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ITALIAN WARS (1848–187o)

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Originally appearing in Volume V14, Page 914 of the 1911 Encyclopedia Britannica.
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ITALIAN See also:WARS (1848–187o) , a generic name for the See also:series of wars for Italian unity which began with the See also:Milan insurrection of the 18th of See also:March 1848 and closed with the See also:capture of See also:Rome by the Italians on the 2oth of See also:September 187o. For their Italian See also:political See also:interest see See also:ITALY: See also:History. The See also:present See also:article deals with certain See also:campaigns of distinctively military importance, viz. 1848–49, 1859 and 1866, in the first and third of which the centre of gravity of the nationalist See also:movement was the Piedmontese See also:Leopardi. Contemporary literature. See also:regular See also:army, and in the second the See also:French army commanded by See also:Napoleon III. On the other See also:side the See also:Austrian army was throughout the basis of the established See also:order of things, settled at the See also:Congress of See also:Vienna on the theory that Italy was " a See also:geographical expression." Side by side with these regular armies, each of which was a See also:special type, there fought See also:national levies of widely varying kinds, and thus practically every known See also:form of military service, except the fully organized " nation in arms " (then See also:peculiar to See also:Prussia) made its See also:appearance in the See also:field. Further, these wars constitute the greater See also:part of See also:European military history between See also:Waterloo and See also:Koniggratz—a See also:bridge—if a broken one—between Napoleon and See also:Moltke. They there-fore present a considerable technical interest, wholly apart from their See also:historical importance and romantic interest. AUSTRO-SARDINIAN See also:WAR OF 1848-1849 From about 1846 the spirit of revolt against See also:foreign domination had gathered force, and two years later, when See also:Europe was on t41e See also:verge of a revolutionary outburst, the struggle for Italian unity was initiated by the insurrection at Milan. At this moment the Austrian army in See also:Lombardy, practically a highly-trained force of See also:long-service professional soldiers, was commanded by See also:Radetzky, one of the greatest generals in Austrian history. Being, however, virtually an army of occupation, it was broken up into many garrisons, and in all was not more than 70,000 strong, so that after five days' fighting in the streets of Milan, Radetzky did as See also:Wellington had proposed to do in 1817 when his army of occupation in See also:France was threatened by a national rising, and withdrew to a concentration See also:area to await reinforcements.

This area was the famous See also:

Quadrilateral, marked by the fortresses of See also:Mantua, See also:Verona, Peschiera and See also:Legnago, and there, in the See also:early days of See also:April, the scattered fractions of the Austrians assembled. Lombardy and See also:Venetia had followed the example of Milan, and See also:King See also:Charles See also:Albert of See also:Sardinia, mobilizing the Piedmontese army in See also:good See also:time, crossed the frontier, with 45,E regulars two days after the Austrians had withdrawn from Milan. Had the insurrectionary movements and the advance of the Piedmontese been properly co-ordinated, there can be little doubt that some, at any See also:rate, of the Austrian detachments would have been destroyed or injured in their See also:retreat, but as it was they escaped without material losses. The See also:blow given to Austrian See also:prestige by the revolt of the See also:great cities was, however, so severe that the whole See also:peninsula rallied to Charles Albert. See also:Venice, reserving a See also:garrison for her own See also:protection, set on See also:foot an improvised army I1,000 strong on the mainland; some 5000 See also:Lombards and 9000 insurgents from the smaller duchies gathered on both sides of the Po; 15,000 Papal troops under See also:Durando and 13,000 Neapolitans under the old patriot See also:general See also:Pepe moved up to See also:Ferrara and See also:Bologna respectively, and Charles Albert with the Piedmontese advanced to the Mincio at the beginning of April. His See also:motley command totalled 96,000 men, of whom, however, only See also:half were thoroughly trained and disciplined troops. The reinforcements available in See also:Austria were about 25,000 disciplined troops not greatly inferior in quality to Radetzky's own veterans. Charles Albert could See also:call up 45,000 levies at a few See also:weeks' See also:notice, and eventually all the resources of the patriot party. The regular war began in the second See also:week of April on the Mincio, the passages of which See also:river were forced and the Austrian advanced troops driven back on the 8th (See also:action of See also:Goito) and 9th. Radetzky maintained a careful defensive, and the king's attempts to surprise Peschiera (14th) and Mantua (19th) were unsuccessful. But Peschiera was closely invested, though it was not forced to capitulate until the end of May. Meantime the Piedmontese army advanced towards Verona, and, finding Radetzky with a portion of his army on their See also:left flank near Pastrengo, swung northward and drove him over the See also:Adige above Verona, but on turning towards Verona they were checked (action of Pastrengo 28th-30th April and See also:battle of See also:Santa See also:Lucia di Verona, 6th May).

Meantime the Austrian reinforcements assembled in See also:

Carniola under an Irish-See also:born general, See also:Count See also:Nugent von See also:Westmeath (1777-1862). and entered See also:Friuli. Their junction with the field See also:marshal was in the last degree See also:precarious, every step of their march was contested by the levies and the townsmen of Venetia. The days of rifled See also:artillery were not yet come, and a See also:physical obstacle to the combined movements of trained regulars and a well-marked See also:line of See also:defence were all that was necessary to convert even medievalwalled towns into centres of effective resistance. When the spirit of resistance was lacking, as it had been for example in 1799 (see FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY WARS), the importance of the walled towns corresponded simply to their material strength, which was practically negligible. But throughout the See also:campaign of 1848–1849, the essential moral conditions of defence being present, the Austrians were hampered by an endless series of See also:minor sieges, in which the effort expended was out of all proportion to the success achieved. Nugent, however, pressed on, though every See also:day weakened by small detachments, and, turning rather than overpowering each obstacle as it was encountered, made his way slowly by See also:Belluno Radetzky to See also:Vicenza and Treviso and joined Radetzky at Verona on the 25th of May. The latter then for a moment took in the the offensive, passing around the right flank of the loyal Quadrlarmy by way of Mantua (actions of Curtatone, 29th May, lateral. and Goito, 30th May), but, failing of the success he expected he turned swiftly See also:round and with 30,000 men attacked the 20,000 Italians (Papal troops, See also:volunteers, Neapolitans) under Durando, who had established themselves across his line of communication at Vicenza, drove them away and reoccupied Vicenza (9th See also:June), where a second See also:body of reinforcements from See also:Trent, clearing the Brenta valley (Val Sugana) as they advanced, joined him, the king meanwhile being held in check by the See also:rest of Radetzky's army. After beating down resistance in the valleys of the Brenta and Piave, the field marshal returned to Verona. Charles Albert had now some 75,000 men actually in See also:hand on the line of high ground, S. Giustina-Somma Campagna, and made the See also:mistake of extending inordinately so as to See also:cover his proposed See also:siege of Mantua. Napoleon, fifty years before on the same ground (see FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY WARS), had only with great difficulty solved this same problem by the economical grouping and resolute handling of his forces, and Charles Albert, setting out his forces en See also:cordon, was weak at all points of his long front of 45 M. Thus Radetzky, gathering his forces opposite the king's centre (Sona, Somma Campagna), was able to break it (23rd See also:July).

The Piedmontese, however, See also:

fell back steadily, and 25,000 of them collected at Villafranca, whence on the 24th they See also:counter-attacked and regained the heights at See also:Custozza and Somma Campagna that they had lost. Radetzky, however, took the offensive again next See also:morning and having succeeded in massing half of his army opposite to one See also:quarter of the Piedmontese, was completely victorious (first battle of Custozza, 24th-25th July). Pursuing vigorously, the Austrians drove the king over the Mincio (action of See also:Volta, 26th-27th), the Chiese, the See also:Adda and the See also:Ticino into his own dominions, Milan being reoccupied without fighting. The smaller bands of patriots were one after the other driven over the See also:borders or destroyed. Venice alone held out to the end. Besieged by See also:land and See also:water, and bombarded as well, she prolonged her resistance until See also:October 1849, long after the war had everywhere else come to an end. The first campaign for unity had ended in See also:complete failure, thanks to the See also:genius of Radetzky and the thorough training, mobility and handiness of his soldiers. During the See also:winter of 1848-1849—for, to avoid unnecessary See also:waste of his See also:precious veterans, Radetzky let the Piedmontese army retire unmolested over the Ticino—Charles Albert took energetic See also:measures to reorganize, refit and See also:augment his army. But his previous career had not fitted him to meet the crisis. With aspirations for unity he sympathized, and to that ideal he was soon to See also:sacrifice his See also:throne, but he had nothing in See also:common with the distinctively revolutionary party, with whom circumstances had allied him. Radicalism, however, was a more obvious if a less real force than nationalism, and Charles Albert made it a fatal concession in appointing the See also:Polish general Albert Chrzanowski (1788-1861) his See also:principal adviser and See also:commander-in-See also:chief—an See also:appointment that alienated the generals and the army, while scarcely modifying the sentiments of distrust with which the Liberal party regarded the king.' In March the two See also:main armies were grouped in the densely intersected See also:district between Milan, See also:Vercelli and See also:Pavia (see See also:sketch See also:map below), separated by the Ticino, of which the out-posts of either side watched the passages. Charles Campaign Albert had immediately in hand 65,000 men, some 25,000 of more being scattered in various detachments to right and See also:Novara. left.

Radetzky disposed of 70,000 men for field operations, besides garrisons. The recovery of Milan, the great See also:

city that had been the first to revolt, seemed to the Italians the first See also:objective of the campaign. It was easier indeed to raise the whole See also:country in arms than to crush the field-marshal's regulars, and it was hoped that Radetzky would, on losing Milan, either retire to See also:Lodi and perhaps ' Several of the French generals—See also:Lamoriciere, Bedeau, See also:Changarnier and others—who had been prominent in See also:Algeria and in the 1848 revolution in France had been invited to take the command, but had declined it. to Mantua (as in 1848), or gather his forces for battle before Milan. ready, it may be presumed, to grapple an enemy coming from Radetzky himself openly announced that he would take the offensive, 1 and the king's plans were framed to meet this See also:case also. Two-thirds of the army, 4 divisions, were grouped in great See also:depth between Novara, Galliate and Castelnuovo. A little to the right, at Vespolate and See also:Vigevano, was one See also:division under Durando, and the remaining division under Ramorino was grouped opposite Pavia with orders to take that See also:place if possible, but it Radetzky advanced thence, to fall back fighting either on See also:Mortara or Lomello,' while the main body descended on the Austrian flank. The grouping both of Ramorino and of the main body—as events proved in the case of the latter—cannot be seriously criticized, and indeed one is almost tempted to assume that Chrzanowski considered the case of Radetzky's advance on Mortara more carefully than that of his own advance on Milan. But the seething spirit of revolt did not allow the army that was Italy's See also:hope to stand still at a foreign and untried general's dictation and await Radetzky's coming. On the 19th of March orders were issued to the main body for the advance on Milan and on the loth one division, led by the king himself, crossed the Ticino at See also:San Martino. But no Austrians were encountered, and such See also:information as was available indicated that Radetzky was concentrating to his left on the Pavia-Lodi road. Chrzanowski thereupon, abandoning (if indeed he ever entertained) the See also:idea of Radetzky's retirement and his own triumphal march on Milan, suspended the advance. His fears were justified, for that evening he heard that Ramorino had abandoned his See also:post and taken his division across the Po.

After the war this general was shot for disobedience, and deservedly, for the covering division, the fighting flank-guard on which Chrzanowski's defensive-offensive depended, was thus withdrawn at the moment when Radetzky's whole army was See also:

crossing the Ticino at Pavia and heading for Mortara.' The four Austrian See also:corps began to See also:file across the Ticino at See also:noon on the loth, and by nightfall the heads of Radetzky's columns were at Zerbolo, Gambolo and La Cava, the reserve at Pavia, a flank-guard holding the Cava-Casatisma road over the Po against the contingency of Ramorino's return, and the two brigades that had furnished the outposts along the Ticino closing on Bereguardo. Chrzanowski, however, having now to See also:deal with a foreseen case, gave his orders promptly. To replace Ramorino, the 1st division Action of was ordered from Vespolate through Mortara to Trumello; A the 2nd division from Cerano to push See also:south on Vigevano; Mortara. the reserve from Novara to Mortara; the See also:remainder to follow the znd division. Had the 1st division been placed at Mortara instead of Vespolate in the first instance the See also:story of the campaign might have been very different, but here again, though to a far less culpable degree, a subordinate generals See also:default imperilled the army. Durando (21st March), instead of pushing on as ordered to Trumello to take contact with the enemy, halted at Mortara. The reserve also halted there and deployed See also:west of Mortara to guard against a possible attack from San Giorgio. The Sardinian advanced guard on the other road reached Borgo San Siro, but there met and was driven back by Radetzky's II. corps under Lieut. Field Marshal d'Aspre (1789-1850), which was supported by the brigades that now crossed at Bereguardo. But the Italians were also supported, the Austrians made little progress, and by nightfall the Sardinian II., III. and IV. divisions had closed up around Vigevano. Radetzky indeed intended his troops on the Vigevano road to See also:act simply as a defensive flank-guard and had ordered the rest of his army by the three roads, Zerbolo-Gambolo, Gropello-Trumello and Lomello-San Giorgio, to converge on Mortara. The rearmost of the two corps on the Gambolo road (the I.) was to serve at need as a support to the flank-guard, and, justly confident in his troops, Radetzky did not hesitate to send a whole corps by the See also:eccentric route of Lomello. And before nightfall an important success had justified him,, for the II. corps from Gambolo, See also:meeting Durando outside Mortara had defeated him before the Sardinian reserve, prematurely deployed on the other side of the See also:town, could come to his assistance.

The remaining corps of Radetzky's army were still See also:

short of Mortara when See also:night came, but this could hardly be well known at the royal headquarters, and, giving up the slight chances of success that a counterstroke from Vigevano on Mortara offered, Chrzanowski ordered a general concentration on Novara. This was effected on the 22nd, on which day Radetzky, pushing out the II. corps towards Vespolate, concentrated the rest at Mortara. That the Italians had retired was clear, but it was not known whither, and, precisely as Napoleon had done before See also:Marengo (see FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY WARS), he sent one corps to seize the king's potential line of retreat, Novara-Vercelli, kept one back at Mortara Students of See also:Napoleonic See also:strategy will find it interesting to replace Ramorino by, say, See also:Lannes, and to post Durando at Mortara-Vigevano instead of Vespolate-Vigevano, and from these conditions to See also:work out the probable course of events. z Ramorino's defence was that he had received information that the Austrians were advancing on See also:Alessandria by the south See also:bank of the Po. But Alessandria was a fortress, and could be expected to hold out for See also:forty-eight See also:hours; moreover, it could easily have been succoured by way of Valenza if necessary. Vigevano—and engaged the other three in a singe long See also:column, widely spaced out, on the Novara road. Thus it came about that on the 23rd d'Aspre's II. corps encountered Charles Albert's whole army long before the III. and Reserve could join it. The battle of Novara was, nevertheless, as great an event in the history of the Imperial-Royal Army as Marengo in that of the French. First the IT. corps, and then the II. and III. together attacked with the utmost See also:resolution, and as the hours went by more and more of the whitecoats came on the field until at last the Novara. IV. corps, swinging inward from Robbio, came on to the flank of the defence. This was no See also:mere strategical See also:triumph; the Austrians, See also:regiment for regiment, were more than a match for the Italians and the result was decisive. Charles Albert abdicated, and the See also:young See also:Victor See also:Emmanuel II., his successor, had to make a hasty See also:armistice.

After Novara, the first great struggle for Italian unity was no more than a spasmodic, if often desperate, struggle of small bodies of patriots and citizens of walled towns to avert the inevitable. The principal incidents in the last phase were the siege of Venice, the See also:

sack of See also:Brescia by the merciless See also:Haynau and the capture of Rome by a French eipeditionary corps under General See also:Oudinot.

End of Article: ITALIAN WARS (1848–187o)

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