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HUTCHESON, FRANCIS (1694-1746)

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Originally appearing in Volume V14, Page 12 of the 1911 Encyclopedia Britannica.
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HUTCHESON, See also:FRANCIS (1694-1746) , See also:English philosopher, was See also:born on the 8th of See also:August 1694. His birthplace was probably the townland of Drumalig, in the See also:parish of Saintfield and See also:county of Down, See also:Ireland.• Though the See also:family had sprung from See also:Ayrshire, in See also:Scotland, both his See also:father and grandfather were ministers of dissenting congregations in the See also:north of Ireland. Hutcheson was educated partly by his grandfather, partly at an See also:academy, where according to his biographer, Dr Leechman, he was taught 1 See See also:Belfast See also:Magazine for August 1813. " the See also:ordinary scholastic See also:philosophy which was in See also:vogue in those days." In 1710 he entered the university of See also:Glasgow, where he spent six years, at first in the study of philosophy, See also:classics and See also:general literature, and afterwards in the study of See also:theology. On quitting the university, he returned to the north of Ireland, and received a See also:licence to preach. When, however, he was about to enter upon the pastorate of a small dissenting See also:congregation he changed his plans on the See also:advice of a friend and opened a private academy in See also:Dublin. In Dublin his See also:literary attainments gained him the friendship of many prominent inhabitants. Among these was See also:Archbishop See also:King (author of the De origin mali), who resisted all attempts to prosecute Hutcheson in the archbishop's See also:court for keeping a school without the episcopal licence. Hutcheson's relations with the See also:clergy of the Established See also:Church, especially with the archbishops of See also:Armagh and Dublin, See also:Hugh Boulter (1672–1742) and See also:William King (1650-1729), seem to have been most cordial, and his biographer, in speaking of " the inclination of his See also:friends to serve him, the schemes proposed to him for obtaining See also:pro-See also:motion," &c., probably refers to some offers of preferment, on See also:condition of his accepting episcopal ordination. These offers, however, were unavailing. While residing in Dublin, Hutcheson published anonymously the four essays by which he is best known, namely, the Inquiry concerning Beauty, See also:Order, See also:Harmony and See also:Design, the Inquiry concerning Moral See also:Good and Evil, in 1725, the See also:Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections and Illustrations upon the Moral Sense, in 1728. The alterations and additions made in the second edition of these Essays were published in a See also:separate See also:form in 1726.

To the See also:

period of his Dublin See also:residence are also to be referred the Thoughts on See also:Laughter (a See also:criticism of See also:Hobbes) and the Observations on the See also:Fable of the Bees, being in all six letters contributed to Hibernicus' Letters, a periodical which appeared in Dublin (1725–1727, 2nd ed. 1734). At the end of the same period occurred the controversy in the See also:London See also:Journal with See also:Gilbert See also:Burnet (probably the second son of Dr Gilbert Burnet, See also:bishop of See also:Salisbury); on the " True See also:Foundation of Virtue or Moral Goodness." All these letters were collected in one See also:volume (Glasgow, 1772). In 1729 Hutcheson succeeded his old See also:master, Gershom See also:Carmichael, in the See also:chair of moral philosophy in the university of Glasgow. It is curious that up to this See also:time all his essays and letters had been published anonymously, though their authorship appears to have been well known. In 1730 he entered on the duties of his See also:office, delivering an inaugural lecture (afterwards published), De naturali hominurn socialitate. It was a See also:great See also:relief to him after the drudgery of school See also:work to secure leisure for his favourite studies; " non See also:levi igitur laetitia commovebar cum almam matrem Academiam me, suum olim alumnum, in libertatem asseruisse audiveram." Yet the See also:works on which Hutcheson's reputation rests had already been published. The See also:remainder of his See also:life he devoted to his professorial duties. His reputation as a teacher attracted many See also:young men, belonging to dissenting families, from See also:England and Ireland, and he enjoyed a well-deserved popularity among both his pupils and his colleagues. Though somewhat See also:quick-tempered, he was remarkable for his warm feelings and generous impulses. He was accused in 1938 before the Glasgow See also:presbytery for " following two false and dangerous doctrines: first, that the See also:standard of moral goodness was the promotion of the happiness of others; and second, that we could have a knowledge of good and evil without and See also:prior to a knowledge of See also:God" (See also:Rae, Life of See also:Adam See also:Smith, 189J). The See also:accusation seems to have had no result.

In addition to the works named, the following were published during Hutcheson's lifetime: a pamphlet entitled Considerations an Patronage (1735); Philosophiae morals instatutio compendiaria, ethices et jurisprudentiae naturalis elementa continens, See also:

lib. iii. (Glasgow, 1742); Metaphysicae synapsis ontologiam et pneumatologiam cnmplectens (Glasgow, 1742). The last work was published anonymously. After his See also:death, his son, Francis Hutcheson (c. 1722-1773), author of a number of popular songs (e.g. " As See also:Colin one evening," " See also:Jolly Bacchus," " Where Weeping Yews "), published much the longest, though by no means the most interesting, of his works, A See also:System of Moral Philosophy, in Three Books (2 vols., London, 17s5). To this is prefixed a life of the author, by Dr William Leechman (1706-1785), See also:professor of divinity in the university of Glasgow. The only remaining work assigned to Hutcheson is a small See also:treatise on See also:Logic (Glasgow, 1764). This compendium, together with the Compendium of See also:Metaphysics, was republished at See also:Strassburg in 1722. Thus Hutcheson dealt with metaphysics, logic and See also:ethics. His importance is, however, due almost entirely to his ethical writings, and among these primarily to the four essays and the letters published during his residence in Dublin. His standpoint has a negative and a See also:positive aspect; he is in strong opposition to See also:Thomas Hobbes and See also:Bernard de See also:Mandeville, and in fundamental agreement with See also:Shaftesbury (See also:Anthony See also:Ashley See also:Cooper, 3rd See also:earl of Shaftesbury), whose name he very properly coupled with his own on the See also:title-See also:page of the first two essays.

There are no two names, perhaps, in the See also:

history of English moral philosophy, which stand in a closer connexion. The See also:analogy See also:drawn between beauty and virtue, the functions assigned to the moral sense, the position that the benevolent feelings form an See also:original and irreducible See also:part of our nature, and the unhesitating See also:adoption of the principle that the test of virtuous See also:action is its tendency to promote the general welfare are obvious and fundamental points of agreement between the two authors. I. Ethics.—According to Hutcheson, See also:man has a variety of senses, See also:internal as well as See also:external, reflex as well as See also:direct, the general See also:definition of a sense being " any determination of our minds to receive ideas independently on our will, and to have perceptions of See also:pleasure and See also:pain " (Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions, See also:sect. I). He does not See also:attempt to give an exhaustive enumeration of these " senses," but, in various parts of his works, he specifies, besides the five external senses commonly recognized (which, he rightly hints, might be added to),—(1) consciousness, by which each man has a See also:perception of himself and of all that is going on in his own mind (Metaph. Syn. pars i. cap. 2) ; (2) the sense of beauty (sometimes called specifically " an internal sense ") ; (3) a public sense, or sensus communis, " a determination to be pleased with the happiness of others and to be uneasy at their misery "; (4) the moral sense, or " moral sense of beauty in actions and affections, by which we perceive virtue or See also:vice, in ourselves or others "; (5) a sense of See also:honour, or praise and blame, " which makes the approbation or gratitude of others the necessary occasion of pleasure, and their dislike, condemnation or resentment of injuries done by us the occasion of that uneasy sensation called shame "; (6) a sense of the ridiculous. It is See also:plain, as the author confesses, that there may be " other perceptions, distinct from all these classes," and, in fact, there seems to be no limit to the number of " senses " in which a psychological See also:division of this See also:kind might result. Of these " senses " that which plays the most important part in Hutcheson's ethical system is the " moral sense." It is this which pronounces immediately on the See also:character of actions and affections, approving those which are virtuous, and disapproving those which are vicious. " His See also:principal design," he says in the See also:preface to the two first See also:treatises, " is to show that human nature was not See also:left quite indifferent in the affair of virtue, to form to itself observations concerning the See also:advantage or disadvantage of actions, and accordingly to regulate its conduct. The weakness of our See also:reason, and the avocations arising from the infirmity and necessities of our nature, are so great that very few men could ever have formed those See also:long deductions of reasons which show some actions t be in the whole advantageous to the See also:agent, and their contraries pernicious.

The Author of nature has much better furnished us for a virtuous conduct than our moralists seem to imagine, by almost as quick and powerful instructions as we have for the preservation of our bodies. He has made virtue a lovely form, to excite our pursuit of it, and has given us strong affections to be the springs of each virtuous action." Passing over the See also:

appeal to final causes involved in this and similar passage's, as well as the See also:assumption that the " moral sense " has had no growth or history, but was " implanted in man exactly in the condition in which it is now to be found among the more civilized races, an assumption See also:common to the systems of both Hutcheson and See also:Butler, it may be remarked that this use of the See also:term " sense " has a tendency to obscure the real nature of the See also:process which goes on in an See also:act of moral See also:judgment. For, as is so clearly established by See also:Hume, this act really consists of two parts: one an act of deliberation, more or less prolonged, resulting in an intellectual judgment; the other a reflex feeling, probably instantaneous, of See also:satisfaction at actions which we denominate good, of dissatisfaction at those which we denominate See also:bad. By the intellectual part of this process we refer the action or See also:habit to a certain class; but no sooner is the intellectual process completed with the attempt to discriminate the respective provinces of the reason and the emotions in these processes, is undoubtedly due to the See also:influence of Hutcheson. To a study of the writings of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson we might, probably, in large measure, attribute the unequivocal adoption of the utilitarian standard by Hume, and, if this be the See also:case, the name of Hutcheson connects itself, through Hume, with the names of See also:Priestley, See also:Paley and See also:Bentham. Butler's Sermons appeared in 1726, the See also:year after the publication of Hutcheson's two first essays, and the See also:parallelism between the " See also:conscience " of the one writer and the " moral sense " of the other is, at least, worthy of remark. II. See also:Mental Philosophy.—In the See also:sphere of mental philosophy and logic Hutcheson's contributions are by no means so important or original as in that of moral philosophy. They are interesting mainly as a See also:link between See also:Locke and the Scottish school. In the former subject the influence of Locke is apparent throughout. All the See also:main outlines of Locke's philosophy seem, at first sight, to be accepted as a See also:matter of course. Thus, in stating his theory of the moral sense, Hutcheson is peculiarly careful to repudiate the See also:doctrine of innate ideas (see, for instance, Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil, sect. i ad fin., and sect.

4; and compare Synopsis Metaphysicae, pars i. cap. 2). At the same time he shows more discrimination than does Locke in distinguishing between the two uses of this expression, and between the legitimate and illegitimate form of the doctrine (Syn. Metaph. pars i. cap. 2). All our ideas are, as by Locke, referred to external or internal sense, or, in other words, to sensation and reflection (see, for instance, Syn. Metaph. pars i. cap. 1; Logicae Compend. pars i. cap. 1; System of Moral Philosophy, bk. i. ch. I). It is, however, a most important modification of Locke's doctrine, and one which connects Hutcheson's mental philosophy with that of See also:

Reid, when he states that the ideas of See also:extension, figure, motion and See also:rest " are more properly ideas accompanying the sensations of sight and See also:touch than the sensations of either of these senses "; that the See also:idea of self accompanies every thought, and that the ideas of number, duration and existence accompany every other idea whatsoever (see Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions, sect. i. See also:art. 1; Syn.

Metaph. pars i. cap. 1, pars ii. cap. 1; See also:

Hamilton on Reid, p. 124, See also:note). Other important points in which Hutcheson follows the See also:lead of Locke are his depreciation of the importance of the so-called See also:laws of thought, his distinction between the See also:primary and secondary qualities of bodies, the position that we cannot know the inmost essences of things (" intimae rerum naturae sive essentiae "), though they excite various ideas in us, and the assumption that external things are known only through the See also:medium of ideas (Syn. Metaph. pars i. cap. I), though, at the same time, we are assured of the existence of an external See also:world corresponding to these ideas. Hutcheson attempts to See also:account for our assurance of the reality of an external world by referring it to a natural See also:instinct (Syn. Metaph. pars i. cap. I). Of the See also:correspondence or similitude between our ideas of the primary qualities of things and the things themselves God alone can be assigned as the cause. This similitude has been effected by Him through a See also:law of nature.

" Haec prima qualitatum primariarum perceptio, sive mentis actio quaedam sive passio dicatur, non alia similitudinis See also:

aut convenientiae inter ejusmodi ideas et res ipsas causa assignari posse videtur, quam ipse See also:Deus, qui certa naturae lege hoc effiicit, ut notiones, quae See also:rebus praesentibus excitantur, sint ipsis similes, aut saltem earum habitudines, si non veras quantitates, depingant " (pars ii. cap. I). Locke does speak of God " annexing " certain ideas to certain motions of bodies; but nowhere does he propound a theory so definite as that here propounded by Hutcheson, which reminds us at least as much of the speculations of See also:Malebranche as of those of Locke. Amongst the more important points in which Hutcheson diverges from Locke is his account of the idea of See also:personal identity, which he appears to have regarded as made known to us directly by consciousness. The distinction between See also:body and mind, corpus or materia and res cogitans, is more emphatically accentuated by Hutcheson than by Locke. Generally, he speaks as if we had a direct consciousness of mind as distinct from body (see, for instance, Syn. Metaph. -pars ii. cap. 3), though, in the See also:posthumous work on Moral Philosophy, he expressly states that we know mind as we know body " by qualities immediately perceived though the substance of both be unknown " (bk. i. ch. I). The distinction between perception proper and sensation proper, which occurs by implication though it is not explicitly worked out (see Hamilton's Lectures on Metaphysics,. Lect.

24; Hamilton's edition of Dugald See also:

Stewart's Works, v. 420); the imperfection of the ordinary division of the external senses into the classes, the See also:limitation of consciousness to a See also:special mental See also:faculty (severely criticized in See also:Sir W. Hamilton's Lectures on Metaphysics, Lect. xii.) and the disposition to refer on disputed questions of philosophy not so much to formal arguments as to the testimony of consciousness and our natural instincts are also amongst the points in which Hutcheson supplemented or departed from the philosophy of Locke. The last point can hardly fail to suggest the " common-sense philosophy " of Reid. Thus, in estimating Hutcheson's position, we find that in particular questions he stands nearer to Locke, but in the general spirit of his philosophy he seems to approach more closely to his Scottish successors. The See also:short Compendium of Logic, which is more original than such than there is excited in us a feeling similar to that which myriads of actions and habits of the same class, or deemed to be of the same class, have excited in us on former occasions. Now, supposing the latter part of this process to be instantaneous, See also:uniform and exempt from See also:error, the former certainly is not. All mankind may, apart from their selfish interests, approve that which is virtuous or makes for the general good, but surely they entertain the most widely divergent opinions, and, in fact, freq Iently arrive at directly opposite conclusions as to particular actions and habits. This obvious distinction is undoubtedly recognized by Hutcheson in his See also:analysis of the mental process preceding moral action, nor does he invariably ignore it, even when treating of the moral approbation or disapprobation which is subsequent on action. None the less, it remains true that Hutcheson, both by his phraseology, and by the See also:language in which he describes the process of moral approbation, has done much to favour that loose, popular view of morality which, ignoring the See also:necessity of deliberation and reflection, encourages hasty resolves and unpremeditated judgments. The term " moral sense " (which, it may be noticed, had already been employed by Shaftesbury, not only, as Dr Whew•ell appears to intimate, in the margin, but also in the See also:text of his Inquiry), if invariably coupled with the term " moral judgment," would be open to little objection; but, taken alone, as designating the complex process of moral approbation, it is liable to lead not only to serious misapprehension but to See also:grave See also:practical errors. For, if each man's decisions are solely the result of an immediate See also:intuition of the moral sense, why be at any pains to test, correct or See also:review them?

Or why educate a faculty whose decisions are infallible? And how do we account for See also:

differences in the moral decisions of different See also:societies, and the observable changes in a man's own views? The expression has, in fact, the See also:fault of most metaphorical terms: it leads to an exaggeration of the truth which it is intended to suggest. But though Hutcheson usually describes the moral faculty as acting instinctively and immediately, he does not, like Butler, See also:con-found the moral faculty with the moral standard. The test or criterion of right action is with Hutcheson, as with Shaftesbury, its tendency to promote the general welfare of mankind. He thus anticipates the See also:utilitarianism of Bentham—and not only in principle, but even in the use of the phrase " the greatest happiness for the greatest number " (Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil, sect. 3). It is curious that Hutcheson did not realize the inconsistency of this external criterion with his fundamental ethical principle. In-tuition has no possible connexion with an empirical calculation of results, and Hutcheson in adopting such a criterion practically denies his fundamental assumption. As connected with Hutcheson's virtual adoption of the utilitarian standard may be noticed a kind of moral See also:algebra, proposed for the purpose of " computing the morality of actions." This calculus occurs in the Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil, sect. 3. The most distinctive of Hutcheson's ethical doctrines still remaining to be noticed is what has been called the " benevolent theory " of Benevo- morals.

Hobbes had maintained that all our actions, how-See also:

knee. ever disguised under apparent sympathy, have their roots in self-love. Hutcheson not only maintains that benevolence is the See also:sole and direct source of many of our actions, but, by a not unnatural recoil, that it is the only source of those actions of which, on reflection, we approve. Consistently with this position, actions which flow from self-love only are pronounced to be morally indifferent. But surely, by the common consent of civilized men, prudence, See also:temperance, cleanliness, See also:industry, self-respect and, in general, the " personal virtues," are regarded, and rightly regarded, as fitting See also:objects of moral approbation. This See also:consideration could hardly See also:escape any author, however wedded to his own system, and Hutcheson attempts to extricate himself from the difficulty by laying down the position that a man may justly regard himself as a part of the rational system, and may thus " be, in part, an See also:object of his own benevolence " (Ibid.),—a curious abuse of terms, which really concedes the question at issue. Moreover, he acknowledges that, though self-love does not merit approbation, neither, except in its extreme forms, does it merit condemnation, indeed the satisfaction of the dictates of self-love is one.of the very conditions of the preservation of society. To See also:press See also:home the inconsistencies involved in these various statements would be a superfluous task. The vexed question of See also:liberty and necessity appears to be carefully avoided in Hutcheson's professedly ethical works. But, in the Synopsis mtaphysicae, he touches on it in three places, briefly stating both sides of the question, but evidently inclining to that which he designates as the See also:opinion of the See also:Stoics in opposition to what he designates as the opinion of the See also:Peripatetics. This is substantially the same as the doctrine propounded by Hobbes and Locke (to the latter of whom Hutcheson refers in a note), namely, that our will is determined by motives in See also:conjunction with our general character and habit 'of mind, and that the only true liberty is the liberty of acting as we will, not the liberty of willing as we will. Though, however, his leaning is clear, he carefully avoids dogmatizing, and deprecates the angry controversies to which the speculations on this subject had given rise. It is easy to trace the influence of Hutcheson's ethical theories on the systems of Hume and Adam Smith.

The prominence given by these writers to the analysis of moral action and moral approbation, works usually are, is remarkable chiefly for the large proportion of psychological matter which it contains. In these parts of the See also:

book Hutcheson mainly follows Locke. The technicalities of the subject are passed lightly over, and the book is readable. It may be specially noticed that he distinguishes between the mental result and its verbal expression [idea—term; judgment—proposition], that he constantly employs the word " idea," and that he defines logical truth as " convenientia signorum cum rebus significatis " (or " propositionis convenientia cum rebus ipsis," Syn. Metaph. pars i. cap 3), thus implicitly repudiating a merely formal view of logic. Hutcheson's writings naturally gave rise to much controversy. To say nothing of See also:minor opponents, such as " Philaretus " (Gilbert Burnet, already alluded to), Dr See also:John See also:Balguy (1686-1748), See also:prebendary of Salisbury, the author of two tracts on " The Foundation of Moral Goodness, and Dr John See also:Taylor (1694–1761) of See also:Norwich, a See also:minister of considerable reputation in his time (author of An Examination of the See also:Scheme of Morality advanced by Dr Hutcheson), the essays appear to have suggested, by antagonism, at least two works which hold a permanent See also:place in the literature of English ethics—Butler's Dissertation on the Nature of Virtue, and See also:Richard See also:Price's Treatise of Moral Good and Evil (1757). In this latter work the author maintains, in opposition to Hutcheson, that actions are in themselves right or wrong, that right and wrong are See also:simple ideas incapable of analysis, and that these ideas are perceived immediately by the understanding. We thus see that, not only directly but also through the replies which it called forth, the system of Hutcheson, or at least the system of Hutcheson combined with that of Shaftesbury, contributed, in large measure, to the formation and development of some of the most important of the See also:modern See also:schools of ethics (see especially art. ETHICS).

End of Article: HUTCHESON, FRANCIS (1694-1746)

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