RELATING TO 547 See also:

• KINGDOM

Disputes between skippers or owners and seamen are to be determined at See also:

• REQUEST, LETTERS OF

The law relating to seamen in the navy will be found in the articles for the government of the navy (Revised Statutes, s. 1624). Legislation in the interests of merchant seamen See also:

• DATES

But, with these exceptions, the whole of British Part II. (Masters and Seamen) applies, unless the ships not See also:

• CONTRACT
• CONTRACT (Lat. contract us, from contrahere, to draw together, to bind)

As in England, consuls are required to provide for the passage See also:

• HOME
• HOME, DANIEL DUNGLAS (1833-1886)
• HOME, EARLS OF

It is one of those See also:

• COMPOUND
• COMPOUND (from Lat. componere, to combine or put together)

In this sense there are many old uses of the phrase. In the last two extracts it means all the elements of the naval strength of the state referred to; and this is the meaning that is now generally, and is likely to be exclusively, attached to the term owing to the brilliant way in which it has been elucidated by See also:

• CAPTAIN (derived from Lat. ca put, head, through the Low Lat. capitanus)

It is interesting as showing that German no more abhors Teuto-Latin or Teuto-Romance compounds than See also:

• ENGLISH

Before Mahan no historian—not Apprectaeven one of those who specially devoted themselves to See also:

• LION
• LION (Lat, leo, leonis; Gr. Mew)

This is perhaps as exact a See also:

• DEFINITION (Lat. definitio, from de-finire, to set limits to, describe)

Until this is perceived there is much history. which cannot be understood, and yet it is essential to the welfare of Great Britain as a maritime power that she should understand it thoroughly. Her failure to understand it has more than once brought her, if not to the See also:

• VERGE (Lat. virga, a rod)

153). The enterprise of their navigators had built up for the Phoenician cities and their great off-shoot Carthage, a sea-power which enabled them to gain the See also:

• PRACTICAL

Until Persia had See also:

• EXPANDED

Though no one has ever surpassed Themistocles in the See also:

• FACULTY (through the French, from the Lat. facultas, ability to do anything, from facilis, easy, facere, to do; another form of the word in Lat. facilitas, facility, ease, keeps the original meaning)

The confidence of the Athenians in their sea-power had a great See also:

• DEAL

It was held by contemporaries, and has been held in our own day, that the Athenian defeat at Syracuse was due to the omission of the government at home to keep the force in Sicily properly supplied and reinforced. This explanation of failure is given in all ages, and should always be suspected. The See also:

• FRIENDS, SOCIETY
• FRIENDS, SOCIETY OF

Nevertheless her sea-power had indeed been ruined at Syracuse. Now she could wage war only " with impaired resources and on ~. purely defensive See also:

• SYSTEM

Mommsen holds that, in the 4th and 5th centuries after the See also:

• FOUNDATION (Lat. fundatio, from fundare, to found)

No one is surprised on finding that the land-forces of Carthage were composed largely of See also:

• ALIEN (Lat. alienus)

Unless this is perceived, it is impossible to understand the See also:

• STORY, JOHN (c. 1510-1571)
• STORY, JOSEPH (1779-1845)
• STORY, ROBERT HERBERT (1835-1907)
• STORY, WILLIAM WETMORE (1819—1895)

,The victory of See also:

• CATULUS

Though modern historians, even those belonging to a maritime country, may have failed to perceive it, the Carthaginians knew well enough that the Romans were too strong for them on the sea. Though other forces co-operated to bring about the defeat of Carthage in the second Punic War, the Roman navy, as Mahan demonstrates, was the most important. As a navy, he tells us in words like those already quoted, " acts on an element See also:

• STRANGE, SIR ROBERT (1721-1792)

40). Far from trying to obstruct the advance of the Romans the Rhodian fleet helped it. Hannibal, in his See also:

• EXILE (Lat. exsilium or exilium, from exsul or exul, which is derived from ex, out of, and the root sal, to go, seen in salire, to leap, consul, &c.; the connexion with solum, soil, country is now generally considered wrong)

" With the See also:

• CON

Neglect of sea-power by those who can be reached by sea brings its own punishment. Whether neglected or not, if it is an artificial creation it is nearly sure to disappoint those who wield it when it encounters a rival power LIT:" of natural growth. How was it possible for the See also:

• CRUSADES

Not only were the Crusaders helped by the fleets of the maritime republics of Italy, they also received reinforcements by sea from western Europe and England, on the " arrival of Malik Ankiltar [See also:

• RICHARD
• RICHARD (d. 1184)
• RICHARD, FRANCOIS MARIE BENJAMIN (18,9-1908)
• RICHARD, HENRY (1812-1888)
• RICHARD, ST

Sea-power seemed, like See also:

• SATURN
• SATURN [SATURNUS]

Venice was soon confronted on the sea by a new rival. The Turkish naval historian, Haji Khalifeh (Maritime wars of the Turks, See also:

• MITCHELL
• MITCHELL, DONALD GRANT (1822—1908)
• MITCHELL, MARIA (1818—1889)
• MITCHELL, SILAS WEIR (1830-)
• MITCHELL, SIR THOMAS LIVINGSTONE (1792-1855)

Even in the 15th century Mahommed and pro. II. had made an attack on Southern Italy; but his grass of sea-power was not equal to the undertaking. Suley- the Turk& man the Magnificent directed the See also:

• OTTOMAN

Though enfeebled and diminishing, the Turkish navy was still able to act with some effect in the 17th century. Nevertheless, the sea-power of the Turks ceased to See also:

• COUNT (Lat. comes, gen. comitis, Fr. comte, Ital. conte, Span. conde)

The more Spanish dominion was extended in Italy the more were the naval resources at the command of Spain augmented. Genoa became " Spain's water-See also:

• GATE

It is memorable, not only because of the harm it did to Spain, but also because it revealed the rise of another claimant to maritime pre-See also:

• EMINENCE (Lat. eminentia)

The battle of Sluys in 1340 rendered invasion of England as impracticable as did that of La Hogue in 1692, that of Quiheron See also:

• BAY

The fleet on which Prince Louis and the rebellious barons had counted was destroyed; and with. it their enterprise. " No more admirably planned, no more fruitful battle has been fought by Englishmen on water_ " (Hannay, p. 7). As introductory to a long See also:

• SERIES (a Latin word from serere, to join)

What was done by one people was soon known to others. It is a See also:

• MISTAKE (i.e. take amiss)

They were really unofficial speculations in which, if the government took part at all, it was for the See also:

• SAKE

It is doubtful if she has learned it even yet. English seamen in all ages seem to have mastered it fully; for they have always demanded—at any rate for upwards of three centuries—that expeditions against foreign territory oversea should be accompanied by a proper number of land- troops. On the other hand, the necessity of organizing the army of a maritime insular state and of training it with the object of rendering effective aid in operations of the See also:

• KIND (O. E. ge-cynde, from the same root as is seen in " kin," supra)

Long voyages and cruises of several ships in navies. See also:

• COMPANY

The minds of men in western Europe, moreover, were set upon obtaining for their country territories in the New World, the amenities of which were now known. From the reign of See also:

• JAMES
• JAMES (Gr. 'IlrKw,l3or, the Heb. Ya`akob or Jacob)
• JAMES (JAMES FRANCIS EDWARD STUART) (1688-1766)
• JAMES, 2ND EARL OF DOUGLAS AND MAR(c. 1358–1388)
• JAMES, DAVID (1839-1893)
• JAMES, EPISTLE OF
• JAMES, GEORGE PAYNE RAINSFOP
• JAMES, HENRY (1843— )
• JAMES, JOHN ANGELL (1785-1859)
• JAMES, THOMAS (c. 1573–1629)
• JAMES, WILLIAM (1842–1910)
• JAMES, WILLIAM (d. 1827)

The case of Athens was different, because the Athenian power Sea-power had not so much been unconsciously developed out Untch. of a great maritime trade, as based on a military marine deliberately and persistently fostered during many years. Thirlwall believes that it was See also:

• SOLON (7th and 6th century n.c.)

It was quite in accordance with the spirit of the age that the Dutch should try to prevent, by force, this want from being satisfied. Any-thing like See also:

• FREE

Mahan's great survey of sea-power opens in i66o, midway between the first and second Dutch Wars. " The sailing-ship era, with its distinctive features, " he tells us, " had fairly begun. " The art of war by sea, in its more important details, had been settled by the first war. From the beginning of the second the general features of ship See also:

• DESIGN (Fr. desiin, drawing; Lat. designare, to mark out)

That was the permanent conquest of trans-oceanic territory. Until the 17th century had well begun, naval, or combined naval and military, operations against the distant possessions of an enemy had been practically restricted to raiding or plundering attacks on commercial centres. The Portuguese territory in See also:

• SOUTH
• SOUTH, ROBERT (1634–1716)

Charles II. and his See also:

• BROTHER

191). In much later times this method has had many respectable defenders. Mahan's works are, in a sense, a formal warning to his fellow-citizens not to adopt it. In France, within the last years of the 19th century, it found, and appears still to find, adherents enough to form a school. The reappearance of belief in demonstrated impossibilities is a recognized incident in human history; but it is usually confined to the emotional or the vulgar. It is serious and filled with menaces of disaster when it is held by men thought See also:

• FIT

The war, which was ended by the Peace of See also:

• RYSWICK, TREATY OF

The debate, still meriting The "Fleet the epithet angry, has been renewed within the last in being „ few years. The matter has to be noticed here, because it involves the consideration of a question of naval See also:

• STRATEGY

This might be supposed enough to settle the question. It has not been allowed, however, to remain one of purely naval strategy. It was made at the time a matter of party politics. This is why it is so necessary that in a notice of sea-power it should be discussed. Both as a strategist and as a tactician Torrington was immeasurably ahead of his contemporaries. The only English admirals who can be placed above him are See also:

• HAWKE
• HAWKE, EDWARD HAWKE, BARON (1705-1781)

The explanation of Torrington's conduct is this: He had a fleet so much weaker than Tourville's that he could not fight a general action with the latter without a practical certainty of a crushing defeat. Such a result would have laid the kingdom open: a defeat of the allied fleet, says Mahan, " if sufficiently severe, might involve the fall of William's throne in England." Given certain movements of the French fleet, Torrington might have manoeuvred to slip past it to the westward and join his force with that under Killigrew, which wduld make him strong enough to See also:

• HAZARD (0. Fr. hazard, from Span. czar, unlucky throw at dice, misfortune, from Arab. al, and zar, dice)

Still, the principle of the " fleet in being " lies at the bottom of all See also:

• SOUND
• SOUND, THE (Danish Oresund)

The wisdom of the plan is undoubted. The hostile navy could be more easily watched and more easily followed if it put to sea. To carry out this plan a navy stronger in number of ships or in general efficiency than that of the enemy was necessary. With the exception of that of American Independence, which will, therefore, require special notice, England's subsequent great wars were conducted in accordance with the. rule. In the early part of the 18th century there was a remarkable manifestation of sea-power in the Baltic. See also:

• PETER
• PETER (Lat. Petrus from Gr. irfpos, a rock, Ital. Pietro, Piero, Pier, Fr. Pierre, Span. Pedro, Ger. Peter, Russ. Petr)
• PETER (PEDRO)
• PETER, EPISTLES OF
• PETER, ST

In this he was assisted by the exhaustion of See also:

• SWEDEN
• SWEDEN [Sverige]
• SWEDEN, NORWAY AND

Mahan's comment is striking: " The magnificence of sea-power and its value had perhaps been more clearly shown by the uncontrolled sway and consequent exaltation of one belligerent; but the lesson thus given, if more striking, is less vividly interesting than the spectacle of that sea-power meeting a foe worthy of its See also:

• STEEL, FLORA ANNIE (1847– )

Still, it is difficult to repress an emotion of astonishment on finding that a British government intentionally permitted de See also:

• GRASSE
• GRASSE, FRANCOIS JOSEPH PAUL, MARQUIS DE GRASSETILLY, COMTE DE (1722-1788)

The mighty conflict which raged between Great Britain on one side and France and her allies on the other, with little inter-See also:

• MISSION

later that the French nd British fleets came into serious conflict. The first great battl :, " The Glorious First of See also:

• JUNE

Almost the same may be said of See also:

• HOOD,
• HOOD, JOHN BELL (1831–1879)
• HOOD, SAMUEL HOOD, VISCOUNT (1724–1816)
• HOOD, SIR SAMUEL (1762-1814)
• HOOD, THOMAS (1799-1845)
• HOOD, TOM (1835–1874)

Even in 1776 the Americans had a great maritime commerce, which, as Mahan says, " had come to be the wonder of the statesmen of the mother country." . In the six- and-thirty years which had elapsed since then this commerce had further increased. There was no finer nursery of seamen than the then states of the American Union. Roosevelt says that " there was no better seaman in the world " than the American, who " had been bred in his work from See also:

• INFANCY

To take the See also:

• FRIGATE

Vast outlying territories had been acquired or were more firmly held, and the communications of all the oversea dominions of the British crown were secured against all possibility of serious menace for many years to come. Her sea-power was so ubiquitous and all-pervading that, like the See also:

• ATMOSPHERE (Gr. fir µ6r, vapour; orkaipa, a sphere)

In forms differing in appearance, but identical in essentials, the efficacy of sea-power was proved again in the American Later Civil War. If ever there were hostilities in which, maairesta- to the unobservant or short-sighted, naval operations (Ions or might at first seem destined to count for little they sea-power. were these. The sequel, however, made it clear that they constituted one of the leading factors of the success of the victorious side. The belligerents, the Northern or Federal states and the Southern or Confederate states, had a common land frontier of great length. The capital of each See also:

• SECTION
• SECTION (Lat. sectio, cutting, secare, to cut)

It established effective blockades of the Confederate ports, and severed their communications with the outside world. Indispensable articles of equipment could not be obtained, and the armies, consequently, became less and less able to cope with their abundantly furnished antagonists. By dominating the See also:

• RIVERS
• RIVERS, ANTHONY WOODVILLE, or WYDEVILLE, 2ND EARL (c. 1442—1483)
• RIVERS, EARL
• RIVERS, RICHARD SAVAGE, 4TH EARL (c. 1660—1712)

This was more conspicuous in a later series of hostilities. The civil war in See also:

• CHILE, or CHILI (derived, it is said, from the Quichua chin , cold, or tchili, snow)

See also:

• KOREA
• KOREA, or COREA (CH'AO HSIEN, DAI HAN)

That Spain, Span/s6- even without a serious insurrection on her hands, American was unequal to the task of meeting so powerful an 'a antagonist as the United States must have been evident even to Spaniards. However that may be, an early collapse of the Spanish defence was not anticipated, and however one-sided the war may have been seen to be, it furnished examples illustrating rules as old as naval warfare. Mahan says of it that, " while possessing, as every war does, characteristics of its own differentiating it from others, nevertheless in its broad analogies it falls into line with its predecessors, evidencing that unity of teaching which pervades the art from its beginnings unto this day " (Lessons of the War with Spain, p. 16). The Spaniards were defeated by the superiority of the American sea-power. " A million of the best soldiers," says Mahan, " would have been powerless in face of hostile control of the sea." That control was obtained and kept by the United States navy, thus permitting the unobstructed despatch of troops—and their subsequent reinforcement and supply—to Spanish territory, which was finally conquered, not by the navy, but by the army on shore. That it was the navy which made this final conquest possible happened, in this case, to be made specially evident by the action of the United States government, which stopped a military expedition on the point of starting for See also:

• CUBA (the aboriginal name)

Its outward and visible sign is a navy, strong in the discipline, skill and courage of a numerous personnel habituated to the sea, in the number and quality of its ships, in the excellence of its materiel, and in the efficiency, scale, security and See also:

• GEOGRAPHICAL

See also the bibliography of the article NAVY. (C. A. G.