bullet \text{ASSIGNS}(f, m) \land 0 < p(f, m) < 1 \}
$$

between a particular functionality and a set of program mod- conditional probabilities $Pr[X_{t+1} = j|X_t = i_t]$ are called the ules. That is, every time a particular function, f, is executed, transition probabilities. In that t a distinct set of software modules will always be invoked. These modules are said to be indispensably involved with the execution of a given functionality, the behavior of the system functionality *f*. This set of indispensably involved modules for is static. That is, the transition probabilities do not change a particular functionality, *f*, is the set of those modules that from one epoch to another. Thus, have the property that

$$
M_i^{(f)} = \{m : M_F | \forall f \in F \bullet \text{ASSIGNS}(f, m) \Rightarrow p(f, m) = 1\}
$$

As a direct result of the design of the program, there will be process.

Since the $p_{ij}^{(n)}$ are conditional probabilities it is clear that a well defined set of program modules, M_f , that might be used to express all aspects of a given functionality, *f*. These are the modules that have the property that p_{ij}

$$
m \in M_f = M_c \cup M_p^{(f)} \cup M_i^{(f)}
$$
 and,

From the standpoint of software design, the real problems in understanding the dynamic behavior of a system are not nec essarily attributable to the set of modules, M_i , that are tightly bound to a functionality or to the set of common modules, Interestingly enough, for all software systems there is a M_c , that will be invoked for all executing processes. The real distinguished module, the main program module that will al-
c real of potentially invoked modules M . The ways receive execution control from the operati problem is the set of potentially invoked modules, M_p . The ways receive execution control from the operating system. greater the cardinality of this set of modules, the less certain we may be about the behavior of a system performing that function. For any one instance of execution of this functionality, a varying number of the modules in M_p may execute. We can see, then, that the unconditional probability of execut-

When a program begins the execution of a functionality, we **P** may envision this beginning as the start of a stochastic process. It is possible to construct a probability adjacency ma- The problem of the determination of the transition probatrix, *P*, whose entries represent the transition probability bilities from each module to another module at each epoch in the execution process while a particular functionality is executing.

an indexed collection of random variables $\{X_i\}$, where the in-

erty end a state of the random variables are observed $\{X_t\}$, where the random variables are observed at epochs $t = 0, 1, 2, \ldots$ and where each random variable *may take on any one of the* $(M + 1)$ integers, from the state space $A = \{0, 1, 2, \ldots, M\}.$

A stochastic process $\{X_t\}$ is a Markov chain if it has the

$$
\Pr[X_{t+1} = j | X_t = i_t, X_{t-1} = i_{t-1}, \dots, X_0 = i_0]
$$

=
$$
\Pr[X_{t+1} = j | X_t = i_t]
$$

for any epoch $t = 0, 1, 2, ...$ and all states $i_0, i_1, ..., i_t$ in *M* the state space *A*. This is equivalent to saying that the conditional probability of executing any module at any future ep-In other program modules, there is extremely tight binding och is dependent only on the current state of the system. The transition probabilities. In that this nomenclature is somewhat cumbersome, let $p_{ii}^{(n)} = Pr[X_n = j | X_{n-1} = i]$. Within the

$$
\Pr[X_{t+1} = j | X_t = i_t] = \Pr[X_1 = j | X_0 = i_0]
$$

for *i*, *j*, in *S*, which is an additional condition of a Markov

$$
p_{ij}^{(n)} \ge 0
$$
, for all *i*, *j* in *A*, $n = 0, 1, 2, \cdots$

$$
\sum_{j=0}^{M} p_{ij}^{(n)} = 1, \text{ for all } i \text{ in } A \text{ and } n = 0, 1, 2, \cdots
$$

$$
Pr[X_0 = 0] = 1
$$
 and $Pr[X_0 = i] = 0$ for $i = 1, 2, \dots, M$

ing in a particular module *^j* is **Profiles of Software Dynamics**

$$
\Pr[X_n = j] = p_{ij}^{(n)} \Pr[X_0 = 0] = p_{ij}^{(n)}
$$

$$
p_{ij}^{(0)} = \Pr[X_1 = j | X_0 = i]
$$

The transition from one module to another may be de- of P^0 is now of interest. Each row *i* of P represents the probascribed as a stochastic process. In which case we may define bility of the transition to a new stat bility of the transition to a new state *j* given that the program is currently in state *i*. These are mutually exclusive events. any arbitrary epoch, *n*, the program will be executing a mod-The program may only transfer control to exactly one other wile $m_i \in M_{f_k}$ with a probability, $u_{ik} = \Pr[X_n = i | Y = k]$. The program module. Under this assumption, the conditional set of conditional probabilities $u_{\bullet k}$ where $k = 1, 2, \ldots, \#[F]$ probabilities that are the rows of \mathbf{P}^0 , also have the property that they are distributed multinomially. They profile the tran- case with the functional profile, the distribution of the execusitions from one state to another. the state of a software system con-

eration. An epoch begins with the onset of execution in a par- of a program, there may be a nonempty set M_{ν}^{ρ} of modules ticular module and ends when control is passed to another that may or may not be executed whe module. The measurable event for modeling purposes is this ality is exercised. Of course, this will cause the cardinality of transition among the program modules. We will count the the set M_f to vary. A particular execution may not invoke any number of calls from a module and the number of returns to of the modules of M_{ν}^{0} . On the other hand, all of the modules that module. Each of these transitions to a different program may participate in the execution of that functionality. This module from the one currently executing will represent an variation in the cardinality of M_f within the execution of a incremental change in the epoch number. Computer pro- single functionality will contribute significantly to the amount grams executing in their normal mode will make state transi- of test effort that will be necessary to test such a functiontions between program modules rather rapidly. In terms of ality. real clock time, many epochs may elapse in a relatively Each operation will be implemented by a subset of func-

it was designed to implement. Each user will typically exer-
cise a subset of these functionalities. Each user will probably
number of functionalities. For a given operation, let l be a use each operation to a different extent than every other user. proportionality constant. Then, $0 \le l_k \le 1$ will represent the
The users bring to the system an operational profile of his/
her use of the system.
tionality

ing executed by the user. Let *W* be a random variable defined on the indices of the set of elements of *O*. Then, $p_k = Pr[W =$ *m*], $m = 1, 2, \ldots$, $\|O\|$ is the probability that the user is executing program operation *m* as specified in the functional requirements of the program and $||O||$ is the cardinality of the **Module Profiles** set of operations.

oper, it is designed to fulfill a set of specific functional require-
ments. The user will run the software to perform a set of per-
 βl_{e} is the unconditional probability that a particular modments. The user will run the software to perform a set of per- *file, s*, is the unconditional probability that a particular mod-
ceived operations. Each of the operations, *o*, maps to one or ule will be executed based on ceived operations. Each of the operations, *o*, maps to one or ule will be executed based on the design of the program. It is
more elements in the set of functionalities as defined by the derived through the application of more elements in the set of functionalities as defined by the derived through the application of Bayes' rule. First, the joint IMPLEMENTS relation. The functional profile of the software probability that a given module is system is the set of unconditional probabilities of each of the is exercising a particular function is given by functionalities *F* being executed by the user under that user's α perational profile. Let *Y* be a random variable defined on the indices of the set of elements of *F*. Then, $q_k = \Pr[Y = k]$, $k = 1, 2, \ldots, ||F||$ is the probability that the user is executing 1, 2, . . ., $\|\mathbf{F}\|$ is the probability that the user is executing where *j* and *k* are defined as before. Thus, the unconditional program functionality *k* as specified in the functional require-
probability *s*. of ments of the program and $\|F\|$ is the cardinality of the set of is functions [described by Musa (13)]. A program executing on a serial machine can only be executing one functionality at a time. The distribution of q , then, is multinomial for programs designed to fulfill more than two specific functions. The prior knowledge of this distribution of functions should guide the software design process [details given by Munson and Ravenel (14)].

When a program is executing a given functionality, say f_k , it Hence, the distribution of q is also multinomial for a system will distribute its activity across the set of modules, M_{f_k}

constitute the execution profile for function f_k . As was the The granularity of the term, epoch, is an important consid- sisting of more than two modules. As a matter of the design that may or may not be executed when a particular function-

short period. the state of $F_e^{(n)} \subset F$. As each operation is run to completion it will generate an execution profile. This execution pro-**Operational Profiles Contract Profiles** file may represent the results of the execution of one or more Any software system has at its core a set of operations *O* that functions. Most operations, however, do not exercise precisely it was designed to implement. Fach year will tunically exercise to functionality. Rather, they proportionality constant. Then, $0 \leq l_k \leq 1$ will represent the The operation profile of the software system is the set of will represent a linear combination of the conditional proba-
unconditional probabilities of each of the functionalities O be-
bilities, u_{ik} as follows:

$$
p_i = \sum_{f_k \in F_e^{(o)}} l_k u_{ik}
$$

The manner in which a program will exercise its many modules as the user chooses to execute the functionalities of the **Functional Profiles** program is determined directly by the design of the program. When a software system is constructed by the software devel-
oper, it is designed to fulfill a set of specific functional require-
is the overall objective of the design process. The module proprobability that a given module is executing and the program

$$
Pr[X_n = j \cap Y = k] = Pr[Y = k]Pr[X_n = j | Y = k] = q_k u_{ik}
$$

probability, s_i , of executing module *j* under a particular design

$$
s_i = \Pr[X_n = i]
$$

=
$$
\sum_k \Pr[X_n = i \cap Y = k]
$$

=
$$
\sum_k q_k u_{ik}
$$

Execution Profiles **Execution Profiles** As was the case for the functional profile and the execution profile, only one module can be executing at any one time. consisting of more than two modules.

to use to capture the fault event is to imagine the existence of an hypothetical failure module. A failure event in any module may then be represented as a transition to this absorbing failure state in our Markov process model for the program operation. With this concept we will augment our module A current assessment of the frequency with which functions transition matrix **P** to form the new augmented matrix **P**^{*i*} are executed may be maintained in a matrix *S*. As was the containing a new row and column for the module representing case with the operational profile, an element *oj* of this vector the failure state. will be incremented every time the program initiates the *j*th

Each failure of the program will alter our view of the tran- function. sition probabilities of a particular module to the failure state Finally, we need to record the behavior of the total system

Each and every failure event must be assiduously monitored
and recorded. As was indicated earlier, the vast majority of
software failures will never be observed nor recorded. The log-
ical mechanism for trapping and recor ical mechanism for trapping and recording faults at their
point of origin is provided by the exception handling facility
struct the functional (operational) sequences of program be-
such as that offered by Ada (15). Using

tions, again specified by a set of functional requirements, will cuting when it met its untimely demise. be mapped into a set of *b* elementary program functions. The functions, in turn, will be mapped by the design process into **Instrumentation for Measurement**

a set of *m* program modules.

The software is designed to function optimally under an a

priori operational profile. We need a mechanism for tracking

the actual behavior of the user of the system. To this end we

the ac

$$
q_{ij} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if IMPLEMENTS } (o_i, f_j) \text{ is TRUE} \\ 0 & \text{if IMPLEMENTS } (o_i, f_j) \text{ is FALSE} \end{cases}
$$

Failure Profiles The next, static, matrix *S* that will have to be maintained What is needed now is a mechanism to describe the actual
failure event in a software system. As was noted earlier, a
failure will actually occur through the execution of a fault in
a process. Each element of this matrix w

$$
s_{jk} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if ASSIGNS } (f_j, m_k) \text{ is TRUE} \\ 0 & \text{if ASSIGNS } (f_j, m_k) \text{ is FALSE} \end{cases}
$$

module. The assumed to another. If there is a set transitions from one program module to another. If there are a total of *m* modules, then we will need an $n \times n$ ($n =$ **THE CONDUCT OF INQUIRY 11** matrix *M* + 1) matrix *T* to record these transitions. Whenever the program transfers control from module m_i to module m_i ; the **Failure Measurement**
 Failure Measur

system and ascribe this failure to a module. ments we may construct the functional behavior of any sys-**Measurement of Profiles include these fundamental matrices and mechanism**, either include these fundamental matrices and mechanism, either Let us now turn to the measurement scenario for the model- within the operating system or even the program itself, to ing process described above. Consider a system whose re- record the necessary entries in these matrices, it would be quirements specify a set of a user operations. These opera- possible to reconstruct the function that a program was exe-

estimation process to compute estimates for the actual posterior operational profile for the software.

The next, static, matrix Q that will have to be maintained

is the matrix that describes the mapping $O \times F$ of the

the software probes is dependent on the nature of the event we wish to monitor. For software reliability purposes, we are interested in instrumenting the software to record functionalinstrument the software for functional profile information, main, by the ability of the system to operate correctly for each the user must physically determine the beginning of the set user. This first experiment will yield accurate operational of modules in call tree representing each functionality. In this profile information. case, calls to the tally function will record the frequency that The second experiment will be to determine the behavior profiles, These call statements transfer control to a special this phase, we will execute the system and measure its behavfunction that records the entry event to each module in a fre- ior to learn about the way in which it was designed. We would quency transition matrix. The same of the state of the distribution of the mod-

for cumulating the software transition information. This run- erate an execution profile. time package will also typically impose some input/output The third experiment will focus on obtaining reasonable burden on the system, as well, in that we need to periodically estimates for the module failure profiles. These failure prodump the transition matrix in that the system may fail at files represent the probability of transitioning to the virtual any time taking the recording module with it. failure modules from any of the program modules. To do this,

the disadvantage of being obtrusive. The system will take a ular module. real performance hit with theses probes in place. This is particularly true when we are instrumenting a poorly designed **Point Estimates for Profiles**

the CPU and main memory. Each call is typically initiated by S_i is one of M mutually exclusive events. Let $S = \bigcup_{i=1}^M S_i$ where a distinct P-capturing instruction. These instructions and S_i is one of M mutually excl trusive. It does not impact the performance of the software it is monitoring. The downside, is that the hardware costs are substantial. We must purchase both a hardware probe and a separate machine to process the flow of information from under the condition that $T = M + 1$, as defined earlier. In

duct three distinct experiments designed to reveal how the *software* will be used, how was it designed, and how likely each program module is to fail when it is executed. The suc-
cess of these experiments will be determined largely by our
ability to obtain accurate measurements on the program and
its users. We must learn that the accurac assessments depend entirely on the accuracy of our measure-
ments.
then module *j* cannot be executing.

To develop a viable assessment of the reliability of a software system we must conduct three distinct experiments. First, we must know how the software will be used. More precisely, we will need good estimates for the operational profile for users and the variance of these profiles across all users. In the best case everyone will use the software in exactly the same manner. In the worst possible case, each user will exercise a dif- where *xi* represents the frequency of execution of the *i*th proferent set of operations. It should be quite clear to us by now gram module.

ity information and also module transition information. To that the reliability of the system will be determined, in the

each functionality has executed. In the case of the execution of the system under the observed operational profiles. During It takes two levels of software to handle the software ule profiles. These module profiles, of course, are dependent probes. First, there is a preprocessor that physically inserts on functional profiles and execution profile. Each operational the necessary calls into the source code. Second, there is the profile will cause the system to exercise a particular set of runtime support consisting of the instrumentation package functionalities. Each of these functionalities, in turn, will gen-

Software probes have a very definite problem. They have we must very carefully map each observed failure to a partic-

system that employs a number of modules that a called very The focus will now shift to the problem of understanding the frequently. **Hardware Probes.** An alternative method for monitoring files. We have so far come to recognize these profiles in terms a setivity of an executing program is to obtain the necessary of their multinomial nature. The multino the activity of an executing program is to obtain the necessary of their multinomial nature. The multinomial distribution is
call information directly from the instruction stream between useful for representing the outcom

$$
w_T = 1 - w_1 - w_2 - \dots - w_M
$$

the probe. which case *w_i* is the probability that the outcome of a random experiment is an element of the set *Si*. If this experiment is **EXPERIMENTAL OBJECTIVES EXPERIMENTAL OBJECTIVES** *X_i* **will represent the frequency of** *S_i* **outcomes. In this case,** If we wish to understand the reliability of a software system
and program module to the next. Note that
and make future predictions about its behavior we must con-
 $\frac{1}{2}$ program module to the next. Note that

$$
X_T = n - X_1 - X_2 - \dots - X_M
$$

The multinomial distribution function with parameters *n* **Understanding Software Behavior by and w** = (w_1, w_2, \ldots, w_T) is given by

$$
f(\mathbf{x}|n, \mathbf{w}) = \begin{cases} \frac{n!}{\prod_{i=1}^{k-1} x_i!} w_1^{x_1} w_2^{x_2} \cdots w_M^{x_M}, \\ 0 & (\text{at } x_1, x_2, \cdots, x_M) \in S \\ 0 & \text{elsewhere} \end{cases}
$$

$$
E(x_i) = \overline{x}_i = nw_i, i = 1, 2, \dots, k
$$

$$
var(x_i) = nw_i(1 - w_i)
$$

$$
cov(w_i, w_j) = -nw_i w_j, \quad i \neq j
$$

multinomial distribution of a program's execution profile other, the posterior distribution of *W* at each transition will
will be a Dirichlet distribution. Further, for $i = 1, 2, \ldots, T$ the while it is executing a particular functionality. The problem, ^{be a} Dirichlet distribution. Further, for $i = 1, 2, \ldots, T$ the home is that executing a program is man we will observe that the component of the augmented pa here, is that every time a program is run we will observe that $\frac{t}{t}$ the component of the augmented parametric vector ϵ there is some variation in the profile from one execution sam-
increased by 1 unit each time m ple to the next. It will be difficult to estimate the parameters $\mathbf{w} = (w_1, w_2, \dots, w_T)$ for the multinomial distribution of the **BIBLIOGRAPHY** execution profile. Rather than estimating these parameters statically, it would be far more useful to us to get estimates 1. E. A. Elsayed, *Reliability Engineering,* Reading, MA: Addisonof these parameters dynamically as the program is actually Wesley, 1996.
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To aid in the process of characterizing the nature of the York: Wiley, 1984.
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observations that have a multinomial distribution [details in 4. W. G. Cochran and G. M. Cox, *Experimental D* 6. observations that have a multinomial distribution [details in 4. W. G. Cochr
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Dirighlet distribution $D(x, x)$, with a parametric vector $x = 5$. G. E. P. Box, W. G. Hunter, and J. S. Hunter, Statistics for Exper-Dirichlet distribution, $D(\alpha, \alpha_T)$, with a parametric vector $\alpha = \alpha_1, \alpha_2, \ldots, \alpha_M$) where $(\alpha_i > 0; i = 1, 2, \ldots, M)$ is
 $\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \ldots, \alpha_M$) where $(\alpha_i > 0; i = 1, 2, \ldots, M)$ is $\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \ldots, \alpha_M$) where (α)

$$
f(w|\alpha) = \frac{\Gamma(\alpha_1 + \alpha_2 + \dots + \alpha_M)}{\prod_{i=1}^M \Gamma(\alpha_i)} w_1^{\alpha_1 - 1} w_2^{\alpha_2 - 1} \cdots w_M^{\alpha_M - 1}
$$

$$
E(w_i) = \mu_i = \frac{\alpha_i}{\alpha_0} \tag{23}
$$

$$
var(w_i) = \frac{\alpha_i(\alpha_0 - \alpha_i)}{\alpha_0^2(\alpha_0 + 1)}
$$
 (24)

$$
Cov(w_i, w_j) = \frac{\alpha_i \alpha_j}{\alpha_0^2(\alpha_0 + 1)}
$$

all of the values are of equal interest. We are interested, in 1993, pp. 45–54.
particular, in the value of μ_T . This will represent the probabil-15 Reference Manual ity of a transition to the terminal failure state from a particu- fense, Washington, D.C., November 1980. lar program module. 16. S. S. Wilks, *Mathematical Statistics,* New York: Wiley, 1962.

The value of the use of the Dirichlet conjugate family for 17. M. H. DeGroot, *Optimal Statistical Decisions,* New York: modeling purposes is twofold. First, it permits us to estimate McGraw-Hill, 1970. the probabilities of the module transitions directly from the observed transitions. Secondly, we are able to obtain revised ALLEN P. NIKORA estimates for these probabilities as the observation process and a general set of Propulsion Laboratory progresses. Let us now suppose that we wish to model the J OHN C. MUNSON behavior of a software system whose execution profile has a University of Idaho

The expected values for the *x_i* are given by multinomial distribution with parameters *n* and **W** = (w_1, w_2, w_1) w_2, \ldots, w_M where *n* is the total number of observed module *transitions and the values of the* w_i *are unknown. Let us as*sume that the prior distribution of *W* is a Dirichlet distributhe variances by tion with a parametric vector $\alpha = (\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \ldots, \alpha_M)$ where $(\alpha_i > 0; i = 1, 2, \ldots, M)$. Then the posterior distribution of *W* for the behavioral observation $X = (x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_M)$ is a Dirichlet distribution with parametric vector $\alpha^* = (\alpha)$ and the covariance by $\begin{aligned}\n\text{Dirichlet distribution with parametric vector } \alpha^* = (\alpha_1 + x_1, \\
\alpha_2 + x_2, \ldots, \alpha_M + x_M) \text{ [details in (17) DeGroot]. As an exam$ ple, suppose that we now wish to model the behavior of a large software system with such a parametric vector. As the We would like to come to understand, for example, the system makes sequential transitions from one module to an-
multinemial distribution of a program's exacution profile other, the posterior distribution of **W** at each t

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REMOTE AND DISTRIBUTED COMPUTING

TOOLS. See REMOTE PROCEDURE CALLS. **REMOTE CONTROL, ROBOTICS.** See TELEROBOTICS. **REMOTE NUMERICAL CONTROL MACHINING.**

See TELECONTROL.