CONSTITUTION OF See also:

• ATHENS
• ATHENS ['AN vat, Athenae, modem colloquial Greek `Ath va]

7; Eudemian Ethics, ii. 3), but sometimes only implied (e.g. in Hist. An. i. 17, 497 a 32; iii. 1, 510 a 30; iv. 1, 525 a 9). The different works are more or less connected by a See also:

• SYSTEM

(See See also:

• ROSE
• ROSE (Rosa)
• ROSE, GEORGE (1744-1818)
• ROSE, HUGH JAMES (1795—1838)
• ROSE, WILLIAM STEWART (1775-1843)

He was really, as we have seen, a prolific writer from the time when he was a See also:

• YOUNG
• YOUNG, A
• YOUNG, ARTHUR (1741-1820)
• YOUNG, BRIGHAM (1801-1877)
• YOUNG, CHARLES MAYNE (1777–1856)
• YOUNG, EDWARD (1683–1765)
• YOUNG, JAMES (1811-1883)
• YOUNG, THOMAS (1773-1829)

Moreover, these two works contain further proofs that they were both begun earlier than this date. The Politics (B 1o) mentions as having happened lately (vewfTL) the expedition of Phalaecus to See also:

• CRETE (Gr. Kp;rrrr; Turk. Kirid, Ital. Candia)

No doubt, however, he went on writing and rewriting well into the last period of his life; for example, the recently discovered 'ABrivaiwv 1rohereia mentions on the one hand (c. J4) the archonship of Cephisophon (329–328), on the other hand (c. 46) triremes and quadriremes but without quinqueremes, which first appeared at Athens in 325–324; and as it mentions nothing later it probably received its final touches between 329 and 324. But it may have been begun See also:

• LONG, GEORGE (1800-1879)
• LONG, JOHN DAVIS (1838– )

This is obvious enough in the Metaphysics: it has two openings (Books A and a) ; then comes a nearly consecutive theory of being ( B, E, Z, H, O), but interrupted by a philosophical See also:

• LEXICON

But when it comes to the moral virtues (Book iii. 6), a new See also:

• MOTIVE (from Lat. movere, to move)

As he might write, so might he think differently in his long career. To put one extreme See also:

• CASE
• CASE, JOHN (d. 1600)

Or, extending himself as it were still more, he might write two drafts, or double versions of his own, on the same subject; e.g. Physics, vii. and De Anima, ii. Or he might, going still further, in his long See also:

• LITERARY

See also:

• PRINTING (from Lat. imprimere, O. Fr. empreindre)

Beginning then with his early writings, which are now lost, the dialogues On See also:

• POETRY

He had, like all the great, many enemies, See also:

• PERSONAL

ILKpoaTekobs Tian Xbywv). But ancient letters are proverbially forgeries, and in the three See also:

• HUNDRED

They are not See also:

• MERE
• MERE, ADALBERT (1838-1909)

2; See also:

• QUINTILIAN [MARCUS FABIUS QUINTILIANUS] (C. A.D. 35-95)

He left others imperfectly arranged, and some of the most important, the Metaphysics, the Politics and the logical writings. Of the imperfect arrangement of the Metaphysics we have already spoken; and we shall speak of that of his logical writings when we come to the order of his whole system. At See also:

• PRESENT

7) ascribed to See also:

• DIDYMUS (?3o9-?394)

On the contrary, Theophrastus and Eudemus, his immediate followers, both wrote works presupposing Aristotle's Metaphysics and his logical works, and See also:

• DICAEARCHUS

By these See also:

• DIFFERENCES, CALCULUS OF (Theory of Finite Differences)

Secondary substances so called are the See also:

• SPECIES

The doctrine that all things are substances which are separate individuals, stated in the Categories, is See also:

• EXPANDED

In brief then the common ground of the Categories and the Meta-physics is the fundamental position that all things are substances having belonging to them universals and attributes, which have no separate being as Plato falsely supposed. This essential agreement suffices to show that the Categories and the Metaphysics are the result of one mind. Nevertheless, there is a deep difference between them in detail, which may be expressed by saying that the Categories is nearer to Platonism. We have seen how anxious Aristotle was to be considered one of the Platonists, how reluctant he was to depart from Plato's hypothesis of forms, and how, in denying the separability, he retained the Platonic belief in the reality and even in the unity of the universal. We have now to see that, in writing the Categories, on the one hand he carried his differences from his master further than he had done in his early criticisms by insisting that individual substances are not only real, but are the very things which sustain the universal; but on the other hand, he clung to further See also:

• RELICS (Lat, reliquiae, the equivalent of the English " remains " in the sense of a dead body)

The hypothesis of inherence gives an inadequate account of the dependence of an attribute on a sub-stance, and is a kind of See also:

• HALF

It is evident that in the category of substance, as Aristotle perceived, substance is predicate of substance, e.g. Socrates (oivvia) is a man (oisia), and an animal (dials). The question then arises, what sort of substance can be predicate; and in the Categories Aristotle gave an answer, which would have been impossible, if he had not, under Plato's influence, accepted both the unity and the substantiality of the universal. What he said in consequence was that the substance in the predicate is not an individual substance, e.g. this man or this animal, because such a primary substance is not a predicate; but that the species man or the genus animal is the substance which is the predicate of Socrates the subject (Cat. 5, 3 a 36 seq.). Finding then that substances are real predicates, and supposing that in that case they must be species or genera, he could not avoid the conclusion that some substances are species or genera, which were therefore called by him " secondary substances," and by his Latin followers substantiae universales. It is true that this conclusion gave him some misgivings, because he recognized that it is a characteristic of a substance to signify an individual (e6Se TO, which a species or a genus does not signify (ib. 5, 3 b 10-21) Nevertheless, in the Categories, he did not venture to deny that in the category of substance a universal species (e.g. man), or genus (e.g. animal), is itself a substance. On the other hand, in the Metaphysics (Z 13), he distinctly denies that any universal can be a substance, on the ground that a substance is a subject, whereas a universal is a predicate and a belonging of a subject, from which it follows as he says that no universal is a substance, and no substance universal. Here again the Categories forms a kind of transition from Platonism to the Metaphysics which is the See also:

• REVERSE

There are difficulties no doubt in See also:

• DRAWING

The De Interpretatione: Another example of Aristotle's gradual See also:

• DESERTION

How then did Aristotle get further in the logical analysis of the proposition? Not in the De Interpretatione, but in the Prior Analytics. The first adumbration was forced upon him in the former work by his theory of opposition; the complete appearance in the latter work by his theory of syllogism. In analysing the syllogism, he first says that a premiss is an affirmative or negative sentence, and then that a See also:

• TERM

It is nearer to Plato's analysis of the sentence, and no logician would have gone back to it, after the Prior Analytics. It is not spurious, as some have supposed, nor later than the De Anima, as Zeller thought, but Aristotle in an earlier See also:

• FRAME

Above all, we must consider our present point that Platonic influence is a sign of earliness in an Aristotelian work; and generally, the same man may both think and write differently at different times, especially if, like Aristotle, he has been a prolific author. These considerations make it probable that the author of all three treatises was Aristotle himself; while the analysis of the treatises favours the hypothesis that he wrote the Eudemian Ethics and the Magna Moralia more or less together as the rudimentary first drafts of the mature Nicomachean Ethics. As the Platonic philosophy was primarily moral, and its meta-physics a theory of the moral order of the universe, Aristotle from the first must have mastered the Platonic ethics. At first he adopted the somewhat ascetic views of his master about soul and body, and about goods of-body and See also:

• ESTATE (through O. Fr. estat, mod. flat, from Lat. status, state, condition, position, stare, to stand)

Aristotle was opposed to Speusippus, and See also:

• NEP

Pleasure is a psychical state, and is not a generation in the body supplying a defect and establishing a natural condition, but an activity of a natural condition of the soul. It should be specially noted that this doctrine like the rest is common to the three treatises: in Book vii. of the Nicomachean, which is Z of the Eudemian, pleasure is defined as E,4pyeta rijs Kara 4duty EE€ws avE127rb&wTOS (chap. 12, 1153 a 14-15); and in the Magna Moralia as i) Kivnai.s afrou Kai of Evipyaaa (ii. 7, 1204 b 28; cf. 1205 b 20-28). It is See also:

• PLAIN (O. Fr. plain, from Lat. plenum)

As then we find this identification of pleasure with activity in the Metaphysics and in the De Anima, as well as in the Nicomachean Ethics, the Eudemian Ethics and the Magna Moralia, the only logical conclusion, from which there is no See also:

• ESCAPE (in mid. Eng. eschape or escape, from the O. Fr. eschapper, modern echapper, and escaper, low Lat. escapium, from ex, out of, and cappa, cape, cloak; cf. for the sense development the Gr. iichueoOat, literally to put off one's clothes, hence to sli

17is Aristotle's, and the distinction not Aristotle's. Moreover, the distinction between activity and pleasure in the tenth book is really fatal to the consistency of the whole Nicomachean Ethics, which started in the first book with the identification of happiness and virtuous activity. For if the pleasure of virtuous activity is a supervening end beyond the activity, it becomes a supervening end beyond the happiness of virtuous activity, which thus ceases to be the final end. Nevertheless, the distinction between activity and pleasure is true. Some unknown Peripatetic detected a flaw in the Nicomachean Ethics when he said that pleasure is a supervening end beyond activity, and, if he had gone on to add that happiness is also a supervening end beyond the virtuous activities which are necessary to produce it, he would have destroyed the foundation of his own founder's Ethics. It is further remarkable that the Nicomachean Ethics proceeds to a different conclusion. After the intrusion of this second discourse on pleasure, it goes on (E.N. x. 6-fin.) to the famous theory that the highest happiness is the speculative life of intellect or wisdom as divine, but that happiness as human also includes the practical life of combining prudence and moral virtue; and that, while both lives need external goods as necessaries, the practical life also requires them as See also:

• INSTRUMENTS

Gentlemanliness it regards as perfect virtue, containing all particular virtues, and all goods for the See also:

• SAKE

Thereupon it proceeds to a discourse on friendship, which in the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics is discussed in an earlier position, but breaks off unfinished. On the whole, the three moral treatises proceed on very similar lines down to the common identification of pleasure with activity, and then diverge. From this point the Eudemian Ethics and the Magna Moralia become more like one another than like the Nicomachean Ethics. They also become less like one another than before: for the treatment of good fortune, gentlemanliness, and their limit is more theological in the Eudemian Ethics than in the Magna Moralia. How are the resemblances and differences of the three to be explained? By Aristotle's gradual method of composition. All three are great works, contributing to the origin of the independent science of Ethics. But the Eudemian Ethics and the Magna Moralia are more rudimentary than the Nicomachean Ethics, which as it were seems to absorb them except in the conclusion. They are, in short, neither independent works, nor mere commentaries, but Aristotle's first drafts of his Ethics. In the Ethics to Eudemus, as Porphyry properly called the Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle in the first four books successively investigates happiness, virtue, the voluntary and the particular moral virtues, in the same order and in the same See also:

• LETTER (through Fr. lettre from Lat. littera or litera, letter of the alphabet; the origin of the Latin word is obscure; it has probably no connexion with the root of linere, to smear, i.e. with wax, for an inscription with a stilus)

On the other hand, nobody would have gone back afterwards on his masterly treatment of happiness, in the first book, or of virtue in the second, or of the voluntary in the third, or of the particular virtues in the third and See also:

• FOURTH

8) : then it is intruded into the diagram of moral virtues as a mean between villainy (iravoupyia) and simplicity (EUi OEia) (E.E. B 33, 1221 a 12) : finally, a distinction between virtue by nature and virtue with prudence (µEra povioews) is promised (E.E. T 7, 1234 a 4). In addition to all this confusion of speculative and practical knowledge, prudence is absent when it ought to be present; e.g. from the division of virtues into moral and intellectual (E.E. B 1, 1220 a 4-13), and from the definition of moral virtue (ib. 5, 1o); while, in a passage (B 11) anticipating the subsequent discussion of the relation between prudence and moral virtue (E.E. E=E.N. vi. 12-13), it is stated that in purpose the end is made right by moral virtue, the means by another See also:

• POWER [WILLIAM GRATTAN] TYRONE (1797-1841)

Indeed, the final proof that the Eudemian Ethics is earlier than the Nicomachean is the very fact that it is more under Platonic influence. In the first place, the reason why the account of prudence begins by confusing the speculative with the practical is that the Eudemian Zthics starts from Plato's Philebus, where, without differentiating speculative and practical knowledge, Plato asks how far good is prudence (cp6snols), how far pleasure (h'ovn) ; and in the Eudemian Ethics Aristotle asks the same question, adding virtue (aperit) in order to correct the Socratic confusion of virtue with prudence. Secondly, the Eudemian Ethics, while not agreeing with Plato's See also:

• REPUBLIC (Lat. respublica, a commonweal or common-wealth)

But gentlemanliness is no longer called perfect virtue, as in the Eudemian Ethics: its place has been taken by justice, which is perfect virtue to one's See also:

• NEIGHBOUR (O. Eng. neahgebiir, from Walt, " nigh," " near ")

= E.E. A–Z). In dealing with justice, it does not make it clear, as the Nicomachean Ethics (Book v.) does, that even universal justice is virtue towards another (M.M. i. 34, 1193 b 1-15), and it omits altogether the division into distributive and corrective justice. In dealing with what the Nicomachean Ethics (Book vi.) calls intellectual virtues, but the Magna Moralia (i. 5, 35) virtues of the rational part of the soul, and right reason, it distinguishes (i.35, 1196 b 34-36) science, prudence, intelligence, wisdom, See also:

• APPREHENSION (Lat. ad, to; prehendere, to seize)

5, 1185 b 8-12), and afterwards arguing that prudence is a virtue, precisely because it is praised (i. 35, 1197 a 16-18). In dealing with continence and incontinence, the same doubts and solutions occur as in the Nicomachean Ethics (Book vii. =E.E. Z), but sometimes confusing doubts and solutions together, instead of first proposing all the doubts and then supplying the solutions as in the Nicomachean Ethics. Such rudimentary and imperfect sketches would be quite excusable in a first draft, but inexcusable and incredible after the Nicomachean Ethics had been written. It has another characteristic which points to its being an early work of Aristotle, when he was still under the influence of Plato's style; namely its approximation to dialogue. It asks direct questions (e.g. Sid Ti'; M.M. i. i repeatedly, 12; ii. 6, 7), incorporates direct statements of others (e.g. See also:

• KNOT
• KNOT (O.E. cnotta, from a Teutonic stem knutt; cf. " knit," and Ger. knoten)

34), and introduces conversations between the author and others, expressed interrogatively, indicatively and even imperatively(&XX' EpsC got, ra srola aian'arko-op 6yistvit kris; i. 35, 1196 b lo; cf. ii. 1o, 1208 a 20-22). The whole treatise inclines to run into dialogue. It is also Platonic, like the Endemian Ethics, in making little of external goods in the account of good fortune (ii. 8), and in emphasizing the perfect virtue of gentlemanliness (ii. 9). Indeed, in some respects it is more like the Eudemian, though in the main more like the Nicomachean Ethics. In the first book, it has the Eudemian distinction between prudence, virtue and pleasure (i. 3, 1184 b 5-6) ; but does not make so much of it as the distinction between prudence and wisdom blurred in the Eudemian but defined in the Nicomachean Ethics. In the second book, it runs parallel to the Eudemian Ethics in placing good fortune and See also:

• GENTLE (through the Fr. gentil, from Lat. gentilis, belonging to the same gens, or family)

Because, then, the Magna Moralia is very like the Nicomachean Ethics, but more rudimentary, nearer to the Platonic dialogues in style and, to a less degree in matter, and also like the Eudemian Ethics, we conclude that it is also like that treatise in having been written as an earlier draft of the Nicomachean Ethics by Aristotle himself. The hypothesis that the Eudemian Ethics, and by consequence the Magna Moralia, are later than Aristotle has arisen from a See also:

• SIMPLE

Books o–Z), and have concluded that Eudemus wrote these common books. But we have seen that Aristotle wrote the first three books of the Eudemian as an earlier draft of the Nicomachean Ethics; so that, even so far hs they form a better introduction, this will not prove the common books to be by Eudemus. Again, those first three books are a better introduction only in details; whereas in regard to the all-important subject of prudence as distinct from wisdom, they are so bad an introduction that the common book which discusses that subject at large (E.N. Book vi. =E.E. Book E) must be rather founded on the first four books of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Further, as Aristotle wrote both the first three Eudemian and the first four Nicomachean books, there is no reason why sometimes one, sometimes the other, should not be the best introduction to the common books by the same author. Finally, the common books are so integral a part of the Aristotelian system of philosophy that they cannot be disengaged from it: the book on justice (E.N. v.) quotes and is quoted in the Politics (cf. 1130 b 28, 128o a 16, 1261 a 30) ; the book on intellectual virtues (E.N. vi.) quotes (vi. 3) the Posterior Analytics, i. 2, and is quoted in the Metaphysics (A I); and we have seen that the book (E.N. vii.) which defines pleasure as activity is simply stating an Aristotelian commonplace. Thirdly, in order to prove that the Eudemian Ethics was by Eudemus, it is said that in its first part it contemplates that there must be a limit (6pos) for virtue as a mean (E.E.

B 5, 1222 b 7-8), in its middle part it criticizes the Nicomachean Ethics for not being clear about this limit (E.E. E 1), and in the end it alone assigns this limit, in the service and contemplation of God (E.E H 15, 1249 b 16 seq.). This argument is subtle, but over-subtle. The Eudemian and the Nicomachean treatments of this subject do not really differ. In the Nicomachean as in the Eudemian Ethics the limit above moral virtue is right reason, or prudence, which is right reason on such matters; and above prudence wisdom, for which prudence gives its orders; while wisdom is the intelligence and science of the most See also:

• VENERABLE (Lat. venerabilis, worthy of reverence, venerari, to reverence, to worship, allied to Venus, love; the Indo-Germ. root is wen-, to desire, whence Eng. " win, properly to struggle for, hence to gain)

Surely, the harmony of these three moral gospels proves that Aristotle wrote them, and wrote the Eudemian Ethics and the Magna Moralia as preludes to the Nicomachean Ethics. When did he begin? We do not know; but there is a pathetic suggestiveness in a passage in the Magna Moralia (i. 35), where he says, "See also:

• CLEVER

2) is as follows :—" There are three genera of political speeches; one deliberative, one declamatory, one forensic: their species are seven; hortative, dissuasive, laudatory, vituperative, accusatory, defensive, See also:

• CRITICAL (in alphabetical order of authors)

OUK aywvOS axx' ErrtbeiEews iveKa 1440 b 13); and, if the terms for it are not always the same, this is just what one would expect in a new discovery. Moreover, he could recognize seven species in the Rhetoric to Alexander, though he recognized only six in the Rhetoric, provided the two works were not written at the same time; and as a matter of fact even in the Rhetoric to Alexander the seventh or critical species (iEeTavriK6v) is in process of disappearing (cf. chap. 37). As then Anaximenes did not, but Aristotle did, recognize three genera, and as Aristotle could as well as Anaximenes recognize seven species, the evidence is overwhelming that the Rhetoric to Alexander is the work not of Anaximenes, but of Aristotle; on the condition that its date is not that of Aristotle's confessedly genuine Rhetoric. There is a second and even stronger evidence that the Rhetoric to Alexander is a genuine work of Aristotle. It divides (chap. 8) evidences (rim-etc) into two kinds (I) evidence from arguments, actions and men (al pip 4 avr&,v r%ov Xiycov Kai Twv 7rp6. ewv Kai See also:

• ROW, JOHN (c. 1525—1580)

The point of Aristotle was to draw a See also:

• LINE

If he did, then the Rhetoric to Alexander in 340 was at least four years prior to the Rhetoric, which was as late as 336. If he did not, the question still remains, what is the See also:

• INTERNAL

Induction (hraywyit) and syllogism (ciAXcymvµ6s), the general forms of inference, do not occur in the Rhetoric to Alexander. In fact, this interesting treatise contains a rudimentary treatment of rational evidences in rhetoric and is therefore earlier than the Rhetoric, which exhibits a developed analysis of these rational evidences as See also:

• SPECIAL

5. Poetics and Rhetoric. 6. Metaphysics (unfinished). But Zeller does not give enough See also:

• WEIGHT

8, 191 b 29), and therefore ought to be regarded as antecedent. Zeller tries to get over this difficulty of cross-reference by detaching Meta-physics, Book 0, from the rest and placing it before the Physics. But this violent and arbitrary remedy is only partial. The truth is that the Metaphysics both precedes and follows the Physics, because it had been all along occupying Aristotle ever since he began to differ from Plato's metaphysical views and indeed forms a kind of presupposed basis of his whole system. So generally, the references backwards and forwards, and the cross-references, are really evidences that Aristotle mainly wrote his works not successively but simultaneously, and entered references as and when he pleased, because he had not published them. There are two kinds of quotations in Aristotle's extant works, the See also:

• QUOTATION

Lastly, when he is silent about a historical fact, the argument from silence is evidence only when he could not have failed to mention it; as, for example, in the Constitution of Athens, when he could not have failed to mention quinqueremes and other facts after 325-324. But this is in a historical work; whereas the argument from silence about historical facts in a philosophical work can seldom apply. The chronological order therefore is not sufficiently detailed to be the real order of Aristotelian writings. Secondly, the traditional order, which for nearly 2000 years has descended from the edition of Andronicus to the Berlin edition, is satisfactory in details, but which are universal; the De Interpretatione earlier than the Analytics, because in it the Platonic analysis of the sentence into noun and verb is retained for the proposition; the Eudemian Ethics and the Magna Moralia earlier than the Nicomachean Ethics, because they are rudimentary sketches of it, and the one written rather in the theological spirit, the other rather in the dialectical style, of Plato; and the Rhetoric to Alexander earlier than the Rhetoric, because it contains a rudimentary theory of the rational evidences afterwards developed into a logic of rhetoric in the Rhetoric and Analytics. It is tempting to think that we can carry out the chronological order of the philosophical writings in detail. But in the gradual process of composition, by which a work once begun was kept going with the rest, although a work such as the Politics (begun in 357) was begun early, and some works more rudimentary came earlier than others, the general body of writings was so kept together in Aristotle's library, and so simultaneously elaborated and consolidated into a system that it soon becomes impossible to put one before another. Zeller, indeed, has attempted an exact order of See also:

• SUCCESSION (Lat. successio, from succedere, to follow after)

It gives too much weight to Aristotle's logic, and too little to his metaphysics, on account of two prejudices of the commentators which led them to place both logic and physics before metaphysics. Aristotle rightly used all the sciences of his day, and especially his own physics, as a basis of his metaphysics. For example, at the very outset he refers to the Physics (ii. 2) for his use of the four causes, material, efficient, formal and final, in the Meta-physics (A 2). This and other applications of the science of nature to the science of all being induced the commentators to adopt this order, and entitle the science of being the Sequel to the Physics (rd µsra rd 4ucww&). But Aristotle knew nothing of this title, the first known use of which was by Nicolaus Damascenus, a younger contemporary of Andronicus, the editor of the Aristotelian writings, and Andronicus was probably the originator of the title, and of the order. On the other hand, Aristotle entitles the science of all being " Primary Philosophy " (rp~rn 4eXoeo4'La), and the science of See also:

• PHYSICAL

Acting on this hint, not Aristotle but the Peripatetics inferred that all logic is an See also:

• INSTRUMENT (Lat. instrumentum, from insincere, to build up, furnish, arrange, prepare)

The traditional order of the Aristotelian writings, still continued in the Berlin edition, beginning with the logical writings on page 1, proceeding to the physical writings on page 184, and postponing the Metaphysics to page 98o, is not the real order of Aristotle's philosophy. The real order of Aristotle's philosophy is that of Aristotle's mind, revealed in his writings, and by the general view of thinking, science, philosophy and all learning therein contained. He classified thinking (Met. E t) and science (Topics, vi. 6) by the three operations of See also:

• SPECULATION

H. Practical or Political Philosophy, or philosophy of things human (cf. E.N. x. 9-fin.): about human good; sub-divided (E.N. vi. 8, cf. E.E. A 8, 1218 b 13) into:- i. Ethics, about the good of the individual. ii. Economics, about the good of the See also:

• FAMILY

Productive, or Art (TEXvn) : about works produced; sub-divided (Met. A. 1, 981 b 17-20) into: i. Necessary (7rposTavay,taia), e.g. See also:

• MEDICINE

E 2), and would in the classification include not only metaphysics and mathematics, but also physics, ethics, economics, politics, necessary and fine art; or in short all speculative, practical and productive thinking of a systematic kind. Hence the Posterior Analytics, which is Aristotle's authoritative logic of science, is of See also:

• PECULIAR

Pr. An. i. 30); and this may be natural history, preparatory to natural philosophy, as in the History of Animals preparatory to the De Partibus Animalium, or what we call civil history, preparatory to political philosophy, as in the 158 Constitutions more or less preparatory to the Politics_ Wide as is all his knowledge of facts and causes, it does not appear to Aristotle to be the whole of learning and the show of it. Beyond knowledge lies opinion, beyond discovery disputation, beyond philosophy and science dialectic between man and man, which was much practised by the Greeks in the dialogues of Socrates, Plato, the Megarians and Aristotle himself in his early manhood. With Plato, who thought that the interrogation of man is the best instrument of truth, dialectic was exaggerated into a universal science of everything that is. Aristotle, on the other hand, learnt to distinguish dialectic (&aX ,<rud) from science (brLVrilpi); in that it has no definite subject, else it would not ask questions (Post. An. i. 11, 77 a 31-33); in that for appropriate principles it substitutes the probabilities of authority (rd EvboEa) which are the opinions of all, or of the majority, or of the See also:

• WISE, HENRY ALEXANDER (1806-1876)
• WISE, ISAAC MAYER (1819-1900)

Moreover, he compared dialectic and sophistry, on account of their generality, with primary philosophy in the Metaphysics (I' 2, 1004 b 17-26); to the effect that all three concern themselves with all things, but that about everything metaphysics is scientific, dialectic tentative, sophistry apparent, not real. He means that a sophist like Protagoras will teach superficially anything as wisdom for See also:

• MONEY

But what has become of Logic, with which the traditional order of Andronicus begins Aristotle's works (1-148 b 8)? So far from coming first, Logic comes nowhere in his classification of science. Aristotle was the founder of Logic; because, though others, and especially Plato, had made occasional remarks about reason (Xlyos); Aristotle kids the first to conceive it as a definite subject of investigation. As he says at the end of the Sophistical Elenchi on the syllogism, he had no predecessor, but took pains and laboured a long time in investigating it. Nobody, not even Plato, had discovered that the process of deduction is a combination of premisses (av)Xoyurphs) to produce a new conclusion. Aristotle, who made this great discovery, must have had greatdifficulty in developing the new investigation of reasoning processes out of dialectic, rhetoric, poetics, grammar, metaphysics, mathematics, physics and ethics; and in disengaging it from other kinds of learning. He got so far as gradually to write short discourses and long treatises, which we, not he, now arrange in the order of the Categories or names; the De Interpretatione on propositions; the Analytics, Prior on syllogism, Posterior on scientific syllogism; the Topics on dialectical syllogism; the Sophistici Elenchi on eristical or sophistical syllogism; and, except that he had hardly a logic of induction, he covered the ground. But after all this original See also:

• RESEARCH (O. Fr. recerche, from recercher, re- and cercer, mod. chercher, to search; Late Lat. circare, to go round in a circle, to explore)

But he never called any of these a division of all logic. Thirdly, he had no one name for logic. In the Posterior Analytics (i. 22, 84 a 7-8) he distinguishes two modes of investigation, analytically (avaXvrua,us) and logically (Jio-ytiLs). But " See also:

• ANALYTICAL

Is logic, then, according to him, not science but dialectic ? The word logic-ally (XoyLKws) means the same as dialectically (&aXeKrucc ,). But the general discussion of opinions, signified by both words, is only a subordinate part of Aristotle's profound investigation of the whole process of reasoning. The Analytics, the most important part, so far from being dialectic or logic in that narrow sense, is called by him not logic but analytic science (&vaILVTLK') E7rLQrn)PI), Rhet. i.4, 1359 b ro; cf, 1356 b 9, 1357 a 30, b 25) ; and in the Metaphysics he evidently refers to it as " the science which considers demonstration and science," which he distinguishes from the three speculative sciences, mathematics, physics and primary philosophy (Met. K 1, 1059 b 9-21). The Analytics then, which from the beginning claims to See also:

• DEAL

But about the Topics we may venture to make the See also:

• SUGGESTION

The Rhetoric is declared by him to be partly dialectic. The Topics is at least an investigation of dialectic, which has had an immense influence on the method of argument. The Magna Moralia almost runs into dialogue. Besides, all the extant works, though apparently didactic, are full of dialectical matter in the way of opinions (Xeyopeva), difficulties and doubts (aaopiaara, aaoplat), solutions (Xegas), and of dialectical style in the way of conversational expressions. It is probable also that the " extraneous discourses " (oi ESLarepiKOi Xiyot) sometimes mentioned in them here mean dialectical discussions of a subject from opinions extraneous to its nature, as opposed to scientific deduction from its appropriate principles. From the eight passages, which refer to the extraneous discourses, we find (I) that Platonic forms were made by them matters of common talk (reOptXiraL, Met. M I, so 76 a 28) ; (2) that time was made by them matter of doubts, which in this case are Aristotle's own doubts (Phys. iv. so, 217 b 31-218 a 30) ; (3) that the discussions of Platonic forms in them and in philosophical discourses were different (E.E. i. 8, 1217 b 22) ; (4) that the ordinary distinction between goods of mind, body and estate is one which we make (&aLpo(peea) in them (E.E. ii. 1, 1218 b 34) ; (5) that in them appeared the division of soul into irrational and rational, used by Aristotle (E.N. i. 13, 1102 a 26), and attributed to Plato; (6) that the distinction between action and production accepted by Aristotle appeared in them (E.N. vi. 4, 1140 a 3) ; (7) that a distinction between certain kinds of See also:

• RULE

1'6, 1278 b 31) ; (8) that a discussion about the best life, used by Aristotle, was made in them (Pol. H 1, 1323 a 22). On the whole, the interpretation which best suits all the pas-sages is that extraneous discourses mean any extra-scientific dialectical discussions, oral or written, occurring in dialogues by Plato, or by Aristotle, or by anybody else, or in ordinary conversation, on any subject under the sun. Among all the eight passages mentioned above, the most valuable is that from the Eudemian Ethics (A 8), which discriminates extraneous discourses and philosophical (Kai is rois tfLOrepLKOLT Xbyoii Kai iv roil Kara 4 Xooc4tav, 1217 b 22-23) ; and it is preceded (A 6, 1216 b 35-37 a 17), by a similar distinction between See also:

• FOREIGN

He says that Aristotle (I) divided his commentationes and arts taught to his pupils into F COTEpLKa. and hKpOaTLKh; (2) taught the latter in the See also:

• MORNING

We shall begin therefore with that primary philosophy which is the real basis of his philosophy, and proceed in the order of his classification of science to give his See also:

• CHIEF (from Fr. chef, head, Lat. caput)

Such is Aristotle's realism of individuals and universals, contained in his primary philosophy, as expressed in the Metaphysics, especially in Book Z, his authoritative pronouncement on being and substance. The individual substances, of which the universe is composed, fall into three great irreducible kinds: nature, God, man. I. Nature.—The obvious substances are natural substances or bodies (0o-See also:

• WALL (O. Eng. weal, weall, Mid. Eng. wal, wane, adapted from Lat. vallum, rampart; the original O. Eng. word for a wall was wag or tenth)
• WALL, RICHARD (1694-1778)

God.—Nature is but one kind of being (hi yap TL yisos See also:

• ROLL (O. Fr. rolle, roulle, mod. role, Lat. rotulus, dim. of rota, wheel)
• ROLL, ALFRED PHILIPPE (1846– )

While nature aims at Him as See also:

• DESIGN (Fr. desiin, drawing; Lat. designare, to mark out)

This intellectual discovery requires sensation and retention of sensation; so that sense (a o-Ogcres) receives impressions, See also:

• IMAGINATION

So can we men, not, as Plato thought, by having in our souls universal principles innate but forgotten, but by acquiring universal principles from sense, which is the origin of knowledge, arrive at judgments which are true, and true because they agree with the things which we know by sense, by inference and by science. Such is Aristotle's psychological and logical realism, contained in the De Anima and logical treatises. 2. Practice (zrp&fLs).—In this natural world of real substances, human good is not an imitation of a supernatural universal form of the good, but is human happiness; and this good is the same both of the Individual as a part and of the state as a whole. Ethics then is a kind of Politics. But in Ethics a man's individual good is his own happiness; and his happiness is no mere state, but an activity of soul according to virtue in a mature life, requiring as conditions moderate bodily and external goods of fortune; his virtue is (1) moral virtue, which is acquired by habituation, and is a purposive habit of per-forming actions in the mean determined by right reason or prudence; requiring him, not to exclude, but to moderate his desires; and (2) intellectual virtue, which is either prudence of practical, or wisdom of speculative intellect; and his happiness is a kind of ascending scale of virtuous activities, in which moral virtue is limited by prudence, and prudence by wisdom; so that the speculative life of wisdom is the happiest and most divine, and the practical life of prudence and moral virtue secondary and human. Good fortune in moderation is also required as a condition of his happiness. Must we then, on ac-See also:

• COUNT (Lat. comes, gen. comitis, Fr. comte, Ital. conte, Span. conde)

To turn from Ethics to Politics, the good of the individual on a small scale becomes on a large scale the good of the See also:

• CITIZEN (a form corrupted in Eng., apparently by analogy with " denizen," from O. Fr. citeain, mod. Fr. citoyen)

Such is Aristotle's practical philosophy, contained in his matured Nicomachean Ethics, and his unfinished Politics. 3. Production (roinaLs).—Production differs from practice in being an activity (evlpyeca; e.g. See also:

• BUILDING

Finally, art is not morality, because its end is always a work of art, not virtuous action: on the other hand, art is subordinate to morality, because all the ends of art are but means to the end of life, and there-fore a work of art which offends against morality is ovposed to the happiness and the good of man. Such is Aristotle s productive science or art, contained in his Rhetoric and Poetics, compared with his Ethics and Politics. Aristotle, even in this sketch of his system, shows himself to be the philosopher of facts, who can best of all men See also:

• BEAR
• BEAR, BLACK
• BEAR, BROWN
• BEAR, GRIZZLY
• BEAR, ISABELLINE
• BEAR, WHITE

Consequently, the universal essence of a species of substances is not one and the same eternal essence in all the individuals of a species but only similar, and is not substance as Aristotle calls it in the Metaphysics, inconsistently with his own doctrine• of substance, but is a whole number of similar substances, e.g. all rational animals which are what all men are. Hence again, the natural world of species and essences is not eternal, but only endures as long as there are individual substances. Hence, moreover, a natural substance or body as an efficient cause or force causes an effect on another, not by propagating one eternal essence of a species into the matter of the other, but so far as we really understand force, by their reciprocally preventing one another from occupying the same place at the same moment on account of the mutual resistance of any two bodies. The essence of a natural substance, e.g. wood, is not immateriate, but is the whole body as what it is. The matter of a natural substance is not a primary matter which is one indeterminate substratum of all natural substances, but is only one body as able to be changed by a force which is another substance able to change it, e.g. a See also:

• SEED (from the root seen in Lat. serere, to sow)

It is not always a true apprehension of essence, but often, especially in physical matter, such as See also:

• SOUND
• SOUND, THE (Danish Oresund)

Or are they, as modern Idealism says, mind and states of mind? Or are they really substances separate from, though related to, myself, who am also a substance? The Aristotelian answer is —" Yes, all things are substances, but not all supernatural, nor all mental; for some are natural substances, or bodies "; and by that answer Aristotelianism stands or falls. In See also:

• ENGLAND
• ENGLAND, THE CHURCH OF

E. See also:

• SANDYS, FREDERICK (1832-1904)
• SANDYS, GEORGE (1578-1644)
• SANDYS, SIR EDWIN (1561-1629)

See also:

• NEWMAN, FRANCIS WILLIAM (1805-1897)
• NEWMAN, JOHN HENRY (1801-1890)