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REJANE, GABRIELLE

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Originally appearing in Volume V23, Page 59 of the 1911 Encyclopedia Britannica.
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REJANE, GABRIELLE [See also:CHARLOTTE Rfjul (1857- the emphasis upon the See also:object of knowledge, " I know this ," we have the other sense of absoluteness of knowledge: it is an assertion that the knower knows the " this," whatever it may be, in its .essence or as it truly is in itself. The phrase " relativity of knowledge " has therefore two meanings: (a) that no portion of knowledge is See also:absolute, but is always affected by its relations to other portions of knowledge; (b) that what we know are not absolute things in themselves, but things conditioned in their quality by our channels of knowledge. Each of these two propositions must command assent as soon as uncritical See also:ignorance gives See also:place to philosophic reflection; but each may be exaggerated, indeed has currently been exaggerated, into falsity. The simplest experience—a single See also:note struck upon the piano—would not be what it is to us but for its relation by contrast or comparison with other experiences. This is true; but we may easily exaggerate it into a falsehood by saying that a piece of experience is entirely constituted by its relation to other experiences. Such an extreme relativity, as advocated by T. H. See also:Green in the first See also:chapter of his Prolegomena to See also:Ethics, involves the absurdity that our whole experience is a See also:tissue of relations with no points of See also:attachment on which the relations depend. The only See also:motive for advocating it is the See also:prejudice of absolute See also:idealism which would deny that sensation has any See also:part whatever in the constitution of experience. As soon as we recognize the part of sensation, we have no See also:reason to deny the See also:common-sense position that each piece of experience has its own quality, which is modified indefinitely by the relations in which it stands. The second sense of relativity, that which asserts the impossibility of knowing things except as conditioned by our perceptive faculties, is more important philosophically and has had a more interesting See also:history. To apprehend it is really the first See also:great step in philosophical See also:education.

The unphilosophical See also:

person assumes that a See also:tree as he See also:sees it is identical with the tree as it is in itself and as it is for other percipient minds. Reflection ;shows that our See also:apprehension of the tree is conditioned by the .sense-See also:organs with which we have been endowed, and that the apprehension of a See also:blind See also:man, and still more the apprehension of a See also:dog or See also:horse, is quite different from ours. What the tree is in itself—that is, for a perfect intelligence—we cannot know, any more than a dog or horse can know what the tree is for a human intelligence. So far the relativist is on sure ground; but from this truth is See also:developed the See also:paradox that the tree has no See also:objective existence at all and consists entirely of the conscious states of the perceiver. Observe the See also:parallelism of the two paradoxical forms of relativity: one says that things are relations with nothing that is related; the other says that things are perceptive conditions with nothing objective to which the conditions apply. Both make the given nothing and the See also:work of the mind everything. To see the absurdity of the second paradox of relativity is easier than to refute it. If nothing exists but the conscious states of the perceiver, how does he come to think that there is an objective tree at all ? Why does he regard his conscious states as produced by an object ? And how does he come to imagine that there are other minds than his own ? In See also:short, this See also:kind of relativity leads straight to what is generally known as " the See also:abyss of See also:solipsism." But, like all the great paradoxes of See also:philosophy, it has its value in directing our See also:attention to a vital, yet much neglected, See also:element of experience. We cannot avoid solipsism (q.v.) so See also:long as we neglect the element of force or See also:power.

If, as See also:

Hegel asserted, our experience is all knowledge, and if knowledge is indefinitely transformed by the conditions of knowing, then we are tempted to regard the object as superfluous, and to treat our innate conviction that knowledge has reference to See also:objects as a delusion which philosophical reflection is destined to dispel. The remedy for the paradox is to recognize that the See also:foundation for our belief in the existence of objects is the force which they exercise upon us and the resistance which they offer to our will. What the tree is in regard to its specific qualities depends on what faculties we have for perceiving it. But, whatever specific qualities it may have, it will still existas an object, so long as it comes into dynamic relations with our minds. In the history of thought the relativity of knowledge as just described begins with See also:Descartes, the founder of See also:modern philosophy: the characteristic of modern philosophy is that it See also:lays more stress upon the subjective than upon the objective See also:side of experience. It is a See also:mistake to refer it back to the Greeks. The See also:maxim of See also:Protagoras, for example, " Man is the measure of all things," has a different purpose; it was meant to point to the truth that man rather than nature is the See also:primary object of human study: it is a See also:doctrine of See also:humanism rather than of relativism. To appreciate the relativistic doctrines we find in various thinkers we must take See also:account of the use to which they were put. By Descartes the principle was used as an See also:instrument of See also:scepticism, the beneficent scepticism of pulling down See also:medieval philosophy to make See also:room for modern See also:science; by See also:Berkeley it was used to combat the materialists; by See also:Hume in the cause of scepticism once more against the intellectual dogmatists; by See also:Kant to prepare a See also:justification for a noumenal See also:sphere to be apprehended by faith; by J. S. See also:Mill and See also:Herbert See also:Spencer to support their derivation of all our experience from sensation. It is in Mill's Examination of See also:Sir See also:William See also:Hamilton's Philosophy that the classical statement of the Relativity of Knowledge is to be found.

The second chapter of that See also:

book sets forth the various forms of the doctrine with admirable lucidity and precision, and gives many references to other writers. For the See also:sake of clearness it seems desirable to keep for the future the See also:term " relativity of knowledge " to the first meaning explained above: for the second meaning it has been superseded in contemporary philosophizing by the terms " See also:subjectivism," " subjective idealism," and, for its extreme See also:form, " solipsism " (q.v.). (H.

End of Article: REJANE, GABRIELLE

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