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CAVALRY (Fr. cavalerie, Ger. Kavaller...
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See also:CAVALRY (Fr. cavalerie, Ger. Kavallerie or Reiterei, derived ultimately from See also:late See also:Lat. caballus, See also:horse) , a word which came into use in military literature about the See also:middle of the 16th See also:century as applied to mounted men of all kinds employed for combatant purposes, whether intended primarily for charging in masses, in small bodies, or for dismounted fighting. By degrees, as greater refinement of terminology has become desirable, the See also:idea has been narrowed down until it includes only " horsemen trained to achieve the purpose of their See also:commander by the combined See also:action of See also:man and horse," and this See also:definition will be found to See also:cover the whole See also: These horses appear to have come from the vicinity of See also:Dongola, and the See also:strain still survives in the See also:Sudan. The breed is traced into See also:Arabia, where only second-See also:rate horses had been reared hitherto, and thence to different parts of Europe, where eventually centres of cavalry activity See also:developed. The first detailed See also:evidence of the existence of organized bodies of mounted men is to be found in See also:Xenophon, whose instructions for the breaking, training and command of a See also:squadron remain almost as a See also:model for See also:modern practice. Their See also:tactical employment, however, seems still to have been relatively insignificant, for the horses were still far too small and too few to deliver a See also:charge with sufficient momentum to break the heavy armed and disciplined hoplites. The strain of See also:ancient See also:battle was of an entirely different See also:order to that of modern fighting. In the See also:absence of projectiles of sufficient range and See also:power to sweep a whole See also:area, the fighting was entirely between the front ranks of the opposing forces. When a front See also:rank fighter See also:fell, his See also:place was immediately taken by his comrade in the See also:rear, who took up the individual combat, excited by his comrade's See also:fate but relatively fresh in mind and muscle. This See also:process of feeding the fight from the rear could be protracted almost indefinitely. If then, as a consequence of a charge, a few mounted men did penetrate the ranks, they encountered such a See also:crowd of well-protected and fresh swordsmen that they were soon pulled off their ponies and despatched. Now and again See also:great leaders, See also: Hence both sides provided them-selves with horsemen, and when these met, each in the performance of their several duties, charges of masses naturally ensued. This explains the value attaching in thg old days to the See also:possession of horse-flesh and the rapid spread of the relatively new Dongola or See also:African strain over the then known See also:world. The See also:primitive See also:instinct of aboriginal man is to throw stones or other missiles for purposes of See also:defence (apes will throw anything they can find, but they never use sticks) ; hence, as the See also:Romans penetrated ever farther amongst the See also:barbarian tribes, their , horsemen in first See also:line found ever-increasing need for See also:protection against projectiles. But the greater the See also:weight of See also:armour carried, the greater the demands upon the endurance of the horse. Then, as the weight-carrying breed was expensive and, with the decay of the Roman See also:Empire, corruption and peculation spread, a limit was soon placed on the multiplication of charging cavalry, and it became necessary to fall back on the indigenous See also:pony, which could only carry a rider from place to place, not charge. Thus there was a See also:gradual levelling down of the mounted arms, the heavy cavalry becoming too heavy to gallop and the See also:light not See also:good enough for See also:united action. Against such opponents, the lighter and better mounted tribesmen of Asia found their task easy. They cut off the supplies of the marching infantry, filled up or destroyed the See also:wells, &c., and thus demonstrated the strategic See also:necessity of See also:superior mobility. With the decay of See also:civilization discipline also disappeared, and, as discipline consists essentially in the spirit of self-See also:sacrifice for the good of the community, its opposite, self-preservation, became the guiding principle. This in turn led to the increase of armour carried, and thence to the demand for heavier horses, and this demand working through several centuries led ultimately to the breeding of the great weight-carrying animals on whose existence that of See also:medieval See also:chivalry depended. These horses, however, being very costly and practically useless for See also:general purposes, could only become the See also:property of the wealthy, who were too See also:independent to feel the need of See also:combination, and preferred to live on the spoliation and See also:taxation of the weak. This spoliation eventually impelled the weaker men to combine, and at first their combination took the See also:form of the construction of fortified places, against which mounted men were powerless. On the other See also:hand, expense put a limit to the area which fortifications could enclose, and this again limited the supplies for the See also:garrison. Horsemen sweeping the See also:country for See also:miles around had no difficulty in feeding themselves, and the surrender of all beleaguered places through See also:starvation was ultimately inevitable, unless See also:food could be introduced from allied towns in the vicinity. It was of no use to introduce fighting men only into a place which primarily required food (cf. See also:Lucknow, 1857) to protract its resistance. Hence some means had to be found to surround the See also:supply-convoys with a physically impenetrable See also:shield, and eighteen-See also:foot pikes in the hands of powerful disciplined soldiers met the requirements. Against eight to ten ranks of such men the best cavalry in the world, relying only on their swords, were helpless, and for the time (towards the See also:close of the 15th century) infantry remained masters of the field on the See also:continent of Europe. See also:England meanwhile had developed on lines of her own. Thanks to her longbowmen and the military See also:genius of her leaders, she might have retained indefinitely the command of the continent had it not been for the invention of See also:gunpowder, which, though readily accepted by the See also:English for sieges in See also:France, proved the ultimate cause of their undoing. It was the See also:French who developed the use of See also:siege See also:artillery most rapidly, and their cavalry were not slow to take the hint; unlike the longbow and the crossbow, the See also:pistol could be used effectively from horseback, and presently the knights and their retainers, having the deepest purses, provided themselves with See also:long pistols in addition to their lances and swords. These weapons sent a See also:bullet through any armour which a foot-soldier could conveniently carry, or his commander afford, and if anything went wrong with their mechanism (which was complicated and uncertain) the See also:speed of his horse soon carried the rider out of danger. A new form of attack against infantry, introduced by the French at Cerisoles, 1544, thus developed itself. A See also:troop or squadron, formed in from twelve to sixteen ranks, trotted up to within pistol shot of the See also:angle of the square to be attacked and halted; then each rank in See also:succession cantered off man by man to the See also:left, discharging his pistol at the square as he passed, and riding back to his place behind the See also:column to reload. This could be prolonged indefinitely, and against such tactics the infantry were powerless. The stakes carried by English archers to check the See also:direct charge of horse-men became useless, as did also chevaux de frise, though the latter (which originated in the 14th century) continued to be employed by the Austrians against the swiftly-charging See also:Turks till the close of the 17th century. Thus it became necessary to devise some new impediment which, whilst remaining See also:mobile, would also give cover and an See also:advantage in the final hand-to-hand See also:shock. The problem was solved in Bohemia, See also:Poland and See also:Moravia (Hussite See also:wars, about 1420), where, distances being great and the country open, greater mobility and capacity in the convoys became essential. Great trains of wagons were placed in charge of an infantry escort, of which a See also:part had become possessed of firearms, and these moved across country in as many as twelve parallel lines drilled to form laagers, as nowadays in See also:South See also:Africa. Again the cavalry proved helpless, and for nearly a century in central Europe the word " Wagenburg " (See also:wagon-fortress) became synonymous with " army." Then an unfortunate See also:inspiration came to the wagon-men. A large See also:gun was relatively cheaper to manufacture, and more effective than a small one. To keep their assailants at a distance, they mounted See also:wall-pieces of about one-See also:inch See also:bore on their wagons. For a moment the See also:balance inclined in their favour, but the cavalry were See also:quick to see their advantage in this new idea, and they immediately followed suit. They, too, mounted guns on wheels, and, as their mobility gave them choice of position, they were able to concentrate their See also:fire against any See also:side of the See also:laager, and again ultimate surrender was the only way out of the defenders' See also:dilemma. The interesting problem thus raised was never finally solved, for the See also:scene of action now shifted to western Europe, to the valley of the Po, and more particularly to the See also:Netherlands, where fortresses were closer together and the clayey nature of the See also:Rhine See also:delta had already made paved roads necessary. Then, the Wagenburg being no longer needed for the See also:short transits between one fortified See also:town and another, the infantry reasserted themselves. Firearms having been much improved in the See also:interval the spearmen (pikemen) had already (about 1515) learnt to protect themselves by musketeers trained to take advantage of cover and ground somewhat in the same See also:fashion as the modern skirmisher. These musketeers kept light guns at a distance from their pikemen, but dared not venture far out, as their fire was altogether inadequate to stop a See also:rush of horsemen; when the latter threatened to intervene, they had to run for safety to the squares of pikemen, whom they assisted in turn by keeping the cavalry beyond pistol range. Hence the horsemen had to fall back upon more powerful guns, and these, being slow and requiring more See also:train, could be most economically protected by infantry (see also ARTILLERY). Thus about the close of the 16th century western armies differentiated themselves out into the still existing three types cavalry, artillery and infantry. Moreover, each type 17th- was subdivided, the cavalry becoming heavy, See also:medium century OroSress, and dragoons. At this period there was nothing to disturb the See also:equilibrium of two contending forces except the characters of their respective leaders. The See also:mercenary See also:element had triumphed everywhere over the feudal levies. The moral qualities of all were on the same indifferent level, and battles in the open followed one recognized course. Neither army being able to outmarch the other, both See also:drew up masses of pikes in parallel lines. The musketeers covered the deployment of the heavy guns on either side, the cavalry drew up on the wings and a strictly parallel fight ensued, for in the absence of a See also:common cause for which men were willing to See also:die, See also:plunder was the ruling See also:motive, and all See also:control and discipline melted in the excitement of the contest. It is to the growth of Protestantism that cavalry owes its next great forward leap. To sweep the battlefield, it was absolutely essential that men should be ready tc subordinate selfish considerations to the See also:triumph of their cause. The Roman Catholicism of the See also:day gave many loopholes for the evasion of clear See also:duty, but from these the reformed faith was See also:free, and it is to the reawakened sense of duty that Gustavus See also:Adolphus appealed. This alone rendered combination amongst his subordinate leaders possible, and on this power of combination all his victories depended. Other cavalry soldiers, once let loose in the charge, could never be trusted to return to the field, the prospective plunder of the enemy's baggage being too strong a temptation; but the See also: " They can Frederick manoeuvre," on foot, " with the same precision as II.; reform my grenadiers, but unfortunately they are equally of the
slow." His enemies the Austrians, thanks to their Prussian wars against the Turks who always charged at a cavalry. gallop, had maintained greater dash and mobility, and at Mollwitz the Prussians only escaped disaster by the astounding rapidity of their infantry fire. In disgust the king then wrote, " Die Cavallerie is nicht einmal See also:werth dasz sie der Teufel See also:week holet," and he immediately set about their re-form with his usual See also:energy and thoroughness. Three years after Mollwitz, the result of his exertions was apparent in the greatly increased importance the arm acquired on the battlefield, and the charge of the See also:Bayreuth dragoons at See also:Hohenfriedberg (See also:June 4, 1745), who with 1500 horses rode over and dispersed 20 See also:Austrian battalions, bringing in 2500 prisoners and 67 See also:colours, will always rank as one of the most brilliant feats in military history.' The following years of See also:peace (1745–1756) were devoted to the methodical preparation of the cavalry to meet the requirements that Frederick's methods of war would make upon them, and it is to this period that the student should devote See also:special See also:attention. From the very outbreak of the Seven Years' War (1956) this training asserted its influence, and See also:Rossbach (1957) and Zorndorf (1958) are the See also:principal examples of what cavalry handled in masses can effect. At Rossbach General v. Seydlitz, at the See also:head of 38 squadrons, practically began and ended the destruction of the French army, and at Zorndorf he saved the day for the Prussians by a See also:series of the most brilliant charges, which successively destroyed the See also:Russian right wing and centre. These battles so conclusively demonstrated the superiority of the Prussian cavalry that their enemies completely altered their tactical See also:procedure. They now utilized their enormous numerical superiority by working in two See also:separate armies, each almost as strong as the whole Prussian force. When the latter moved against either, the one threatened immediately threw up heavy entrenchments, against which cavalry were, of course, ineffective, whilst the other pursued its See also: The increased demands made upon the mobility of the Prussian horsemen naturally resulted in the gradual rejection of everything which was not essential to their striking power. The long muskets and bayonets were laid aside, but the See also:cuirass was retained for the melee, and by the close of the great struggle the various branches of the arm had differentiated themselves out into the types still adhered to, heavy cavalry, dragoons, hussars, whose equipment as regards essentials thenceforward hardly varied up to the latter- years of the loth century. The only striking difference lies in the entire rejection of the lance in the armament of the charging squadrons, and the See also:reason is characteristic of the principles of the day. The Prussian cavalry had realized that success was decided, not primarily by actual collision, but by the moral effect of the appearance of an absolutely closed wall of horse-men approaching the adversary at full speed. If the necessary degree of cohesion was attained, the other side was morally beaten before collision took place, and either turned to See also:flight, or met the shock with so little See also:resolution that it was ridden over without difficulty. In the former See also:case any weapon was good enough to kill a flying enemy; in the latter, in the melee which then ensued, the crush in the ranks of the victors was still so great that the lance was a hindrance rather than a help. In the years succeeding the war the efficiency of the Prussian cavalry sank very rapidly, the initial cause being the See also:death of Seydlitz at the early See also:age of fifty-two. His personality had alone dominated the discontent, lethargy and hopelessness created'by ruthless See also:financial economies. When he was gone, as always in the absence of a great leader, men adapted their lives to the line of least resistance. In See also:thirty years the See also:wreck was See also:complete, and within the splendid squadrons which had been accustomed to manceuvre with perfect precision at the highest speed, there were (as F. A. von der Marwitz in his Nan/class clearly shows) not more than seven thoroughly trained men and horses to each, the See also:remainder being trained for little longer and receiving less attention than is the case with modern and line or See also:auxiliary cavalry. For the See also:generation preceding the outbreak of the French Revolution, Frederick the Great's army, and especially his Cavalry cavalry, had become the model for all Europe, but in the the mainspring of the excellence of his squadrons revolu- was everywhere overlooked. Seydlitz had manceuvred tnottary great masses of horsemen, therefore every one 'else wam must have great masses also; but no nation grasped the See also:secret, viz. the unconditional obedience of the horse to its rider, on which his success had depended. Neither was it possible under the prevailing social conditions to secure the old See also:stamp of horse, or the former attention to detail on the part of men and See also:officers. In France, owing to the agricultural decay of the country, suitable remounts for charging cavalry were almost unobtainable, and as this particular See also:branch of the arm was almost exclusively commanded by the See also:aristocracy it suffered most in the early days of the Revolution: The hussars, being chiefly recruited and officered by Alsatians and Germans from the Rhine provinces, retained their individuality and traditions much longer than the dragoons and cuirassiers, and, to the very close of the great wars, we find them always ready to charge at a gallop; but the unsteadiness and poor See also:horsemanship of the other branches was so great that up to 1812, the See also:year of their destruction, they always charged at a trot only, considering that the advantage of superior cohesion thus gained more than balanced the loss of momentum due to the slower See also:pace. Generally, the growth of the French cavalry service followed the universal See also:law. The best big horses went to the heavy charging cavalry, viz. the cuirassiers, the best light horses to the hussars, and the dragoons received the remainder, for in principle they were only infantry placed on horseback for convenience of loco-See also:motion, and were not primarily intended for combined mounted action. Fortunately for them, their principal adversaries, the Austrians, had' altogether failed to grasp the See also:lesson of the Seven Years' War. See also:Writing in 178o See also:Colonel Mack, a very capable officer, said, " Even in1769, the cavalry could not ride, could not See also:manage to control their horses. Not a single squadron could keep its dressing at a gallop, and before they had gone fifty yards at least ten out of See also:forty horses in the first rank would break out to the front," and though the See also:veteran field See also:marshal See also:Lacy issued new regulations, their spirit seems always to have escaped the executive officers. The See also:British cavalry was almost worse off, for See also:economy had reduced its squadrons to See also:mere skeletons, and the traditional British See also:style of horsemanship, radically different from that in See also:vogue in France, made their training for combined action even more difficult than elsewhere. Hence the history of cavalry during the earlier campaigns of the Revolution is marked by no decisive triumphs, the results are always in-adequate when judged by the magnitude of the forces employed, and only the brilliant exploit of the 15th Light Dragoons (now Hussars) at Villers en Couche (See also:April 24, 1794) deserves to be cited as an instance of the extraordinary influence which even a few horsemen can exercise over a demoralized or untrained See also:mob of infantry. Up to the See also:campaign of Poland (see NAPoLEo c CAMPAIGNS) French victories were won chiefly by the brilliant infantry fighting, cavalry only intervening (as at See also:Jena) to charge a beaten enemy and complete his destruction by pursuit. But after the terrible See also:waste of See also:life in the See also:winter of 1806-7i and the appalling losses in battle, See also:Napoleon introduced a new form of attack. The case-shot preparation of his artillery (see ARTILLERY) sowed confusion and terror in the enemy's ranks, and the opportunity was used by masses of cavalry. Henceforward this method dominated the See also:Napoleonic tactics and strategy. The essential difference between this See also:system and the Frederician lies in this, that with the artillery available in the former period it was not possible to say in advance at what point the intervention of cavalry would be necessary, hence the need for speed and precision of manceuvre to ensure their arrival at the right time and place. Napoleon now selected beforehand the point he meant to overwhelm and could bring his cavalry masses within striking distance at leisure. Once placed, it was only necessary to induce them to run away in the required direction to overwhelm everything by sheer weight of men and horses, • This method failed at See also:Waterloo because the ground was too heavy; the slope of it against the charge, and the whole condition of the horses too See also:low for the exertion demanded of them. The British cavalry from- t to 1815 suffered from the same causes which at the beginning of the aoth century brought about its breakdown in the South African War. Over-See also:sea transport brought the horses to See also:land in poor condition, and it was rarely possible to afford them sufficient time to recover and become accustomed to the change in See also:forage, the conditions of the particular theatre of operations, &c., before they had to be led against the enemy—hence a • heavy casualty See also:roll and the introduction into the ranks , of raw unbroken horses which interfered with the precision of manceuvre of the remainder. Their losses (about 13% per annum) were small as compared with those of South Africa, but this is mainly accounted for by the fact that, operations being generally in the See also:northern hemisphere, the change of See also:climate was never so severe. Tactically, they suffered, like the Austrians and Prussians, from the absence of any conception of the Napoleonic strategy amongst their principal leaders. As it was not known where the great See also:blow was to fall, they were distributed along the whole line, and thus became habituated to the idea of operating in relatively small bodies. This is the worst school for the cavalry soldier, because it is only when -working in masses of forty to sixty squadrons that the cumulative consequences of small errors of detail become so apparent as to convince all ranks of the necessity of conforming accurately to established prescriptions. Nevertheless, they still retained the practice of charging at a gallop, and as a whole were by far the most efficient See also:body of horsemen who survived at the close of the great wars. In the reaction that then ensued all over Europe, cavalry practically ceased to exist. The financial and agricultural exhaustion of all countries, and of Prussia in particular, was so complete that See also:money was nowhere to be found for the great concentrations and manoeuvre practices which are Darer more essential to the efficiency of the cavalry than to 19th century. that of the other arms. Hence a whole generation of officers See also:grew up in See also:ignorance of the fundamental principles which govern the employment of their arm. It was not till 1848 that the Prussians began again to unite whole cavalry divisions for See also:drill and manoeuvre, and the soldiers of the older generation had not yet passed away when the campaigns of 1866 and 1870 brought up again the realities of the battle-field. Meanwhile the introduction of long-range artillery and small arms had entirely destroyed the tactical relation of the three arms on which the Napoleonic tactics and strategy had been based, and the idea gained ground that the battle-field would no longer afford the same opportunities to cavalry as before. The experiences gained by the Americans in the See also:Civil War helped to confirm this preconception. If in battles waged between infantries armed only with muzzle-loading rifles, cavalry could find no opportunity to repeat past exploits, it was argued that its chances could not fail to be still further reduced by the See also:breech-loader. But this reasoning ignored the principal factors of former successes. The mounted men in See also:America failed not as a See also:con-sequence of the armament they encountered, but because the war brought out no Napoleon to create by his skill the opportunity for decisive cavalry action, and to See also:mass his men beforehand in confident anticipation. The same reasoning applies to the See also:European campaigns of 1866 and 187o, and the results obtained by the arm were so small, in proportion to the See also:numbers of squadrons available and to their cost of See also:maintenance as compared with the other arms, that a strong reaction set in everywhere against the existing institutions, and the re-creation of the See also:dragoon, under the new name of mounted rifleman, was advocated in the See also:hope of obtaining a cheap and efficient substitute for the cavalryman. Later events in South Africa and in See also:Manchuria again brought this question prominently to the front, but the essential difference between the old and new See also:schools of thought has not been generally realized. The " mounted rifle " adherents See also:base their arguments on the greatly increased efficiency of the rifle itself. The cavalry " school, on the other hand, maintains that, the weapons themselves being everywhere substantially equal in efficiency, the advantage rests with the side which can create the most favourable conditions for their employment, and that, fundamentally, superior mobility will always confer upon its possessor the choice of the circumstances under which he will elect to engage. Where the two sides are nearly equally matched in mobility, neither side can afford the time to dismount, for the other will utilize that time to manoeuvre into a position which gives him a relative superiority for whichever form of attack he may elect to adopt, and this relative superiority will always more than suffice to eliminate any advantage in accuracy of fire that his opponent may have obtained by devoting his principal attention to training his men on the range instead of on the mounted manoeuvre ground. Finally, the " cavalry" school reasons that in no single campaign since Napoleon's time have the conditions governing encounters been normal. Either the roadless and barren nature of the country has precluded of itself the rapid marching which forms the basis of all modern strategy, as in America, See also:Turkey, South Africa and Manchuria, or the relative power of the infantry and artillery weapons, as in Bohemia (1866) and in France (1870), has rendered wholly impossible the creation of the great tactical opportunity characteristic of Napoleon's later method, for there then existed no means of overwhelming the enemy with a sufficient See also:hail of projectiles to render the penetration of the cavalry feasible. The latest improvement in artillery, viz. the perfected shrapnel and the quick-firing guns, have, however, enormously facilitated the attainment of this See also:primary fire superiority, and, moreover, it has simplified the procedure to such a degree that Napoleon is no longer needed to direct. The battles of the future will thus, in civilized countries, revert to the Napoleonic type,567 and the side which possesses the most highly trained and mobile force of cavalry will enjoy a greater relative superiority over its adversary than at any period since the days of Frederick. The whole experience of the past thus goes to show that no nation in peace has ever yet succeeded in maintaining a highly trained cavalry sufficiently numerous to meet all the demands of a great war. Hence at the outbreak of hostilities there has always been a demand for some See also:kind of supplementary force which can relieve the See also:regular squadrons of those duties of observation and exploration which See also:wear down the horses most rapidly and thus render the squadrons ineffective for their culminating duty on the battle-field. This demand has been met by the enrolment of men willing to fight and rendered mobile by mounts of an inferior description, and the greater the urgency the greater has been the tendency to give them arms which they can quickly learn to 'use. To make a man an See also:expert swordsman or lancer has always taken years, but he can be taught to use a See also:musket or rifle sufficiently for his immediate purpose in a very short time. Hence, to begin with, arms of this description have invariably been issued to him. But once these bodies have been formed, and they have come into collision with trained cavalry, the advantages of mobility, combined with the power of shock, have become so apparent to all, that insensibly the " dragoon" has developed into the cavalry soldier; the rate of this evolution being conditioned by the nature of the country in which the fighting took place. This evolution is best seen in the See also:American Civil War. The men of the mounted forces engaged had been trained to the use of the rifle from childhood, while the vast See also:majority had never seen a sword, hence the formation of " mounted rifles "; and these " mounted rifles " developed precisely in accordance with the nature of their surroundings. In districts of virgin forests and marshland they remained " mounted rifles," in the open See also:prairie country of the See also:west they became cavalry pure and See also:simple, though for want of time they never rivalled the precision of manoeuvre and endurance of modern Prussian or Austrian horse. In South Africa the same sequence was followed, and had the See also:Boer War lasted longer it is certain that such Boer leaders as de Wet and de la Rey would have reverted to cavalry tactics of shock and See also:cold See also:steel at the earliest possible opportunity. Therefore when we find, extending over a See also:cycle of ages, the same causes producing the same effects, the natural conclusion is that the evolution of the cavalry arm is subject to a universal law which persists in spite of all changes of armament. Employment of Cavalry.—It is a fundamental See also:axiom of all military action that the officer commanding the cavalry of any force comprising the three arms of the service is in the strictest sense an executive officer under the officer commanding that particular force as a whole. The latter again is himself responsible to the See also:political power he represents. When intricate political problems are at stake, it may be, and generally is, quite impracticable that any subordinate can See also:share the secret knowledge of the power to which he owes his See also:allegiance. The essence of the value of the cavalry soldier's services lies in this, that the demand is never made upon him in its supremest form until the instinct of the real commander realizes that the time has come. Whether it he to cover a See also:retreat, and by the loss of hundreds to See also:save the lives of tens of thousands, or to complete a victory with commensurate results in the opposite direction, the See also:obligation remains the same—to stake the last man and horse in the attainment of the immediate See also:object in view, the defeat of the enemy. This at once places the leader of cavalry in See also:face of his principal problem. It is a See also:matter of experience that the broader the front on which he can deliver a charge, the greater the chances of success. However strong the bonds of discipline may be, the line is ultimately, and at a certain See also:nervous tension, only a number of men on horses, acting and reacting on one another in various ways. When therefore, of two lines, moving to meet one another at speed, one See also:sees itself overlapped to either hand, the men in the line thus over-lapped invariably and inevitably tend to open outwards, so as at least to meet their enemy on an equal frontage. Hence 568 every cavalry commander tries to strike at-the flank of his enemy, and the latter manoeuvres to meet him, and if both have equal mobility, See also:local collision must ensue on an equal and parallel front. Therefore both strive to put every available man and horse in their first line, and if men and horses were invulnerable such a line would sweep over the ground like a See also:scythe and nothing could withstand it. Since, however, bullets kill at a distance, and inequalities and unforeseen difficulties of the ground may throw hundreds of horses and riders, a working See also:compromise has to be found to meet eventualities, and, other things being equal, victory inclines to the leader who best See also:measures the risks and uncertainties of his undertaking, and keeps in hand a sufficient reserve to meet all chances. Thus there has arisen a saying, which is sometimes regarded as axiomatic, that in cavalry encounters the last dosed reserve always wins. The truth is really that he who has best judged the situation and the men on both sides finds himself in possession of the last reserve at the See also:critical moment. The next point is, how to ensure the presence of this reserve, and what is the critical moment. The battle-field is the critical moment in each phase of every campaign—not the mere See also:chance locality on which a combat takes place, but the decisive See also:arena on which the strategic consequences of all pre-existing conditions of See also:national cohesion, national organization and of civilization are focussed. It is indeed the See also:judgment-seat of nature, on which the right of the See also:race to survive in the struggle for existence is weighed and measured in the most impartial scales. Before, however, the final decision of the battle-field can be attained, a whole series of subordinate decisions have to be fought out, success in each of which conditions the result of the next series of encounters. Every commanding officer of cavalry thus finds himself successively called on to win a victory locally at any cost, and the question of economy of force does not concern him at all. Hence the same fundamental rules apply to all cavalry combats, of whatever magnitude, and condition the whole of cavalry tactics. Broadly speaking, if two cavalries of approximately equal mobility manoeuvre against each other in open country, neither side can afford the loss of time that dismounting to fight on foot entails. Hence, assuming that at the outset of a campaign each side aims at securing a decisive success, both seek out an open See also:plain and a mounted charge, sword in hand, for the decision. When the speed and skill of the combatants are approximately equal, collision ensues simultaneously along parallel fronts, and the See also:threat of the overlapping line is the principal See also:factor in the decision. The better the individual training of man and horse the less will be the chances of unsteadiness or local failures in See also:execution, and the less the need of reserves; hence the force which feels itself the most perfect in the individual efficiency of both man and horse (on which therefore the whole ultimately depends) can afford to keep fewer men in reserve and can thus irkrease the width of its first line for the direct collision. Careful preparation in peace is therefore the first See also:guarantee of success in action. This means that cavalry, unlike infantry, cannot be See also:expanded by the absorption of reserve men and horses on the outbreak of hostilities, but must be maintained at war strength in peace, ready to take the field at a moment's See also:notice, and this is actually the See also:standard of readiness attained on the continent of Europe at the present day. Further, uniformity of speed is the essential condition for the execution of closed charges, and this obviously cannot be assured if big men on little horses and small men on big horses are in-discriminately mixed up in the same See also:units. Horses and men have therefore been sorted out everywhere into three categories, light, medium and heavy, and in periods when war was practically chronic, suitable duties have been allotted to each. It is clear, on purely mechanical grounds, that the greater the velocity of motion at the moment of collision the greater will be the chances of success, and this greater speed will be on the side of the bigger horses as a consequence of their longer stride. On the other hand, these horses, by reason of their greater weight, are used up much more rapidly than small ones. Hence, to ensure the greater speed at the moment of contact, it is necessary to save them asmuch as possible to keep them fresh for the shock only, and this has been the practice of all great cavalry leaders all over the world, and has only been departed from under special circumstances, as by the Germans in France in 1870, when their cavalry practically rode everywhere unopposed. Collisions, however, must be expected by every body of troops large or small; hence each regiment—ultimately each squadron—endeavours to save its horses as far as this is compatible with the attainment of the special object in view, and this has led everywhere and always to a demand for some inter-mediate arm, less expensive to raise and maintain than cavalry proper, and able to cover the ground with sufficient rapidity and collect the information necessary to ensure the proper direction of the cavalry commands. Originally this intermediate force received the designation of dragoons; but since under pressure of circumstances during long periods of war these invariably improved themselves into cavalry and became permanent units in the army organization, fresh names have had to be invented for them, of which Mounted Infantry and Mounted Rifles are the latest, and every improvement in firearms has led to an increased demand for their services. It is now relatively easy to trace out the considerations which should govern the employment of his cavalry by the officer commanding a force of the three arms. Assuming for purposes of See also:illustration an army numerically weak in cavalry, what course will best ensure the presence of the greatest number of sabres at the decisive point, i.e. on the battle-field? To push out cavalry screens far to the front will be to See also:court destruction, nor is the information they obtain of much real service unless the means to See also:act upon it at once is at hand. This can only be supplied economically by the use of strong advanced See also:guards of infantry, and such supplementary See also:security and information as these may require will be best supplied by mounted infantry, the sacrifice of whom will disturb least the fighting integrity of the whole army. Imagine an army of 300,000 men advancing by five parallel roads on a front of go m., each column (6o,000 men, 2 army corps) being covered by a strong advance guard, coming in contact with a similarly constituted army moving in an opposite direction. A series of engagements will ensue, in each of which the object of the local commander will be to paralyse his opponent's will-power by a most vigorous attack, so that his superior officer following him on the same road will be free to act as he chooses. The front of the two armies will now be defined by a line of combats localized each about a comparatively small area, and between them will be wide gaps which it will be the See also:chief business of the directing minds on either side to close by other troops as soon as possible. Generally the See also:call will be made upon the artillery for this purpose, since they can cover the required distances far more rapidly than infantry. Now, as artillery is powerless when limbered up and always very vulnerable on the flanks of" the long lines, a strong cavalry escort will have to be assigned to them which, trotting forward to See also:screen the march, will either come in contact with the enemy's cavalry advancing with a similar object, or themselves find an opportunity to catch the enemy's guns at a disadvantage. These are opportunities for the cavalry, and if necessary it must sacrifice itself to turn them to the best See also:account. The whole course of the battle depends on success or failure in the early formation of great lines of guns, for ultimately the See also:victor in the artillery See also:duel finds himself in command of the necessary balance of guns which are needed to prepare the way for his final decisive infantry attack. If this latter succeeds, then any mounted men who can gallop and shoot will suffice for pursuit. If it fails, no cavalry, however gallant, has any hope of definitely restoring the combat, for against victorious infantry, cavalry, now as in the past, can but gain a little time. This time may indeed be See also:worth the See also:price at which it can be bought, but it will always be more economical to concentrate all efforts to prevent the emergency arising. After the Franco-See also:German War much was written about the possibility of vast cavalry encounters to be fought far in advance of the main armies, for the purpose of obtaining information, and ideas were freely mooted of wide-flung raids traversing the enemy's communications, breaking up his depots, reserve formations, &c. But riper See also:consideration has relegated these suggestions to the background, for it is now evident that such expeditions involve the dissemination of force, not its concentration. See also:Austria and France for example would scarcely throw their numerically inferior cavalry against the Germans, and nothing would suit them better than that the latter should hurl their squadrons against the frontier guards, advanced posts, and, generally, against unbeaten infantry; nor indeed would the Germans stultify their whole strategic teaching by weakening themselves for the decisive struggle. It follows therefore that cavalry See also:reconnaissance duties will be strictly local and tactical, and that arrangements will be made for procuring strategical information by wireless telegraphy, balloons, motor cars, bicycles, &c., and that on the whole that nation will be best served in war which has provided in peace a See also:nucleus of mounted infantry capable of rapid expansion to fill the See also:gap which history shows always to have existed between the infantry and the cavalry. Such troops need not be organized in large bodies, for their See also:mission is to act by " slimness," not by violence. They must be the old " verlorene Haufe " (anglice, " forlorn hope ") of former days, men whose individual bravery and decision is of the highest order. But they can never become a " decision-compelling arm," though by their devotion they may well hope to obtain the See also:grand opportunity for their cavalry, and share with them in harvesting the fruits of victory. The great cavalry encounters of forty to sixty squadrons on either side, which it has been shown must arise from the necessity of screening or preventing the formation of the all-important artillery lines, will take their form mainly from the topographical conditions of the district, and since on a front of 6o to too m. these may vary indefinitely, cavalry must be trained, as indeed it always has been, to fight either on foot or on horseback as occasion requires. In either case, thoroughness of preparation in horsemanship (which, be it observed, includes horsemastership) is the first essential, for in the end victory will See also:rest with the side which can put in the right place with the greatest rapidity the greatest number of sabres or rifles. In the case of rifles there is a greater margin of time available and an initial failure is not irremediable, but the underlying principle is the same in either case; and since it is impossible to foretell exactly the conditions of the collision, all alike, according to the class to which they belong, must be brought up to the highest standard, for this alone guarantees the smooth and rhythmical motion required for covering long distances with the least See also:expenditure of See also:physical and nervous strength on the part both of horse and rider. As a consequence of successes gained in these preliminary encounters, opportunities will subsequently arise for the balance of fresh or rallied squadrons in hand to ride home upon masses of infantry disorganized and demoralized by the combined fire of infantry and artillery, and such opportunities are likely to be much more numerous at the outbreak of future wars than they have been in the past, because the enormous gain in range and rapidity of fire enables a far greater weight of See also:metal to be concentrated on any chosen area within a given time. It cannot be too often reiterated that cavalry never has ridden over unshaken infantry of See also:average quality by reason of its momentum alone, but that every successful cavalry charge has always owed its issue to a previously acquired moral superiority which has prevented the infantry from making adequate use of their means of defence. Nor will such charges See also:entail greater losses than in the past, for, great though the increase of range of modern infantry weapons has been, the speed and endurance of cavalry has increased in a yet higher ratio; whereas in Napoleon's days, with an extreme range for musketry of r000 yds., cavalry were expected only to trot Boo yds. and gallop for 200, nowadays with an extreme infantry range of under 4000. yds., the cavalry are trained to trot for 8000 yds. and gallop for 2000. Neither the experiences in South Africa nor those in Manchuria seriously influenced the views of the leading cavalry experts as above outlined, for the conditions of both cases were entirely abnormal. No nation in western Europe can afford to mountthe whole of its able-bodied manhood, nor, with the restricted area of its possessions, could repeat the Boer tactics with useful effect; in Manchuria, the theatre of operation was so far roadless, and the motives of both combatants so distinct from any conceivable as a basis for European strategy, that time was always available to construct entrenchments and obstacles physically insuperable to mounted arms. In western Europe, with its ex-• treme development of communications, such tactics are impracticable, and under the system of compulsory service which is in force in all nations, an early decision must be sought at any cost. This motive imposes a rapid-marching campaign in the Napoleonic style, and in such warfare there is neither time nor energy available for the erection of extemporised fortresses. Victory must therefore fall to the side that can develop the greatest fire power in the shortest time. The greatest factor of fire power is the long artillery lines, and as cavalry is the one arm which by its mobility can hamper or prevent the formation of such lines, on its success in this task all else must depend. Hence both sides will concentrate every available horse and man for this special purpose, and on the issue of the collisions this mutual concentration must entail will hang the fate of the battle, and ultimately of the nation. But the cavalry which will succeed in this task will be the one in which the spirit of duty See also:burns brightest, and the See also:oath of allegiance, renewed daily on the See also:cross of the sword, is held in the highest esteem. Organization.—The existing organization of cavalry throughout the civilized world is an instance of the " survival of the fittest " in an extreme form. The execution of the many manoeuvres with the speed and precision which condition success is only possible by a force in which, as Frederick the Great said, " every horse and trooper has been finished with the same care that a watchmaker bestows upon each See also:wheel of the See also:watch mechanism." Uniformity of excellence is in fact the See also:keystone of success, and this is only attainable where the mass is subdivided into See also:groups, each of which requires superintendence enough to absorb the whole energy of an average commander. Thus it has been found by ages of experiment that an average officer, with the assistance of certain subordinates to whom he delegates as much or as little responsibility as he pleases, finds his time fully occupied by the care of about one See also:hundred and fifty men and horses, each individual of which he must understand intimately, in See also:character, physical strength and See also:temper, for horse and man must be matched with the utmost care and judgment if the best that each is capable of is to be attained. The fundamental secret of the exceptional efficiency attained by the Prussian cavalry lies in the fact that they were the first to realize what the above implies. After the close of the Napoleonic Wars they made their squadron commanders responsible, not only for the training of the combatants of their unit, but also for the breaking in of remounts and the elementary teaching of recruits as well, and in this manner they obtained an intimate knowledge of their material which is almost unattainable by British officers owing to the conditions entailed by See also:foreign service and frequent changes of garrisons. Further, to obtain the maximum celerity of manoeuvre with the minimum exertion of the horses, the squadron requires to be subdivided into smaller units, generally known as troops, and experience has shown that with 128 sabres in the ranks (the average strength on See also:parade, after deducting sick and See also:young horses, and the N.C. officers required as troop guides, &c.) four troops best satisfy all conditions; as, with this number, the squadron will, under all circumstances of ground and surroundings, make any change of formation in less time and with greater accuracy than with any other number of subdivisions. The See also:size of the unit next above the squadron, the regiment, is again fixed by the number of subordinates that an average commander can control, and the universal experience of all arms has settled this as not less than four and not more than eight. Experiments with eight and even ten squadrons have been tried both in Austria and Prussia, but only exceptional men have succeeded in controlling such large bodies effectively, and in the end the normal has been fixed at four or five squadrons in quarters, and three or four in the field. Of these, the larger number is undoubtedly preferable, for, with the work of the See also:quarter See also:tester and the See also:adjutant to supervise, in addition, the regimental commander is economically applied to the best advantage. The essential point, however, is that the officer commanding the regiment does not interfere in details, but commands his four squadron commanders, his quartermaster, and his adjutant, and holds them absolutely responsible for results. There is no unity of practice in the constitution of larger units. Brigades vary according to circumstances from two regiments to four, and the See also:composition of divisions fluctuates similarly. The See also:custom in the German cavalry has been to form brigades of two regiments and divisions of three brigades, but this practice arose primarily from the system of recruiting and has no tactical advantage. The territory assigned to each army corps provides men and horses for two regiments of cuirassiers or lancers (classed as heavy in See also:Germany), two of dragoons, and two of hussars, and since it is clearly essential to ensure uniformity of speed and endurance within those units most likely to have to work together, it was impossible to mix the different classes. But the views now current as to the tactical employment of cavalry contemplate the employment not only of divisions but of whole cavalry corps, forty to sixty squadrons strong, and these may be called on to fulfil the most various missions. The farthest and swiftest reconnaissances are the See also:province of light cavalry, i.e. hussars, the most obstinate attack and defence of localities the task of dragoons, and the decisive charges on the battle-field essentially the duty of the heavy cavalry. It seems probable then that the See also:brigade will become the highest unit the composition of which is fixed in peace, and that divisions and corps will be put together by brigades of uniform composition, and assigned to the several sections of the theatre of war in which each is likely to find the most suitable field for its special character. This was the case in the Frederician and Napoleonic epochs, when efficiency and experience in the field far outweighed considerations of ad-ministration and convenience in quarters. Hitherto, horse artillery in Europe has always formed an integral portion of the divisional organization, but the system has never worked well, and in view of the technical evolution of artillery material is no longer considered desirable. As it is always possible to assign one or more batteries to any particular brigade whose line of march will bring it across villages, defiles, &c. (where the support of its fire will be essential), and on the battle-field itself responsibility for the guns is likely to prove more of a hindrance than a help to the cavalry commander, it is probable that horse artillery will revert to the inspection of its own technical officers, and that the See also:sole tie which will be retained between it and the cavalry will be in the batteries being informed as to the cavalry units they are likely to serve with in war, so that the officers may make themselves acquainted with the idiosyncrasies of their future commanders. The same course will be pursued with the See also:engineers and technical troops required for the cavalry, but it seems probable that, in accordance with a See also:suggestion made by See also:Moltke after the r866 campaign, the supply columns for one or more cavalry corps will be held ready in peace, and specially organized to attain the highest possible mobility which modern technical progress can ensure. The general causes which have led to the differentiation of cavalry into the three types—hussars, dragoons and heavy—have already been dealt with. Obviously big men on little horses cannot manoeuvre side by side with light men on big horses. Also, since uniformity of excellence within the unit is the See also:prime condition of efficiency, and the greatest personal dexterity is required for the management of sword or lance on horseback, a further sorting out became necessary, and the best light weights were put on the best light horses and called hussars, the best heavy weights on the best heavy horses and called lancers, the average of either type becoming dragoons and cuirassiers. In England, the lance not being indigenous and the conditions of foreign service making adherence to a logical system impossible, lancers are medium cavalry, but the difference of weights carried and type of horses is too small to render these distinctions of See also:practical moment. In Germany, where every suitable horsefinds its place in the ranks and men have no right of individual selection, the distinctions are still maintained, and there is a very marked difference between the weights 'carried and the types of men and horses in each branch, though the dead weight which it is still considered necessary to carry in cavalries likely to manceuvre in large masses hardly varies with the weight of the man or size of the horse. Where small units only are required to march and See also:scout, the See also:kit can be reduced to a minimum, everything superfluous for the moment being carried on hired transport, as in South Africa: But when ro,000 horsemen have to move by a single road all transport must be left miles to the rear, and greater mobility for the whole is attained by carrying upon the horse itself the essentials for a period of some See also:weeks. Still, even allowing for this, it is impossible to account for the extraordinary load that is still considered necessary. In India, the British lancer, averaging 11 st. per man, could turn out in marching order at 17 St. 8 lb (less forage nets). In Germany, the See also:hussar, averaging so st.6 lb, rode at 18 st., also without forage, and the cuirassier at 21 St. to 22 st. Cavalry equipment is, in fact, far too heavy, for in the interests of the budgets of the departments which supply See also:saddlery, See also:harness, &c., everything is made so as to last for many years. Cavalry saddles fifty years old frequently remain in good condition, but the losses in horse-flesh this excessive solidity entails are ignored. The remount accounts are kept separately, and few realize that in war it is cheaper to replace a horse than a saddle: In any case, the armament alone of the cavalry soldier makes great demands on the horses. His sword and See also:scabbard weigh about 4 ib, See also:carbine or rifle q lb to 9 lb, 120 rounds of ammunition with pouches and belts about 12 lb, lance about 5 lb, and two days' forage and See also:hay at the lowest 40 lb, or a See also:gross See also:total of 7o lb or 5 st., which with a st. for the man brings the total to 16 st.; add to this the lightest possible saddle, bridle, cloak and blanket, and 17 st. 8 lb is approximately the irreducible minimum. It may be imagined what care and management of the horses is required to enable them under such loads to manceuvre in masses at a trot, and gallop for distances of 5 M. and upwards without a moment for dismounting. Reconnaissance and Scouting.—After 187o public See also:opinion, misled by the performances of the " ubiquitous Uhlan " and disappointed by the absence of great cavalry charges on the field of battle, came somewhat hastily to the conclusion that the day of " shock tactics " was past and the future of cavalry lay in acting as the eyes and ears of the following armies. But, as often happens, the fact was overlooked that the German cavalry screen was entirely unopposed in its reconnoitring expeditions, and it was not till long afterwards that it became apparent how very little these far-flung reconnaissances had contributed to the total success. It has been calculated by German cavalry experts that not 1% of the reports sent in by the scouts during the advance from the See also:Saar to the See also:Meuse, See also:August r87o, were of appreciable importance to the headquarters, and that before the orders based upon this evidence reached the front, events frequently anticipated them. Generally the conviction has asserted itself, that it is impossible to train the short-service soldiers of civilized nations sufficiently to render their reports worth the trouble of collating, and if a few cases of natural aptitude do exist nothing can ensure that these particular men should be sufficiently well mounted to transmit their information with sufficient celerity to be of importance. It is of little value to a commander to know that the enemy was at a given spot forty-eight See also:hours previously, unless the sender of the See also:report has a sufficient force at his disposal to compel the enemy to remain there; in other words, to attack and hold him. Cavalry and horse artillery alone, however, cannot economically exert this holding power, for, whatever their effect against worn-out men at the close of a great battle, against fresh infantry they are relatively powerless. Hence, it is probable that we shall see a revival of the strategic advanced guard of all arms, as in the Napoleonic days, which will not only reconnoitre, but See also:fix the enemy until the army itself can execute the manceuvre designed to effect his destruction. The general situation of the enemy's masses will, in western Europe, always be sufficiently fixed by the trend of his railway communications, checked by reports of spies, See also:newspapers, &c., for, with neutral frontiers everywhere within a few hours' ride for a motor cyclist, anything approaching the secrecy of the See also:Japanese in Manchuria is quite unattainable, and, once the great masses begin to move, the only " shadowing " which holds out any hope of usefulness is that undertaken by very small selected_parties of officers, perfectly mounted, daring riders, and accustomed to cover distances of zoo m. and upwards. These will be supported by motor cars and advanced feelers from the field telegraphs, though probably the motor See also:car would carry the See also:eye-See also:witness to his destination in less time than it would take to draft and See also:signal a complete report. Tactical scouting, now as always, is invaluable for securing the safety of the marching and sleeping troops, and brigade, divisional and corps commanders will remain dependent upon their own squadrons for the See also:solution of the immediate tactical problem before them; but, since both sides will employ mounted men to screen their operations, intelligence will generally only be won by fighting, and the side which can locally develop a marked fire superiority will be the more likely to obtain the information it requires. In this direction the introduction of the motor car and of cyclists is likely to exercise a most important influence, but, whatever may be the See also:conveyance, it must be looked upon as a means of advance only, never of retreat. The troops thus conveyed must be used to seize villages or defiles about which the cavalry and guns can manoeuvre. Formations and Drill.—Cavalry, when mounted, act exclusively by " shock " or more precisely by " the threat of their shock," for the immediate result of collision is actually decided some instants before this collision takes place. Experience has shown that the best guarantee for success in this shock is afforded by a two-deep line, the men riding See also:knee to knee within each squadron at least. Perfect cavalry can charge in larger bodies without intervals between the squadrons, but, ordinarily, intervals of about so yds. between adjacent squadrons are kept to localize any partial unsteadiness due to difficulties of ground, casualties, &c. The obvious drawbacks of a two-deep line are that it halves the possible extent of front, and that if a front-rank horse falls the rear-rank horse generally tumbles over it also. To minimize the latter evil, the charge in two successive lines, 150 to 200 yds. apart, has often been advocated, but this has never stood the test of serious cavalry fighting; first, because when squadrons are galloping fast and always striving to keep the See also:touch to the centre, if a horse falls the adjacent horses close in with such force that their sidelong collision may throw down more and always creates violent oscillation; and secondly, be-cause owing to the dust raised by the first rank the following one can never maintain its true direction. It is primarily to avoid the danger and difficulty arising from the dust that the ranks in manoeuvre are closed to within one horse's length, as, when moving at speed, the rear rank is past before the dust has time to rise. Of all formations, the line is the most difficult to handle, and, particularly, to conceal—hence various formations in column are necessary for the preliminary manoeuvres requisite to place the squadrons in position for the final deployment previous to the charge. Many forms of these columns have been tried, but, setting aside the columns intended exclusively for marching along roads, of which " sections " (four men abreast) is most usual in England, only these survive: Squadron column. See also:Double column of squadrons. Half column. In squadron column, the troops of the squadron formed are in line one behind the other at a distance equal to the front of the troop in line. The ideal squadron consists of 128 men formed in two ranks giving 64 files, and divided into four troops of 16 files —a larger number of troops makes the drill too complicated, a smaller number makes each troop slow and unhandy. When the squadron is weak, therefore, the troop should still be maintained as near 16 files as possible, the number of troops being if571 necessary reduced. Thus with only 32 files, two troops of z6 files would be better than four of only 8 files. All other formations of the regiment or brigade are fundamentally derived from the squadron column, only varying with the order in which the squadrons are grouped, and the intervals which separate them. Thus the regiment may move in line of squadron columns at close interval, i.e. 11 paces apart or in double column as in the See also:diagram. To form line for the charge, the squadrons open out, still in column, to full interval, i.e. the width they occupy when in line; and then on the command " Line to the front," each troop moves up to its place in line as shown in the diagram. When in line a large body of cavalry can no longer vary its direction without sacrificing its appearance of order, and as above pointed out, it is this appearance of order which really decides the result of the charge before the actual collision. Since, however, the enemy's movements may compel a change, an intermediate formation is provided, known as the " half column." When this formation is ordered, the troops within each squadron wheel half right or left, and each squadron is then able to form into column or line to the front as circumstances demand, or the whole line can be formed into column of shortest possible time., Regiment in Line Line of Squadron Columns (Close interval) =Em aim LL3 1, Ccm l 1 j Half Column Mr. Intermediate.;.' INIMI t. Final Formation. ..(~ % It"141'v \` 'Orly. Line '1g' % ~• .0riylnai Lina Half Column Manoeuvres ^ Orly. Line - T""T See also:Original Una troops by continuing the wheel and in this formation gallop out into a fresh direction; re-forming line ,by a simple wheel in the Service de sfirete' strategique de la cavalerie (1874); Bonie, Tactique Co. See also:Roscommon. See also:Anthracite, probably of inorganic origin, has francaise, cavalerie en campagne, cavalerie au combat (1887-1888); been See also:mined without permanent success in the See also:Silurian beds near Foucart, Campagne de Pologne, operations de la cavalerie, nov. 1866- Kilnaleck, and is traceable freely, associated with See also:veins of See also:quartz See also:jan. 1867 (1882), La Cavalerie See also:pendant la campagne de Prusse (188o) ; and See also:haematite, at Ballyjamesduff a little farther See also:east. De See also:Galliffet, Projet d'instruction sur l'smploi de la cavalerie en liaison avec See also:les autres armes (188o), Rapport sur les grandes manceuvres de cavalerie de 1879; Kaehler, Die preussische Reiterei 18o6-1876 (French See also:translation, La Cavalerie prussienne d e l 8o6 a1876) ; Cavalry Studies (translated from the French of Bonie and the German of Kaehler, with a See also:paper on U.S. cavalry in the Civil War) ; v.Bernhardi, Cavalry in Future Wars (English translation, 1906) ; P. S., Cavalry in the Wars of the Future (translated from the French by J. Formby, 1905) ; D. Haig, Cavalry Studies (1907) ; v. Pelet See also:Narbonne, Die Kavalleriedienst (1901),Cavalry on Service (English translation, 1906) ; Erziehung vnd Fiihrung von Kavallerie. The principal cavalry See also:periodicals are the Revue de cavalerie, the Kavalleristische Monatshefte (Austrian), the Cavalry See also:Journal (British), and the Journal of the U.S. Cavalry Association. (F. N. 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