THE WRITINGS OF See also:

• KANT, IMMANUEL (1724-1804)

Hastie, 1900, Kant's See also:

• COSMOGONY (from Gr. K6Qµos, world and yiyvevGay to be born)

(On this question see discussion in W. Hastie's Kant's Cosmogony, as above.) 4. Meditationum quarundam de igne succincta delineatio (1755) : an inaugural dissertation, containing little beyond the notion that bodies operate on one another through the See also:

• MEDIUM

7. On the Different Races of Men (1775); Determination of the Notion of a Human See also:

• RACE

426–484) ; to See also:

• DIETRICH, CHRISTIAN WILHELM ERNST (1712-1774)

1763. Versuch den Begriff der negativen Grossen in die Weltweisheit einzufuhren, " Attempt to introduce the Notion of Negative Quantities into Philosophy." 1763. Der einzig mogliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes, " The only possible See also:

• FOUNDATION (Lat. fundatio, from fundare, to found)

The following introduce the notions and principles characteristic of the critical philosophy. 1770. De mundi sensibilis et intelligibilis forma et principies. 1781. Kritik der reinen Vernunft, " Kritik of Pure See also:

• REASON (Lat. ratio, through French raison)

Meiklejohn, 1854). 1783. Prolegomena zu einer jeden kiinftigen Metaphysik die als Wissenschaft See also:

• WIND
• WIND (a common Teut. word, cognate with Skt. vats, Lat. ventus, cf. " weather," to be of course distinguished from to " wind," to coil or twist, O.Eng. windan, cf. "wander," "wend," &c.)

Apel, Kommentar zu Kants Prolegomena, 1908). 1784. Idee zu einer ailgemeinen Geschichte im weltbiirgerlicher Absicht, " Notion of a Universal History in a See also:

• COSMOPOLITAN (Gr. Kbvµos, world, and IroXirgs, citizen)

Belfort Bax, Prolegomena and Metaphysical Foundations, 1883). 1788. Ueber den Gebrauch teleologischer Prinzipien in der Philosophic, " On the Employment of Teleological Principles in Philosophy." 1788. Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, " Kritik of See also:

• PRACTICAL

1790. Ueber eine Entdeckung, See also:

• MACH, ERNST (1838– )

Zum ewigen Frieden (Eng. trans., M. See also:

• CAMPBELL, ALEXANDER (1788–1866)
• CAMPBELL, BEATRICE STELLA (Mrs PATRICK CAMPBELL) (1865– )
• CAMPBELL, GEORGE (1719–1796)
• CAMPBELL, JOHN
• CAMPBELL, JOHN (1708-1775)
• CAMPBELL, JOHN CAMPBELL, BARON (1779-1861)
• CAMPBELL, JOHN FRANCIS
• CAMPBELL, LEWIS (1830-1908)
• CAMPBELL, REGINALD JOHN (1867— )
• CAMPBELL, THOMAS (1777—1844)

Matter of fact and matter of knowledge are thus at a stroke dissevered. The very notion of relation beti~yyeen mind and things leads at once to the See also:

• COUNTER

In See also:

• SHORT, FRANCIS JOB (1857– )

In any complete account of the Kantian system it is therefore necessary that there should be See also:

• CONSTANT, BENJAMIN (1845-1902)

The tendency towards what may be technicaliy called See also:

• SUBJECTIVISM

The meta-physical conception of the monads, each of which is the universe in nuce, presents insuperable difficulties when the connexion or interdependence of the monads is in question, and these difficulties obtrude themselves when the attempt is made to work out a consistent doctrine of cognition. For the whole See also:

• MASS (O.E. maesse; Fr. messe; Ger. Messe; Ital. messa; from eccl. Lat. missa)
• MASS, IN

There can be no doubt that some of the special features of the Kritik are to be found in these precritical essays, e.g. the doctrine of the Aesthetik is certainly foreshadowed in the Dissertation of 1770; the Kritik, however, is no patchwork, and what appears in the Dissertation takes an altogether new form when it is wrought into the more comprehensive conception of the later treatise. The particular problem which gave the occasion to the first of the precritical writings is, in an imperfect or particular fashion, the fundamental question to which the Kritik is an answer. What is the nature of the distinction between knowledge gained by analysis of notions and knowledge of matters of fact? Kant seems never to have been satisfied with the Wolffian See also:

• IDENTIFICATION (Lat. idem, the same)

" I can understand perfectly well," says Kant, " how a consequence follows from its reason according to the See also:

• LAW
• LAW (0. Eng. lagu, M. Eng. lawe; from an old Teutonic root lag, " lie," what lies fixed or evenly; cf. Lat. lex, Fr. loi)
• LAW, JOHN (1671—1729)
• LAW, WILLIAM (1686-1761)

Any See also:

• DIRECT

In all See also:

• PROBABILITY (Lat. probabilis, probable or credible)

A brief notice of the contents of this tract will suffice to show how far removed Kant yet was from the methods and principles of the critical or transcendental philosophy. Sense and understanding, according to the Dissertation, are the two See also:

• SOURCES

Here they are supposed to exist, dissevered from experience, and are allowed validity as determinations of things in themselves. The stage which Kant had now reached in his philosophical development was one of great significance. The doctrine of know-ledge expressed in the Dissertation was the final form which the Wolffian See also:

• RATIONALISM (from Lat. rationalis, pertaining to reason, ratio)

In the Dissertation sense-perception had been taken as receptivity of representations of objects, and experience as the product of the treatment of such representations by the logical or analytical processes of understanding. Some traces of this confused fashion of regarding sense-perceptions are left even in the Kritik, specially perhaps in the Aesthetik, and they give rise to much of the See also:

• AMBIGUITY (Fr. ambiguite, med. Lat. ambiguitas, from Lat. ambiguus, doubtful; ambi, both ways, agere, to drive)

Experience, as given, contingent material, had a certain uniformity, and recurring uniformities generated in us the habit of regarding things as necessarily connected. That such a resort to experience for explanation could See also:

• LEAD
• LEAD (pronounced iced)

The central ideas are thus self-consciousness, as the supreme condition under which experience is subjectively possible, and the manifold details of experience as a varied and complex whole. The solution of the problem demanded the utmost care in keeping the due balance between these ideas; and it can hardly be said that Kant was perfectly successful. He is frequently untrue to the more comprehensive conception which dominates his work as a whole. The influence of his previous philosophical training, See also:

• NAY, or NEY

The difficulties or obscurities of the Kantian system, of which the above are merely the more prominent, may all be traced to the one source, the false or at least inadequate idea of the individual. The more thorough explanation of the relation between experience as critically conceived and the individual subject was the problem left by Kant for his successors. In any detailed exposition of the critical system it would be requisite in the first place to See also:

• STATE
• STATE, GREAT OFFICERS OF

The problem of the Kritik thus becomes for Kant the complete statement of the elements necessarily involved in synthesis, and of the subjective processes by which these elements are realized in our individual consciousness. He is not asking, with Locke, whence the details of experience arise; he is not attempting a natural history of the growth of experience in the individual mind; but he is endeavouring to state exhaustively what conditions are necessarily involved in any fact of knowledge, i.e. in any synthetic combination of parts of experience by the conscious subject. So far as the elements necessarily involved in conscious experience are concerned, these may be enumerated briefly thus: given data of sense, inner or See also:

• OUTER

The unity and identity of the ego, so regarded, are taken in See also:

• ABSTRACTION (Lat. abs and trahere)

Unfortunately for the consistency of the Kritik, Kant does not attempt to work out systematically the elements involved in knowledge before considering the subjective processes by which knowledge is realized in consciousness. He mixes up the two inquiries, and in the general division of his work depends rather upon the results of previous See also:

• PSYCHOLOGY
• PSYCHOLOGY (>Guxrl, the mind or soul, and X yos, theory)

Kant was anxious to avoid the error of Leibnitz, who had taken sense and understanding to differ in degree only, not in kind; but in avoiding the one error he See also:

• FELL
• FELL, JOHN (1625-1686)

Kant has pointedly declared that it would be a See also:

• GROSS

It had not then occurred to him to ask, With what right do we assume that the conclusions arrived at from arbitrary constructions in mathematical matter have applicability to objects of experience? Might not mathematics be a purely imaginary science? To this question he is now enabled to return an answer. Space and time, the two essential conditions of sense-perception, are not data given by things, but universal forms of intellect into which all data of sense must be received. Hence, whatever is true of space and time regarded by imagination as objects, i.e. quantitative constructions, must be true of the objects making up our sense-experience. The same forms and the same constructive activity of imagination are involved in mathematical synthesis and in the constitution of objects of sense-experience. The foundation for pure or rational mathematics, there being included under this the pure science of movement, is thus laid in the critical doctrine of space and time. The Aesthetik isolates sense-perception, and considers its forms as though it were an independent, complete faculty. A certain See also:

• CON

Affection of sense, even when received into the pure forms of perception, is not matter of knowledge. For cognition there is requisite synthetic combination, and the intellectual function through which such combination takes place. The forms of intellectual function Kant proceeds to enumerate with the aid of the commonly received logical doctrines. For this reference to logic he has been severely blamed, but the precise nature of the See also:

• DEBT (Lat. debitum, a thing owed)

It has already been noted how serious was the error involved in the description of these as notions, without further attempt to clear up their precise significance. Kant, indeed, was mainly influenced by his strong opposition to the Leibnitzian rationalism, and therefore assigns the categories to understanding, the logical faculty, without consideration of the question,—which might have been suggested by the previous statements of the Dissertation,—what relation these categories held to the empirical notions formed by comparison, abstraction and generalization when directed upon representations of objects. But when the categories are described as notions, i.e. formed products of thought, there rises of necessity the problem which had presented itself to Kant at every stage of his pre-critical thinking,—with what right can we assume that these notions apply to objects of experience? The answer which he proceeds to give altogether explodes the See also:

• DEFINITION (Lat. definitio, from de-finire, to set limits to, describe)

He has shown that the conditions of self-consciousness are the conditions of possible experience. But he has not shown, nor did he attempt to show, how it was that the conditions of self-consciousness are the very categories arrived at by consideration of the system of logical judgments. He does endeavour to show, but with small success, how the junction of category and data of sense is brought about, for according to his See also:

• SCHEME (Lat. schema, Gr. oxfjya, figure, form, from the root axe, seen in exeiv, to have, hold, to be of such shape, form, &c.)

This intermediate process—which is really the junction of understanding and sense—Kant calls productive imagination, and it is only through productive imagination that knowledge or experience is actually realized in our subjective consciousness. The specific forms of productive imagination are called schemata, and upon the nature of the schema Kant gives much that has proved of extreme value for subsequent thought. Productive imagination is thus the concrete element, of knowledge, and its general modes are the abstract expression. of the a priori laws of all possible experience. The categories are restricted in their applicability to the schema, i.e. to the pure forms of conjunction of the manifold in time, and in the modes of combination of schemata and categories we have the foundation for the rational sciences of mathematics and physics. Perception or real cognition is thus conceived as a complex fact, involving data of sense and pure perceptive forms, determined by the category and realized through productive imagination in the schema. The system of principles which may be deduced from the consideration of the mode in which understanding and sense are united by productive imagination is the See also:

• POSITIVE (or PORTABLE) ORGAN

The analogies of experience rest upon the order of perceptions in time, i.e. their permanence, See also:

• SUCCESSION (Lat. successio, from succedere, to follow after)

Morever, the manner in which space and time had been treated made it possible for him to regard these as contingent forms, necessary for intelligences like ours, but not to be viewed as absolutely necessary. The real meaning of these peculiarities is hardly ever expressed by him, though it is clear that the solution of the matter is to be found in the inadequacy of the positive theory to meet the demands of reason for completed explanation. But the conclusion to which he was led was one of the greatest importance for the after development of his system. Cognition is necessarily limited. The categories are restricted in their application to elements of possible experience to that which is presented in intuition, and all intuition is for the ego contingent. But to assert that cognition is limited and its matter contingent is to form the idea of an intelligence for whom cognition would not be limited and for whom the data of intuition would not be given, contingent facts, but necessarily produced along with the pure categories. This idea of an intuitive understanding is the definite expression for the complete explanation which reason demands, and it involves the conception of a realm of objects for such an understanding, a realm of objects which, in opposition to the phenomena of our relative and limited experience, may be called noumena or things-in-themselves. The See also:

• NOUMENON (Gr. voouµevov, a thing known, from voeiv)

We are still able and necessitated to reflect upon the whole world of phenomena as thus cognized, and driven to inquire after its significance. In our reflection we necessarily treat the objects, not as phenomena, as matters of positive, scientific knowledge, but as things-in-themselves, as noumena. The distinction between phenomena and noumena is, therefore, nothing but the expression of the distinction between understanding and reason, a distinction which, according to Kant, is merely subjective. The specific function of reason is the effort after completed ex-planation of the experience presented in cognition. But in such effort there are no notions to be employed other than the categories, and these, as has already been seen, have validity only in reference to objects of possible experience. We may expect, then, to find the transcendent employment of the categories leading into various difficulties and inconsistencies. The criticism of reason in its specific aspect throws fresh light on the limits to human knowledge and the significance of experience. Experience has presented itself as the complex result of relation between the ego or subject and the world of phenomena. Reason may therefore attempt a completed explanation either of the ego or of the world of phenomena or of the total relation between them. The three inquiries correspond to the subjects of the three ancient metaphysical sciences, rational psychology, rational cosmology, rational theology. It is readily seen, in regard to the first of them, that all attempts to determine the nature of the ego as a simple, perdurable, immaterial substance rest upon a confusion between the ego as pure logical unity and the ego as object of intuition, andinvolve a transcendent use of the categories of experience. It profits not to apply such categories to the soul, for no intuition corresponding to them is or can be given.

The idea of the soul must be regarded as transcendent. So too when we endeavour, with the help of the categories of quantity, quality, relation and modality, to determine the nature and relation of parts of the world, we find that reason is landed in a peculiar difficulty. Any solution that can be given is too narrow for the demands of reason and too wide for the restrictions of understanding. The transcendent employment of the categories leads to See also:

• ANTINOMY (Gr. avri, against, v6uos, law)

They are supremely significant, as indicating the very essence of the function of reason. The limits of scientific cognition become intelligible, only when the sphere of understanding is subjected to critical reflexion and compared with the possible sphere of reason, that is, the sphere of rationally complete cognition. The ideas, therefore, in relation to knowledge strictly so called, have regulative value, for they furnish the general 'precepts for extension and completion of knowledge, and, at the same time, since they See also:

• SPRING (from " to spring," " to leap or jump up," " burst out," O. Eng., springau, a common Teut. word, cf. Ger. springer, possibly allied to Gr. QnrFpxecOac, to move rapidly)

The theoretical proof rather serves as useful aid towards the more exact determination of the nature and See also:

• PROVINCE
• PROVINCE (Lat. provincia; perhaps a contraction of providentia)

The general principle of the adaptation of nature to our faculties of cognition has two specific applications, with the second of which it is more closely connected than with the first. In the first place, the adaptation may be merely subjective, when the empirical condition for the exercise of judgment is furnished by the feeling of See also:

• PLEASURE (through Fr. plaisir from Lat. placere, to please; Gr. rlbovii)

The final conception of the Kantian philosophy is, therefore, that of ethical teleology. As Kant expresses it in a remarkable passage of the'Kritik, " The systematic unity.of ends in this world of intelligences, which, although as mere nature it is to be called only the world of sense, can yet as a system of freedom be called an intelligible, i.e. moral world (regnum gratiae), leads inevitably to the teleological unity of all things which constitute this great whole according to universal natural laws, just as the unity of the former is according to universal and necessary moral laws, and unites the practical with the speculative reason. The world must be represented as having originated from an idea, if it is to harmonize with that use of reason without which we should hold ourselves unworthy of reason—viz. the moral use, which rests entirely on the idea of the supreme good. Hence all natural See also:

• RESEARCH (O. Fr. recerche, from recercher, re- and cercer, mod. chercher, to search; Late Lat. circare, to go round in a circle, to explore)

Hartenstein, " in See also:

• CHRONOLOGICAL