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NAVAL STRATEGY AND
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See also:NAVAL See also:STRATEGY AND See also:TACTICS See also:Historical See also:Evolution.—That the methods of conducting See also:war at See also:sea have been conditioned by the capacity of the See also:ships and their armament, and that capacity and armament have interacted upon one another, may appear to be platitudes. But they are none the less truths which must always be See also:borne in mind when we are considering the See also:history of naval strategy, that is, of the large movements by which a See also:commander secures the See also:advantage of fighting at a See also:place convenient to himself, or of tactics—which are the movements he makes in See also:battle. Throughout antiquity and the See also:middle ages till the 16th See also:century, the weapons relied on were—(1) the See also:ship itself, used as a See also:ram, (2) the swords of the See also:crew, (3) such missile weapons as bolts from heavy crossbows fixed on the bulwarks, bows and arrows, weights dropped from a yard or See also:pole rigged out, and the various means of setting an enemy alight; by See also:shooting arrows with burning See also:tow or by See also:Greek See also:fire or See also:wild fire, blown through tubes (See also:cannae, whence " See also:cannon "). The nature of the " Greek fire " is still an unsettled question, and it is believed by some authorities that the Byzan- tines of the middle ages were acquainted with the use of See also:gun- See also:powder. However that may be, it is certain that even after the introduction of See also:artillery in the 14th century, the were very feeble. All actions, therefore, were fought at See also:close quarters, where ramming and boarding were possible. But the use of the ram was only available for a See also:vessel driven by oars. A sailing vessel could not ram unless she were See also:running before a See also:good See also:breeze. In a See also:light See also:wind her See also:charge would be ineffective, and it could not be made at all from leeward. There-fore, while fleets depended on the methods of battle at close quarters, two conditions were imposed on the warship. She must be small and light, so that. her crew could See also:row her with effect, and she must carry a numerous crew to See also:work her oars and See also:board or repel boarders. Sails were used by the triremes and other classes of warship, See also:ancient and See also:medieval, when going from point to point—to relieve the rowers from absolutely exhausting toil. They were lowered in See also:action, and when the combatant had a secure See also:port at See also:hand, they were See also:left ashore before battle. These conditions applied alike to Phormio, the Athenian See also:admiral of the 5th century B.C., to the Norse See also: It always endeavoured to secure a basis on shore to See also:store provisions and See also:rest the crews. Therefore the wider operations were slowly made. Therefore too, when the enemy was to be waited for, or a port watched, some point on shore was secured and the ships were See also:drawn up. It was by holding such a point that the Corinthian See also:allies of the Syracusans were able to See also:pin in the Athenians. The See also:Romans watched Lilybeum in the same way, and See also:Hannibal the Rhodian could run the blockade before they were launched and ready to stop him. The Norsemen hauled their ships on shore, stockaded them and marched inland. The Greeks of See also:Homer had done the same and could do nothing else. See also:Roger di See also:Lauria, in A.D. 1285, waited at the Hormigas with his galleys on the beach till the See also:French were seen to be coming past him. See also:Edward III. in A.D. 1350, stayed at See also:Winchelsea till the Spaniards were sighted. The allies at Lepanto remained at See also:anchor near Dragonera till the last moment. Given again that the fighting was at close quarters with ram, stroke of See also:sword, crossbow See also:bolt, arrow, pigs of See also:iron or See also:lead and wild fire blown through tubes, it follows that the formations and tactics were equally imposed on the combatants. The formation was inevitably the See also:lane abreast—the ships going sideby See also:side—for the See also:object was to bring all the rams, or all the boarders into action at once. It was quite as necessary to strike with the See also:prow when boarding as when ramming. If the vessels were laid side by side the oars would have prevented them from touching. It may be added that this See also:rule prevailed equally with the sailing ship of later times, since they were built with what is technically called " a tumble See also:home," that is to say, their sides sloped inwards from the water See also:line, and the space from the See also:top of the bulwarks of one to the other was too See also:great to be jumped. The extent to which ramming or boarding would be used respectively would depend on the skill of the rowers. The highly trained Athenian crews of the See also:early Pelopon- nesian War relied mainly on the ram. They aimed at Ancient dashing through an enemy's line, and shaving m off the methods. oars from one side of an opponent. When successfully practised, this manoeuvre would be See also:equivalent to the dismasting of a sailing line of battle ship. It was the See also:beE c r?ous, and it enabled the assailant to turn, and ram his crippled enemy in the stern (7repiirXous) But an attack with the ram might be exceedingly dangerous to the assailant, if he were not very solidly built. His ram might be broken off in the See also:shock. The Athenians found this a very real peril, and were compelled to construct their triremes with stronger bows, to contend with the more heavily built Peloponnesian vessels—whereby they lost much of their mobility. In fact success in ramming depended so much on a See also:combination of skill and good See also:fortune that it played a somewhat subordinate See also:part in most ancient sea fights. The Romans baffled the ramming tactics of the Carthaginians by the invention of the corva or See also:crow, which grappled the prow of the rammer, and provided a gangway for boarders. After the introduction of artillery in the 14th century, when guns were carried in the bows of the galley, it was considered See also:bad management to fire them until the prow was actually touching the enemy. If they were discharged before the shock there was always a See also:risk that they would be fired too soon, and the guns of the See also:time could not be rapidly reloaded. The officer-like course was to keep the fire for the last moment, and use it to clear the way for the boarders. As a See also:defence against boarding, the ships of a weaker fleet were sometimes tied side to one another, in the middle ages, and a barrier made with oars and spars. But this defensive arrangement, which was adopted by Olaf Tryggveson of See also:Norway at Swolder (A.D. 1000), and by the French at See also:Sluys (A.D. 1340), could be turned by an enemy who attacked on the flank. To meet the shock of ramming and to ram, medieval ships were sometimes " bearded," i.e. fortified with iron bands across the bows. The principles of naval warfare known to the ancient See also:world descended through See also:Byzantium to the See also:Italian Republics and from them to the See also:West. With the growth of ships, the development of artillery, and the beginning of the great sailing fleets capable of keeping the sea for long periods together, came the need for a new See also:adaptation of old principles. A ship which depended on the wind for its See also:motive power could not See also:hope to ram. It could still board, and the Spaniards did for long make it their See also:main object to run their See also:bow over an enemy's sides, and invade his deck. In order to carry out this See also:kind of attack they would naturally try to get to windward and then See also:bear down before the wind in line abreast ship upon ship. But an opponent to leeward could always baffle this attack by edging away, and in the meantime fire with his See also:broadside to cripple his opponent's spars. Experience soon showed the more intelligent sea See also:officers of all nations, that a ship which relied on broadside fire, must See also:present her broadside to the enemy; it was also soon seen that in order to give full See also:play to the guns of the fleet, the ships must follow one another. Thus there arose the practice of arranging ships in the line ahead, one behind the other. For a time sea-officers were inclined to doubt whether order could be maintained among vessels subject to the forces of wind and See also:tide. But in the very first years of the 16th century, a See also:Spanish writer of the name of Alonso de See also:Chaves argued with force that even an approach to order is See also:superior to none—and that, given the accidents of early means of injuring an enemy at a distance were nil, or history. Sailing ships. 314 wind and tide, the advantage would rest with him who took his precautions. The truth was so obvious that it could not but be universally accepted. The line ahead then became "the line of battle." This See also:term has a See also:double meaning. It may mean the formation, but it may also mean the ships which are See also:fit to See also:form parts of the line in action. The practice of sorting out ships, so as to class those fit to be in a line of battle apart from others, See also:dates from the second See also:half of the 17th century. Its advantages had been seen before, but the See also:classification was not made universal till then. The excessive number of ships collected in those naval See also:wars, their variety in size, and the presence in the fleets of a large proportion of pressed or hired See also:merchant ships had led to much bad See also:execution. But in the final battles of the first war between See also:England and the Dutch See also:Republic (1652-53), the See also:Parliamentary admirals enforced the formation of the line by strong See also:measures. On the conclusion of the war, they See also:drew up the first published See also:code of fighting instructions. These give the basis of the whole See also:tactical See also:system of the 17th and 18th centuries in naval warfare. The See also:treatises of See also:Paul See also:Hoste, See also:Bigot de Morogues and Bourde de Villehuet, which were the See also:text-books of the time, all French in origin but all translated into other See also:languages, are commentaries upon and developments of this traditional code of practice. The governing principles were See also:simple and were essentially See also:sound. The ships were arranged in a line, in order that each should have her broadside See also:free to fire into the enemy Principles without running the risk of firing into her own See also:friends. alighting tactics. In order to remove the danger that they would See also:touch each other, a competent space, to allow for a See also:change of course in See also:case of need, was left between them. It was fixed at two cables—that is, 200 fathoms, or 400 yds. —though less See also:room was occasionally taken. To reduce the number of men required to handle the sails, and leave them free to fight the guns, the ships fought under reduced See also:canvas. But it was necessary to retain the power to increase the speed of a ship rapidly. This was secured by not sheeting home one of the sails—that is to say, it was left loose, and the wind was "spilt out of it." When the vessel was required to shoot ahead it was easy to See also:sheet the sail home, and " let all draw." The fleets would fight " on the wind "—that is to say, with the wind on the side, because they were then under better See also:control. With the wind blowing from behind they would take the wind out of one another's sails. When the course had to be altered, the ships turned by tacking—that is, See also:head to wind—or by wearing—that is, stern to wind, either together or in See also:succession. To tack or See also:wear a large fleet in succession was a very lengthy operation. The second ship did not tack, or wear, till she had reached the place where the first had turned, and so on, down the whole line. By tacking or wearing together the order of a fleet was reversed, the See also:van becoming the See also:rear, and the rear the van. It must be remembered that a fleet was divided into van, centre and rear, which kept their names even when the order was reversed. Orders were given by signals from the See also:flag-ship, but as they could not be seen by the ships in a line with her, frigates were stationed on the side of the line opposite to that facing the enemy " to repeat signals." A main object which the admirals who drafted the orders had before them was to obviate the risk that the enemy would double on one end of the line and put it between two fires. It is obvious that if two fleets, A and B, are sailing, both with the wind on the right side, and the leading ship of A comes into action with the seventh or eighth of B, then six or seven leading ships of B's line will be free to turn and surround the head of A's line. This did actually happen at the battle of Beachy Head. Therefore, the orders enjoin on the admiral the strict See also:obligation to come into action in such a way that his leading ship shall See also:steer with the leading ship of the enemy, and his rear with the rear. The See also:familiar expression of the See also:British See also:navy was " to take every See also:man his See also:bird." The See also:regular method of fighting battles was thus set up. In itself it was founded on sound principles. As it was framed when the enemies kept in view were the Dutch, who in See also:seamanship[STRATEGY AND TACTICS and gunnery were fully equal to the British, its authors were justified in prescribing the safe course. Unhappily they added the direction that a British admiral was to keep his fleet, through-out the battle, in the order in which it was begun. Therefore he could take no advantage of any disorder which might occur in the enemy's lines. When therefore the conflict came to be between the British and the French in the 18th century, battles between equal or approximately equal forces were for long inconclusive. The French, who had fewer ships than the British, were anxious to fight at the least possible cost, lest their fleet should be worn out by severe action, leaving Great See also:Britain with an untouched See also:balance. Therefore, they preferred to engage to leeward, a position which left them free to See also:retreat before the wind. They allowed the British fleet to get to windward, and, when it was parallel with them and See also:bore up before the wind to attack, they moved onwards. The attacking fleet had then to advance, not directly before the wind with its ships moving along lines perpendicular to the line attacked, but in slanting or curving lines. The assailants would be thrown into " a bow and See also:quarter line "—that is to say, with the bow of the second level with the after part of the first and so on from end to end. In the case of a number of ships of various See also:powers of sailing, it was a difficult formation to maintain. The result was that the ships of the assailing line which were steering to attack the enemy's van came into action first and were liable to be crippled in the See also:rigging. If the same formation was to be maintained, the others were now limited to the speed of the injured vessels, and the enemy to leeward slipped away. At all times a fleet advancing from windward was liable to injury in spars, even if the leeward fleet did not deliberately aim at them. The leeward ships would be leaning away from the wind, and their shot would always have a tendency to See also:fly high. So long as the assailant remained to windward, the ships to leeward could always slip off. The inconclusive results of so many battles at sea excited the attentions of a Scottish See also:gentleman, Mr Clerk of Eldin (1728-1812), in the middle of the 18th century. He began a clerk,s See also:series of speculations and calculations, which he em- theories. bodied in See also:pamphlets and distributed among naval officers. They were finally published in See also:book form in 1790 and 1797. The See also:hypothesis which governs all Clerk's demonstrations is that as the British navy was superior in gunnery and See also:seaman-ship to their enemy, it was their See also:interest to produce a melee. He advanced various ingenious suggestions for concentrating superior forces on parts of the enemy's line—by preference on the rear, since the van must lose time in turning to its support. They are all open to the See also:criticism that an See also:expert opponent could find an See also:answer to each of them. But that must be always the case, and victory is never the See also:fruit of a skilful See also:movement alone, but of that superiority of skill or of moral strength which enables one combatant to forestall or to crush another by more rapid movement or greater force of See also:blow. Clerk's theories had at least this merit that they must infallibly tend to make battles decisive by throwing the combatants into a furious mingled strife. The unsatisfactory See also:character of the accepted method of fighting battles at sea had begun to be obvious to naval officers, both French and See also:English, who were Clerk's contemporaries. The great French admiral Suffren condemned naval tactics as being little better than so many excuses for avoiding a real fight. He endeavoured to find a better method, by concentrating superior forces on parts of his opponent's line in some of his actions with the British fleet in the See also:East Indies in 1782 and 1783. But his orders were See also:ill obeyed, and the quality of his fleet was not superior to the British. See also:Rodney, in his first battle in the West Indies in 1780, endeavoured to concentrate a superior force on part of his enemy's line by throwing a greater number of British ships on the rear of the French line. But his directions were misunderstood and not properly executed. Moreover he did not then go beyond trying to place a larger number of ships in action to windward against a smaller number to leeward by arranging them at a less distance than two-cables length. But " Line of battle." an enemy who took the simple and obvious course of closing his the conduct of war at sea. The time of revolution in means of line could baffle the attack, and while the retreat to leeward remained open could still slip away. On the 12th of See also:April 1782 (battle of See also:Dominica) Rodney was induced, by the disorder in the French line, to break his own formation and pass through the enemy. He took the French flag-ship and five other vessels. The favourable result of this departure from the old practice of keeping the formation intact throughout the battle ruined the moral authority of the orthodox system of tactics. In the French war which began in 1793 See also:Lord See also:Howe (battle of 1st of See also:June) ordered his fleet to steer through the enemy, and to put them-selves on his line only as a means of bringing his fleet into action, and then played to produce a melee in which the individual superiority of his vessels would have free play. Throughout the war, which lasted, with a brief See also:interval of See also:peace, from 1793 to 1815, British admirals See also:grew constantly bolder in the method they adopted for producing the desired melee (battles of St See also:Vincent, Camperdown, See also:Trafalgar). It has sometimes been argued that their line of attack was rash and would have proved disastrous if tried against more skilful opponents. But this is one of those criticisms which are of value only against those who think that there can be a magic efficacy in any particular attack, which makes its success infallible. That the tactics of British admirals of the great wars of 1793–1815 had in themselves no such virtue was amply demonstrated at the engagement off See also:Lissa in 1811. They were justified because the reliance of admirals on the quality of their fleets was well founded. It should be borne in mind that a vessel while bearing down on an enemy's line could not be exposed to the fire of three enemies at once when at a less distance than 950 yds., because the guns could not be trained to converge on a nearer point. The whole range of effective fire was only a thousand yards or a very little over. The See also:chance that a ship would be dismasted and stopped before reaching the enemy's line was small. The improvements in the construction of ships, which had so much See also:influence on the development of tactics, had its effect also Influence on strategy. The great aims of a fleet in war must be of ins. to keep the See also:coast of its own See also:country free from attack, proved to secure the freedom of its trade, and to destroy ship- the enemy's fleet or confine it to port. The first and See also:building. second of these purposes can be attained by the successful achievement of the third—the destruction or See also:paralysis of the hostile fleet. But till after the end of the 17th century it was thought impossible, or at least very rash, to keep the great ships out of port between See also:September and May or June. Therefore continuous See also:watch on an enemy by blockading his ports was beyond the power of a'ny navy. Therefore too, as the opponent might be at sea before he could be stopped, the movements of fleets were much subordinated to the need for providing See also:convoy to the trade. It was not till the middle of the 18th century that the continuous blockade first carried out by Lord See also:Hawke in 1758–59, and then brought to perfection by See also:Earl St Vincent and other British admirals between 1793 and 1815, became possible. See also:Modern Times.—The interval of ninety years between 1815 and 1904 (the opening of the Russo-See also:Japanese conflict) was marked by no naval war. There was fighting at sea, and there were prolonged blockades, but there were no encounters between large and well appointed navies. During this See also:period an entire revolution took place in the means of propulsion, armament and material of construction of ships. See also:Steam was applied to war-ships, at first as an See also:auxiliary force, in the second quarter of the 19th century. The See also:Crimean War gave a great stimulus to the development of the guns. It also brought about the application of iron to ships as a See also:cuirass. Very soon See also:metal was adopted as the material out of which ships were made. The extended use of shells, by immensely increasing the danger of fire, rendered so inflammable a substance as See also:wood too dangerous for employment in a war-ship. See also:France has the See also:honour of having set the example of employing iron as a cuirass, while England was the first to take it as the See also:sole material. Changes so sweeping as these could not take place without affecting all the established ideas as topropulsion, armament and construction was also a time of much See also:speculation. Doubts and obscurities remained unsolved because they had never been brought to the test of actual fighting on an adequate See also:scale. As the 19th century drew to a close, another See also:element of uncertainty was introduced by the development of the See also:torpedo. A weapon which is a floating and moving mine, capable up to a certain point of being directed on its course, invisible or very hard to trace, and able to deliver its blow beneath the water-line, was so See also:complete a novelty that its action was hard indeed to foresee and therefore particularly liable to be exaggerated. From the torpedo sprang too the submarine vessel, which aims at striking below the See also:surface, where it itself is, like its weapon, invisible, or nearly so. How to solve the problems which See also:science has set has been the task of thoughtful naval officers—and of the governments which the military seaman serves. The questions to be solved may be stated in the following order. What would be the effect: 1st, of the employment of steam, or of any substitute for steam other than the wind or the oar; 2nd, of the development of the gun; 3rd, of the use of metal as a material of construction; 4th, of the use of a weapon and a vessel acting below the surface of the water, and if not wholly invisible at least very much hidden? The belief that steam had given the lesser fleet an advantage over the greater—that it had, in a phrase once popular among Englishmen, " bridged the Channel,"—need only be touched on for its historical interest. It was an intelligible, perhaps pardonable, example of the confusion produced by a novelty of improved capacity on the minds of those who were not prepared to consider it in all its See also:bearings. A mo ment's thought ought to have shown that where both sides had the command of steam, the proportion between them would remain what it was before. The only exception would be that the fleet which was steering in a direction already laid down would have a somewhat greater advantage than of old, over another which was endeavouring to detect its presence and course. Its movements would be more rapid, and it could steam through a See also:fog by which it would be hidden in a way impossible for a sailing ship. On the other hand, such a fleet could be much more rapidly pursued and interrupted when once its course was known. The influence which the freedom and certainty of movement conferred by steam would have on the powers of fleets and ships presented a problem less easy to dispose of. Against the advantage they conferred was to be set the See also:limitation they imposed. The See also:necessity for replacing indispensable See also:fuel was a restriction unknown to the sailing ship, which needed only to renew its provisions and water—stores more easily obtained all the world over than See also:coal. Hence doubts naturally arose as to how far a See also:state which did not possess coaling stations in all parts of the world could conduct extensive operations over great distances. The events of the See also:recent Russo-Japanese War lead to the conclusion that the obligation to obtain coal has not materially limited the freedom of movement of fleets. By carrying store vessels with him, by coaling at sea, and taking advantage of the friendly See also:neutrality of certain ports on his route, the See also:Russian admiral, Rojdesvensky, reached the Far East in 1905 in less time and with !See also:ess difficulty than he could have done in days when he would have been liable to delay by calms, contrary winds and loss of spars in See also:gales. The amount of skill on the part of the crews required to carry a fleet a long distance would even appear to be less than it was of old. From this it would seem to follow that modern fleets possess no less capacity than the old sailing fleets for the great operations of war at a distance, or for maintaining blockades. Advantage and disadvantage counterbalance one another, and the proportion remains the same. Blockade is only another name for the See also:maintenance of a watch on an enemy's See also:squadron in port by a force capable of fighting him if he comes out. Admiral See also:Togo blockaded the Russian squadron at Port See also:Arthur in 1904 as effectually as any admiral has done the work in the past. The mobility given to the blockaded fleet by steam has been exactly counterbalanced by the increased mobility of the watch. The proportions remain the same. But if the power to undertake far-ranging operations, and to confine an enemy to port by keeping him under observation, and See also:driving him back when he comes out remains the same, the strategy of war at sea cannot have undergone any material alteration. The See also:possession of ports where stores can be accumulated and See also:repairs effected is an advantage as it always was. But a powerful fleet when operating far from its own country can See also:supply itself with a store-house (a See also:base) on the enemy's coast, or can be served at sea by store-ships, as of old. If beaten, it will suffer from the want of places of See also:refuge as it always did. Among the speculations of recent years, a good See also:deal has been heard of the " fleet in being." If this phrase is only used to Fleet In mean that, so long as any part of an enemy's navy wog." is capable of acting with effect, its existence cannot be ignored with the certainty of safety, then the words convey a truth which applies to all war whether by See also:land or sea. If it means, as it was at least sometimes clearly intended to mean, that no such operation as the transport of troops oversea can be undertaken with success, so long as the naval forces of an opponent are not wholly destroyed, it is contrary to ancient experience. The Japanese in the beginning of 1904 began transporting troops to See also:Korea before they had beaten the Russians, and they continued to send them in spite of the risk of interruption by the See also:Vladivostok squadron. There was a risk, but risk is inseparable from war. The degree which can be incurred with sanity depends on the stake at issue, the nature of the circumstance and the capacity of the persons, which vary infinitely and must be separately judged.
The war of 1904-05 may also be said to have shown that the
vast change in the construction of ships, together with the develop-
Ramming. ment of old and the invention of new weapons, has
done far less to alter the course of battles at sea than
had been thought likely. Two calculations have been successively
made and have been supported with plausibility. The first was
that steam would enable the ship herself to be used as a projectile
and that the use of the ram would again become See also:common.
The sinking of the " Re d'Italia " by the See also:Austrian ironclad
See also: But the activity of science has See also:developed one weapon to counterbalance another. The torpedo has made it very dangerous for one fleet to See also:rush at another. A vessel Torpedoes. cannot fire torpedoes ahead, and when charging home at an opponent presenting his broadside would be liable to be struck by one. The torpedo may be said therefore to have excluded the pell-mell battle and the use of the ram except on rare occasions. But then arose the question whether the torpedo itself would not become the decisive weapon in naval warfare. It is undoubtedly capable of producing a great effect when its power can be fully exerted. A school arose, having its most convinced partisans in France, which argued that, as a small vessel could with a torpedo destroy a great battle-ship, the first would drive the second off the sea. The battle-ship was to give place to the torpedo-See also:boat or torpedo-boat-destroyer which was itself only a torpedo-boat of a larger growth. But the torpedo is subject to close restrictions. It cannot be used with effect at more than two thousand yards. It passes through a resisting See also:medium, which renders its course uncertain and comparatively slow, so that a moving opponent can avoid it. The vessel built to use it can be easily sunk by gun-fire. By See also:night the risk from gun-fire is less, but science has nullified what she had done. The invention of the See also:search-light has made it possible to keep the See also:waters See also:round a ship under observation all night. In the war between See also:Russia and See also:Japan the torpedo was at first used with success, but the injury it produced See also:fell below expectations, even when See also:allowance is made for the fact that the Russian squadron at Port Arthur had the means of repair close at hand. In the sea fights of the war it was of subordinate use, and indeed was not employed except to give the final stroke to, or force the surrender of, an already crippled ship. This war (and as much may be said for the war between the See also:United States and See also:Spain) confirmed an old experience. A resolute See also:attempt was made by the Americans to See also:block or See also:blind (in the modern phrase to " See also:bottle-up ") the entrance to See also:Santiago de See also:Cuba by sinking a ship in it. The Japanese renewed the attempt on a great scale, and with the utmost intrepidity, at Port Arthur; but though a steamer can move with a speed and precision impossible to a sailing ship, and can therefore be sunk more surely at a chosen spot, the experiment failed. Neither Americans nor Japanese succeeded in preventing their enemy from coming out when he wished to come. Since neither ram nor torpedo has established the claim made for it, the cannon remains " the See also:queen of battles at sea." It can still deliver its blows at the greatest distance, and Gan-fire. in the greatest variety of circumstances. The change has been in the method in which its power is applied. Now, as in former times, the aim of a skilful officer is to concentrate a superior force on a part of his opponent's formation. When the range of effective fire was a thousand or twelve See also:hundred yards, and when guns could only be trained over a small segment of a circle because they were fired out of ports, concentration could only be effected by bringing a larger number of ships into close action with a smaller. To-See also:day when gun-fire is effective even at seven thousand yards, and when guns fired from turrets and barbettes have a far wider sweep, concentration can be effected from a distance. The power to effect it must be sought by a judicious choice of position. It is true that greater rapidity and precision of fire produce concentration in one way. If of two forces engaged one can bring See also:forty guns to bear on a chosen point of its opponent's formations, while that opponent can bring fifty guns to bear on a part of it, the superiority would seem to be with the larger number. But this is by no means necessarily the case. The smaller number of guns may give the greater number of blows if fired with greater speed and accuracy. Yet no commander has a right to rely on such a superiority as this till it has been demonstrated, as it had been in the case of the British fleet by the time that Trafalgar was fought. Therefore an able See also:chief will always play for position. He will do so all the more because an advantage of position adds to any other which he may possess. He may dispense with it for a particular See also:reason at a given moment and in reliance on other See also:sources of strength, but he will not throw it away. When position is to be secured the first See also:condition to be thought of is the order in which it is to be sought for. The " line ahead " was imposed on the sailing fleets by the See also:peremptory position. need for bringing, or at least retaining the power to bring, all their broadsides into action. Experiments made during manoeuvres by modern navies, together with the experience gained in the war of r9o4-o5 in the Far East, have combined to show that no material change has taken place in this respect. It is still as necessary as ever that all the guns should be so placed as to be capable of being brought to bear, and it is still a condition imposed by the See also:physical necessities of the case that this freedom can only be obtained when ships follow one another in a line. When in pursuit or See also:flight, or when steaming on the look-out for a still unseen enemy, a fleet may be arranged in the " line abreast." A pursuing fleet would have to run the risk of being struck by torpedoes dropped by a retreating enemy. But it would have the advantage of being able to bring all its guns which can fire ahead to bear on the rear-ship of the enemy. When an opponent is prepared to give battle, and turns his broad-side so as to bring the maximum of his gun-fire to bear, he must be answered by a similar display of force—in other words, the line ahead must be formed to meet the line ahead. Both fleets being in this formation, how is the concentration of a superior force to be effected? If the opponents are equal in number, speed, armament, gunnery and the leadership of the chiefs, accident alone can confer an advantage on either of them. Where equal weights are tried on accurate scales one cannot force up the other, but this evenness of power is rarely met in war by land or sea. The knowledge that it existed would probably prevent an See also:appeal to arms between nations, since no decisive result could be hoped for. It is needless to insist that superior See also:numbers make the task of concentrating comparatively easy, unless counterbalanced by a great inferiority in speed. Speed is the quality which an admiral will wish his fleet to possess, in order that he may have the power to choose his point of attack. The swifter of two forces, otherwise equal, speed. can always get ahead of its opponent, and then by turning inwards bring the leading ship of the force it is attacking into a See also:curve of fire. The See also:leader of the slower fleet can avoid the danger by also turning inwards. By so doing he will keep the assailant on his beam, opposite his side. Then the two fleets will tend to See also:swing round in two circles having a common centre, the swifter going round the See also:outer circumference and the slower round the inner. As the difference in length of these two lines would be always great and perhaps immense, the less speedy fleet could easily avoid the risk of being headed. On the other hand the outer fleet will be in a See also:concave formation, and therefore able to bring all its guns to bear on the same point, while the inner fleet will be in a See also:convex line, so that it will be unable to bring the guns of both van and rear to bear on the same See also:mark. The advantage is obvious, but it may perhaps be easily exaggerated. The swifter fleet on the larger circle can in theory concentrate all its fire on one point, but all its ships will still be under fire, and in practice it is found very difficult to make men neglect the enemy who is actually hitting them, and apply their See also:attention entirely to another. Moreover the ships on the outer circle, having the larger line to cover, cannot allow themselves the same margin of steam-power to make good loss of speed by injury from shot. A fleet would not go at its maximum See also:rate of common speed in action. A blow on the water-line might fill part of the ship's watertight compartments and reduce her speed. She must be able to make good the loss by putting on a greater pressure of steam, which she would not be able to do if already going at her maximum rate. In actual battle very much will depend on the respective skill of the gunnery. The swifter fleet might well find its superiority neutralised by the crippling of two or three of its leading ships. In such an action as this it will be, if not impossible, at least exceedingly difficult to give orders by See also:signal. An admiral will therefore have to See also:direct by example, which he cannot do except by placing his flag-ship at the head of the line. In that place he will be marked out as a See also:target for the enemy's concentrated fire. He may indeed decide to direct the battle by signal from outside the line. Yet the difficulty he will find in seeing what is happening, as well as the difficulty the captains will find in seeing the signals, will always be so great, that in all See also:probability the admirals of the future, will, like Nelson, be content to See also:lay down the See also:general principles on which the battle is to be fought, and See also:trust the captains to apply them as circumstances arise. A large measure of See also:independence must needs be allowed to the captains in the actual stress of battle. Ships must be placed at such a distance apart as will allow them room to manoeuvre so as to avoid collision with their own friends. The interval cannot be less than Soo yds. When the length of the vessels themselves is added, it will be seen that a line of twelve vessels will stretch six See also:miles. Modern powder is nominally smokeless, and it certainly does not create the dense See also:bank of See also:smoke produced by the old See also:explosives. Yet it does create a sufficient haze to obscure the view from the van to the rear of an extended line. The movements must be rapid, and there will be little time indeed in which to take decisions. The torpedo may not be used during the actual battle. Its part will be to complete the destruction or enforce the surrender of a beaten enemy, and to cover retreats. The submarine and submergible vessel were brought into prominence by France in the hope that by diminishing the value of battleships they would reduce the superiority of the British navy. The example of France was followed by other powers, and particularly by Great Britain; but their value as weapons of war is necessarily a See also:matter of speculation. Additional information and CommentsThere are no comments yet for this article.
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