OBJECTS . See also:

• SAVE, or SAVA (Ger. Sau; Hungarian Szdva; Lat. Savus)

to. We come now to the exposition of the objects of attention or consciousness, i.e. to what we may See also:

• CALL (from Anglo-Saxon ceallian, a common Teutonic word, cf. Dutch kallen, to talk or chatter)

The descendant has no consciousness of his ancestor's failures when performing by " an untaught ability " what they slowly and perhaps painfully acquired. But, if we are to See also:

• ATTEMPT (Lat. adtemptare, attentare, to try)

" If we are to resort to See also:

• PHYSICAL

But " change of consciousness" is too loose an expression to take the See also:

• PLACE (through Fr. from Lat. platea, street; Gr. IrAar6s, wide)

But some differentiations being given, then it may be safely said that, in accordance with what we have called the principle of subjective selection (see § 6), attention would be voluntarily concentrated upon certain of these and upon the voluntary movements specially connected with them. To such subjectively initiated modifications of the presentation-continuum, moreover, we may reasonably suppose "restriction" to be in large measure due. But increased restriction would render further differentiation of the given whole of presentation possible, and so the two processes might supplement each other. These processes have now proceeded so far that at the level of human consciousness we find it hard to form any tolerably clear conception of a See also:

• FIELD (a word common to many West German languages, cf. Ger. Feld, Dutch veld, possibly cognate with O.E. f olde, the earth, and ultimately with root of the Gr. irAaror, broad)
• FIELD, CYRUS WEST (1819-1892)
• FIELD, DAVID DUDLEY (18o5-1894)
• FIELD, EUGENE (1850-1895)
• FIELD, FREDERICK (18o1—1885)
• FIELD, HENRY MARTYN (1822-1907)
• FIELD, JOHN (1782—1837)
• FIELD, MARSHALL (183 1906)
• FIELD, NATHAN (1587—1633)
• FIELD, STEPHEN JOHNSON (1816-1899)
• FIELD, WILLIAM VENTRIS FIELD, BARON (1813-1907)

" 12. In the preceding paragraphs we have had occasion to distinguish between the presentation-continuum or whole field of consciousness, as we may for the present call it, Retentive. and those several differentiations within this field ness. which are ordinarily spoken of as presentations, and to which—now that their true character as parts is clear— then, to conceive our psychological individual in the earliest stages of development we must not picture him as experiencing a See also:

• SUCCESSION (Lat. successio, from succedere, to follow after)

What nascent presentations of sight are thus involved it would be hard to say; and the problem of heredity is one that we have for the present See also:

• LEFT

But what is it that persists? On our theory we must answer, the continuum as differentiated, not the particular differentiation as an isolated unit. If psychologists have erred in regarding the presentations of one moment as merely a plurality of units, they have erred in like manner concerning the so-called residua of such presentations. As we see a certain colour or a certain object again and again, we do not go on accumulating images or representations of it, which are somewhere crowded together like shades on the See also:

• BANKS, GEORGE LINNAEUS (1821-1881)
• BANKS, NATHANIEL PRENTISS (1816–1894)
• BANKS, SIR JOSEPH
• BANKS, THOMAS (1735-1805)

There is a limit, of course, to such a See also:

• PROCEDURE (Fr. procedure, from Lat. procedere, to go for-ward)

(1882), pp. 369 fn. 374; See also:

• JAMES
• JAMES (Gr. 'IlrKw,l3or, the Heb. Ya`akob or Jacob)
• JAMES (JAMES FRANCIS EDWARD STUART) (1688-1766)
• JAMES, 2ND EARL OF DOUGLAS AND MAR(c. 1358–1388)
• JAMES, DAVID (1839-1893)
• JAMES, EPISTLE OF
• JAMES, GEORGE PAYNE RAINSFOP
• JAMES, HENRY (1843— )
• JAMES, JOHN ANGELL (1785-1859)
• JAMES, THOMAS (c. 1573–1629)
• JAMES, WILLIAM (1842–1910)
• JAMES, WILLIAM (d. 1827)

When it is said that " a See also:

• CONSTANT, BENJAMIN (1845-1902)

. We are more conscious of heat when passing to a higher temperature, and of cold when passing to a lower. The See also:

• STATE
• STATE, GREAT OFFICERS OF

If they are not the same thing, then the succession of shocks or surprises cannot wholly determine the impressions which successively determine them. But we have still to consider whether the impressions them-selves are nothing but differences or contrasts. " We do not know any one thing of itself but only the difference between it and another thing," said Bain. But it is See also:

• PLAIN (O. Fr. plain, from Lat. plenum)

Thus, if we cannot have a presentation X but only the presentation of the difference between Y and Z, it would seem that in like manner we cannot have the presentation of Y or Z, nor therefore of their difference X, till we have had the presentation of A and B say, which differ by Y, and of C and D, which we may suppose differ by Z. The lurking See also:

• ERROR (Lat. error, from errare, to wander, to err)

Change, however, implies continuity, and there is continuity here in the movement of attention and the affective state consequent on that, but not directly in the qualities themselves. c. If red follows green we may be aware of a greater difference than we could if red followed orange; and we should ordinarily call a ro lb load heavy after one of s lb and light after one of 20 lb. Facts like these it is which make the differential theory of presentations plausible. On the strength of such facts Wundt has formulated a law of relativity, See also:

• FREE

In what is called See also:

• MEYER, CHRISTIAN ERICH HERMANN VON (18or-1869)
• MEYER, HEINRICH AUGUST WILHELM (1800-1873)
• MEYER, JULIUS LOTHAR (183o-1895)
• MEYER, KONRAD FERDINAND (1825-1898)
• MEYER, VICTOR (1848-1897)
• MEYER, [MARIE] PAUL HYACINTHE (184o- )

At a conversazione we may listen to some one See also:

• SPEAKER

Now, such anticipated presentations as soon as they are clearly discernible have already a certain finite intensity, and so they are said to have passed over " the See also:

• THRESHOLD

We listen, say, to a certain sound as it steadily diminishes; at length we cease to hear it. Again, we listen for this same sound as it steadily increases and presently just barely hear it. In general it is found that its intensity in the former case is less than it is in the latter, and there is also in both cases a certain margin of doubt between clear presence and clear See also:

• ABSENCE (Lat. absentia)

Et c'est faute de See also:

• CETTE

Nevertheless, it may be urged, it is surely incredible that all the incidents of a long lifetime and all the items of knowledge of a well-stored mind that may possibly recur—" the infinitely greater part of our spiritual treasures," as Hamilton says—are severally retained and continuously presented in the form and order in which they were originally experienced or acquired. This, however, is not implied. Images in contrast to impressions have always a certain generality. The same image may figure in very various connexions, as may the same letter, for example, in many words, the same word in many sentences. We cannot measure the literature of a language by its vocabulary, nor may we equate the extent of our " spiritual treasures " when these are successively unfolded with the psychical apparatus, so to say, in which they are subconsciously involved? Take the first book of the Aeneid, which, as See also:

• MACAULAY, THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY, BARON (1800-1859)

And there is a like sudden shifting of the substratum of our thoughts, when, taking up the morning See also:

• PAPER
• PAPER (Fr. papier, from Lat. papyrus)

They are processes or functions more or less inhibited, and the See also:

• INHIBITION (from Lat. inhibere, to restrain, prevent)

Surely there must be some functional activity answering to this conscious presentation; why may not a much less amount of it be conceived possible in subconscious presentation? Sensation, Movement and the External World. 16. On the view of experience here maintained, we are bound to See also:

• CHALLENGE (O. Fr. chalonge, calenge, &c., from Lat. calumnia, originally meaning trickery, from calvi, to deceive, hence a false accusation, a " calumny ")

But it may be urged, why not recognize a connexion that actually obtains, since otherwise sensation must remain unexplained ? Well, in the first place, such " psychophysical " connexion is not a psychological explanation: it cannot be turned directly to account in psychology, either See also:

• ANALYTIC (the adjective of " analysis," q.v.)

Into the man's See also:

• HEAD (in 0. Eng. heafad; the word is common to Teutonic languages; cf. Dutch hoofd, Ger. Haupt, generally taken to be in origin connected with Lat. caput, Gr. KerbOvi7)
• HEAD, SIR EDMUND WALKER, BART
• HEAD, SIR FRANCIS BOND, BART

The distinction of conception and concept (conceit) is to be found in older See also:

• ENGLISH

In this case then what we have is not a plurality of presentations (a+b +c), but a single presentation having a plurality of attributes (a b c) so related that the absence of any one annihilates the whole. But though, as already said, such single presentation gives, as it stands, no evidence of this plurality, yet it is to be remembered that in actual experience we do not deal with sensations in isolation; here, accordingly, we find evidence in plenty to justify our psychological analysis. In innumerable cases we experience varieties of intensity with little or no apparent change of quality, as happens, for example, when a See also:

• SOUNDING (for derivation see SOUND above)

The only evidence apparently to which we can safely See also:

• APPEAL

Several of our supposed sensations of taste, e.g., are complicated with sensations of touch and smell: thus the pungency of See also:

• PEPPER
• PEPPER, WILLIAM (1843–1898)

Nagel, " See also:

• DIE
• DIE (Fr. de, from Lat. datum, given)

In the absence of such direct evidence it is unwarrantable to infer psychical complexity from complexity in the physical stimuli, even when this is really present. In the case of pigment mixture, however, there is no such physical complexity as is vulgarly supposed. And it is See also:

• WORTH
• WORTH, CHARLES FREDERICK (1825-1895)

See also:

• STUMPF, JOHANN (1500-1576)

And it has yet to be shown that there is any more justification for speaking of visual sensations without luminosity. Meanwhile we must maintain that in absolute darkness we do not see black, since we do not see at all. No doubt we are prone to identify the two concepts darkness and blackness, for what we may call their sensory content is the same, viz. the absence of visual sensation. Whereas in nature the only diffused light we need consider is that emitted by the See also:

• SUN
• SUN (0. Eng. sonne, Ger. sonne. Fr. soleil, Lat. sol, Gr. ijXior, from which comes helio- in various English compounds)

But this does not affect the See also:

• ARGUMENT

The various sensations classed together as organic, See also:

• HUNGER

59). But this important psychological truth is affirmed as strenuously by some, at any rate (e.g. Professor James) of Bain's opponents as it was by Bain himself. Unhappily many, under the same psychophysical ' Cf. See also:

• BASTIAN, ADOLF (1826– )

In treating apart of the differentiation of our sensory and motor continua, as resulting merely in a number of dis-Mentai syn- tinguishable sensations and movements, we have thesis or been compelled by the exigencies of exposition Integration. to leave out of sight another process which really advances pari passe with this differentiation, viz. the integration or synthesis of these proximately elementary presentations into those complex presentations which are called percepts, intuitions, sensori-motor reactions and the like. It is, of course, not to be supposed that in the evolution of mind any creature attained to such variety of distinct sensations and movements as a human being possesses without making even the first step towards building up this material into the most rudimentary knowledge and action. On the contrary, there is every See also:

• REASON (Lat. ratio, through French raison)

More frequently it is used as the See also:

• EQUIVALENT

18. The range of the terms recognition or assimilation of impressions is wide: between the simplest mental process they may be supposed to denote and the most complex Assimilathere is a great difference. The See also:

• PENGUIN

The pure sensation we may regard as a psychological myth; and the simple image, or such sensation revived, seems equally mythical, as we may see later on. The nth sensation is not like the first: it is a change in a presentation-continuum that has itself been changed by those pre-ceding; and it cannot with any propriety be said to reproduce these past sensations, for they never had the individuality which such reproduction implies. Nor does it See also:

• ASSOCIATE (Lat. associates, from ad, to, and sociare to join)

In the concrete " up " is much more than a different direction from " along." The See also:

• HEN

For, as has been already remarked by critics of the associationist psychology, we have an experience very similar to this in singing and hearing musical notes or the See also:

• CHROMATIC (Gr. xpcoµaruc6s, coloured, from xpwµa, colour)

Such difference of relation must be regarded fundamentally as a ground or possibility of distinctness of sign—whether as being the ground or possibility of different complexes or otherwise—rather than as being from the beginning such an overt difference as the term " local sign," when used by See also:

• LOTZE, RUDOLF HERMANN (1817-1881)

Of such experience the typical case is that of passive touch, though the other senses exemplify it. It must be allowed that' our concept of space in like manner involves a fixed continuity of positions; but then it involves, further, the possibility of movement. Now in the continuum of local signs there is nothing whatever of this; we might call this continuum an implicit plen_tm. It only becomes the presentation of oecupied space after its several local signs are complicated in an orderly way with active touches, when in fact we have experienced the contrast of movements with contact and movements without, i.e. in vacuo. It is quite true that we cannot now think of this plenum except as a space, because we cannot divest ourselves of these motor experiences by which we have explored it. We can, how-ever, form some idea of the difference between the perception of space and this one element in the perception by contrasting massive See also:

• INTERNAL

True, such positions would not be known as spatial without movement; but neither would the movement be known as spatial had those positions no other difference than such asarises from movement. In a See also:

• BALLOON

The resulting complex perhaps admits of symbolization as follows: FjF,FeFdFjFfF,FhFk Tttt P1p.PaP4 Here the first line represents a portion of the tactual continuum, Fd and F, being distinct " feels," if we may so say, or passive touches presented along with the fainter sensations of the continuum as a whole, which the general " body-sense " involves; T stands for the active touch of the exploring finger and Pi for the corresponding kinaesthetic sensation regarded as " positional sign "; the rest of the succession, as not actually present at this stage but capable of revival from past explorations, is symbolized by the t i t and p2PaP4. When the series of movements is accompanied by active touches without passive there arises the distinction between one's own body and foreign bodies; when the initial movement of a series is accompanied by both active and passive touches, the final movement by active touches only, and the intermediate movements are unaccompanied by either, we get the further presentation of empty space lying between us and them—but only when by frequent experience of contacts along with those intermediate movements we have come to know all movement as not only succession but change of position. Thus active touches come at length to be projected, passive touches alone being localized in the stricter sense. But in actual fact, of course, the localization of one impression is not perfected before that of another is begun, and we must take care lest our necessarily meagre exposition give rise to the • mistaken notion 2 Thus a place may be known topographically without its position being known geographically, and vice versa. the nerve-endings but in the variety of the underlying parts—in one place See also:

• BONE (a word common in various forms to Teutonic languages, in many of which it is confined to the shank of the leg, as in the German Bein)
• BONE, HENRY (1755-1834)

So far has this development advanced that we do not even imagine the special movements which the localization of an impression implies, that is to say, they are no longer distinctly represented as they would be if we definitely intended to make them: the past experiences are " retained," but too much blended in the mere perception to be appropriately spoken of as remembered or imaged. A propos of this almost instinctive character of even our earliest spatial percepts it will be appropriate to animadvert on a misleading implication in the current use of such terms as " localization," " projection," " bodily reference," " spatial reference " and the like. The implication is that external space, or the body as extended, is in some sort presented or supposed apart from the localization, projection or reference of impressions to such space. That it may be possible to put a book in its place on a shelf there must be (I) the book, and (2), distinct and apart from it, the place on the shelf. But in the evolution of our spatial experience impressions and positions are not thus presented apart. We can have, or at least we can suppose, an impression which is recognized without being localized as has been already said; but if it is localized this means that a more complex presentation is formed by the addition of new elements, not that a second distinct object is presented and some indescribable connexion established between the impression and it, still less that the impression is referred to something not strictly presented at all. The truth is that the body as extended is from the psychological point of view not perceived at all apart from localized impressions. In like manner impressions projected (or the absence of impressions projected) constitute all that is perceived as the occupied (or unoccupied) space beyond. It is not till a much later stage, after many varying experiences of different impressions similarly localized or projected, that even the mere materials are present for the formation of such an abstract concept of space as " spatial reference " implies.' Psychologists, being themselves at this later stage, are apt to commit the oversight of introducing it into the earlier stage which they have to expound. 20. In a complex percept, such as that of an orange or a piece of wax, may be distinguished the following points concerning which psychology may be expected to give an account: (a) the object's reality, (b) its solidity or occupation of space, (c) its unity and complexity, (d) its permanence, or rather its continuity in time and (e) its substantiality and the connexion of its attributes and See also:

• POWERS, HIRAM (1805-1873)

a. The terms actuality and reality have each more than one meaning. Thus what is real, in the sense of material, is opposed acruatHy or to what is mental; as the existent or actual it is Reality opposed to the non-existent; and again, what is actual is distinguished from what is possible or necessary. But here both terms, with a certain shade of difference, in so far as actual is more appropriate to movements and events, are used, in See also:

• ANTITHESIS (the Greek for " setting opposite ")

Know., pt. i. § 33)as colour or solidity may be. Neither is it a special relation among these elements, like that of substance and attribute, for example. In these respects the real and the ideal, the actual and the possible, are alike; all the elements or qualities within the complex, and all the relations of those elements to each other, are the same in the rose represented as in the presented rose. The difference turns not upon what these elements are, regarded as qualities or relations presented or represented, but upon whatever it is that distinguishes the presentation from the See also:

• REPRESENTATION

At the outset things are all corporeal like his own body, the first and archetypal thing, that is to say: things are intuited only when touch is accompanied by pressure; and, though at a later stage passive touch without pressure may suffice, this is only because pressures depending on a subjective initiative, i.e. on voluntary muscular exertion, have been previously experienced. It is of more than psychological interest to remark how the primordial factor in materiality is thus due to the projection of a subjectively determined reaction to that action of a not-self of which sense-impressions consist—an action of the not-self which, of course, is not known as such till this projection of the subjective reaction has taken place. Still we must remember that accompanying sense-impressions are a condition of its projection: muscular effort without simultaneous sensations of contact would not yield the distinct presentation of something resistant occupying the space into which we have moved and would move again. See also:

• NAY, or NEY

We might wonder, too —those at least who have made so much of association by similarity ought to wonder—that, say, the white of See also:

• SNOW (in O. Eng. sndw; a common Indo-European word; cf. in Teutonic languages, Ger. Schnee, Du. sneeuw; in Slavonic snieg', Lith. snegas; Gr. vi4a, Lat. nix, nivis, whence the Romanic forms, Ital. neve, Fr. neige, &c.; Ir. and Gael. sneachd; the original

As we have existed—or, more exactly, as the body has been continuously presented—during the interval between two encounters with some other recognized body, so this is regarded as having continuously existed during its absence from us. However permanent we suppose the conscious subject to be, it is hard to see how, without the continuous presentation to if of such a group as the bodily self, we should ever be prompted to resolve the discontinuous presentations of external things into a continuity of existence. It might be said: Since the second presentation of a particular group would, by the mere workings of psychical See also:

• LAWS

Of all the constituents of things only one is universally present, that above described as physical solidity, which presents itself according to circumstances as impenetrability, resistance or weight. Things differing in temperature, colour, taste and smell agree in resisting See also:

• COMPRESSION

To begin, it is very questionable whether Hume was right in applying Locke's distinction of simple and complex to ideas in the narrower sense as well as to impressions. " That idea of red," says Hume, " which we form in the dark and that impression which strikes our eyes in the sunshine differ only in degree, not in nature." 3 But what he seems to have overlooked is that, whereas we may have a mere sensation red, we can only have an image or representation of a red thing or a red form, i.e of red in some way ideally projected' or intuited. In other words, there are no ideas—though there are concepts—answering to simple or isolated impressions. The synthesis which has taken place in the evolution of the percept can olily partially fail in the idea, and never so far as to leave us with a chaotic " manifold " of mere sensational remnants. On the contrary, we find that in " constructive imagination " a new kind of effort is often requisite in order partially to dissociate these representational complexes as a preliminary to new combinations. But it is doubtful whether the results of such an analysis are ever the ultimate elements of the percept, that is, merely isolated impressions in a fainter form. We may now try to ascertain further the characteristic marks which distinguish what is imaged from what is perceived. The distinction between the thing and its properties is one that might be more fully treated under the head of " Thought and Conception." Still, inasmuch as the material warrant for these concepts is contained more or less implicity in our percepts, some consideration of it is in place here. z Ideation—" a word of my own coining," says James Mill. 3 Treatise of Human Nature, bk. i. pt. i. § I. The most obvious difference is that which Hume called I " the force or liveliness " of primary presentations as compared Character- with secondary presentations.

But what exactly istks of are we to understand by this somewhat figurative Ideas. language ? A simple difference of intensity cannot be all that is meant, for--though we may be momentarily confused—we can perfectly well distinguish the faintest impression from an image; moreover, we can reproduce such faintest impressions in idea. The whole subject of the intensity of representations awaits investigation. Between moonlight and sunlight or between midday and dawn we can discriminate many grades of intensity; but it does not appear that there is any corresponding variation of intensity between them when they are not seen but imagined. Many persons suppose they can imagine a waxing or a waning sound or the gradual See also:

• ABATEMENT (derived through the French abattre, from the Late Latin battere, to beat)

Ideas are not only in a continual flux, but even when we attempt forcibly to detain one it varies continually in clearness and completeness, reminding one of nothing so much as of the illuminated devices made of See also:

• GAS

We cannot at once see the sky red and blue; how is it we can imagine it the one while perceiving it to be the other? When we attempt to make the field of sight at once red and blue, as in looking through red glass with one eye and through blue glass with the other, either the colours See also:

• MERGE

22. But, distinct as they are, impressions and images are still closely connected. In the first place, there are two or three well-marked intermediate stages, so that, though we connexion cannot directly observe it, we seem justified in assum- of Impress ing a steady transition from the one to the other. As skins and the first of such intermediate stages, it is usual to Images. reckon what are often, and—so far as psychology goes—inaccurately, styled after-images. They would be better de-scribed as after-sensations, inasmuch as they are due either (i) to the persistence of the original peripheral excitation after the stimulus is withdrawn, or (2) to the effects of the exhaustion or the repair that immediately follows this excitation. In the former case they are qualitatively identical with the original sensation and are called " positive," in the latter they are complementary to it and are called "negative " (see VISION). These last, then, of which we have clear instances only in connexion with sight, are obviously in no 1 Moreover, as we shall see, the distinction between present and past or future psychologically presupposes the contrast of impression and image. 2 Organic sensations, though distinguishable from images by their definite though often anatomically inaccurate localization, furnish no clear evidence of such adaptations. But in another respect they are still more clearly marked off from images, viz. by the pleasure or pain they directly occasion. sort re -presentations of the original impression, but a sequent presentation of diametrically opposite quality; while positive after-sensations are, psychologically regarded, nothing but the original sensations in a state of evanescence. It is this continuance and gradual waning after the physical stimulus has completely ceased that give after-sensations their chief title to a place in the transition from impression to image.

There is, however, another point: after-sensations are less affected by movement than impressions are. If we turn away our eyes we cease to see the See also:

• FLAME (Lat. flamma; the root flag- appears in flagrare, to burn, blaze, and Gr. d, XEryew)

The image of the object will appear for a moment very vividly and distinctly, and can be so recovered several times in succession by an effort of attention. Such reinstatement is materially helped by rapidly opening and closing the eyes, or by suddenly moving them in any way. In this respect a primary memory-image resembles an after-sensation, which can be repeatedly revived in this manner when it would otherwise have disappeared. This seems to show that the primary memory-image in such cases ' The following scant See also:

• QUOTATION

The primary memory-image retains so much of its original definiteness and intensity as to make it possible with great accuracy to compare two physical phenomena, one of which is in this way " remembered " while the other is really present. For the most part this is indeed a more accurate procedure than that of dealing with both together, but it is only possible for a very short time. From Weber's experiments with weights and lines2 it would appear that even after ro seconds a considerable waning has taken place, and after too seconds all that is distinctive of the primary image has probably ceased. On the whole, then, it appears that the See also:

• ORDINARY (med. Lat. ordinarius, Fr. ordinaire)

23. We find ourselves sometimes engrossed in present perceptions, as when tracing, for example, the meanderings of an See also:

• ANT
• ANT (O. Eng. aemete, from Teutonic a, privative, and maitan, cut or bite off, i.e. " the biter off "; aemete in Middle English became differentiated in dialect use to (mete, then amte, and so ant, and also to emete, whence the synonym " emmet," now only u

Even what is most fundamental of all, that " plasticity " which we have analysed into retentiveness, differentiation and integration, is sometimes described as if it already involved memory-ideas and their association. Ideas, that is to say, are identified with mere " residua " of former " impressions," and yet at the same time are spoken of as " copies " of these: which is much like saying the evening See also:

• TWILIGHT

But it is obvious that there must be an objective factor as well; and it is this objective factor in the process giving rise to y that now primarily concerns us. We have described that process as assimilation or immediate recognition: the older psychology described it as association of the completely similar, or as automatic association. That the two views have some-thing in common is shown by the juxtaposition of " automatic " and " immediate," " similarity " and " assimilation." To pre-See also:

• PARE, AMBROISE (1510-1590)

Considering the intimate relation of life and mind, and the strong physiological bias shown by the Associationists from See also:

• HARTLEY, DAVID (1705–1757)
• HARTLEY, JONATHAN SCOTT (1845– )
• HARTLEY, SIR CHARLES AUGUSTUS (1825– )

There is, however, nothing in this of memory, save as the term is loosely used for mere retentiveness; and after percept would therefore be a less objectionable name for it. This after-percept is entirely sense-sustained and admits of no ideal recall, though—in minds sufficiently advanced—it may persist for a few moments, and so form the basis of such comparison with a second sensation, as we find in the experiments of Weber, Fechner and others.' At a still lower level, or in actual perception, we cannot assume even this amount of partial independence, though continuity clearly points to something beyond the See also:

• BARE

complex, if representation is to imply the presence of a free or independent idea. To call this " something " a tied or nascent idea on the ground of its possible later development into an independent representation seems, then, nearest the truth. The same meaning is sometimes expressed in a wholly different and designedly paradoxical way, by saying that all cognition (perception) is recognition. This statement has been met by elaborate expositions of the difference between knowing and knowing again, the irrelevance of which any See also:

• LEXICON

Nor can this complication be with any propriety identified either with the association pertaining to memory or with that specially pertaining to ideation; though, no doubt, the two processes—complication and association—are genetically continuous, as are their respective constituents, nascent and free ideas? The whole course of perceptual integration being determined and sustained by subjective interest, involves from the outset, as we have seen, concurrent conative impulses; and thus the same assimilation that results in familiarity and preperception on the subjective side results in facility and purpose on the conative. Knowing immediately what to do is here the best evidence of knowing what there is to do with; the See also:

• MOTH

In such wise preperceptions displaced by the actual fact yield the " what " severed from the " that," the " ideal " freed at length from the exclusive hold of the real. In a new situation after such adventures the attitude assumed—if, for brevity, we describe it in terms of our own still more advanced experience—is of this sort: " It may be a See also:

• WEASEL (Putorius nivalis)

The See also:

• CARP

50, 126, 19 seq., 1o1. W. Bateson, " The Sense-Organs and Perceptions of Fishes," Journ. Marine Biol. Assoc. (189o), p. 239. Cf. Stout, See also:

• MANUAL