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THE ITALIAN WAR OF
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THE See also:ITALIAN See also:WAR OF 1859 The See also:campaign of See also:Magenta and See also:Solferino took See also:place ten years later. See also:Napoleon III., himself an ex-carbonaro, and the apostle of the theory of " nationalities," had had his See also:attention and his ambitions See also:drawn towards the Italian problem by the See also:attempt upon his See also:life by See also:Orsini. The See also:general See also:political See also:horizon was by no means clear at the end of 1858, and on the 1st of See also:January 1859 the See also:emperor of the See also:French publicly expressed to the See also:Austrian See also:ambassador his regret that " our relations are not 'so See also:good as heretofore." This was regarded by all concerned as a prelude to war, and within a See also:short See also:time a treaty and a See also:marriage-See also:contract allied See also:Sardinia with the leading See also:European See also:power: In the smaller Italian states, as before, the governments were on the See also:side of See also:Austria and the " See also:settlement of 1815, " and the peoples on that of See also:United See also:Italy. The French still maintained it See also:garrison in See also:Rome to support the See also:pope. The thorny question of the temporal power versus the See also:national See also:movement was not yet in the foreground, and though Napoleon's support of the former was later to prove his undoing, in 1859 the See also:main enemy was Austria and the See also:paramount See also:factor was the assistance of 200,000 French regulars in solving the immediate problem. The Sardinian See also:army, reconstituted by La Marinora with the definite See also:object of a war for See also:union and rehabilitated by its conduct in the See also:Crimea, was eager and willing. The French army, proud of its reputation as the premier army in the See also:world, and composed, three-fourths of it, of professional soldiers whose See also:gospel was the " See also:Legend," welcomed a return to the first Napoleon's See also:battle-grounds, while the emperor's ambitions coincided with his sentiments. Austria, on the other See also:hand, did not See also:desire war. Her only See also:motive of resistance was that it was impossible to cede her Italian possessions in See also:face of a See also:mere See also:threat. To her, even more than to See also:France and infinitely more than to Italy, the war was a political war, a " war with a limited aim " or " stronger See also:form of See also:diplomatic See also:note "; it entirely lacked the national and See also:personal spirit of resistance which makes even a passive See also:defence so powerful. Events during the See also:period of tension that preceded the actual See also:declaration of war were practically governed by these moral conditions. Such advantages as Austria possessed at the outset could only be turned to See also:account, as will presently appear, by prompt See also:action. But her army See also:system was a See also:combination of See also:conscription and the " nation in arms," which for the diplomatic war on hand proved to be quite inadequate. Whereas the French army was permanently on a two-thirds war footing (4o0,000 See also:peace, 6o0,000 war), that of Austria required to be more than doubled on mobilization by calling in reservists. Now, the value of reservists is always conditioned by the See also:temper of the See also:population from which they come, and it is more than probable that the indecision of the Austrian See also:government between January and See also:April 1859 was due not only to its desire on general grounds to avoid war, but also, and perhaps still more,
to its hopes of averting' it by firmness, without having recourse to the possibly dangerous expedient of a real mobilization. A few years before the method of " bluffing " had been completely successful against See also:Prussia. But the Prussian reservist of 1850 did not want to fight, whereas the French soldier of 1859 desired nothing more ardently.
In these conditions the Austrian preparations were made sparingly, but with ostentation. The three See also:corps constituting the Army of Italy (commanded since See also:Radetzky's See also:death in 1858 by Feldzeugmeister See also:Count See also:Franz Gyulai (1798-1863)), were maintained at war efficiency, but not at war strength (corps averaging 15,000). Instead, however, of mobilizing them, the See also:Vienna government sent an army corps (III.) from Vienna at peace strength in January. This was followed by the II. corps, also at peace strength, in See also:February, and the available See also: See also: ' The Volunteer movement in See also:England was the result of this crisis in the relations of England and France.
' As far as possible Italian conscripts had been sent elsewhere and replaced by Austrians.
See also:WARS 915
See also:port, directly. Gyulai's See also:left was on the 2nd of May opposite the allied centre, and his right stretched as far as See also:Vercelli.' On the 3rd he planned a concentric attack on See also: In fact, the Austrians grouped at Austrian headquarters were full of able soldiers, each ,yiortara. of whom had his own views on the See also:measures to be taken and a certain measure of support from Vienna—Gyulai, See also:Colonel See also:Kuhn his See also:chief of See also:staff, and Feldzeugmeister See also:Hess, who had formerly played See also:Gneisenau to Radetzky's See also:Blucher. But what emerges most clearly from the movements of these days is that Gyulai himself distrusted the offensive projects he had .been ordered to execute, and catching apparently at some expression of approval given by the emperor, had determined to imitate Radetzky in " a defensive based on the Quadrilateral." His immediate intention, on abandoning the advance on Turin was to See also:group his army around Mortara and to strike out as opportunity offered against the heads of the allied columns wherever they appeared. Meantime, the IX. corps had been sent to Italy, and the I. and XI. were mobilizing. These were to form the I. Army, Gyulai's the II. The latter was by the 13th of May grouped in the Lomellina, one third (chiefly VII. corps) spread ' The movements of the See also:division employed-in policing See also:Lombardy (See also:Urban's) are not included here, unless specially mentioned. Mobiiization. 4y brigades fanwise from Vercelli along the Sesia and Po to Vaccarizza, two thirds massed in a central position about Mortara. There was still no See also:information of the enemy's See also:distribution, except what was forwarded from Vienna or gathered by the indefatigable Urban's division, which moved from See also:Milan to See also:Biella, thence to See also:Brescia and See also:Parma, and back to Lombardy in See also:search of revolutionary bands, and the latter's doings in the nature of things could not afford any certain inferences as to the enemy's See also:regular armies. On the side of the allies, the Piedmontese were grouped on the 1st of May in the fortified positions selected for them by Canrobert about Valenza-Casale-Alessandria. The French III. corps arrived on the 2nd and 3rd and the IV. corps on the 7th at Alessandria from Genoa. Unhampered by Gyulai's offensive, though at times and places disquieted by his See also:minor reconnaissances, the allies assembled until on the 16th the French were stationed as follows: I. corps, See also:Voghera and Pontecurone, II., See also:Sale and Bassignana, III., See also:Tortona, IV., Valenza, Guard, Alessandria, and the king's army between Valenza and Casale. The V. French corps under See also:Prince Napoleon had a political See also:mission in the duchies of See also:middle Italy; one division of this corps, however, followed the main army. On the See also:eve of the first collision the emperor Napoleon, commanding in chief, had in hand about See also:ioo,000 French and about 6o,000 Sardinian troops (not including Garibaldi's enlisted volunteers or the national guard). Gyulai's II. Army was nominally of nearly equal force to that of the allies, but in reality it was only about 106,000 strong in combatants. The first battle had no relation to the See also:strategy contemplated by the emperor, and was still less a See also:part of the defence scheme framed by Gyulai. The latter, still pivoting on Mortara, See also:Monte- be es. had between the 14th and 19th drawn his army some- what to the left, in proportion as more and more of the French came up from Genoa. He had further ordered a See also:reconnaissance in force in the direction of Voghera by a mixed corps drawn from the V., Urban's division and the IX. (the last belonging to the I. Army). The saying that " he who does not know what he wants, yet feels that he must do something, appeases his See also:conscience by a reconnaissance in force," applies to no See also:episode more forcibly than to the action of Montebello (20th May) where Count See also:Stadion, the commander of the V. corps, not knowing what to reconnoitre, engaged disconnected fractions of his available 24,000 against the French division of See also:Forey (I. corps), 8000 strong, and was boldly attacked and beaten, with a loss of 1400 men against Forey's 700. Montebello had, however, one singular result: both sides See also:fell back and took defensive measures. The French See also:head-
quarters were already meditating, if they had not Flank actually resolved upon, a See also:transfer of all their forces
march of
the Allies. from right to left, to be followed by a march on Milan
(a scheme inspired by See also:Jomini). But the opening of
the movement was suspended until it became quite certain
that Stadion's advance meant nothing, while Gyulai (impressed
by Forey's aggressive See also:tactics) continued to stand fast, and thus
it was not until the 28th that the French offensive really began.'
The infantry of the French III. corps was sent by rail from See also:Ponte-
curone to Casale, followed by the See also:rest of the army, which marched
by road. To See also:cover the movement D'Autemarre's division of
Prince Napoleon's corps (V.) was posted at Voghera and one
division of the king's army remained at Valenza. The rest of
the Piedmontese were pushed northward to join Cialdini's
division which was already at Vercelli. The emperor's orders
were for Victor Emmanuel to push across the Sesia and to take
' The advantages and dangers of the flank march are well summarized in Colonel H. C. Wylly's Magenta and Solferino, p. 65, where the doctrinaire objections of See also:Hamley and See also:Rustow are set in parallel with the See also:common-sense views of a much-neglected English writer (See also:Major See also: Faithful to his view of the situation he adopted the former course (1st See also:June). The See also:retreat began on the 2nd, while the French were still busied in closing up. Equally with the Austrians, the French were the victims of a system of marching and camping that, by requiring the tail of the columns to close up on the head every evening, reduced the See also:day's See also:net progress to 6 or 7 m., although the troops were often under arms for fourteen or fifteen See also:hours. The difference between the supreme commands of the See also:rival armies See also:lay not in the See also:superior generalship of one or the other, but in the fact that Napoleon III. as See also:sovereign knew what he wanted and as general pursued this object with much See also:energy, whereas Gyulai neither knew how far his government would go nor was entire " See also:master in his own See also:house." The latter became very evident in his retreat. Kuhn, the chief of staff, who was understood to represent the views of the general staff in Vienna, had already protested against Gyulai's See also:retrograde movement, and on the 3rd Hess retreat appeared from Vienna as the emperor's See also:direct repre- sentative and stopped the movement. It was destined to be resumed after a short See also:interval, but meanwhile the troops suffered from the orders and See also:counter-orders that had marked every See also:stage in the Austrian movements and were now intensified instead of being removed by higher intervention. Meanwhile (June 1-2) the allies had regrouped themselves See also:east of the Sesia for the movement on Milan. The IV. corps, driving out an Austrian detachment at See also:Novara, established itself there, and was joined by the II. and Guard. The king's army, supported by the I. and III. corps, was about Vercelli, with cavalry far out to the front towards Vespolate. From Novara, the emperor, who desired to give his troops a rest-day on the 2nd, pushed out first a mixed reconnaissance and then in the afternoon two divisions to seize the crossing of the Ticino, Camou's of the French Guard on Turbigo, Espinasse's of the II. corps on advance See also:San Martino. Further the whole of the Vercelli to the group was ordered to advance on the 3rd to Novara T/clno. and Galliate, where Napoleon would on the 4th have all his forces, except one division, beyond Gyulai's right and in hand for the move on Milan. The division sent to Turbigo bridged the See also:river and crossed in the night of the 2nd/3rd, that at San Martino (on the main road) occupied the See also:bridge-head and also the river bridge itself, though the latter was damaged. Espinasse's division here was during the night replaced by a Guard division and went to join a growing See also:assembly of troops under General See also:MacMahon, which established itself at Turbigo and Robecchetto on the See also:morning of the 3rd. Lastly, in order to make sure that no attack was impending from the direction of Mortara, Napoleon sent General See also:Niel with a mixed reconnoitring force thither, which returned without See also:meeting any Austrian force—fortunately for itself, if the See also:fate of the " reconnaissance in force " at Montebello proves anything. The centre of gravity was now at Buffalora, a See also:village on the main Milan road at the point where it crosses the Naviglio Grande. Here, on the night of the 1st, Count Clam-See also:Gallas, commanding the Austrian I. corps (which had just arrived in Italy and was to form part of the future I. Army) had posted a division, with a view to occupying the bridge-head of San Martino. On inspecting the latter Clam-Gallas concluded that it was indefensible, and, ordering the San Martino road and railway See also:bridges to be destroyed (an order which was only partially executed), he called on Gyulai for support, sent out detachments to the right against the French troops re-ported at Turbigo, and %prepared to hold his ground at Buffalora. On See also:receipt of Clam-Gallas's See also:report at the Austrian headquarters, Hess ordered the resumption of the retreat that he had countermanded, but it was already See also:late and many of the troops did not See also:halt for the night till midnight, June 3rd/4th. Gyulai promised them the 4th as a rest-day, but See also:fortune ordered it otherwise. This much at least was in favour of the Austrians, that when the troops at last reached their assigned positions four-fifths of them were within 12 M. of the battlefield. But, as before, the greater part of the army was destined to be chained to " supporting positions " well back from the battlefield. When day See also:broke on the 4th, the emperor of the French was still uncertain as to Gyulai's whereabouts, and his intention was there-Battle of fore no more than to secure the passage of the Ticino and magenta. to place his army on both sides of the river, in sufficient strength to make head against Gyulai, whether the latter advanced from Mortara and See also:Vigevano or from Abbiategrasso. He therefore kept back part of the French army and the whole of the Sardinian. But during the morning it became known that Gyulai had passed the Ticino on the evening of the 3rd; and Napoleon then ordered up all his forces to San Martino and Turbigo. The battlefield of Magenta is easily described. It consists of two level plateaux, wholly covered with vineyards, and between them the broad and See also:low-lying valley of the Ticino. This, sharply defined by the bluffs of the adjoining plateaux, is made up of backwaters, channels, See also:water meadows and swampy See also:woods. At Turbigo the See also:band of low ground is 1; m. wide, at Buffalora 21. Along the foot of the eastern or Austrian bluffs between Turbigo and Buffalora runs the See also:Grand See also:Canal (Naviglio Grande) ; this, however, cuts into the See also:plateau itself at the latter place and trending gradually inwards leaves a See also:tongue of high ground See also:separate from the main plateau. The Novara-Milan road and railway, crossing the Ticino by the bridge of San Martino, pass the second obstacle presented by the canal by the New Bridges of Magenta, the Old Bridge being moo yards See also:south of these. The canal is bridged at several points between Turbigo and Buffalora, and also at Robecco, m. to the (Austrian) left of the Old Bridge. Clam-Gallas's main line of defence was the canal between Turbigo and the Old Bridge, skirmishers being posted on ccros, under the general command of Marshal Baraguay d'Hilliers, the tongue of high ground in front of the New Bridges, which See also:wear- ' kept open for their retreat. He had been joined by the II. corps attacked an Austrian rearguard (part of VIII. corps, Benedek) and disposed of 40,000 men, 27,000 more being at Abbiategrasso (24 m. S. of Robecco). Of his immediate command, he disposed about 12,000 for the defence of the New Bridges, 12,000 for that of Buffalora, 8000 at Magenta and 8000 at Robecco; all bridges, except the New Bridges, were broken. Cavalry played no part whatever, and See also:artillery was only used in small force to See also:fire along roads and paths. Napoleon, as has been mentioned, spent the morning of the 4th in ascertaining that Gyulai had repassed the Ticino. Being desirous merely of securing the passage and having only a small force avail-able for the moment at San Martino, he kept this back in the See also:hope that MacMahon's advance from Turbigo on Magenta and Buffalora would dislodge the Austrians. MacMahon advanced in two columns, 2 divisions through Cuggiono and 1 through Inveruno. The former drove back the Austrian outposts with ease, but on approaching Buffalora found so serious a resistance that MacMahon broke off the fight in order to close up and deploy his full force. Meantime, however, on hearing the cannonade Napoleon had ordered forward Mellinet's division of the Guard on the New Bridges and Buffalora. The bold advance of this corps d'elite carried both points at once, but the masses of the allies who had been retained to meet a possible attack from Mortara and Vigevano were still far distant and Mellinet was practically unsupported. Thus the French, turning towards the Old Bridge, found themselves (3.30 P.M.) involved in a close fight with some 18,000 Austrians, and meantime Gyulai had begun to bring up his III. and VII. corps towards Robecco and (with Hess) had arrived on the field himself. The VII. corps, on its arrival, drove Mellinet back to and over the New Bridges, but the French, now broken up into dense swarms of individual fighters, held on to the tongue of high ground and prevented the Austrians from destroying the bridges, while, the occupants of Buffalora similarly held their own, and beyond them MacMahon, advancing through orchards and vineyards in a line of battle 2 M. long, slowly gained ground towards Magenta. The III. Austrian corps, mean-while, arriving at Robecco spread out on both sides of the canal and advanced to take the defenders of the New Bridges in See also:rear, but were checked by fresh French troops which arrived from San Martino (4 P.M.). The struggle for the New and Old Bridges continued till 6 P.M., more and more troops being drawn into the vortex, but at last the Austrians, stubbornly defending each vineyard, fell back on Magenta. See also:Bit while nearly all the Austrian reinforcements from the See also:lower Ticino had successively been directed on the bridges, MacMahon had only had to deal with the 8000 men who had originally formed the garrison of Magenta. The small part of the reinforcing troops that had been directed thither by Gyulai before he was aware of the situation, had in consequence no active role defined in their orders and (initiative being then regarded as a See also:vice) they stood fast while their comrades were beaten. But it was not until after sunset that the thronging French troops at last broke into Magenta and the victory was won. The splendid Austrian cavalry (always at a disadvantage in Italy) found no opportunity to redress the See also:balance, and their slow-moving and over-loaded infantry, in spite of its devotion, was no match in broken country for the See also:swift and eager French. The forces engaged were 54,000 French (one-third of the allied army) to 58,000 Austrians (about See also:half of Gyulai's total force). Thus the fears of Napoleon as regards an Austrian attack from Mortara-Vigevano neutralized the See also:bad distribution of his opponent's force, and Magenta was a See also:fair contest of equal See also:numbers. The victory of the French was palpably the consequence not of See also:luck or generalship but of specific superiority in the soldier. The great result of the battle was therefore a conviction, shared by both sides, that in future encounters nothing but exceptional good fortune or skilful generalship could give the Austrians victory. The respective losses were: French 4000 killed and wounded and boo missing, Austrians 5700 killed and wounded, 4500 missing. While the fighting was prolonged to nightfall, the various corps of the Austrian army had approached, and it was Gyulai's intention to resume the battle next day with 100,000 men. But Clam-Gallas reported that the I. and II. corps were fought out, and thereupon Gyulai resolved to retreat on See also:Cremona and See also:Mantua, leaving the great road Milan-Brescia unused, for the townsmen's patriotism was sharpened by the remembrance of See also:Haynau, " the See also:Hyena of Brescia." Milan and See also:Pavia were evacuated on the 5th, Hess departed to meet the emperor See also:Francis See also:Joseph (who was coming to take command of the united I. and II. Armies), and although Kuhn was still in favour of the offensive Gyulai decided that the best service he could render was to deliver up the army intact to his sovereign on the Mincio. On the 8th of June Napoleon and Victor Emmanuel made their triumphal entry into Milan, while their corps followed up rather than pursued the retreating enemy along the See also:Lodi and Cremona roads. On the same day, the 8th of June, the I. and II. French at the village of See also:Melegnano. MacMahon with the Me%g- II. corps was to turn the right flank, the IV. the left nano. of the defenders, while Baraguay attacked in front. But MacMahon, as at Magenta, deployed into a formal line of battle before closing on the village, and his progress through the vineyards was correspondingly slow. The IV. corps was similarly involved in intricate country, but Baraguay, whose corps had not been See also:present at Magenta, was burning to attack, and being a See also:man aussi dur a ses soldats qu'a lui-meme, he delivered the frontal attack about 6 P.M. without waiting for the others. This attack, as straightforward, as brusque, and as destitute of See also:tactical refinements as that of the Swiss on that very ground in 1515 (See also:Marignan), was carried out, without " preparation," by See also:Bazaine's division a la balonnette. Benedek was dislodged, but retreated safely, having inflicted a loss of over See also:rood men on the French, as against 36o in his own command. After Melegnano, as after Magenta, contact with the retiring enemy was lost, and for a fortnight the See also:story of the war is simply that of a triumphal advance of the allies and a quiet retirement and reorganization of the Austrians. Up to Magenta Napoleon had a well-defined scheme and executed it with vigour. But the fierceness of the battle itself had not a little effect on his See also:strange dreamy character, and although it was proved beyond doubt that under reasonable conditions the French must win in every encounter, their emperor turned his attention to dislodging rather than to destroying the enemy. War clouds were gathering elsewhere—on the Rhine above all. The See also:simple brave promise to free Italy " from the Alps to the Adriatic " became complicated by many minor issues, and the emperor was well content to let his enemy retire and to accelerate that retirement by manoeuvre as far as might be necessary. He therefore kept on the left of his adversary's routes as before, and about the 20th of June the whole allied army (less Cialdini's Sardinian division, detached to operate on the fringe of the See also:mountain country) was closely grouped around Montechiaro on the Chiese. It now consisted of 107,000 French and 48,000 Sardinians (combatants only). The Austrians had disappeared into the Quadrilateral, where the emperor Francis Joseph assumed personal command, with Hess as his chief of staff. Gyulai had resigned the command of the II. Army to Count Schlick, a cavalry general of 70 years of See also:age. The I. Army was under Count See also:Wimpffen. But this See also:partition produced nothing but evil. The imperial headquarters still issued voluminous detailed orders for each corps, and the intervening army staff was a cause not of initiative or of simplification, but of un- necessary delay. The direction of several armies, in fact, is only feasible when general directions (directives as they are technically called) take the place of orders. All the necessary conditions for working such a system—uniformity of training, methods and doctrine in the recipients, abstention from inter- ference in details by the supreme command—were wanting in the Austrian army of 1859. The I. Army consisted of the III., Iii. and XI. corps with one cavalry division and details, 67,000 t&aari>raAu in all; the II. Army of the I., V., VII. and VIII. corps, one cavalry division and details or 90,000 combatants—total 160,000, or practically the same force as the allies. The emperor had made several salutary changes in the See also:administration, notably an order to the infantry to send their heavy equipment and See also:parade full-See also:dress into the fortresses, which enormously lightened the hitherto overburdened infantryman. At this moment the political omens were favourable, and gathering the impression from his outpost reports that the French were in two halves, separated by the river Chiese, the See also:young emperor at last accepted Hess's See also:advice to resume the offensive, in view of which Gyulai had left strong outposts See also:west of the Mincio, when the main armies retired over that river, and had maintained and supplemented the available bridges. The possibility of such a See also:finale to the campaign had been considered but dismissed at the allied headquarters, where it was thought that if the Austrians took the offensive it would be on their own side, not the enemy's, of the Mincio and in the midst of the Quadrilateral. Thus the advance of the French army on the 24th was simply to be a general move to the line of the Mincio, preparatory to forcing the crossings, coupled with the destruction of the strong outpost bodies that had been left by the Austrians at Solferino, Guidizzolo, &c. The Austrians, who advanced over the Mincio on the 23rd, also thought that the decisive battle would take place on the third or See also:fourth day of their advance. Thus, although both armies moved with all precautions as if a battle was the immediate object, neitherexpected a collision, and Solferino was consequently a pure encounter-battle. Speaking generally, the battlefield falls into two distinct halves, the hilly undulating country, of which the edge (almost everywhere cliff-like) is defined by Lonato, See also:Castiglione, Cavriana and Battle of See also:Volta, and the See also:plain of Medole and Guidizzolo. The Solferino. village of Solferino is within the elevated ground, but close to the edge. Almost in the centre of the plateau is Pozzolengo, and from Solferino and Pozzolengo roads See also:lead to crossing places of the Mincio above Volta (Monzambano-Salionze and Valeggio). These routes were assigned to the Piedmontese (44,000) and the French left wing (I., II. and Guard, 57,000), the plain to the III. and IV. corps and 2 cavalry divisions (50,000). On the other side the Austrians, trusting to the defensive facilities of the plateau, had directed the II. Army and part of the I. (86,000) into the plain, 2 corps of the I. Army (V. and I.) on Solferino-Cavriana (40,000), and only the VIII. corps (Benedek), 25,000 strong, into the See also:heart of the undulating ground. One division was sent from Mantua towards Marcaria. Thus both armies, though disposed in parallel lines, were grouped in very unequal See also:density at different points in these lines. The French orders for the 24th were—Sardinian army on Pozzolengo, I. corps Esenta to Solferino, II. Castiglione to Cavriana, IV. with two cavalry divisions, Carpenedolo to Guidizzolo, III. Mezzane to Medole by See also:Castel Goffredo; Imperial Guard in reserve at Castiglione. On the other side the VIII. corps from Itlonzambano was to reach Lonato, the See also:remainder of the II. Army from Cavriana, Solferino and Guidizzolo to Esenta and Castiglione, and the I. Army from Medole, Robecco and Castel Grimaldo towards Carpenedolo. At 8 A.M. the head of the French I. corps encountered several brigades of the I. Army in advance of Solferino. The fighting was severe, but the French made no progress. MacMahon advancing on Guidizzolo came upon a force of the Austrians at Casa Morino and (as on former occasions) immediately set about deploying his whole corps in line of battle. Meanwhile masses of Austrian infantry became visible on the edge of the heights near Cavriana and the firing in the hills See also:grew in intensity. Marshal MacMahon therefore called upon General Niel on his right rear to hasten his march. The latter had already expelled a small body of the Austrians from Medole and had moved forward to Robecco, but there more Austrian masses were found, and Niel, like MacMahon, held his hand until Canrobert (III. corps) should come up on his right. But the latter, after seizing Castel Goffredo, judged it prudent to collect his corps there before actively intervening. Meantime, however, MacMahon had completed his preparations, and capturing Casa Morino with ease, he drove forward to a large open field called the Campo di Medole; this, aided by a heavy cross fire from his artillery and part of Niel's, he carried without great loss, Niel meantime attacking Casa Nuova and Robecco. But the Austrians had not yet See also:developed their full strength, and the initial successes of the French, won against isolated brigades and battalions, were a mere prelude to the real struggle. Meanwhile the stern Baraguay d'Hil. Tiers had made ceaseless attacks on the V. corps at Solferino, where, on a steep See also: But the Austrian emperor had not lost hope, and it was only a despairing See also:message from Wimpffen, who had suffered least in the battle, that finally induced him to order the retreat over the Mincio. On the extreme right Benedek and the VIII. corps had fought successfully all day against the Sardinians, this engagement being often known by the separate name of the battle of San Martino. On the left Wimpffen, after sending his despondent message, plucked up heart afresh and, for a moment, took the offensive against Niel, who at last, supported by the most part of Canrobert's corps, had reached Guidizzolo. Austrians on the Mincio. In the centre the Austrian rearguard held out for two hours in several successive positions against the attacks of MacMahon and the Guard. But the battle was decided. A violent See also:storm, the exhaustion of the assailants, and the See also:firm countenance of Benedek, who, retiring front; San Martino, covered the retreat of the rest of the II. Army over th'e Mincio, precluded an effective pursuit. The losses on .eit'hg side had been: Allies, 14,415 killed and wounded and 2976 iftlasing, total 17,191; Austrians, 13,317 killed and wounded, 9220 missing, total 2'21537. The heaviest losses in the French army were in Niel's corps (IV.), which lost 4483, and in Baraguay d'Hilliers' (I.), which lost 4431. Of the total of 17,191, 5521 was the See also:share of the Sardinian army, which in the battle of San Martino had had as resolute an enemy, and as formidable a position to attack, as had Baraguay at Solferino. On the Austrian side the IX. corps, which See also:bore the brunt of the fighting on the plain, lost 4349 and the V. corps, that had defended Solferino, 4442. Solferino, in the first instance an encounter-battle in which each corps fought whatever enemy it found in its path, became after a time a decisive trial of strength. In the true sense of the word, it was a soldier's battle, and the now doubly-proved superiority of the French soldier being reinforced by the conviction that the Austrian leaders were incapable of neutralizing it by superior strategy, the war ended without further fighting. The peace of Villafranca was signed on the 11th of See also:July. Additional information and CommentsThere are no comments yet for this article.
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