MENTAL ASSOCIATION) Mental Association and the Memory-Continuum. 24. See also:

• GREAT

It has been often contended that any investigation into the nature of association must be fruitless.' But, if association is thus a first principle, it ought at least to admit of such a statement as shall remove the See also:

• NECESSITY (Lat. necessitas)

526.573 See also:

• REPRODUCTION

The disconcerted preperception which sets this free may likewise liberate a similar or contrasting idea, but it will not resolve either complex into the several " ideas of its sensory or motor constituents, with which only the psychologist is familiar. The actual recurrence of some of these constituents may again reinstate the rest, not, however, as memories or as " thoughts," but only as tied ideas in a renewed See also:

• PERCEPTION (from Lat. percipere, to perceive)

For it is characteristic of a continuum that an increase in the intensity of any See also:

• PART

As regards the first, we may infer that the waning or sinking towards the See also:

• THRESHOLD

But the evanescence, which is in all cases comparatively rapid at first, deepens sooner or later into real or apparent oblivion. In this manner it comes about that parts of the memory-continuum lose all distinctness of feature and, being without Obiiriscence. recognizable content, shrivel up to a dim and meagre representation of life that has lapsed—a representation that just suffices, for example, to show us that " our earliest recollections " are not of our first experiences, or to See also:

• SAVE, or SAVA (Ger. Sau; Hungarian Szdva; Lat. Savus)

It has been often remarked that one's most familiar See also:

• FRIENDS, SOCIETY
• FRIENDS, SOCIETY OF

Since our See also:

• POWER [WILLIAM GRATTAN] TYRONE (1797-1841)

There is here not merely mental See also:

• ARREST (Fr. arrester, arreeter, to stop or stay)

Having thus attempted to ascertain the formation of the ideational continuum out of the memory-train, the question arises: How now are we to distinguish between imagining and remembering, and again, between imagining and expecting? ' It is a mark of the looseness of much of our psychological terminology that facts of this See also:

• KIND (O. E. ge-cynde, from the same root as is seen in " kin," supra)

Memory includes recognition; recognition as such does not include memory. In human consciousness, as we directly observe it, there is, perhaps, no pure recognition: here the new presentation in not only assimilated to the old, but the former framing of circumstance is reinstated, and so perforce distinguished from the present. It may be there is no See also:

• WARRANT (Med. Lat. warantum; O. Fr. garant, warant, derived from O.H.G. root represented in modern German bygewdhren)

It sometimes happens that we have the one with little or nothing of the other. For example, we may have but a faint and meagre representation of a scene, yet if it falls into and retains a fixed place in the memory train we have no doubt that some such experience was once actually ours. On the other hand, as in certain so-called illusions of memory, we may suddenly find ourselves reminded by what is happening at the moment of a preceding experience exactly like it—some even feel that they know from what is thus recalled what will happen next; and yet, because we are wholly unable to assign such representation a place in the past, instead of a belief that it happened, there arises a most distressing sense of bewilderment, as if one were haunted and had lost one's See also:

• PERSONAL

. . on the recurrence of A, i.e. provided the memory-train continues so far intact. Such expectation, at first perhaps slight—a mere tendency easily overborne—becomes strengthened by every repetition of the series in the old order, till eventually, if often fulfilled and never falsified, it becomes certain and, as we commonly say, irresistible. To have a clear case of expectation, then, it is not necessary that we should distinctly remember any previous experience like it, but only that we should have actually present some earlier member of a series which has been firmly associated by such previous experiences, the remaining members, or at least the next, if they continue serial, being revived through that which is once again realized. This expectation may be instantly checked by reflection, just as it may, of course, be disappointed in fact;'but these are matters which do not concern the inquiry as to the nature of expectation while expectation lasts. We shall continue this inquiry to most advantage by widening it into an examination of the distinction of present, past and future. To a being whose presentations never passed through ' Any full discussion of paramnesia, as these very interesting states of mind are called, belongs to mental See also:

• PATHOLOGY (from Gr. raBos, suffering)

This we first obtain when our present consciousness consists partly of memories or partly of expectations as well. An event expected differs from a like event remembered chiefly in two ways—in its relation to present impressions and images and in the active attitude to which it leads. The diverse feelings that accompany our intuitions of time and contribute so largely to their colouring are mainly consequences of these differences. Let us take a series of simple and familiar events A B C D E, representing ideas by small letters, and perceptions by capitals whenever it is necessary to distinguish them. Such series may be present in consciousness in such See also:

• WISE, HENRY ALEXANDER (1806-1876)
• WISE, ISAAC MAYER (1819-1900)

Thus, psycho-logically regarded, the distinction of past and future and what we might call the oneness of direction of time depend, as just described, (I) upon the continuous sinking of the primary memory-images on the one See also:

• SIDE
• SIDE (mod. Eski Adalia)

What we have is not a moving point or moment of See also:

• OBJECTIVE, or OBJECT GLASS

W. James, Principles of Psychology, i. 629 sqq. ; L. W. Stern, "Psychische Prasenzzeit," Z. f. Psych., (1897), xiii. 325 sqq. such distinct appreciation of See also:

• COMPARATIVE

But first, it is evident that we cannot apply this method to indefinitely See also:

• SHORT, FRANCIS JOB (1857– )

This we may perhaps take to be evidence of the time occupied in accommodating or fixing attention. Whether the " point of indifference " is determined by the rate of usual bodily movement, as Spencer asserts and See also:

• WUNDT, WILHELM MAX (1832— )

Each impression lasts as long as it is interesting, but does not continue to monopolize the focus of consciousness till attention to it is fatiguing, because uninteresting. In such facts, then, we seem to have proof that our perception of duration rests ultimately upon quasi-motor acts of varying intensity, the duration of which we do not directly experience as duration at all. They do endure and their intensity is a See also:

• FUNCTION

Hume, again, is at still greater pains to show that " the idea which we form of any finite quality is not infinitely divisible, but that by proper distinctions and separations we may run this idea up to inferior ones, which will be perfectly simple and indivisible . . that the imagination reaches a minimum, and may raise up to itself an idea of which it cannot conceive any subdivision, and which cannot be diminished without a See also:

• TOTAL

Attention does not move by hops from one definite spot to another. but, as Wundt himself allows, by alternate See also:

• DIFFUSION (from the Lat. diffundere; dis-, asunder, and fundere, to pour out)

Familiarity of course implies previous learning and retaining; the first essential, there-fore, in any attempt to study these processes from the beginning, is the exclusion of this See also:

• FACTOR (from Lat. facere, to make or do)

(1894) xxxviii., 148 sqq. closely connected with certain other psychical constants, such as the duration of the psychical present and of the primary memory-image, the tempo of movements of attention (§§ 28, 29), &c. There are isolated investigations of these several conditions, but the subject as a whole still awaits systematic treatment.' That it is not wanting in interest is evident when we consider that if our span of prehension were enlarged, a corresponding increase in the variety and range of See also:

• METRE ((terpuc?, sc. rFxvf, from Gr. Or poi', measure)

Thus taking a line of 10 syllables, the number of syllables reproduced correctly and in their proper order, after 1, 3, 6, 9 and 12 " repetitions," were 2.2, 2.5, 2.8, 3'4, 3'9 respectively, as the averages of a series of experiments with each of eight persons.2 " The first repetition is undoubtedly the best," assuming, of course, that the subjects start with their attention fully concentrated. Some persons naturally do this, many do not; the experimenter has therefore to take special precautions to secure uniformity in this respect. 2. (a) On relearning a line after an interval of twenty-four See also:

• HOURS, CANONICAL

325 sqq.; Daniels, " Memory After-image and Attention," Am. Jour. of Psychology (1893), vi. 558 sqq. ' W. G. See also:

• SMITH
• SMITH, ADAM (1723–1790)
• SMITH, ALEXANDER (183o-1867)
• SMITH, ANDREW JACKSON (1815-1897)
• SMITH, CHARLES EMORY (1842–1908)
• SMITH, CHARLES FERGUSON (1807–1862)
• SMITH, CHARLOTTE (1749-1806)
• SMITH, COLVIN (1795—1875)
• SMITH, EDMUND KIRBY (1824-1893)
• SMITH, G
• SMITH, GEORGE (1789-1846)
• SMITH, GEORGE (184o-1876)
• SMITH, GEORGE ADAM (1856- )
• SMITH, GERRIT (1797–1874)
• SMITH, GOLDWIN (1823-191o)
• SMITH, HENRY BOYNTON (1815-1877)
• SMITH, HENRY JOHN STEPHEN (1826-1883)
• SMITH, HENRY PRESERVED (1847– )
• SMITH, JAMES (1775–1839)
• SMITH, JOHN (1579-1631)
• SMITH, JOHN RAPHAEL (1752–1812)
• SMITH, JOSEPH, JR
• SMITH, MORGAN LEWIS (1822–1874)
• SMITH, RICHARD BAIRD (1818-1861)
• SMITH, ROBERT (1689-1768)
• SMITH, SIR HENRY GEORGE WAKELYN
• SMITH, SIR THOMAS (1513-1577)
• SMITH, SIR WILLIAM (1813-1893)
• SMITH, SIR WILLIAM SIDNEY (1764-1840)
• SMITH, SYDNEY (1771-1845)
• SMITH, THOMAS SOUTHWOOD (1788-1861)
• SMITH, WILLIAM (1769-1839)
• SMITH, WILLIAM (c. 1730-1819)
• SMITH, WILLIAM (fl. 1596)
• SMITH, WILLIAM FARRAR (1824—1903)
• SMITH, WILLIAM HENRY (1808—1872)
• SMITH, WILLIAM HENRY (1825—1891)
• SMITH, WILLIAM ROBERTSON (1846-'894)

Psychologie, xiv. 455 sqq.familiarity next day apparent, the proportional saving was no greater. The absolute saving would, of course, be less. We are so far led to infer that the stronger associations effected by many repetitions at one time fall off more rapidly than weaker associations effected by fewer repetitions in the same way. Herbart in his " psychical dynamics "—influenced probably by physical analogies—conjectured that the " sinking " or " inhibition " of presentations generally was proportional to their intensity: the less there was to sink, the slower the sinking became. Recent experiments certainly point in this direction. (b) As to retention as a function of the time—we all know that memories fade with time, but not at what precise rate. Ebbinghaus, by a series of prolonged experiments, ascertained the rate to be proportional to the See also:

• LOGARITHM (from Gr. Abyos, word, ratio, and apx0µos, number)

Thus, for Ebbinghaus, 38 repetitions spread over three days were as effective as 68 taken together. The results of careful experiments by Jost with two different subjects, using G. E. Mailer's " method of telling " (to be described later on), are still more conclusive. Comparing 8 repetitions on three successive days with 4 repetitions on six, and 2 on twelve, the efficiencies, tested twenty-four hours later, were respectively as 11.5, 35, and 54; and probably, as Jost surmises, the effect of the maximum distribution—single " repetition " on twenty-four successive days—would have been more advantageous still, securing in fact the superiority of a first impression (cf. 1, above) on every occasion. This result again, is in part explained by the law of sinking already found. For if the sinking were simply proportional to the time, or were independent of the intensity, there would so far be no reason why one mode of distributing a given number of repetitions should be more economical than another. There is, however, another reason for this superiority, less clearly implied, to which we shall come presently. Invariably, and almost of necessity, a more or less complex rhythmical See also:

• ARTICULATION (from Lat. articulare, to divide into joints)

A series of twelve syllables, for example, would be connected into six trochees, with a See also:

• CAESURA (Lat. for " cutting," Gr. row))

The average duration of the groups, whether these are large or small, is comparatively constant, measuring rather more than one second. The subject usually keeps time by taps, nods or other accompanying movements; the See also:

• PULSE

In the See also:

• ACT (Lat. actus, actum)

Does association work forwards only or backwards also, as the middle See also:

• LINK

249 sqq., 393 sqq.; M. K. Smith, " Rhythmus and Arbeit," Phil Studien (1900), xvi. 71 sqq. 197 sqq.; Arbeit and Rhythmus (1899), by K. See also:

• BUCHER, LOTHAR (1817–1892)

Even when learning backwards and skipping one syllable, Ebbinghaus found a saving of 5 %. But the number of his experiments (four) was too few to give this result much value, as he fully admits. These experiments as a whole, then, might incline us to suppose that association does work in both directions, though the connexions backwards are considerably weaker. But if so the associations both ways should be alike at least in form—continuous, that is to say, backwards, d c b a, as well as forwards, a b c d. The facts at present available are, however, against this. In two or three hundred. experiments by See also:

• MULLER, FERDINAND VON, BARON (1825–1896)
• MULLER, FRIEDRICH (1749-1825)
• MULLER, GEORGE (1805-1898)
• MULLER, JOHANNES PETER (18o1-1858)
• MULLER, JOHANNES VON (1752-1809)
• MULLER, JULIUS (18oi-1878)
• MULLER, KARL OTFRIED (1797-1840)
• MULLER, LUCIAN (1836-1898)
• MULLER, WILHELM (1794-1827)
• MULLER, WILLIAM JAMES (1812-1845)

The old series was found (by the method of saving) to require on an average 5.85 repetitions for relearning, and the new 9.6; yet on the method of telling, the new series yielded 2.7 " hits," with an average time of about i second for each, while the old yielded only •9 " hits," with an average time of 41 seconds for each. Thus one may be able to reproduce relatively little of a given subject-matter, and yet require only a few repetitions in order to learn it off anew; on the other hand, one may know relatively much, and still find many more repetitions requisite for such complete learning. The " See also:

• AGE (Fr. age, through late Lat. aetaticum, from aetas)

We seem warranted, then, in concluding that this conception of " association-strength," so freely used by G. E. Muller and his co-workers, requires more analysis than it has yet received. The two factors which their methods disclose in it appear to confirm the distinction we have already made between impressions and free ideas. They help us also to understand, further, the superiority of distributed over cumulated repetition, of " inwardly digesting " over " cram." Feeling. 31. Such See also:

• SUMMARY

At this higher level also it is possible that either form of receptive consciousness may lead to either form of active: sensations may lead to thought rather than to See also:

• ACTION

Here, again, it suffices for our present purpose if it be granted that there is a See also:

• FAIR

Were it possible it would be quite unnecessary to examine in detail every variety of pleasurable and painful consciousness in connexion with a general inquiry of this sort. It will be best to enumerate at the outset the only cases that specially call for investigation. Feeling may arise mainly from (a) single sensations or movements, including in these what recent psychologists call their See also:

• TONE, THEOBALD WOLFE (1763-1798)

expression, or with the sensations or ideas that are its cause. For feeling as such is, so to put it, matter of being rather than of direct knowledge; and all that we know about it we know from its antecedents or consequents in presentation. Pure feeling, then, ranging solely between the opposite extremes of pleasure and pain, we are naturally led to inquire whether there is any corresponding contrast in the feelings, which might be distinguished from all the preceding as reflex, since they arise from the memory or expectation of feelings but in fact these are largely involved in all the higher feelings, and this brief reference to them will suffice: of such hope, fear, regret are examples. a. The quality and intensity as well as the duration and frequency of a sensation or movement all have to do with Sensations determining to what feeling it gives rise. It will and Move- be best to leave the last two out of account for a time. meats. Apart from these, the pleasantness or painfulness of a movement appears to depend solely upon its intensity, that is to say, upon the amount of effort necessary to effect it, in such wise that a certain amount of exertion is agreeable and any excess disagreeable. Some sensations also, such as those of light and sound, are agreeable if not too intense, their pleasantness increasing with their intensity up to a certain point, on nearing which the feeling rapidly changes and becomes disagreeable or even painful. Other sensations, as bitter tastes, e.g. are naturally unpleasant, however faint—though we must allow the possibility of an acquired liking for moderately bitter or pungent flavours. But in every case such sensations produce unmistakable manifestations of disgust, if at all intense. Sweet tastes, on the other hand, however intense, are pleasant to an unspoiled See also:

• PALATE (Lat. palatum, possibly from the root of pascere, to feed)

A comparison of examples of this kind, which it would be tedious to describe more fully and which are indeed too familiar to need much description, seems to show (r) that, so far as feeling is determined by the intensity of a presentation, there is pleasure so long as attention can be adapted or accommodated to the presentation, and pain so soon as the intensity is too great for this; and (2) that, so far as feeling is determined by the quality of a presentation, those that are pleasurable enlarge the field of consciousness and introduce or agreeably increase in intensity certain organic sensations, while those that are painful See also:

• CONTRACT
• CONTRACT (Lat. contract us, from contrahere, to draw together, to bind)

But perhaps at first the special qualities that are now throughout unpleasant may have been always presented with an excessive intensity that would be painful on this score alone, and the reflexes that at present pertain to them may then have been psychologically the expression of this pain). At any rate it is manifestly unfair to refuse either to seek out the See also:

• PRIMITIVE

In the lowly organisms that absorb food directly through the skin such bitter juices as exist naturally might at once produce very violent effects—comparable, say, to scalding; and the reflexes then established may have been continued by natural selection so as to save from poisoning the higher organisms, whose absorbent surfaces are internal and only guarded in this way by the See also:

• ORGAN

far as continued presentation entails diminished intensity we have nothing but diminished feeling as a consequence; so far as its continued presentation entails satiety the train of agreeable accompaniments ceases in which the pleasurable tone consisted. But in another way long duration and frequent repetition produce indirectly certain characteristic effects on feeling in consequence of habituation and accommodation. We may get used to a painful presentation in such wise that we cease to be conscious of it as positively disagreeable, though its cessation is at once a source of pleasure; in like manner we come to require things simply because it is painful to be without them, although their possession has long ceased to be a ground of positive enjoyment. This loss (or gain) consequent on accommodation has a most important effect in changing the sources of feeling: it See also:

• HELPS, SIR ARTHUR (1813-1875)

See also:

• HARMONY (Gr. dpµovia, a concord of musical sounds, dpA'ew to join; &plan midi (sc. TeXvil)

2 Preyer, Akustische Untersuchungen, p. 59now concerned with are the pleasurable or painful combinations of different ungraduated colours. A comparison of these seems to justify the general statement that those colours yield good combinations that are far apart in the colour circle, while those near together are apt to be discordant. The explanation given, viz. that the one arrangement secures and the other prevents perfect retinal activity, seems on the whole satisfactory—especially if we acknowledge the tendency of all recent investigations and distinguish sensibility to colour and sensibility to mere light as both psychologically and physiologically two See also:

• SEPARATE

Thus, be the ideas what they may, when their onward movement is checked by divergent or obstructing lines of association, and especially when in this manner we are hindered, say, from recollecting a name or a See also:

• QUOTATION

Thus, if it should be objected that the intellectual satisfaction of consistency is really due to its utility, to the fact that what is incompatible and incomprehensible is of no avail for See also:

• PRACTICAL

We have already noticed more than once the power which primary presentations have to sustain vivid re-presentations, and the, bearing of this on the aesthetic effects of See also:

• WORKS

Under disappointment or reverse the same two pictures may be present to his mind, but accompanied by the certainty that the better is not his or is his no more. So far, then, it might be said the contents of his consciousness are in each case the same, the whole difference lying in the different relationship to self. But this makes all the difference even to the contents of his consciousness, as we shall at once see if we consider its active side. Even the idlest and most thoughtless mind teems with intentions and expectations, and in its prosperity, like the See also:

• FOOL (O. Fr. fol, modern fou, foolish, from a Late Latin use of follis, bellows, a ball filled with air, for a stupid person, a jester, a wind-bag)

exercised, and pain in proportion as such effective attention is frustrated by distractions, shocks, or incomplete and faulty adaptations, or fails of exercise, owing to the narrowness of the field of consciousness and the slowness and smallness of its changes. Something must be said in explication of this See also:

• FORMULA
• FORMULA (Lat. diminutive of forma, shape, pattern, &c., especially used of rules of judicial procedure)

Since different presentations See also:

• CONSORT (Lat. consors, a companion)

If a particular presentation is pleasurable or painful in such wise as to lead to a redistribution of attention, it is reasonable to look for an explanation primarily in its connexion with the rest of the field of consciousness. Moreover, it is obvious—since what takes place in subconsciousness can only be explained in analogy with what takes place in consciousness—that, if we have an inexplicable in the one, we must have a corresponding inexplicable in the other. If the feeling produced by what comports itself as a simple presentation cannot be explained by what is in consciousness, we should be forced to admit that some presentations are unpleasant simply because they are unpleasant—an inexplicability which the hypothesis of subconsciousness might push farther back but would not remove. 33. But there is still another and more serious difficulty to See also:

• FACE (from Lat. fades, derived either from facere, to make, or from a root fa-, meaning " appear "; cf. Gr. cbatvstv)

Whatever be the variety in the sources of pleasure, whatever be the moral or conventional estimate of their worthiness, if a given state of consciousness is pleasant we seek so far to retain it, if painful to be rid of it: we prefer greater pleasure before less, less pain before greater. This is, in fact, the whole meaning of preference as a psychological terns. See also:

• WISDOM, BOOK OF, or WISDOM OF SOLOMON (Sept. Io4ia IaXwµwvos; Lat. Vulg. Liber sapientiae)

If it is only quantity that turns the scales, where does quality come in, for we cannot say, e.g. that the astronomer experiences a greater thrill of delight when a new See also:

• PLANET (Gr. ssXavirrns, a wanderer)

Yet such repugnance is but another outcome of the common mistake of supposing that the real is obtained by pulling to pieces rather than by See also:

• BUILDING

Resolve the statue or the building into See also:

• STONE
• STONE (0. Eng. shin; the word is common to Teutonic languages, cf. Ger. Stein, Du. steen, Dan. and Swed. sten; the root is also seen in Gr. aria, pebble)
• STONE, CHARLES POMEROY (1824-1887)
• STONE, EDWARD JAMES (1831-1897)
• STONE, FRANK (1800-1859)
• STONE, GEORGE (1708—1764)
• STONE, LUCY [BLACKWELL] (1818-1893)
• STONE, MARCUS (184o— )
• STONE, NICHOLAS (1586-1647)

With this question we pass to the psychophysical side of the theory, and here it be-comes perplexing, and is itself perplexed; for to this question it is driven to return two distinct and divergent answers. First, we are told that it is not the emotion that gives rise to the bodily expression, but that, on the contrary, " the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the existing fact," it being beyond doubt " that objects do excite bodily changes by a preorganised mechanism." Again: Each emotion is," for Professor James, " a resultant of a sum of elements, and each element is caused by a physiological process of a sort already well known. The elements are all organic changes, and each of them is the reflex effect of the existing object." The old attempts at classification and description being contemptuously dismissed as belonging only to " the lowest stage of See also:

• SCIENCE (Lat. scientia, from scire; to learn, know)

Such, with scarcely an exception; has always been, and still remains, the analysis of emotion in See also:

• VOGUE, EUGENE MELCHIOR, COMTE DE (1848- )

Nevertheless, Professor James's main position is that an emotion is but a sum of organic sensations; and in order to establish this he is led to the second and very different statement which we have now to examine. Here, so far from suggesting inquiries as to the " objects " that excite emotion, his point is to maintain that in so far as the bodily cause is set up, be the means what they may, in so far the emotion is present.' And here, at length, the contention is explicit: Emotions are a certain complex of organic sensations, and such complexes are emotions: the two are not merely coexistent, they are identical. The exciting object is thus, after all, physiological; that is to say, it is whatever stimulus sets up the sensations. It cannot be psychological, " the total situation for the reacting subject," for in this sense the emotion, it is maintained, may be " objectless." In support of his position Professor James first of all cites pathological cases of such objectless emotion. He next follows up these with accounts of other cases in which emotional apathy seemed to keep pace with sensory See also:

• ANAESTHESIA

But some distinction is called for among the various movements expressive of emotion; for there is more in these than the direct effect of feeling regarded as merely pleasure or pain. It has been usual with psychologists to confound emotions with feeling, because intense feeling is essential to emotion. But, strictly 1 Text-See also:

• BOOK

390 sqq.; and Nature, lxii. 328 sqq.speaking, a state of emotion is a complete state of mind, a psychosis, and not a psychical element, if we may so say. Thus in anger we have over and above pain a more or less definite object as its cause, and a certain characteristic reactive display—frowns, compressed lips, erect head, clenched fists, in a word, the combative attitude—as its effect, and similarly of other emotions; so that generally in the particular movements indicative of particular emotions the primary and primitive effects of feeling are overlaid by what See also:

• DARWIN, CHARLES ROBERT (1809-1882)
• DARWIN, ERASMUS (1731-1802)

The intenser the feeling the intenser the reaction, no doubt, whether it be See also:

• SMILES, SAMUEL (1812-1904)

But such See also:

• ADMISSION

Under such circumstances natural selection would have to do almost everything and subjective selection almost nothing. So far as natural selection worked, we should have, not the individual subject making a series of tries and perfecting itself by practice, as in learning to dance or swim, but we should have those individuals whose structure happened to vary for the better surviving, increasing and displacing the rest. How much natural selection, apparently unaided, can accomplish in the way of complicated adjustment we see in the adaptation of the form and colour of See also:

• PLANTS

Upon this movement, the last of a tentative series, attention, released from the pain, is concentrated; and in this way the evil and the remedy become so far associated that on a recurrence of the former the many diffused movements become less, and the one purposive movement more, pronounced; the one effectual way is at length established and the others, which were but palliatives, disappear. (d) When things have advanced so far that some one definite movement is definitely represented along with the painful sensation it remedies, it is not long before a still further advance is possible and we have preventive movements. Thanks to the orderliness of things, dangers have their premonitions. After a time, therefore, the occurrence of some See also:

• SIGNAL

A busy man reads a novel at the close of the day, and finds himself led off by a reference to See also:

• ANGLING

In some cases this greater vividness may suffice. This is most likely to happen when the new idea affords intellectual occupation, and this is at the time congenial, or with indolent and imaginative persons who prefer dreaming to doing. (4) But when the new idea does not lead off the pent-up stream of action by opening out fresh channels, when, instead of this, it is one that keeps them See also:

• INTENT (from Lat. intend ere, to stretch out, extend, particularly in the phrase intendere animum, to turn one's mind to, purpose)

The feeling directly consequent on desire as a state of want and See also:

• RESTRAINT (from " to restrain," Lat. restringere, to hold back, prevent)

Pleasure in the past, no doubt, has usually brought about the association between the representation of the desired object and the movement for its realization; but neither the recollection of this pleasure nor its anticipation is necessary to desire, and even when present they do not determine what urgency it will have. The best proof of this lies in certain habitual desires. Pleasures are diminished by repetition, whilst habits are strengthened by it; if the intensity of desire, therefore, were proportioned to the " pleasure value " of its gratification, the desire for renewed gratification should diminish as this pleasure grows less; but, if the present pain of restraint from action determines the intensity of desire, this should increase as the action becomes habitual. And observation seems to show that, unless prudence suggests the forcible suppression of such belated desires or the active energies themselves fail, they do in fact become more imperious, although less productive of positive pleasure, as time goes on. In this there is, of course, no exception to the general principle that action is consequent on feeling—a greater pleasure being preferred before a less, a less pain before a greater; for, though the feeling that follows upon its satisfaction be less or even change entirely, still the pain of the unsatisfied desire increases as the desire hardens into habit. It is also a point in favour of the position here taken that appetites, which may be compared to inherited desires, certainly prompt to action by present pain rather than by prospective pleasure. Intellection. 36. Desire naturally prompts to the search for the means to its satisfaction and frequently to a mental See also:

• REHEARSAL (from " rehearse," to say over again, repeat, recount, O.Fr. rehercer, from re, again, and hercer, to harrow, cf. " hearse," the original meaning being to rake or go over the same ground again as with a harrow)

But thought as a permanent activity may be fairly said to originate in and even to depend upon the acquisition of speech. This indispensable See also:

• INSTRUMENT (Lat. instrumentum, from insincere, to build up, furnish, arrange, prepare)

Nor can we well maintain that the presentations attended to differ in kind, albeit such a view has been held from Plato downwards. Nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit See also:

• ARIUS ("Apews)

Thinking may be broadly described as solving a problem—finding an AX that is B. In so doing we start from a comparatively fixed central idea or See also:

• INTUITION (from Lat. intueri, to look at)

Thus, while it is possible for thought to begin without language, just as arts may begin without tools, yet language enables us to carry the same process enormously farther. In the first place it gives us an increased command ofLanThouguaght and ge. even such comparatively concrete generic images as can be formed without it. The name of a thing or action becomes, for one who knows the name, as much an objective mark or attribute as any quality whatever can be. The form and colour of what we call an " orange " are perhaps even more intimately combined with the sound and utterance of this word than with the taste and fragance which we regard as strictly essential to the thing. But, whereas its essential attributes often evade us, we can always command its nominal attribute, in so far as this depends upon movements of articulation. By uttering the name (dr hearing it uttered) we have secured to us, in a greater or less degree, that superior vividness and definiteness that pertain to images reinstated by impressions: our idea approximates to the fixity and See also:

• INDEPENDENCE
• INDEPENDENCE, DECLARATION OF
• INDEPENDENCE, WAR OF

The mental picture answering to the word " See also:

• HORSE (a word common to Teutonic languages in such forms as hors, hros, ros; cf. the Ger. ross)

The question thus arises—What are the properly ideational elements concerned in thought? Over this question psychologists long waged fight as either nominalists or conceptualists. The former maintain that what is imaged in connexion with a general concept, such as triangle, is some individual triangle " taken in a certain light,"a while the latter maintain that an " abstract idea " is formed embodying such constituents of the several particulars as the concept connotes, but dissociated from the specific or accidental variations that distinguish one particular from another. As often happens in such controversies, each side saw the weak point in the other. The nominalists easily showed that there was no distinct abstract idea representable apart from particulars; and the conceptualists could as easily show that a particular presentation " considered in a certain light " is no longer merely a particular presentation nor yet a mere See also:

• CROWD, CROUTH, CROWTH

But such isolated images of an impression, even if possible, would no more be intuitions than the mere impression itself would be one: taken alone the one would be as free of space and time as is the other. Till it is settled, therefore, whether the ideational elements concerned in conception are intuitive complexes or something answering to the ultimate elements of these, nothing further can be done. In the case of what are specially called " concrete " as distinct from " abstract " concepts—if this rough-and-ready, but unscientific, distinction may be allowed—the idea answering to the concept differs little from an intuition, and we have already remarked that the generic image (Gemeinbild of German psychologists) constitutes the connecting link between imagination and conception. But even concerning these it is useless to ask what does one imagine in thinking, e.g. of triangle or man or colour. We never—except for the See also:

• SAKE

Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge, Introd. § 16, Hume, op. cit. § 7.tion or See also:

• MUSTER (Mid. Eng. mostre, moustre, adapted from the similar O. Fr. forms; Lat. monstrare)

The distinctive character of this intellectual synthesis lies, we have seen, in the fact that it is determined entirely by what is synthesized, whether that be the elemen- General tary constituents of intuitions or general relations character of whatever kind among these. It differs, therefore, and Growth in being selective from the synthesis of association, oflntellecwhich rests upon contiguity and unites together tion. whatever occurs together. It differs also from any synthesis, though equally voluntary in its See also:

• INITIATION (Lat. inilium, beginning, entrance, from mire, to go in)

Gradually See also:

• IMITATION (Lat. imitatio, from intitari, to imitate)

So far the material of thought is always general—is freed, that is, from the local and temporal and other defining See also:

• MARL (from O. Fr. marle, Late Lat. margila, dim. of marga; cf. Du. and Ger. Mergel)

But of more account is the further judgment to which it leads, that which connects the new fact with the generic idea. Though actually complex, generic images are not explicitly known as complexes when they first enter into judgments; as the subjects of such judgments they are but starting-points for See also:

• PREDICATION (from Lat. praedicare, to state, assert)

Whether the subject or starting-point of our discursive thinking be actually what we perceive as a thing, or whether it be a quality, an action, an effectuation (i.e. a transitive action), a concrete spatial or temporal relation, or finally, a resemblance or difference in these or in other respects, it becomes by the very fact of being the central object of thought pro tanto a unity, and all that can be affirmed concerning it may so far be regarded as its See also:

• PROPERTY

On this view if a concept is complex it can only be so as a class combination ; and, if the mode of its synthesis could be taken account of at all, this could only be by treating it too as an element in the combination like the rest: See also:

• IRON [symbol Fe, atomic weight 55.85 (0=16)]

In his exposition of the latter he brings to light the difference between the " functions of the understanding " in synthesizing—or, as we might say, organizing—percepts into concepts and the merely analytic subsumption of abc and abd under ab—a, b, c and d being what they may. Unlike other concepts, categories as such do not in the first instance signify objects of thought, however general, but these functions of the understanding in constituting objects. In fine, they all imply some special process, and the general characteristic of the resulting products is what we have first of all to note Objects of Higher Order: their Analysis and Genesis. 39. By transposing a tune from one key to another we may obtain two entirely diverse aggregates of notes, and yet the See also:

• MELODY (Gr. ,ueXw3ia, a choral song, from name, tune, and gi6i, song)

2 As to these it must suffice to refer to what has peen already said ; cf. § 11 and § 28. For the interval, too, is a whole, though a simpler one: it does not necessarily change with a change of its constituents, nor remain the same as long as their distance is unaltered. Feelings and " associations," again, cannot account for the result, inasmuch as such accompaniments are not invariably present: moreover, they obviously presuppose the melody instead of producing it. Of such complex wholes or combinations—as distinct from mere aggregates or collections—there are many forms; as, for example, geometrical figures and patterns, motions and other changes, numbers, logical connexions, &c. In view of this variety it seems to strike the unprejudiced as See also:

• WILD, JONATHAN (c. 1682-1725)

After vainly seeking the living whole among the dead particulars, he next surmises that they generate it by their conjoint action! But whence this notion of " action "; and how, if such disjecta membra suffice, do they so often fail of their effect, so that we cannot " see the See also:

• WOOD, ANTHONY A2 (1632-1695)
• WOOD, JOHN GEORGE (1827—1889)
• WOOD, MRS HENRY [ELLEN] (1814—1887)
• WOOD, SEARLES VALENTINE (1798—188o)

' Cf. e.g. F. See also:

• SCHUMANN, ROBERT ALEXANDER (1810-1856)

182 sqq. Special mention must be made of an earlier See also:

• PAPER
• PAPER (Fr. papier, from Lat. papyrus)

Yet there are the facts: reds and blues of sorts and a whole See also:

• SCALE
• SCALE (1) A

When the sunset red changes to the See also:

• TWILIGHT

2 Essay concerning Human Understanding, II. xvi. § i.a mistake—one of a class of mistakes already more than once referred to, which consist in transferring to the data, of sense all that is implied in the language necessarily used in speaking of them. The term " a sensation " no doubt carries along with it the idea of unity, but the bare sensation as received brings along with it nothing but itself. And, if we consider sensory consciousness merely, we do not receive a sensation, and then another sensation, and so on seriatim; but we have always a continuous diversity of sensations even when these are qualitatively sharply differentiated. Moreover, if unity were an impression of sense and passively received, it would, in common with other impressions, be unamenable to change. We cannot see red as blue, but we can resolve many (parts) into one (whole), and vice versa .3 Unity, then, is the result of an act the occasions for which, no doubt, are at first non-voluntarily determined; but the act is still as distinct from them as is attention from the objects attended to. It is to that movement of attention already described in dealing with ideation (§ 24) that we must look as the source of this category. This same movement, in like manner, yields us temporal signs; and the complex unity formed by a combination of these is what we call number. When there is little or no difference between the field and the focus of attention, unifying is an impossibility, whatever the impressions received may be. On the other hand, as voluntary acts of concentration become more frequent and distinct the variegated continuum of sense is shaped into intuitions of definite things and events. Also, as soon as words facilitate the control of ideas, it becomes possible to single out special aspects and relations of things as the subjects or starting-points of our discursive thinking. Thus the forms of unity are manifold: every act of intuition or thought, whatever else it is, is an act of unifying.

It is obvious that the whole field of consciousness at any moment can never be actually embraced as one. What is unified becomes thereby the focus of consciousness and so leaves an outlying field; so far unity may be held to imply plurality. But it cannot with propriety be said that in a simple act of attention the field of consciousness is analysed into two distinct parts, i.e. two unities—this (now attended to) and the other or the rest (abstracted from). For the not-this is but the rest of a continuum and not itself a whole; it is left out but not determined, as the bounding space is left out when a figure is drawn. To know two unities we must connect both together; and herein comes to light the difference between the unity which is the form of the concept or subject of discourse and the unity of a judgment. The latter is of necessity complex; the former may or may not be. But in any case the complexity of the two is different. If the subject of thought is not only clear but distinct—i.e. not merely defined as a whole but having its constituents like-wise more or less defined—such distinctness is due to previous judgments. At any future time these may of course be repeated; such are the analytical or explicative judgments of logic. As the mere subject of discourse it is, however, a single unity simultaneously apprehended; the relation ascertained between it and its predicate constitutes the unity of judgment, a unity which is comprehended only when its parts are successively apprehended. But, though a judgment is always a complex unity, the extent of this complexity seems at first sight to vary as the form of synthesis varies. Formal logic, as we have seen, Law of by throwing the form of synthesis into the predicate See also:

• DICHOTOMY (Gr. bLya, apart, TEµvew, to cut)

S is P. But, if we at all regard the matter thought, it is certain, for example, that " It is an See also:

• EXPLOSION

This, as See also:

• RUNNING

That this absolute difference—or disparateness, as we may call it—affords no ground for relations becomes evident when we consider (i) that, if we had only a plurality of absolutely different presentations, we should have no consciousness at all (cf. § iI); and (2) that we never compare—although we distinguish—presentations which seem absolutely or totally disparate, as e.g. a thunderclap and the taste of sugar, or the notion of free See also:

• TRADE (O. Eng. trod, footstep, from tredan, to tread; in M. Eng. the forms teed, trod and trade appear, the last in the sense of a beaten track)
• TRADE, BOARD OF

This is evident from the fact that in the former there is positive presentation and in the latter no presentation at all. The relation of unlikeness, then, is distinguished from the mere " position " or fact of change by (r) the voluntary concentration of attention upon ab and ac with a view to the detection of this change as their difference, and by (2) the act, relating them through it, in that they are judged unlike to that extent. The type of comparison is such superposition of geometrical lines or figures (as, e.g. in See also:

• EUCLID
• EUCLID [EucLEIDES]

This ambiguity in the word " same," whereby it Identity. means either individual identity or indistinguishable resemblance has been often noticed, and from a logical or objective point of view justly complained of as " engendering fallacies in otherwise enlightened understandings." But apparently no one has inquired into its psychological basis, although more than one writer has admitted that the ambiguity is one " in itself not always to be avoided."3 It is not enough to trace the confusion to the existence of common names and to cite the forgotten controversies of scholastic See also:

• REALISM (from Low Lat. realis, appertaining to res, things, as opposed to ideas and imaginations)

709. them and to examine their connexion. Perhaps we might term the one " material identity " and the other " individual identity "—following the analogy of expressions such as " different things but all made of the same stuff," " the same person but entirely changed." Thus there is unity and plurality concerned in both, and herein identity or sameness differs from singularity or mere oneness, which so far entails no relation. But the unity and the plurality are different in each, and each is in some sort the converse of the other. In the one, two different individuals partially coincide; in the other, one individual is partially different; the unity in the one case is an individual presentation, in_the other is the presentation of an individual. In material identity the unity is that of a single presentation, whether simple or complex, which enters as a common con-Material stituent into two or more others. It may be possible, Identity. of course, to individualize it, but as it emerges in a comparison it is a single presentation and nothing more. On account of this absence of individual marks this single presentation is what logicians call " abstract "; but this is not psychologically essential. It may be a generic image which has resulted from the neutralization of individual marks, but it may equally well be a simple presentation, like red, to which such marks never belonged. We come here from a new side upon a truth which has been already expounded at length, viz. that presentations are not given to us as individuals but as changes in a continuum. Time and space—the See also:

• INSTRUMENTS

But it individual will serve to bring out the difference between the identity. two forms of identity to note that an See also:

• IDENTIFICATION (Lat. idem, the same)

But, again, it is equally true that, if we could not feel and move as well a& receive impressions, and if experience did not repeatitself, we should never attain even to this level of spatial and temporal intuition. Kant shows a very lame and halting recognition of this dependence of the higher forms on the lower both in his schematism of the categories, and again in correcting in his Analytic the opposition of sense and understanding as respectively receptive and active with which he set out in his Aesthetic. Still, although what are called the subjective and objective factors of real knowledge advance together, the former is in a sense always a step ahead. We find again without us the permanence, individuality, efficiency, and adaptation we have found first of all within (cf. § 20, b and d). But such primitive imputation of personality, though it facilitates a first understanding, soon proves itself faulty and begets the contradictions which have been one chief motive to philosophy. We smile at the savage who thinks a magnet must need food or the child who is puzzled that the horses in a picture remain for ever still; but few consider that underlying all common-sense thinking there lurks the same natural precipitancy. We attribute to extended things a unity which we know only as the unity of an unextended subject; we attribute to changes among these extended things what we know only when we act and suffer ourselves; and we attribute further to them in their changes a striving for ends which we know only because we feel. In asking what they are, how they act, and why they are thus and thus, we assimilate them to ourselves, in spite of the differences which lead us by-and-by to see a gulf between mind and matter. Such instinctive analogies have, like other analogies, to be confirmed, refuted, or modified by further knowledge, i.e. by the very insight into things which these analogies have themselves made possible. That in their first form they were mythical, and that they could never have been at all unless originated in this way, are considerations that make no difference to their, validity—assuming, that is, that they admit, now or hereafter, of a logical transformation which renders them objectively valid. This legitimation is, of course, the business of philosophy; we are concerned only with the psychological analysis and origin of the conceptions themselves.

_ 42. As it must here suffice to examine one of these categories; let us take that which is the most important and central of the three, viz. causality or the relation of cause and effect, Causality. as that will necessarily throw some light upon the con- stitution of the others. To begin, we must distinguish three things, which, though very different, are very liable to be confused. (t) Perceiving in a definite case, e.g. that on the sun shining a stone becomes warm, we may say the sun makes the stone warm. This is a concrete instance of predicating the causal relation. In this there is, explicitly at all events, no statement of a general law or See also:

• AXIOM (Gr. &iwµa)

We say indeed " The sun warms the stone " as readily as we say " The sun rises and sets," as if both were matters of direct observation then and there. But that this is not so is evident from the fact that only in some cases when one change follows upon another do we regard it as following from the other: casual coincidence is at least as common as causal connexion. Whence the difference, then, if not from perception? Hume's answer,' repeated in the main by English psychologists since, is, as all the world knows, that the difference is the result of association, that when a change a in an object A has been frequently observed to precede a change # in another object B, this repetition determines the mind to a transition from the one to the other. It is this ' Treatise of Human Nature, pt. iii. § xiv., " of the idea of necessary connexion." determination, which could not be present at first, that constitutes " the third relation betwixt these objects." This " internal impression " generated by association is then projected ; " for 'tis a common observation that the mind has a great propensity to spread itself on external objects." The subjective origin and the after-See also:

• PROJECTION

It will not do to say both that an invariable succession generates the idea, and that such invariable succession must be not only invariable but also unconditional in order to generate it. We may here turn the master against the disciple: " the same principle," says Hume, " cannot be both the cause and the effect of another, and this is perhaps the only proposition concerning that relation which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain " (op. cit. p. 391). Unconditionality is then part of the causal relation and yet not the product of invariable repetition. Perhaps the source of this element in the relation will become clear if we examine more closely the so-called " internal impression " of the mind, which according to Hume constitutes the whole of our idea of power or efficacy. To illustrate the nature of this impression Hume cites the instant passage of the imagination to a particular idea on hearing the word commonly annexed to it, when " 'See also:

• TWILL (connected with " two ")

Even irresistible association can only be known as such by efforts to resist it. Hume allows this when he says that his principles of association " are not infallible causes; for one may fix his attention during some time on any one object without looking farther " (op. cit. p. 393). But the fact is, we know both what it is to act and what it is to suffer, to go where we would and to be carried where we would not, quite apart from the workings of association. And, had Hume not confused the two different inquiries, that concerning the origin of the idea of causation and that concerning the ground of causal inference or law of causation, it could never have occurred to him to offer such an analysis of the former as he does. Keeping to the•former and simpler question, it would seem that when in ordinary thinking we say A causes this or that in B we project or analogically attribute to A what we experience in acting, and to B what we experience in being acted on; and the structure of language shows that such projection was made long before it was suspected that what A once did and B once suffered will be done and suffered in the same circumstances again. The occasions suitable for this projection are determined by the temporal and spatial relations of the objects concerned, which relations are matter of intuition. These are of no very special interest from a psychological point of view, but the subjective elements we shall do well to consider further. First of all, we must note the distinction of immanent action and transuent action; the former is what we call action simply, and implies only a single thing, the agent; the latter, which we might with advantage call effectuation, implies two things, a patient as well as an agent. In scientific language the agent in an intransitive act is called a causa immanens and so distinguished from the agent in effectuation or cause transiens. Common thought, however, does not regard mere action as caused at all; and we shall find it, in fact, impossible to resolve action into effectuation. But, since the things with which we ordinarily deal are complex, have many parts, properties, members, phases, and in consequence of the analytic procedure of thought, there ensues, indeed, a continual shifting of the point of view from which we regard any given thing, so that what is in one aspect one'thing is in another many(cf.

§ 2o). So it comes about that, when regarding himself as one, the natural man speaks of himself as walking, shouting, &c.; but, when distinguishing between himself and his members, he speaks of raising his voice, moving his legs, and so forth. Thus no sooner do we resolve any given action into an effectuation, by analytically distinguishing within the original agent an agent and a patient, than a new action appears. Action is thus a simpler notion than causation and inexplicable by means of it. It is certainly no easy problem in philosophy to determine where the resolution of the complex is to cease, at what point we must stop, because in the presence of an individual thing and a simple activity. At any rate, we reach such a point psychologically in the conscious subject, and that energy in consciousness we call attention. If this be allowed, Hume's critique of the notion of efficacy is really wide of the mark. " Some," he says, " have asserted that we feel an energy or power in our own mind; and that, having in this manner acquir'd the idea of power, we transfer that quality to matter, where we are not able immediately to discover it. . . . But to convince us how fallacious this reasoning is, we need only consider that the will, being here consider'd as a cause, has no more a discoverable connexion with its effects than any material cause has with its proper effect. . . . The effect is there [too] distinguishable and separable from the cause, and could not be foreseen without the experience of their constant conjunction (op.cit. p.

455). This is logical analysis, not psychological ; the point is that the will is not considered as a cause and distinguished from its effects, nor in fact considered at all. It is not a case of sequence between two separable impressions; for we cannot really make the indefinite regress that such logical distinctions as that between the conscious subject and its acts implies. Moreover, our activity as such is not directly presented at all: we are, being active; and further than this psychological analysis will not go., There are, as we have seen, two ways in which this activity is manifested, the receptive or passive and the motor or active in the stricter sense—(cf. § 8) and our experience of these we project in predicating the causal relation. But two halves do not make a whole; so we have no complete experience of effectuation, for the simple reason that we cannot be two things at once. We are guided in piecing it together by the temporal and spatial relations of the things concerned. Hence, perhaps, some of the antinomies that beset this concept. In its earliest form, then, the so-called necessary connexion of cause and effect is perhaps nothing more than that of physical constraint. To this, no doubt, is added the strength of expectation—as Hume supposed—when the same effect has been found invariably to follow the same cause. Finally, when upon the basis of such associated uniformities of sequence a definite intellectual elaboration of such material ensues, the logical necessity of reason and consequent finds a place, and so far as See also:

• DEDUCTION (from Lat. deducere, to take or lead from or out of, derive)

43• The mention of logical necessity brings us to a new topic, viz. the " objectivity " of thought and cognition generally. The psychological treatment of this topic is tantamount to an inquiry into the characteristics of the states of mind we call certainty, doubt, belief—all of which centre round the one fact of evidence. Between the certainty that a proposition is true and the certainty that it is not there may intervene many grades of uncertainty. We may know that A is sometimes B, or sometimes not; or that some at least of the conditions of B are present or absent; or the presentation of A may be too confused for distinct analysis. This is the region of probability, possibility, more or less obscurity. Leaving this aside, it will be enough to notice those cases in which certainty may be complete. With that certainty which is absolutely objective, i.e. with knowledge, psychology has no direct concern; it is for logic to furnish the criteria by which knowledge is ascertained. Emotion and desire are frequent indirect causes of subjective certainty, in so far as they determine the constituents and the 1 Hume here has Locke and Berkeley specially in view. Locke as a patient and acute inquirer was incomparably better as a psychologist than a man addicted to See also:

• LITERARY

317) Mr F. H. See also:

• BRADLEY, GEORGE GRANVILLE (1821–1903)
• BRADLEY, JAMES (1693–1762)

(i.) We have this effect before us most clearly if we consider what is by common consent regarded as the type of certainty and evidence, the certainty of present sense-impressions whence it is said, " Seeing is believing." The evident is here the actual, and the " feeling or consciousness " of certainty is in this case nothing but the sense of being taken fast hold of and forced to apprehend what is there. (ii.) The like is true of memory and expectation: in these also there is a sense of being tied down to what is given, whereas in mere imagination, however lively, this non-voluntary determination is absent (cf. § 26). Hume saw this at times clearly enough, as, e.g. when he says, " An idea assented to feels different from a fictitious idea that the fancy alone presents to us." But unfortunately he not only made this difference a mere difference of intensity, but spoke of belief itself as " an operation of the mind " or " manner of conception that bestowed on our ideas this additional force or vivacity."' In short, Hume confounded one of the indirect causes of belief with the ground of it, and again, in describing this ground committed the 6Qrepov rpbrepov of making the mind determine the ideas instead of the ideas determine the mind. (iii.) In speaking of intellection he is clearer: " The answer is easy with regard to propositions that are prov'd by intuition or demonstration. In that case the person who assents not only conceives the ideas according to the proposition, but is necessarily determin'd to conceive them in that particular manner " (op. Cit. p. 395). It has been often urged—as by J. S. Mill, for example—that belief is something " ultimate and primordial." No doubt it is; but so is the distinction between activity and passivity, and it is not here maintained that certainty can be analysed into something simpler, but only that it is identical with what is of the nature of passivity—objective determination. As Bain put it, " The leading fact in belief .

. . is our primitive credulity. We begin by believing everything; whatever is is true " (Emotions and Will, 3d ed., p. 511). But the point is that in this primitive state there is no act answering to " believe " distinct from the non-voluntary attention answering to " perceive," and no reflection such as a modal term like " true " implies. With eyes open in the broad day no man says, " I am certain there is light "; he simply sees. He may by-and-by come absolutely to disbelieve much that he sees—e.g. that things are nearer when viewed through a See also:

• TELESCOPE

396.internal perception. Concerning all presentations whatever—that of self no less than the rest—it is possible to reflect, " This presentation is mine; it is my object; I am the subject attending to it." The presentation of self, then, is one presentation among others, the result, like them, of the differentiation of the original continuum. But it is obvious that this presentation must be in existence first before other presentations can be related to it. On the other hand, it is only in and by means of such relations that the concept of self is completed. We begin, therefore, with self simply as an object, and end with the concept of that object as the subject or " myself " that knows itself. The self has, first of all (a) a unique interest and (b) a certain inwardness, (c) it is an individual that (d) persists, (e) is active, and finally (f) knows itself. These several characteristics of self are intimately involved; so far as they appear at all they advance in definiteness from the lowest level of mere sentience to those moments of highest self-consciousness in which See also:

• CONSCIENCE (Lat. con-scientia, literally " knowledge of a thing shared with another person " or " complete knowledge," and derivatively " consciousness in general)
• CONSCIENCE, HENDRIK (1812-1883)

See also:

• RIBOT, ALEXANDRE FELIX JOSEPH (1842– )
• RIBOT, THEODULE (1823–1891)
• RIBOT, THEODULE ARMAND (1839- )

In all such reminiscence or reverie a generic image of self is the centre, and every new image as it arises derives all its interest from relation to this; and so apart from bodily appetites new desires may be quickened and old emotions stirred again when all that is actually present is dull and unexciting. But desires and emotions, it must be remembered, though awakened by what is only imaginary, invariably See also:

• ENTAIL (from Fr. tailler, to cut; the old derivation from tales haeredes is now abandoned)

Normally there is a certain equilibrium to which they return, and which, we may suppose, determines the so-called temperament, nature/ or disposition, thus securing some tolerable uniformity and continuity in the presentation of self. But even within the limits of sanity great and sudden changes of See also:

• MOOD

In the first we have a distinctly active manipulation of ideas as compared with the more passive spectacle of memory and imagination. Thereby emerges a contrast between the thinker and these objects of his thought, including among them the mere generic image of self, from which is now formed this concept of self as a person. A similar, even sharper, contrast also accompanies the exercise of what is very misleadingly termed " self-control," i.e. control by this personal self of " the various natural affections "—to use Butler's phrase—which often hinder it as external objects hindered them. It is doubtful whether the reasoning, regulating self is commonly regarded as definitely localized. The effort of thinking and concentrating attention upon ideas is no doubt referred to the brain, but this is only comparable with the localization of other efforts in the limbs; when we think we commonly feel also, and the emotional basis is of all the most subjective and inalienable. If we speak of this latest phase of self as par excellence " the inner self," such language is then mainly figurative, inasmuch as the contrasts just described are contrasts into which spatial relations do not enter. 45• The term " reflection," or internal perception is applied to that state of mind in which some particular presentation or group of presentations (x or y) is not simply in the field of self consciousness but there as consciously related to self, sness. , which is also presented at the same time. Self here may be symbolized by M, to emphasize the fact that it is in like manner an object in the field of consciousness. The relation of the two is commonly expressed by saying, " This (x or y) is my (M's) percept, idea or volition; I (M) it is that perceive, think, will it." Self-consciousness, in the narrowest sense, as when we say " I know myself, I am conscious that I am," &c., is but a special, though the most important, instance of this internal perception: here self (M) is presented in relation to self (with a difference, M'); the subject itself—at least, so we say —is or appears as its own object. It has been often maintained that the difference between consciousness and reflection is not a real difference, that to know and to know that you know are " the same thing considered in This subject has a very wide literature. The following are specially interesting: Rihot, Les Maladies de la personnalite (3rd ed., 1889) ; Boris Sidis and S.

P. Goodhart, Multiple Personality (1905) ; See also:

• MORTON, JAMES DOUGLAS, 4TH EARL OF (c. 1525-1581)
• MORTON, JOHN (c. 1420-1500)
• MORTON, JOHN MADDISON (1811-1891)
• MORTON, LEVI PARSONS (1824- )
• MORTON, OLIVER PERRY (1823-1877)
• MORTON, THOMAS (1564-1659)
• MORTON, THOMAS (c. 1590-1646)

To de- See also:

• SCRIBE, AUGUSTIN EUGENE (1791-1860, French dramatist, was born in Paris on the 24th of December 1791. His father was a silk merchant, and he was well educated, being destined for the bar. But, having a real gift for the theatre, a gift which unfortunately

In the blind seen that desire in prompting to the search for' means. to its end struggle of so-called " self-regarding " impulses might is the only right; but in the light of principles or practical maxims right is is the primum mavens of intellection (cf. § 35). But intellect the only might.2 This superiority in position of principles is only does much more than devise and contrive in unquestioning explicable by reference to the inhibitory power of attention, which subservience to the impulse of the moment, like some demon of alone makes deliberation possible and is essentially voluntary; Eastern fable; even the brutes, whose cunning is on the whole that is, subjectively determined. But no, it may be objected, deliberation in such cases is just the result of painful experiences of this sort, are not without traces of self-control. As motives of the evil of hasty action, and only ensues when this motive is conflict and the evils of hasty action recur to mind, deliberation strong enough to restrain the impulse that would otherwise prevail. succeeds to mere invention and design, In moments of leisure, Even if this be granted, it does not prove that the subject's action the more imperious cravings being stilled, besides the rehearsal is determined for and not by him; it merely states the obvious of failures or successes in the longer and longer that prudence and self-control are gradually acquired. Authon- Past come ger ger tative principles of action, such as self-love and conscience, are flights of imagination into the future. Both furnish material for no more psychologically on a par with appetites and desires than intellectual rumination, and so we have at length (r) concepts thought and reason are on a par with the association of ideas. of general and distant ends, as wealth, power, knowledge, and Relation of Body and Mind. —self-consciousness having arisen—that concept also of the 47 The question of subjective initiative leads us naturally happiness or perfection of self, and (2) maxims or practical to that concerning the connexion of mind and organism, to which generalizations as to the best means to these ends. Instead of we now proceed. In development and efficiency, in actions determined by the vis a tergo of blind See also:

• PASSION (post-classical Lat. passio, formed from pati, passus, to suffer, endure)

The good, it is truly urged, is not to be found in comparative psychology, and especially in mental identified with the pleasant, for the one implies a See also:

• STANDARD
• STANDARD, BATTLE OF THE

The existence and nature of this internal freedom is the sensation of red as produced by retinal stimulation due to light problem. But if such freedom is held to imply a certain See also:

• SOVEREIGNTY

It of these—severed, however, from Spinoza's metaphysics—is still must then be admitted that psychological analysis in this case is perhaps the prevailing theory, and to it the term psychophysical not only actually imperfect, but must always remain so—so long, at anv rate, as all that we discern by reflection is less than all we arc. Parallelism most properly applies. For whereas the parallelism But this admission does not commit us to allowing the possible first mentioned states a real correspondence between psychical existence of a liberum arbitrium indifferentiae, sometimes called processes and neural processes, but leaves open the question of " absolute indeterminism "; for that would seem to differ in no a possible interaction between matter and mind, modern respect from absolute chance or caprice. On the other hand, the rigidly determinist position can only be psychologically justified Psychophysical parallelism is a pure hypothesis concerning the by ignoring the activity of the experiencing subject altogether. relation of psychical facts to physical theories, on the ground of At bottom it treats the analysis of conduct as if it were a dynamical which—as we shall presently see—any interaction between problem pure and simple. But motives are never merely so many matter and mind is expressly denied. entirely by et forces themselves. playing At the upon something of self-consciousness inert, or interacting especi- 2 The right is only relative, of course, when the maxims are hypothetical "—to use Kant's phrase,—but it is absolute when 1 Essay concerning Human Understanding, II. xxi. §§ i6 sqq. the maxim is " categorical." - But in the exposition of this hypothesis these two meanings of parallelism are frequently confused or interchanged. The same term " body " is applied both to an aggregate of matter and to the living organism. Now life must be regarded as either inherent in matter, or as the result simply of a particular material configuration, or as physically inexplicable. But, for the present at all events, it cannot be explained physically; nor are we even within measurable distance of such an explanation: so much is beyond cavil. Yet the hypothesis of psychophysical parallelism confines us to one or other of the former alternatives: at the same time its unwarrantable identification with psychoneural parallelism—where we find a real correspondence between mind and organism—tends to conceal the gravity of such assumptions. The standpoint of physiology, there-fore, must be described not as identical with that of physics, but as intermediate between it and the standpoint of psychology.

If the fact of life could he reduced to physical terms, physiology then, no doubt, would have to fall into line with physics, much as See also:

• CHEMISTRY
• CHEMISTRY (formerly "chymistry"; Gr. xvµela; for derivation see ALCHEMY)

First—and negatively—the connexion, it is said, is not causal: mind does not act on body, nor body on mind: the changes on each side form two independent series, each " going along by itself." In other words, the series themselves are said to exemplify what methodology enjoins on the sciences that investigate them—they mind their own business and never intrude into each other's domains. Nevertheless their interaction is not prima facie contradictory or absurd, and ordinary thought, as we have seen, assumes that it exists. What evidence, then, is there for denying it absolutely? Empirical evidence for such a universal negative there can hardly be; it must be established therefore—if established at all—on a priori grounds. Meanwhile two facts, already noticed, make seriously against it. On the psychical side sensations point to an intrusion of some sort, and are not psychically explicable (cf. § 16), and the like—for the present at all events—must be said of the fact of life on the physical side. Apart from all this, it seems plain that methodological parallelism, so far from justifying the denial of interaction, simply precludes its discussion on the dualistic level to which that parallelism is confined. The gulf implied is indeed not absolute of so much, parallelism in the first sense assures us—but those who are forced to keep to their own side of it obviously are not the See also:

• PEOPLE

This unknowable substance is assumed, then, simply because—the impossibility of causal connexion being taken as established—no other alternative remains. The nega- Live proposition is thus the See also:

• FOUNDATION (Lat. fundatio, from fundare, to found)

So far, then, there is fundamentally only one standpoint—that of the subjective factor to the objective factor, which is immediately perceived in the one and mediately conceived ih the other. The question here raised is thus primarily epistemological, but it is a question, as we have seen, in which psychology is intimately concerned. " Aspect " in the second sense is independent of standpoints. We have here to deal with attributes of the one reality, more or less in Spinoza's sense: this reality itself, as possessed of disparate attributes, is so far dual, and the question of causal connexion between these attributes is not escaped. For to know that a thing has invariably two distinct attributes does not enable us to determine straightway how the changes or " modes " of the one are connected with those of the other. (r) The same attribute might be always the initiating or independent variant, and then would come the question of finding out which of the two it was; or (2) it might be that now one, now the other, took the lead, the grounds of this alternation being then the topic for inquiry; or, finally, (3) it might be, as our theory assumes, that there was but a single series of double changes. The questions here raised are philosophical questions, but again they are questions in which psychology is intimately concerned. Our examination thus yields two results: first, there is fundamentally only a single standpoint—that of experience, now at the perceptual, now at the conceptual, level; and secondly, the distinction of aspects is not merely phenomenal, but pertains " somehow " to reality. The question is how; and this leads us to resume our inquiry into the grounds on which interaction is denied. These grounds neither pertain to psychology nor to physiology. In spite of the outstanding difficulties connected with sensation and life, which these sciences severally raise, such denial is upheld ' In fact, if there were, since it is only as we contemplate finite portions of the circle that the distinction of concave and convex is present, the nearer we approximated to its elements the more this difference of aspect would disappear. If on the physical side we called these elements atoms, there would be an answering element of " mind-stuff " on the psychical; and there would be no more unity and no other diversity in a given man's mind than in his brain regarded as a complex of primordial atoms.

Wild as all this seems, yet views of the kind have been seriously put forward more than once as the logical outcome of psychophysical parallelism. mainly on the strength of an interpretation of the principle known as the conservation of energy—an interpretation of it, however, which many of the ablest physicists disallow. The energy of the physical world, it is maintained, is a strictly in-variable amount; matter, therefore, cannot act on mind, for such action would entail a decrease, nor can mind act on matter, since that would entail an increase, of this energy. In other words, the material world is held to be a " closed system "; and as all the changes within it are mass-motions, there can be none which are not the effect and equivalent of antecedent mass-motions. But now this statement must be established on physical grounds: to assume it otherwise would be openly to beg the very question at issue. For if mind does act on matter, the physical mechanism is subject to changes from without, and so often its motions are not due to antecedent motions; and this —the common-sense view—cannot, of course, be summarily dismissed as impossible or absurd. Now, energy is essentially a metrical notion, and its conservation in finite and isolated material systems has been ascertained by careful quantitative experiments. To say that the energy of the material universe is constant is only a way of expressing the generalization of this result—is tantamount, in other words, to saying that it holds of all finite isolated systems. The whole universe may perhaps be called isolated, but we do not know that it is finite. We cannot, therefore, apply metrical concepts to it; and consequently we cannot interpret the conservation of energy as meaning that the physical part of it is a closed system. But if not a closed system, then the energy of a given group of bodies may be increased or decreased without interaction between that group and other bodies—may be increased or decreased by psychophysical interaction, that is to say. And, moreover, such psychophysical interaction would not invalidate the conservation of energy, rightly understood; for that merely means that the energy of a group of bodies can be altered only from without, and this might happen whenever such interaction occurred.' We seem, therefore, justified for the present in rejecting psychophysical parallelism as one of the three possible modes of relating mind and matter regarded as attributes of the real.

Not only are there psychological as well as biological objections which it has not yet overcome, but there are so far no physical grounds in its favour. At this point we may again for a moment turn aside to consider a modified form of the doctrine—the so-called Conscious Auto-"Conscious See also:

• MASON, FRANCIS (1799—1874)
• MASON, GEORGE (1725—1792)
• MASON, GEORGE HEMMING (1818–1872)
• MASON, JAMES MURRAY (1798-1871)
• MASON, JOHN (1586-1635)
• MASON, JOHN YOUNG (1799-1859)
• MASON, LOWELL (1792—1872)
• MASON, SIR JOHN (1503–1566)
• MASON, SIR JOSIAH (1795-1881)
• MASON, WILLIAM (1725—1797)

But to detect illusion requires experience of reality—we only know the sham by knowing the genuine first; and even passive states could not be experienced as such save by contrast with states that are active. To the physical side, then, we naturally turn for this knowledge which we are told is not to be found on the psychical; and we do so the more readily as, according to the present theory, the physical holds the primary place. But we turn in vain; for matter is inert, and its energy only " works " by taking the line of least resistance, like See also:

• WATER

And lastly, their abstract, merely quantitative, character shows that it is the concepts of physics, and not the facts of immediate experience, that are symbolic, and so to say epithetic. The attempt—either empirically or speculatively—to outflank mind by way of matter is an absurdity on a par with getting into a See also:

• BASKET

would be found intelligible as well. Psychophysical parallelism, then, we conclude, is not a philosophically tenable position; and —pending the metaphysical discussion as to the ultimate nature of interaction generally—we have to rest content with the second of the three possible modes of connexion above defined, as occasionalism formulates it. According to this, the two series, the psychical and the physical, are not independent and " closed " against each other; but in certain circumstances—e.g. in perception—physical changes are the occasion of psychical, and in certain circumstances—e.g. in purposive movements—psychical changes are the occasion of physical: the one change not being explicable from its psychical antecedents, nor the other from its physical. Into the metaphysical discussion we cannot, of course, enter here. It must suffice to say that it will not be conducted on the lines of our present inquiry: it will not start from a dualism of matter and mind, either regarded as substances or as phenomena. Its problem will rather be the interaction of subject and object—a duality in the unity of experience, which by no means coincides with the dualism of matter and mind, neurosis and psychosis, and the like.up of such reflexes, supposed to be devoid of all psychical concomitants; but consciousness—so far from having disappeared —first comes upon the scene at the opportune moment when the increasing complexity of the mechanism calls for its guidance. Psychologically this hypothesis is less defensible than the last, and it has already been dealt with at some length (cf. § q). It not only assumes, as that does, far more uniformity in the interaction of organism and environment than the facts warrant, but in regarding life as prior to mind, and as the means of its evolution, it burdens science with two insoluble problems instead of one. For even if it were possible chemically to build up protoplasm, we should still be as far from organisms as a heap of bricks are from putting themselves together as a house. (iii.) The last view we have to notice is essentially an extension of the preceding, and is chiefly interesting as a reductio ad absurdum of that. The physics of colloidal substances—at present wanting, but confidently expected " in the near future " by certain biologists—is the key which is to unlock the mysteries of protoplasm.

Certain organisms, regarded as varieties of such a substance, react positively to a given physical property of the environment, and others negatively: thus a See also:

• MOTH

188 sqq.—an interesting book, full of psychological crudities. ' But, of course, a thoroughgoing See also:

• SPIRITUALISM