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See also:TRAFALGAR, See also:BATTLE OF . The See also:British victory over the See also:French off Cape Trafalgar, fought on the 21st of See also:October 18o5, was a sequel of the breakdown of See also:Napoleon's See also:great See also:scheme for the invasion of the British Isles (See See also:NAPOLEONIc See also:CAMPAIGNS: See also:Naval). When See also:Villeneuve gave up in despair the See also:attempt to enter the Channel, he steered for See also:Cadiz, and anchored in that See also:port on the loth of See also:August 1805. He found three British See also:ships of the See also:line, under the command of See also:Vice-See also:Admiral See also:Cuthbert See also:Collingwood, on the See also:watch. Collingwood, resolved that theallies should not drive him through the Straits of See also:Gibraltar without being compelled to follow, retired slowly, and at a See also:short distance ahead of the ships sent to pursue him. They, not being willing to be See also:drawn into the Mediterranean, gave up the pursuit. The British officer then resumed his watch off Cadiz. On the 22nd of August he was joined by See also:Rear-Admiral See also:Sir See also:Richard Bickerton with four ships of the line, and on the 3oth by Vice-Admiral Sir See also:Robert See also:Calder with 18. The allied See also:fleet, consisting of 29 See also:sail of the line which had come with Villeneuve, and five already at Cadiz, 34 in all, remained quiescent. The use to be made of it, or the See also:measures to be taken for its destruct See also:ion, were matters of urgent See also:consideration to Napoleon and to the British See also:government. On the 14th of See also:September Napoleon gave orders that the French and See also:Spanish ships at Cadiz should put to See also:sea at the first favourable opportunity, join seven Spanish ships of the line then at See also:Cartagena, go to See also:Naples, and See also:land the soldiers they carried to reinforce his troops then in that See also:kingdom, and should fight a decisive See also:action if they met a British fleet of inferior See also:numbers. Two Spanish ships of the line were to be counted as equal to one French. Their final destination was to be See also:Toulon. On the 15th he decided that Villeneuve, whose " excessive pusillanimity " rendered him incapable of vigorous action, must be replaced by Admiral Rosily. Rosily received his orders on the 17th and See also:left for Cadiz. The British government, determined to confine the See also:allies to Cadiz, or See also:beat them if they came out, sent See also:Nelson to take command and prepared to despatch reinforcements. Nelson left See also:Portsmouth on the 15th of September, and reached Cadiz on the 28th, bringing three ships of the line with him. He gave orders that no salute should be fired for him lest the enemy should learn that reinforcements had arrived. The bulk of the fleet—23 sail—was kept well out at sea, and five ships of the line under Rear-Admiral See also: He learnt also that Rosily was coming, but not that he himself was to be superseded. On the 5th of October he held a See also:council of See also:war of French and Spanish See also:officers. They decided that the See also:condition of their ships did not justify them in hoping for victory over the British fleet, but Napoleon's orders were See also:peremptory, and they agreed that a sortie must be made. Easterly winds were needed to facilitate the sailing of a large and awkward fleet from Cadiz, and till the 14th the See also:wind was hard from the See also:west. Even when it See also:fell the allies lingered. On the 18th of October Villeneuve heard that Rosily had reached See also:Madrid, and of his own supersession. Stung by the prospect of being disgraced before the fleet, he resolved to go to sea before his successor could reach Cadiz. The allies, aided by a See also:light land See also:breeze which blew from the See also:east, though the wind at sea was See also:westerly, began to leave Cadiz See also:Bay on the 19th. Their movements were at once known to the British look-out frigates, and were transmitted by See also:signal to Nelson, who was cruising some See also:thirty See also:miles to the west. During the See also:period of See also:blockade he had instructed his captains as to how he meant to fight the approaching battle. The memorandum in which his instructions were embodied was dated the 9th of October. It was drawn up in view of the circumstances which' did not arise—that the enemy would come to sea with a strong easterly wind which would give him the See also:weather See also:gage; that he might be reinforced to a strength of over 50 ships of the line from See also:Brest, See also:Rochefort and Cartagena; that the British fleet might be raised by reinforcements to 40 ships. But the governing principles of the memorandum were See also:independent of such details. They were that the order of sailing in which the fleet was when the enemy was seen was to be the order of battle; that no See also:time was to be wasted in forming a precise line; that the attack was to be made in two bodies, of which one, to be led by the second in command, Collingwood, was to be thrown on the rear of the enemy, while the other, led by Nelson himself, was to take care that the centre and See also:van should not come to the assistance of the ships cut off. Nelson was careful to point out that " Something must be left to See also:chance. Nothing is sure in a sea fight beyond all others "; and he left his captains See also:free from .all hampering rules by telling them that " No See also:captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of the enemy." In short the See also:execution was to be as circumstances should dictate, subject to the guiding See also:rule that the enemy's rear was to be cut off and a concentration of See also:superior force on an inferior sought for. The uncertainties of naval warfare in the days of sailing ships were fully shown at Trafalgar. The allies, having left Cadiz on the 2oth of October, were 33 sail of the line strong,. one of the fleet having been left behind. They sailed in five squadrons. Three were nearer the land than the other two. The leading squadron of the three was commanded by the Spanish admiral, See also:Alava; Villeneuve followed; and the French admiral, Dumanoir, commanded the rear. The other two squadrons of six ships of the line each, commanded by the Spanish admiral, Graving, and the French admiral, Magon, were parallel with, and outside of the three. All headed for the Straits of Gibraltar in the westerly breezes, which had become very light. The British fleet of 27 sail in two divisions also headed for the Mediterranean. During the See also:night of the 2oth–2tst of October several movements were made to gain position, and there was an inevitable tendency to straggle among vessels which did not all sail equally well and were moving in light winds. On the See also:early See also:morning of the 2tst the allies were some twelve miles off Cape Trafalgar. The British fleet was some ten or twelve miles out at sea to the west of them. Seeing that a battle would now be forced on him, Villeneuve ordered his whole fleet to turn so as to bring their heads on Cadiz. He was painfully aware that the incomparably more See also:expert British fleet would not be content to attack him in the old-fashioned way, coming down in a parallel line and engaging from van to rear. He knew that they would endeavour to concentrate on a See also:part of his line. But Villeneuve was too conscious of the inexperience of his officers and men to think it possible to make See also:counter movements with them. It has been said that the French and Spanish ships which had taken part in the See also:late cruise to the West Indies and back must be considered as trained in the same sense as the British. But apart from the fact that these vessels formed little more than a See also:half of the allied fleet, the comparison is childish. It could only have occurred to writers who, wishing to exalt the See also:glory of Trafalgar, forget that the superior quality of the British fleet, the See also:fruit of foresight, of See also:good sense, and the strenuous See also:work of a See also:people, was itself the best of all claims to See also:honour. A hasty cruise across the See also:Atlantic and back was no See also:equivalent for years of training. The blockades maintained by the British fleet had made it difficult for the allies to obtain stores and their ships were See also:ill fitted. Their crews contained a See also:minute proportion of men bred to the sea, and as they had to be taught the elements of See also:seamanship on the few occasions when they got to sea, their gunnery was neglected. There was valour in the allied fleet, but there was neither skill nor confidence. Moreover the very Ight wind then blowing rendered manoeuvring all but impossible for the most expert crews. Villeneuve could do nothing more than order his fleet to turn so as to bring the ships' heads on Cadiz, to See also:form the line, and await the enemy's attack. He, however, left his captains free to See also:act for the best when the battle had begun, by telling them that whoever was not under See also:fire was not at his See also:post. The See also:movement of See also:conversion ordered at 6 o'See also:clock a.m. was not executed till about to o'clock, and it was ill done. The three squadrons nearest the See also:shore turned first, the rear beginning, to leave See also:room for the others. Thus Dumanoir now led the van and Alava followed Villeneuve. The two squadrons of See also:Gravina and Magon, which had been outside, fell in behind Alava. No accurate line was formed. The allies drifted rather than sailed into a See also:curve of some five miles See also:long, stretching from See also:north to See also:south, See also:concave on the west See also:side, and more pronounced at the See also:southern than at the See also:northern end. • Their ships did not follow one another, but were in many cases two, and in some cases three, abreast in See also:groups. To some extent this was to their See also:advantage, as the effective range of fire of the See also:artillery of the See also:day was barely t2oo yds., and as the See also:power of concentrating the fire of guns out of ports was limited, the danger to an assailant bearing down was not great during his approach. The peril was that he would be engaged with two or three enemies when he had broken into the line, and this See also:risk was increased by the accidental See also:group formation of the allies. The confidence and promptitude of the British fleet presented a marked contrast to the passivity of the allies. When in the early morning the enemy was seen to the east, Nelson's fleet was in two divisions, somewhat scattered—his own of 12 sail of the line being to the westward and windward in the light breeze from W.N.W.; Collingwood's of 15 sail being to leeward and east. At 6.4o the signal wag made to form the order of sailing and prepare for battle. The enemy's movement of conversion was already seen, and it was obvious that unless he were rapidly stopped he might reach Cadiz Bay in safety. A few minutes before 7 o'clock the signal to See also:bear up, No. 76, was made by Nelson. Much discussion has arisen as to whether this was an order to bear up together, or in See also:succession; the first if exactly executed would have caused the British ships to approach the enemy in a line abreast (side by side) since all would have turned at once; the second would have caused them to approach in a line ahead (one after the other) since they would have turned successively. The discussion is in reality futile, because the want of wind rendered it impossible to arrange exact formations, because it had been decided that no time should be wasted in dressing the line, and because Nelson's flagship, the " Victory " (too), and Collingwood's flagship, the " Royal See also:Sovereign " (too), were See also:quick-sailing vessels, and both admirals moved at the best attainable See also:speed. The slow ships could not keep up with them. The two squadrons went down heading to north of east, Collingwood to the right and leeward, Nelson to the north and windward, in two bodies without exact formation, according to the speed of the ships. Collingwood headed for the centre, and the pronounced curve at the south end of the allied line caused the ships of his See also:division to come into action in a close approach to a parallel with the enemy. The " Royal Sovereign " was the first British ship to break into the enemy's line, which she did about midday and astern of Alava's flagship the " See also:Santa See also:Ana." She was alone for a few minutes, but the ships of Collingwood's division, as they sailed into the curve, were mostly able, by steering .to the right, to get into action very soon after their admiral. Nelson's division was headed by himself to cut through the enemy between his van and centre, and to See also:bar his road to Cadiz. It was certainly in a nearer approach to a line ahead than Collingwood's. After making a demonstration at the allied van, he See also:broke into their line astern of the " Bucentaure " (too), the flagship of Villeneuve. The exact movements of all the ships engaged could only be given in a very detailed See also:account of the battle, but the See also:main lines of the action are already indicated. To the allies it appeared that the British fleet assailed them in two lines See also:con-verging on their centre, and that it then carried out a concentration on this part of their line. Though this is too See also:simple—or too bald—a statement of the See also:case, it does not go far from the truth. The allied formation was broken in two, and though the rear part was kept well in See also:play by Collingwood's division, the severest blows fell on the central sections. The battle, which began at midday, was terminated about five. Eighteen of the allies were taken. Their van, after long remaining quiescent, made a futile demonstration, and then sailed away. The four van ships which escaped with Admiral Dumanoir were met and captured off Cape Ortegal on the 4th of See also:November by a British squadron of five ships under Sir Richard See also:Strachan. The stormy weather which followed the battle gave the enemy an opportunity to retake some of the prizes, and others were lost. Four only were carried into Gibraltar by the British fleet—three French and one Spanish. Only eleven of the allied fleet succeeded in finding safety in Cadiz. The fragment of the French squadron remained there under Admiral Rosily till he was forced to surrender to the Spaniards in 18o8 on the breaking out of the See also:Peninsular War. The loss of See also:life of the allies cannot be stated with precision. In the British fleet the reported loss in killed and wounded was 1690, of whom 1452 belonged to 14 out of the 27 ships of the line See also:present—the inequality of loss being mainly due to the fact that it was as a rule these vessels which came earliest into action. For the circumstances of Nelson's See also:death see the See also:article NELSON. Additional information and CommentsThere are no comments yet for this article.
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