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WATERLOO CAMPAIGN, 1815

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Originally appearing in Volume V28, Page 372 of the 1911 Encyclopedia Britannica.
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WATERLOO See also:CAMPAIGN, 1815 . On See also:February 27, 1815, See also:Napoleon set See also:sail from See also:Elba with his force of boo men and 4 guns, determined to reconquer the See also:throne of See also:France. On See also:March 1 he landed near See also:Cannes, and proceeded at once to march on See also:Paris. He deliberately See also:chose the difficult route over the See also:French See also:Alps because he recognized that his opponents would neither expect him by this route nor be able to See also:concert combined operations in See also:time to thwart him. Events proved the See also:wisdom of his choice. His advance to Paris was a See also:series of triumphs, his See also:power waxing with every See also:league he covered, and when he reached Paris the Bourbons had fled. But he had soon to turn his See also:attention to See also:war. His sudden return, far from widening the breaches between the See also:allies, had fused them indissolubly together, and the four See also:powers See also:bound themselves to put 15o,00o men apiece under arms and to maintain them in the See also:field until Napoleon had been utterly crushed. So, from the first, France was faced with anothet war against an affrighted and infuriated See also:Europe, a war in which the big battalions would be on the See also:side of the Seventh See also:Coalition; and to oppose their vast armies Napoleon only had in March the 150,000 men he had taken over from See also:Louis XVIII. when the See also:Bourbon hurriedly quitted the throne. Of this force the See also:emperor could have See also:drawn together some 50,000 men within ten days and struck straight at the small allied forces that were in See also:Belgium at the moment: But he wisely refrained from taking the immediate offensive. Such an See also:act would have proved that he desired, See also:nay provoked a war; and further, the engagement of such small forces could See also:lead to no decisive results. Napoleon therefore stayed his See also:hand and proceeded to hasten forward the organization, almost the creation of an See also:army, with which he could confront the coalition.

Mean-while he sought to detach See also:

Great See also:Britain and See also:Austria from the See also:alliance. But he did not permit his See also:political enterprise to stay his military preparations; and, by See also:constant attention to the minutest details, by See also:June 1 he had got together p ;ara~~s an army of 360,000 for the See also:defence of France, one See also:half agog. of which was available for field service. In this army was comprised his whole means of defence; for he had no allies. On his return from Elba it is true that See also:Murat, the See also:king of See also:Naples, took his side; but recklessly opening an offensive campaign, Murat was beaten at See also:Tolentino (May 2-3), and he found himself compelled to See also:fly in disguise to France, where the emperor refused him an See also:audience or employment. Herein Napoleon wronged France, for he deprived her of the most brilliant See also:cavalry soldier of the See also:period. Shorn thus of his single ally, the emperor realized that the whole eastern See also:land-frontier of France was open to invasion, from the See also:North See also:Sea to the Mediterranean. By the end of May he had placed his forces as follows to protect his See also:empire. D'Erlon's I. See also:Corps cantoned between See also:Lille and See also:Valenciennes. Reille's II. Corps cantoned between Valenciennes and See also:Avesnes. See also:Vandamme's III.

Corps cantoned around See also:

Rocroi. See also:Gerard's IV. Corps cantoned at See also:Metz. See also:Lobau's VI. Corps cantoned at See also:Laon. See also:Grouchy's Cavalry Reserve at See also:Guise. See also:Marshal See also:Mortier with the Imperial Guard at Paris. Rapp with the V. Corps (20,000) near See also:Strassburg. 18,5oo more troops under See also:Suchet, See also:Brune and Lecourbe guarded the S.E. frontier from See also:Basel to See also:Nice, and covered See also:Lyons; 8000 men under See also:Clausel and See also:Decaen guarded the Pyrenean frontier; whilst Lamarque led 1o,000 men into La See also:Vendee to quell the insurrection in that See also:quarter. In 1815 Napoleon was not supported by a See also:united and unanimous France; the See also:country 372 was weakened by See also:internal dissensions at the very moment when it was needful to put every See also:man in See also:line to meet the rising See also:tide of invasion surging against the See also:long curving eastern frontier. Napoleon now pondered over his See also:plan of campaign.

In Belgium, across an almost open frontier, See also:

lay an ever-increasing force of Anglo-Dutch and Prussian troops under See also:Wellington and See also:Blucher. The See also:Rhine frontier was threatened by See also:Schwarzenberg's Austrians (210,000); See also:Barclay de Tolly's Russians (150,0O0) were slowly coming up; and another See also:Austrian force menaced the S.E. frontier of France. The allies determined that they would wage a war without risks, and they were particularly anxious to avoid the See also:risk of defeat in detail. It was accordingly arranged that Wellington and Blucher should await in Belgium the arrival of the Austrian and See also:Russian masses on the Rhine, about See also:July r, before the See also:general invasion of France was begun. Thereafter, whatever befell, the allied armies would resolutely See also:press forward towards Paris, affording each other mutual support, and with the tremendous See also:weight of troops at their disposal thrust back Napoleon upon his See also:capital, force him to fight in front of it, and drive him when defeated within its See also:works. The end would then be in sight. Thus they had planned the campaign, but Napoleon forestalled them.. In fact, the threatening danger forced his hand and compelled him to strike before he had collected a sufficient army for his defensive needs. Consequently he determined to advance swiftly and secretly against Wellington and Blucher, whose forces, as Napoleon knew, were dispersed over the country of their unenthusiastic ally. Thus he designed to crush a See also:part of the coalition before the Russians and Austrians poured over the eastern frontier. Once Wellington and Bliicher were destroyed he would move southwards and meet the other allies on the Rhine. He might thus compensate for his numerical inferiority by See also:superior mobility and superior leadership.

His See also:

information showed that Wellington held the western half of Belgium from the See also:Brussels-See also:Charleroi road to the See also:Scheldt, that his See also:base of operations was See also:Ostend, and that his headquarters were at Brussels. Blucher, based on Napoleon's plans. the Rhine at Coblentz, held the eastern half from the Brussels-Charleroi road to the See also:Meuse, and had his headquarters at See also:Namur. The emperor was convinced that nothing could be gained by invading Belgium from the S.E. or W.; such a stroke would surely drive the allies together, and that was never Napoleon's See also:custom. On the other hand, if he struck straight at Charleroi-the allied junction point—he would drive the " Armee du See also:Nord " like an armoured See also:wedge between the allies, if only he caught them unsuspicious and unready. Forced asunder at the outset, each would (in all See also:probability) fall back along his own line of communication, and the See also:gap thus made between the allies would enable the emperor to manoeuvre between them and defeat them in turn. To gain the best See also:chance of success he would have to concentrate his whole army almost within gunshot of the centre of the enemies' outposts without attracting their attention; otherwise he would find the allies concentrated and waiting for him. Wellington and Blucher were disposed as follows in the See also:early days of June (See also:Map I.). The Anglo-Dutch army of 93,000 with headquarters at Brussels were cantoned: I. Corps (See also:Prince of See also:Orange), 30,200, headquarters Braine-le-See also:Comte, disposed in the See also:area See also:Enghien-Genappe-See also:Mons; II. Corps (See also:Lord See also:Hill), 27,300, headquarters Atli, distributed in the area See also:Ath-Oudenarde-See also:Ghent; reserve cavalry (Lord See also:Uxbridge) 9900, in the valley of the Dendre See also:river, between See also:Grammont and Ninove; the reserve (under Wellington himself) 25,500, lay around Brussels. The frontier in front of Leuze and Binche was watched by the Dutch-Belgian See also:light cavalry.

End of Article: WATERLOO CAMPAIGN, 1815

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WATERLOW, SIR ERNEST ALBERT (1850- )

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