See also:

• GENERAL
• GENERAL (Lat. generalis, of or relating to a genus, kind or class)

Judgment and Conception.—The emphasis now laid on judgment, the recovery from See also:

• HUME, ALEXANDER (c. 1557-1609)
• HUME, DAVID (1711-1776)
• HUME, JOSEPH (1777-1855)

It is a decision of the validity of an idea requiring will (Bergmann, following Brentano). g. Judgment (Urtheil) expresses that two ideas belong together: " by-judgment " (Beurtheilung) is the reaction of will expressing the validity or invalidity of the combination of ideas (Windelband, following Bergmann, but distinguishing the decision of validity from the judgment). h. Judgment is consciousness of the identity or difference and of the causal relations of the given; naming the actual combinations of the data, but also requiring a priori categories of the understanding, the notions of identity, difference and causality, as principles of thought or See also:

• LAWS

" I am a See also:

• MAN
• MAN, ISLE OF (anc. Mona)

It requires no comparison in See also:

• ORDER
• ORDER (through Fr. ordre, for earlier ordene, from Lat. ordo, ordinis, rank, service, arrangement; the ultimate source is generally taken to be the root seen in Lat. oriri, rise, arise, begin; cf. " origin ")
• ORDER, HOLY

These are conclusions which primarily are inferred from sensory and memorial judgments; and so far as inference starts from sense of something sensible in the present, and from memory after sense of something sensible in the past, and concludes similar things, inferential judgments are indirect beliefs in being and in existence beyond ideas. When from the sensible pressures between the parts of my mouth, which I feel and remember and See also:

• JUDGE (Lat. judex, Fr. juge)

" I exist," or by the subject, e.g. " I who exist think." There are indeed See also:

• DIFFERENCES, CALCULUS OF (Theory of Finite Differences)

They resemble them in that they are beliefs in being signified by the copula. They are beliefs in things of a sort; for, after all, ideas and names are things; their objects, even though non-existent, are at all events things conceivable or nameable; and therefore we are able to make judgments that things, non-existent but conceivable or nameable, are (or are not) determined in a particular manner. Thus the judgment about a centaur is the belief, " A conceivable centaur is a fiction of the poets," and the judgment about a square circle is the belief, " A so-called square circle is an impossibility." But, though beliefs that things of some sort are (or are not) determined, these secondary judgments fall short of primary judgments of existence. Whereas in a primary judgment there is a further belief, signified by subject or predicate, that the thing is an existing thing in the sense of being a real thing (e.g. a man), different from the idea of it as well as from the name for it; in a secondary judgment there is no further belief that the thing has any existence beyond the idea (e.g. a centaur), or even beyond the name (e.g. a square circle) : though the idea or name exists, there is no belief that anything represented by idea or name exists. Starting, then, from this fundamental distinction between judgments of existence and judgments of non-existence, we may hope to See also:

• STEER, PAUL WILSON (186o– )

"There is not an immortal man." E. "There is not a live See also:

• STONE
• STONE (0. Eng. shin; the word is common to Teutonic languages, cf. Ger. Stein, Du. steen, Dan. and Swed. sten; the root is also seen in Gr. aria, pebble)
• STONE, CHARLES POMEROY (1824-1887)
• STONE, EDWARD JAMES (1831-1897)
• STONE, FRANK (1800-1859)
• STONE, GEORGE (1708—1764)
• STONE, LUCY [BLACKWELL] (1818-1893)
• STONE, MARCUS (184o— )
• STONE, NICHOLAS (1586-1647)

The idea of the centaur does exist in our imagination, and inside our heads, and the name of it in our mouths. But the point is that the centaur conceived and named does not exist beyond the idea of it and the name for it; it is not, like a man, a real thing which is neither the idea of it nor the name for it. No amount of subtlety will remove the difference between a categorical judgment of existence, e.g. " An existing man is mortal," and a categorical judgment of non-existence, e.g. " A conceivable centaur is a fiction," because in the former we believe and mean that the thing exists beyond the idea, and in the latter we do not. If, contrary to usage, we choose to call the latter a judgment of existence, there is no use in quarrelling about words; but we must insist that new terms must in that See also:

• CASE
• CASE, JOHN (d. 1600)

3. Particular and Universal Judgments.—Aristotle, by distinguishing affirmative and negative, particular and universal, made the fourfold See also:

• CLASSIFICATION (Lat. classis, a class, probably from the root cal-, cla-, as in Gr. icaMce, clamor)

Sigwart, indeed, is deceived both about particulars and universals. On the one hand, some particulars are not judgments of existence, e.g. " some imaginary deities are goddesses "; on the other hand, some universals are not judgments of non-existence, e.g. "every existing man is mortal." Neither kind is always a judgment of existence, but each is some-times the one and sometimes the other. In no case is a universal hypothetical, unless we think it under a condition; for in a universal judgment about the non-existing, e.g. about all conceivable centaurs, we do not think, " If anything is a centaur," because we do not believe that there are any; and in a universal judgment about the existent, e.g. about all existing men, we do not think, " If anything is a man," because we believe that there is a whole class of men existing at different times and places. The cause of Sigwart's See also:

• ERROR (Lat. error, from errare, to wander, to err)

When Bosanquet says that in " See also:

• HEAT (0. E. haktu, which like " hot," Old Eng. hat, is from the Teutonic type haita, hit, to be hot; cf. Ger. hitze, heiss; Dutch, hitte, heet, &c.)

But the expression is not necessary. Sensation irresistibly produces a judgment of existence without needing language. Children think long before they speak; and indeed, as mere vocal sounds are not speech, and as the See also:

• APPREHENSION (Lat. ad, to; prehendere, to seize)

But even the normal proposition in the syllogistic form tertii adjacentis, with subject, predicate and copula, is seldom a See also:

• COMPLETE

Here See also:

• SIR

In judgments, and therefore in propositions, indefinite predicates are the See also:

• RULE

" I am See also:

• BORN, IGNAZ, EDLER VON (1742–1791)

. If anything is a professor it is mortal. But both these unnatural forms, which are certainly not analyses of any conscious process of categorical reasoning, break down at once, because they cannot explain those moods in the third figure, e.g. Darapti, which reason from universal premises to a particular conclusion. Thus, in order to infer that some See also:

• WISE, HENRY ALEXANDER (1806-1876)
• WISE, ISAAC MAYER (1819-1900)

. No logic can be sound which leads to the following analysis: If anything is a body it is extended. If anything is a See also:

• PLANET (Gr. ssXavirrns, a wanderer)

But even Sigwart's errors are outdone by Lotze, who not only reduces " Every M is P " so " If S is M, S is P," but proceeds to reduce this hypothetical to the disjunctive, " If S is M, S is Pi or P2 or P3," and finds See also:

• FAULT (Mid. Eng. faute, through the French, from the popular Latin use of fallere, to fail; the originallof the Latin being replaced in English in the 15th century)

No M is P. No P is M. S is not M. S is not M. S is not M. .Neither S nor M . ' .S may be P. . ' .S may be P. is P. But (I) concludes with a mere repetition, (2) and (3) with a contingent " may be," which, as Aristotle says, also " may not be," and therefore nihil certo colligitur. The same See also:

• ANSWER (derived from and, against, and the same root as swear)

...Some S may be P. The only difference between these and the previous examples (2) and (3) is that, while those break the rule against two negative premises, these break that against undistributed See also:

• MIDDLE

The last supposed syllogism, namely, that having two affirmative premises and entailing an undistributed middle in the second figure, is accepted by Wundt under the See also:

• TITLE (0. Fr. title, mod. titre, from Lat. titulus)

R is M. ...Every `.', which is See also:

• COMMON

...No S is P. :.x=z. :.x=z. Now, there is no doubt that, especially in mathematical equations, universal conclusions are obtainable from convertible premises expressed in these ways. But the question is how the premises must be thought, and they must be thought in the converse way to produce a logical conclusion. Thus, we must think in (r) ` All P is M " to avoid illicit process of the major, in (2) "All y is z" to avoid undistributed middle, in (3) "All x is y" to avoid illicit process of the minor. Indeed, it is the very essence of a convertible judgment to think it in both orders, and especially to think it in the order necessary to an inference from it. Accordingly, however expressed, the syllogisms quoted above are, as thought, ordinary syllogisms, (r) being Camestres in the second figure, (2) and (3) Barbara in the first figure. Aristotle, indeed, was as well aware as German logicians of the force of convertible premises; but he was also aware that they require no See also:

• SPECIAL

It is the same with all the recent attempts to extend the syllogism beyond its rules, which are not liable to exceptions, because they follow from the nature of syllogistic inference from universal to particular. To give the name of syllogism to inferences which infringe the general rules against undistributed middle, illicit process, two negative premises, non-sequitur from negative to affirmative, and the introduction of what is not in the premises into the conclusion, and which consequently infringe the special rules against affirmative conclusions in the second figure, and against universal conclusions in the third figure, is to open the See also:

• DOOR (corresponding to the Gr. Bbpa,. Lat. fores or valvae; the English word, with other forms common in allied languages, comes from the same Indo-European stem as the Gr. Obpa and Lat. fares)

All S is P. All M is S. ...AllSisP. :.All S is M. ..All M is P. Proceeding from one order to the other, by converting one of the premises, and substituting the conclusion as premise for the other premise, so as to deduce the latter as conclusion, is what he calls circular inference; and he remarked that the process is fallacious unless it contains propositions which are convertible, as in mathematical equations. Further, he perceived that the difference between the progressive and regressive orders extends from See also:

• MATHEMATICS (Gr. /saBnµar1Kil, Sc. vOcvn or E7rlQTt'µn; from p iN.La, "learning" or "science ")

2. Regression. What is spherical waxes. What waxes is spherical. The moon is spherical. The moon waxes. .The moon waxes. ... The moon is spherical. These two kinds of syllogism are synthesis and analysis in the See also:

• ANCIENT
• ANCIENT (also spelt ANTIENT; derived, through the Fr. ancien, old, from the late Lat. antianum, from ante, before)

But the full value of the ancient theory of these processes cannot be appreciated until we recognize that as Aristotle planned them See also:

• NEWTON
• NEWTON, ALFRED (1829–1907)
• NEWTON, JOHN (1725-1807)
• NEWTON, JOHN (1823-1895)
• NEWTON, SIR CHARLES THOMAS (1816-1894)
• NEWTON, SIR ISAAC (1642-1727)

Worse still, Jevons proceeded to confuse analytic deduction from consequence to ground with hypothetical deduction from ground to conseguence under the common term "inverse deduction." Wundt attempts, but in vain, to make a See also:

• COMPROMISE (pronounced compromize; through Fr. from Lat. compromittere)

Yet such is the See also:

• PASSION (post-classical Lat. passio, formed from pati, passus, to suffer, endure)

Since Mill's time, however, the logic of induction tends to revert towards syllogisms more like that of Aristotle. Jevons supposed induction to be inverse deduction, distinguished from See also:

• DIRECT

S is M. S is M. . . M and P are connected. . • . S is P. He agrees with Jevons in calling this second syllogism analytical deduction, and with Jevons and Sigwart in calling it hypothetical deduction. It is, in fact, a common point of Jevons, Sigwart and Wundt that the universal is not really a conclusion inferred from given particulars, but a hypothetical major premise from which given particulars are inferred, and that this major contains presuppositions of See also:

• CAUSATION

The result is that both Sigwart and Wundt transform the inductive process of adducing particular examples to induce a universal law into a deductive process of presupposing a universal law as a ground to deduce particular consequences. But we can easily extricate ourselves from these confusions by comparing induction with different kinds of deduction. The point about induction is that it starts from experience, and that, though in most classes we can experience only some particulars individually, yet we infer all. Hence induction cannot be reduced to Aristotle's inductive syllogism, because experience cannot give the convertible premise, " Every S is M, and every M is S " ; that "All A, B, C are magnets " is, but that " All magnets are A, B, C " is not, a fact of experience. For the same reason induction cannot be reduced to analytical deduction of the second kind in the form, S-P, M-S, . . M-P; because, though both end in a universal conclusion, the limits of experience prevent induction from such inference as: Every experienced magnet attracts iron. Every magnet whatever is every experienced magnet. Every magnet whatever attracts iron. Still less can induction be reduced to analytical deduction of the first kind in the form—P-M, S-P, . ' . S-M, of which Newton has See also:

• LEFT

But induction cannot start from a known law. Hence it is that Jevons, followed by Sigwart and Wundt, reduces it to deduction from a hypothesis in the form "Let every M be P, S is M, . . S is P." There is a superficial reseniblance between induction and this hypothetical deduction. Both in a way use given particulars as evidence. But in induction the given particulars are the evidence by which we discover the universal,, e.g. particular magnets attracing iron are the origin of an inference that all do; in hypothetical deduction, the universal is the evidence by which we explain the given particulars, as when we suppose undulating See also:

• AETHER, or ETHER (Gr. deli p, probably from caeca, I burn, though Plato in his Cratylus (410 B)

The See also:

• AXIOM (Gr. &iwµa)

A deduction is often like an induction, in inferring from particulars; the difference is that deduction combines a law in the major with the particulars in the minor premise, and infers syllogistically that the particulars of the minor have the predicate of the major premise, whereas induction uses the particulars simply as instances to generalize a law. An infallible sign of an induction is that the subject and predicate of the universal conclusion are merely those of the particular instances generalized; e.g. " These magnets attract iron, .. all do." This brings us to another source of error. As we have seen, Jevons, Sigwart and Wundt all think that induction contains a belief in causation, in a cause, or ground, which is not present in the particular facts of experience, but is contributed by a hypo-thesis added as a major premise to the particulars in order to explain them by the cause or ground. Not so; when an induction is causal, the particular instances are already, beliefs in particular causes, e.g. " My right hand is exerting pressure reciprocally with my left," " A, B, C magnets attract iron "; and the problem is to generalize these causes, not to introduce them. Induction is not introduction. It would make no difference to the form of induction, if, as Kant thought, the notion of causality is a priori; for even Kant thought that it is already contained in experience. But whether Kant be right or wrong, Wundt and his school are decidedly wrong in supposing " supplementary notions which are not contained in experience itself, but are gained by a process of logical treatment of this experience "; as if our behalf in causality could be neither a posteriori nor a priori, but beyond experience See also:

• WAKE (A.S. wacan, to " wake " or " watch ")
• WAKE, THOMAS (1297-1349)
• WAKE, WILLIAM (1657-1737)

When from the fact that the many crows in our experience are See also:

• BLACK
• BLACK, ADAM (1784-1874)
• BLACK, JEREMIAH SULLIVAN (1810–1883)
• BLACK, WILLIAM (1841-1898)

Different asthey are, the three kinds have something in common: first, they are all processes from similar to similar; secondly, they all consist in combining two judgments so as to cause at third, whether expressed in so many propositions or not; thirdly, as a judgment is a belief in being, they all proceed from premises which are beliefs in being to a conclusion which is a belief in being. Nevertheless, simple as this account appears, it is opposed in every point to recent logic. In the first place, the point of Bradley's logic is that " similarity is not a principle which works. What operates is identity, and that identity is a universal." This view makes inference easy: induction is all over before it begins; for, according to Bradley, " every one of the instances is already a universal proposition; and it is not a particular fact or phenomenon at all," so that the moment you observe that this magnet attracts iron, you ipso facto know that every magnet does so, and all that remains for deduction is to identify a second magnet as the same with the first, and conclude that it attracts iron. In dealing with Bradley's works we feel inclined to repeat what Aristotle says of the discourses of Socrates: they all exhibit excellence, cleverness, novelty and inquiry, but their truth is a difficult matter; and the Socratic See also:

• PARADOX (Gr. treat, beyond, contrary to, Sofia, opinion)

The consequence of this true metaphysics to logic is twofold: on the one hand, one singular or particular judgment, e.g. " this magnet attracts iron," is not another, e.g. " that magnet attracts iron," and neither is universal; on the other hand, a universal judgment, e.g. " every magnet attracts iron," means, distributively, that each individual magnet exerts its individual attraction, though it is similar to other magnets exerting similar attractions. A universal is not " one identical point," but one distributive whole. Hence in a syllogism, a middle term, e.g. magnets, is " absolutely the same," not in the sense of " one identical point " making each individual the same as any other, as Bradley supposes, but only in the sense of one whole class, or total of many similar individuals, e.g. magnets, each of which is separately though similarly a magnet, not magnet in general. Hence also induction is a real process, because, when we know that this individual magnet attracts iron, we are very far from knowing that all alike do so similarly; and the question of inductive logic, how we get from some similars to all similars, remains, as before, a difficulty, but not to be solved by the fallacy that inference is identification. Secondly, a subordinate point in Bradley's logic is that there are inferences which are not syllogisms; and this is true. But when he goes.on to propose, as a complete independent inference, " A is to the right of B, B is to the right of C, therefore A is to the right of C," he confuses two different operations. When A, B and C are objects of sense, their relative positions are matters, not of inference, but of observation; when they are not, there is an inference, but a syllogistic inference with a major premise. by ideas, is not an ideal construction, nor a process from idea to idea, nor a process from idea to thing, but a process from direct to indirect beliefs in things, and originally in existing things. Logic cannot, it is true, decide what these things are, nor what the senses know about them, without appealing to metaphysics and psychology.

But, as the science of inference, it can make sure that inference, on the one hand, starts from sensory judgments about sensible things and logically proceeds to inferential judgments about similar things beyond sense, and, on the other hand, cannot logically go beyond the similar. These are the limits within which logical inference works, because its nature essentially consists in proceeding from two judgments to another about similar things, existing or not. 6. Truth.—Finally, though sensory judgment is always true of its sensible object, inferential judgments are not always true, but are true so far as they are logically inferred, however in-directly, from sense; and knowledge consists of sense, memory after sense and logical inference from sense, which, we must remember, is not merely the See also:

• OUTER

But it will be said that Kant has proved that real truth, in the sense of the " agreement of knowledge wtth the object," is unattainable, because we could compare knowledge with the object only by knowing both. Sigwart, indeed, adopting Kant's See also:

• ARGUMENT

In this syllogistic analysis two points must always be considered: one, that we usually use premises in thought which we do not express; and the other, that we sometimes use them unconsciously, and therefore infer and reason unconsciously, in the manner excellently described by See also:

• ZELLER, EDUARD (1814-1908)

Inference then, though it is accompanied parity of reasoning. We return then to the old view of Aristotle, that truth is believing in being; that sense is true of its immediate objects, and reasoning from sense true of its mediate objects; and that logic is the science of reasoning with a view to truth, or Logica est ars ratiocinandi, ut discernatur verum a false. All we aspire to add is that, in order to attain to real truth, we must proceed gradually from sense, memory and experience through analogical particular inference, to inductive and deductive universal inference or reasoning. Logic is the science of all inference, beginning from sense and ending in reason. In conclusion, the logic of the last See also:

• QUARTER (through Fr. from Lat. quartarius, fourth part)

Brentano, Psychologie See also:

• EARN

G. Hibben, Inductive Logic (See also:

• EDINBURGH

E. See also:

• CONSTANCE
• CONSTANCE (Ger. Konstanz or Costnitz)
• CONSTANCE, COUNCIL OF
• CONSTANCE, LAKE OF (called by the Romans Lacus Brigantinus or lake of Bregenz, and now usually named in German Bodensee, as well as the " Swabian Sea ")

T. See also:

• LADD, GEORGE TRUMBULL (1842– )

Venn, Symbolic Logic (2nd ed., London, 1894) ; The Principles of Empirical or Inductive Logic (London, 1889) ; J. Volkelt, Erfahren and Denken (Hamburg and Leipzig, 1886); T. Welton, A See also:

• MANUAL

The See also:

• MOVEMENT

In seeking for a single material principle underlying the multiplicity of phenomena, the first nature-philosophers, Thales and the See also:

• REST (O. Eng. rest, reste, bed, cognate with other Teutonic forms, e.g. Ger. Rast, Riiste, rest, and probably Gothic Rasta, league, i.e. resting or stopping place)

Zeno's paradoxes, notably, for example, the See also:

• PUZZLE

25, from the lost Sophistes of Aristotle. 3 Plato and See also:

• PLATONISM

The spirit of debate run See also:

• RIOT (0. Fr. riote, of uncertain etymology)

He construes the give and take of the debate-See also:

• GAME

The nihilism of Gorgias from the Eleatic From of view of See also:

• BARE

Arise. See also:

• TOP (cf. Dan. top, Ger. Topf, also meaning pot)

The subject-predicate relation fails really to arise. Euclides7 found no difficulty in fixing Antisthenes' mode of illustrating his simple elements by comparison, and therewith perhaps the induction " of Socrates, with the See also:

• DILEMMA (Gr. &Xuµua, a double proposition, from bi- and aµ(36.vetv)

Upon this it bases a theory of predication, which, however, is compatible with more than one See also:

• READING

The formula for an indefinite number of particular things in particular places at particular times, and all of them presentable in sensuous imagery of a given time and place, is not itself presentable in sensuous imagery side by side with the individual members of the See also:

• GROUP

Io7. II The Sophists. See also:

• ANNE (1665-1714)
• ANNE (1693-1740)

. Plato replies with the doctrine of the interpenetration of ideas, obviously not of all with all, but of some with some, the formula of identity in difference within thought itself. Nor can the opponent fairly refuse to admit it, if he affirms the participation of the identical with being, and denies the participation of difference with being, or affirms it with not-being. The Sophistes shows among other things that an identity-philosophy breaks down into a See also:

• DUALISM (from rare Lat. dualis, containing two, from duo)

We must bisect as far as may be, but the division is after all to he into limbs, not parts. The later examples of the Politicus show that the permission of three or more co-See also:

• ORDINATE

91b 12 sqq. Epicrates gives a picture of it at See also:

• WORK

It is this unity of apperception which enables us to combine the data of more than one sense, to affirm reality, unreality, identity, difference, unity, plurality and so forth, as also the good, the beautiful and their contraries. Plato calls these pervasive factors in knowledge Koava, and describes them as developed by the soul in virtue of its own activity. They are objects of its reflection and made explicit in the few with pains and gradually.4 That they are not, however, psychological or acquired categories, due to " the workmanship of the mind " as conceived by See also:

• LOCKE, GOTTFRIED CHRISTIAN FRIEDRICH (1791–1855)
• LOCKE, JOHN (1632-1704)
• LOCKE, MATTHEW (c. 1630-1677)

4 Theaetetus, 186c. ' See also:

• TIMAEUS (c. 345—c. 250 B.e.)

2, iii. 5. 10 For Plato's Logic, the controversies as to the genuineness of the dialogues may be treated summarily. The Theaetetus labours under no suspicion. The Sophistes is apparently matter for animadversion by Aristotle in the Metaphysics and elsewhere, but derives stronger support from the testimonies to the Politicus which presumes it. The Politicus and Philebus are guaranteed by the use made of them in Aristotle's See also:

• ETHICS
• ETHICS, SHAFTESBURY, HOBBES

Therrl is even formal recognition of the fact that to advance in dia'o tg* c is a greater thing than to bring any special inquiry to a successful issue.3 But to the end there is a lack of See also:

• INTEREST

Theaetetus, Sophistes and Politicos in the order named. The Philebus seems to presuppose Politicos, 283-284, but if this be an error, it will affect the logical theory not at all. There remains the Parmenides. It can scarcely be later than the Sophistes. The antinomies with which it concludes are more naturally taken as a prelude to the discussion of the Sophistes than as an unnecessary retreatment of the doctrine of the one and the many in a more negative form. It may well be earlier than the Theaetetus in its present form. The stylistic argument shows the Theaetetus relatively early. The maturity of its philosophic outlook tends to give it a place relatively advanced in the Platonic See also:

• CANON

On the stylistic argument as applied to Platonic controversies Janell's Quaestiones Platonicae (1901) is important. On the whole question of genuineness and See also:

• DATES

See also:

• PRINCIPAL

thought to follow. In the course of inquiry into the formal consequences from probable premises, the principle of See also:

• MEDIATION (Lat. medius, middle)

to the relation in which Aristotle supposed it to stand to other disciplines. In his definite classification of the sciences," into First Philosophy, Mathematics and Physics, it has no place. Its axioms, such as the law of contradiction, belong to first philosophy, but the doctrine as a whole falls neither under this See also:

• HEAD (in 0. Eng. heafad; the word is common to Teutonic languages; cf. Dutch hoofd, Ger. Haupt, generally taken to be in origin connected with Lat. caput, Gr. KerbOvi7)
• HEAD, SIR EDMUND WALKER, BART
• HEAD, SIR FRANCIS BOND, BART

It is a world of communication of thought, where persons as thinkers need to utter in language truths objectively valid for the mundus communis. In these truths predicates are accepted or rejected by subjects, and therefore depend on the reflection of fact in Xbyol (propositions). These are combinatory of parts, attaching or detaching predicates, and so involving References such as t8b 12 are the result of subsequent editing and prove nothing. See, however, ARISTOTLE. Adrastus is said to have called them lrpd rwv ro ris&iv. 11 Metaphys. E. I. ' De Part. Animal. A. 1, 639a 1 sqq.; cf.

Metaphys. ioo5b 2 sqq. 13 De Interpretatione 16a sqq. subject, predicate and copula' At this stage we are as much concerned with speech-forms as the thought-forms of which they are conventional symbols, with Plato's analysis, for instance, into a noun and a verb, whose See also:

• CONNOTATION

But we are still on the ground of common opinion, and these doctrines are not yet laid down as fundamental to the development. Dialectic then, though it may prove to be the ultimate method of establishing principles in philosophy,5 starts from probable The and conceded premises,6 and deals with them only in Topics. the light of common principles such as may be reason- ably appealed to or easily established against See also:

• CHALLENGE (O. Fr. chalonge, calenge, &c., from Lat. calumnia, originally meaning trickery, from calvi, to deceive, hence a false accusation, a " calumny ")

19a 28-29. As shown e.g. by the way in which the relativity of sense and the object of sense is conceived, 7b 35-37. 5 Topics Iota 27 and 36-b 4. ° Topics too. Politics 1282a I sqq. I03b 21.judgment, though still viewed as combinatory, has the types which belong to coherent systems of implication discriminated from those that predicate coincidence or accident, i.e. any happening not even derivatively essential from the point of view of the grouping in which the subject has found a place. In the theory of dialectic any predicate may be: uggested for a subject, and if not affirmed of it, must be denie'.of it, if not denied must be affirmed. The development of aU1 eory of the ground on which subjects claim their predicates and disown See also:

• ALIEN (Lat. alienus)

Obviously tentative, and with limits and ultimate interpretation to be determined elsewhere, it failed to See also:

• BEAR
• BEAR, BLACK
• BEAR, BROWN
• BEAR, GRIZZLY
• BEAR, ISABELLINE
• BEAR, WHITE

In analytic we work with an ethos different from that of dialectic. We presume truth and not probability or con-cession, but a true conclusion can follow from false premises, and it is only in the attempt to derive the premises in turn from their grounds that we unmask the deception. The passage to the conception of system is still required. The See also:

• PRIOR (from Lat. prior—former, and hence superior, through O. Fr. priour)
• PRIOR, MATTHEW (1664-1721)

" Of necessity." If what are to be conjoined are severally in relation to a common third it does perforce relate or conjoin them. "Something other." The conjunction was by hypothesis not given, and is a new result by no means to be reached, apart from direct perception save by use of at least two given conjunctions. " Because of them," therefore. Yet so long as the class-view is prominent, there is a suggestion of a begging of the question. The class is either constituted by enumeration of its members, and, passing by the difficulty involved in the thought of " its " members, is an empirical universal of fact merely, or it is grounded in the class-concept. In the first case it is a formal scheme which See also:

• HELPS, SIR ARTHUR (1813-1875)

A man may know that mules are sterile and that the beast before him is a See also:

• MULE (Lat. mulus)

' 67a 33-37, M') auveewpior rb Kae' &KarEpov. 4 67a 39-b 3. s 79a 4-5.Whether this is explanation or description, a problem or its solution, is of course another matter. In the Posterior Analytics the syllogism is brought into decisive connexion with the real by being set within a system in which its See also:

• FUNCTION

A formula such as the equality of the interior angles of a triangle to two right angles is only scientifically known when it is not of isosceles or scalene triangle that it is known, nor even of all the several types of triangle collectively, but as a predicate of triangle recognized as the widest class-concept of which it is true, the first stage in the progressive differentiation of figure at which it can be asserted.8 Three points obviously need development, the nature of definition, its connexion with the syllogism in which the middle term is cause or ground, and the way in which we have assurance of our principles. Definition is either of the subject-kind or of the See also:

• PROPERTY

In the scientific syllogism the interposition of the earth is the middle term, the cause or "because" (&b n), the See also:

• RESIDUE (through the French, from the Lat. residuum, a remainder, from residere, to remain)

the fruit of the conclusion, severing its nexus with the stock is See also:

• AUXILIARY (from Lat. auxilium, help)

Axioms, on the other hand, in which the sciences inter-connect" through the employment of them in a parity of relation, seem to be implicit indeed in the psychological mechanism, but to come to a kind of explicitness in the first reflective reaction upon it, and without reference to any particular content of it. They are not to be used as premises but as immanent laws of thought, save only when an inference from true or admitted premises and correct in form is challenged. The challenge must be countered in a reduclio ad impossibile in. which the dilemma is put. Either this conclusion or the denial of rationality. Even these principles, however, may get a greater explicitness by dialectical treatment." The relation, then, of the two orders of principle to the psychological mechanism is different. The kind of See also:

• WARRANT (Med. Lat. warantum; O. Fr. garant, warant, derived from O.H.G. root represented in modern German bygewdhren)

The same break is to be found in the conception of the relation of receptive to active mind in the treatise Of the Soul.19 The one is impressed by things and receives their form without their matter. The other is free from impression. It thinks its system of concepts freely on the occasion of the affections of the receptivity. Aristotle is fond of declaring that knowledge is of the universal, while existence or reality is individual. It seems to follow that the cleavage between knowledge and reality 12 Topics, lola 25, 36-37, b1-4, &c. 1a Zeller (loc. cit. p. 194), who puts this formula in order to reject it. 1a Metaphys. Ls 1, 1o13a 14. 15 Posterior Analytics, 72¢ 16 seq. 15 Posterior Analytics, 77a 26, 76a 37 sqq. " Metaphys. r.

18 Posterior Analytics, ii. 19. '' de Anima, iii. 4-6. from which it springs, we have an imperfect form of definition, while, if further we abandon all idea of making it adequate by exhibition of its ground, we have, with still the same form of words, a definition merely nominal or lexicographical. In the aporematic treatment of the relation of definition and syllogism identical as to one form and in one view, distinct as to another form and in another view, much of Aristotle's discussion consists. The rest is a consideration of scientific inquiry as The middle converging in taou i'11r70-cs the investigation of term. the See also:

• LINK

The planets are near, and we know it by their not twinkling,2 but science must conceive their nearness as the cause of their not twinkling and make the prius in the real order the middle term of its syllogism. In this irreversible catena proceeding from ground to consequent, we have left far behind such things as the formal parity of genus and differentia considered as falling under the same predicable,3 and hence justified in part See also:

• PORPHYRY (IlopcPisptos) (A.D. 233-c. 304)

Yet they must have some-thing to develop from, and thereupon Aristotle gives an account of a process in the psychological mechanism which he illustrates by See also:

• COMPARATIVE

16. 6 Posterior Analytics, i. 13 ad. fin., and i. 27. The form which a mathematical science treats as relatively self-subsistent is certainly not the constitutive idea. ' Posterior Analytics, i. 3. ' Posterior Analytics, ii. 19. ' De Anima, 428b 18, 19. 10 Prior Analytics, i. 30, 46a 18.

11 Topics, coob 2o, 21. is not bridged by the function of vows in relation to " induction." What is known is not real, and what is real is not known. The nodes' has its cause in the double sense of the word Knowledge " universal " and a possible solution in the doctrine and reality. of eiSos. The " form " of a thing constitutes it what it is, and at the same time, therefore, is constitutive of the group to which it belongs. It has both individual and universal reference. The individual is known in the eiSos, which is also the first universal in which by analysis higher universals are discoverable. These are predicates of the object known, ways of knowing it, rather than the object itself. The suggested solution removes certain difficulties, but scarcely all. On seeing See also:

• CALLIAS

He had abandoned for the most part con- the Platonic sense of the corresponding verb, viz. to cluslons lead forward to the as yet unknown, and his substitute as to in- is not quite clear. It is scarcely the military metaphor. duction. The adducing of a See also:

• WITNESS
• WITNESS (from O. Eng. witan, to know)

It appears safer, notwithstanding, to take the less subtle interpretation 11 that dialectical induction struggling with instances is formally justified only at the limit, and that this, where we have exhausted and know that we have exhausted the cases, is in regard to individual subjects rarely and accident-ally reached, so that we perforce illustrate rather from the definite class-concepts falling under a higher notion. After Metaphys. M. 10870 10-12; Zeller loc. cit. 304 sqq. ; McLeod Innes, The Universal and Particular in Aristotle's Theory of Know-ledge (1886). Topics, 1o5a 13. 3 Metaphys. 995a 8. ' E.g., Topics, to8b 10, " to induce " the universal. ' Posterior Analytics, ii. 19, ioob 3, 4.

6 Topics, i. 18, 1o8b 10. 7 Prior Analytics, ii. 23. 8 IIape.becyµa, Prior Analytics, ii. 24. ' Sigwart, Logik, Eng. trans. vol. i1. p. 292 and elsewhere. 10 t'eberweg, System, § 127, with a ref. to de Partibus Animalium, 667a. " See 67a 17 iE araVrwv T 3V aroµ~v.all, Aristotle must have had means by which he reached the conclusions that horses are long-lived and lack See also:

• GALL (a word common to many Teutonic languages, cf. Dutch gal, and Ger. Galle; the Indo-European root appears in Gr. xoXi,, and Lat. fel; possibly connected with " yellow," with reference to the colour of bile)
• GALL, FRANZ JOSEPH (1758-1828)

Without pressing metaphysical formulae in logic proper, he analysed formal implica- See also:

• SUMMARY

The example of Aristotle's view of celestial physics as a science of pure forms exhibits both points. On the Copernican change the heavenly bodies were recognized as concrete and yet subject to calculable law. Intelligence had warranted false principles. The moral is that of the See also:

• STORY, JOHN (c. 1510-1571)
• STORY, JOSEPH (1779-1845)
• STORY, ROBERT HERBERT (1835-1907)
• STORY, WILLIAM WETMORE (1819—1895)

If there is conscious and purposed divergence from Aristotle, inquiry moves, on the whole, within the circle of ideas where Aristotelianism had fought its fight and won its victory. Where new conceptions emerge, the imperfection of the instruments, mechanical and methodological, of the sciences renders them unfruitful, until their rediscovery in a later age. We have activity without advance, diversity without development. Attempts at comprehensiveness end in the compromises of eclecticism. Illustrations are not far to seek. See also:

• THEOPHRASTUS

Even inference, though apparently not a classical word, throws back to the Stoic name for a conclusion.' In the second place, it is in the form in which it was raised in connexion with the individualistic theory of perception with which the Stoics started, that one question of fundamental importance, viz. that of the criterion of truth, exercised its influence on the individualists of the Renaissance. Perception, in the view of the Stoics, at its highest both revealed and guaranteed the being of its object. Its hold upon the object involved the discernment that it could but be that which it purported to be. Such " psychological certainty " was denied by their agnostic opponents, and in the history of Stoicism we have apparently a modification of the doctrine of 4avraria KaraX,prruc,i with a view to meet the critics, an approximation to a recognition that the primary conviction might meet with a counter-conviction, and must then persist undissipated in face of the challenge and in the last resort find verification in the haphazard instance, under varying conditions, in actual working. The controversy as to the self-evidence of perception in which the New Academy effected some sort of conversion of the younger Stoics, and in which the Sceptics opposed both, is one of the really vital issues of the decadence. Another doctrine of the Stoics which has interest in the light of certain modern developments is their insistence on the place of the XEKThY in knowledge. Distinct alike from thing and mental happening, it seems to correspond to " meaning " as it is used as a technical phrase now-a-days. This anticipation was apparently sterile. Along the same lines is their use of the hypothetical form for the universal judgment, and their treatment of the hypothetical form as the typical form of inference. The Stoical categories, too, have an See also:

• HISTORICAL

They offer pure categories arising in series, each successive one presupposing those that have gone before. Yet the substance, quality, condition absolute (,rws ZXov) and condition relative of Stoicism have no enduring influence out-side the school, though they recur with eclectics like See also:

• GALEN (or GALENUS), CLAUDIUS
• GALEN, CHRISTOPH BERNHARD, FREIHERR VON (16o6-1678)

More probably it reflects the fact that Epicurus was, according to tradition through Nausiphanes, on the whole dominated by the influences that produced Pyrrhonism. Democritean physics without a calculus had necessarily proved sterile of determinate concrete results, and this was more than enough to ripen the natural-ism of the utilitarian school into See also:

• SCEPTICISM (o-Kesrroµai, I consider, reflect, hesitate, doubt)

Adv. Math. vii. 211. Diog. Laert. x. 87; cf. Lucretius, vi. 703 sq., v. 526 sqq. (ed. See also:

• MUNRO, HUGH ANDREW JOHNSTONE (1819-1885)
• MUNRO, MUNRO
• MUNRO, SIR HECTOR (1726-1805)
• MUNRO, SIR THOMAS (1761-1827)

If there be but one of these uncovered by the generalization, this cannot be sound. If the See also:

• CROCODILE

See also:

• NAY, or NEY

But the rule apparently obtains throughout that stereotype and compromise offer themselves as the exhaustive alternative. This is perhaps fortunate for the history of doctrine, for it produces the commentator, your See also:

• ASPASIUS

Hypotyp. ii. i95, 196. ' Sextus, op. cit. ii. 204. s Op. cit. iii. 17 sqq., and especially 28. 7 The point is raised by Aristotle, 95A. based on compromise. A See also:

• BASTARD (O. Fr. bastard, mod. bdtard = fits de bast, "pack-saddle child," from bast, saddle)

Neoplatonism is philosophy become See also:

• THEOSOPHY (from Gr. Oe6s, god, and vogbta, wisdom)

The logic of the Stoics had been discredited by the sceptical onset, but in any case there was no organon of a fitness even comparable to Aristotle's for the task of See also:

• DRAWING

Yet with all its effective manipulation of the formal technique of its translated and mutilated Aristotle, Scholasticism would have gone under long before it did through the weakness intrinsic to its divorce of the form and the matter of knowledge, but for two reasons. The first is the filtering through of some science and some new Aristotelian learning from the See also:

• ARABS

The See also:

• FLIGHT

The transformation of logic lay with the man of science, hindered though he might be by the See also:

• ENTHUSIASM

The reformed Aristotelian logic of the first-named with its inductio demonstrativa, the mathematicophysical analysis followed by synthesis of the second, the exclusiva, or method of exclusions of the last, agree at least in this, that the method of science is one and indivisible, while containing both an inductive and a deductive moment. That what, e.g., Bacon says of his method may run counter to this is an accident of the tradition of the See also:

• QUARREL

It was in reaction against a dialectic and not immediately to he again entrapped. In scientific method, then, it could but advance, provided physics and mathematics did not again fail of See also:

• ACCORD (from Fr. accorder, to agree)

The scientific movement had happily been content for the time with a half which, then and there at least, was more than the whole. Bacon was no mathematician, and so was out of touch with the main See also:

• ARMY
• ARMY (from Fr. armee, Lat. armata)

' See E. Cassirer, Das Erkenntnisproblem, i. 134 seq., and the justificatory excerpts, pp. 539 sqq. ' See Riehl in Vierteljahrschr. f. wins. Philos. (1893).[THE RENAISSANCE In all this there is but little promise for a new organon. It is neither novel nor instrumental. On a sudden Bacon's conception of a new method begins to unfold itself. It is inductive only in the sense that it is identical in purpose with the ascent from particulars. It were better called exclusiva or elimination of the alternative, which Bacon proposes to achieve, and thereby guarantee his conclusion against the possibility of instance to the contrary. Bacon's method begins with a See also:

• DIGEST

The first contains cases of the occurrence of the quality under investigation, colour, e.g., or heat, in ms three varying combinations. The second notes its absence in methods. combinations so allied to certain of these that its presence might fairly have been looked for. The third registers its quantitative variation according to quantitative changes in its concomitants. The method now proceeds on the basis of the first table to set forth the possible suggestions as to a general explanatory formula for the quality in question. In virtue of the remaining tables it rejects any suggestion qualitatively or quantitatively inadequate. If one suggestion, and one alone, survives the process of attempted rejection it is the explanatory formula required. If none, we must begin afresh. If more than one, recourse is to be had to certain devices of method, in the enumeration of which the methods of agreement, difference and concomitant variations' find a place, beside the crucial experiment, the glaring instance and the like. An appeal, however, to such devices, though a permissible " first vintage " is relatively an imperfection of method, and a proof that the tables need revision. The positive procedure by hypothesis and verification is rejected by Bacon, who thinks of hypothesis as the will o' the wisp of science, and prefers the cumbrous machinery of negative reasoning. Historically he appears to have been under the dominance of the Platonic metaphor of an alphabet of nature, with a consequent belief in the relatively small number of ultimate principles to be determined, and of Plato's conception of Division, cleared of its dialectical associations and used experientially in application to his own 'molecular physics. True it is that the rejection of all the co-species is a long process, but what if therein their simultaneous or subsequent determination is helped forward ?

They, too, must fall to ba determined sometime, and the ideal of science is fully to determine all the species of the genus. This will need co-operative effort as described in the account of See also:

• SOLOMON, ODES OF
• SOLOMON, PSALMS OF

A mode of motion, for instance, of a certain definite kind, is the form of heat. It is the See also:

• RECIPE

1139b 27) and Sextus Empiricus, Pyrr. Hypot. iii. 15. ' Bacon's Works, ed. See also:

• ELLIS (originally SHARPE), ALEXANDER JOHN (1814-189o)
• ELLIS, GEORGE (1753-1815)
• ELLIS, ROBINSON (1834- )
• ELLIS, SIR HENRY (1777-1869)
• ELLIS, WILLIAM (1794 – 1872)

In the mathematics we determine complex problems by a construction link by link from axioms and simple data clearly and distinctly conceived. Three moments are involved. The first is an induction, i.e. an exhaustive enumeration of the simple elements in the complex phenomenon under investigation. This resolution or analysis into simple, because clear and distinct, elements may be brought to a standstill again and again by obscurity and indistinctness, but patient and repeated revision of all that is included in the problem should bring the analytic process to fruition. It is impatience, a perversity of will, that is the cause of error. Upon the analysis there results intuition of the simple data. With Descartes intuition does not connote givenness, but its objects are evident at a glance when induction has brought them to light. Lastly we have deduction the determination of the most complex phenomena by a continuous synthesis or combination of the simple elements. Synthesis is demonstrative and complete. It is in virtue of this view of derived or mediate knowledge that Descartes speaks of the (subsumptive) syllogism as " of avail rather in the communication of what we already know." Syllogism is not the synthesis which together with analysis goes to constitute the new instrument of science. The celebrated Regulae of Descartes are precepts directed to the achievement of the new methodological ideal in any and every subject matter, however reluctant. It is the paradox involved in the function of intuition, the acceptance of the psychological characters of clearness and distinctness as See also:

• WARRANTY

In order to lay bare the ground of certainty he raises the universal doubt, and, although, following See also:

• AUGUSTINE, SAINT (354-430)
• AUGUSTINE, SAINT (d. c.613)

See also:

• HOBBES, THOMAS (1588–1679)

Though he makes his See also:

• BOW (pronounced " bo ")

Simple ideas of sensation are the only points of contact we have with things. They are the atomic elements which " the workmanship of the understanding " can thereafter do no more than systematically compound and the like. It is Locke's initial attribution of the primary role in mental process to the simple ideas of sensation that precludes him from the development of the conception of another sort of ideas, or mental contents that he notes, which are produced by reflection on " the operations of our own mind within us." It is in the latter group that we have the explanation of all that marks Locke as a forerunner of the critical philosophy. It contains in germ a doctrine of categories discovered but not generated in the psychological processes of the individual. Locke, however, fails to " deduce " his categories. He has read Plato's Theaetetus in the light of Baconian and individualist preconceptions. Reflection remains a sort of " See also:

• INTERNAL

Elementa Philosophise, i. 3. 20, i. 6. 17 seq. Hobbes, Elementa Philosophise, i. I. 5. c Id. ib. i. 6. 16. Id. ib. i.

4. 8; cf. Locke's Essay of Human Understanding, iv. 17. 9 Id. See also:

• LEVIATHAN

By this way of abstraction they are made capable of representing more individuals than one." This doctrine has found no acceptance. Not from the point of view for which idea means image. Berkeley, though at length the notions of See also:

• SPIRITS

Reasoning from particular to particular, i.e. without the necessity of a general premise, must be possible, and the possibility finds warranty in a consideration of the psycho-logical order of the terms in syllogism. As to syllogism specific-ally, Locke in a passage,6 which has an obviously Cartesian ring, See also:

• LAYS

§ 8. 6 Id. ib. iv. 4, §§ 6 sqq. 6 Berkeley, Of the Principles of Human Knowledge, § 142. 7 Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, i. 1. 7 (from Berkeley, op. cit., introd., §§ 15-16). 9 Essay, iv. 17, § 3.[EMPIRICISM ideas and Hume's change of front as to mathematical certainty. What, however, Hume describes as " all the logic I think proper to employ in my reasoning," viz. his " rules by which to judge cause and effects," 9 had, perhaps, farther-reaching historical effects than either. In these the single method of Bacon is already split up into separate modes. We have Mill's inductive methods in the germ, though with an emphasis quite older than Mill's.

Bacon's form has already in transmission through Hobbes been transmuted into cause as antecedent in the time series. It may, perhaps, be accounted to Hume for righteousness that he declares—whether consistently or not is another matter—that " the same effect never arises but from the same cause," and that he still follows Bacon in the conception of absentia in proximo. It is " when in any instance we find our expectation disappointed "that the effect of one of " two resembling objects " will be like that of the other that Hume proposes to apply his method of difference. No scientific discipline, however, with the doubtful exception of descriptive psychology, stands to gain anything from a See also:

• TEMPER (from Lat. temperare, to mingle or compound in due proportion, to qualify, rule, regulate, to be moderate, formed from tempos, time, fit or due season)

The exponents of psychological atomism, on the other hand, with the association of ideas for their one principle of See also:

• AGGLUTINATION (Lat. ad, and gluten, glutinare, literally to fasten together with glue)

finds given, without reference to insensible implications of doubtful validity and value. The upshot is a psychological account of what from one aspect is evidence, from the other, belief. So he explains " concepts or general notions"1 by an abstraction which he represents as a sort of alt-See also:

• RELIEF

Mill's view of ratiocinative process clearly stands and falls with the presumed impossibility of establishing the necessity for universals of another type than his, for what may be called principles of construction. His critics incline to press the point that association itself is only intelligible so far as it is seen to depend on universals of the kind that he denies. In Mill's inductive logic, the nominalistic See also:

• CONVENTION (Lat. conventio, an assembly or agreement, from convenire, to come together)
• CONVENTION, THE NATIONAL

17. 2 Cf. Mill, Autobiography, p. 259. " I grappled at once with the problem of Induction, postponing that of Reasoning." lb. p. 182 (when he is preoccupied with syllogism), " I could make nothing satisfactory of Induction at this time." 2 Autobiography, p. 181.was easy. Mill's device rested special inductions of causation upon the laws that every event has a cause, and every cause has always the same effect. It rested these in turn upon a general induction enumerative in character of enormous and practically infinite range and always uncontradicted. Though obviously not exhaustive, the unique extent of this induction was held to render it competent to give practical certainty or psychological necessity. A vicious circle is obviously involved. It is true, of course, that ultimate laws need discovery, that they are discovered in some .sense in the medium of the psychological mechanism, and that they are nevertheless the grounds of all specific inferences.

But that truth is not what Mill expounds, nor is it capable of development within the limits imposedby the associationist formula. It is deservedly, nevertheless, that Mill's applied logic has retained its See also:

• PRIDE, THOMAS (d. 1658)

Or, on rather a different line of criticism, the use of corresponding letters in the two series of antecedents and consequents raises, it is said, a false presumption of correlation. Nay, even the use of letters at all suggests that the sort of analysis that actually breaks up its subject-matter is universally or all but universally applicable in nature, and this is not the case. Finally, the conditions of the methods are either realized or not. If they are realized, the work of the scientist falls entirely within the field of the processes preliminary to the satisfaction of the canon. The latter becomes a mere memorandum or formula of registration. So is it possible " to have the enginer hoist with his own petar." But the conditions are not realized, and in an experiential subject-matter are not realizable. Not one circumstance only in common but " apparently one relevant circumstance only in common " is what we are able to assert. If we add the qualification of relevance we destroy the cogency of the method. If we fail to add it, we destroy the applicability. The objections turn on two main issues. One is the exaggeration of the possibilities of resolution into separate elements that is due to the acceptance of the postulate of an alphabet of nature. This so soon as noted can be allowed for.

It is to the ° The insight, for instance, of F. H. Bradley's criticism, Principles of Logic, II. ii. 3, is somewhat dimmed by a lack of sympathy due to extreme difference in the point of view adopted. combination of this doctrine with a tendency to think chiefly of experiment, of the controlled addition or subtraction of these elements one at a time, that we owe the theoretically premature linking of a as effect to A as cause. This too can be met by a modification of form. The other issue is perhaps of more significance. It is the oscillation which Mill manifests between the conception of his formula as it is actually applicable to concrete problems in practice, and the conception of it as an expression of a theoretical limit to practical procedure. Mill seems most often to think of the former, while tending to formulate in terms of the latter. At any rate, if relevance in proximo is interpolated in the peccant clause of the canon of the Joint-Method, the practical utility of the method is rehabilitated. So too, if the canon of the Method of Agreement is never more than approximately satisfied, intermixture of effects will in practice mean that we at least often do not know the cause or antecedent equivalent of a given effect, without the possibility of an alternative. Finally, it is on the whole in keeping with Mill's presuppositions to admit even in the case of the method of difference that in practice it is approximative and instructive, while the theoretical formula, to which it aims at approaching asymptotically as limit, if exact, is in some sense sterile.

Mill may well have himself conceived his methods as practically fruitful and normally convincing with the limiting formula in each case more cogent in form but therewith merely the See also:

• SKELETON

But how we reach our assurance of the necessity of these principles is not made specifically clear. The invaluable tractate De Intellectus emendatione, in which the agreement with and divergence from Descartes on the question of method could have been fully elucidated, is unhappily not finished. We know that we need to pass from what Spinoza terms experientia vaga,' where imagination with its fragmentary apprehension is liable to error and neither necessity nor impossibility can be predicated, right up to that which ficlionem terminal—namely, in!ellectio. And what Spinoza has to say of the requisites of definition and the marks of intellection makes it clear that insight comes with coherence, and that the work of method on the " inductive " side is by means of the unravelling of all that makes for artificial See also:

• LIMITATION, STATUTES OF

There is a subject then, or there are subjects which must be recognized as not possible to be predicated, but as absolute. For reasons not purely logical Leibnitz declares for the plurality of such subjects. Each contains all its predicates: and this is true not only in the case of truths of reason, which are necessary, and ultimately to be exhibited as coming under the law of contra-diction, " or, what comes to the same thing, that of identity," but also in the case of truths of fact which are contingent, though a sufficient reason can be given for them which " inclines " without importing necessity. The extreme case of course is the human subject. " The individual notion of each See also:

• PERSON, OFFENCES AGAINST THE

In recognizing, further, that the relation of an actual individual fact to its sufficient ground was not reducible to identity, he set a problem diversely treated by Kant and Herbart. He brought existential propositions, indeed, within a rational system through the principle that it must be feasible to assign a sufficient reason for them, but he refused to bring them under the conception of identity or necessity, i.e. to treat their opposites as formally self-contradictory. This bore interest in the Kantian age in the treatment alike of cause and effect, and of the onto-logical proof of existence from essence. Not that the Law of Sufficient Reason is quite free from equivoque. Propositions concerning the possible existence of individuals put Leibnitz to some shifts, and the difficulty accounts for the close connexion established in regard to our actual world between the law of sufficient reason and the doctrine of the final cause. This connexion is something of an afterthought to distinguish from the potential contingency of the objectively possible the real contingency of the actual, for which the " cause or reason " of Spinoza 6 could not account. The law, however, is not invalidated by these considerations, and with the degree of emphasis and the special setting that Leibnitz gives the law, it is definitely his own. If we may pass by the doctrine of the Identity of Indiscernibles, which played a part of some importance in subsequent philosophy, and the Law of Continuity, which as Leibnitz represents it is, if not sheer See also:

• DOGMA (Gr. Sbypa, from b6aeiv, to seem; literally " that which seems, sc. good or true or useful " to any one)

6 Spinoza, ed. See also:

• VAN

He also, by a transparent petitio principii, brought the law of the sufficient reason under that of non-contradiction. Wolff and his numerous followers account for the See also:

• CHARGE
• CHARGE (through the Fr. from the Late Lat. carricare, to load in a carrus or wagon; cf. " cargo ")

Or again, within the latter in his admission of a duality of thought and " the given " in knowledge, which within knowledge was apparently irreducible, concurrently with hints as to the possibility, upon a wider view, of the sublation of their disparateness at least hypothetically and speculatively. The sense in which there must be a ground of the unity of the supersensible2 while yet the transcendent use of Reason—i.e. its use beyond the limits of experience was denied theoretical validity—was not unnaturally regarded as obscure. Kant's treatment of technical logic was wholly traditional, and in itself is almost negligible. It is comprised3 in an early essay on the mistaken subtlety of the syllogistic figures, and a late compilation by a pupil from the See also:

• INTRODUCTORY

T. K. See also:

• ABBOTT
• ABBOTT, EMMA (1849-1891)
• ABBOTT, JACOB (1803-1879)
• ABBOTT, JOHN STEVENS CABOT (1805-1877)
• ABBOTT, LYMAN (1835- )

The technical logic of Kant, then, justifies literally a movement among his successors in favour of a formal conception of logic with the law of contradiction and the doctrine of formal implication for its equipment. Unless the doctrine of Kant's " transcendental logic " must be held to supply a point of view from which a logical development of quite another kind is inevitable, Kant's See also:

• MANTLE

Formal Logic. 912 was thought to lie open to an interpretation in conformity with ! the spirit of his logic, in the sense that the form and the content in knowledge are not merely distinguishable func- Form of tions within an organic whole, but either separable, or Thought. Thought. at least indifferent one to the other in such a way as to ~' be clearly independent. Thought as form would thus be a See also:

• FACTOR (from Lat. facere, to make or do)

They passed easily from the acceptance of a priori forms of thinking to that of forms of a priori thinking, and could plead the example of Kant's logic. Kant's theory of knowledge, then, needed to be pressed to other consequences for logic which were more consonant with the spirit of the Critique. The forms of thought and what gives thought its particular content in concrete acts of thinking could not be regarded as subsisting in a purely external and indifferent relation one to the other. " Laws according to which the subject thinks " and " laws according to which the object is known " cannot be the concern of separate departments of inquiry. As soon divorce the investigation of the shape and material of a mirror from the laws of the incidence of the rays that form images in it, and call it a science of reflection! An important group of writers developed the conception of an See also:

• ADAPTATION (from Lat. adaptare. to fit to)

Historically the question of the extent to which writers adopted the dualistic interpretation or one that had the like consequences is of greater importance. It may be said summarily that Kant holds the antithesis between thought and " the given " to be unresolved and within the limits of theory of knowledge irreducible. The See also:

• DOVE
• DOVE (Dutch duyve, Dan. due, Ice. dufa, Ger. Taube)

There must also be development of the correlated terms from a single principle. Form and content must not only correspond one to the other. They must be exhibited as distinguish-able moments within a unity which can at one and the same time be seen to be the ground from which the distinction springs and the ground in virtue of which it is over-ruled. Along this line of speculation we have a logic which claims that whatsoever is in one plane or at one stage in the development of thought a residuum that apparently defies analysis must at another stage and on a higher plane be shown so to be absorbed as to fall altogether within thought. This is the view of Hegel upon which logic comes to coincide with the progressive self-unfolding of thought in that type of metaphysic which is known as absolute, i.e. all-inclusive idealism. The exponent of logic as metaphysic, for whom the rational is the real is necessarily in revolt against all that is characteristically Kantian in the theory of knowledge, against the transcendental method itself and against the doctrine of limits which constitutes the nerve of " criticism." Stress was to be laid upon the constructive character of the act of thought which Kant had recognized, and without Kant's qualifications of it. In all else the claim is made to have left the Kantian teaching behind as a cancelled level of speculation. Transcendental method is indeed not invulnerable. A principle is transcendentally " deduced " when it and only it can explain the validity of some phase of experience, some order Limitation of truths. The order of truths, the phase of experience of Trans. and its certainty had to be taken for granted. The endentai sense, for example, in which the irreversibility of meth" sequence which is the more known in ordine ad hominem in the case of the causal principle differs from merely psychological conviction is no made fully clear. Even so the inference to the a priori ground of its necessity is, it has been often pointed out, subject to the limitation inherent in any process of reduction, in any regress, that is, from conditionate to condition, viz. that in theory an alternative is still possible.

The inferred principle may hold ,he field as explanation without obvious competitor potential or actual. Nevertheless its claim to be the sole possible explanation can in nowise be validated. It has been established after all by dialectic in the Aristotelian sense of the word. But if transcendental method has no special pride of place, Kant's conclusion as to the limits of the competence of intellectual faculty falls with it. Cognition manifestly needs the help of Reason even in its theoretical use. Its speculation can no longer' be stigmatized as vaticination in vacuo, nor its results as illusory. Finally, to logic as metaphysic the polar antithesis is psychology as logic. The turn of this also was to come again. If logic were treated as merely formal, the stress of the problem of knowledge See also:

• FELL
• FELL, JOHN (1625-1686)

" Yet what as thing-in-itself lies hack of the phenomenon may perhaps not be so wholly disparate after all " (ib. p. 278, 11. 26 sqq.). to the development of the post-Kantian psychological logic. Another movement helped also; the exponents of naturalistic evolution were prepared with See also:

• SPENCER
• SPENCER, HERBERT (1820-1903)
• SPENCER, JOHN CHARLES SPENCER, 3RD EARL (1782-1845)
• SPENCER, JOHNPOYNTZ SPENCER
• SPENCER, WILLIAM ROBERT (1769-1834)

The first way is that of the purely formal logicians, of whom Twesten2 and in England H. L. Mansel may be regarded as typical. They take thought and " the given " as The Formal Logicians. self-contained units which, if not in fact separable, are at any rate susceptible of an abstraction the one from the other so decisive as to constitute an ideal separation. The laws of the pure activity of thought must be independently determined, and since the contribution of thought to knowledge is form they must be formal only. They cannot go beyond the limits of formal consistency or analytic correctness. They are confined to the determination of what the truth of any matter of thought, taken for granted upon grounds psychological or other, which are extraneous to logic, includes or excludes. The unit for logic is the concept taken for granted. The function of logic is to exhibit its formal implications and repulsions. It is questionable whether even this modest task could be really achieved without other reference to the content abstracted from than Mansel, for example, allows. The analogy of the resolution of a chemical compound with its elements which is often on the lips of those who would justify the See also:

• INDEPENDENCE
• INDEPENDENCE, DECLARATION OF
• INDEPENDENCE, WAR OF

Or, if applicable, it is double-edged. Suppose Critique of Judgment, Introd. § 2 (Werke, v., 276 11. 9 sqq.) ; cf. See also:

• BERNARD, CHARLES DE
• BERNARD, CLAUDE (1813-1878)
• BERNARD, JACQUES (1658--1718)
• BERNARD, MOUNTAGUE (1S2o—1882)
• BERNARD, SAINT
• BERNARD, SAINT (Iogo-1153)
• BERNARD, SIMON (1779—1839)
• BERNARD, SIR THOMAS, BART

As the living organism includes something of mechanism—the skeleton, for example—so an organic logic doubtless includes determinations of formal consistency. The skeleton is meaningless apart from reference to its function in the life of an organism, yet there are laws ol skeleton structure which can be studied with most advantage if other characters of the organism are relegated to the background. To allow, however, that abstraction admits of degrees, and that it never obliterates all reference to that from which it is abstracted, is to take a step forward in the direction of the correlation of logical forms with the concrete processes of actual thinking. What was true in formal logic tended to be absorbed in the correlationist theories. Those formal logicians of the Kantian school, then, may be summarily dismissed, though their undertaking was a necessary one, who failed to raise the epistemological issue at all, or who, raising it, acquiesced in a naive dualism agnostic of the real world as Kant's essential lesson. They failed to develop any view which could serve either in fact or in theory as a corrective to the effect of their formalism. What they said with justice was said as well or better elsewhere. Among them it is on the whole impossible not to include the names of Hamilton and Mansel. The former, while his erudition in respect to the history of philosophical opinion has rarely been equalled, was not a clear thinker. His general theory of know-ledge deriving from Kant and See also:

• REID, ROBERT (1862– )
• REID, SIR GEORGE (1841- )
• REID, SIR ROBERT GILLESPIE (184o-19o8)
• REID, SIR WILLIAM (1791-1858)
• REID, THOMAS (1710-1796)
• REID, THOMAS MAYNE (1818-1883)
• REID, WHITELAW (1837- )

He accepts an ultimate See also:

• ANTINOMY (Gr. avri, against, v6uos, law)

Hutchison See also:

• STIRLING
• STIRLING, JAMES (1692-1770)
• STIRLING, JAMES HUTCHISON (182o-1909)
• STIRLING, MARY ANNE [FANNY] (1815-1895)
• STIRLING, WILLIAM ALEXANDER, (titular) EARL OF (1726—1783)
• STIRLING, WILLIAM ALEXANDER, EARL OF (c. 1567-1640)

He was, however, the first whose analysis was sufficiently convincing to exorcise the tyranny of grammatical forms. The categorical and disjunctive judgment reduce to the hypothetical. By means of the doctrine of the quantification of the predicate, in which with his Leibnitzian conception of identity he anticipated Beneke and Hamilton alike, universal and particular judgments are made to pull together. Modal, impersonal, existential judgments are all accounted for. Only the distinction of affirmative and negative judgments remains unresolved, and the exception is a natural one from the point of view of a philosophy of pluralism. There was little left to be done here save in the way of an inevitable mutatis mutandis, even by Lotze and F. H. Bradley. From the judgment viewed as hypothetical we pass by See also:

• AFFIRMATION (from Lat. affirmare, to assert)

It stands, however, on a different footing from that of the formal logic hitherto discussed, and is not to be condemned upon quite the same grounds. In the first place, Herbart is quite aware of the nature of abstraction. In the second, there is no claim that thought at one and the same time imposes form on " the given " and is susceptible of treatment in isolation by logic. With Herbart the forms of common experience, and indeed all that we can regard as his categories, are products of the psychological mechanism and destitute of logical import. And lastly, Herbart's logic conforms to the exigencies of his system as a whole and the principle of the bare or absolute self-identity of the ultimate " reals " in particular It is for this reason that it finally lacks real affinity to the " pure logic" of Fries. For at the basis of Herbart's speculation there lies a conception of identity See also:

• FOREIGN

In less direct relation stands Lotze, who, although under other influences he developed a different view even in logic, certainly let no point in the doctrineof his great predecessor at See also:

• GOTTINGEN

They agree, then, in a See also:

• MAINTENANCE (Fr. maintenance, from maintenir, to maintain, support, Lat. manu tenere, to hold in the hand)

Schleiermacher's formula obviously ascribes a function in knowledge to thought as such, and describes in a suggestive manner a duality of the intellectual and organic functions, resting on a parallelism of thought and being whose collapse into identity it is beyond human capacity to grasp. It is rather, Schleiermacher. however, a statement of a way in which the relations of the terms of the problem may be conceived than a system of necessity. It may indeed be permitted to doubt whether its influence upon subsequent theory would have been a great one apart from the spiritual force of Schleiermacher's personality. Some sort of correlationist conception, 'however, was an inevitable development, and the list' of those who accepted it in something of the spirit of Schleiermacher is a long one and contains many distinguished names, notably those of Trendelenburg and Ueberweg. The group is loosely constituted however. There was See also:

• SCOPE (through Ital. scopo, aim, purpose, intent, from Gr. o'KOaos, mark to shoot at, aim, o ic07reiv, to see, whence the termination in telescope, microscope, &c.)

Synthesis as the work of thought always supplies, beside the mere conjunction or disjunction of ideas, a ground of their coherence or non-coherence. It is evident that thought, even as dealt with in pure logic, has an objectifying function. Its universals have objective validity, though this does not involve direct real reference. The formal conception of pure logic, then, is modified by Lotze in such a way as not only to be compatible with a view of the structural and functional adequacy of thought to that which at every point at which we take thinking is still distinguishable from thought, but even inevitably to suggest it. That the unit for logic is the concept and not the judgment has proved a stumbling-block to those of Lotze's critics who are accustomed to think in terms of the act of thought as unit. Lotze's procedure is, indeed, analogous to the way in which, in his philosophy of nature, he starts from a plurality of real beings, but by means of a reductive movement, an application of Kant's transcendental method, arrives at the postulate or fact of a law of their reciprocal action which calls for a monistic and idealist interpretation. He starts, that is in logic, with conceptual units apparently self-contained and admitting of nothing but external relation, but proceeds to justify the intrinsic relation between the matter of his units by an appeal to the fact of the coherence of all contents of thought. Indeed, if thought admits irreducible units, what often perhaps without consciousness of, the way in which can unite? Yet he is left committed to his puzzle as to a historically it had taken shape to meet the problem held to have 1 reduction of judgment to identity, which partially vitiates been left unresolved by Kant. Lotze on the one hand held the Hegelian " deduction " to be untenable, and classed himself with those who in his own phrase i otse. " passed to the order of the day," while on the other hand he definitely raised the question, how an " object " could be brought into forms to which it was not in some sense adapted. Accordingly, though he regards logic as formal, its forms come into relation to objectivity in some sort even within the logical field itself, while when taken in the setting of his system as a whole, its formal character is not of a kind that ultimately excludes psychological and metaphysical reference, at least speculatively.

As a logician Lotze stands among the masters. His flair for the essentials in his problem, his subtlety of analysis, his patient willingness to return upon a difficulty from a fresh and still a fresh point of view, and finally his fineness of judgment, make his logic' so essentially logic of the present, and of its kind not soon to be superseded, that nothing more than an indication of the historical significance of some of its characteristic features need be attempted here. In Lotze's pure logic it is the Herbartian element that tends to be disconcerting. Logic is formal. Its unit, the logical concept, is a manipulated product and the process of manipulation may be called abstraction. Processes of the psychological mechanism lie below it. The paradox of the theory of judgment is due to the ideal of identity, and the way in which this is evaded by supplementation to produce a non-judgmental identity, followed by translation of the introduced accessories with conditions in the hypothetical judgment, is thoroughly in Herbart's manner. The reduction of judgments is on lines already familiar. Syllogism is no instrumental method by which we compose our knowledge, but an ideal to the form of which it should be brought. It. is, as it were, a See also:

• SCHEDULE

There is no discontinuity between the pre-logical or sub-logical tee Ueberweg, .System of Logic and History of Logical Doctrines, § 34. Drei See also:

• BIT (from the verb " to bite," either in the sense of a piece bitten off, or an act of biting, or a thing that bites or is bitten)

With Lotze the ideal that at last the forms of thought shall be realized to be adequate to that which at any stage of actual knowledge always proves relatively intractable is an See also:

• ILLUMINATING

The position of the search for truth, for which knowledge is a growing organism in which thought needs, so to speak, to feed on something other than itself, is conditioned in the post-Kantian period by antagonism to the speculative movement which culminated in the dialectic of Hegel. The radical thought of this movement was voiced in the demand of See also:

• REINHOLD, KARL LEONHARD (1758-1823)

It is logic or a rationale of thought by thought, with a full development among other matters of all that the most separatist of logicians regards as thought forms. It offers a solution of what has throughout appeared as the logical problem. That solution lies doubtless in the evolution of the Idea, i.e. an all-inclusive in which mere or pure thought is cancelled in its separateness by a transfiguration, while logic is nothing but the science of the Idea viewed in the medium of pure thought. But, whatever else it be, this Panlogismus, to use the word of J. E. Erdmann, is at least a logic. Thought in its progressive unfolding, of which the history of philosophy taken in its broad outline offers a See also:

• PAGEANT

Eng. trans., See also:

• WALLACE, ALFRED RUSSEL (1823— )
• WALLACE, LEWIS [LEW] (1827—1905)
• WALLACE, SIR RICHARD
• WALLACE, SIR WILLIAM (c. 1270-1305)
• WALLACE, WILLIAM (1768-1843)
• WALLACE, WILLIAM (1844-1897)
• WALLACE, WILLIAM VINCENT (1814-1865)

And so forth. It is easy to raise difficulties not only in regard to the detail in Hegel's development of his categories, especially the higher ones, but also in regard to the essential rhythm of his method. The consideration that mere double negation leaves us precisely where we were and not upon a higher plane where the dominant concept is richer, is, of course, fatal only to certain verbal expressions of Hegel's intent. There is a differentiation in type between the two negations. But if we See also:

• GRANT (from A.-Fr. graunter, O. Fr. greanter for creanter, popular Lat. creantare, for credentare, to entrust, Lat. credere, to believe, trust)
• GRANT, ANNE (1755-1838)
• GRANT, CHARLES (1746-1823)
• GRANT, GEORGE MONRO (1835–1902)
• GRANT, JAMES (1822–1887)
• GRANT, JAMES AUGUSTUS (1827–1892)
• GRANT, ROBERT (1814-1892)
• GRANT, SIR ALEXANDER
• GRANT, SIR FRANCIS (1803-1878)
• GRANT, SIR JAMES HOPE (1808–1895)
• GRANT, SIR PATRICK (1804-1895)
• GRANT, U
• GRANT, ULYSSES SIMPSON (1822-1885)

It is a " theosophical logic." Consider the ratidhal-real in the unity that must be, and this is the way of it, or an approximation to the way of it! It was inevitable that the epistemologists of the search for truth would have none of it. The ideal in whatsoever sense real still needs to be realized. It is from the human standpoint regulative and only hypothetic-ally or formally constitutive. We must not confuse ouoia with vat, nor eivac with 'yiyvecBat. Yet in a less ambitious form the fundamental contentions of Hegel's method tend to find a qualified acceptance. In any piece of presumed knowledge its partial or abstract character involves the presence of loose edges which force the conviction of in-adequacy and the development of contradictions. Contradictions must be annulled by complementation, with resultant increasing coherence in ascending stages. At each successive stage in our progress fresh contradictions break out, but the ideal of a station at which the thought-process and its other, if not one, are at one, is permissible as a limiting conception. Yet if Hegel meant only this he has indeed succeeded in concealing his meaning. Hegel's treatment of the categories or thought determinations which arise in the development of the immanent dialectic is rich in flashes of insight, but most of them are in the ordinary Logic as Meta-physic. view of logic wholly metaphysical.

In the stage, however, of his process in which he is concerned with the notion are to be found concepts judgment, syllogism. Of the last he declares that it "is the reasonable and everything reasonable" (Encyk. § 181), and has the phantasy to speak of the definition of the Absolute as being " at this stage " simply the syllogism. It is, of course, the rhythm of the syllogism that attracts him. The concept goes out from or utters itself in judgment to return to an enhanced unity in syllogism. Ueberweg (System § See also:

• LOT
• LOT (Lat. Oltis)

Hegel's logic as a whole, however, stands and falls not with his thoughts on syllogism, but with the claim made for the dialectical method that it exhibits logic in its integral unity with metaphysic, the thought-process as the self-See also:

• REVELATION, BOOK OF

v. Logic from 1880-1910 Logic in the present exhibits, though in characteristically modified shapes, all the main types that have been found in its past history. There is an intellectualist logic coalescent with an absolutist metaphysic as aforesaid. There is an epistemological logic with sometimes formalist, sometimes methodological leanings. There is a formal-symbolic logic engaged with the elaboration of a relational calculus. Finally, there is what may be termed psychological-voluntaryist logic. It is in the rapidity of development of logical investigations of the third and fourth types and the growing number of their exponents that the present shows most clearly the history of logic in the making. All thesemovements are logic of the present, and a very brief indication may be added of points of historical significance. Of intellectualist logic See also:

• FRANCIS
• FRANCIS (FRarrcols) OF SALES, ST (1567-1622)
• FRANCIS (Lat. Franciscus, Ital. Francesco, Span. Francisco, Fr. Francois, Ger. Franz)
• FRANCIS, SIR PHILIP (174o-1818)

The thorough recasting that this involves, even of the thought of the masters when it occasionally echoes them, has resulted in a phrasing uncouth to the ear of the plain man with his world of persons and things in which the former simply think about the latter, but it is fundamentally necessary for Bradley's purpose. The negative judgment, for example, cannot be held in one and the same undivided act to presuppose the unity of the real, project an See also:

• ADJECTIVE (from the Lat. adjectives, added)

He treats the book-tradition, however, a debt to which, nowadays inevitable, he is generous in acknowledging,3 with a judicious exercise of freedom in adaptation, i.e. constructively as datum, never eclectically. In his fundamental theory of judgment his See also:

• OBLIGATION

Id. vol. ii. p. 4. be impossible without the knowledge of the necessity of all presence of what is at least an important half-truth, which intellectuallism with its statics of'the rational order viewed as a completely articulate system has tended to ignore. . It throws light on many phases of the search for truth, upon the plain man's claim to start with a subject which he knows whose predicate which he does not know is still to be developed, or again upon his use of the negative form of judgment, when the further determination of his purposive system is served by a positive judgment from without, the positive content of which is yet to be dropped as irrelevant to the matter in hand. The movement has, however, scarcely developed its logic 6 except as polemic. What seems clear is that it cannot be the whole solution. While man must confront nature from the human and largely the practical standpoint, yet his control is achieved only by the increasing recognition of objective controls. He conquers by obedience. So truth works and is economical because it is truth. Working is proportioned to inner coherence. It is well that the view should be developed into all its consequences. The result will be to limit it, though perhaps also to justify it, save in its claim to reign alone.

There is, perhaps, an increasing tendency to recognize that the organism of knowledge is a thing which from any single view= point must be seen in See also:

• PERSPECTIVE (Lat. peespicere, to see through)

18J3)4 is qualified by the warning that the real activity of thought tends to fall outside the calculus of relations and to attach rather to the subsidiary function of denoting. The future of symbolic logic as coherent with the rest of logic, in the sense which the word has See also:

• BORNE, KARL LUDWIG (1786–1837)

It is clear that we are in the Logik (1873, 1889), Eng. trans. ii. 17. t Op. cit. ii. 289. 3 Introd. to Logic., trans. Abbott, p. Io. Ueber Annahmen (1902, &c.). 3 Logik (1880, and in later See also:

• EDITIONS

123-242 historical, pp. 453-518 See also:

• BIBLIOGRAPHICAL

569-644), as does the Denklehre (1822) of van Calker (allied in thought to Fries) pp. 12 sqq.; Eberstein's Geschichte der Logik and Metaphysik bei den Deutschen von Leibniz bis auf gegenwdrtige Zeit (latest edition, 1799) is still of importance in regard to logicians of the school of Wolff and the origines of Kant's logical thought. See also:

• HOFFMANN, AUGUST HEINRICH (1798–1874)
• HOFFMANN, ERNST THEODOR WILHELM (1776-1822)
• HOFFMANN, JOHANN JOSEPH (1805-1878)

B.•) s Yet see Studies in Logic, by See also:

• JOHN
• JOHN (1167–1216)
• JOHN (1290-c. 1320)
• JOHN (1296-1346)
• JOHN (1371–1419)
• JOHN (1468-1532)
• JOHN (1801-1873)
• JOHN (Heb. llni')
• JOHN (ZAPOLYA) (1487-1540)
• JOHN, 4TH MARQUESS OF TWEEDDALE (c. 1695-1762)
• JOHN, DON (1545-1578)
• JOHN, DON (1629–1679)
• JOHN, GOSPEL OF ST
• JOHN, or HAYS (1513–1571)
• JOHN, THE APOSTLE
• JOHN, THE EPISTLES OF