BUTLER .) The success of the Essays, though hardly See also:

• GREAT

" I believe the Philosophical Essays contain everything of consequence See also:

• RELATING

In a playful letter to Dr Clephane, he describes his See also:

• SATISFACTION (Lat. salisfacerc, to satisfy)

At the same time the bitterness of Hume's feelings and their effect are of importance in his life. It is from the publication of the History that we date his virulent hatred of everything See also:

• ENGLISH

It was the first attempt at a comprehensive treatment of historic facts, the first to introduce the social and literary aspects of a nation's life as only second in importance to its political fortunes, and the first historical See also:

• WRITING
• WRITING (the verbal noun of " to write," O. Eng. writan, to inscribe)

Without positively asserting much more than he can prove, he gives prominence to all the circumstances which support his case; he glides lightly over those which—are unfavourable to it; his own witnesses are applauded and encouraged; the statements which seem to throw discredit on them are controverted; the contradictions into which they fall are explained away; a clear and connected abstract of their See also:

• EVIDENCE (Lat. evidentia, evideri, to appear clearly)

Hume certainly did his utmost to secure for Rousseau a comfortable See also:

• RETREAT (O. Fr. retrete, mod. retraite, from Lat. retrahere, to draw back)

No notice of Hume would be complete without the See also:

• SKETCH (directly adapted from Dutch schets, which was taken from Ital. schizzo, a rough draft, Lat. schedium, something hastily made, Gr. oxE&os, sudden, off-hand, axeb6v, near by; Ger. Skizze and Fr. esquisse are from the same source)

See also:

• MILL
• MILL (O. Eng. mylen, later myln, or miln, adapted from the late Lat. molina, cf. Fr. moulin, from Lat. mola, a mill, molere, to grind; from the same root, mol, is derived " meal;" the word appears in other Teutonic languages, cf. Du. molen, Ger. muhle)
• MILL, JAMES (1773-1836)
• MILL, JOHN (c. 1645–1707)
• MILL, JOHN STUART (1806-1873)

The terms which he employs in describing the aim and See also:

• SCOPE (through Ital. scopo, aim, purpose, intent, from Gr. o'KOaos, mark to shoot at, aim, o ic07reiv, to see, whence the termination in telescope, microscope, &c.)

Now if this mode of treatment be accepted as the only possible method, and its results assumed to be conclusive as regards the problem of knowledge, the fundamental peculiarity of cognition is overlooked. In all cognition, strictly so-called, there is involved a certain See also:

• SYNTHESIS (Gr. a6vOeacs, from avvrcBivac, to put together)

107.) The course of Hume's work follows immediately from his fundamental principle, and the several divisions of the treatise, so far as the theoretical portions are concerned, are but its logical See also:

• CON

128 n., 137, 192). By this theory, Hume is freed from all the problems of See also:

• ABSTRACTION (Lat. abs and trahere)

These principles of association determine the imagination to combine ideas in various modes, and by this See also:

• MECHANICAL

In the second place, cognition, in any real sense of that term, implies connexion for the individual mind between the present fact of experience and other facts, whether past or future. It appears to involve, therefore, some real relation among the portions of experience, on the basis of which relation judgments and inferences as to matters of fact can be shown to rest. The theoretical question is consequently that of the nature of the supposed relation, and of the certainty of judgments and inferences resting on it. Hume's well-known distinction between relations of ideas and matters of fact corresponds fairly to this separation of the formal and real problems in the theory of cognition, although that distinction is in itself inadequate and not fully representative of Hume's own conclusions. With regard, then, to the first problem, the formal See also:

• ELEMENT (Lat. elementum)

Whence then do these units arise? or, if we put the problem as it was necessary Hume should put it to himself, in what orders or classes of impressions do we find the elements of space and time? Beyond all question Hume, in endeavouring to answer this problem, is brought face to face with one of the difficulties inherent in his conception of conscious experience. For he has to give some explanation of the nature of space and time which shall identify these with impressions, and at the same time is compelled to recognize the fact that they are not identical with any single impression or set of impressions. Putting aside, then, the various obscurities of terminology, such as the distinction between the See also:

• OBJECTS

It is important to notice that See also:

• MANES

The principle with which he starts and from which follows his well-known distinction between relations of ideas and matters of fact, a distinction which See also:

• KANT, IMMANUEL (1724-1804)

But in both works these utterances are qualified in such a manner as to enable us to perceive the real See also:

• BEARINGS

So far, then, as geometry is concerned, Hume's opinion is perfectly definite. It is an experimental or observational science, founded on primary or immediate judgments (in his phraseology, perceptions), of relation between facts of See also:

• INTUITION (from Lat. intueri, to look at)

The See also:

• AMBIGUITY (Fr. ambiguite, med. Lat. ambiguitas, from Lat. ambiguus, doubtful; ambi, both ways, agere, to drive)

" No negation of a fact can involve a contradiction." Existence of any fact, not present as a perception, can only be proved by arguments from cause or effect. But as each perception is in consciousness only as a contingent fact, which might not be or might be other than it is, we must admit that the mind can conceive no necessary relations or con• nexions among the several portions of its experience. If, therefore, a present perception leads us to assert the existence of some other, this can only be interpreted as meaning that in some natural, i.e. psychological, manner the idea of this other perception is excited, and that the idea is viewed by the mind in some peculiar fashion. The natural link of connexion Hume finds in the similarities presented by experience. One fact or perception is discovered by experience to be uniformly or generally accompanied by another, and its occurrence therefore naturally excites the idea of that other. But when an idea is so roused up by a present impression, and when this idea, being a consequence of memory, has in itself a certain vivacity or liveliness, we regard it with a peculiar indefinable feeling, and in this feeling consists the immense difference between mere imagination and belief. The mind is led easily and rapidly from the present impression to the ideas of impressions found by experience to be the usual accompaniments of the present fact. The ease and rapidity of the mental transition is the See also:

• SOLE (Solea)

It should be noted that this theory of Causation entirely denies the doctrine of Uniformity in Nature, so far as the human mind is concerned. All alleged uniformity is reduced to observed similarity of process. The idea is a mere See also:

• CONVENTION (Lat. conventio, an assembly or agreement, from convenire, to come together)
• CONVENTION, THE NATIONAL

The results follow with the utmost ease from his original postulate. If there is nothing in conscious experience save what observation can disclose, while each See also:

• ACT (Lat. actus, actum)

It follows, therefore, that the thought alone feels See also:

• PERSONAL

The work of the See also:

• CRITICAL (in alphabetical order of authors)

A brief survey of its contents will be sufficient to show its general nature and its relations to such works as See also:

• CLARKE, ADAM (1762?—1832)
• CLARKE, CHARLES COWDEN (1787-1877)
• CLARKE, EDWARD DANIEL (1769–1822)
• CLARKE, JAMES FREEMAN (1810–1888)
• CLARKE, JOHN SLEEPER (1833–1899)
• CLARKE, MARCUS ANDREW HISLOP (1846–1881)
• CLARKE, MARY ANNE (c.1776–1852)
• CLARKE, SAMUEL (1675–1729)
• CLARKE, SIR ANDREW (1824-1902)
• CLARKE, SIR EDWARD GEORGE (1841– )
• CLARKE, THOMAS SHIELDS (1866- )
• CLARKE, WILLIAM BRANWHITE (1798-1878)

Cleanthes, pointing out that from a nature thoroughly evil we can never prove the existence of an infinitely powerful and benevolent Creator, hazards the conjecture that the deity, though all-benevolent, is not all-powerful. Philo, however, pushing his principles to their full consequences, shows that unless we assumed (or knew) beforehand that the system of nature was the work of a benevolent but limited deity, we certainly could not, from the facts of nature, infer the benevolence of its creator. Cleanthes's view is, therefore, an See also:

• HYPOTHESIS (from Gr. inrorcOivat, to put under; cf. Lat. suppositio, from sub-ponere)

It is no exaggeration to say that the later English school of philosophy represented by J. S. Mill made in theory no advance beyond Hume. In the logic of Mill, e.g., we find much of a special character that has no See also:

• COUNTER

His economic essays were published in the volumes entitled Political Discourses (1752) and Essays and See also:

• TREATISES

84 sqq.). He goes on to show that the See also:

• VARIATIONS
• VARIATIONS, CALCULUS
• VARIATIONS, CALCULUS OF

He denies that all taxes fall finally on the See also:

• LAND

H. See also:

• GROSE, FRANCIS (c. 1730–1791)

See also:

• PFLEIDERER, OTTO (1839—1908)

Eine exakte Losung See also:

• DES

See also:

• BONAR, HORATIUS (1808-1889)

(R. AD.; J. M.