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See also:BENEKE, See also:FRIEDRICH EDUARD (1798-1854) , See also:German psychologist, was See also:born at See also:Berlin on the 17th of See also:February 1798, studied at the See also:universities of See also:Halle and Berlin, and served as a volunteer in the See also:war of 1815. After studying See also:theology under See also:Schleiermacher and De Wette, he turned to pure See also:philosophy, studying particularly See also:English writers and the German modifiers of Kantianism, such as See also:Jacobi, See also:Fries and See also:Schopenhauer. In 1820 he published his Erkenntnisslehre, his Erfahrungsseelenlehre als Grundlage See also:ales Wissens, and his inaugural dissertation De Veris Philosophiae Initiis. IIis marked opposition to the philosophy of See also:Hegel, then dominant in Berlin, was shown more clearly in the See also:short See also:tract, Neue Grundlegung zur Metaphysik (1822), intended to be the See also:programme for his lectures as privat-docent, and in the able See also:treatise, Grundlegung zur Physik der Sitten (1822), written, in See also:direct antagonism to See also:Kant's Metaphysic of See also:Ethics, to deduce ethical. principles from a basis of empirical feeling. In 1822 his lectures were prohibited at Berlin, according to his own belief through the See also:influence of Hegel with the Prussian authorities, who also prevented him from obtaining a See also:chair from the Saxon See also:government. He retired to See also:Gottingen, lectured there for some years, and was then allowed to return to Berlin. In 1832 he received an See also:appointment as See also:professor extraordinarius in the university, which he continued to hold till his See also:death. On the 1st of See also: The next step was his own; he insisted that psychology must be treated as one of the natural sciences. As is the See also:case with them, its content is given by experience alone, and differs from theirs only in being the See also:object of the See also:internal as opposed. to the See also:external sense. But by this Beneke in no See also:wise meant a psychology founded on See also:physiology. These two sciences, in his See also:opinion, had quite distinct provinces and gave no mutual assistance. Just as little help is to be expected from the See also:science of the See also:body as from See also:mathematics and See also:metaphysics, both of which had been pressed by Herbart into the service of psychology. The true method of study is that applied with so much success in the See also:physical sciences—critical examination of the given experience, and reference of it to ultimate causes, which may not be themselves perceived, but are nevertheless hypotheses necessary to See also:account for the facts. (See on method, Neue Psych., See also:essay i.) Starting from the two assumptions that there is nothing, or at least no formed product, innate in the mind, and that definite faculties do not originally exist, and from the fact that our minds nevertheless actually have a definite content and definite modes of See also:action, Beneke proceeds to See also:state somewhat dogmatically his scientifically verifiable hypotheses as to the See also:primitive See also:condition of the soul and the See also:laws according to which it develops. Originally the soul is possessed of or is an immense variety of See also:powers, faculties or forces (conceptions which Beneke, in opposition to Herbart, holds to be metaphysically justifiable), differing from one another only in tenacity, vivacity, receptivity and grouping. These primitive immaterial forces, so closely See also:united as to See also:form but one being (essence), acquire definiteness or form through the action upon them of stimuli or excitants from the See also:outer See also:world. This action of external impressions which are appropriated by the internal powers is the first fundamental See also:process in the See also:genesis of the completed mind. If the See also:union of impression and See also:faculty be sufficiently strong, consciousness (not self-consciousness) arises, and definite sensations and perceptions begin to be formed. These primitive sensations, however, are not to be identified with the sensations of the See also:special senses, for each of these senses is a system of many powers which have grown into a definite unity, have been educated by experience. From ordinary experience it must be concluded that a second fundamental process is incessantly going on, viz. the formation of new powers. which takes place principally during See also:sleep. The third and most important process results from the fact that the See also:combination between stimulus and See also:power may be weak or strong; if weak, then the two elements are said to be movable, and they may flow over from one to another of the already formed psychical products. Any formed faculty does not cease to exist on the removal of its stimulus; in virtue of its fundamental See also:property, tenacity, it sinks back as a trace (See also:Spur) into unconsciousness, whence it may be recalled by the application to it of another stimulus, or by the attraction towards it of some of the movable elements or newly-formed See also:original powers. These traces and the flowing over of the movable elements are the most important conceptions in Beneke's psychology; by means of them he gives a rationale of See also:reproduction and association, and strives to show that all the formed faculties are simply developments from traces of earlier processes. Lastly, similar forms, according to the degree of their similarity, attract one another or tend to form closer combinations. All psychical phenomena are explicable by the relation of impression and power, and by the flow of movable elements; the whole process of mental development is nothing but the result of the action and interaction of the above simple laws. In See also:general this growth may be said to take the direction of rendering more and more definite by repetition and attraction of like to like the originally indefinite activities of the See also:primary faculties. Thus the sensations of the special senses are gradually formed from the primary sensuous feelings (sinnliche Enzpfndungen); concepts are formed from intuitions of individuals by the attraction of the See also:common elements, and the consequent flow towards them of movable forms. See also:Judgment is the springing into consciousness of a concept alongside of an in-tuition, or of a higher concept alongside of a See also:lower. Reasoning is merely a more complex judgment. Nor are there special faculties of judging or reasoning. The understanding is simply the See also:mass of concepts lying in the background of unconsciousness, ready to be called up and to flow with force towards anything closely connected with them. Even memory is not a special faculty; it is simply the fundamental property of tenacity possessed by the original faculties. The very distinction between the great classes, Knowledge, Feeling and Will, may be referred to elementary See also:differences in the original relations of faculty and impression. This is the groundwork of Beneke's philosophy. It should be carefully compared with the association psychology of See also:modern See also:British thinkers, most of whose results and processes will be found there worked into a comprehensive system (see ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS). In See also:logic, metaphysics and ethics Beneke's speculations are naturally dependent on his psychology. The special value of Beneke's See also:works, as has been already said, consists in the many specimens of acute psychological analysisscattered throughout them. As a See also:complete explanation of psychical facts, the theory seems defective. The original hypotheses, See also:peculiar to Beneke, on which the whole depends, are hastily assumed and See also:rest on a clumsy See also:mechanical See also:metaphor. As is the case with all empirical theories of mental development, the higher categories or notions, which are apparently shown to result from the simple elements, are really presupposed at every step. Particularly um satisfactory is the account of consciousness, which is said to arise from the union of impression and faculty. The See also:necessity of consciousness for any mental action whatsoever is apparently granted, but the conditions involved in it are never discussed or mentioned. The same defect appears in the account of ethical judgment; no amount of empirical fact can ever yield the notion of See also:absolute See also:duty. His results have found See also:acceptance mainly with See also:practical teachers. Undoubtedly his See also:minute See also:analysis of temperament and careful exposition of the means whereby the See also:young, unformed mind may be trained are of See also:infinite value; but the truth of many of his doctrines on these points lends no support to the fundamental hypotheses, from which, indeed, they might be almost entirely severed. Beneke was a most prolific writer, and besides the works mentioned above, published large See also:treatises in the several departments of philosophy, both pure and as applied to See also:education and ordinary See also:life. A complete See also:list of his writings will be found in the appendix to Dressler's edition of the Lehrbuch der Psychologie als Naturwissenschaft (1861). The See also:chief are :—Psychologische Skizzen (1825, 1827); Lehrbuch der Psychologie (1832); Metaphysik and Religionsphilosophie (184o); See also:Die neue Psychologie (1845); Pragmatische Psychologie See also:oder Seelenlehre in der Anwendung auf das Leben (1832). Among German writers, who, though not professed followers of Beneke, have been largely influenced by him, may be mentioned See also:Ueberweg and Karl See also:Fortlage (1806-1881). In See also:England, perhaps, the only writer who shows traces of acquaintance with his works is J. D. See also:Morell (Introd. to Mental Philosophy). The most eminent members of the school are J. G. Dressler (whose Beneke oder Seelenlehre als Naturwissenschaft is an admirable exposition), Fried. Dittes and G. Raue. The compendium by the last-named author passed through four See also:editions in See also:Germany, and has been translated into See also:French, Flemish and English. The English See also:translation, Elements of Psychology (1871), gives a lucid and succinct view of the whole system. Among more See also:recent works on Beneke are O. E. See also:Hummel, Die Unterrichtslehre Benekes (See also:Leipzig, 1885) ; on his ethical theory, C. H. Th. See also:Kuhn, Die Sittenlehre F. E. Benekes (1892); Joh. Friedrich, F. E. Beneke (See also:Wiesbaden, 1898, with See also:biography and list of works); See also:Otto Gramzow, F. E. Benekes Leben and Philos. (See also:Bern, 1899, with full bibliography); on his theory of knowledge, H. Renner, Benekes Erkenntnistheorie (Halle, 1902); on his metaphysics, Die Metaphysik Benekes, by A. Wandschneider (Berlin, 1903) ; Brandt, Beneke, the See also:Man and His Philosophy (New See also:York, 1895) ; Falckenberg, Hist. of Phil. (Eng. trans., 1895); and H. See also:Hoffding, Hist. of Mod. Phil. vol. ii. (Eng. trans., 1900). (R. Additional information and CommentsThere are no comments yet for this article.
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