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FRANCKEN

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Originally appearing in Volume V11, Page 14 of the 1911 Encyclopedia Britannica.
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FRANCKEN . Eleven painters of this See also:

family cultivated their See also:art in See also:Antwerp during the 16th and 17th centuries. Several of these were related to each other, whilst many See also:bore the same See also:Christian name in See also:succession. Hence unavoidable confusion in the subsequent See also:classification of paintings not widely differing in See also:style or See also:execution. When See also:Franz Francken the first found a See also:rival in Franz Francken the second, he described himself as the "See also:elder," in contradistinction to his son, who signed himself the " younger." But when Franz the second was threatened with competition from Franz the third, he took the name of " the elder," whilst Franz the third adopted that of Franz " the younger." It is possible, though not by any means easy, to sift the See also:works of these artists. The eldest of the Franckens, See also:Nicholas of Herenthals, died at Antwerp in 1596, with nothing but the reputation of having been a painter. None of his works remain. He bequeathed his art to three See also:children. Jerom Francken, the eldest son, after leaving his See also:father's See also:house, studied under Franz See also:Floris, whom he afterwards served as an assistant, and wandered, about 156o, to See also:Paris. In 1566 he was one of the masters employed to decorate the See also:palace of See also:Fontainebleau, and in 1574 he obtained the See also:appointment of See also:court painter from See also:Henry III., who had just returned from See also:Poland and visited See also:Titian at See also:Venice. In 1603, when See also:Van See also:Mander wrote his See also:biography of Flemish artists, Jerom Francken was still in Paris living in the then aristocratic See also:Faubourg St Germain. Among his earliest works we should distinguish a " Nativity " in the See also:Dresden museum, executed in co-operation with Franz Floris.

Another of his important pieces is the " See also:

Abdication of See also:Charles V." in the See also:Amsterdam museum. Equally interesting is a "Portrait of a See also:Falconer," dated 1558, in the See also:Brunswick See also:gallery. In style these pieces all recall Franz Floris. Franz, the second son of Nicholas of Herenthals, is to be kept in memory as Franz Francken the first. He was See also:born about 1544, matriculated at Antwerp in 1567, and died there in x616. He, too, studied under Floris, and never settled abroad, or lost the hard and See also:gaudy style which he inherited from his See also:master. Several of his pictures are in the museum of Antwerp; one dated. 1597 in the Dresden museum represents " See also:Christ on the Road to Golgotha," and is signed by him as D. 6 (Den ouden) F. See also:Franck. See also:Ambrose, the third son of Nicholas of Herenthals, has bequeathed to us more specimens of his skill than Jerom or Franz the first. He first started as a partner with Jerom at Fontainebleau, then he returned to Antwerp, where he passed for his gild in 1573, and he lived at Antwerp till 1618.

His best works are the " See also:

Miracle of the Loaves and Fishes " and the " Martyrdom of St See also:Crispin," both large and ambitious compositions in the Antwerp museum. In both these pieces a See also:fair amount of See also:power is displayed, but marred by want of See also:atmosphere and See also:shadow or by hardness of See also:line and gaudiness of See also:tone. There is not a trace in the three painters named of the See also:influence of the revival which took See also:place under the See also:lead of See also:Rubens. Franz Francken the first trained three sons to his profession, the eldest of whom, though he practised as a master of gild at Antwerp from x600 to 1610, See also:left no visible trace of his labours behind. Jerom the second took service with his See also:uncle Ambrose. He was born in 1578, passed for his gild in 1607, and in 1620 produced that curious picture of " Horatius Codes defending the Sublician See also:Bridge " which still hangs in the Antwerp museum. The third son of Franz Francken the first is Franz Francken the second, who signed himself in pictures till 1616 " the younger," from 163o till his See also:death " the elder " F. Francken. These pictures are usually of a small See also:size, and are found in considerable See also:numbers in See also:continental collections. Franz Francken the second was born in 158r. In x6o5 he entered the gild, of which he subsequently became the See also:president, and in 1642 he died. His earliest See also:composition is the " Crucifixion " in the See also:Belvedere at See also:Vienna, dated 1606.

His latest compositions as " the younger" F. Francken are the " Adcration of the Virgin " (1616) in the gallery of Amsterdam, and the " Woman taken in See also:

Adultery " (1628) in Dresden. From 1616 to 163o many of his pieces are signed F. Francken; then come the " Seven Works of Charity " (1630) at See also:Munich, signed " the elder F. F.," the " Prodigal Son " (1633) at the Louvre, and other almost countless examples. It is in F. Francken the second's style that we first have See also:evidence of the struggle which necessarily arose when the old customs, hardened by Van See also:Orley and Floris, or See also:Breughel and De Vos, were swept away by Rubens. But F. Francken the second, as before observed, always clung to small surfaces; and though he gained some of the freedom of the moderns, he lost but little of the dryness or gaudiness of the earlier Italo-Flemish revivalists. F. Francken the third, the last of his name who deserves to be recorded, passed in the Antwerp gild in 1639 and died at Antwerp in 1667. His practice was chiefly confined to adding figures to the architectural or landscape pieces of other artists.

As Franz Pourbus sometimes put in the portrait figures for Franz Francken the second, so Franz Francken the third often introduced the necessary personages into the works of Pieter Neefs the younger (museums of St See also:

Petersburg, Dresden and the See also:Hague). In a " See also:Moses striking the See also:Rock," dated 1654, of the See also:Augsburg gallery, this last of the Franckens signs D. 6 (Den ouden) F. Franck. In the pictures of this artist we most clearly discern the effects of Rubens's example. FRANCO-See also:GERMAN See also:WAR (187o-187I). The victories of See also:Prussia in 1866 over the Austrians and their German See also:allies (see SEVEN See also:WEEKS' WAR) rendered it evident to the statesmen and soldiers of See also:France that a struggle between the two nations could only be a question of See also:time. See also:Army reforms were at once under-taken, and See also:measures were initiated in France to place the armament and equipment of the troops on a level with the requirements of the times. The See also:chassepot, a new See also:breech-loading See also:rifle, immensely See also:superior to the Prussian See also:needle-See also:gun, was issued; the See also:artillery trains were thoroughly overhauled, and a new See also:machine-gun, the mitrailleuse, from which much was expected, introduced. Wide schemes of reorganization (due mainly to See also:Marshal See also:Niel) were set in See also:motion, and, since these required time to mature, recourse was had to See also:foreign alliances in the See also:hope of delaying the impending rupture. In the first See also:week of See also:June 187o, See also:General See also:Lebrun, as a confidential See also:agent of the See also:emperor See also:Napoleon III., was sent to Vienna to See also:concert a See also:plan of See also:joint operations with See also:Austria against Prussia. See also:Italy was also to be included in the See also:alliance, and it was agreed that in See also:case of hostilities the See also:French armies should concentrate in See also:northern See also:Bavaria, where the Austrians and Italians were to join them, and the whole immense army thus formed should See also:march via See also:Jena on See also:Berlin.

To what extent Austria and Italy committed themselves to this See also:

scheme remains uncertain, but that the emperor Napoleon believed in their See also:bona fides is beyond doubt. Whether the plan was betrayed to Prussia is also uncertain, and almost immaterial, for See also:Moltke's plans were based on an accurate estimate of the time it would take Austria to mobilize and on the effect of a See also:series of victories on French See also:soil. At any See also:rate Moltke was not taken into See also:Bismarck's confidence in the affair of See also:Ems in See also:July 187o, and it is to be presumed that the See also:chancellor had already satisfied himself that the schemes of operations prepared by the See also:chief of the General See also:Staff fully provided against all eventualities. These schemes were founded on See also:Clausewitz's view of the See also:objects to be pursued in a war against France—in the first place the defeat of the French See also:field armies and in the second the occupation of Paris. On these lines plans for the strategic deployment of the Prussian army were prepared by the General Staff and kept up to date See also:year by year as fresh circumstances (e.g. the co-operation of the See also:minor German armies) arose and new means of communication came into existence. The See also:campaign was actually opened on a revise of 1868-1869, to which was added, on the 6th of May 1870, a See also:secret memorandum for the General Staff. Under the German organization then existing the preliminary to all active operations was of See also:necessity full and See also:complete mobilization. Then followed transport by road and See also:rail to the line selected for the " strategic deployment," and it was essential that no See also:part of these operations should be disturbed by See also:action on the part of the enemy. But no such delay imposed itself of necessity upon the French, and a vigorous offensive was so muchin See also:harmony with their traditions that the German plan had to be framed so as to meet such emergencies. On the whole, Moltke concluded that the enemy could not undertake strategic this offensive before the eighth See also:day after mobilization. deploy. At that date about five French army See also:corps (150,000 went . men) could be collected near See also:Metz, and two corps of the (70,000) near See also:Strassburg; and as it was six days' march armtesn from Metz to the See also:Rhine, no serious attack could be delivered before the fourteenth day, by which day it could be met by superior forces near Kirchheirnbolanden. Since, however, the transport of the bulk of the Prussian forces could not begin till the ninth day, their ultimate line of detrainment need not be fixed until the French plans were disclosed, and, as it was important to strike at the earliest moment possible, the deployment was provisionally fixed to be beyond the Rhine on the line Wittlich-See also:Neunkirchen-See also:Landau.

Of the thirteen See also:

North German corps three had to be left behind to guard the eastern frontier and the See also:coast, one other, the VIII., was practically on the ground already and could concentrate by road, and the remaining nine were distributed to the nine through railway lines available. These ten corps were grouped in three armies, and as the French might violate Belgian See also:neutrality or endeavour to break into See also:southern See also:Germany, two corps (Prussian Guard and Saxon XII. corps) were temporarily held back at a central position around See also:Mainz whence they could move rapidly up or down the Rhine valley. If Belgian neutrality remained unmolested, the reserve would join the III. army on the left wing, giving it a two to one superiority over its adversary; all three armies would then See also:wheel to the right and combine in an effort to force the French army into a decisive See also:battle on the See also:Saar on or about the twenty-third day. As in this wheel the army on the right formed the See also:pivot and was required only to stand fast, two corps only were allotted to it; two corps for the See also:present formed the III. army, and the remaining five were assigned to the II. army in the centre. When (16th-17th July) the See also:South German states decided to throw in their See also:lot with the See also:rest, their three corps were allotted to the III. army, the See also:Guards and See also:Saxons to the II. army, whilst the three corps originally left behind were finally distributed one to each army, so that up to the investment of Metz the See also:order of battle was as follows: See also:Total . . 85,000 Guard Pr. See also:August of Wurttem- See also:berg (II. corps, v. Fransecky) III. v. See also:Alvensleben II. II. Army: IV. v. Alvensleben I.

See also:

Prince See also:Frederick Charles IX. v. Manstein - „ v. Voigts-Rhetz (C. of S., v. Stiehie) X. of See also:Saxony 5th and 6th See also:cavalry divisions Total . . 210,000 V. corps, v. Kirchbach (VI.) „ v. Tumpling XI. v. Bose I. Bavarian, v. der Tann II. v. See also:Hartmann See also:Wurttemberg div. 1 v.

See also:

Werder See also:Baden div. (2nd) and 4th cavalry divisions Total . . 180,o00 See also:Grand Total . . 475,E (The See also:units within brackets were those at first retained in Germany.) On the French See also:side no such plan of operations was in existence when on the See also:night of the 15th of July Krieg mobil was telegraphed all over Prussia. An outline scheme had indeed been positions prepared as a basis for agreement with Austria and of the Italy, but practically no details were fixed, and the French - troops were without transport and supplies. Never- fO1res theless, since See also:speed was the essence of the See also:contract, the troops Headquarters : The See also:king of Prussia (General v. Moltke, chief of staff). I. Army: I (I. corps, v. See also:Manteuffel) General v. See also:Steinmetz VII. „ v.

Zastrow (C. of S., v. Sperling) VIII. „ v. See also:

Goeben (1st) and 3rd cavalry divisions See also:crown prince of Prussia (C. of S., v. See also:Blumenthal) were hurried up without waiting for their reserves, and delivered, as Moltke had foreseen, just where the See also:lie of the See also:railways and convenience of temporary See also:supply dictated, and the Prussian Intelligence See also:Department was able to inform Moltke on the 22nd of July (seventh day of mobilization) that the French stood from right to left in the following order, on or near the frontier: 1st corps Marshal Mac Mahon, See also:duke of See also:Magenta, Strassburg 5th corps General de See also:Failly, See also:Saargemund and Bitche 2nd corps General See also:Frossard, St Avoid 4th corps General de Ladmirault, Thionville With, behind them: 3rd corps Marshal See also:Bazaine, Metz Guard General See also:Bourbaki, See also:Nancy 6th corps Marshal See also:Canrobert, Chalons 7th corps . General See also:Felix Douay, See also:Belfort If therefore they began a forward See also:movement on the 23rd (eighth day) the case foreseen by Moltke had arisen, and it became necessary to detrain the II. army upon the Rhine. Without waiting for further See also:confirmation of this intelligence, Moltke, with the consent of the king, altered the arrangements accordingly, a decision which, though foreseen, exercised the gravest influence on the course of events. As it happened this decision was pre-mature, for the French could not yet move. Supply trains had to be organized by requisition from the inhabitants, and even arms and See also:ammunition procured for such reserves as had succeeded in joining. Nevertheless, by almost superhuman exertions on the part of the railways and administrative services, all essential deficiencies were made See also:good, and by the 28th of July (13th day) the troops had received all that was absolutely indispensable and might well have been led against the enemy, who, thanks to Moltke's premature action, were for the moment at a very serious disadvantage. But the French generals were unequal to their responsibilities. It is now clear that, had the See also:great Napoleon and his marshals been in command, they would have made See also:light of the want of cooking pots, See also:cholera belts, &c., and, by a series of rapid See also:marches, would have concentrated odds of at least three to one upon the heads of the Prussian columns as they struggled through the defiles of the See also:Hardt, and won a victory whose See also:political results might well have proved decisive.

To meet this pressing danger, which came to his knowledge during the course of the 29th, Moltke sent a confidential staff officer, See also:

Colonel v. Verdy du Vernois, to the III. army to impress upon the crown prince the necessity of an immediate advance to distract the enemy's See also:attention from the I. and II. armies; but, like the French generals, the crown prince pleaded that he could not move until his trains were complete. Fortunately for the Germans, the French intelligence service not only failed to inform the staff of this extraordinary opportunity, but it allowed itself to be hypnotized by the most amazing rumours. In See also:imagination they saw armies of 1oo,000 men behind every See also:forest, and, to guard against these dangers, the French troops were marched and See also:counter-marched along the frontiers in the vain hope of discovering an ideal defensive position which should afford full See also:scope to the power of their new weapons. As these delays were exerting a most unfavourable effect on public See also:opinion not only in France but throughout See also:Europe, the emperor decided on the 1st of August to initiate a movement towards the Saar, chiefly as a See also:guarantee of good faith to the Austrians and Italians. On this day the French corps held the following positions from right to left: Ist corps . See also:Hagenau 2nd corps . See also:Forbach 3rd corps . St Avoid 4th corps . Bouzonville 5th corps Bitche 6th corps Chalons 7th corps . Belfort and See also:Colmar Guard . . near Metz The French 2nd corps was directed to advance on the following See also:morning See also:direct on See also:Saarbrucken, supported on the flanks by two divisions from the 5th and 3rd corps.

The order was duly carried out, and the Prussians (one See also:

battalion, two squadrons and abattery), seeing the overwhelming numbers opposed to them, See also:fell back fighting and vanished to the northward, having given a very excellent example of steadiness and dis- cipline to their enemy.' The latter contented them- S See also:Sion of selves by occupying Saarbriicken and its suburb St bracken. Johann, and here, as far as the troops were concerned, the incident closed. Its effect, however, proved far-reaching. The Prussian staff could not conceive that nothing See also:lay behind this display of five whole divisions, and immediately took steps to meet the expected danger. In their excitement, although they had announced the beginning of the action to the king's See also:head-quarters at Mainz, they forgot to notify the See also:close and its results, so that Moltke was not in See also:possession of the facts till See also:noon on the 3rd of August. Meanwhile, Steinmetz, left without instructions and fearing for the safety of the II. army, the heads of whose columns were still in the defiles of the Hardt, moved the I. army from the neighbourhood of Merzig obliquely to his left front, so as to strike the flank of the French army if it continued its march towards See also:Kaiserslautern, in which direction it appeared to be heading. Whilst this order was in See also:process of execution, Moltke, aware that the II. army was behind time in its march, issued instructions to Steinmetz for the 4th of August which entailed moltke, a withdrawal to the See also:rear, the See also:idea being that both prince armies should, if the French advanced, fight a defensive Frederick battle in a selected position farther back. Steinmetz Charles obeyed, though bitterly resenting the idea of See also:retreat. an etz. d See also:Stein- m This movement, further, See also:drew his left across the roads reserved for the right See also:column of the II. army, and on See also:receipt of a See also:peremptory order from Prince Frederick Charles to evacuate the road, Steinmetz telegraphed for instructions direct to the king, over Moltke's head. In reply he received a telegram from Moltke, ordering him to clear the road at once, and couched in terms which he considered as a severe reprimand. An explanatory See also:letter, meant to soften the rebuke, was delayed in transmission and did not reach him till too See also:late to modify the orders he had already issued. It must be remembered that Steinmetz at the front was in a better position to See also:judge the apparent situation than was Moltke at Mainz, and that all through the day of the 5th of August he had received intelligence indicating a See also:change of attitude in the French army.

The See also:

news of the German victory at See also:Weissenburg on the 4th (see below) had in fact completely paralysed the French head-quarters, and orders were issued by them during the course of the 5th to concentrate the whole army of the Battle of Rhine on the selected position osition of Cadenbronn. As a preliminary, Frossard's corps withdrew from Saar- brficken and began to entrench a position on the Spicheren heights, 3000 yds. to the southward. Steinmetz, therefore, being quite unaware of the scheme for a great battle on the Saar about the 12th of August, See also:felt that the situation would best be met, and the letter of his instructions strictly obeyed, by moving his whole command forward to the line of the Saar, and orders to this effect were issued on the evening of the 5th. In pursuance of these orders, the advance guard of the 14th See also:division (See also:Lieutenant General von Kameke) reached Saarbriicken about 9 A.M. on the 6th, where the Germans found to their amazement that the See also:bridges were intact. To secure this See also:advantage was the obvious See also:duty of the See also:commander on the spot, and he at once ordered his troops to occupy a line of See also:low heights beyond the See also:town to serve as a bridge-head. As the leading troops deployed on the heights Frossard's guns on the Spicheren See also:Plateau opened See also:fire, and the advanced guard See also:battery replied. The See also:sound of these guns unchained the whole fighting See also:instinct carefully See also:developed by a See also:long course of Prussian manoeuvre training. Everywhere, generals and troops hurried towards the See also:cannon See also:thunder. Kameke, even more in the dark than Steinmetz as to Moltke's intentions and the strength of his adversaries, attacked at once, precisely as he would have done at manoeuvres, and in See also:half an See also:hour his men were committed beyond recall. As each fresh unit reached the field it was hurried into action where its services 1 This was the celebrated ".bapteme de See also:feu " of the prince imperial were most needed, and each fresh general as he arrived took a new view of the combat and issued new orders. On the other side, Frossard, knowing the strength of his position, called on his neighbours for support, and determined to hold his ground. Victory seemed certain.

There were sufficient troops within easy reach to have ensured a crushing numerical superiority. But the other generals had not been trained to mutual support, and thought only of their own immediate See also:

security, and their staffs were too inexperienced to See also:act upon even good intentions; and, finding himself in the course.of the afternoon left to his own devices, Frossard began gradually to withdraw, even before the pressure of the r3th German division on his left flank (about 8 P.m.) compelled his retirement. When darkness ended the battle the Prussians were scarcely aware of their victory. Stein- metz, who had reached the field about 6 P.m., rode back to his headquarters without issuing any orders, while the troops bivouacked where they stood, the units of three army corps being mixed up in almost inextricable confusion. But whereas out of 42,900 Prussians with 120 guns, who in the morning lay within striking distance of the enemy, no fewer than 27,000, with 78 guns were actually engaged; of the French, out of 64,000 with 210 guns only 24,000 with 90 guns took part in the action. Meanwhile on the German left wing the III. army had begun its advance. See also:Early on the 4th of August it crossed the frontier and fell upon a French detachment under See also:Abel Douay, Adlon of which had been placed near Weissenburg, partly to Weissen- See also:burg. See also:cover the Pigeonnier pass, but principally to consume the supplies accumulated in the little dismantled fortress, as these could not easily be moved. Against this force of under 4000 men of all arms, the Germans brought into action successively portions of three corps, in all over 25,000 men with 90 guns. After six See also:hours' fighting, in which the Germans lost some 1500 men, the gallant remnant of the French withdrew deliberately and in good order, notwithstanding the death of their See also:leader at the See also:critical moment. The Germans were so elated by their victory over the enemy, whose strength they naturally overestimated, that they forgot to send cavalry in pursuit, and thus entirely lost See also:touch with the enemy. Next day the advance was resumed, the two Bavarian corps moving via Mattstall through the foothills of the See also:Vosges, the V. corps on their left towards Preuschdorf, and the XI. farther to the left again, through the wooded See also:plain of the Rhine valley. The 4th cavalry division scouted in advance, and army head-quarters moved to Sulz.

About noon the advanced patrols discovered See also:

MacMahon's corps in position on the left See also:bank of the Sauer (see WoR2u: Battle of). As his army was dispersed over a wide See also:area, the crown prince determined to devote the 6th to concentrating the troops, and, probably to avoid alarming the enemy, ordered the cavalry to stand fast. . At night the outposts of the I. Bavarians and V. corps on the Sauer saw the fires of the French encampment and heard the See also:noise of railway See also:traffic, and rightly conjectured the approach of reinforcements. MacMahon had in fact determined to stand in the very formidable position he had selected, and he counted on receiving support both from the 7th corps (two divisions of which were being railed up from Colmar) and from the 5th corps, which lay around Bitche. It was also quite possible, and the soundest See also:strategy, to withdraw the bulk of the troops then facing the German I. and II. armies to his support, and these would reach him by the 8th. He was therefore justified in accepting battle, though it was to his See also:interest to delay it as long as possible. At See also:dawn on the 6th of August the commander of the V. corps outposts noticed certain movements in the French lines, and to See also:Barrie of clear up the situation brought his guns into action. See also:worth. As at Spicheren, the sound of the guns set the whole machinery of battle in motion. The French artillery immediately accepted the Prussian See also:challenge. The I. Bavarians, having been ordered to be ready to move if they heard artillery fire, immediately advanced against the French left, encountering presently such a stubborn resistance that parts of their line began to give way.

The Prussians of the V. corps felt that theycould not abandon their allies, and von Kirchbach, calling on the XI. corps for support, attacked with the troops at See also:

hand. When the crown prince tried to break off the fight it was too late. Both sides were feeding troops into the firing line, as and where they could lay hands on them. Up to 2 P.M. the French fairly held their own, but shortly afterwards their right yielded to the overwhelming pressure of the XI. corps, and by 3.30 it was in full retreat. The centre held on for another hour, but in its turn was compelled to yield, and by 4.30 all organized resistance was at an end. The debris of the French army was hotly pursued by the German divisional squadrons towards Reichshofen, where serious panic showed itself. When at this See also:stage the supports sent by de Failly from Bitche came on the ground they saw the hopelessness of intervention, and retired whence they had come. Fortunately for the French, the German 4th cavalry division, on which the pursuit should have devolved, had been forgotten by the German staff, and did not reach the front before darkness fell. Out of a total of 82,000 within reach of the battlefield, the Germans succeeded in bringing into action 77,500. The French, who might have had 50,000 on the field, deployed only 37,000, and these suffered a collective loss of no less than 20,100; some regiments losing up to 90% and still retaining some semblance of discipline and order. Under cover of darkness the remnants of the French army escaped. When at length the 4th cavalry division had succeeded in forcing a way through the confusion of the battlefield, all touch with the enemy had been lost, and being without firearms the troopers were checked by the French stragglers in the See also:woods and the villages, and thus failed to establish the true line of retreat of the French.

Ultimately the latter, having gained the railway near See also:

Luneville, disappeared from the German front altogether, and all trace of them was lost until they were discovered, about the 26th of August, forming part of the army of Chalons, whither they had been conveyed by rail via Paris. This is a remarkable example of the strategical value of railways to an army operating in its own See also:country. In the See also:absence of all resistance, the III. army now proceeded to carry out the See also:original See also:programme of marches laid down in Moltke's memorandum of the 6th of May, and marching on a broad front through a fertile See also:district it reached the line of the Moselle in excellent order about the 17th of August, where it halted to await the result of the great battle of See also:Gravelotte-St Privat. We return now to the I. army at Saarbrucken. Its position on the morning of the 7th of August gave cause for the gravest anxiety. At daylight a dense See also:fog lay over the country, and through the mist sounds of heavy firing came from the direction of Forbach, where French stragglers had rallied during the night. The confusion on the battlefield was appalling, and the troops in no See also:condition to go forward. Except the 3rd, 5th and 6th cavalry divisions no closed troops were within a day's march; hence Steinmetz decided to spend the day in reorganizing his See also:infantry, under cover of his available cavalry. But the German cavalry and staff were quite new to their task. The 6th cavalry division, which had bivouacked on the battlefield, sent on only one See also:brigade towards Forbach, retaining the See also:remainder in reserve. The 5th, thinking that the 6th had already undertaken all that was necessary, withdrew behind the Saar, and the 3rd, also behind the Saar, reported that the country in its front was unsuited to cavalry movements, and only sent out a few See also:officers' patrols. These were well led, but were too few in number, and their reports were consequently unconvincing.

In the course of the day Steinmetz became very uneasy, and ultimately he decided to concentrate his army by retiring the VII. and VIII. corps behind the See also:

river on to the I. (which had arrived near See also:Saarlouis), thus clearing the Saarbrucken-Metz road for the use of the II. army. But at this moment Prince Frederick Charles suddenly modified his views. During the 6th of August his scouts had reported considerable French forces near Bitche (these were the 5th, de Failly's corps), and early in the morning of the 7th he received a telegram from Moltke Movements on the Saar. informing him that MacMahon's beaten army was retreating on the same place (the troops observed were in fact those which had marched to MacMahon's assistance). The prince forthwith deflected the march of the Guards, IV. and X. corps, towards Rohrbach, whilst the IX. and XII. closed up to supporting distance behind them. Thus, as Steinmetz moved away to the See also:west and north, Frederick Charles was diverging to the south and See also:east, and a great See also:gap was opening in the very centre of the German front. This was closed only by the III. corps, still on the battle-field, and by portions of the X. near Saargemund,l whilst within striking distance lay 130,000 French troops, prevented only by the incapacity of their chiefs from delivering a decisive counter-stroke. Fortunately for the Prussians, Moltke at Mainz took a different view. Receiving absolutely no intelligence from the front during the 7th, he telegraphed orders to the I. and II. armies (10.25 P.M.) to See also:halt on the 8th, and impressed on Steinmetz the necessity of employing his cavalry to clear up the situation. The I. army had already begun the marches ordered by Steinmetz. It was now led back practically to its old bivouacs amongst the unburied dead.

Prince Frederick Charles only conformed to Moltke's order with the III. and X. corps; the remainder executed their concentration towards the south and east. During the night of the 7th of August Moltke decided that the French army must be in retreat towards the Moselle and forthwith busied himself with the preparation of fresh tables of march for the two armies, his See also:

object being to See also:swing up the left wing to outflank the enemy from the south. This See also:work, and the See also:transfer of headquarters to Homburg, needed time, hence no fresh orders were issued to either army, and neither commander would incur the responsibility of moving without any. The I. army therefore spent a See also:fourth night in See also:bivouac on the battle-field. But Constantin von Alvensleben, commanding the III. corps, a See also:man of very different See also:stamp from his colleagues, See also:hearing at first hand that the French had evacuated St Avoid, set his corps in motion early in the morning of the loth August down the St Avold-Metz road, reached St Avoid and obtained conclusive evidence that the French were retreating. During the 9th the orders for the advance to the Moselle were issued. These were based, not on an exact knowledge of where the French army actually stood, but on the opinion Moltke had formed as to where it ought to have been on military grounds solely, overlooking the fact that the French staff were not See also:free to See also:form military decisions but were compelled to See also:bow to political expediency. Actually on the 7th of August the emperor had decided to attack the Germans on the 8th with the whole Rhine Army, but this decision was upset by alarmist reports from the beaten army of MacMahon. He then decided to retreat to the Moselle, as Moltke had foreseen, and there to draw to himself the remnants of MacMahon's army (now near Luneville). At the same time he assigned the executive command over the whole Rhine Army to Marshal Bazaine. This retreat was begun during the course of the 8th and 9th of August; but on the night of the 9th urgent telegrams from Paris induced the emperor to suspend the movement, and during the loth the whole army took up a strong position on the French Nied. Meanwhile the II.

German army had received its orders to march in a line of army corps on a broad front in the general direction of See also:

Pont-a-Mousson, well to the south of Metz. The I. army was to follow by See also:short marches in See also:echelon on the right; only the III. corps was directed on Falkenberg, a day's march farther towards Metz along the St Avold-Metz road. The movement was begun on the See also:roth, and towards evening the French army was located on the right front of the III. corps. This entirely upset Moltke's See also:hypothesis, and called for a complete modification of his plans, as the III. corps alone could not be expected to resist the impact of Bazaine's five corps. The III. corps therefore received orders to stand fast for the moment, and the remainder of the II. army was instructed to wheel to the t The H. corps had not yet arrived from Germany. right and concentrate for a great battle to the east of Metz on the 16th or 17th. Before, however, these orders had been received the sudden retreat of the French completely changed the situation. The Germans therefore continued their movement towards the Moselle. On the 13th the French took up a fresh position 5 m. to the east of Metz, where they were located by the cavalry and the advanced guards of the I. army. Again Moltke ordered the I. army to observe and hold the enemy, whilst the II. was to swing See also:round to the north. The cavalry was to See also:scout beyond the Moselle and intercept all communication with the See also:heart of France (see METZ).

Battle of By this time the whole German army had imbibed the BQ ° y. idea that the French were in full retreat and endeavour- See also:

ing to evade a decisive struggle. When therefore during the morning of the r4th their outposts observed signs of retreat in the French position, their impatience could no longer be restrained; as at Worth and Spicheren, an outpost commander brought up his guns, and at the sound of their fire, every unit within reach spontaneously got under arms (battle of See also:Colombey-Borny). In a short time, with or without orders, the I., VII., VIII. and IX. corps were in full march to the battle-field. But the French too turned back to fight, and an obstinate engagement ensued, at the close of which the Germans barely held the ground and the French withdrew under cover of the Metz forts. Still, though the fighting had been indecisive, the conviction of victory remained with the Germans, and the idea of a French retreat became an obsession. To this idea Moltke gave expression in his orders issued early on the 15th, in which he laid down that the " fruits of the victory " of the previous evening could only be reaped by a vigorous pursuit towards the passages of the See also:Meuse, where it was hoped the French might yet be overtaken. This order, however, did not allow for the hopeless inability of the French staff to regulate the movement of congested masses of men, horses and vehicles, such as were now accumulated in the streets and environs of Metz. Whilst Bazaine had come to no definite decision whether to stand and fight or continue to retreat, and was merely drifting under the impressions of the moment, the Prussian leaders, in particular Prince Frederick Charles, saw in imagination the French columns in rapid orderly movement towards the west, and calculated that at best they could not be overtaken short of See also:Verdun. In this order of ideas the whole of the II. army, followed on its right rear by two-thirds of the I. army (the I. corps being detached to observe the eastern side of the fortress), were pushed on towards the Moselle, the cavalry far in advance towards the Meuse, whilst only the 5th cavalry division was ordered to scout towards the Metz-Verdun road, and even that was disseminated over far too wide an area. Later in the day (15th) Frederick Charles sent orders to the III. corps, which was on the right flank of his long line of columns and approaching the Moselle at Corny and Noveant, to march via Gorze to See also:Mars-la-Tour on the Metz-Verdun road; to the X. corps, strung out along the road from Thiaucourt to Ponta-Mousson, to move to Jarny; and for the remainder to push on westward to seize the Meuse crossings. No definite See also:information as to the French army reached him in time to modify these instructions. Meanwhile the 5th (Rheinbaben's) cavalry division, at about 3 P.M. in the afternoon, had come into contact with the French cavalry in the vicinity of Mars-la-Tour, and gleaned intelligence enough to show that no French infantry had as yet reached Rezonville.

The commander of the X. corps at Thiaucourt, informed of this, became anxious for the security of his flank during the next day's march and decided to push out a strong flanking detachment under von Caprivi, to support von Rheinbaben and maintain touch with the III. corps marching on his right rear. Von Alvensleben, to whom the 6th cavalry division had mean-while been assigned, seems to have received no See also:

local intelligence whatsoever; and at daybreak on the 16th he began his march Advance to the Moselle. in two columns, the 6th division on Mars-la-Tour, the 5th from St See also:Hubert northwards—became evident, and the II. towards the Rezonville-See also:Vionville plateau. And shortly after 9.15 A.M. he suddenly discovered the truth. The entire French Battle of army lay on his right flank, and his nearest supports Vlonville- were almost a day's march distant. In this crisis he Mars-la- made up his mind at once to attack with every Tour. available man, and to continue to attack, in the See also:con- viction that his audacity would serve to conceal his weakness. All day long, therefore, the Brandenburgers of the III. corps, supported ultimately by the X. corps and part of the 'IX., attacked again and again. The enemy was thrice their strength, but very differently led, and made no adequate use of his superiority (battle of Vionville-Mars-la Tour). Meanwhile Prince Frederick Charles, at Pont-a-Mousson, was still confident in the French retreat to the Meuse, and had even issued orders for the 17th on that See also:assumption. Firing had been heard since 9.15 A.M., and about noon Alvensleben's first See also:report had reached him, but it was not till after 2 that he realized the situation. Then, mounting his See also:horse, he covered the 15 M. to See also:Flavigny over crowded and difficult roads within the hour, and on his arrival abundantly atoned for his strategic errors by his unconquerable determination and See also:tactical skill. When darkness put a stop to the fighting, he considered the position.

Cancelling all previous orders, he called all troops within reach to the battle-field and resigned himself to wait for them. The situation was indeed critical. The whole French army of five corps, only half of which had been engaged, lay in front of him. His own army lay scattered over an area of 30 M. by 20, and only some 20,000 fresh troops—of the IX. corps—The 17th could reach the field during the forenoon of the 17th. of august. He did not then know that Moltke had already inter- vened and had ordered the VII.,VIII. and II. corps I to his assistance. Daylight revealed the extreme exhaustion of both men and horses. The men lay around in hopeless confusion amongst the killed and wounded, each where See also:

sleep had over-taken him, and thus the extent of the actual losses, heavy enough, could not be estimated. Across the valley, See also:bugle sounds revealed the French already alert, and presently a long line of skirmishers approached the Prussian position. But they halted just beyond rifle range, and it was soon evident that they were only intended to cover a further withdrawal. Presently came the welcome intelligence that the reinforcements were well on their way. About noon the king and Moltke drove up to the ground, and there was an animated discussion as to what the French would do next. Aware of their withdrawal from his immediate front, Prince Frederick Charles reverted to his previous idea and insisted that they were in full retreat towards the north, and that their entrenchments near Point du Jour and St Hubert (see See also:map in See also:article ME1rz) were at most a rearguard position.

Moltke was inclined to the same view, but considered the alternative possibility of a withdrawal towards Metz, and about 2 P.M. orders were issued to meet these divergent opinions. The whole army was to be See also:

drawn up at 6 A.M. on the 18th in an echelon facing north, so as to be ready for action in either direction. The king and Moltke then drove to Pont-a-Mousson, and the troops bivouacked in a See also:state of readiness. The rest of the 17th was spent in restdring order in the shattered III. and X. corps, and by nightfall both corps were reported See also:fit for action. Strangely enough, there were no organized cavalry reconnaissances, and no intelligence of importance was collected during the night of the 17th-18th. Early on the 18th the troops began to move into position in the following order from left to right: XII. (Saxons), Guards, IX., VIII. and VII. The X. and III. were retained in reserve. The idea of the French retreat was still uppermost in the prince's mind, and the whole army therefore moved north. But between ro and II A.M. part of the truth—viz. that the French had their backs to Metz and stood in battle order 1 Of the I. army the I. corps was retained on the east side of Metz. The II. corps belonged to the II. army, but had not yet reached the front.army, pivoting on the I., wheeled to the right and moved eastward. Suddenly the IX. corps fell right on the Battle of centre of the French line (Amanvillers), and a most Gravelottedesperate encounter began, superior See also:control, as before, See also:saint ceasing after the guns had opened fire.

Prince Frederick Privat. Charles, however, a little farther north, again asserted his tactical ability, and about 7 P.M. he brought into position no less than five army corps for the final attack. The sudden collapse of French resistance, due to the frontal attack of the Guards (St Privat) and the turning movement of the Saxons (Roncourt), rendered the use of this See also:

mass unnecessary, but the See also:resolution to use it was there. On the German right (I. army), about Gravelotte, all superior leading ceased quite early in the afternoon, and at night the French still showed an unbroken front. Until midnight, when the prince's victory was reported, the suspense at head-quarters was terrible. The I. army was exhausted, no steps had been taken to ensure support from the III.: army, and the IV. corps (II. army) lay inactive 30 M. away. This seems a fitting place to discuss the much-disputed point of Bazaine's conduct in allowing himself to be driven back into Metz when See also:fortune had thrown into his hands the great Bazalne opportunity of the 16th and 17th of August. He In nfetz. had been appointed to command on the loth, but the presence of the emperor, who only left the front early on the 16th, and their dislike of Bazaine, exercised a disturbing influence on the headquarters staff officers. During the retreat to Metz the marshal had satisfied himself as to the inability of his corps commanders to handle their troops, and also as to the See also:ill-will of the staff. In the circumstances he felt that a battle in the open field could only end in disaster; and, since it was proved that the Germans could outmarch him, his army was sure to be overtaken and annihilated if he ventured beyond the shelter of the fortress. But near Metz he could at least inflict very severe See also:punishment on his assailants, and in any case his presence in Metz would neutralize a far superior force of the enemy for weeks or months. What use the French See also:government might choose to make of the breathing space thus secured was their business, not his; and subsequent events showed that, had they not forced MacMahon's hand, the existence of the latter's See also:nucleus army of trained troops might have prevented the investment of Paris.

Bazaine was condemned by court-See also:

martial after the war, but if the case were reheard to-day it is certain that no See also:charge of treachery could be sustained. On the German side the victory at St Privat was at once followed up by the headquarters. Early on the loth the investment of Bazaine's army in Metz was commenced. A new army, the Army of the Meuse (often called the IV.); was as soon as possible formed of all troops not required for the See also:maintenance of the investment, and marched off under the command. of the crown prince of Saxony to discover and destroy the remainder of the French field army, which at this moment was known to be at Chalons. The operations which led to the See also:capture of MacMahon's army in See also:Sedan See also:call for little explanation. Given seven corps, each capable of averaging 15 m. a day for a week in succession, opposed to four corps only, shaken by defeat Campaign of sedan. and unable as a whole to cover more than 5 M. a day, the result could hardly be doubtful. But Moltke's method of conducting operations left his opponent many openings which could only be closed by excessive demands on the marching power of the men. Trusting only to his cavalry See also:screen to secure information, he was always without any definite fixed point about which to manoeuvre, for whilst the reports of the screen and orders based thereon were being transmitted,. the enemy was free to move, and generally their movements were dictated by political expediency, not by calculable military motives. Thus whilst the German army, on a front of nearly 50 in., was marching due west on Paris, MacMahon, under political pressure, was moving parallel to them, but on a northerly route, to See also:attempt the See also:relief of Metz. So unexpected was this move and so uncertain the information which called attention to it, that Moltke did not venture to change at once the direction of march of the whole army, but he directed the Army of the Meuse northward on Damvillers and ordered Prince Frederick Charles to detach two corps from the forces investing Metz to reinforce it. For the moment, therefore, MacMahon's move had succeeded, and the opportunity existed for Bazaine to break out. But at the critical moment the hopeless want of real efficiency in MacMahon's army compelled the latter so to delay his advance that it became evident to the Germans that there was no longer any necessity for the During the 31st the retreat practically became a rout, and the morning of the 1st of See also:September found the French crowded around the little fortress of Sedan, with only one line of retreat to the north-west still open.

By 11 A.M. the XL corps (III. army) had already closed that line, and about noon the Saxons (Army of the Meuse) moving round between the town and the Belgian frontier joined hands with the XI., and the circle of investment was complete. The battle of Sedan was closed about .is P.M. by the hoisting of the See also:

white See also:flag. Terms were agreed upon during the night, and the whole French army, with the emperor, passed into captivity. (F. N. M.) Thus in five weeks one of the French field armies was See also:im- prisoned in Metz, the other destroyed, and the Germans were free to march upon Paris. This seemed easy. There could be no organized opposition to their progress,' and Paris, if not so defenceless as in 1814, was more populous. See also:Starvation was the best method of attacking an over- crowded fortress, and the Parisians were not thought to be See also:proof against the deprivation of their accustomed luxuries. Even ' Moltke hoped that by the end of See also:October he would be " See also:shooting See also:hares at Creisau," and with this confidence the German III. and IV. armies left the vicinity of Sedan on the 4th of September. The march called for no more than good staff arrangements, and the two armies arrived before Paris a fortnight later and gradually encircled the place—the III. army on the south, the IV. on the north side—in the last days of September. Headquarters were established at See also:Versailles.

Meanwhile the Third See also:

Empire had fallen, giving place on the 4th of September to a republican Government of See also:National See also:Defence, which made its See also:appeal to, and evoked, the spirit of 1992. Henceforward the French nation, which had left the conduct of the war to the See also:regular army and had been little more than an excited spectator, took the See also:burden upon itself. The regular army, indeed, still contained more than 500,000 men (chiefly recruits and reservists), and 5o,000 sailors, See also:marines, dc•uaniers, &c., were also available. But the Garde See also:Mobile, framed by Marshal Niel in 1868, doubled this figure, and the addition of the Garde Nationale, called into existence on the 15th of September, and including all able-bodied men of from 31 to 6o years of See also:age, more than trebled it. The German staff had of course to reckon on the Garde Mobile, and did so beforehand, but they wholly underestimated both its effective members and its willingness, while, possessing themselves a See also:system in which all the military elements of the German nation stood close behind ' The 13th corps (See also:Vinoy), which had followed MacMahon's army at some distance, was not involved in the See also:catastrophe of Sedan, and by good See also:luck as well as good management evaded the German pursuit and returned safely to Paris.the troops of the active army, they ignored the potentialities of the Garde Nationale. Meanwhile, both as a contrast to the events that centred on Paris and because in point of time they were decided for the most part in the weeks immediately following Sedan, we must briefly allude to the sieges conducted by the Germans—Paris (q.v.), Metz (q.v.) and Belfort (q.v.) excepted. Old and ruined as many of them were, the French fortresses possessed consider-able importance in the eyes of the Germans. Strassburg, in particular, the See also:key of See also:Alsace, the See also:standing menace to South Germany and the most conspicuous of the spoils of See also:Louis XIV.'s Raubkriege, was an obvious See also:target. Operations were begun on the 9th of August, three days after Worth, General v. Werder's corps (Baden troops and Prussian See also:Landwehr) making the See also:siege. The French commandant, General Uhrich, surrendered after a stubborn resistance on the 28th of September. Of the smaller fortresses many, being practically unarmed and without garrisons, capitulated at once.

See also:

Toul, defended by See also:Major Huck with 2000 mobiles, resisted for See also:forty days, and drew upon itself the efforts of 13,000 men and roo guns. Verdun, commanded by General See also:Guerin de Waldersbach, held out till after the fall of Metz. Some of the fortresses lying to the north of the Prussian line of advance on Paris, e.g. See also:Mezieres, resisted up to See also:January 1871, though of course this was very largely due to the diminution of pressure caused by the See also:appearance of new French field armies in October. On the 9th of September a See also:strange incident took place at the surrender of See also:Laon. A See also:powder See also:magazine was blown up by the soldiers in charge and 300 French and a few German soldiers were killed by the See also:explosion. But as the Germans advanced, their lines of communication were thoroughly organized, and the See also:belt of country between Paris and the Prussian frontier subdued and garrisoned. Most of these fortresses were small town enceintes, dating from See also:Vauban's time, and open, under the new conditions of warfare, to concentric See also:bombardment from positions formerly out of range, upon which the besieger could place as many guns as he See also:chose to employ. In addition they were usually deficient in armament and stores and garrisoned by newly-raised troops. Belfort, where the defenders strained every See also:nerve to keep the besiegers out of bombarding range, and Paris formed the only exceptions to this general See also:rule. The policy of the new French government was defined by Jules See also:Favre on the 6th of September. " It is for the king of Prussia, who has declared that he is making war on The the Empire and not on France, to stay his hand; we Defense shall not cede an See also:inch of our territory or a See also:stone of our Nation-fortresses." These proud words, so often ridiculed See also:ale." as empty bombast, were the prelude of a national effort which re-established France in the eyes of Europe as a great power, even though provinces and fortresses were ceded in the See also:peace that that effort proved unable to avert.

They were translated into action by See also:

Leon See also:Gambetta, who escaped from Paris in a See also:balloon on the 7th of October, and established the headquarters of the defence at See also:Tours, where already the " Delegation " of the central government—which had decided to remain in Paris-had concentrated the machinery of government. Thenceforward Gambetta and his See also:principal assistant de See also:Freycinet directed the whole war in the open country, co-ordinating it, as best they could with the See also:precarious means of communication at their disposal, with See also:Trochu's military operations in and round the See also:capital. His critics—Gambetta's See also:personality was such as to ensure him numerous enemies among the higher See also:civil and military officials, over whom, in the interests of La Patrie, he rode rough-shodhave acknowledged the fact, which is patent enough in any case. that nothing but Gambetta's See also:driving See also:energy enabled France in a few weeks to create and to equip twelve army corps, representing See also:thirty-six divisions (600,000 rifles and 1400 guns), after all her organized regular field troops had been destroyed or neutralized. But it is claimed that by undue interference with the generals at the front, by presuming to dictate their plans of campaign, and by forcing them to act when the troops were unready, Gambetta and de Freycinet nullified the efforts of themselves and the rest of the nation and subjected France Later operations. to a humiliating treaty of peace. We cannot here discuss the See also:justice or injustice of such a general condemnation, or even whether in individual instances Gambetta trespassed too far into the See also:special domain of the soldier. But even the brief narrative given below must at least suggest to the reader the existence amongst the generals and higher officials of a dead See also:weight of passive resistance to the Delegation's orders, of unnecessary distrust of the qualities of the improvised troops, and above all of the utter fear of responsibility that twenty years of literal obedience had bred. The closest study of the war cannot lead to any other conclusion than this, that whether or not Gambetta as a strategist took the right course in general or in particular cases, no one else would have taken any course whatever. On the approach of the enemy Paris hastened its preparations for defence to the utmost, while in the provinces, out of reach of the German cavalry, new army corps were rapidly organized out of the few constituted regular units not involved in the previous catastrophes, the See also:depot troops and the mobile national guard. The first-fruits of these efforts were seen in See also:Beauce, where early in October important masses of French troops prepared not only to See also:bar the further progress of the invader but actually to relieve Paris. The so-called " fog of war "—the armed inhabitants, francs-tireurs, sedentary national guard and volunteers—prevented the German cavalry from venturing far out from the infantry camps around Paris, and behind this screen the new 15th army corps assembled on the See also:Loire. But an untimely demonstration of force alarmed the Germans, all of whom, from Moltke downwards, had hitherto disbelieved in the existence of the French new formations, and the still unready 15th corps found itself the target of an expedition of the I.

Bavarian corps, which drove the defenders out of See also:

Orleans after a See also:sharp struggle, while at the same time another expedition swept the western part of Beauce, sacked See also:Chateaudun as a punishment for its brave defence, and returned via See also:Chartres, which was occupied. After these events the French forces disappeared from German eyes for some weeks. D'Aurelle de Paladines, the commander of the " Army of the Loire " (15th and 16th corps), improvised a See also:camp of instruction at Salbris in See also:Sologne, several marches out of reach, and subjected his raw troops to a stern regime of See also:drill and discipline. At the same time an "Army of the West" began to gather on the side of Le Mans. This army was almost imaginary, yet rumours of its existence and numbers led the German commanders into the gravest errors, for they soon came to suspect that the See also:main army lay on that side and not on the Loire, and this mistaken impression governed the German dispositions up to the very See also:eve of the decisive events around Orleans in See also:December. Thus when at last D'Aurelle took the offensive from Tours (whither he had transported his forces, now 1oo,000 strong) against the position of the I. Bavarian corps near Orleans, he found his task easy. The Bavarians, out-numbered and unsupported, were defeated with heavy losses in the battle of Coulmiers (See also:November 9), and, had it not been for the inexperience, want of See also:combination, and other technical weaknesses of the French, they would have been annihilated. What the results of such a victory as Coulmiers might have been, had it been won by a fully organized, smoothly working army of the same strength, it is difficult to overestimate. As it was, the retirement of the Bavarians rang the alarm See also:bell all along the line of the German positions, and that was all. Then once again, instead of following up its success, the French army disappeared from view. The victory had emboldened the " fog of war " to make renewed efforts, and resistance to the pressure of the German cavalry See also:grew day by day.

The Bavarians were reinforced by two Prussian divisions and by all available cavalry commands, and constituted as an " army detachment " under the grand-duke See also:

Friedrich Franz of See also:Mecklenburg-See also:Schwerin to See also:deal with the Army of the Loire, the strength of which was far from being accurately known. Meantime the See also:capitulation of Metz on the 28th of October had set free the veterans of Prince Frederick Charles, the best troops in the German army, for field operations. The latter were at first misdirected to the upper See also:Seine, and yet another opportunity arose for the French to raise the siege of Paris. But D'Aurelle utilized the time he had gained in strengthening the army and in imparting drill and discipline to the new units which gathered round the original nucleus of the 15th and 16th corps. All this was, however, unknown and even unsuspected at the German headquarters, and the invaders, feeling the approaching crisis, became more than uneasy as to their prospects of maintaining the siege of Paris. At this moment, in the See also:middle of November, the general situation was as follows: the German III. and Meuse armies, investing Paris, had had to throw off important detachments to protect the enterprise, which they had or leans undertaken on the assumption that no further field campaign. armies of the enemy were to be encountered. The maintenance of their communications with Germany, relatively unimportant when the struggle took place in the circumstances of field warfare, had become supremely necessary, now that the army had come to a standstill and undertaken a great siege, which required heavy guns and See also:constant replenishment of ammunition and stores. The rapidity of the German invasion had left no time for the proper organization and full garrisoning of these communications, which were now threatened, not merely by the Army of the Loire, but by other force's assembling on the area protected by See also:Langres and Belfort. The latter, under General Cambriels, were held in check and no more by the Baden troops and reserve units (XIV. German corps) under General Werder, and eventually without arousing attention they were able to send 40,000 men to the Army of the Loire. This army, still around Orleans, thus came to number perhaps 150,000 men, and opposed to it, about the 14th of November, the Germans had only the Army Detachment of about 40,000, the II. army being still distant. It was under these conditions that the famous Orleans campaign took place.

After many vicissitudes of fortune, and with many misunderstandings between Prince Frederick Charles, Moltke and the grand-duke, the Germans were ultimately victorious, thanks principally to the brilliant fighting of the X. corps at See also:

Beaune-la-Rolande(28th of November), which was followed by the battle of Loigny-Poupry on the 2nd of December and the second capture of Orleans after heavy fighting on the 4th of December. The result of the capture of Orleans was the severance of the two wings of the French army, henceforward commanded respectively by See also:Chanzy and Bourbaki. The latter fell back at once and hastily, though not closely pursued, to See also:Bourges. But Chanzy, opposing the Detachment between See also:Beaugency and the Forest of Marchenoir, was of sterner See also:metal, and in the five days' general engagement around Beaugency (December 7-11) the Germans gained little or no real advantage. Indeed their solitary material success, the capture of Beaugency, was due chiefly to the fact that the French there were subjected to conflicting orders from the military and the governmental authorities. Chanzy then abandoned little but the field of battle, and on the grand-duke's representations Prince Frederick Charles, leaving a See also:mere screen to impose upon Bourbaki (who allowed himself to be deceived and remained inactive), hurried thither with the II. army. After that Chanzy was rapidly driven north-westward, though always presenting a stubborn front. The Delegation left Tours and betook itself to See also:Bordeaux, whence it directed the government for the rest of the war. But all this continuous marching and fighting, and the growing severity of the See also:weather, compelled Prince Frederick Charles to call a halt for a few days. About the 19th of December, therefore, the Germans (II. army and Detachment) were closed up in the region of Chartres, Orleans, See also:Auxerre and Fontainebleau, Chanzy along the river See also:Sarthe about Le Mans and Bourbaki still passive towards Bourges. During this, as during other halts, the French government and its generals occupied themselves with fresh plans of campaign, the former with an eager See also:desire for results, the latter (Chanzy excepted) with many misgivings. Ultimately, and fatally, it was decided that Bourbaki, whom nothing could move towards Orleans, should depart for the south-east, with a view to relieving Belfort and striking perpendicularly against the long line of the Germans' communications.

This movement, bold to the point of extreme rashness judged by any theoretical rules of strategy, seems to have been suggested by de Freycinet. As the execution of it fell actually into incapable hands, it is difficult to judge what would have been the result had a Chanzy or a See also:

Faidherbe been in command of the French. At any rate it was vicious in so far as immediate advantages were sacrificed to hopes of ultimate success which Gambetta and de Freycinet did wrong to See also:base on Bourbaki's See also:powers of generalship. Late in December, for good or evil, Bourbaki marched off into Franche-See also:Comte and ceased to be a See also:factor in the Loire campaign. A mere calculation of time and space sufficed to show the German headquarters that the moment had arrived to demolish the stubborn Chanzy. Prince Frederick Charles resumed the interrupted offensive, pushing westward with four corps and four cavalry divisions Le See also:Maas, which converged on Le Mans. There on the loth, 11th and 12th of January 1871 a stubbornly contested battle ended with the retreat of the French, who owed their defeat solely to the misbehaviour of the See also:Breton mobiles. These, after deserting their See also:post on the battlefield at a mere See also:threat of the enemy's infantry, fled in disorder and infected with their terrors the men in the reserve camps of instruction, which See also:broke up in turn. But Chanzy, resolute as ever, drew off his field army intact towards See also:Laval, where a freshly raised corps joined him. The prince's army was far too exhausted to deliver another effective See also:blow, and the main See also:body of it gradually drew back into better quarters, while the grand duke departed for the north to aid in opposing Faidherbe. Some idea of the See also:strain to which the invaders had been subjected may be gathered from the fact that army corps, originally 30,000 strong, were in some cases reduced to lo,000 and even fewer bayonets. And at this moment Bourbaki was at the head of 120,000 men!

Indeed, so threatening seemed the situation on the Loire, though the French south of that river between See also:

Gien and See also:Blois were mere isolated brigades, that the prince hurried back from Le Mans to Orleans to take See also:personal command. A fresh French corps, bearing the number 25, and being the twenty-first actually raised during the war, appeared in the field towards Blois. Chanzy was again at the head of 156,000 men. He was about to take the offensive against the 40,000 Germans left near Le Mans when to his See also:bitter disappointment he received the news of the See also:armistice. " We have still France," he had said to his staff, undeterred by the news of the capitulation of Paris, but now he had to submit, for even if his improvised army was still cheerful, there were many significant tokens that the See also:people at large had sunk into apathy and hoped to avoid worse terms of peace by discontinuing the contest at once. So ended the critical See also:period of the " Defense nationale." It may be taken to have lasted from the day of Coulmiers to the last day of Le Mans, and its central point was the battle of Beaune-la-Rolande. Its characteristics were, on the German side, inadequacy of the system of strategy practised, which became palpable as soon as the See also:organs of See also:reconnaissance met with serious resistance, misjudgment of and indeed contempt for the fighting powers of " new formations," and the rise of a spirit of ferocity in the man in the ranks, born of his resentment at the continuance of the war and the ceaseless sniping of the See also:franc-tireur's rifle and the See also:peasant's shot-gun. On the French side the continual efforts of the statesmen to stimulate the generals to decisive efforts, coupled with actual suggestions as to the plans of the campaign to be followed (in See also:default, be it said, of the generals themselves producing such plans), and the professional soldiers' distrust of half-trained troops, acted and reacted upon one another in such a way as to neutralize the powerful, if disconnected and erratic, forces that the war and the See also:Republic had unchained. As for the soldiers themselves, their most conspicuous qualities were their uncomplaining endurance of fatigues and wet bivouacs, and in action theircapacity for a single great effort and no more. But they were unreliable in the hands of the See also:veteran regular general, because they were heterogeneous in recruiting, and unequal in experience and military qualities, and the French staff in those days was wholly incapable of moving masses of troops with the rapidity demanded by the enemy's methods of war, so that on the whole it is difficult to know whether to wonder more at their missing success or at their so nearly achieving it. The decision, as we have said, was fought out on the Loire and the Sarthe. Nevertheless the glorious See also:story of the " Defense nationale " includes two other important campaigns—that of Faidherbe in the north and that of Bourbaki in the east.

In the north the organization of the new formations was begun by Dr Testelin and General Farre. Bourbaki held the command for a short time in November before proceeding to Tours, but the active command in field h:r erbe s operations came into the hands of Faidherbe, a general campaign. whose natural powers, so far from being cramped by years of peace routine and court repression, had been developed by a career of See also:

pioneer warfare and colonial See also:administration. General Farre was his capable chief of staff. Troops were raised from fugitives from Metz and Sedan, as well as from depot troops and the Garde Mobile, and several minor successes were won by the national troops in the Seine valley, for here, as on the side of the Loire, mere detachments of the investing army round Paris were almost powerless. But the capitulation of Metz came too soon for the full development of these See also:sources of military strength, and the German I. army under Manteuffel, released from duty at Metz, marched north-eastward, capturing the minor fortresses on its way. Before Faidherbe assumed command, Farre had fought several severe actions near See also:Amiens, but, greatly outnumbered, had been defeated and forced to retire behind the See also:Somme. Another French general, See also:Briand, had also engaged the enemy without success near See also:Rouen. Faidherbe assumed the command on the 3rd of December, and promptly moved forward. A general engagement on the little river Hallue (December 23), east-north-east of Amiens, was fought with no decisive results, but Faidherbe, feeling that his troops were only capable of winning victories in the first See also:rush, drew them off on the 24th. His next effort, at Bapaume (January 2-3, 1871), was more successful, but its effects were counterbalanced by the surrender of the fortress of Peronne (January 9) and the consequent See also:establishment of the Germans on the line of the Somme. Meanwhile the Rouen troops had been contained by a strong German detachment, and there was no further See also:chance of succouring Paris from the north. But Faidherbe, like Chanzy, was far from despair, and in spite of the deficiencies of his troops in equipment (50,000 pairs of shoes, supplied by See also:English contractors, proved to have See also:paper soles), he risked a third great battle at St Quentin (January 19).

This time he was severely defeated, though his loss in killed and wounded was about equal to that of the Germans, who were commanded by Goeben. Still the attempt of the Germans to surround him failed and he drew off his forces with his artillery and trains unharmed. The Germans, who had been greatly impressed by the solidity of his army, did not pursue him far, and Faidherbe was preparing for a fresh effort when he received orders to suspend hostilities. The last See also:

episode is Bourbaki's campaign in the east, with its mournful close at See also:Pontarlier. Before the crisis of the last week of November, the French forces under General See also:Cremer, Cambriels' successor, had been so far successful in minor enterprises that, as mentioned above, the right wing of the Loire army, severed from the left by the battle of Orleans and subsequently held inactive at Bourges and See also:Nevers, was ordered to Franche Comte to take the offensive against the XIV. corps and other German troops there, to relieve Belfort and to strike a blow across the invaders' line of communications. But there were many delays in execution. The staff work, which was at no time satisfactory in the French armies of 187o, was complicated by the See also:snow, the See also:bad state of the roads, and the mountainous nature of the country, and Bourbaki, a brave general of division in action, but irresolute and pretentious as a commander in chief, was not the man to See also:cope with the situation. Only the furious courage and patient endurance of hardships of the See also:rank and See also:file, and the good qualities of some of the generals, such as See also:Clinchant, Cremer and Billot, and junior staff officers such as Major Brugere (afterwards generalissimo of the French army), secured what success was attained. Werder, the German commander, warned of the imposing concentration of the French, evacuated See also:Dijon and See also:Dole just in The time to avoid the blow and rapidly drew together his campaign forces behind the Ognon above See also:Vesoul. A furious in the attack on one of his divisions at Villersexel (January 9) East' -- cost him 2000 prisoners as well as his killed and wounded, and Bourbaki, heading for Belfort, was actually nearer to the fortress than the Germans. But at the crisis more time was wasted, Werder (who had almost lost hope of maintaining himself and had received both encouragement and stringent instructions to do so) slipped in front of the French, and took up a long weak line of defence on the river Lisaine, almost within cannon shot of Belfort. The cumbrous French army moved up and attacked him there with 15o,000 against 6o,0oo (January 15-17,1871).

It was at last repulsed, thanks chiefly toBourbaki's inability to handle his forces, and, to the bitter disappointment of officers and men alike, he ordered a retreat, leaving Belfort to its See also:

fate. Ere this, so urgent was the necessity of assisting Werder, Manteuffel had been placed at the head of a new Army of the South. Bringing two corps from the I. army opposing Faidherbe and calling up a third from the armies around Paris, and a fourth from the II. army, Manteuffel hurried southward by Langres to the See also:Saone. Then, hearing of Werder's victory off the Lisaine, he deflected the march so as to cut off Bourbaki's retreat, See also:drawing off the left flank guard of the latter (commanded with much eclat and little real effect by See also:Garibaldi) by a sharp feint attack on Dijon. The pressure of Werder in front and Manteuffel in flank gradually forced the now thoroughly disheartened French forces towards the Swiss frontier, and 'Bourbaki, realizing at once the ruin of his army and his own incapacity to re-establish its efficiency, shot himself, though not fatally, on the 26th of January. Clinchant, his successor, acted promptly enough to remove the immediate danger, but on the 29th he was informed of the armistice without at the same time being told that Belfort and the eastern See also:theatre of war had been on Jules Favre's demand expressly excepted from its operation.l Thus the French, the leaders distracted by doubts and the worn-out soldiers fully aware that the war was practically over, stood still, while Manteuffel completed his preparations for hemming them in. On the 1st of See also:February General Clinchant led his troops into See also:Switzerland, where they were disarmed, interned and well cared for by the authorities of the neutral state. The rearguard fought a last action with the advancing Germans before passing the frontier. On the 16th, by order of the French government, Belfort capitulated, but it was not until the rith of March that the Germans took possession of Bitche, the little fortress on the Vosges, where in the early days of the war de Failly had illustrated so signally the want of concerted action and the neglect of opportunities which had throughout proved the bane of the French armies. The losses of the Germans during the whole war were 28,000 dead and 101,000 wounded and disabled, those of the French, 156,000 dead (17,000 of whom died, of sickness and wounds, as prisoners in German hands) and 143,000 wounded and disabled. 720,000 men surrendered to the Germans or to the authorities of neutral states, and at the close of the war there were still 250,000 troops on See also:foot, with further resources not immediately available to the number of 280,000 more. In this connexion, and as evidence of the respective numerical yields of the German system working normally and of the French improvised for the emergency, we quote from Berndt (Zahl im Kriege) the following See also:comparative figures: ' Jules Favre, it appears, neglected to inform Gambetta of the exception.

End of July . . . French 250,000, Germans 384,000 under arms. Middle of November „ Soo,000 „ 425,000 „ After the surrender of Paris and the disarmament of Bourbaki's army . „ The date of the armistice was the 28th of January, and that of the ratification of the treaty of Frankfurt the 23rd of May 1871. General.—German See also:

official See also:history, Der See also:deutsch franzosische Krieg (Berlin, 1872–1881; English and French See also:translations) ; monographs of the German general staff (Kriegsgesch. Einzelschriften) ; Moltke, Gesch. See also:des deutsch-See also:franzos. Krieges (Berlin, 1891; English See also:translation) and Gesammelte Schriften des G. F. M. Grafen v. Moltke (Berlin, 1900— ) ; French official history, La Guerre de 18go–1871 (Paris, 1902– ) (the fullest and most accurate See also:account) ; P.

Lehautcourt (General Palat), Hist. de la guerre d e g 870-1871 (Paris, 1901–1907) ; v. Verdy du Vernois, Studien fiber den Krieg . auf Grundlage 1870–1871 (Berlin, 1892–1896) ; G. See also:

Cardinal von Widdern, Kritische Take 1870—1871 (French translation, Journees critiques). Events preceding the war are dealt with in v. Bernhardi, Zwischen zwei Kriegen; See also:Baron Stoffel, Rapports militaires 1866–1870 (Paris, 1871; English translation) ; G. See also:Lehmann, See also:Die Mobilmachung 1870-1871 (Berlin, 1905). For the war in See also:Lorraine: Prince Kraft of 'See also:Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, Briefe fiber Strategie (English translation, Letters on Strategy) ; F. Foch, Conduite de la guerre, pt. H.; H. Bonnal, Manoeuvre de Saint Privat (Paris, 1904–1906); See also:Maistre, Spicheren (Paris, 1908); v. Schell, Die Operationen der I. Armee unter Gen. von Steinmetz (Berlin, 1872 ; English translation) ; F.

Hoenig, Taktik der Zukunft (English translation), and 24 Stunden Moltke'schen Strategie (Berlin, 1892; English and French translations). For the war in Alsace and See also:

Champagne: H. Kunz, Schlacht von Worth (Berlin, 1891), and later works by the same author; H. Bonnal, Froschweiler (Paris, 1899) ; Hahnke, Die Operationen des III. Armee bis Sedan (Berlin, 1873; French translation). For the war in the Provinces: v. der See also:Goltz, Leon Gambetta and seine Armeen (Berlin, 1877) ; Die Operationen der II. Armee an die Loire (Berlin, 1875) ; Die sieben Tage von Le Mans (Berlin, 1873) ; Kunz, Die Zusammensetzung der franzos. Provinzialheeren; de Freycinet, La Guerre en See also:province (Paris, 1871); L. A. See also:Hale, The People's War (See also:London, 1904) ; Hoenig, Volkskrieg an die Loire (Berlin, 1892) ; Bldme, Operationen v. Sedan bis zum Ende d. Kriegs (Berlin, 1872 ; English translation) ; v.

Schell, Die Operationen der I. Armee unter Gen. v. Goeben (Berlin, 1873; English translation) ; See also:

Count Wartensleben, Feldzug der Nordarmee unter Gen. v. Manteuffel (Berlin, 1872), Operationen der Sudarmee (Berlin, 1872; English translation) ; Faidherbe, Campagne de l'armee du See also:nord (Paris, 1872). For the sieges: Frobenius, Kriegsgesch. Beispiele d. Festungskriegs aus d. deutsch.-franz. Kg. (Berlin, 1899–1900) ; Goetze, Tatigkeit der deutschen Ingenieuren (Berlin, 1871; English translation). The most useful bibliography is that of General Palat (” P. Lehautcourt "). (C.

F.

End of Article: FRANCKEN

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