See also:

• TILE (0. Eng. tigel, Fr. tuile, connected with Lat. tegula)

All met with success, thanks to See also:

• MASSENA, ANDRE, or ANDREA

Operations, however, did not after all take either of these forms. The younger Robespierre perished with his See also:

• BROTHER

After a brief See also:

• TENURE (Fr. tenure, from Lat. tenere, to hold)

He calculated that once the French advanced the Austrians would seek to See also:

• COVER (from the Fr. convert, from couvrir, to cover, Lat. cooperire)

Meanwhile the See also:

• MENTOR

Napoleon's first task was far more difficult than the See also:

• WRITING
• WRITING (the verbal noun of " to write," O. Eng. writan, to inscribe)

There you will find honour, glory and riches. Soldiers of Italy, will you be wanting in courage ? " Such words go far, and little as he was able to supply material deficiencies—all he could do was to expel rascally contractors, sell a captured See also:

• PRIVATEER

The delay due to this, as a See also:

• MATTER

The wings were therefore so far connected that Colli wrote to Beaulieu on this See also:

• DAY (O. Eng. dreg, Ger. Tag; according to the New English Dictionary, " in no way related to the Lat. dies")
• DAY, JOHN (1574-1640?)
• DAY, THOMAS (1748-1789)

On the 1th (a day behind time), this general drove in the French outposts, but he soon came on three battalions under See also:

• COLONEL (derived either from Lat. column, Fr. colonne, column, or Lat. corona, a crown)

This became evident on the afternoon of the 13th, but meanwhile Bonaparte, eager to begin at once the subjugation of the Piedmontese (for which purpose he wanted to bring Serurier and Rusca into play) sent only Laharpe's division and a few details of Massena's, under the latter, towards Dego. These were to protect the main attack from interference by the forces that had been engaged at Montenotte (presumed to be Beaulieu's main body), the said main attack being delivered by fl[eFimo. Augereau's division, reinforced by most of Massena's, on the positions held by Provera. The latter, only loon strong to Augereau's 9000, shut himself in the See also:

• CASTLE
• CASTLE (Lat. castellum, a fort, diminutive of castra, a camp; Fr. chateau and chdtel)

Not until the afternoon of the 14th did Beaulieu place a few extra battalions at Argenteau's disposal " to be used only in case of extreme See also:

• NECESSITY (Lat. necessitas)

This was perhaps the crisis of the campaign. Even now it was not certain that the Austrians had been definitively pushed aside, while it was quite clear that Beaulieu's main body was intact and Colli was still more an unknown quantity. But Napoleon's intention remained the same, to attack the Piedmontese as quickly and as heavily as possible, Beaulieu being held in check by a containing force under Massena and Laharpe. The See also:

• REMAINDER, REVERSION

Further, the line of supply, as an extra See also:

• GUARANTEE (sometimes spelt " guarantie " or " guaranty "; an O. Fr. form of " warrant," from the Teutonic word which appears in German as wahren, to defend or make safe and binding)

velopment, decided once more to retreat, and the Republicans occupied the Cursaglia lines on the morning of the 21st without firing a shot. But Colli halted again at See also:

• VICO, GIOVANNI BATTISTA (1668-1744)

If there were many thousand soldiers who marched unarmed and shoeless in the ranks, it was towards " the Promised See also:

• LAND

Neither condition was fully met at any time in the Montenotte campaign. On the I1th Napoleon knew that the attack on Voltri had been made by a part only of the Austrian forces, yet he flung his own masses on Montenotte. On the 13th he thought that Beaulieu's main body was at Dego and Colli's at Millesimo, and on this assumption had to exact the most extraordinary efforts from Augereau's troops at Cossaria. On the See also:

• LATH (0. Eng. laett, Mid. Eng. lappe, a form possibly due to the Welsh llath; the word appears in many Teutonic languages, cf. Dutch lat, Ger. Latte, and has passed into Romanic, cf. Ital. latta, Fr. latte)

" My enemies saw too much at once," said Napoleon. Singleness of aim and of purpose, the product of clear thinking and of " personality," was the See also:

• FOUNDATION (Lat. fundatio, from fundare, to found)

But the latter was handled -See also:

• PERM

But Bonaparte, flushed with victory, and better informed than the malcontents of the real condition of Italy, never hesitated. His first object was to drive out Beaulieu, his second to push through Tirol, and his only serious restriction the See also:

• CHANCE (through the O. Fr. cheance, from the Late Lat. cadentia, things happening, from cadere, to fall out, happen; cf. " case ")

If the Piacenza detachment succeeded in crossing, the army was to follow rapidly in its track. If, on the other hand, Beaulieu See also:

• FELL
• FELL, JOHN (1625-1686)

This See also:

• GAME

Finally he gave the order to Dallemagne's 4000 grenadiers, who were See also:

• DRAWN

This took the form of exacting from the neighbouring princes See also:

• MONEY

In addition, he gave his 1 Soo men three hours' leave to pillage. Then, as swiftly as they had come, they returned to the army on the Oglio. From this river Napoleon advanced to the See also:

• BANKS, GEORGE LINNAEUS (1821-1881)
• BANKS, NATHANIEL PRENTISS (1816–1894)
• BANKS, SIR JOSEPH
• BANKS, THOMAS (1735-1805)

Serurier (12,000) was besieging Mantua, and the only central reserve was the cavalry (2000) under See also:

• KILMAINE, CHARLES EDWARD (1751-1799)

t See C. von B.-K., Geist and Stoff, pp. 449-451. On the 29th Quasdanovich attacked Sauret at Salo, drove him towards Desenzano, and pushed on to Gavardo and thence into Brescia. Wurmser expelled Massena's advanced guard from La Corona; and captured in See also:

• SUCCESSION (Lat. successio, from succedere, to follow after)

. . and the enemy has captured Brescia. You see that our communications with Milan and Verona are cut." The reports that came to him during the morning of the 3oth enabled him to place the main body of the enemy opposite Massena, and this, without in the least alleviating the gravity of the situation, helped to make his course less doubtful. Augereau was ordered to hold the line of the Molinella, in case Davidovich's attack, the least-known See also:

• FACTOR (from Lat. facere, to make or do)

Now, however, he made up his mind that the siege could not be continued, and See also:

• BITTER, KARL THEODORE FRANCIS (1867– )

But a renewed advance of Quasdano- See also:

• VICH

But Revolutionary discipline was not See also:

• FIRM

Wurmser's plan for the relief of Mantua, suited to its purpose, succeeded. But when he made his objective the French field army, he had to take his own army as he found it, disposed for an altogether different purpose. A properly, combined attack of convergent columns framed ab initio by a good staff officer, such as Mack, might indeed have given good results. But the success of such a plan depends principally on the assailant's See also:

• ORIGINAL

There, however, they missed their target. Wurmser had already drawn over the bulk of his army (22,000) into the Val Sugana, whence, with the Bassano division as his advanced guard, he intended once more to relieve Mantua, while Davidovich with 13,000 (excluding detachments) was to hold Tirol against any See also:

• ATTEMPT (Lat. adtemptare, attentare, to try)

When Massena entered Trent on the morning of the 5th of September, Napoleon became aware that the force in his front was a mere detachment, and news soon came in that Bassaao. Wurmser was in the Val Sugana about Primolano and at Bassano. This move he supposed to be intended to cover Trieste, being influenced by his own hopes of advancing in that direction, and underestimating the importance, to the Austrians, of preserving Mantua. He therefore informed the Directory that he could not proceed with the Tirol scheme, and spent one more day in driving Davidovich well away from Trent. Then, leaving Vaubois to watch him, Napoleon marched Augereau and Massena, with a rapidity he scarcely ever surpassed, into the Val Sugana. Wurmser's rearguard was attacked and defeated again and again, and Wurmser himself felt compelled to stand and fight, in the hope of checking the pursuit before going forward into the plains. Half his army had already reached Montebello on the Verona road, and with the rear half he posted himself at Bassano, where on the 8th he was attacked and defeated with heavy losses. Then began a strategic pursuit or general See also:

• CHASE
• CHASE, SALMON PORTLAND (1808-1873)
• CHASE, SAMUEL (1741–1811)
• CHASE, WILLIAM MERRITT (1849– )

Wurmser meantime had halted for a day at Legnago, to restore order, and had then resumed his march. It was almost too late, for in the evening, after having to push aside the head of Massena's column at Cerea, he had only reached Nogara, some miles short of Castellaro, and close upon his rear was Augereau, who reached Legnago that night. On the 12th, eluding Sahuguet by a detour to the southward, he reached Mantua, with all the columns of the French, weary as most of them were, in hot pursuit. After an attempt to keep the open field, defeated in a general action on the 15th, the relieving force was merged in the See also:

• GARRISON
• GARRISON, WILLIAM LLOYD (1805-1879)

Wurmser was to co-operate by vigorous sorties. At this time Napoleon's protective system was as follows: Kilmaine (9000) investing Mantua, Vaubois (io,000) at Trent, and Massena (9000) at Bassano and Treviso, Augereau (9000) and Macquard (3000) at Verona and Villafranca constituting, for the first time in these operations, important See also:

• MOBILE

Then, on the afternoon of the rrth, being informed that Alvintzi was approaching, Napoleon decided to attack him. On the 12th the advanced guard of Alvintzi's army was furiously assailed in the position of Caldiero. But the troops in rear came up rapidly, and by 4 P.M, the French were defeated all along the line and in retreat on Verona. Napoleon's situation was now indeed See also:

• PRECARIOUS

On the 15th he had written to the Directory, " The weakness and the exhaustion of the army causes me to fear the worst. We are perhaps on the See also:

• EVE

But Davidovich again stood still, and with incredible obstinacy Bonaparte ordered a third assault for the 17th, using struggle of the campaign. Once he felt sure of the situation Napoleon acted promptly. Joubert was ordered to hold on to Rivoli at all costs. Rey was brought up by a forced march to Castelnuovo, where See also:

• VICTOR
• VICTOR, GAIUS JULIUS (4th cent. A.D.)
• VICTOR, SEXTUS AURELIUS

After the See also:

• ORDEAL (O.Eng. ordal, ordael, judgment)

But the Austrians still sullenly resisted. It was at this moment that Bonaparte secured victory by a mere ruse, but a ruse which would have been unprofitable and ridiculous had it not been based on his fine sense of the moral conditions. Both sides were nearly fought out, and he sent a few trumpeters to the rear of the Austrian army to See also:

• SOUND
• SOUND, THE (Danish Oresund)

At this time 8000 men under Serurier blockaded Mantua, Massena (g000) was at Verona, Joubert (Vaubois's successor) at Rivoli with so,000, Augereau at Legnago with 9000. In reserve were Rey's division (4000) between Brescia and Montechiaro, and Victor's brigade at Goito and Castelnuovo. On the other side, Alvintzi had 9000 men under Provera at Padua, 6000 under Bayalic at Bassano, and he himself with 28,000 men stood in the Tirol about Trent. This time he intended to make his principal effort on the Rivoli side. Provera was to capture Legnago on the 9th of January, and Bayalic Verona on the 12th, while the main army was to deliver its blow against the Rivoli position on the 13th. The first See also:

• MARCHES, THE (It. Le Marche)

But hearing of this, Napoleon sent back Massena from the field of Rivoli, and that general, with Augereau and Serurier, not only forced Wurmser to retire again into the fortress, but compelled Provera to lay down his arms. On the and. of See also:

• FEBRUARY

Nothing but the news of the armistice of Leoben saved him from envelopment and surrender. This general armistice was signed by Bonaparte, on his own authority and to the intense chagrin of the Directory and of Hoche, on the 18th of April, and was the basis of the peace of Campo Formio.