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PELOPONNESIAN WAR
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PELOPONNESIAN See also:WAR , in See also:Greek See also:history, the name given specially to the struggle between See also:Athens at the See also:head of the Delian See also:League and the confederacy of which See also:Sparta was the leading See also:power.' According to See also:Thucydides the war, which was ' Some historians prefer to See also:call it the Second Peloponnesian War, the first being that of 457, which ended with the. See also:Thirty Years' See also:Peace. in his view the greatest that had ever occurred in See also:Greece, lasted from 431 to the downfall of Athens in 404. The See also:genius of Thucydides has given to the struggle the importance of an See also:epoch in See also:world history, but his view is open to two See also:main criticisms—(1) that the war was in its ultimate See also:bearings little more than a See also:local disturbance, viewed from the standpoint of universal history; (2) that it cannot be called a war in the strict sense. The former of these criticisms is justified in the See also:article on GREECE: History (q.v.). Unless we are to believe that the Macedonian supremacy is directly traceable to the mutual weakening of the Greek cities in 431–403, it is difficult to see what lasting importance attaches to the war. As regards the second, a few See also:chief difficulties may be indicated. The very narrative even of Thucydides himself shows that the " war " was not a connected whole. It may be divided into three main periods—(1) from 431 to 421 (See also:Lysias calls it the "Archidamian " War), when the Peace of See also:Nicias, not merely formally, but actually produced a cessation of hostilities; (2) from 421 till the intervention of Sparta in the Sicilian War; during these years there was no " Peloponnesian War," and there were several years in which there was in reality no fighting at all: the Sicilian expedition was in fact a See also:side issue; (3) from 413 to 404, when fighting was carried on mainly in the See also:Aegean See also:Sea (Isocrates calls this the " Decelean " War). The disjointed See also:character of the struggle is so obvious from Thucydides himself that historians have come to the conclusion that the See also:idea of treating the whole struggle as a single unit was ex See also:post facto (see GREECE: History, § A, " See also:Ancient " ad fin.). The See also:book itself affords See also:evidence which goes far to justify this view. A very important problem is presented by bk. v., which is obviously put in as a connecting See also:link to prove a theory. Thucydides expressly warns us not to regard the See also:period of this book as one of peace, and yet the very contents of the book refute his See also:argument. In 419 and 417 there is practically no fighting: the Mantinean War of 418 is a disconnected See also:episode which did not See also:lead to a resumption of hostilities: in 420 there are only obscure battles in See also:Thrace: in 416 there is only the expedition to Melos; and finally from 421 to 413 there is See also:official peace. Other details may be cited in corroboration. Book v. (ch. 26) contains a second introduction to the subject; SSe o iroXeµos in i. 23 and iv. 48 is the Archidamian or Ten Years' War; in v. 26 we read of a apwros 1roXeµos, a ilcTepos 1roXe,uos and an avaKwXil. Some critics think on these and other grounds that Thucydides wrote and published bks. i.–v. 25 by itself, then bks. vi. and vii. (Sicilian expedition), and finally revising his view joined them into one whole by the somewhat unsatisfactory bk. v. 26 and following chapters, and began to See also:round off the See also:story with the incomplete bk. viii. (on this see GREECE: History, as above). It is perhaps most probable that he retained notes made See also:con-temporarily and worked them up some See also:time after 404, in a few passages failing to correct inconsistencies and dying before bk. viii. was completed. The See also:general introduction in bk. i. was unquestionably written shortly after 404.
The causes of the war thus understood are complex. The view taken by Thucydides that Sparta was the real foe of Athens has been much modified by See also:modern writers. The See also: He now laid an See also:embargo upon See also:Megara by which the Megarians were forbidden on See also:pain of See also:death to pursue trading operations with any part of the Athenian See also:Empire. The circumstances of this See also:decree (or decrees) are not material to the See also:present argument (see See also:Grote, History of Greece, ed. 1907, p. 370 See also:note) except that it turned See also:special See also:attention to the commercial supremacy which Athens claimed to enjoy. In 432 a See also:conference of Peloponnesian See also:allies was summoned and the Corinthian envoys urged the Spartans to declare war on the ground that the power of Athens was becoming so great as to constitute a danger to the other states. This might have been urged with See also:justice before the Thirty Years' Truce (447) ; but by that truce Athens gave up all her conquests in Greece proper except See also:Naupactus and See also:Plataea, while her solitary gains in See also:Amphipolis and See also:Thurii were compensated by other losses. The fact that the Corinthian argument failed to impress Sparta and many of the delegates is shown by the course of the debate. What finally impelled the Spartans to agree to the war was the veiled See also:threat by the Corinthians that they would be driven into another See also:alliance (i.e. See also:Argos, i. 71). We can hardly regard Sparta as the deter-See also:mined enemy of Athens at this time. Only twice since 461 had she been at war with Athens—in 457 (Tanagra) and 447, when she deliberately abstained from pushing the See also:advantage which the revolt in See also:Euboea provided; she had refused to help the oligarchs of See also:Samos in 440. Corinth however had not only strong, but also immediate and urgent reasons (Potidaea and Corcyra) for desiring war. It has been argued that the war was ultimately a struggle between the principles of See also:oligarchy and See also:democracy. This view, however, cannot be taken of the See also:early stages of the war when there was democracy and oligarchy on both sides (see ad fin.); it is only in the later stages that the See also:political difference is prominent. The Opposing Forces.—The permanent strength of the Peloponnesian confederacy lay in the Peloponnesian states, all of which except Argos and See also:Achaea were See also:united under Sparta's leadership. But it included also extra-Peloponnesian states—viz. Megara, See also:Phocis, See also:Boeotia and Locris (which had formed part of the Athenian See also:land empire), and the maritime colonies round the Ambracian Gulf. The organization was not elaborate. The federal See also:assembly with few exceptions met only in time of war, and then only when Sparta agreed to summon it. It met in Sparta and the delegates, having stated their views before the Spartan See also:Apella, withdrew till the Apella had come to a decision. The delegates were then invited to return and to confirm that decision. It is clear that the link was purely one of See also:common See also:interest, and that Sparta had little or no See also:control over, e.g. so powerful a confederate as Corinth. Sparta was the chief member of the confederacy (hegemon), but the states were autonomous. In time of war each had to provide two-thirds of its forces, and that See also:state in whose territory the war was to take See also:place had to equip its whole force. The Athenian Empire is described elsewhere (DELIAN LEAGUE, ATHENS). Here it must suffice to point out that there was among the real and technical allies no true See also:bond of interest, and that many of the states were in fact See also:bound by See also:close ties to members of the Peloponnesian confederacy (e.g. Potidaea to Corinth). Sparta could not only rely on voluntary co-operation but could undermine Athenian See also:influence by posing as the See also:champion of See also:autonomy. Further, Thucydides is wrong on his own showing in saying that Sparta refused to tolerate democratic See also:government in confederate cities: it was not till after 418 that this policy was adopted. Athens, on the other See also:hand, had undoubtedly interfered in the interest of democracy in various allied states (see DELIAN LEAGUE). No detailed examination of the See also:comparative military and naval resources of the combatants can here be attempted. On land the Peloponnesians were See also:superior: they had at least 30,000 hoplites not including ro,00e from Central Greece and Boeotia: the overcrowded See also:population of the city was terrible. Of the 1200 See also:cavalry (including mounted archers) 300 died, together with 4400 hoplites: altogether the estimate of Diodorus (xii. 58) that more than io,000 citizens and slaves succumbed is by no means excessive. None the less Pericles sailed with roo triremes, and ravaged the territory near See also:Epidaurus. Subsequently he re-turned and the expedition proceeded to Potidaea. But the See also:plague went with them and no results were achieved. The enemies of Pericles, who even with the aid of Spartan intrigue had hitherto failed to harm his See also:prestige, now succeeded in inducing the desperate citizens to See also:fine him for alleged malversation. The See also:verdict, however, shocked public feeling and Pericles was reinstated in popular favour as See also:strategus (c. Aug. 430). About a See also:year later he died. In the autumn of 430 a Spartan attack on Zacynthus failed and the Ambraciots were repulsed from Amphilochian Argos. In reply Athens sent Phormio to Naupactus to See also:watch her interests in that See also:quarter. In the See also:winter Potidaea capitulated, receiving extremely favourable terms. In 429 the Peloponnesians were deterred by the plague from invading See also:Attica and laid See also:siege to Plataea in the interests of See also:Thebes. The Athenians failed in an expedition to Chalcidice under See also:Xenophon, while the Spartan Cnemus with Chaonian and Epirot allies was repulsed from Stratus, See also:capital cf See also:Acarnania, and Phormio with only 20 See also:ships defeated the Corinthian See also:fleet of 47 See also:sail in the Gulf of Corinth. Orders were at once sent from Sparta to repair this disaster and 77 ships were equipped. Ilelp sent from Athens was diverted to See also:Crete, and after much manoeuvring Phormio was compelled to fight off Naupactus. Nine of his ships were driven ashore, but with the other rr he subsequently defeated the enemy and recovered the lost nine. With the reinforcement which arrived afterwards he established See also:complete control of the western seas. A See also:scheme for operating with Sitalces against the Chalcidians of Thrace See also:fell through, and Sitalces joined Perdiccas. The year 428 was marked by a third invasion of Attica and by the revolt of See also:Lesbos from Athens. After delay in fruitless negotiations the Athenian Cleippides, and afterwards Paches, besieged Mytilene, which appealed to Sparta. The Peloponnesian confederacy resolved to aid the rebels both directly and by a counter demonstration against Athens. The Athenians, though their reserve of 6000 talents was by now almost exhausted (except for r000 talents in a special reserve), made a tremendous effort (raising 200 talents by a special See also:property tax), and not only prevented an invasion by a demonstration of roo triremes at the See also:Isthmus, but sent Asopius, son of Phormio, to take his place in the western seas. In See also:spring 427 the Spartans again invaded Attica without result. The winter of 428–427 was marked by the daring See also:escape of See also:half the Plataean See also:garrison under See also:cover of a stormy See also:night, and by the See also:capitulation of Mytilene, which was forced upon the oligarchic rulers by the democracy. The Spartan fleet arrived too See also:late and departed without attempting to recover the town. Paches cleared the See also:Asiatic seas of the enemy, reduced the other towns of Mytilene and returned to Athens with upwards of r000 prisoners. An assembly was held and under the invective of See also:Cleon (q.v.) it was decided to kill all male Mytileneans of military See also:age and to sell the See also:women and See also:children as slaves. This decree, though in accordance with the rigorous customs of ancient warfare as exemplified by the treatment which Sparta shortly afterwards meted out to the Plataeans, shocked the feelings of Athens, and on the next See also:day it was (illegally) rescinded just in time to prevent Padres carrying it out. The thousand' oligarchic prisoners were however executed, and Lesbos was made a See also:cleruchy. Meanwhile there occurred See also:civil war in Corcyra, in which ultimately, with the aid of the Athenian See also:admiral See also:Eurymedon, the democracy triumphed amid scenes of the wildest savagery. In the autumn of the year Nicias fortified Minoa at the mouth of the See also:harbour of Megara. Shortly afterwards the Spartans 1 So Thuc. iii. 5o. It is suggested that this number is an See also:error for 30 or 50 (i.e., A or N for A). It seems incredible that r000 could be described as " ringleaders " out of a population of perhaps 5000. these soldiers were highly trained. The Athenian See also:army was undoubtedly smaller. There has been considerable discussion as to the exact figures, the evidence in Thucydides being highly confusing, but it is most probable that the available fighting force was not more than half that of the Peloponnesian confederacy. Even of these we learn (Thuc. iii. 87) that 4400 died in the great plague. The only See also:light-armed force was that of Boeotia at Delium (ro,000 with 500 peltasts). Of cavalry Athens had r000, Boeotia a similar number. The only other cavalry force was that of See also:Thessaly, which, had it been loyal to Athens, would have meant a distinct superiority. In naval power the Athenians undoubtedly had an overwhelming advantage at the beginning, both in See also:numbers and in training. Financially Athens had an enormous apparent advantage. She began with a See also:revenue of See also:rood talents (including 600 from o(,µµaxoL), and had also, in spite of the heavy expense which the See also:building schemes of Pericles had involved, a reserve of 6000 talents. The Peloponnesians had no reserve and no fixed revenue See also:assessment. On the other hand the Peloponnesian armies were unpaid, while Athens had to spend considerable sums on the See also:payment of crews and mercenaries. In the last stages of the war the issue was determined by the poverty of Athens and See also:Persian See also:gold. The events of the struggle from 431 to 404 may be summarized in the three periods distinguished above.
r. The Ten Years' or Archidamian War.—The Spartans sent to Athens no formal See also:declaration of war but rather sought first to create some specious cases See also:belli by sending requisitions to Athens. The first, intended to inflame the existing hostilities against Pericles (q.v.) in Athens, was that he should be expelled the city as being an Alcmaeonid (See also:grand-See also:nephew of See also:Cleisthenes) and so implicated in the curse pronounced on the murderers of Cylon nearly 200 years before. This outrageous demand was followed by three others—that the Athenians should (r) withdraw from Potidaea, (2) restore autonomy to See also:Aegina, and (3) withdraw the embargo on Megarian See also:commerce. Upon the refusal of all these demands Sparta finally made the See also:maintenance of peace contingent upon the restoration by Athens of autonomy to all her allies. Under the guidance of Pericles Athens replied that she would do nothing on compulsion, but was prepared to submit difficulties to amicable See also:arbitration on the basis of mutual concessions. Before anything could come of this proposal, matters were precipitated (end of See also: Moreover sea power was not everything, and delay exhausted the See also:financial reserves of the state, while financial considerations, as we have seen, were comparatively unimportant to the Peloponnesians. The descents on the Peloponnese were futile in the extreme.
Archidamus, having wasted much territory, including Acharnae, retired at the end of See also:July. The Athenians retaliated by attacking Methone (which was secured by See also:Brasidas), by successes in the West, by expelling all Aeginetans from Aegina (which was made a cleruchy), and by wasting the Megarid.
In 430 Archidamus again invaded Attica, systematically wasting the See also:country. Shortly after he entered Attica plague See also:broke out in Athens, See also:borne thither by traders from See also:Carthage or See also:Egypt (Holm, Greek History. ii. 346 note). The effect upon
planted an unsuccessful colony at See also:Heraclea in the Trachinian A the war, not including those cities which had been acquired by
territory north-west of See also:Thermopylae.
In the summer of 426 Nicias led a predatory expedition along the north-west See also:coast without achieving any See also:positive victory. More important, though equally ineffective, was the scheme of See also:Demosthenes to march from Naupactus through See also:Aetolia, subduing the See also:wild See also: An Ambracian reinforcement was annihilated at one of the peaks called Idomene, and a disgraceful truce was accepted by the surviving Spartan See also:leader Menedaeus. This was not only the worst disaster which befell any powerful state up to the peace of Nicias (as Thucydides says), but was a serious See also:blow to Corinth, whose trade on the West was, as we have seen, one of the chief causes of the war. The year 425 is remarkable for the Spartan disaster of See also:Pylos (q.v.). The Athenians had despatched 40 triremes under Eurymedon and Procles to See also:Sicily with orders to call first at Corcyra to prevent an expected Spartan attack. Meantime Demosthenes had formed the See also:plan of planting the Messenians of Naupactus in See also:Messenia—now Spartan territory—and obtained permission to accompany the expedition. The fleet was, as it chanced, delayed by a See also:storm in the See also:Bay of See also:Navarino, and rough fortifications were put up by the sailors on the promontory of Pylos. Demosthenes was See also:left behind in this fort, and the Spartans promptly withdrew from their annual See also:raid upon Attica and their projected attack on Corcyra to dislodge him. After a naval engagement (see PYLOS) a See also:body of Spartan hoplites were cut off on Sphacteria. So acutely did Sparta feel their position that an offer of peace was made on See also:condition that the hoplites should go See also:free. The eloquence of Cleon frustrated the peace party's See also:desire to accept these terms, and ultimately to the astonishment of the Greek world the Spartan hoplites to the number of 292 surrendered unconditionally (see CLEON). Thus in 424 the Athenians had seriously damaged the prestige of Sparta, and broken Corinthian supremacy in the north-west, and the Peloponnesians had no fleet. This was the See also:zenith of their success, and it was unfortunate for them that they declined the various offers of peace which Sparta made. The next two years changed the whole position. The doubling of the See also:tribute in 425 pressed hardly on the allies (see DELIAN LEAGUE): Nicias failed in a See also:plot with the democratic party in Megara to seize that town; and the brilliant See also:campaigns of Brasidas (q.v.) in the north-east, culminating in the capture of Amphipolis (422), finally destroyed the Athenian hopes of recovering their land empire, and entirely restored the See also:balance of success and Spartan prestige. Moreover, the admirably conceived scheme for a simultaneous triple attack upon Boeotia at Chaeronea in the north, Delium in the See also:south-east, and Siphae in the south-west had fallen through owing to the inefficiency of the generals. The scheme, which probably originated with the atticizing party in Thebes, resulted in the severe defeat of See also:Hippocrates at Delium by the Boeotians under Pagondas, and was a final blow to the policy of an Athenian land empire. These disasters at Megara, Amphipolis and Delium left Athens with only one See also:trump card—the See also:possession of the Spartan hoplites captured in Sphacteria. This solitary success had already in the spring of 423 induced Sparta jn spite of the successes which Brasidas was achieving in Thrace to accept the " truce of See also:Laches "—which, however, was rendered abortive by the refusal of Brasidas to surrender Scione. The final success of Brasidas at Amphipolis, where both he and Cleon were killed, paved the way for a more permanent agreement, the peace parties at Athens and Sparta being in the ascendant. 2. From 421 to 413.—Peace was signed in March 421 on the basis of each side's surrendering what had been acquired bycapitulation. It was to last for fifty years. Its weak points, however, were numerous. Whereas Sparta had been least of all the allies interested in the war, and apart from the campaigns of Brasidas had on the whole taken little part in it, her allies benefited least by the terms of the Peace. Corinth did not regain Sollium and Anactorium, while Megara and Thebes respectively were indignant that Athens should retain Nisaea and receive Panactum. These and other reasons rapidly led to the See also:isolation of Sparta, and there was a general refusal to carry out the terms of agreement. The history of the next three years is therefore one of complex inter-state intrigues combined with See also:internal political See also:convulsions. In 421 Sparta and Athens concluded a defensive alliance; the Sphacterian captives were released and Athens promised to abandon Pylos. Such a peace, giving Sparta everything and Athens nothing but Sparta's See also:bare alliance, was due to the fact that Nicias and See also:Alcibiades were both seeking Sparta's friendship. At this time the Fifty Years' Truce between Sparta and Argos was expiring. The Peloponnesian malcontents turned to Argos as a new leader, and an alliance was formed between Argos, Corinth, See also:Elis, Mantinea and the Thraceward towns (420), This See also:coalition between two different elements—an See also:anti-oligarchic party and a war party—had no See also:chance of permanent existence. The war party in Sparta regained its strength under new ephors and negotiations began for an alliance between Sparta, Argos and Boeotia. The details cannot here be discussed. The result was a re-shuffling of the See also:cards. The democratic states of the Peloponnese were driven, partly by the intrigues of Alcibiades, now anti-Laconian, into alliance with Athens, with the See also:object of establishing a democratic Peloponnese under the leadership of Argos. These unstable combinations were soon after upset by Alcibiades himself, who, having succeeded in displacing Nicias as strategus in 419, allowed Athenian troops to help in attacking Epidaurus. For a cause not easy to determine Alcibiades was defeated by Nicias in the See also:election to the post of strategus in the next year, and the suspicions of the Peloponnesian coalition were roused by the inadequate assistance sent by Athens, which arrived too late to assist Argos when the Spartan king See also:Agis marched against it. Ultimately the Spartans were successful over the coalition at Mantinea, and soon afterwards an oligarchic revolution at Argos led to an alliance between that city and Sparta (c. Feb. 417). This oligarchy was overthrown again in See also:June, and the new democracy having vainly sought an agreement with Sparta rejoined Athens. It was thus left to Athens to expend men and See also:money on protecting a democracy by the aid of which she had hoped practically to control the See also:Peloponnesus. All this time, however, the alliance between her and Sparta was not officially broken. The unsatisfactory character of the Athenian Peloponnesian coalition was one of the negative causes which led up to the Sicilian Expedition of 415. Another negative cause may be found in the failure of an See also:attempt or attempts to subdue the Thraceward towns. By combining the evidence of See also:Plutarch (in his comparison of Nicias and See also:Crassus), Thuc. v. 83, and the inscription which gives the See also:treasury payments for 418-415 (See also:Hicks and Hill, Gr. Hist. Inscr. 70), we can scarcely doubt that there were expeditions in 418 (See also:Euthydemus) and the summer of 417 (Nicias), and that in the winter of 417 a blockading See also:squadron under See also:Chaeremon was despatched. This policy—which was presumably that of Nicias in opposition to Alcibiades—having failed, the way was cleared for a reassertion of that policy of western See also:conquest which had always had See also:advocates from See also:Themistocles onward in Athens,' and was part of the democratic See also:programme. The tragic fiasco of the Sicilian expedition, involving the death 1 In 454 Athens made a treaty with See also:Segesta (inscr. Hicks and Hill, Greek Hist. Inscr. 34) : in 433 with Rhegium and See also:Leontini (Hicks and Hill, 51 and 52; cf. Thuc. iii. 86, TeXaul evJ axia with Chalcidic towns in Sicily): in 444 the colony of Thurii was founded: in 427 (see above) 6o ships were sent to Sicily; and if we may believe See also:Aristophanes (Eq. 1302) Hyperbolus asked for See also:loo triremes for Carthage. of Nicias and the loss of thousands of men and hundreds of ships, was a blow from which Athens never recovered (see under See also:SYRACUSE and SICILY). Even before the final See also:catastrophe the Spartans had reopened hostilities. On the See also:advice of Alcibiades (q.v.), exiled from Athens in 415, they had fortified See also:Decelea in Attica within fifteen See also:miles of Athens. This place not only served as a permanent headquarters for predatory expeditions, but cut off the revenue from the See also:Laurium mines, furnished a ready See also:asylum for runaway slaves, and rendered the transference of supplies from Euboea considerably more difficult (i.e. by the sea round Cape See also:Sunium). Athens thus entered upon the third See also:stage of the conflict with exceedingly poor prospects. 3. The Ionian or Decelean War.—From the Athenian stand-point this war may be broken up into three periods: (I) period of revolt of allies (413-411), (2) the rally (410-408), (3) the relapse (407-404). As contrasted with the Archidamian War, this war was fought almost exclusively in the Aegean Sea, the enemy was primarily Sparta, and the deciding See also:factor was Persian gold. Furthermore, apart from the See also:gradual disintegration of the empire, Athens was disturbed by political strife. In 412 many Ionian towns revolted, and appealed either to Agis at Decelea or to Sparta See also:direct. Euboea, Lesbos, See also:Chios, See also:Erythrae led the way in negotiation and revolt, and simultaneously the See also:court of See also:Susa instructed the satraps See also:Pharnabazus and See also:Tissaphernes to renew the collection of tribute from the Greek cities of See also:Asia See also:Minor. The satraps likewise made overtures to Sparta. The revolt of the Ionian allies was due in part to Alcibiades also, whose prompt See also:action in co-operation with his friend the See also:ephor Endius finally confirmed the Chian oligarchs in their purpose. In 411 a treaty was signed by Sparta and Tissaphernes against Athens: the treaty formally surrendered to the Persian king all territory which he or his predecessors had held. It was subsequently renewed in a See also:form somewhat less disgraceful to Greek patriotism by the Spartans Astyochus and See also:Theramenes. On the other hand, a democratic rising in Samos prevented the See also:rebellion of that island, which for the See also:remainder of the war was invaluable to Athens as a stronghold lying between the two great centres of the struggle. After the See also:news of the Sicilian disaster Athens was compelled at last to draw on the reserve of 'coo talents which had lain untouched in the treasury.' The revolt of the Ionian allies, and (in 411) the loss of the Hellespontine, Thracian and Island tributes (see DELIAN LEAGUE), very seriously crippled her finances. On the other hand, Tissaphernes undertook to pay the Peloponnesian sailors a daily wage of one See also:Attic drachma (afterwards reduced to drachma). In Attica itself Athens lost Oenoe and See also:Oropus, and by the end of 411 only one quarter of the empire remained. In the meanwhile Tissaphernes began to See also:play a See also:double See also:game with the object of wasting the strength of the combatants. Moreover Alcibiades lost the confidence of the Spartans and passed over to Tissaphernes, at whose disposal he placed his great See also:powers of See also:diplomacy, at the same time scheming for his restoration to Athens. He opened negotiations with the Athenian leaders in Samos and urged them to upset the democracy and establish a See also:philo-Persian oligarchy. After elaborate intrigues, in the course of which Alcibiades played false to the conspirators by forcing them to abandon the idea of friendship with Tissaphernes owing to the exorbitant terms proposed, the new government by the Four See also:Hundred was set up in Athens (see THERAMENES). This government (which received no support from the armament in Samos) had a brief See also:life, and on the final revolt of Euboea was replaced by the old democratic See also:system. Alcibiades (q.v.) was soon afterwards invited to return to Athens. The war, which, probably because of financial trouble, the Spartans had neglected to pursue when Athens was thus in the throes of political convulsion, was now resumed. After much manoeuvring and intrigues a naval See also:battle was fought at Cynos- She had already abolished the system of tribute in favour of a 5 °o ad valorem tax on all imports and exports carried by sea between her ports and those of the allies.sema in the See also:Hellespont in which victory on the whole rested with the Athenians (Aug. 411), though the See also:net result was inconsiderable. About this time the duplicity of Tissapherneswho having again and again promised a Phoenician fleet and having actually brought it to the Aegean finally dismissed it on the excuse of trouble in the See also:Levant—and the vigorous honesty of Pharnabazus definitely transferred the Peloponnesian forces to the north-west coast of Asia Minor and the Hellespont. There they were regularly financed by Pharnabazus, while the Athenians were compelled to rely on forced levies. In spite of this See also:handicap Alcibiades, who had been seized and imprisoned by Tissaphernes at See also:Sardis but effected his escape, achieved a remark.. able victory over the Spartan Mindarus at See also:Cyzicus (about See also:April 410). So complete was the destruction of the Peloponnesian fleet that, according to Diodorus, peace was offered by Sparta (see ad fin.)and would have been accepted but for the warlike speeches of the " See also:demagogue " Cleophon representing the extreme democrats? Another result was the return to See also:allegiance (4o9) of a number of the north-east cities of the empire. Great attempts were made by the Athenians to hold the Hellespont and then to protect the See also:corn-See also:supply from the See also:Black Sea. In Greece these gains were compensated by the loss of Pylos and Nisaea. - In 408 Alcibiades effectively invested See also:Chalcedon, which surrendered by agreement with Pharnabazus, and subsequently See also:Byzantium also fell into his hands with the aid of some of its inhabitants. Pharnabazus, weary of bearing the whole cost of the war for the Peloponnesians, agreed to a period of truce so that envoys might visit Susa, but at this stage the whole position was changed by the See also:appointment of See also:Cyrus the Younger as See also:satrap of See also:Lydia, Greater See also:Phrygia and See also:Cappadocia. His arrival coincided with the appointment of See also:Lysander (c. Dec. 408) as Spartan admiral—the third of the three great commanders (Brasidas and See also:Gylippus being the others) whom Sparta produced during the war. Cyrus promptly agreed on the special See also:request of Lysander (q.v.) to pay slightly increased See also:wages to the sailors, while Lysander established a system of anti-Athenian clubs and oligarchic governments in various cities. Meanwhile Alcibiades (May 407), having exacted levies in See also:Caria, returned at length to Athens and was elected strategus with full powers (see STRATEGUS). He raised a large force of men and ships and endeavoured to draw Lysander (then at See also:Ephesus) into an engagement. But Cyrus and Lysander were resolved not to fight till they had a clear advantage, and Alcibiades took a small squadron to See also:Phocaea. In spite of his See also:express orders his See also:captain See also:Antiochus in his See also:absence provoked a battle and was defeated and killed at Notium. This failure and the refusal of Lysander to fight again destroyed the confidence which Alcibiades had so recently regained. Ten strategi were appointed to supersede him and he retired to fortified ports in the See also:Chersonese which he had prepared for such an emergency (c. See also:Jan. 406). At the same time Lysander's year of See also:office expired and he was superseded by Callicratidas, to the disgust of all those whom he had so carefully organized in his service. Callicratidas, an See also:honourable See also:man of See also:pan-Hellenic patriotism, was heavily handicapped in the fact that Cyrus declined to afford him the help which had made Lysander powerful, and had recourse to the Milesians and Chians, with whose aid he fitted out a fleet of 140 triremes (only so Spartan). With these he pursued See also:Conon (chief of the ten new Athenian strategi), captured 30 of his 70 ships and besieged him in Mytilene. Faced with inevitable destruction, Conon succeeded in sending the news to Athens, where by extraordinary efforts a fleet of See also:Ito ships was at once equipped. Callicratidas, See also:hearing of this fleet's approach, with-See also:drew from Mytilene, leaving Eteonicus in See also:charge of the See also:blockade. See also:Forty more ships were collected by the Athenians, who met and defeated Callicratidas at Arginusae with a loss of more than half his fleet. The immediate result was that Eteonicus left Mytilene and Conon found himself free. Unfortunately the victorious generals at Arginusae, through See also:negligence or owing 2 Xenophon, See also:Hell. does not mention it : Thucydides's history had by this time come to an end. to a storm, failed to recover the bodies of those of their crews who were drowned or killed in the action. They were therefore recalled, tried and condemned to death, except two who had disobeyed the See also:order to return to Athens. At this point Lysander was again sent out, nominally as secretary to the official admiral Aracus. Cyrus, recalled to Susa by the illness of See also:Darius, left him in entire control of his satrapy. Thus strengthened he sailed to See also:Lampsacus on the Hellespont and laid siege to it. Conon, now in charge of the Athenian fleet, sailed against him, but the fleet was entirely destroyed while at See also:anchor at See also:Aegospotami (See also:Sept. 405), Conon escaping with only 12 out of 18o sail to See also:Cyprus. In April 404 Lysander sailed into the See also:Peiraeus, took possession of Athens, and destroyed the See also:Long Walls and the fortifications of Peiraeus. An oligarchical government was set up (see Camas), and Lysander having compelled the capitulation of Samos, the last Athenian stronghold, sailed in See also:triumph to Sparta. Two questions of considerable importance for the full understanding of the Peloponnesian War may be selected for special See also:notice: (I) how far was it a war between two antagonistic theories of government, oligarchic and democratic ? and (2) how far was Athenian statesmanship at See also:fault in declining the offers of peace which Sparta made? 1. A common theory is that Sparta fought throughout the war as an See also:advocate of oligarchy, while Athens did not seek to interfere with the constitutional preferences of her allies. The view is based partly on Thuc. i. 19, according to which the Spartans took care that their allies should adhere to a policy convenient to themselves. This idea is disproved by Thucydides' own narrative, which shows that down to 418 (the battle of Mantinea) Sparta tolerated democratic governments in Peloponnesus itself—e.g. Elis, Mantinea, See also:Sicyon, Achaea, It was only after that date that democracy was suppressed in the Peloponnesian League, and even then Mantinea remained democratic. In point of fact, it was only when Lysander became the representative of Spartan See also:foreign policy—i.e. in the last years of the war—that Sparta was identified with the oligarchic policy. On the other hand, there is strong evidence that the Athenian Empire at a much earlier date was based upon a See also:uniform democratic type of government (cf. Thuc. i. 19, viii. 64; Xen. Pol. i. 14, Hell. in. 47; Arist. Pol. viii. 69). It is true that we find oligarchic government in Chios and Lesbos (up to 428) and in Samos (up to 440), but this is discounted by the fact that all three were " autonomous " allies. Moreover, in the See also:case of Samos there was a democracy in 439, though in 412 the government was again oligarchic. The case of Selymbria (see Hicks and Hill, op. cit. 77) is of little See also:account, because at that time (409) the Empire was in extremis. In general we find that Athenian orators take special See also:credit on the ground that the Athenian had given to her allies the constitutional advantages which they themselves enjoyed. 2. In view of the disastrous issue of the war, it is important to notice that on three occasions—(a) after Pylos, (b) after Cyzicus, (c) after Arginusae—Athens refused formal peace proposals from Sparta. (a) Though Cleon was probably See also:wise in opposing peace negotiations before the capture of the Spartans in Sphacteria, it seems in the light of subsequent events that he was wrong to refuse the terms which were offered after the hoplites had been captured. No doubt, however, the See also:temper in Athens was at that time pre-dominantly warlike, and the surrender of the hoplites was a unique triumph. Possibly, too, Cleon foresaw that peace would have meant a triumph for the philo-Laconian party. (b) The peace proposals of 410 are given by Diodorus, who says that the ephor Endius proposed that a peace should be made on the basis of uti possidetis, except that Athens should evacuate Pylos and See also:Cythera, and Sparta, Decelea. Cleophon, however, perhaps doubting whether the offer was sincere (cf. See also:Philochorus in Schol. ap. Eurip. Orest. 371; Fragm. ed. See also:Didot, 117, 118), demanded the status quo ante (413 or 431). (c) The proposals of 406, mentioned by See also:Ath. Pol. 34, were on the same lines, except that Athens no longer had Pylos and Cythera, and had lost practically half her empire. At this time peace must therefore have been advantageous to Athens as showing the world that in spite of her losses she was still one of the great powers of Greece. Moreover, an alliance with Sparta would have meant a check to Persian interference. It is probable, again, that party interest was a leading See also:motive in Cleophon's mind, since a peace would have meant the return of the oligarchic exiles and the See also:establishment of a moderate oligarchy. Additional information and CommentsThere are no comments yet for this article.
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