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GUSTAVUS II

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Originally appearing in Volume V12, Page 736 of the 1911 Encyclopedia Britannica.
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GUSTAVUS II . See also:

ADOLPHUS (1544-1632), See also:king of See also:Sweden, the eldest son of See also:Charles IX. and of See also:Christina, daughter of Adolphus, See also:duke of See also:Holstein-Gottorp, was See also:born at See also:Stockholm See also:castle on the 9th of See also:December 1594. From the first he was carefully nurtured to be the future prop of Protestantism by his austere parents. Gustavus was well grounded in the See also:classics, and his linguistic accomplishments were extraordinary. He may be said to have grown up with two See also:mother-See also:tongues, See also:Swedish and See also:German; at twelve he had mastered Latin, See also:Italian and Dutch; and he learnt subsequently to See also:express himself in See also:Spanish, See also:Russian and See also:Polish. But his See also:practical See also:father took care that he should grow up a See also:prince, not a See also:pedant. So See also:early as his ninth See also:year he was introduced to public See also:life; at thirteen he received petitions and conversed officially with the See also:foreign ministers; at fifteen he administered his duchy of Vestmanland and opened the See also:Orebro See also:diet with a speech from the See also:throne; indeed from 1610 he may be regarded as his father's co-See also:regent. In all See also:martial and chivalrous accomplishments he was already an See also:adept; and when, a year later, he succeeded to supreme See also:power, his See also:superior ability was as uncontested as it was incontestable. The first See also:act of the See also:young king was to terminate the fratricidal struggle with See also:Denmark by the See also:peace of Knared (28th of See also:January 1613). Simultaneously, another See also:war, also an heritage from Charles IX., had been proceeding in the far distant regions See also:round lakes Ilmen, See also:Peipus and See also:Ladoga, with See also:Great See also:Novgorod as its centre. It was not, however, like the Danish War, a See also:national danger, but a See also:political See also:speculation meant to be remunerative and compensatory, and.was concluded very advantageously for Sweden by the peace of Stolbova on the 27th of See also:February 1617 (see SWEDEN: See also:History). By this peace Gustavus succeeded in excluding Muscovy from the Baltic.

" I See also:

hope to See also:God," he declared to the Stockholm diet in 1617, when he announced the conclusion of peace, " that the Russians will feel it a See also:bit difficult to skip over that little See also:brook." The war with See also:Poland which Gustavus resumed in 1621 was a much more difficult affair. It began with an attack upon See also:Riga as the first step towards conquering See also:Livonia. Riga was invested on the 13th of See also:August and surrendered on the 15th of See also:September; on the 3rd of See also:October See also:Mitau was occupied; but so great were the ravages of sickness during the See also:campaign that the Swedish See also:army had to be reinforced by no fewer than 1o,000 men. A truce was thereupon concluded and hostilities were suspended till the summer of 1625, in the course of which Gustavus took Kokenhusen and invaded Lithuania. In January 1626 he attacked the Poles at Walhof and scattered the whole of their army after slaying a fifth See also:part of it. This victory, remark-able besides as Gustavus's first pitched See also:battle, completed the See also:conquest of Livonia. As, however, it became every year more difficult to support an army in the See also:Dvina See also:district, Gustavus now resolved to See also:transfer the war to the Prussian provinces of Poland with a view to securing the See also:control of the See also:Vistula, as he had already secured the control of the Dvina. At the end of 1626, the Swedish See also:fleet, with 14,000 men on See also:board, anchored in front of the See also:chain of See also:sand-See also:dunes which separates the Frische-Haff from the Baltic. See also:Pillau, the only Baltic See also:port then accessible to See also:ships of war, was at once occupied, and See also:Konigsberg shortly afterwards was scared into an unconditional See also:neutrality. See also:July was passed in conquering the bishopric of See also:Ermeland. The surrender of See also:Elbing and See also:Marienburg placed Gustavus in See also:possession of the fertile and easily defensible See also:delta of the Vistula, which he treated as a permanent conquest, making Axel See also:Oxenstjerna its first See also:governor-See also:general. Communications between See also:Danzig a,nd the See also:sea were cut off by the erection of the first of Gustavus's famous entrenched camps at See also:Dirschau.

From the end of August 1626 the See also:

city was blockaded, and in the meantime Polish irregulars, under the capable See also:Stanislaus See also:Koniecpolski, began to harass the Swedes. But the See also:object of the campaign, a convenient basis of operations, was won; and in October the king departed to Sweden to get reinforcements. He returned in May 1627 with 7000 men, which raised his forces to 14,000, against which Koniecpolskicould only oppose woo. But his superior See also:strategy frustrated all the efforts of the Swedish king, who in the course of the year was twice dangerously wounded and so disabled that he could never See also:wear See also:armour again. Gustavus had made extensive preparations for the ensuing campaign and took the See also:field with 32,000 men. But once again, though far outnumbered, and unsupported by his own See also:government, the Polish See also:grand-See also:hetman proved more than a match for Gustavus, who, on the loth of September, See also:broke up his See also:camp and returned to See also:Prussia; the whole autumn campaign had proved a failure and cost him 5000 men. During the ensuing campaign of 1629 Gustavus had to contend against the combined forces of Koniecpolski and ro,000 of See also:Wallenstein's mercenaries. The Polish See also:commander now showed the Swedes what he could do with adequate forces. At Stuhm, on the 29th of See also:June, he defeated Gustavus, who lost most of his See also:artillery and narrowly escaped See also:capture. The result of the campaign was the conclusion of the six years' truce of Altmark, which was very advantageous to Sweden. And now Gustavus turned his See also:attention to See also:Germany. The motives which induced the Swedish king to intervene directly in the See also:Thirty Years' War are told us by himself in his See also:correspondence with Oxenstjerna.

Here he says plainly that it was the fear lest the See also:

emperor should acquire the Baltic ports and proceed to build up a sea-power dangerous to Scandinavia. For the same See also:reason, the king rejected the See also:chancellor's alternative of waging a simply defensive war against the emperor by means of the fleet, with See also:Stralsund as his See also:base. He was convinced by the experience of See also:Christian IV. of Denmark that the enemies' harbours could be wrested from them only by a successful offensive war on See also:land; and, while quite alive to the risks of such an enterprise in the See also:face of two large armies, See also:Tilly's and Wallenstein's, each of them larger than his own, he argued that the vast extent of territory and the numerous garrisons which the enemy was obliged to maintain, more than neutralized his numerical superiority. Merely to See also:blockade all the German ports with the Swedish fleet was equally impossible. The Swedish fleet was too weak for that; it would be safer to take and fortify the pick of them. In Germany itself, if he once got the upper See also:hand, he would not find himself without resources. It is no enthusiastic crusader, but an anxious and farseeing if somewhat speculative statesman who thus opens his mind to us. No doubt religious considerations largely influenced Gustavus. He had the deepest sympathy for his See also:fellow-Protestants in Germany; he regarded them as God's See also:peculiar See also:people, himself as their divinely appointed deliverer. But his first See also:duty was to Sweden; and, naturally and rightly, he viewed the whole business from a predominantly Swedish point of view. See also:Lutherans and Calvinists were to be delivered from a " soul-crushing tyranny "; but they were to be delivered by a foreign if friendly power; and that power claimed as her See also:reward the See also:hegemony of See also:Protestant See also:Europe and all the political privileges belonging to that exalted position. On the 19th of May 1630 Gustavus solemnly took leave of the estates of the See also:realm assembled at Stockholm.

He appeared before them holding in his arms his only See also:

child and heiress, the little princess Christina, then in her See also:fourth year, and tenderly committed her to the care of his loyal and devoted people. Then he solemnly took the estates to See also:witness, as he stood there " in the sight of the. Almighty," that he had begun hostilities " out of no lust for war, as many will certainly devise and imagine," but in self-See also:defence and to deliver his fellow-Christians from oppression. On the 7th of June 163o the Swedish fleet set See also:sail, and two days after midsummer See also:day, the whole army, 16,000 strong, was disembarked at Peenemunde. Gustavus's See also:plan was to take possession of the mouths of the See also:Oder Haff, and, resting upon Stralsund in the See also:west and Prussia in the See also:east, penetrate into Germany. In those days See also:rivers were what See also:railways now are, the great military routes; and Gustavus's German war was a war waged along See also:river lines. The opening campaign was to be fought along the See also:line of the Oder. See also:Stettin, the See also:capital of See also:Pomerania, and the See also:key of the Oder line, was occupied and converted into a first-class fortress. He then proceeded to clear Pomerania of the, piebald imperial See also:host composed of every See also:nationality under See also:heaven, and officered by Italians, Irishmen, Czechs, Croats, Danes, Spaniards and See also:Walloons. Gustavus's army has often been described by German historians as an army of foreign invaders; in reality it was far more truly See also:Teutonic than the See also:official defenders of Germany at that See also:period. Gustavus's political difficulties (see SWEDEN: History) chained him to his camp for the See also:remainder of the year. But the dismissal of Wallenstein and the See also:declaration in Gustavus's favour of See also:Magdeburg, the greatest city in the See also:Lower Saxon Circle, and strategically the strongest fortress of See also:North Germany, encouraged him to advance boldly.

But first, See also:

honour as well as expediency moved him to See also:attempt to relieve Magdeburg, now closely invested by the imperialists, especially as his hands had now been considerably strengthened by a definite See also:alliance with See also:France (treaty of Barwalde, 13th of January 1631). Magdeburg, therefore, became the See also:focus of the whole campaign of 1631; but the obstructive timidity of the See also:electors of See also:Brandenburg and See also:Saxony threw insuperable obstacles in his way, and, on the very day when See also:John See also:George I. of Saxony closed his See also:gates against Gustavus the most populous and prosperous city in North Germany became a heap of smoking ruins (20th of May). Gustavus, still too weak to meet the foe, entrenched himself at Werben, at the confluence of the See also:Havel and See also:Elbe. Only on the 12th of September did the elector of Saxony, alarmed for the safety of his own states, now invaded by the emperor, See also:place himself absolutely at the disposal of Gustavus; and, five dayslater, at the See also:head of the combined Swedish-Saxon army, though the Swedes did all the fighting, Gustavus routed Tilly at the famous battle of See also:Breitenfeld, north of See also:Leipzig. The question now was: In what way should Gustavus utilize his See also:advantage? Should he invade the See also:Austrian See also:crown lands, and dictate peace to See also:Ferdinand II. at the gates of See also:Vienna? Or should he pursue Tilly westwards and crush the See also:league at its own See also:hearth and See also:home? Oxenstjerna was the first alternative, but Gustavus decided in favour of the second. His decision has been greatly blamed. More than one See also:modern historian has argued that if Gustavus had done in 1631 what See also:Napoleon did in 18o5 and 1809, there would have been a fifteen instead of a thirty years' war. But it should be See also:borne in mind that, in the days of Gustavus, Vienna was by no means so essential to the existence of the See also:Habsburg See also:monarchy as it was in the days of Napoleon; and even Gustavus could not allow so dangerous an opponent as Tilly See also:time to recover himself. Accordingly, he set out for the See also:Rhine, taking See also:Marienberg and See also:Frankfort on his way, and on the loth of December entered See also:Mainz, where he remained throughout the See also:winter of 1631–1632.

At the beginning of 1632, in See also:

order to bring about the general peace he so earnestly desired, he proposed to take the field with an overwhelming numerical See also:majority. The See also:signal for Gustavus to break up from the Rhine was the sudden advance of Tilly from behind the See also:Danube. Gustavus pursued Tilly into See also:Bavaria, forced the passage of the Danube at Donau-See also:worth and the passage of the See also:Lech, in the face of Tilly's strongly entrenched camp at See also:Rain, and pursued the flying foe to the fortress of See also:Ingolstadt where Tilly died of his wounds a fortnight later. Gustavus then liberated and garrisoned the See also:long-oppressed Protestant cities of See also:Augsburg and See also:Ulm, and in May occupied See also:Munich. The same See also:week Wallenstein chased John George from See also:Prague and manoeuvred the See also:Saxons out of Bohemia. Then, armed as he was with plenipotentiary power, he offered the elector of Saxony peace on his own terms. Gustavus suddenly saw himself exposed to extreme peril. If Tilly had made John George such an offer as Wallenstein was now empowered to make, the elector would never have become Gustavus's ally; would he remain Gustavus's ally now? Hastily quitting his quarters in Upper See also:Swabia, Gustavus hastened towards See also:Nuremberg on his way to Saxony, but finding that Wallenstein and See also:Maximilian of Bavaria had See also:united their forces, he abandoned the attempt to reach Saxony, and both armies confronted each other at Nuremberg which furnished Gustavus with a point of support of the first order. He quickly converted the See also:town into an entrenched and fortified camp. Wallenstein followed the king's example, and entrenched himself on the western See also:bank ofthe See also:Regnitz in a camp twelve See also:English See also:miles in circumference. His object was to See also:pin Gustavus fast to Nuremberg and cut off his See also:retreat northwards.

Throughout July and August the two armies faced each other immovably. On the 24th of August, after an unsuccessful attempt to See also:

storm Alte Veste, the key of Wallenstein's position, the Swedish host retired southwards. Towards the end of October, Wallenstein, after devastating Saxony, was preparing to go into winter quarters at Liitzen, when the king surprised him as he was See also:crossing the Rippach (1st of See also:November) and a rearguard See also:action favourable to the Swedes ensued. Indeed, but for nightfall, Wallenstein's scattered forces might have been routed. During the See also:night, however, Wallenstein re-collected his host for a decisive action, and at day-break on the 6th of November, while an autumn mist still See also:lay over the field, the battle began. It was obviously Gustavus's plan to drive Wallenstein away from the Leipzig road, north of which he had posted himself, and thus, in See also:case of success, to isolate, 'and subsequently, with the aid of the Saxons in the Elbe fortresses, annihilate him. The king, on the Swedish right wing, succeeded in See also:driving the enemy from the trenches and capturing his See also:cannon. What happened after that is See also:mere conjecture, for a thick mist now obscured the autumn See also:sun, and the battle became a See also:colossal melee the details of which are indistinguishable. It was in the midst of that awful obscurity that Gustavus met his See also:death—how or where is not absolutely certain; but it would seem that he lost his way in the darkness while leading the Smaland See also:horse to the assistance of his See also:infantry, and was despatched as he lay severely wounded on the ground by a hostile horseman. By his wife, See also:Marie Eleonora, a See also:sister of the elector of Brandenburg, whom he married in 162o, Gustavus Adolphus had one daughter, Christina, who succeeded him on the throne of Sweden. See Sveriges Historic (Stockholm, 1877, 81), vol. iv.; A. Oxenstjerna, Skrifter och Brefvexling (Stockholm, 1900, &c.); G.

Bjirlen, Gustaf Adolf (Stockholm, 1890) ; R. N. See also:

Bain, Scandinavia (See also:Cam-See also:bridge, 1905) ; C. R. L. See also:Fletcher, Gustavus Adolphus (See also:London, 1892); J. L. See also:Stevens, History of Gustavus Adolphus (London, 1885); J. Mankell, Om Gustaf II. Adolfs politik (Stockholm, 1881); E. Bluemel, Gustav Adolf, See also:Konig von Schweden (See also:Eisleben, 1894) ; A. Rydfors, De diplomatiska forbindelserna mellan Sverige och See also:England 7624–1630 (See also:Upsala, 1890).

(R. N.

End of Article: GUSTAVUS II

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