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THE CAMPAIGN OF 1796 IN

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Originally appearing in Volume V11, Page 184 of the 1911 Encyclopedia Britannica.
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THE See also:

CAMPAIGN OF 1796 IN See also:GERMANY The wonder of See also:Europe now transferred itself from the See also:drama of the See also:French Revolution to the equally absorbing drama of a See also:great See also:war on the See also:Rhine. " Every See also:day, for four terrible years," wrote a See also:German pamphleteer See also:early in 1796, " has surpassed the one before it in grandeur and terror, and to-day surpasses all in dizzy sublimity." That a manoeuvre on the See also:Lahn should possess an See also:interest to the peoples of Europe surpassing that of the Reign of Terror is indeed hardly imaginable, but there was a See also:good See also:reason for the tense expectancy that prevailed everywhere. See also:France's policy was no longer defensive. She aimed at invading and " revolutionizing " the monarchies and principalities of old Europe, and to this end the campaign of 1796 was to be the great and conclusive effort. The " liberation of the oppressed" had its See also:part in the decision, and the See also:glory of freeing the serf easily merged itself in the glory of defeating the serf's masters. But a still more pressing See also:motive for carrying the war into the enemy's See also:country was the fact that France and the lands she had overrun could no longer subsist her armies. The See also:Directory frankly told its generals, when they complained that their men were starving and ragged, that they would find plenty of subsistence beyond the Rhine. On her part, See also:Austria, no longer fettered by allied contingents nor by the expenses of a far distant campaign, could put forth more strength than on former See also:campaigns, and as war came nearer See also:home and the See also:citizen saw himself threatened by " revolutionizing " and devastating armies, he ceased to hamper or to swindle the troops. Thus the See also:duel took See also:place on the grandest See also:scale then known in the See also:history of See also:European armies. Apart from the secondary See also:theatre of See also:Italy, the See also:area embraced in the struggle was a vast triangle extending from See also:Dusseldorf to See also:Basel and thence to Ratisbon, and See also:Carnot sketched the outlines in accordance with the scale of the picture. He imagined nothing less than the See also:union of the armies of the Rhine and the See also:Riviera before the walls of See also:Vienna. Its practicability cannot here be discussed, but it is See also:worth contrasting the attitude of contemporaries and of later strategical theorists towards it.

The former, with their empirical knowledge of war, merely thought it impracticable with the available means, but the latter have condemned it See also:

root and See also:branch as " an operation on exterior lines." The See also:scheme took shape only gradually. The first advance was made partly in See also:search of See also:food, partly to disengage the See also:Palatinate, which See also:Clerfayt had conquered in 1795. " If you have reason to believe that you would find some supplies on the Lahn, hasten thither with the greater part of your forces," wrote the Directory to See also:Jourdan (See also:Army of the Sambre-and-See also:Meuse, 72,000) on the 29th of See also:March. He was to move at once, before the Austrians could concentrate, and to pass the Rhine at Dusseldorf, thereby bringing back the centre of the enemy over the See also:river. He was, further, to take every 8IIa dea See also:advantage of their want of concentration to deliver See also:Moreau. See also:blow after blow, and to do his utmost to break them up completely. A fortnight later Moreau (Army of the Rhineand-Moselle, 78,000) was ordered to take advantage of Jourdan's move, which would draw most of the See also:Austrian forces to the See also:Mainz region, to enter the See also:Breisgau and Suabia. " You will attack Austria at home, and See also:capture her magazines. You will enter a new country, the resources of which, properly handled, should suffice for the needs of the Army of the Rhine-and-Moselle." Jourdan, therefore, was to take upon himself the destruction of the enemy, Moreau the invasion of See also:South Germany. The first See also:object of both was to subsist their armies beyond the Rhine, the second to defeat the armies and terrorize the populations of the See also:empire. Under these instructions the campaign opened. Jourdan crossed at Diisseldorf and reached the Lahn, but the enemy concentrated against him very swiftly and he had to retire over the river. Still, if he had not been able to " break them up completely," he had at any See also:rate See also:drawn on himself the See also:weight of the Austrian army, and enabled Moreau to See also:cross at See also:Strassburg without much difficulty.

The Austrians were now commanded by the See also:

archduke See also:Charles, who, after all detachments had been made, disposed of some 56,000 men. At first he employed the bulk of this force against Jourdan, but on See also:hearing of Moreau's progress he returned to the See also:Neckar country with 20,000 men, leaving Feldzeugmeister v. Wartensleben with- 36,000 to observe Jourdan. In later years he admitted himself that his own force was far too small to See also:deal with Moreau, who, he probably thought, would retire after a few manoeuvres. But by now the two French generals were aiming at something more than alternate raids and feints. Carnot had set before them the ideal of a decisive See also:battle as the great object. Jourdan was instructed, if the archduke turned on Trhichduke's Moreau, to follow him up with all See also:speed and to bring See also:plan. him to See also:action. Moreau, too, was not retreating but advancing. The two armies, Moreau's and the archduke's, met in a straggling and indecisive battle at Malsch on the 9th of See also:July, and soon afterwards Charles learned that Jourdan had recrossed the Rhine and was See also:driving Wartensleben before him. He thereupon retired both armies from the Rhine valley into the interior, hoping that at least the French would detach large forces to besiege the river fortresses. Disappointed of this, and compelled to See also:face a very See also:grave situation, he resorted to an expedient which may be described in his own words: " to retire both armies step by step without committing himself to a battle, and to seize the first opportunity to unite them so as to throw himself with See also:superior or at least equal strength on one of.the two hostile enemies." This is the ever-recurring See also:idea of " interior lines." It was not new, for See also:Frederick the Great had used similar means in simila., circumstances, as had See also:Souham at See also:Tourcoing and even Dampierre at See also:Valenciennes. Nor was it differentiated, as were See also:Napoleon's operations in this same See also:year, by the deliberate use of a small containing force at one point to obtain relative superiority at another.

A See also:

general of the 18th See also:century did not believe in the efficacy of superior See also:numbers—had not Frederick the Great disproved it ?—and for him operations on " interior lines " were simply successive blows at successive targets, the efficacy of the blow in each See also:case being dependent chiefly on his own See also:personal qualities and skill as a general on the See also:field of battle. In the See also:present case the point to be observed is not the expedient, which was dictated by the circumstances, but the courage of the See also:young general, who, unlike Wartensleben and the See also:rest of his generals, unlike, too, Moreau and Jourdan themselves, surmounted difficulties instead of lamenting them. On the other See also:side, Carnot, of course, foresaw this possibility. He warned the generals not to allow the enemy to " use his forces sometimes against one, sometimes against the other, as he did in the last campaign," and ordered them to go forward respectively into See also:Franconia and into the country of the upper Neckar, with a view to seeking out and defeating the enemy's army. But the plan of operations soon See also:grew bolder. Jourdan was informed on the 21st of July that if he reached the See also:Regnitz without See also:meeting the enemy, or if his arrival there forced the latter to retire rapidly to the See also:Danube, he was not to hesitate to advance to Ratisbon and even to See also:Passau if the disorganization of the enemy admitted it, but in these contingencies he was to detach a force into Bohemia to See also:levy contributions. " We presume that the enemy is too weak to offer a successful resistance and will have See also:united his forces on the Danube; we See also:hope that our two armies will See also:act in unison to rout him completely. Each is, in any case, strong enough to attack by itself, and nothing is so pernicious as slowness in war." Evidently the fear that the two Austrian armies would unite against one of their assailants had now given place to something like disdain. This was due in all See also:probability to the rapidity with which Moreau was driving the archduke before him. After a brief stand on the Neckar at Cannstadt, the Austrians, only 25,000 strong, See also:fell hack to the Rauhe See also:Alb, where they halted again, to See also:cover their magazines at See also:Ulm and Gunzburg, towards the end of July. Wartensleben was similarly falling back before Jourdan, though the latter, starting considerably later than Moreau, had not advanced so far. The details of the successive positions occupied by Wartensleben need not be stated; all that concerns the general development of the campaign is the fact that the hitherto See also:independent See also:leader of the " See also:Lower Rhine Army '.' resented the loss of his freedom of action, and besides See also:lamentations opposed a dull passive resistance to all but the most formal orders of the See also:prince.

Many See also:

weeks passed before this was over-come sufficiently for his leader even to arrange for the contemplated See also:combination, and in these weeks the archduke was being driven back day by day, and the German principalities were falling away one by one as the French advanced and preached the revolutionary See also:formula. In such circumstances as these — the general facts, if not the causes, were patent enough—it was natural that the confident See also:Paris strategists should think chiefly of the profits of their enterprise and ignore the fears of the generals at the front. But the latter were justified in one important respect; their operating armies had seriously diminished in numbers, Jourdan disposing of not more than 45,000 and Moreau of about 5o,000. The archduke had now, owing to the arrival of a few detachments from the See also:Black See also:Forest and elsewhere, about 34,000 men, Wartensleben almost exactly the same, and the former, for some reason which has never been fully explained but has its See also:justification in psychological factors, suddenly turned Neresheim. and fought a See also:long, severe and straggling battle above Neresheim (See also:August 11). This did not, however, give him much See also:respite, and on the 12th and 13th he retired over the Danube. At this date Wartensleben was about See also:Amberg, almost as far away from the other army as he had been on the Rhine, owing to the See also:necessity of retreating See also:round instead of through the principality of See also:Bayreuth, which was a Prussian See also:possession and could therefore make its See also:neutrality respected. Hitherto Charles had intended to unite his armies on the Danube against Moreau. His later choice of Jourdan's army as the See also:objective of his combination grew out of circumstances and in particular out of the brilliant See also:reconnaissance See also:work of a See also:cavalry brigadier of the Lower Rhine Army, Nauendorff. This general's reports — he was working in the country south and south-See also:east of Nurnberg, Wartensleben being at Amberg — indicated first an advance of Jourdan's army from See also:Forchheim through Nurnberg to the south, and induced the archduke, on the 12th, to begin a concentration of his own army towards See also:Ingolstadt. This was a purely defensive measure, but Nauendorff reported on the 13th and 14th that the See also:main columns of the French were swingingaway to the east against Wartensleben's front and inner flank, and on the 14th he boldly suggested the idea that decided the campaign. " If your Royal See also:Highness will or can advance 12,000 men against Jourdan's See also:rear, he is lost.

We could not have a better opportunity." When this See also:

message arrived at See also:head-quarters the archduke had already issued orders to the same effect. See also:Lieutenant Field See also:Marshal See also:Count Latour, with 30,000 men, was to keep Moreau occupied—another expedient of the moment, due to the very See also:close pressure of Moreau's advance, and the failure of the See also:attempt to put him out of action at Neresheim. The small See also:remainder of the army, with a few detachments gathered en route, in all about 27,000 men, began to recross the Danube on the 14th, and slowly advanced See also:north on a broad front, its leader being now sure that at some point on his See also:line he would encounter the French, whether they were heading for Ratisbon or Amberg. Meanwhile, the Directory had, still acting on the theory of the archduke's weakness, ordered Moreau to combine the operations with those of See also:Bonaparte in See also:Italian See also:Tirol, and Jourdan to turn both flanks of his immediate opponent, and thus to prevent his joining the archduke, as well as his See also:retreat into Bohemia. And curiously enough it was this latter, and not Moreau's move, which suggested to the archduke that his See also:chance had come. The chance was, in fact, one dear to the 18th century general, catching his opponent in the act of executing a manoeuvre. So far from " exterior lines " being fatal to Jourdan, it was not until the French general began to operate against Wartensleben's inner flank that the archduke's opportunity came. The decisive events of the campaign can be described very briefly, the ideas that directed them having been made clear. The long thin line of the archduke wrapped itself round Jourdan's right flank near Amberg, while Wartensleben a db'r fought him in front. The battle (August 24) was a wiinbarg. See also:series of engagements between the various columns that met; it was a repetition in fact of See also:Fleurus, without the intensity of fighting spirit that redeems that battle from dulness. Success followed, not upon bravery or even See also:tactics, but upon the pre-existing strategical conditions. At the end of the day the French retired, and next See also:morning the archduke began another wide See also:extension to his See also:left, hoping to head them off.

This consumed several days. In the course of it Jourdan attempted to take advantage of his opponent's dissemination to regain the See also:

direct road to See also:Wurzburg, but the attempt was defeated by an almost fortuitous combination of forces at the threatened point. More effective, indeed, than this indirect pursuit was the very active hostility of the peasantry, who had suffered in Jourdan's advance and retaliated so effectually during his retreat that the army became thoroughly demoralized, both by want of food and by the See also:strain of incessant sniping. Defeated again at Wurzburg on the 3rd of See also:September, Jourdan continued his retreat to the Lahn, and finally withdrew the shattered army over the Rhine, partly by Dusseldorf, partly by Neuwied. In ,the last engagement on the Lahn the young and brilliant Marceau was mortally wounded. Far away in See also:Bavaria, Moreau had meantime been driving Latour from one line of resistance to another. On receiving the See also:news of Jourdan's reverses, however, he made a rapid and successful retreat to Strassburg, evading the prince's army, which had ascended the Rhine valley to head him off, in the nick of See also:time. This celebrated campaign is pre-eminently strategical in its See also:character, in that the positions and movements anterior to the battle preordained its issue. It raised the reputation of the See also:arch-See also:duke Charles to the highest point, and deservedly, for he wrested victory from the most desperate circumstances by the skilful and resolute employment of his one advantage. But this was only possible because Moreau and Jourdan were content to accept strategical failure without seeking to redress the See also:balance by hard fighting. The great question of this campaign is, why did Moreau and Jourdan fail against inferior numbers, when in Italy Bonaparte with a similar army against a similar opponent won victory after victory against equal and superior forces? The See also:answer will not be supplied by any theory of " exterior and interior lines." It lies far deeper.

So far as it is possible to celebrated See also:

maxim: " The principles of war are the same as those summarize it in one phrase, it lies in the fact that though the Directory meant this campaign to be the final word on the Revolutionary War, for the nation at large this final word had been said at Fleurus. The troops were still the nation; they no longer fought for a cause and for See also:bare existence, and Moreau and Jourdan were too closely allied in ideas and sympathies with the misplaced citizen soldiers they commanded to be able to dominate their collective will. In See also:default of a cause, however, soldiers will fight for a See also:man, and this brings us by a natural sequence of ideas to the war in Italy.

End of Article: THE CAMPAIGN OF 1796 IN

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