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SCHOLASTICISM

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Originally appearing in Volume V24, Page 352 of the 1911 Encyclopedia Britannica.
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SCHOLASTICISM , the name usually employed to denote the most typical products of See also:

medieval thought. After the centuries of intellectual darkness which followed upon the closing of the philosophical See also:schools in See also:Athens (529), and the See also:death of See also:Boetius, the last of the See also:ancient philosophers, the first symptoms of renewed intellectual activity appear contemporaneously with the consolidation of the See also:empire of the See also:West in the hands of See also:Charlemagne. He endeavoured to attract to his See also:court the best scholars of See also:Britain and See also:Ireland, and by imperial See also:decree (787) commanded the See also:establishment of schools in connexion with every See also:abbey in his realms. See also:Peter of See also:Pisa and See also:Alcuin of See also:York were his advisers, and under their care the opposition See also:long supposed to exist between godliness and See also:secular learning speedily disappeared. Besides the celebrated school of the See also:Palace, where Alcuin had among his hearers the members of the imperial See also:family and the dignitaries of the empire as well as talented youths of humbler origin, we hear of the episcopal schools of See also:Lyons, See also:Orleans and St See also:Denis, the See also:cloister schools of St See also:Martin of See also:Tours, of See also:Fulda, See also:Corbie, See also:Fontenelle and many others, besides the older monasteries of St See also:Gall and See also:Reichenau. These schools became the centres of . medieval learning and See also:speculation,and from them the name Scholasticism is derived (cf., See also:Sandys, Hist. of Class. Schol., i. 472, 1906). They were designed to communicate instruction in the seven liberal arts which constituted the educational curriculum of the See also:middle ages (see TRIV1uM). The name See also:doctor scholasticus was applied originally to any teacher in such an ecclesiastical gymnasium, but gradually the study of See also:dialectic or See also:logic overshadowed the more elementary disciplines, and the See also:general acceptation of doctor " came to be one who occupied himself with the teaching of logic. The See also:philosophy of the later. Scholastics is more extended in its See also:scope; but to the end of the medieval See also:period philosophy centres in the discussion of the same logical problems which began to agitate the teachers of the 9th and loth centuries.

Scholasticism in the widest sense thus extends from the 9th to the end of the 14th or the beginning of the 15th See also:

century—from See also:Erigena to See also:Occam and his followers. The belated Scholastics who lingered beyond the last mentioned date served only as marks for the obloquy heaped upon the schools by the men of the new See also:time. Erigena is really of the spiritual kindred of the Neoplatonists and See also:Christian mystics rather than of the typical Scholastic doctors, and, in fact, the activity of Scholasticism is mainly confined within the limits of the 11th and the 14th centuries. It is divisible into two well-marked periods—the first extending to the end of the 12th century and embracing as its See also:chief names See also:Roscellinus, See also:Anselm, See also:William of See also:Champeaux and See also:Abelard, while the second extended from the beginning of the 13th century to the See also:Renaissance and the general See also:distraction of men's thoughts from the problems and methods of Scholasticism. In this second period the names of Albertus See also:Magnus, See also:Thomas See also:Aquinas and See also:Duns Scotus represent (in the 13th century and the first years of the 14th century) the See also:culmination of Scholastic thought and its consolidation into See also:system. Prantl says that there is no such thing as philosophy in. the middle ages; there are only logic and See also:theology. The remark overlooks two facts—firstly that the See also:main See also:objects of theology and philosophy are identical, though the toglcan. theology. method of treatment is different, and secondly that logical discussion commonly leads up to metaphysical problems, and that this was pre-eminently the See also:case with the logic of the Schoolmen. But the saying draws See also:attention to the two See also:great influences which shaped medieval thought—the tradition of ancient logic and the system of Christian theology. Scholasticism opens with a discussion of certain points in the Aristotelian logic; it speedily begins to apply its logical distinctions to the doctrines of the See also:church; and when it attains its full stature in St Thomas it has, with the exception of certain mysteries, rationalized or Aristotelianized the whole churchly system. Or we might say with equal truth that the philosophy of St Thomas is See also:Aristotle Christianized.

The Schoolmen contemplate the universe of nature and See also:

man not with their own eyes but in the See also:glass of Aristotelian formulae. Their chief See also:works are in the shape of commentaries upon the writings of "the philosopher." Their problems and solutions alike See also:spring from the See also:master's dicta—from the need of reconciling these with one another and with the conclusions of Christian theology. The fact that the channels of thought during the middle ages were determined in this way is usually expressed by saying that See also:reason in the middle See also:age is subject to authority. It has not the See also:free See also:play which characterizes its activity .Reason in See also:Greece and in the philosophy of See also:modern times. Its authority. conclusions are predetermined, and the initiative of the individual thinker is almost confined, therefore, to formal details in the treatment of his thesis. To the church, reason is the handmaid of faith (ancilla fcdei). But this principle of the subordination of the reason wears a different aspect according to the century and writer referred to. In Scotus Erigena, at the beginning of the Scholastic era, there is no such subordination contemplated, because philosophy and theology in his See also:work are in implicit unity. " Conficitur inde veram esse philosophiam veram religionem, conversimque veram religionem esse veram ' The See also:common designation of Aristotle in the middle ages. See also:Chronological limits. philosophiam " (De divina praedestinatione, Proem). Reason in its own strength and with its own See also:instruments evolves a system of the universe which coincides, according to Erigena, with the teaching of Scripture.

For Erigena, therefore, the speculative reason is the supreme arbiter; and in accordance with its results the utterances of Scripture and of the church have not infrequently to be subjected to an allegorical or mystical See also:

interpretation. But this is only to say again that Erigena is more of a Neoplatonist than a Scholastic. Hence See also:Cousin suggested in respect of this point a threefold chronological See also:division—at the outset the See also:absolute subordination of philosophy to theology, then the period of their See also:alliance, and finally the beginning of their separation. In other words, we See also:note philosophy gradually extending its claims. Dialectic is, to begin with, a merely secular See also:art, and only by degrees are its terms and distinctions applied to the subject-See also:matter of theology. The See also:early results of the application, in the hands of See also:Berengarius and Roscellinus, did not seem favourable to Christian orthodoxy. Hence the strength with which a See also:champion of the faith like Anselm insists on the subordination of reason. To See also:Bernard of See also:Clairvaux and many other churchmen the application of dialectic to the things of faith appears as dangerous as it is impious. Later, in the syste..is of the great Schoolmen, the rights of reason are fully established and acknowledged. The relation of reason and faith remains See also:external, and certain doctrines—an increasing number as times goes on—are withdrawn from the See also:sphere of reason. But with these exceptions the two See also:march See also:side by side; they establish by different means the same results. For the conflicts which accompanied the first intrusion of philosophy into the theological domain more profound and cautious thinkers with a far ampler apparatus of knowledge had substituted a See also:harmony.

" The See also:

constant effort of Scholasticism to be at once philosophy and theology "1 seemed at last satisfactorily realized. But the further progress of Scholastic thought consisted in a withdrawal of See also:doctrine after doctrine from the possibility of rational prsof and their relegation to the sphere of faith. Indeed, no sooner was the harmony apparently established by Aquinas than Duns Scotus began this negative See also:criticism, which is carried much farther by William of Occam. But this is See also:equivalent to a See also:confession that Scholasticism had failed in its task, which was to rationalize the doctrines of the church. The Aristotelian See also:form refused to See also:fit a matter for which it was never intended; the matter of Christian theology refused to be forced into an See also:alien form. The end of the period was thus brought about by the See also:internal decay of its method and principles quite as much as by the variety of external causes which contributed to See also:transfer men's interests to other subjects. But, although the relation of reason to an external authority thus constitutes the badge of medieval thought, it would be schoos- unjust to look upon Scholasticism as philosophically ticism not barren, and to speak as if reason, after an See also:interregnum ammo- of a thousand years, resumed its rights at the Renaisgressive. sance. Such See also:language was excusable in the men of the Renaissance, fighting the See also:battle of classic form and beauty and of the manysidedness of See also:life against the barbarous terminology and the monastic ideals of the schools, or in the protagonists of modern See also:science. The new is never just to the old. In the schools and See also:universities of the middle age the See also:intellect of the semi-barbarous See also:European peoples had been trained for the work of the modern See also:world. But we may go further and say that, in spite of their initial See also:acceptance of authority, the Scholastics are not the antagonists of reason; on the contrary they fight its battles. The See also:attempt to establish by See also:argument the. authority of faith is in reality the unconscious establishment of the authority of reason.

Reason, if admitted at all, must ultimately claim the whole man. Anselm's See also:

motto, Credo ut intelligam, marks well the distance that has been traversed since See also:Tertullian's Credo quia absurdum est. The claim of reason has been recognized to manipulate the data of faith, at first blindly and immediately received, and to weld them into a system such as will satisfy its own needs. Scholasticism that See also:Milman's Latin See also:Christianity, ix. sot.has outlived its See also:day may be justly identified with obscurantism, but not so the systems of those who, by their intellectual force alone, once held all the minds of See also:Europe in subjection. The scholastic systems are not the free products of speculation; in the main they are summae theologise, or they are modified versions of Aristotle. But each system is a fresh recognition of the rights of reason, and Scholasticism as a whole may be regarded as the See also:history of the growth and See also:gradual emancipation of reason which was completed in the movements of the Renaissance and the See also:Reformation. In speaking of the origin of Scholasticism—name and thing—it has been already noted that medieval speculation takes its rise in certain logical problems. To be more precise, it is the nature of universals " which forms the vessels." central theme of Scholastic debate (see See also:NOMINALISM, See also:REALISM). This is the case almost exclusively during the first period, and only to a less extent during the second, where it reappears in a somewhat different form as the difficulty concerning the principle of individuation. The controversy was between Nominalists and Realists; and, exclusively logical as the point may at first sight seem to be, adherence to one side or the other is an accurate indication of philosophic tendency. The two opposing theories See also:express at bottom, in the phraseology of their own time, the See also:radical divergence of See also:pantheism and See also:individualism—the two extremes between which philosophy seems pendulum-See also:wise to oscillate, and which may be said still to await their perfect reconciliation. First, however, we must examine the form which this question assumed to the first medieval thinkers, and the source from which they derived it.

A single See also:

sentence in See also:Porphyry's Isagoge or " introduction " to the Categories of Aristotle furnished the ,y$ s See also:text of the discussion. The See also:treatise of Porphyry deals with the notions of genus, See also:species, difference, See also:property and See also:accident (see See also:PREDICABLES); and he mentions, but declines to discuss, the various theories that have been held as to the ontological import of genera and species. In the Latin See also:translation of Boetius, in which alone the Isagoge was then known, the sentence runs as follows: " Mox de generibus et speciebus illud quidem sive subsistant, sive in See also:solis nudis intellectibus posita sint, sive subsistentia corporalia sint an incorporalia, et utrum separata a sensibilibus an in sensibilibus posits et circa haec consistentia, dicere recusabo; altissimun2 enim negotium est hujusmodi et majoris egens inquisitionis." This passage indicates three possible positions with regard to universals. It may be held that they exist merely as conceptions in our minds; this is Nominalism or See also:Conceptualism (q.v.). It may be held that they have a substantial existence of their own, See also:independent of their existence in our thoughts. This is Realism, which may be of two varieties, according as the substantially existent universals are supposed to exist apart from the sensible phenomena or only in and with the objects of sense as their essence. The first form of Realism corresponds to the Platonic theory of the transcendence of the ideas; the second reproduces the Aristotelian doctrine of the essence as inseparable from the individual thing. But, though he implies an ample previous treatment of the questions by philosophers, Porphyry gives no references to the different systems of which such distinctions are the outcome, nor does he give any hint of his own See also:opinion on the subject, definite enough though that was. He simply sets the discussion aside as too difficult for a preliminary discourse, and not strictly relevant to a purely logical inquiry. Porphyry, the Neoplatonist, the See also:disciple of See also:Plotinus, was an unknown personage to those early students of the Isagoge. The passage possessed for them a mysterious See also:charm, largely due to its See also:isolation and to their See also:ignorance of the historic speculations which suggested it. And accordingly it gave rise to the three great doctrines which divided the medieval schools: Realism of the Platonic type, embodied in the See also:formula universalia ante rem; Realism of the Aristotelian type, universalia in re; and Nominalism, including Conceptualism, expressed by the phrase universalia See also:post rem, and also claiming to be based upon the Peripatetic doctrine.

To form a proper estimate of the first See also:

stage of Scholastic discussion it is requisite above all things to have a clear See also:idea of the appliances Extent of then at the disposal of the writers. What was the extent the early t o of their knowledge of ancient philosophy? To begin with, the we know that till the 13th century the middle age was Schoo men's ignorant of See also:Greek, and possessed no philosophical works in knowledge. their Greek See also:original(see See also:CLASSICS). In See also:translations they had only the Categories and the De interpretatione of Aristotle in the versions of Boetius, the See also:Timaeus of See also:Plato in the version of Chalcidius, and Boetius's translation of Porphyry's Isagoge. Some general See also:information as to the Platonic doctrines (chiefly in a Neoplatonic garb) was obtainable from the commentary with which Chalcidius (6th century) accompanied his translation, from the work of See also:Apuleius (2nd century) De dogmate Platens, and indirectly from the commentary of See also:Macrobius (c. 400) on the Somnium Scipionis of See also:Cicero, and from the writings of St See also:Augustine. As See also:aids to the study of logic, the doctors of this period, beside the commentaries and See also:treatises of Boetius (q.v.), possessed two tracts attributed to St Augustine, the first of which, Principia dialecticae, is probably his, but is mainly grammatical in its import. The other See also:tract, known as Categoriae decem, and taken at first for a translation of Aristotle's treatise, is really a rapid See also:summary of it, and certainly does not belong to Augustine. To this See also:list must be added: (1) the Satyricon of Martianus See also:Capella (q.v.), the greater See also:part of which is a treatise on the seven liberal arts, the See also:fourth See also:book dealing with logic ; (2) the De artibus ac disciplinis liberalium literarum of See also:Cassiodorus (q.v.); (3) the Origines of Isidore of See also:Seville (ob. 636), which is little more than a See also:reproduction of (2). The above constitutes the whole material which the earlier middle age had at its disposal.

The grandly conceived system of Erigena (see ERIGENA and See also:

MYSTICISM) stands by itself in the 9th century like the Prigen& product of another age. See also:John the See also:Scot was still acquainted with Greek, seeing that he translated the work of the pseudo-See also:Dionysius; and his speculative See also:genius achieved the See also:fusion of Christian doctrine and Neoplatonic thought in a system of quite remarkable metaphysical completeness. It is the only See also:complete and independent system between the decline of ancient thought and the system of Aquinas in the 13th century, if indeed we ought not to go further, to modern times, to find a parallel. Erigena pronounces no express opinion upon the question which was even then beginning to occupy men's minds; but his Platonico-Christian theory of the Eternal Word+as containing in Himself the exemplars of created things is equivalent to the assertion of universalia ante rem. His whole system, indeed, is based upon the idea of the divine as the exclusively real, of which the world of individual existence is but the theophany; the See also:special and the individual are immanent, therefore, in the general. And hence at a much later date (in the beginning of the 13th century) his name was invoked to See also:cover the pantheistic heresies of Amalrich of Bena. Erigena does not See also:separate his Platonic theory of pre-existent exemplars from the Aristotelian doctrine of the universal as in the individuals. As See also:Ueberweg points out, his theory is rather a result of the transference of the Aristotelian conception of substance to the Platonic Idea, and of an See also:identification of the relation of accidents to the substance in which they inhere with that of the individuals to the Idea of which, in the Platonic doctrine, they are copies (Hist. of Philosophy, i. 363, Eng. trans.). Hence it may be said that the universals are in the individuals, constituting their essential reality (and it is an express part of Erigena's system that the created but creative Word, the second division of Nature, should pass into the third stage of created and non-creating things) ; or rather, perhaps, we ought to say that the individuals exist in the bosom of their universal. At all events, while Erigena's Realism is pronounced, the Platonic and Aristotelian forms of the doctrine are not distinguished in his writings. Prantl has professed to find the See also:head-stream of Nominalism also in Scotus Erigena; but beyond the fact that he discusses at considerable length the categories of thought and their mutual relations, occasionally using the See also:term votes to express his meaning, Prantl appears to adduce no reasons for an assertion which directly contradicts Erigena's most fundamental doctrines.

Moreover, Erigena again and again declares that dialectic has to do with the stadia of a real or divine See also:

classification: " Intelligitur quod ars illa, quae dividit genera in species et species in genera resolvit, quae btaXrsrud dicitur, non ab humanis machinationibus sit facta, sed in natura rerum ab auctore omnium artium, quae verae artes sunt, condita et a sapientibus inventa " (De divisione naturae, iv. 4). The immediate See also:influence of Erigena's system cannot have been great, and his works seem soon to have dropped out of See also:notice in the centuries that followed. The real germs of Realism and Nominalism are to be found in the gth century, in scattered commentaries and glosses upon the statements of Porphyry and Boetius. Boetius in commenting upon Porphyry had already started the discussion as to the nature of universals. He is definitely See also:anti-Platonic, and his language sometimes takes even a nominalistic See also:tone, as when he declares t°fluence of that the species is nothing more than a thought or Boetihm conception gathered from the substantial similarity of a number of dissimilar individuals. The expression " substantial similarity" is still, however, sufficiently vague to cover a multitude of views. He concludes that the genera and species exist as universals only in thought; but, inasmuch as they are collected from singulars on See also:account of a real resemblance, they have a certain existence independently of the mind, but not an existence disjoined from the singulars of sense. " Subsistunt ergo circa sensibilia, intelliguntur autem praeter corpora." Or, according to the phrase which recurs so often during the middle ages, " universale intelligitur, singulare sentitur." Boetius ends by declining to adjudicate between Plato and Aristotle, remarking in a semi-apologetic See also:style that, if he has expounded Aristotle's opinion by preference, his course is justified by the fact that he is commenting upon an introduction to Aristotle. And, indeed, his discussion cannot claim to be more than semi-popular in See also:character. The point in dispute has not in his hands the all-absorbing importance it afterwards attained, and the keenness of later distinctions is as yet unknown. In this way, however, though the distinctions See also:drawn may still be comparatively vague, there existed in the schools a Peripatetic tradition to set over against the Neoplatonic influence of John the Scot, and amongst• the earliest remains of Scholastic thought we find this tradition asserting itself somewhat vigorously.

There were Nominalists before Roscellinus among these early thinkers. Alcuin (q.v.) does nothing more in his Dialectic than abridge Boetius and the other commentators. But in the school of Fulda, presided over by his See also:

pupil Hrabanus Maurus Hrabanus (776-856), there are to be found some fresh contribu- nfaarus. tions to the discussion. The collected works of Hrabanus himself contain nothing new, but in some glosses on Aristotle and Porphyry, first exhumed by Cousin, there are several noteworthy expressions of opinion in a Nominalistic sense. The author interprets Boetius's meaning to be " Quod eadem res individuum et species et genus est, et non esse universalia individuis quasi quoddam diversum." He also cites, apparently with approval, the view of those who held Porphyry's treatise to be not de quinque See also:rebus, but de quinque vocibus. A genus, they said, is essentially something which is predicated of a subject; but a thing cannot be a predicate (res enim non praedicatur). These glosses, it should be added, however, have been attributed by Prantl and Kaulich, on the ground of divergence from doctrines contained in the published works of Hrabanus, to some disciple of his rather than to Hrabanus himself. Fulda had become through the teaching of the latter an intellectual centre. See also:Eric or Heiricus, who studied there under Haimon, the successor of Hrabanus, and after- erlc. wards taught at See also:Auxerre, wrote glosses on the margin of his copy of the pseudo-Augustinian Categoriae, which have been published by Cousin and Ilaureau. He there says in words which recall the language of See also:Locke (See also:Essay, iii. 3) that because proper names are innumerable, and no intellect or memory would suffice for the knowing of them, they are all as it were comprehended in the species. Taken strictly his words See also:state the position of extreme Nominalism; but even if we were not forbidden to do so by other passages, in which the doctrine of moderate Realism is adopted (under cover of the current distinction between the singular as See also:felt and the pure universal as understood), it would still be unfair to See also:press any passage in the writings of this period.

As Cousin says, " Realism and Nominalism were undoubtedly there in germ, but their true principles with their necessary consequences remained profoundly unknown; their connexion with all the great questions of See also:

religion and politics was not even suspected. The two systems were nothing more as yet than two different ways of interpreting a phrase of Porphyry, and they remained unnoticed in the obscurity of the schools. . . . It was the r rth century which gave Nominalism to the world."' See also:Remigius of Auxerre, pupil of Eric, became the most celebrated See also:professor of dialectic in the Parisian schools of the rcth century. Remigius. As he reverted to Realism, his influence, first at Rheims and then in See also:Paris, was doubtless instrumental in bringing about the general acceptance of that doctrine till the See also:advent of Roscellinus as a powerful disturbing influence. " There is one genus more general than the See also:rest," says Remi (J. B. See also:Haureau, Histoire de la philosophie scolastique, i. 146), " beyond which the intellect cannot rise, called by the Greeks obaea, by the Latins essentia. The essence, indeed, comprehends all natures, and everything that exists is a portion of this essence, by participation in which everything that is hath its existence." And similarly with the intermediate genera. " Homo est multorum hominum substantialis unitas." Remigius is thus a Realist, not so much in the sense of Plato as in the spirit of Parmenides, and Haureau applies to this form of Realism See also:Bayle's description of Realism in general as " le Spinosisme non developpe." The rot.h century as a whole is especially marked out as a dark age, being partly filled with See also:civil troubles and partly characterized by a reaction of faith against reason.

In the monastery of St Gall there was considerable logical activity, but nothing of philosophical See also:

interest is recorded. The chief name of the century is that of See also:Gerbert (died 0esbert. as See also:Pope See also:Silvester II. in 1003). His treatise De rationali et ratione uti is more interesting as a display of the logical acquirements of the age than as possessing any See also:direct See also:philo- sophical bearing. The school of See also:Chartres, founded in 990 by Fulbert, one of Gerbert's pupils, was distinguished See also:change in the accidents. M de See also:Remusat characterizes his view on the See also:Eucharist as a specific application of Nominalism. More intimately connected with the progress of philosophical thought was the tritheistic view of the Trinity propounded by Roscellinus as one of the results of his Nominalistic theory Roster- of knowing and being. The sharpness and onesidedness lions. with which he formulated his position were the See also:im- mediate occasion of the contemporaneous See also:crystallization of Realism in the theories of Anselm and William of Champeaux. Henceforth discussion is carried on with a full ' See also:Victor Cousin, Ouvrages See also:ine'dits d'Abelard, Introd. p. lxxxv. ' Melalogicus, i. 27, quoted in See also:Poole's Illustrations of Medieval Thought. 349 consciousness of the See also:differences involved and the issues at stake; and, thanks to the heretical conclusion disclosed by Roscellinus, Realism became established for several centuries as the orthodox philosophical creed.

Roscellinus (d. c. 1125) was looked upon by later times as the originator of the sententia vocum, that is to say, of Nominalism proper. From the scanty and See also:

ill-natured notices of his opponents (Anselm and Abelard), we gather that he refused to recognize the reality of anything but the individual; he treated " the universal substance," says Anselm, as no more than ' flatum vocis," a verbal breathing or See also:sound; and in a similar See also:strain he denied any reality to the parts of which a whole, such as a See also:house, is commonly said to be composed. The parts in the one case, the general name or common attributes in the other, are only, he seems to have argued, so many subjective points of view from which we choose to regard that which in its own essence is one and indivisible, existing in its own right apart from any connexion with other individuals. This pure individualism, consistently interpreted, involves the denial of all real relation whatsoever; for things are related and classified by means of their general characteristics. Accordingly, if these general characteristics do not possess reality, things are reduced to a number of characterless and mutually indifferent points. It is possible, as Haureau maintains, that Roscellinus meant no more than to refute the extreme Realism which asserts the substantial and, above all, the independent existence of the universals. Some of the expressions used by Anselm in controverting his position favour this idea. He upbraids Roscellinus, for example, because he was unable to conceive whiteness apart from its existence in something See also:white. But this is precisely an instance of the hypostatization of abstractions in exposing which the chief strength and value of Nominal-ism See also:lie. Cousin is correct in pointing out, from the Realistic point of view, that it is one thing to deny the hypostatization of an accident like See also:colour or See also:wisdom, and another thing to deny the See also:foundation in reality of those " true and legitimate universals " which we understand by the terms genera and species. It is not to be supposed that the full scope of his doctrine was See also:present to the mind of Roscellinus; but Nominalism would hardly have made the sensation it did had its assertions been as See also:innocent as Haureau would make them.

Like most innovators, Roscellinus stated his position in bold language, which emphasized his opposition to accepted doctrines; and his words, if not his intentions, involved the extreme Nominalism which, by making universality merely subjective, pulverizes existence into detached particulars. And, though we may acquit Roscellinus of consciously propounding a theory so subversive of all knowledge, his criticism of the doctrine of the Trinity is See also:

proof at least of the determination with which he was prepared to carry out his individualism. If we are not prepared to say that the three Persons are one thing—in which case the See also:Father and the See also:Holy See also:Ghost must have been incarnate along with the Son—then, did usage permit, he says, we ought to speak of three Gods. This theological See also:deduction from his doctrine See also:drew upon Roscellinus the polemic of his most celebrated opponent, Anselm of See also:Canterbury (1033-11oq). Roscellinus appears at first to have imagined gnselm. that his tritheistic theory had the See also:sanction of See also:Lanfranc and Anselm, and the latter was led in consequence to compose his treatise De fide Trinitatis. From this may be gathered his views on the nature of universals. " How shall he who has not arrived at understanding how several men are in species one man comprehend how in that most mysterious nature several persons, each of which is perfect See also:God, are one God? " The manner in which humanity exists in the individual was soon to be the subject of keen discussion, and to bring to See also:light diverging views within the Realistic See also:camp; but St Anselm does not go into detail on this point, and seems to imply that it is not surrounded by special difficulties. In truth, his Realism was of a somewhat uncritical type. It was simply accepted by him in a broad way as the orthodox philosophic doctrine, and the doctrine which, as a sagacious churchman, he perceived to be most in harmony with Christian theology. Anselm's natural See also:element was theology, and the high metaphysical questions which are as it were the obverse of theology. On the other See also:hand, as the first to formulate the onto-logical argument (in his Proslogion) for the existence of God, he joins hands with some of the profoundest names in modern philosophy.

To Anselm specially belongs the motto Credo lit intelligem, or, as it is School of for nearly two centuries not so much for its dialectics Chartres. and philosophy as for its humanistic culture. The account which John of See also:

Salisbury gives of it in the first See also:half of the 12th century, under the See also:presidency of See also:Theodoric and Bernard, affords a very pleasant glimpse into the history of the middle ages. Since then, says their regretful pupil, " less time and less care have been bestowed on See also:grammar, and persons who profess all arts, liberal and See also:mechanical, are ignorant of the See also:primary art, without which a man proceeds in vain to the rest. For albeit the other studies assist literature, yet this has the See also:sole See also:privilege of making one lettered." 2 Hitherto, if dialectical studies had been sometimes viewed askance by the stricter churchmen, it was not because logic Appt>ca- had dared to stretch forth its hands towards the tion of See also:ark of God, but simply on the ground of the old opposi- logtcto tion between the church and the world. But now theology. bolder See also:spirits arose who did not shrink from applying the distinctions of their human wisdom to the mysteries of theology. It was the excitement caused by their attempt, and the heterodox conclusions which were its first result, that lifted these Scholastic disputations into the central position which they henceforth occupied in the life of the middle ages. The next centuries show that See also:peculiar See also:combination of logic and theology which is the See also:mark of Scholasticism, especially in the period before the 13th century. One of the first of these attacks was made by Berengarius of Tours (999-1088) upon the doctrine of See also:transubstantiation; See also:Berea- he denied the possibility of a change of substance gartns in the See also:bread and See also:wine without some corresponding 350 otherwise expressed in the sub-See also:title of his Proslogion, Fides quaerens sntellectum. He endeavoured to give a philosophical demonstration not only of the existence of God but also of the Trinity and the Incarnation, which were placed by the later Scholastics among the " mysteries." The Christological theory of See also:satisfaction expounded in the Cur See also:Deus Homo falls beyond the scope of the present See also:article. But the Platonically conceived proof of the being of God contained in the Monologion shows that Anselm's doctrine of the universals as substances in things (universalia in re) was closely connected in his mind with the thought of the universalia ante rem, the exemplars of perfect goodness and truth and See also:justice, by participation in which all earthly things are judged to possess these qualities. In this way he rises like Plato to the absolute Goodness, Justice and Truth, and then proceeds in Neoplatonic See also:fashion to a deduction of the Trinity as involved in the idea of the divine Word (see further ANSELM).

Besides its connexion with the speculations of Anselm, the doctrine of Roscellinus was also of decisive influence within the schools hi crystallizing the opposite opinion. "fi°m William of Champeaux (lo70-1s21), who is reputed of cn8m= the founder of a definitely formulated Realism, much pesos. as Roscellinus is regarded as the founder of Nominalism, was instructed by Roscellinus himself in dialectic. Unfortunately none of William's philosophical works have survived, and we depend upon the statements of his opponent Abelard, in the Historia calamitatum mearum, and in certain See also:

manuscripts discovered by Cousin. From these See also:sources it appears that he professed successively two opinions on the nature of the universals, having been dislodged from his first position by the criticism of Abelard, his quondam pupil. There is no obscurity about William's first position. It is a Realism of the most uncompromising type, which by its reduction of individuals to accidents of one identical substance seems to tremble on the very See also:verge of Spinozism. He taught, says Abelard, that the same thing or substance was present in its entirety and essence in each individual, and that individuals differed no whit in their essence but only in the variety of their accidents. Thus " Socratitas " is merely an accident of the substance " humanitas," or, as it is put by the author of the treatise De generibus et speciebus,' " Man is a species, a thing essentially one (res una essentialiter), which receives certain forms which make it See also:Socrates. This thing, remaining essentially the same, receives in the same way other forms which constitute Plato and the other individuals of the species man; and, with the exception of those forms which See also:mould that matter into the individual Socrates, there is nothing in Socrates that is not the same at the same time under the forms of Plato. . . . According to these men, even though rationality did not exist in any individual, its existence in nature would still remain intact " (Cousin, Introduction, &c., p. cxx.).

Criticism was speedily at work upon William of Champeaux's position. He had said expressly that the universal essence, by the addition of the individual forms, was individualized and present secundum totam suam quantitatem in each individual. But if homo is wholly and essentially present in Socrates, then it is, as it were, absorbed in Socrates; where Socrates is not, it cannot be, consequently not in Plato and the other individua hominis. This was called the argument of the homo Socraticus; and it appears to have been with the view of obviating such time and space difficulties, emphasized in the criticism of Abelard, that William latterly modified his form of expression. But his second position is enveloped in considerable obscurity. Abelard says, " Sic autem correxit sententiam, ut deinceps rem eamdem non essentialiter sed individualiter diceret." In other words, he merely sought to avoid the awkward consequences of his own doctrine by substituting " individualiter " for " essentialiter " in his See also:

definition. If we are to put a sense upon this new expression, William may probably have meant to recall any words of his which seemed, by locating the universal in the entirety of its essence in each individual to confer upon the individual an See also:independence which did not belong to it—thus leading in the end to the demand for a separate universal for 1 This treatise, first published by Cousin in his Ouvrages inedits d'Abelard, was attributed by him to Abelard, and he was followed in this opinion by Haureau; but Prantl adduces reasons which seem satisfactory for believing it to be the work of an unknown writer of somewhat later date (see Prantl. Geschichte d. Logik, ii. 143).each individual. In opposition to this Nominalistic view, which implied the reversal of his whole position, William may have meant to say that, instead of the universal being multiplied, it is rather the individuals which are reduced to unity in the universal. The species is essentially one, but it takes on individual varieties or accidents.

If, however, we are more ill-natured, we may regard the phrase, with Prantl, as simply a meaningless makeshift in extremities; and if so, Abelard's account of the subsequent decline of William's reputation would be explained. But there is in some of the manuscripts the various See also:

reading of " indifferenter " for " individualiter," and this is accepted as giving the true sense of the passage by Cousin and Remusat (Haureau and Prantl taking, on different grounds, the opposite view). According to this reading, William sought to rectify his position by asserting, not the numerical identity of the universal in each individual, but rather its sameness in the sense of indistinguishable similarity. Ueberweg cites a passage from his theological works which apparently bears out this view, for William there expressly distinguishes the two senses of the word " same." Peter and See also:Paul, he says, are the same in so far as they are both men, although the humanity of each is, strictly speaking, not identical but similar. In the Persons of the Trinity, on the other hand the relation is one of absolute identity. Whether this view is to be traced to William or not, it is certain that the theory of " ° indifference" or " non-difference " (indifferentia) was a favourite See also:solution in the Realistic schools soon after Theory his time. The inherent difficulties of Realism led to a Theo variety of attempts to reach a more satisfactory formula. John of Salisbury, in his account of the controversies of these days (Metalogicus, ii. 17) reckons up nine different views which were held on the question of the universals, and the list is extended by Prantl (ii. 118) to thirteen. In this list are included of course all shades of opinion, from extreme Nominalism to extreme Realism. The doctrine of indifference as it appears in later writers certainly tends, as Prantl points out, towards Nominalism, inasmuch as it gives up the substantiality of the universals.

The universal consists of the non-different elements or attributes in the separate individuals, which alone exist substantially. If we restrict attention to these non-different elements, the individual becomes for us the species, the genus, &c. ; everything depends on the point of view from which we regard it. " Nihil omnino est praeter individuum, sed et illud aliter et aliter attentum species et genus et generalissimum est." See also:

Adelard of See also:Bath (whose treatise De eodem et diverse must have been written between 1105 and 1117) was probably the author or at all events the elaborator of this doctrine, and he sought by its means to effect a reconciliation between Plato and Aristotle :—" Since that which we see is at once genus and species and individual, Aristotle rightly insisted that the universals do not exist except in the things of sense. But, since those universals, so far as they are called genera and species, cannot be perceived by any one in their purity without the admixture of See also:imagination, Plato maintained that they existed and could be beheld beyond the things of sense, to wit, in the divine mind. Thus these men, although in words they seem opposed, yet held in reality the same opinion." Prantl distinguishes from the system of indifference the " status " doctrine attributed by John of Salisbury to See also:Walter of See also:Mortagne (d. 1174), according to which the universal is essentially See also:united to the individual, which may be looked upon, e.g. as Plato, man, See also:animal, &c., according to the " status " or point of view which we assume. But this seems only a different expression for the same position, and the same may doubtless be said of the theory which employed the outlandish word " maneries" (Fr. maniere) to signify that genera and species represented the different ways in which individuals might be regarded. The See also:con-cessions to Nominalism which such views embody make them representative of what Haureau calls " the Peripatetic See also:section of the Realistic school." Somewhat apart from current controversies stood the teaching of the school of Chartres, humanistically nourished on the study of the ancients, and important as a revival of See also:Platonism in School of opposition to the formalism of the Aristotelians. Bernard School o of Chartres, at the beginning of the 12th century, en- deavoured, according to John of Salisbury, to reconcile Plato and Aristotle; but his doctrine is almost wholly derived from the former through St Augustine and the commentary of Chalcidius. The universalia in re have little See also:place in his thoughts, which are directed by preference to the eternal exemplars as they exist in the super-sensible world of the divine thought. His Megacosmus and Microcosmus are little more, than a poetic See also:gloss upon the Timaeus.

William of Conches, a pupil of Bernard's, devoting himself to psycho-logical and physiological questions, was of less importance for the specific logico-metaphysical problem. But See also:

Gilbert de la Porree, according to Haureau, is the most eminent logician of the Realistic school in the rzth century and the most profound metaphysician of either school. The views which he expressed in his commentary on the pseudo-Boetian treatise, De Trinitate, are certainly much more important than the mediatizing systems already referred to. The most interesting part of the work is the distinction which Gilbert draws between the manner of existence of genera and species and of substances proper. He distinguishes between the quod est and the quo est. Genera and species certainly exist, but they do not exist in their own right as substances. What exists as a substance and the basis of qualities or forms (quod est) may be said substare; the forms on the other hand by which such an individual substance exists qualitatively (quo est) subsistunt, though it cannot be said that they substant. The intellect collects the universal, which exists but not as a substance (est sed non substat), from the particular things which not merely are (sunt) but also, as subjects of accidents, have substantial existence (substant), by considering only their substantial similarity or conformity. The universals are thus forms inherent in things—" native forms," according to the expression by which Gilbert's doctrine is concisely known. The individual consists of an assemblage of such forms; and it is individual because nowhere else is exactly such an assemblage to be met with. The form exists concretely in the individual things (sensibilis in re sensibili), for in sensible things form and matter are always united. But they may be conceived abstractly or non-sensuously by the mind (sed mente concipitur insensibilis), and they then refer themselves as copies to the Ideas their divine exemplars.

In God, who is pure form without matter, the archetypes of material things exist as eternal immaterial forms. In this way Gilbert was at once Aristotelian and Platonist. The distinctions made by him above amount to a formal criticism of categories, and in the same spirit he teaches that no one of the categories can be applied in its literal sense to God (see further GILBERT DE LA PORREE). But the outstanding figure in the controversies of the first half of the r 2th century is Abelard. There is considerable Abelard. difference of.opinion as to his system, some, like See also:

Ritter and See also:Erdmann, regarding it as a moderate form of Realism—a return indeed to the position of Aristotle—while others, like Cousin, Remusat, Haureau and Ueberweg, consider it to be essentially Nominalistic, only more prudently and perhaps less consistently expressed than was the case with Roscellinus. His position is ordinarily designated by the name Conceptualism (q.v.), though there is very little talk of concepts in Abelard's own writings. There can be no doubt, at all events, that Abelard himself intended to find a See also:compromise. As against Realism he maintains consistently Res de re non praedicatur; genera and species, therefore, which are predicated of the individual subject, cannot be treated as things or substances. This is manifestly true, however real the facts may be which are designated by the generic and specific names; and the position is fully accepted, as has been seen, by a Realist like Gilbert, who perhaps adopted it first from Abelard. Abelard also perceived that Realism, by separating the universal substance from the forms which individualize it, makes the universal indifferent to these forms, and leads directly to the doctrine of the identity of all beings in one universal substance or matter—a pantheism which might take either an Averroistic or a Spinozistic form. Against the system of non-difference Abelard has a number of logical and traditional arguments to bring, but it is sufficiently condemned by his fundamental doctrine that only the individual exists in its own right.

For that system still seems to recognize a generic substance as the core of the individual, whereas, according to Cousin's rendering of Abelard's doctrine, " only individuals exist, and in the individual nothing but the individual." Holding fast then on the one hand to the individual as the only true substance, and on the other to the traditional definition of the genus as that which is predicated of a number of individuals (quod praedicatur de pluribus), Abelard declared that this definition of itself condemns the Realistic theory; only a name, not a thing, can be so predicated—not the name, however, as a flatus vocis or a collection of letters, but the name as used in discourse, the name as a sign, as having a meaning—in a word, not vox but sermo. Sermo est praedicabilis. By these distinctions Abelard hoped to See also:

escape the consequences of extreme Nominalism, from which, as a matter of history, his doctrine has been distinguished under the name of Conceptualism, seeing that it See also:lays stress not on the word as such but on the thought which the word is intended to convey. Moreover, Abelard evidently did not mean to imply that the distinctions of generaand species are of arbitrary or merely human See also:imposition. His favourite expression for the universal is " quod de pluribus natum est praedicari " (a translation of Aristotle, De interpretatione, 7), which would seem to point to a real or See also:objective counterpart of the products of our thought; and the traditional See also:definitions of Boetius, whom he frequently quotes, support the same view of the concept as gathered from a number of individuals in virtue of a real resemblance. What Abelard combats is the substantiation of these resembling qualities, which leads to their being regarded as identical in all the separate individuals, and thus paves the way for the gradual undermining of the individual, the only true and indivisible substance. But he modifies his Nominalism so as to approach, though somewhat vaguely, to the position of Aristotle himself. At the same time he has nothing to say against the Platonic theory of universalia ante rem (see See also:IDEALISM). Abelard's discussion of the problem (which it is right to say is on the whole incidental rather than systematic) is thus marked by an See also:eclecticism which was perhaps the source at once of its strength and its weakness. But his brilliant ability and restless activity made him the central figure in the dialectical as in the other discussions of his time. To him was indirectly due, in the main, that troubling of the Realistic See also:waters which resulted in so many modifications of the original thesis; and his own somewhat eclectic ruling on the question in debate came to be tacitly accepted in the schools, as the ardour of the disputants began to abate after the middle of the century. Abelard's application of dialectic to theology betrayed the Nominalistic basis of his doctrine.

He zealously combated the Tritheism of Roscellinus, but his own views on the $ernard of Trinity were condemned by two See also:

councils (at See also:Soissons ciairvsux. in 1121 and at See also:Sens in 1140). Of the alternatives three Gods or una res—which his Nominalistic logic presented to Roscellinus, Roscellinus had chosen the first; Abelard recoiled to the other extreme, reducing the three Persons to three aspects or attributes of the Divine Being (See also:Power, Wisdom and Love). For this he was called to account by Bernard of Clairvaux (1(291-1153), the recognized See also:guardian of orthodoxy in See also:France. Nor can it be said that the See also:instinct of the See also:saint was altogether at See also:fault. The germs of See also:Rationalism were unquestionably present in several of .Abelard's opinions, and still more so, the traditionalists must have thought, in his general attitude towards theological questions. " A doctrine is believed," he said, " not because God has said it, but because we are convinced by reason that it is so." "Doubt is the road to inquiry, and by inquiry we perceive the truth." The application of dialectic.to theology was not new. Anselm had made an elaborate employment of reason in the interest of faith, but the spirit of pious subordination which had marked the demonstrations of Anselm seemed "wanting in the argumentations of this bolder and more restless spirit; and the church, or at least an influential section of it, took alarm at the encroachments of Rationalism. Abelard's remarkable compilation Sic et Non was not calculated to allay their suspicions. In bringing together the conflicting opinions of the fathers on all the chief points of Christian dogmatics, it may be admitted that Abelard's aim was simply to make these contradictions the starting point of an inquiry which should determine in each case the true position and via See also:media of Christian theology. Only such a determination could enable the doctrines to be summarily presented as a system of thought. The book was undoubtedly the precursor of the famous Books of Sentences of Abelard's own pupil Peter Lombard and others, and of all the Summae theologiae with which the church was presently to abound. But the antinomies, as they appeared in Abelard's treatise, without their solutions, could not but seem to insinuate a deep-laid See also:scepticism with regard to authority.

And even the proposal to apply the unaided reason to solve questions which had divided the fathers must have been resented by the more rigid churchmen as the rash intrusion of an over-confident Rationalism. Realism was in the beginning of the 12th century the dominant doctrine and the doctrine of the church; the Nominalists were the innovators and the especial representatives of the Rationalistic tendency. In See also:

order to see the difference in this respect between the schools we have only to compare the peaceful and fortunate life of William of Champeaux (who enjoyed the friendship of St Bernard) with the agitated and persecuted existence of Roscellinus and, in a somewhat less degree, of Abelard. But now the greater boldness of the dialecticians awakened a spirit of general distrust in the exercise of reason on sacred subjects, and we find even a Realist like Gilbert de la Porree arraigned by Bernard and his See also:friends before a general See also:council on a See also:charge of See also:heresy (at Rheims, 1148). Though Gilbert was acquitted, the fact of his being brought to trial illustrates the growing spirit of suspicion. Those heresy-hunts show us the worst side of St Bernard, yet they are in a way just the obverse of his deep mystical piety. The same attitude is maintained by the mystical See also:Hugo of school of St Victor. Hugo of St Victor (1097–1141) st victor declares that " the uncorrupted truth of things cannot a mmests. be discovered by reasoning." The perils of dialectic are manifold, especially in the overbold spirit it engenders. Nevertheless Hugo, by the See also:composition of his Summa sententiarum, endeavoured to give a methodical or rational presentation of the content of faith, and was thus the first of the so-called Summists. See also:Richard of St Victor, See also:prior of the monastery from 1162 to 1173, is still more absorbed in mysticism, and his successor Walter loses his See also:temper altogether in abuse of the dialecticians and the Summists alike. The Sunmists have as much to say against the existence of God as for it, and the dialecticians, having gone to school to the pagans, have forgotten over Aristotle the way of salvation. Abelard, Peter Lombard, Gilbert de la Porree and Peter of See also:Poitiers he calls the " four labyrinths of France." This anger and contempt may have been partly justified by the discreditable state into which the study of logic had fallen.

Dectiae of The speculative impulse was exhausted which marks logic, the end of the 11th and the first half of the 12th century —a period more original and more interesting in many ways than the great age of Scholasticism in the 13th century. By the middle of the century, logical studies had lost to a great extent their real interest and application, and had degenerated into trivial displays of ingenuity. On the other hand, the Summists' occupied themselves merely in the systematizing of authorities. The mystics held aloof from both, and devoted themselves to the See also:

practical work of See also:preaching and edification. The intellect of the age thus no longer exhibited itself as a unity. And it is significant of this that the ablest and most cultured representative of the second half of the century was rather an John of historian of opinion than himself a philosopher or a Salisbury. theologian. John of Salisbury (Johannes Sarisberiensis) was educated in France in the years 1136–1148. The autobiographical account of these years contained in his Metalogicus is of the utmost value as a picture of the schools of the time; it is also one of the historian's chief sources as a See also:record of the many-coloured logical views of the period. John recoiled from the idle See also:casuistry which occupied his own logical contemporaries; and, mindful probably of their aimless ingenuity, he adds the caution that dialectic, valuable and necessary as it is, is " like the See also:sword of See also:Hercules in a pigmy's hand " unless there be added to it the See also:accoutrement of the other sciences. See also:Catholic in spirit rather than dogmatic, John ranks himself at times among the Academics, " since, in those things about which a wise man may doubt, I depart not from their footsteps." It is not fitting to subtilize overmuch, and in the end John of Salisbury's solution is the practical one, his charitable spirit pointing him in particular to that love which is the fulfilling of the See also:law. I Among these may be mentioned See also:Robert Pulleyn (d. 1150), Peter Lombard (d.

1164), called the Magister sententiarum, whose work became the text-book of the schools, and remained so for centuries. Hundreds of commentaries were written upon it. Peter of Poitiers, the pupil of Peter the Lombard, flourished about 116o-1170. Other names are Robert of See also:

Melun, Hugo of See also:Amiens, See also:Stephen See also:Langton and William of Auxerre. More important is Alain de See also:Lille (Alanus de Insulis), who died at an advanced age in 1203. His De arte seu de articulis catholicae fidei is a Summa of Christian theology, but with a greater infusion than usual of philosophical reasoning. Alanus was acquainted with the celebrated See also:Liber de causis. The first period of Scholasticism being thus at an end, there is an See also:interval of nearly half a century without any noteworthy philosophical productions.

End of Article: SCHOLASTICISM

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