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CAUSATION

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Originally appearing in Volume V05, Page 558 of the 1911 Encyclopedia Britannica.
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CAUSATION or CAUSALITY (See also:

Lat. causa, derived perhaps from the See also:root cav-, as in caveo, and meaning something taken care of; corresponding to Gr. atria), a philosophical See also:term for the operation of causes and for the See also:mental conception of cause as operative throughout the universe. The word " cause" is correlative to " effect." Thus when one thing B is regarded as taking See also:place in consequence of the See also:action of another thing A, then A is said to be the cause of B, and B the effect of A. The philosophical problems connected with causation are both metaphysical and psycho-logical. The metaphysical problem is See also:part of the whole theory of existence. If everything is to be regarded as causally related with simultaneous and See also:prior things or actions, it follows logically that the investigation of existence must, by See also:hypothesis, be a regress to infinity, i.e. that we cannot conceive a beginning to existence. This explanation has led to the postulate of a First Cause, the nature of which is variously explained. The empirical school See also:sees no difficulty in assuming a single event; but such a theory seems to deny the validity of the See also:original hypothesis. Theologians assert a divine origin in the See also:form of a See also:personal self-existent creator, while some metaphysical See also:schools, preferring an impersonal First Cause, substitute the See also:doctrine of the See also:Absolute (q.v.). All the explanations are alike in this respect, that at a certain point they pass from the See also:sphere of the senses, the See also:physical See also:world, to a metaphysical sphere in which the data and the intellectual operation of cognizing them are of a totally different quality. For example, the causal connexion between See also:drunkenness and See also:alcohol is not of the same observable See also:character as that which is inferred between the See also:infinite First Cause and the whole domain of sense-given phenomena. A second metaphysical problem connected with causation arises when we consider the nature of See also:necessity. It is generally assumed when two things are spoken of as cause and effect that their relation is a necessary one, or, in other wards, that given the cause the effect must follow.

The arguments connected with this problem belong to psychological discussions of causation. It is sufficient here to See also:

state that, in so far as causation is regarded as necessary connexion, it can form no part of a purely empirical theory of existence. The senses can say only that in all observed CAUSATION 557 cases B has followed A, and this does not establish necessary connexion. The See also:idea of causation is a purely intellectual (a priori) one. The psychological problems connected with causation refer (r) to the origin of the conception in our minds; (2) to the validity of the conception. As regards the origin of the conception See also:modern psychological See also:analysis does not carry us beyond the doctrine of See also:Locke contained in his See also:chapter on " See also:Power " (See also:Essay, bk. ii. ch. 21), wherein he shows that the idea of power is got from the knowledge of our own activity. " Bodies by their causes," he says, " do not afford us so clear and distinct an idea of active power as we have from reflection on the operation of our minds." Putting Locke's doctrine into modern See also:language, we may say that a See also:man has the conception of cause primarily because he himself is a cause. The conception thus obtained we " project," that is, See also:transfer to See also:external See also:objects, so far as we may find it useful to do so. Thus it is by a sort of See also:analogy that we say that the See also:sun is the " cause " of daylight. The See also:rival theory to Locke's is that of See also:Hume (See also:Treatise, bk. I.), who derives the conception from the unaided operation of See also:custom.

When one See also:

object, A, has been noticed frequently to precede another object, B, an association between A and B is generated; and by virtue of this association, according to Hume, we say that A is the cause of B. The weakness of this See also:account is that many invariable successions, such as See also:day and See also:night, do not make us regard the earlier members of the successions as causing the later; while in numberless cases we assert a causal connexion between two objects from a single experience of them. We may proceed now to consider the validity of the conception of causation, which has been attacked from two sides. From the See also:side of absolute See also:idealism it is argued that the conception of cause, as involving a transition in See also:time, cannot be ultimately valid, since the time-relation is not ultimately real. Upon this view (ably stated in See also:Professor Bosanquet's See also:Logic, bk. i. ch. 6) the more we know of causes and effects the less relevant becomes the time-relation and the nearer does the conception of cause and effect approach to another conception which is truly valid, the conception of ground and consequence. This means that, viewed from the standpoint of See also:science, a See also:draught of alcohol causes See also:intoxication in no other sense than the triangularity of a triangle causes the interior angles to be equal to two right angles. This See also:argument ceases to have cogency so soon as we deny its fundamental proposition that the time-relation is not ultimately real, but is irrelevant from the standpoint of science. This is a sheer assertion, contrary to all See also:ordinary experience, which we have as much right to deny as the absolute idealists to affirm. It is only plausible to those who are committed to the Hegelian view of reality as consisting of a static See also:system of universals, a view which has See also:long been discredited in See also:Germany, its native See also:land, and is fast losing ground in See also:England. Against the Hegelians we must maintain that the See also:common distinction between " ground " and " cause " is perfectly justifiable. Whereas " ground " is an appropriate term for the relations within a static, simultaneous system, " cause " is appropriate to the relations within a dynamic, successive system.

From the other side the validity of causation has been attacked in the interests of the See also:

naturalism of the See also:mechanical sciences. J. S. See also:Mill argues that, scientifically, the cause of anything is the See also:total assemblage of the conditions that precede its See also:appearance, and that we have no right to give the name of cause to one of them exclusively of the others. The See also:answer to this is that Mill fails to recognize that cause is a conception which we find useful in our dealings with nature, and that whatever conceptions we find useful we are justified in using. Among the conditions of an event there are always one or two that stand in specially See also:close relation to it from our point of view; e.g. the draught of alcoholic liquor is more closely related to the man's drunkenness than is the attraction of the See also:earth's gravity, though that also must co-operate in producing the effect. Such closely related conditions we find it convenient to single out by a term which expresses their analogy to the cause of causes, human 'volition. These are the questions respecting causation which are matters of See also:present controversy; there are in addition many other points which belong to the controversies of the past. Among the most important are See also:Aristotle's See also:classification of causes into material, formal, efficient and final, set forth in his Physics and elsewhere, and known as his doctrine of the Four Causes; See also:Geulincx's Occasional Causes, meant as a See also:solution of certain difficulties in the cosmology of See also:Descartes; See also:Leibnitz's See also:law of Sufficient See also:Reason; and See also:Kant's explanation of cause and effect as an a priori See also:category of the understanding, intended as an answer to Hume's See also:scepticism, but very much less effective than the See also:line of explanation suggested by Locke. The following is a See also:list of the various technical terms connected with causation which have been distinguished by logicians and psychologists. The four Aristotelian causes are: (r) Material cause (i)Xn), the material out of which a thing is made; the material cause of a See also:house is the bricks and See also:mortar of which it is composed. (2) Formal cause (et&os, Xoyos, Td at iv etvaa), the See also:general external appearance, shape, form of a thing; the formal cause of a triangle is its triangularity.

(3) Efficient cause (apxs) Tits Kav*crscs), the alcohol which makes a man drunk, the See also:

pistol-See also:bullet which kills. This is the cause as generally understood in modern usage. (4) Final cause (Taos, rb ob. See also:Eve,a), the object for which an action is done or a thing produced; the final cause of a commercial man's enterprise is to make his livelihood (see See also:TELEOLOGY). This last cause was rejected by See also:Bacon, Descartes and See also:Spinoza, and indeed in ordinary usage the cause of an action in relation to its effect is the See also:desire for, and expectation of, that effect on the part of the See also:agent, not the effect itself. The Proximate cause of a phenomenon is the immediate or superficial as opposed to the Remote or See also:Primary cause. See also:Plurality of Causes is the much criticized doctrine of J. S. Mill that a fact may be the See also:uniform consequent of several different antecedents. Causa essendi means the cause whereby a See also:change is what it is, as opposed to the causa cognoscendi, the cause of our knowledge of the event; the two causes evidently need not be the same. An object is called causa immanens when it produces its changes by its own activity; a causa transiens produces changes in some other object. Causa sui is a term applied to See also:God by Spinoza to denote that he is dependent on nothing and has no need of any external thing for his existence.

See also:

Vera causa is a term used by See also:Newton in his Principle, where he says, " No more causes of natural things are to be admitted than such as are both true and sufficient to explain the phenomena of those things "; verae causae must be such as we have See also:good inductive grounds to believe do exist in nature, and do perform a part in phenomena analogous to those we would render an account of.

End of Article: CAUSATION

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